

DOE/EIS-0359

**FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT  
STATEMENT FOR CONSTRUCTION  
AND OPERATION OF A DEPLETED URANIUM  
HEXAFLUORIDE CONVERSION FACILITY  
AT THE PADUCAH, KENTUCKY, SITE**

Volume 1: Main Text and Appendixes A–H

June 2004



U.S. Department of Energy  
Office of Environmental Management

## COVER SHEET\*

**RESPONSIBLE FEDERAL AGENCY:** U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)

**TITLE:** Final Environmental Impact Statement for Construction and Operation of a Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride Conversion Facility at the Paducah, Kentucky, Site (DOE/EIS-0359)

**CONTACT:** For further information on this environmental impact statement (EIS), contact:

Gary S. Hartman  
DOE-ORO Cultural Resources Management Coordinator  
U.S. Department of Energy-Oak Ridge Operations  
P.O. Box 2001  
Oak Ridge, TN 37831  
e-mail: Pad\_DUF6@anl.gov  
phone: 1-866-530-0944  
fax: 1-866-530-0943

For general information on the DOE National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) process, contact:

Carol Borgstrom, Director  
Office of NEPA Policy and Compliance (EH-42)  
U.S. Department of Energy  
1000 Independence Avenue, SW  
Washington, DC 20585  
202-586-4600, or leave message at 1-800-472-2756

**ABSTRACT:** The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) proposes, via a contract awarded at the direction of Congress (Public Law 107-206), to design, construct, and operate two conversion facilities for converting depleted uranium hexafluoride (commonly referred to as DUF<sub>6</sub>): one at Portsmouth, Ohio, and one at Paducah, Kentucky. DOE intends to use the proposed facilities to convert its inventory of DUF<sub>6</sub> to a more stable chemical form suitable for beneficial use or disposal. This site-specific EIS considers the construction, operation, maintenance, and decontamination and decommissioning (D&D) of the proposed DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion facility at three locations within the Paducah site; transportation of depleted uranium conversion products and waste materials to a disposal facility; transportation and sale of the hydrogen fluoride (HF) produced as a conversion co-product; and neutralization of HF to calcium fluoride (CaF<sub>2</sub>) and its sale or disposal in the event that the HF product is not sold. This EIS also considers a no action alternative that assumes continued storage of DUF<sub>6</sub> at the Paducah site. A separate EIS has been prepared for the proposed facility at Portsmouth (DOE/EIS-0360). DOE's preferred alternative is to construct and operate the conversion facility at Location A within the Paducah site. DOE plans to decide where to dispose of depleted U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> conversion product after additional appropriate NEPA review.

---

\* Vertical lines in the right margin of this cover sheet and in the remainder of this EIS document indicate changes that have been added after the public comment period.

**CONTENTS**

COVER SHEET ..... iii

NOTATION ..... xxv

ENGLISH/METRIC AND METRIC/ENGLISH EQUIVALENTS ..... xxx

SUMMARY ..... S-1

    S.1 Introduction..... S-1

        S.1.1 Background Information..... S-1

            S.1.1.1 Creation of USEC..... S-5

            S.1.1.2 Growing Concern over the DUF<sub>6</sub> Inventory ..... S-6

            S.1.1.3 Programmatic NEPA Review and Congressional Interest..... S-7

            S.1.1.4 DOE Request for Contractor Proposals and Site-Specific  
                    NEPA Review ..... S-8

            S.1.1.5 Public Law 107-206 Passed by Congress..... S-9

            S.1.1.6 Characteristics of DUF<sub>6</sub> ..... S-10

        S.1.2 Purpose and Need ..... S-11

        S.1.3 Proposed Action..... S-11

        S.1.4 Scope..... S-12

        S.1.5 Public Review of the Draft EIS ..... S-12

        S.1.6 Relationship to Other NEPA Reviews..... S-13

        S.1.7 Organization of This Environmental Impact Statement ..... S-13

    S.2 Alternatives..... S-14

        S.2.1 No Action Alternative..... S-14

        S.2.2 Proposed Action Alternatives ..... S-16

            S.2.2.1 Alternative Location A (Preferred Alternative) ..... S-17

            S.2.2.2 Alternative Location B ..... S-17

            S.2.2.3 Alternative Location C ..... S-17

            S.2.2.4 Conversion Process Description..... S-17

            S.2.2.5 Option of Shipping ETTP Cylinders to Paducah ..... S-19

            S.2.2.6 Option of Expanding Conversion Facility Operations ..... S-23

        S.2.3 Alternatives Considered but Not Analyzed in Detail ..... S-25

            S.2.3.1 Use of Commercial Conversion Capacity ..... S-25

            S.2.3.2 Sites Other Than Paducah ..... S-25

            S.2.3.3 Alternative Conversion Processes ..... S-25

            S.2.3.4 Long-Term Storage and Disposal Alternatives ..... S-25

            S.2.3.5 Other Transportation Modes ..... S-26

            S.2.3.6 One Conversion Plant for Two Sites ..... S-26

    S.3 Affected Environment ..... S-26

    S.4 Environmental Impact Assessment Approach, Assumptions,  
        and Methodology ..... S-27

**CONTENTS (Cont.)**

S.5	Consequences and Comparison of Alternatives .....	S-30
S.5.1	Human Health and Safety — Construction and Normal Facility Operations .....	S-30
S.5.2	Human Health and Safety — Facility Accidents .....	S-31
S.5.2.1	Physical Hazards.....	S-31
S.5.2.2	Facility Accidents Involving Radiation or Chemical Releases.....	S-31
S.5.3	Human Health and Safety — Transportation.....	S-35
S.5.4	Air Quality and Noise .....	S-38
S.5.5	Water and Soil.....	S-39
S.5.6	Socioeconomics.....	S-40
S.5.7	Ecology.....	S-41
S.5.8	Waste Management.....	S-41
S.5.9	Resource Requirements.....	S-43
S.5.10	Land Use .....	S-43
S.5.11	Cultural Resources .....	S-43
S.5.12	Environmental Justice .....	S-43
S.5.13	Option of Shipping ETTP Cylinders to Paducah .....	S-43
S.5.14	Impacts Associated with Conversion Product Sale and Use.....	S-44
S.5.15	Impacts from D&D Activities .....	S-45
S.5.16	Cumulative Impacts.....	S-45
S.5.17	Mitigation.....	S-47
S.5.18	Unavoidable Adverse Impacts .....	S-49
S.5.19	Irreversible and Irrecoverable Commitment of Resources .....	S-49
S.5.20	Relationship between Short-Term Use of the Environment and Long-Term Productivity.....	S-49
S.5.21	Pollution Prevention and Waste Minimization .....	S-50
S.5.22	Potential Impacts Associated with the Option of Expanding Conversion Facility Operations .....	S-50
S.6	Environmental and Occupational Safety and Health Permits and Compliance Requirements .....	S-51
S.7	Preferred Alternative .....	S-51
1	INTRODUCTION .....	1-1
1.1	Background Information.....	1-2
1.1.1	Creation of USEC.....	1-3
1.1.2	Growing Concern over the DUF <sub>6</sub> Inventory.....	1-4
1.1.3	Programmatic NEPA Review and Congressional Interest.....	1-6
1.1.4	DOE Request for Contractor Proposals and Site-Specific NEPA Review .....	1-7
1.1.5	Public Law 107-206 Passed by Congress .....	1-8

