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Fact Sheet

GTRI: Reducing Nuclear Threats
Feb 1, 2011

The National Nuclear Security Administration established the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) in the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation to, as quickly as possible, identify, secure, remove and/or facilitate the disposition of high risk vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials around the world that pose a threat to the United States and the international community.



President Obama pledged to lead an international effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years.  The President’s FY 2012 budget request provides the resources required to implement that agenda.  It requests $2.5 billion in FY 2012 and $14.2 billion over the next five years to reduce the global nuclear threat by detecting, securing, safeguarding, disposing and controlling nuclear and radiological material, as well as promoting the responsible application of nuclear technology and science.

The National Nuclear Security Administration established the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) in the Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation to, as quickly as possible, identify, secure, remove and/or facilitate the disposition of high risk vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials around the world that pose a threat to the United States and the international community. GTRI works to reduce and protect vulnerable nuclear and radiological material located at civilian sites around the world.

GTRI has removed more than 120 nuclear bombs worth of highly enriched uranium and plutonium, secured more than 775 bombs worth of HEU and plutonium associated with the BN-350 reactor in Kazakhstan, and secured more than 960 radiological sites around the world containing over 20 million curies, enough for thousands of dirty bombs.

Since its inception, GTRI has accelerated its nuclear security efforts and made significant progress to reduce the risk posed by vulnerable civilian nuclear and radiological materials, which could be used by terrorists to make an improvised nuclear device or a radiological dispersal device ("dirty bomb").

GTRI's specific accomplishments to reduce the threat from both nuclear and radiological materials since its inception include:

  • Nuclear Material Threat Reduction
    Accelerated conversion of research reactors from the use of highly enriched uranium to low enriched uranium:
    Only two research reactors were converted during the four-year period prior to the creation of GTRI, from 2000 to 2004. 
  • Since May 2004, 22 research reactors have been converted to operate with low enriched uranium (LEU) instead of using highly enriched uranium (HEU), which can be used to make a nuclear weapon. 
  • The 22 research reactors that have been converted to LEU are: 
    • The HIFAR in Australia converted in October 2004; 
    • The VR-1 Sparrow research reactor at the Czech Technical University in Prague. (This conversion in October 2005 was the first time a Russian-supplied research reactor was converted to LEU); 
    • The HFR in Petten, the Netherlands converted in October 2005; 
    • The IRT critical assembly in Libya converted in January 2006; 
    • The 1-megawatt TRIGA reactor at Texas A&M University converted in late September 2006; 
    • The University of Florida Training Reactor converted in late September 2006; 
    • The Russian-supplied IRT-1 research reactor at the Tajoura facility in Libya converted in late October 2006; 
    • The Chinese HFETR research reactor at the Leshan Nuclear Power Institute of China converted in March 2007;  
    • The Chinese HFETR Critical Assembly at the Leshan Nuclear Power Institute converted in April 2007; 
    • The Purdue University 1-kilowatt Reactor (PUR-1) converted in September 2007; 
    • The Dalat research reactor at the Nuclear Research Institute in Vietnam in September 2007; 
    • The 1 Megawatt Portuguese research reactor (RPI) converted in September 2007; 
    • The VVR-SM reactor at the Institute of Nuclear Physics in Uzbekistan was converted in March 2008; 
    • The SAFARI-1 reactor in Pelindaba, South Africa was converted in September 2008; 
    • Argentina's RA-6 reactor in Bariloche was converted in September 2008; 
    • The WWR-M reactor at the Kiev Institute of Nuclear Research in Ukraine was converted in September 2008;
    • Washington State University's research reactor at its Nuclear Radiation Center was converted in September 2008  
    • The research reactor at Oregon State University was converted in September 2008; 
    • The University of Wisconsin research reactor converted in September 2009; 
    • The Budapest research reactor in Hungary converted in September 2009; 
    • The NRAD reactor at Idaho National Laboratory converted in September 2009; and  
    • The Kyoto University research reactor in Japan converted in March 2010.

