



DOE/NNSA Response to Radiological Releases from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant


Daniel Blumenthal, PhD, CHP
Manager, Consequence Management Program
U.S. Department of Energy
National Nuclear Security Administration

Office of Emergency Response


- ◆ **Expert technical advice from the DOE/NNSA National Laboratories in response to:**
 - **Nuclear weapon accidents and incidents**
 - **Possible acts of nuclear terrorism**
 - **Lost or stolen radioactive materials**
 - **Radiological accidents**
- ◆ **Expertise in nuclear weapons design, nuclear/radiological materials characterization, and radiological detection and characterization**
- ◆ **Deployable capabilities, configured for a rapid response to any nuclear/radiological accident or incident**



U.S. Response Asset Integration



Fukushima Dai-ichi Damage & Deposition



DOE Timeline

- March 11: Assets activated
- March 12: Technical Liaison deployed to Tokyo
- March 14, 2011: Field monitoring team deployed via military airlift to Yokota Air Base



DOE Timeline (cont'd)

- March 16: Assets arrive at Yokota AB and begin flights
- March 17: First aerial measurement activities near reactor; first ground measurements
- March 22: Initial data published on DOE website
- May 28: Last DOE personnel depart Yokota AB




DOE's home at Yokota AB



Overview

- Many partners - US and Japanese



- DOE Role
 - Monitor environment through aerial and ground-based measurements
 - Perform dose assessments
 - Advise senior leaders (U.S. Embassy, U.S. Military)
- Division of labor among DOE teams
 - Field team: small, interdisciplinary, experienced, adaptable
 - Home team: multi-lab
 - Headquarters: handle political pressures

Aerial Monitoring

What was done

- Fixed wing and helicopter
 - US Military
- Up to 3 aircraft per day
- DOE & GOJ joint survey
- Map ground deposition out to 80 km from reactor

Why it was done

- Support Humanitarian and Disaster Relief Operations, evacuation, relocation, agricultural decisions






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The Right Product for the Right Audience



Ground monitoring

What was done

- Mobile mapping
- In-situ & exposure rate
- Air & soil sampling
- Contamination swipes
- DoD & GOJ data aggregation

Why it was done

- Calibrate aerial measurements
- Define isotopic mix
- Characterize the inhalation component of integrated dose
- Assess vertical and horizontal migration of deposited material






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Ground monitoring





Assessment

- Evaluation of field measurement results (aerial and ground)
 - Referenced to protective action measures
 - Informed mission planning
- Trend analysis and quality control
- Analysis of possible scenarios to inform future planning





Transition

- DOE provided equipment and training to augment GOJ capabilities
 - Aerial measurements
 - Laboratory analysis
- Current Status
 - Japanese bought additional aerial and laboratory analysis systems; DOE equipment returned to U.S.
 - DOE continues to support GOJ, US Military, and US embassy remotely from the DOE Home Team.

Field Team Challenges & Successes

Challenges

- Mission parameters
 - Unclear scope
 - Changing dose guidance
- Coordination of monitoring activities
 - Unfamiliar with partner expertise
 - Unclear chain of command
- Availability of experts
- Data volume & variety
- Communications/messaging
 - Both inter- and intra-agency
 - Comprehensive data products

Successes

- Rapid response
 - delivered right information at right time to support decisions
- Planning and preparedness
 - able to adapt established processes and analysis techniques
 - developed customized products
- Forged new relationships in time of crisis
- Unprecedented data collection

It's all about the planning, not the plan



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Lessons Learned



- Before Response
 - Need to know available technical resources to avoid gaps and duplication in response capabilities
 - Need stable dose guidelines to avoid confusion on personnel safety
- During Response
 - Need clear mission objectives
 - Need stable chain of command and tasking process to accommodate unfamiliar assets and de-conflict and effectively employ similar capabilities
 - Not all existing organizational structures are applicable as is; need some specialization
 - Need timely, science-based, risk-informed decisions with incomplete information
 - Should not ignore the data in favor of political pressure; cannot wait for all the data
 - Need interagency strategy for intra-governmental and public affairs communication