**CONTENTS (Cont.)**

1.2	Characteristics of DUF <sub>6</sub> .....	1-9
1.2.1	Cylinder Inventory .....	1-10
1.2.2	Cylinder Condition and Potential Contamination .....	1-12
1.3	Purpose and Need .....	1-13
1.4	Proposed Action.....	1-13
1.5	DOE DUF <sub>6</sub> Management Program.....	1-14
1.6	Scope.....	1-15
1.6.1	Public Scoping Process for This Environmental Impact Statement.....	1-15
1.6.2	Scope of This Environmental Impact Statement.....	1-17
1.6.2.1	Alternatives.....	1-18
1.6.2.2	Depleted Uranium Conversion Technologies and Products.....	1-18
1.6.2.3	Transportation Modes.....	1-19
1.6.2.4	Conversion Product Disposition.....	1-19
1.6.2.5	Human Health and Environmental Issues .....	1-21
1.6.3	Public Review of the Draft EIS.....	1-21
1.7	Relationship to Other NEPA Reviews.....	1-24
1.8	Other Documents and Studies Related to DUF <sub>6</sub> Management and Conversion Activities.....	1-27
1.9	Organization of This Environmental Impact Statement .....	1-30
2	DESCRIPTION AND COMPARISON OF ALTERNATIVES .....	2-1
2.1	No Action Alternative.....	2-1
2.2	Proposed Action.....	2-4
2.2.1	Action Alternatives .....	2-5
2.2.1.1	Alternative Location A (Preferred Alternative).....	2-6
2.2.1.2	Alternative Location B.....	2-6
2.2.1.3	Alternative Location C.....	2-6
2.2.2	Conversion Process Description.....	2-8
2.2.2.1	Cylinder Transfer System .....	2-12
2.2.2.2	Vaporization System.....	2-12
2.2.2.3	Conversion System .....	2-13
2.2.2.4	Depleted Uranium Conversion Product Handling System .....	2-13
2.2.2.5	HF Recovery System .....	2-14
2.2.2.6	Emptied Cylinder Processing.....	2-14
2.2.2.7	Management of Potential Transuranic and PCB Contamination.....	2-15
2.2.3	Conversion Product Disposition .....	2-16
2.2.4	Option of Shipping ETTP Cylinders to Paducah .....	2-18
2.2.5	Option of Expanding Conversion Facility Operations .....	2-20
2.3	Alternatives Considered but Not Analyzed in Detail .....	2-23
2.3.1	Utilization of Commercial Conversion Capacity.....	2-23
2.3.2	Other Sites .....	2-23

**CONTENTS (Cont.)**

2.3.3	Other Conversion Technologies.....	2-24
2.3.4	Long-Term Storage and Disposal Alternatives.....	2-24
2.3.5	Other Transportation Modes.....	2-25
2.3.6	One Conversion Plant Alternative.....	2-25
2.4	Comparison of Alternatives.....	2-26
2.4.1	General.....	2-26
2.4.2	Summary and Comparison of Potential Environmental Impacts.....	2-27
2.4.2.1	Human Health and Safety — Construction and Normal Facility Operations.....	2-28
2.4.2.2	Human Health and Safety — Facility Accidents.....	2-28
2.4.2.3	Human Health and Safety — Transportation.....	2-32
2.4.2.4	Air Quality and Noise.....	2-35
2.4.2.5	Water and Soil.....	2-36
2.4.2.6	Socioeconomics.....	2-37
2.4.2.7	Ecology.....	2-37
2.4.2.8	Waste Management.....	2-38
2.4.2.9	Resource Requirements.....	2-39
2.4.2.10	Land Use.....	2-40
2.4.2.11	Cultural Resources.....	2-40
2.4.2.12	Environmental Justice.....	2-40
2.4.2.13	Option of Shipping ETTP Cylinders to Paducah.....	2-40
2.4.2.14	Impacts Associated with Conversion Product Sale and Use.....	2-41
2.4.2.15	Impacts from D&D Activities.....	2-42
2.4.2.16	Cumulative Impacts.....	2-42
2.4.2.17	Potential Impacts Associated with the Option of Expanding Conversion Facility Operaitons.....	2-43
2.5	Preferred Alternative.....	2-44
3	AFFECTED ENVIRONMENT.....	3-1
3.1	Paducah Site.....	3-1
3.1.1	Cylinder Yards.....	3-2
3.1.2	Site Infrastructure.....	3-2
3.1.3	Climate, Air Quality, and Noise.....	3-5
3.1.3.1	Climate.....	3-5
3.1.3.2	Existing Air Emissions.....	3-5
3.1.3.3	Air Quality.....	3-7
3.1.3.4	Existing Noise Environment.....	3-11
3.1.4	Geology and Soil.....	3-11
3.1.4.1	Topography, Structure, and Seismic Risk.....	3-11
3.1.4.2	Soils.....	3-14
3.1.5	Water Resources.....	3-15

**CONTENTS (Cont.)**

3.1.5.1	Surface Water .....	3-15
3.1.5.2	Groundwater .....	3-16
3.1.6	Biotic Resources.....	3-17
3.1.6.1	Vegetation .....	3-17
3.1.6.2	Wildlife.....	3-18
3.1.6.3	Wetlands.....	3-19
3.1.6.4	Threatened and Endangered Species .....	3-22
3.1.7	Public and Occupational Safety and Health.....	3-24
3.1.7.1	Radiation Environment.....	3-24
3.1.7.2	Chemical Environment.....	3-26
3.1.8	Socioeconomics.....	3-26
3.1.8.1	Population.....	3-28
3.1.8.2	Employment .....	3-28
3.1.8.3	Personal Income .....	3-29
3.1.8.4	Housing .....	3-30
3.1.8.5	Community Resources .....	3-31
3.1.9	Waste Management .....	3-32
3.1.9.1	Wastewater .....	3-34
3.1.9.2	Solid Nonhazardous, Nonradioactive Waste.....	3-34
3.1.9.3	Nonradioactive Hazardous and Toxic Waste .....	3-35
3.1.9.4	Low-Level Radioactive Waste .....	3-35
3.1.9.5	Low-Level Radioactive Mixed Waste.....	3-35
3.1.10	Land Use .....	3-35
3.1.11	Cultural Resources .....	3-37
3.1.12	Environmental Justice .....	3-38
3.1.12.1	Minority Populations .....	3-38
3.1.12.2	Low-Income Populations .....	3-39
3.2	East Tennessee Technology Park .....	3-39
3.2.1	Cylinder Yards .....	3-42
3.2.2	Site Infrastructure.....	3-44
3.2.3	Climate, Air Quality, and Noise.....	3-44
3.2.3.1	Climate .....	3-44
3.2.3.2	Existing Air Emissions.....	3-45
3.2.3.3	Air Quality.....	3-47
3.2.3.4	Existing Noise Environment .....	3-50
3.2.4	Geology and Soil.....	3-52
3.2.4.1	Topography, Structure, and Seismic Risk.....	3-52
3.2.4.2	Soils .....	3-52
3.2.5	Water Resources.....	3-53
3.2.5.1	Surface Water .....	3-53
3.2.5.2	Groundwater .....	3-55
3.2.6	Biotic Resources.....	3-57
3.2.6.1	Vegetation .....	3-57