Twelve additional HEU research reactors were shut down: The ZLFR in Germany was shut down in May 2005 without converting; the FRJ-2 reactor in Germany was shut down in May 2006 without converting; the ULYSSE reactor in France was shut down in February 2007 without converting; the Chinese MNSR-SH at the Shanghai Testing and Research Institute was shut down in March 2007; the ZPPR reactor at Idaho National Laboratories began decommissioning in September 2008; the General Atomics research reactor in San Diego shut down in November 2008; the IRT-2000 research reactor in Bulgaria shut down in April 2009; the PhS-4, PhS-5, and STRELA reactors in Russia were confirmed by Rosatom as shutdown in February 2010; the RECH-2 reactor in Chile was shut down in April 2010; and China confirmed its MNSR-Shandong reactor as shutdown in December 2010.

Accelerated removal of Russian-origin HEU fresh and spent fuel:

  • In the two years prior to the creation of GTRI, only four shipments to remove Russian-origin research reactor fuel had taken place. 
  • Since May 2004, GTRI has significantly increased the number of shipments to return Russian-origin research reactor fuel. Thirty-five shipments have successfully taken place to remove and return to Russia more than 1,490 kilograms of Russian-origin HEU since the creation of GTRI.
  • HEU Fresh Fuel: 16 shipments to remove and return over 450 kilograms of Russian-origin HEU fresh fuel have taken place since May 2004. These shipments include the return of nuclear material to Russia from:
    • The Institute of Nuclear Physics in Uzbekistan in September 2004;  
    • The Nuclear Research Institute Rez in the Czech Republic in December 2004;  
    • The Salaspils facility in Latvia in May 2005; 
    • The Czech Technical University in the Czech Republic in September 2005; 
    • The Tajoura research reactor in Libya in July 2006; 
    • The Maria research reactor in Poland in August 2006; 
    • The Rossendorf facility in former East Germany in December 2006; 
    • The Maria research reactor in Poland in August 2007;  
    • The Dalat research reactor at the Nuclear Research Institute in Vietnam in September 2007; 
    • The SSR Pitesti facility in Romania in June 2009; 
    • The BRR facility in Hungary in July 2009; 
    • The REZ facility in the Czech Republic in June 2010; and 
    • The Kiev Institute for Nuclear Research, the Kharkiv Institute for Physics and Technology, and Sevastopol National University of Nuclear Industry and Energy in Ukraine in December 2010.
  • HEU Spent Fuel: 19 shipments to remove and return over 980 kilograms of Russian-origin HEU spent fuel have taken place since May 2004. These shipments include the return of:
    • Sixty-three kilograms in four shipments from the Institute of Nuclear Physics in Uzbekistan, which took place from January to April 2006; 
    • Eighty kilograms from the Czech Republic in December 2007; 
    • Fourteen kilograms from Latvia in May 2008; 
    • Six and a half kilograms from Bulgaria in August 2008;   
    • Almost 155 kilograms from Hungary in October 2008; 
    • 73 kilograms from Kazakhstan in April 2009; 
    • Five kilograms from Libya in December 2009; 
    • More than 450 kilograms from Poland in 2009-2010; and 
    • 13 kilograms from Serbia in December 2010.

 

Removal of U.S.-origin research reactor spent fuel

  • Since 2004, more than 320 kilograms of U.S.-origin HEU in spent research reactor nuclear fuel was returned to the United States from a number of international partners, including Australia, Germany, Austria, Greece, Japan, Argentina, Sweden, Portugal, Romania, Taiwan, and the Netherlands.

 

Removal of "Gap" Material

  • Significant progress has been made to secure nuclear material that was not covered by other pre-existing nuclear material threat reduction programs. This material is referred to as "gap" material. 
  • More than 250 kilograms of HEU  and plutonium have been safely removed from a number of countries, including Canada, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Chile.

 

Radiological Threat Reduction

  • Physical protection upgrades have been completed in more than 40 countries at more than 960 radiological sites, including industrial, medical, and commercial facilities. 
  • Since May 2004, GTRI secured more than 900 vulnerable radiological sites around the world containing over 10,000,000 curies - enough for approximately 10,000 dirty bombs. 
  • In the United States since May 2004, GTRI removed over 13,000 at-risk radiological sources totaling 680,000 curies - enough for more than 900 dirty bombs. Over the life of the program, more than 26,000 radioactive sources have been secured from around the country.