**CONTENTS (Cont.)**

3.2.6.2	Wildlife.....	3-57
3.2.6.3	Wetlands.....	3-58
3.2.6.4	Threatened and Endangered Species.....	3-58
3.2.7	Public and Occupational Safety and Health.....	3-58
3.2.7.1	Radiation Environment.....	3-58
3.2.7.2	Chemical Environment.....	3-61
3.2.8	Socioeconomics.....	3-61
3.2.8.1	Population.....	3-61
3.2.8.2	Employment.....	3-63
3.2.8.3	Personal Income.....	3-64
3.2.8.4	Housing.....	3-67
3.2.8.5	Community Resources.....	3-68
3.2.9	Waste Management.....	3-68
3.2.9.1	Wastewater.....	3-68
3.2.9.2	Solid Nonhazardous, Nonradioactive Waste.....	3-71
3.2.9.3	Nonradioactive Hazardous and Toxic Waste.....	3-71
3.2.9.4	Low-Level Radioactive Waste.....	3-71
3.2.9.5	Low-Level Radioactive Mixed Waste.....	3-71
3.2.10	Land Use.....	3-72
3.2.11	Cultural Resources.....	3-72
3.2.12	Environmental Justice.....	3-74
3.2.12.1	Minority Populations.....	3-74
3.2.12.2	Low-Income Populations.....	3-75
4	ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT APPROACH, ASSUMPTIONS, AND METHODOLOGY.....	4-1
4.1	General Approach.....	4-1
4.2	Major Assumptions and Parameters.....	4-2
4.3	Methodology.....	4-2
4.3.1	Overview of the Human Health Assessment.....	4-5
4.3.2	Radiation.....	4-5
4.3.2.1	Background Radiation.....	4-5
4.3.2.2	Radiation Doses and Health Effects.....	4-7
4.3.3	Chemicals.....	4-9
4.3.4	Accidents.....	4-10
4.3.4.1	Accident Consequences.....	4-10
4.3.4.2	Accident Frequencies.....	4-12
4.3.4.3	Accident Risk.....	4-12
4.3.4.4	Physical Hazard Accidents.....	4-13
4.4	Uncertainty in Estimated Impacts.....	4-13

**CONTENTS (Cont.)**

5 ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF ALTERNATIVES ..... 5-1

5.1 No Action Alternative..... 5-1

5.1.1 Introduction ..... 5-1

5.1.1.1 Cylinder Maintenance Activities..... 5-2

5.1.1.2 Assumptions and Methods Used to Assess Impacts  
Associated with Cylinder Breaches..... 5-5

5.1.2 Impacts of No Action at the Paducah Site..... 5-6

5.1.2.1 Human Health and Safety..... 5-7

5.1.2.2 Transportation ..... 5-15

5.1.2.3 Air Quality and Noise..... 5-15

5.1.2.4 Water and Soil ..... 5-17

5.1.2.5 Socioeconomics..... 5-19

5.1.2.6 Ecology..... 5-19

5.1.2.7 Waste Management ..... 5-20

5.1.2.8 Resource Requirements ..... 5-20

5.1.2.9 Land Use..... 5-20

5.1.2.10 Cultural Resources ..... 5-20

5.1.2.11 Environmental Justice ..... 5-20

5.2 Proposed Action Alternatives ..... 5-21

5.2.1 Conversion Facility Construction Impacts..... 5-21

5.2.1.1 Human Health and Safety — Normal  
Construction Activities..... 5-22

5.2.1.2 Human Health and Safety — Accidents..... 5-22

5.2.1.3 Air Quality and Noise..... 5-23

5.2.1.4 Water and Soil ..... 5-27

5.2.1.5 Socioeconomics..... 5-29

5.2.1.6 Ecology..... 5-30

5.2.1.7 Waste Management ..... 5-37

5.2.1.8 Resource Requirements ..... 5-39

5.2.1.9 Land Use..... 5-39

5.2.1.10 Cultural Resources ..... 5-40

5.2.1.11 Environmental Justice ..... 5-41

5.2.2 Operational Impacts ..... 5-42

5.2.2.1 Human Health and Safety — Normal Facility Operations..... 5-42

5.2.2.2 Human Health and Safety — Facility Accidents ..... 5-47

5.2.2.3 Air Quality and Noise..... 5-59

5.2.2.4 Water and Soil ..... 5-65

5.2.2.5 Socioeconomics..... 5-66

5.2.2.6 Ecology..... 5-67

5.2.2.7 Waste Management ..... 5-69

5.2.2.8 Resource Requirements ..... 5-70

5.2.2.9 Land Use..... 5-71

**CONTENTS (Cont.)**

5.2.2.10	Cultural Resources .....	5-71
5.2.2.11	Environmental Justice .....	5-72
5.2.3	Transportation .....	5-73
5.2.3.1	Collective Population Risk.....	5-73
5.2.3.2	Maximally Exposed Individuals during Routine Conditions.....	5-82
5.2.3.3	Accident Consequence Assessment .....	5-82
5.2.3.4	Historical Safety Record of Anhydrous NH <sub>3</sub> and HF Transportation in the United States.....	5-87
5.2.4	Impacts Associated with HF and CaF <sub>2</sub> Conversion Product Sale and Use.....	5-90
5.2.5	Impacts If ETTP Cylinders Are Shipped to Paducah Rather Than to Portsmouth .....	5-91
5.2.5.1	Construction and Operation Impacts.....	5-91
5.2.5.2	Cylinder Preparation Impacts at ETTP .....	5-93
5.2.5.3	Transportation of Cylinders from ETTP to Paducah.....	5-96
5.2.6	Potential Impacts Associated with the Option of Expanding Conversion Facility Operations.....	5-103
5.2.6.1	Potential Impacts Associated with Increasing Plant Throughput.....	5-104
5.2.6.2	Potential Impacts Associated with Extending the Plant Operational Period.....	5-104
5.2.6.3	Potential Impacts Associated with Possible Future Paducah-to-Portsmouth Cylinder Shipments .....	5-105
5.3	Cumulative Impacts.....	5-106
5.3.1	Issues and Assumptions .....	5-106
5.3.2	Paducah Site.....	5-109
5.3.3	Results .....	5-110
5.3.3.1	Radiological Releases — Normal Operations.....	5-110
5.3.3.2	Accidental Releases — Radiological and Chemical Materials.....	5-110
5.3.3.3	Transportation .....	5-110
5.3.3.4	Chemical Exposure — Normal Operations.....	5-111
5.3.3.5	Air Quality.....	5-111
5.3.3.6	Noise.....	5-111
5.3.3.7	Water and Soil.....	5-111
5.3.3.8	Ecology.....	5-112
5.3.3.9	Land Use.....	5-112
5.3.3.10	Cultural Resources .....	5-112
5.3.3.11	Environmental Justice .....	5-112
5.3.3.12	Socioeconomics.....	5-113
5.4	Mitigation .....	5-113
5.5	Unavoidable Adverse Impacts.....	5-116

**CONTENTS (Cont.)**

5.6	Irreversible and Irretrievable Commitment of Resources .....	5-116
5.6.1	Land.....	5-117
5.6.2	Materials.....	5-117
5.6.3	Energy .....	5-118
5.7	Relationship between Short-Term Use of the Environment and Long-Term Productivity .....	5-119
5.8	Pollution Prevention and Waste Minimization.....	5-120
5.9	Decontamination and Decommissioning of the Conversion Facility .....	5-120
5.9.1	Human Health and Safety — Off-Site Public .....	5-121
5.9.2	Human Health and Safety — On-Site Workforce.....	5-122
5.9.3	Air Quality.....	5-123
5.9.4	Socioeconomics.....	5-123
5.9.5	Waste Management.....	5-123
6	ENVIRONMENTAL AND OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH PERMITS AND COMPLIANCE REQUIREMENTS .....	6-1
6.1	DUF <sub>6</sub> Cylinder Management and Construction and Operation of a DUF <sub>6</sub> Conversion Facility.....	6-1
6.2	Transportation of UF <sub>6</sub> .....	6-1
6.3	Worker Safety and Health .....	6-3
7	REFERENCES .....	7-1
8	LIST OF PREPARERS .....	8-1
9	GLOSSARY .....	9-1
10	INDEX.....	10-1
APPENDIX A:	Text of Public Law 107-206 Pertinent to the Management of DUF <sub>6</sub> .....	A-1
APPENDIX B:	Issues Associated with DUF <sub>6</sub> Cylinder Contamination.....	B-1
APPENDIX C:	Scoping Summary Report for Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride Conversion Facilities Environmental Impact Statement Scoping Process .....	C-1
APPENDIX D:	Environmental Synopsis for the Depleted UF <sub>6</sub> Conversion Project.....	D-1
APPENDIX E:	Impacts Associated with HF and CAF <sub>2</sub> Conversion Product Sale and Use.....	E-1

**CONTENTS (Cont.)**

APPENDIX F: Assessment Methodologies ..... F-1

APPENDIX G: Consultation Letters ..... G-1

APPENDIX H: Contractor Disclosure Statement ..... H-1

**FIGURES**

S-1 Regional Map of the Paducah, Kentucky, Site Vicinity ..... S-2

S-2 Storage of DUF<sub>6</sub> Cylinders ..... S-4

S-3 Three Alternative Conversion Facility Locations within the Paducah Site,  
with Location A Being the Preferred Alternative ..... S-18

S-4 Conceptual Overall Material Flow Diagram for the Paducah  
Conversion Facility ..... S-20

S-5 Conceptual Conversion Facility Site Layout for Paducah ..... S-21

S-6 Areas of Potential Impact Evaluated for Each Alternative ..... S-28

1-1 DUF<sub>6</sub> Storage Locations ..... 1-2

1.1-1 Storage of DUF<sub>6</sub> Cylinders ..... 1-4

2.2-1 Three Alternative Conversion Facility Locations within the Paducah Site,  
with Location A Being the Preferred Alternative ..... 2-7

2.2-2 Conceptual Overall Material Flow Diagram for the Paducah  
Conversion Facility ..... 2-9

2.2-3 Conceptual Conversion Facility Site Layout for Paducah ..... 2-10

3.1-1 Regional Map of the Paducah Site Vicinity ..... 3-3

3.1-2 Locations of Cylinder Yards at the Paducah Site That Are Used  
to Store DOE-Managed Cylinders ..... 3-4

3.1-3 Wind Rose for the Barkley Regional Airport, 1990–1994 ..... 3-6

**FIGURES (Cont.)**

3.1-4	Wetlands in the Vicinity of the Three Candidate Locations for the Paducah Conversion Facility.....	3-20
3.1-5	Areas of Potential Indiana Bat Habitat at the Paducah Site .....	3-23
3.1-6	Land Cover in McCracken County, Kentucky.....	3-36
3.1-7	Census Tracts within 50 mi of the Conversion Facility at the Paducah Site with Minority Populations in Excess of State-Specific Thresholds.....	3-40
3.1-8	Census Tracts within 50 mi of the Conversion Facility at the Paducah Site with Low-Income Populations in Excess of State-Specific Thresholds .....	3-41
3.2-1	Regional Map of the ETTP Vicinity .....	3-42
3.2-2	Locations of Storage Yards at ETTP That Are Used to Store DOE-Managed Cylinders.....	3-43
3.2-3	Wind Rose for the ETTP K1209 Meteorological Tower, 2001 .....	3-46
3.2-4	Surface Water Features in the Vicinity of ETTP .....	3-54
3.2-5	Land Cover in Roane County, Tennessee .....	3-73
3.2-6	Census Tracts within 50 mi of the Storage Facility at ETTP with Minority Populations in Excess of State-Specific Thresholds.....	3-76
3.2-7	Census Tracts within 50 mi of the Storage Facility at ETTP with Low-Income Populations in Excess of State-Specific Thresholds.....	3-77
4.3-1	Areas of Potential Impact Evaluated for Each Alternative .....	4-4
5.2-1	Wetlands within Location A at the Paducah Site.....	5-34
5.2-2	Wetlands along the Proposed Rail Line at the Paducah Site.....	5-36
5.2-3	Areas of Potential Indiana Bat Habitat at the Paducah Site .....	5-38

**TABLES**

S-1	Inventory of DOE UF <sub>6</sub> Cylinders Considered in This EIS .....	S-4
S-2	Summary of Alternatives Considered for the Paducah Conversion Facility EIS .....	S-15
S-3	Summary of Paducah Conversion Facility Parameters .....	S-22
S-4	Summary of Proposed Conversion Product Treatment and Disposition .....	S-22
S-5	Summary of Major EIS Data and Assumptions .....	S-29
S-6	Summary Comparison of Potential Environmental Consequences of the Alternatives .....	S-52
1.1-1	Inventory of DOE UF <sub>6</sub> Cylinders Considered in This EIS .....	1-11
2.1-1	Summary of Alternatives Considered .....	2-2
2.2-1	Summary of Paducah Conversion Facility Parameters .....	2-11
2.2-2	Summary of Proposed Conversion Product Treatment and Disposition.....	2-17
2.4-1	Summary Comparison of Potential Environmental Consequences of the Alternatives .....	2-45
3.1-1	DOE-Managed DUF <sub>6</sub> Cylinders at the Paducah Site.....	3-2
3.1-2	Annual Criteria Pollutant and Volatile Organic Compound Emissions from Selected Major Point Sources around the Paducah Site in 1999.....	3-7
3.1-3	National Ambient Air Quality Standards, Kentucky State Ambient Air Quality Standards, Maximum Allowable Increments for Prevention of Significant Deterioration, and Highest Background Levels Representative of the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant .....	3-8
3.1-4	Additional Commonwealth of Kentucky Ambient Air Quality Standards .....	3-10
3.1-5	Federal- and State-Listed Endangered, Threatened, and Special Concern Species near the Paducah Site .....	3-22
3.1-6	Estimated Radiation Doses to Members of the General Public and Cylinder Yard Workers at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant.....	3-25

**TABLES (Cont.)**

3.1-7 Estimated Hazard Quotients for Members of the General Public near the Paducah Site under Existing Environmental Conditions ..... 3-27

3.1-8 Population in the Paducah Region of Influence, Kentucky, and Illinois in 1990, 2000, and 2003 ..... 3-28

3.1-9 Employment in McCracken County by Industry in 1990 and 2000 ..... 3-29

3.1-10 Employment in the Paducah Region of Influence by Industry in 1990 and 2000 ..... 3-30

3.1-11 Unemployment Rates in McCracken County, the Paducah Region of Influence, and Kentucky ..... 3-31

3.1-12 Personal Income in McCracken County and the Paducah Region of Influence in 1990, 2000, and 2003..... 3-31

3.1-13 Housing Characteristics in the City of Paducah, McCracken County, and the Paducah Region of Influence in 1990 and 2000..... 3-32

3.1-14 Public Service Employment in the City of Paducah, McCracken County, and Kentucky in 2002 ..... 3-33

3.1-15 Number of Physicians in McCracken County and Kentucky in 1997 ..... 3-33

3.1-16 School District Data for McCracken County and Kentucky in 2001..... 3-33

3.1-17 Medical Facility Data for McCracken County in 1998..... 3-34

3.1-18 Projected Waste Generation Volumes for the Paducah Site ..... 3-34

3.2-1 DOE-Managed DUF<sub>6</sub> Cylinders at the ETTP Site..... 3-42

3.2-2 Annual Criteria Pollutant and Volatile Organic Compound Emissions from Selected Major Point Sources around the ETTP Site in 1999..... 3-47

3.2-3 National Ambient Air Quality Standards, Tennessee State Ambient Air Quality Standards, Maximum Allowable Increments for Prevention of Significant Deterioration, and Highest Background Levels Representative of the ETTP Site ..... 3-48

3.2-4 Additional Tennessee Ambient Air Quality Standards ..... 3-50

**TABLES (Cont.)**

3.2-5 Allowable Noise Level by Zoning District in Anderson County, Tennessee ..... 3-51

3.2-6 Federal- and State-Listed Endangered, Threatened,  
and Special Concern Species on ORR ..... 3-59

3.2-7 Estimated Radiation Doses to Members of the General Public  
and Cylinder Yard Workers at ETTP ..... 3-60

3.2-8 Estimated Hazard Quotients for Members of the Public near ETTP  
under Existing Environmental Conditions ..... 3-62

3.2-9 Population in the ETTP Region of Influence and Tennessee  
in 1990, 2000, and 2003 ..... 3-63

3.2-10 Employment in Knox County by Industry in 1990 and 2000 ..... 3-64

3.2-11 Employment in Anderson County by Industry in 1990 and 2000..... 3-65

3.2-12 Employment in the ETTP Region of Influence by Industry in 1990 and 2000 ..... 3-65

3.2-13 Unemployment Rates in the Knoxville Metropolitan Statistical Area  
and Tennessee ..... 3-66

3.2-14 Personal Income in Knox and Anderson Counties and the ETTP Region  
of Influence in 1990, 2000, and 2003..... 3-66

3.2-15 Housing Characteristics in the City of Knoxville, Knox and Anderson  
Counties, and the ETTP Region of Influence in 1990 and 2000..... 3-67

3.2-16 Public Service Employment in the City of Knoxville, ETTP  
Region-of-Influence Counties, and Tennessee in 2001 ..... 3-69

3.2-17 Number of Physicians in Knox and Anderson Counties and Tennessee  
in 1997..... 3-69

3.2-18 School District Data for Knox and Anderson Counties and Tennessee  
in 2001 ..... 3-70

3.2-19 Medical Facility Data for Knox and Anderson Counties in 1998..... 3-70

3.2-20 Projected Waste Generation Volumes for ETTP ..... 3-71

4.2-1 Summary of Major EIS Data and Assumptions ..... 4-3

**TABLES (Cont.)**

4.3-1	Key Features of Potential Human Exposures to Radiological, Chemical, and Physical Hazards .....	4-6
4.3-2	Comparison of Radiation Doses from Various Sources.....	4-8
5.1-1	No Action Alternative: Comparison of Frequencies Assumed in the PEIS with Planned Frequencies for Activities at the Paducah Site.....	5-3
5.1-2	No Action Alternative: Estimated Consequences of Chemical Exposures for Cylinder Accidents at the Paducah Site.....	5-11
5.1-3	No Action Alternative: Estimated Consequences from Radiation Exposures for Cylinder Accidents at the Paducah Site.....	5-13
5.2-1	Potential Impacts to Human Health from Physical Hazards during Conversion Facility Construction and Operations at the Paducah Site.....	5-23
5.2-2	Annual Criteria Pollutant and Volatile Organic Compound Emissions from Construction of the Conversion Facility at the Paducah Site .....	5-24
5.2-3	Maximum Air Quality Impacts at the Construction Site Boundary Due to Emissions from Activities Associated with Construction of the Conversion Facility at the Paducah Site.....	5-25
5.2-4	Socioeconomic Impacts from Construction of the Conversion Facility at the Paducah Site .....	5-29
5.2-5	Wastes Generated from Construction Activities for the Conversion Facility at the Paducah Site .....	5-39
5.2-6	Materials/Resources Consumed during Construction of the Conversion Facility at the Paducah Site .....	5-40
5.2-7	Estimated Radiological Doses and Cancer Risks under Normal Conversion Facility Operations at the Paducah Site.....	5-45
5.2-8	Bounding Radiological Accidents Considered for Conversion Operations at the Paducah Site .....	5-48
5.2-9	Estimated Radiological Doses per Accident Occurrence during Conversion at the Paducah Site .....	5-49

**TABLES (Cont.)**

5.2-10 Estimated Radiological Health Risks per Accident Occurrence during Conversion at the Paducah Site..... 5-50

5.2-11 Bounding Chemical Accidents during Conversion Operations at the Paducah Site ..... 5-53

5.2-12 Consequences of Chemical Accidents during Conversion at the Paducah Site: Number of Persons with the Potential for Adverse Effects ..... 5-54

5.2-13 Consequences of Chemical Accidents during Conversion at the Paducah Site: Number of Persons with the Potential for Irreversible Adverse Effects..... 5-55

5.2-14 Annual Point Source Emissions of Criteria Pollutants, Volatile Organic Compounds, Uranium, and Fluoride from Operation of the Conversion Facility at the Paducah Site ..... 5-60

5.2-15 Maximum Air Quality Impacts Due to Emissions from Activities Associated with Operation of the Conversion Facility at the Paducah Site ..... 5-61

5.2-16 Socioeconomic Impacts from Operation of the Conversion Facility at the Paducah Site ..... 5-67

5.2-17 Wastes Generated from Operation of the Conversion Facility at the Paducah Site ..... 5-69

5.2-18 Materials Consumed Annually during Normal Conversion Facility Operations at the Paducah Site..... 5-71

5.2-19 Utilities Consumed during Conversion Facility Operations at the Paducah Site ..... 5-72

5.2-20 Collective Population Transportation Risks for Shipment of Anhydrous NH<sub>3</sub> to the Paducah Conversion Facility ..... 5-74

5.2-21 Collective Population Transportation Risks for Shipment of Conversion Products to Envirocare as the Primary Disposal Site, Assuming the U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> Is Disposed of in Bulk Bags..... 5-76

**TABLES (Cont.)**

5.2-22	Collective Population Transportation Risks for Shipment of Conversion Products to NTS as an Optional Disposal Site, Assuming the U <sub>3</sub> O <sub>8</sub> Is Disposed of in Bulk Bags.....	5-78
5.2-23	Collective Population Transportation Risks for Shipment of U <sub>3</sub> O <sub>8</sub> Conversion Products in Emptied Cylinders.....	5-80
5.2-24	Collective Population Transportation Risks for Shipment of the HF Conversion Co-Product from the Paducah Site to Commercial Users .....	5-81
5.2-25	Collective Population Transportation Risks for Shipment of CaF <sub>2</sub> for the Neutralization Option.....	5-81
5.2-26	Estimated Radiological Impacts to the MEI from Routine Shipment of Radioactive Materials from the Paducah Conversion Facility .....	5-83
5.2-27	Potential Radiological Consequences to the Population from Severe Transportation Accidents .....	5-84
5.2-28	Potential Chemical Consequences to the Population from Severe Transportation Accidents .....	5-85
5.2-29	Potential Radiological Consequences to the MEI from Severe Transportation Accidents Involving Shipment of Radioactive Materials.....	5-88
5.2-30	Products from DUF <sub>6</sub> Conversion.....	5-90
5.2-31	Summary of Environmental Parameters for a Cylinder Transfer Facility .....	5-95
5.2-32	ETTP UF <sub>6</sub> Cylinder Shipments to Paducah.....	5-97
5.2-33	Estimated Radiological Impacts to the MEI from Routine Shipment of DUF <sub>6</sub> Cylinders .....	5-98
5.2-34	Potential Radiological Consequences to the Population from Severe Transportation Accidents Involving Shipment of DUF <sub>6</sub> Cylinders.....	5-99
5.2-35	Potential Chemical Consequences to the Population from Severe Transportation Accidents Involving Shipment of DUF <sub>6</sub> Cylinders.....	5-100
5.2-36	Potential Radiological Consequences to the MEI from Severe Transportation Accidents Involving Shipment of DUF <sub>6</sub> Cylinders.....	5-101

**TABLES (Cont.)**

5.2-37 Potential Chemical Consequences to the MEI from Severe Transportation Accidents Involving Shipment of DUF<sub>6</sub> Cylinders ..... 5-101

5.2-38 Estimated Radiological Impacts to the MEI from Routine Shipment of Non-DUF<sub>6</sub> Cylinders ..... 5-102

5.2-39 Annual Transportation Impacts for the Shipment of DUF<sub>6</sub> Cylinders from Paducah to Portsmouth, Assuming 1,000 DUF<sub>6</sub> Cylinders Shipped per Year ..... 5-106

5.3-1 Cumulative Impacts of DUF<sub>6</sub> Activities and Other Past, Present, or Reasonably Foreseeable Future Actions at the Paducah Site ..... 5-107

5.6-1 Materials/Resources Consumed during Conversion Facility Construction at the Paducah Site ..... 5-118

5.6-2 Materials Consumed Annually during Conversion Facility Operations at the Paducah Site ..... 5-118

5.6-3 Utilities Consumed during Conversion Facility Operations at the Paducah Site ..... 5-119

5.9-1 Estimated Latent Cancer Fatalities from Radiation Exposure Resulting from Conversion Facility D&D Activities at the Paducah Site ..... 5-122

5.9-2 Annual and Total Waste Volume Estimates from Conversion Facility D&D Activities at the Paducah Site ..... 5-125

6.1 Potentially Applicable Consents for the Construction and Operation of a DUF<sub>6</sub> Conversion Facility ..... 6-4

B-1 Bounding Concentrations of Dispersed Transuranic and Tc-99 Contamination in the DUF<sub>6</sub> Full and Heels Cylinders ..... B-5

B-2 Maximum Total Quantities of Transuranics and Technetium in the DUF<sub>6</sub> Inventory ..... B-6

B-3 Concentrations of Transuranic Constituents and Tc-99 in Depleted Uranium That Would Result in 10% Contribution to Dose ..... B-8

B-4 Radiological Parameters for Uranium, Transuranic, and Technetium Isotopes ..... B-10

**TABLES (Cont.)**

B-5	Relative Contributions of Transuranic and Technetium Isotopes to Dose.....	B-10
B-6	Estimated Maximum Transuranic Radioactivity Concentration in Heels.....	B-13
B-7	Estimated Maximum Transuranic Activity Concentration in Converted Heels Material .....	B-13
B-8	Estimated Maximum Number of Drums Containing Potential Transuranic Waste.....	B-13
E-1	Products from DUF <sub>6</sub> Conversion Assuming HF Acid Is Sold.....	E-4
E-2	Aqueous HF Levels for Sale .....	E-4
E-3	Activity Levels for Aqueous HF .....	E-5
E-4	Activity Levels for CaF <sub>2</sub> .....	E-5
E-5	Process Control Specifications for HF.....	E-6
E-6	Process Control Specifications for Acid-Grade CaF <sub>2</sub> .....	E-6
F-1	Bounding Aqueous HF Spill Source Term .....	F-15
F-2	Anhydrous NH <sub>3</sub> Tank Rupture Spill Parameters .....	F-16
F-3	Potential Shipments of Material Analyzed for the DUF <sub>6</sub> Conversion EIS.....	F-22
F-4	Environmental Management Waste Generation Forecast for Fiscal Years 2002 through 2025.....	F-41

## NOTATION

The following is a list of acronyms and abbreviations, chemical names, and units of measure used in this document. Some acronyms used only in tables may be defined only in those tables.

### GENERAL ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AEA	Atomic Energy Act of 1954
AEC	U.S. Atomic Energy Commission
AIHA	American Industrial Hygiene Association
ALARA	as low as reasonably achievable
ANL	Argonne National Laboratory
ANP	Advanced Nuclear Power (Framatone ANP, Inc.)
ANSI	American National Standards Institute
AQCR	Air Quality Control Region
BLS	Bureau of Labor Statistics
CAA	Clean Air Act
CEQ	Council on Environmental Quality
CERCLA	Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
CFR	<i>Code of Federal Regulations</i>
CRMP	cultural resource management plan
CWA	Clean Water Act
D&D	decontamination and decommissioning
DCG	derived concentration guide
DNFSB	Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board
DNL	day-night average sound level
DOE	U.S. Department of Energy
DOT	U.S. Department of Transportation
DU	depleted uranium
DUF <sub>6</sub>	depleted uranium hexafluoride
EA	environmental assessment
EBE	evaluation basis earthquake
EIS	environmental impact statement
EM	Office of Environmental Management (DOE)
EPA	U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
ERDA	Energy Research and Development Administration
ERPG	Emergency Response Planning Guideline
ETTP	East Tennessee Technology Park (formerly K-25 site)

FONSI	Finding of No Significant Impact
FR	<i>Federal Register</i>
FTE	full-time equivalent
FY	fiscal year
GDP	gaseous diffusion plant
GIS	geographic information system
HEPA	high-efficiency particulate air
HMMH	Harris Miller Miller & Hanson, Inc.
HMR	hazardous materials regulation
HMTA	Hazardous Materials Transportation Act
ICRP	International Commission on Radiological Protection
IHE	irreversible health effect
ISC	Industrial Source Complex
KPDES	Kentucky Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
KOW	Kentucky Ordnance Works
LCF	latent cancer fatality
L <sub>eq</sub>	equivalent steady sound level
LLMW	low-level radioactive mixed waste
LLW	low-level radioactive waste
LMES	Lockheed Martin Energy Systems, Inc.
MCL	maximum concentration limit
MEI	maximally exposed individual
MMES	Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc.
MOA	memorandum of agreement
NAAQS	National Ambient Air Quality Standard(s)
NCRP	National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements
NEPA	National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
NESHAPs	National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants
NOI	Notice of Intent
non-DUF <sub>6</sub>	non-depleted uranium hexafluoride
NOV	Notice of Violation
NPDES	National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
NPL	National Priorities List
NRC	U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NRHP	<i>National Register of Historic Places</i>
NTS	Nevada Test Site
OEPA	Ohio Environmental Protection Agency
OIG	Office of Inspector General (DOE)

ORNL	Oak Ridge National Laboratory
ORR	Oak Ridge Reservation
OSHA	Occupational Safety and Health Administration
PA	preliminary assessment
PEA	programmatic environmental assessment
PEIS	programmatic environmental impact statement
PEL	permissible exposure limit
P.L.	Public Law
PM	particulate matter
PM <sub>10</sub>	particulate matter with a mean aerodynamic diameter of 10 μm or less
PM <sub>2.5</sub>	particulate matter with a mean aerodynamic diameter of 2.5 μm or less
PSD	prevention of significant deterioration
R&D	research and development
RCRA	Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
RFP	Request for Proposal(s)
ROD	Record of Decision
ROI	region of influence
SAAQS	State Ambient Air Quality Standard(s)
SAR	safety analysis report
SHPO	State Historic Preservation Officer
SWMU	solid waste management unit
TDEC	Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation
TEDE	total effective dose equivalent
TLD	thermoluminescence dosimeter
TRU	transuranic(s)
TSCA	Toxic Substances Control Act
TVA	Tennessee Valley Authority
UDS	Uranium Disposition Services, LLC
USACE	U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
USC	<i>United States Code</i>
USDA	U.S. Department of Agriculture
USEC	United States Enrichment Corporation
USFWS	U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
USGS	U.S. Geological Survey
VOC	volatile organic compound
WM PEIS	Waste Management Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement

**CHEMICALS**

Am	americium
CaF <sub>2</sub>	calcium fluoride
Co	cobalt
CO	carbon monoxide
H <sub>2</sub>	hydrogen
HF	hydrogen fluoride (slag); hydrofluoric acid
H <sub>2</sub> O	water
H <sub>2</sub> S	hydrogen sulfide
KF	potassium fluoride
KOH	potassium hydroxide
kPa	kilopascal(s)
NH <sub>3</sub>	ammonia
NO	nitrogen oxide
NO <sub>2</sub>	nitrogen dioxide
NO <sub>x</sub>	nitrogen oxides
Np	neptunium
O <sub>3</sub>	ozone
PAH	polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbon
Pb	lead
PCB	polychlorinated biphenyl
Pu	plutonium
SO <sub>2</sub>	sulfur dioxide
SO <sub>x</sub>	sulfur oxides
Tc	technetium
TCE	trichloroethylene
U	uranium
UF <sub>4</sub>	uranium tetrafluoride
UF <sub>6</sub>	uranium hexafluoride
UO <sub>2</sub>	uranium dioxide
UO <sub>3</sub>	uranium trioxide
UO <sub>2</sub> F <sub>2</sub>	uranyl fluoride
U <sub>3</sub> O <sub>8</sub>	triuranium octaoxide

**UNITS OF MEASURE**

°C	degree(s) Celsius	mi <sup>2</sup>	square mile(s)
Ci	curie(s)	min	minute(s)
cm	centimeter(s)	mL	milliliter(s)
		mph	mile(s) per hour
d	day(s)	mR	milliroentgen(s)
dB	decibel(s)	mrem	millirem(s)
dB(A)	A-weighted decibel(s)	mSv	millisievert(s)
		MVA	megavolt-ampere(s)
°F	degree(s) Fahrenheit	MW	megawatt(s)
ft	foot (feet)	MWh	megawatt-hour(s)
ft <sup>2</sup>	square foot (feet)		
ft <sup>3</sup>	cubic foot (feet)	nCi	nanocurie(s)
g	gram(s)	oz	ounce(s)
gal	gallon(s)		
		pCi	picocurie(s)
h	hour(s)	ppb	part(s) per billion
ha	hectare(s)	ppm	part(s) per million
		psia	pound(s) per square inch absolute
in.	inch(es)	psig	pound(s) per square inch gauge
in. <sup>2</sup>	square inch(es)		
		rem	roentgen equivalent man
kg	kilogram(s)		
km	kilometer(s)	s	second(s)
km <sup>2</sup>	square kilometer(s)	Sv	sievert(s)
kPa	kilopascal(s)		
		t	metric ton(s)
L	liter(s)	ton(s)	short ton(s)
lb	pound(s)		
		wt%	percent by weight
m	meter(s)		
m <sup>2</sup>	square meter(s)	yd <sup>3</sup>	cubic yard(s)
m <sup>3</sup>	cubic meter(s)	yr	year(s)
MeV	million electron volts		
mg	milligram(s)	µg	microgram(s)
mi	mile(s)	µm	micrometer(s)

## ENGLISH/METRIC AND METRIC/ENGLISH EQUIVALENTS

Multiply	By	To Obtain
<i>English/Metric Equivalents</i>		
acres	0.4047	hectares (ha)
cubic feet (ft <sup>3</sup> )	0.02832	cubic meters (m <sup>3</sup> )
cubic yards (yd <sup>3</sup> )	0.7646	cubic meters (m <sup>3</sup> )
degrees Fahrenheit (°F) -32	0.5555	degrees Celsius (°C)
feet (ft)	0.3048	meters (m)
gallons (gal)	3.785	liters (L)
gallons (gal)	0.003785	cubic meters (m <sup>3</sup> )
inches (in.)	2.540	centimeters (cm)
miles (mi)	1.609	kilometers (km)
pounds (lb)	0.4536	kilograms (kg)
short tons (tons)	907.2	kilograms (kg)
short tons (tons)	0.9072	metric tons (t)
square feet (ft <sup>2</sup> )	0.09290	square meters (m <sup>2</sup> )
square yards (yd <sup>2</sup> )	0.8361	square meters (m <sup>2</sup> )
square miles (mi <sup>2</sup> )	2.590	square kilometers (km <sup>2</sup> )
yards (yd)	0.9144	meters (m)
<i>Metric/English Equivalents</i>		
centimeters (cm)	0.3937	inches (in.)
cubic meters (m <sup>3</sup> )	35.31	cubic feet (ft <sup>3</sup> )
cubic meters (m <sup>3</sup> )	1.308	cubic yards (yd <sup>3</sup> )
cubic meters (m <sup>3</sup> )	264.2	gallons (gal)
degrees Celsius (°C) +17.78	1.8	degrees Fahrenheit (°F)
hectares (ha)	2.471	acres
kilograms (kg)	2.205	pounds (lb)
kilograms (kg)	0.001102	short tons (tons)
kilometers (km)	0.6214	miles (mi)
liters (L)	0.2642	gallons (gal)
meters (m)	3.281	feet (ft)
meters (m)	1.094	yards (yd)
metric tons (t)	1.102	short tons (tons)
square kilometers (km <sup>2</sup> )	0.3861	square miles (mi <sup>2</sup> )
square meters (m <sup>2</sup> )	10.76	square feet (ft <sup>2</sup> )
square meters (m <sup>2</sup> )	1.196	square yards (yd <sup>2</sup> )

## SUMMARY<sup>1</sup>

### S.1 INTRODUCTION

This document is a site-specific environmental impact statement (EIS) for construction and operation of a proposed depleted uranium hexafluoride (DUF<sub>6</sub>) conversion facility at the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Paducah site in northwestern Kentucky (Figure S-1). The proposed facility would convert the DUF<sub>6</sub> stored at Paducah to a more stable chemical form suitable for use or disposal.

In a Notice of Intent (NOI) published in the *Federal Register* (FR) on September 18, 2001 (*Federal Register*, Volume 66, page 48123 [66 FR 48123]), DOE announced its intention to prepare a single EIS for a proposal to construct, operate, maintain, and decontaminate and decommission two DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion facilities at Portsmouth, Ohio, and Paducah, Kentucky, in accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) (*United States Code*, Title 42, Section 4321 et seq. [42 USC 4321 et seq.]) and DOE's NEPA implementing procedures (*Code of Federal Regulations*, Title 10, Part 1021 [10 CFR Part 1021]). Subsequent to award of a contract on August 29, 2002, to Uranium Disposition Services, LLC (hereafter referred to as UDS), Oak Ridge, Tennessee, for design, construction, and operation of DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion facilities at Portsmouth and Paducah, DOE reevaluated its approach to the NEPA process and decided to prepare separate site-specific EISs. This change was announced in a *Federal Register* Notice of Change in NEPA Compliance Approach published on April 28, 2003 (68 FR 22368); the Notice is included as Attachment B to Appendix C of this EIS.

This EIS addresses the potential environmental impacts from the construction, operation, maintenance, and decontamination and decommissioning (D&D) of the proposed conversion facility at three alternative locations within the Paducah site; from the transportation of depleted uranium conversion products to a disposal facility; and from the transportation, sale, use, or disposal of the fluoride-containing conversion products (hydrogen fluoride [HF] or calcium fluoride [CaF<sub>2</sub>]). Although not part of the proposed action, an option of shipping all cylinders (DUF<sub>6</sub>, normal and enriched UF<sub>6</sub>, and empty) stored at the East Tennessee Technology Park (ETTP) near Oak Ridge, Tennessee, to Paducah rather than to Portsmouth is also considered, as is an option of expanding operations. In addition, this EIS evaluates a no action alternative, which assumes continued storage of DUF<sub>6</sub> in cylinders at the Paducah site. A separate EIS (DOE/EIS-0360) evaluates the potential environmental impacts for the proposed Portsmouth conversion facility.

#### S.1.1 Background Information

The current DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion facility project is the culmination of a long history of DUF<sub>6</sub> management activities and events. To put the current project into context and provide

---

<sup>1</sup> Vertical lines in the right margin of this summary and the remainder of this EIS document indicate changes that have been added after the public comment period.

perspective, this section briefly discusses the origin and size of the DOE cylinder inventory considered in this EIS and then summarizes the management history.


Uranium enrichment in the United States began as part of the atomic bomb development by the Manhattan Project during World War II. Enrichment for both civilian and military uses continued after the war under the auspices of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission and its successor agencies, including DOE. Three large gaseous diffusion plants (GDPs) were constructed to produce enriched uranium, first at the K-25 site (now called ETPP) and subsequently at Paducah and Portsmouth. The K-25 plant ceased operations in 1985, and the Portsmouth plant ceased operations in 2001. The Paducah GDP continues to operate.

The DUF<sub>6</sub> produced during enrichment has been stored in large steel cylinders at all three gaseous diffusion plant sites since the 1950s. The cylinders are typically stacked two high and are stored outdoors on concrete or gravel yards. Figure S-2 shows typical arrangements for storing cylinders.

DOE is currently responsible for the management of approximately 700,000 metric tons (t) (770,000 short tons [tons])<sup>2</sup> of DUF<sub>6</sub> stored in about 60,000 cylinders at three storage sites. The cylinder inventory considered in this EIS is provided in Table S-1. This EIS considers the conversion of the approximately 440,000 t (484,000 tons) of DUF<sub>6</sub> stored in about 36,200 cylinders at Paducah. Also in storage at Paducah are approximately 1,940 cylinders of various sizes that contain enriched UF<sub>6</sub> or normal UF<sub>6</sub> (collectively called “non-DUF<sub>6</sub>” cylinders in this EIS) or are

<b>DUF<sub>6</sub> Management Time Line</b>	
1950–1993	DOE generates DUF <sub>6</sub> stored in cylinders at the ETPP, Portsmouth, and Paducah sites.
1985	K-25 (ETPP) GDP ceases operations.
1992	Ohio EPA issues Notice of Violation (NOV) to Portsmouth.
1993	USEC is created by P.L. 102-186.
1994	DOE initiates DUF <sub>6</sub> PEIS.
1995	DNFSB issues Recommendation 95-1, Safety of Cylinders Containing Depleted Uranium. DOE initiates UF <sub>6</sub> Cylinder Project Management Plan.
1996	USEC Privatization Act (P.L. 104-134) is enacted.
1997	DOE issues Draft DUF <sub>6</sub> PEIS.
1998	DOE and Ohio EPA reach agreement on NOV. Two DOE-USEC MOAs transfer 11,400 DUF <sub>6</sub> cylinders to DOE. P.L. 105-204 is enacted.
1999	DOE and TDEC enter consent order. DOE issues Final DUF <sub>6</sub> PEIS and Record of Decision. DOE issues conversion plan in response to P.L. 105-204. DNFSB closes Recommendation 95-1. DOE issues Draft RFP for conversion services.
2000	DOE issues Final RFP for conversion services.
2001	DOE receives five proposals in response to RFP. DOE identifies three proposals in competitive range. DOE publishes NOI for site-specific DUF <sub>6</sub> Conversion EIS. DOE prepares environmental critique to support conversion services procurement process. Portsmouth GDP ceases operations. DOE holds public scoping meetings for the site-specific DUF <sub>6</sub> Conversion EIS.
2002	DOE-USEC agreement transfers 23,000 t (25,684 tons) of DUF <sub>6</sub> to DOE. P.L. 107-206 is enacted. DOE awards conversion services contract to UDS. DOE prepares environmental synopsis to support conversion services procurement process.
2003	DOE announces Notice of Change in NEPA Compliance Approach and issues the draft EIS. DOE issues draft site-specific conversion facility EISs.
2004	Final site-specific conversion facility EISs issued.

<sup>2</sup> In general, in this EIS, values in English units are presented first, followed by metric units in parentheses. However, when values are routinely reported in metric units, the metric units are presented first, followed by English units in parentheses.



**FIGURE S-2 Storage of DUF<sub>6</sub> Cylinders: (a) New cylinder storage yard at the Paducah site. (b) Overview of cylinder yards at the Paducah site.**

**TABLE S-1 Inventory of DOE UF<sub>6</sub> Cylinders Considered in This EIS<sup>a</sup>**

Location	No. of Cylinders	Weight of UF <sub>6</sub> (t)
Paducah – DUF <sub>6</sub>	36,191	436,400
Non-DUF <sub>6</sub>		
Enriched UF <sub>6</sub>	182	1,600
Normal UF <sub>6</sub>	1,485	16,000
Empty	275	0
ETTP <sup>b</sup> – DUF <sub>6</sub>	4,822	54,300
Non-DUF <sub>6</sub>		
Enriched UF <sub>6</sub>	881	7
Normal UF <sub>6</sub>	221	19
Empty	20	0
Total		
DUF <sub>6</sub>	41,013	490,700
Non-DUF <sub>6</sub>	2,769	17,625
Empty	295	0

<sup>a</sup> As of January 26, 2004.

<sup>b</sup> The proposed action calls for shipment of the ETTP cylinders to Portsmouth.

empty. The management of the DOE non-DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders at Paducah is considered in the EIS; however, the non-DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders would not be processed in the conversion facility. In addition, in storage at ETTP are approximately 4,800 DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders and approximately 1,100 non-DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders. Although not part of the proposed action, this EIS considers as an option the shipment of all ETTP cylinders to Paducah and conversion of the DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders.

### S.1.1.1 Creation of USEC

In 1993, the U.S. government began the process of privatizing uranium enrichment services by creating the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC), a wholly owned government corporation, pursuant to the *Energy Policy Act of 1992* (Public Law [P.L.] 102-186). The Paducah and Portsmouth GDPs were leased to USEC, but DOE retained responsibility for storage, maintenance, and disposition of 46,422 DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders produced before 1993 and located at the three gaseous diffusion plant sites (28,351 at Paducah, 13,388 at Portsmouth, and 4,683 at K-25). In 1996, the *USEC Privatization Act* (P.L. 104-134) transferred ownership of USEC from the government to private investors. This act provided for the allocation of USEC's liabilities between the U.S. government (including DOE) and the new private corporation, including liabilities for DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders generated by USEC before privatization.

In May and June of 1998, USEC and DOE signed two memoranda of agreement (MOAs) regarding the allocation of responsibilities for depleted uranium generated by USEC after 1993. The two MOAs transferred ownership of a total of 11,400 DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders from USEC to DOE.

On June 17, 2002, DOE and USEC signed a third agreement to transfer up to 23,300 t (25,684 tons) of DUF<sub>6</sub> from USEC to DOE between 2002 and 2006. The exact number of cylinders was not specified. Transfer of ownership of all the material will take place at Paducah. While title to the DUF<sub>6</sub> is transferred to DOE under this agreement, custody and cylinder management responsibility remains with USEC until DOE requests the USEC deliver the cylinders for processing in the conversion facility.

### Cylinder-Related Terms Used in This EIS

#### Types of UF<sub>6</sub>

UF <sub>6</sub>	A chemical composed of one atom of uranium combined with six atoms of fluorine. UF <sub>6</sub> is a volatile white crystalline solid at ambient conditions.
Normal UF <sub>6</sub>	UF <sub>6</sub> made with uranium that contains the isotope uranium-235 at a concentration equal to that found in nature, that is, 0.7% uranium-235.
DUF <sub>6</sub>	UF <sub>6</sub> made with uranium that contains the isotope uranium-235 in concentrations less than the 0.7% found in nature. In general, the DOE DUF <sub>6</sub> contains between 0.2% and 0.4% uranium-235.
Enriched UF <sub>6</sub>	UF <sub>6</sub> made with uranium containing more than 0.7% uranium-235. In general, DOE enriched UF <sub>6</sub> considered in this EIS contains less than 5% uranium-235.
Reprocessed UF <sub>6</sub>	UF <sub>6</sub> made with uranium that was previously irradiated in a nuclear reactor and chemically separated during reprocessing.

#### Types of Cylinders

Full DUF <sub>6</sub>	Cylinders filled to 62% of their volume with DUF <sub>6</sub> (some cylinders are slightly overfilled).
Partially Full	Cylinders that contain more than 50 lb (23 kg) of DUF <sub>6</sub> but less than 62% of their volume.
Heel	Cylinders that contain less than 50 lb (23 kg) of residual nonvolatile material left after the DUF <sub>6</sub> has been removed.
Empty	Cylinders that have had the DUF <sub>6</sub> and heel material removed and contain essentially no residual material.
Feed	Cylinders used to supply UF <sub>6</sub> into the enrichment process. Most feed cylinders contain natural UF <sub>6</sub> , although some historically contained reprocessed UF <sub>6</sub> .
Non-DUF <sub>6</sub>	A term used in this EIS to refer to cylinders that contain enriched UF <sub>6</sub> or normal UF <sub>6</sub> .

### S.1.1.2 Growing Concern over the DUF<sub>6</sub> Inventory

In May 1995, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB), an independent DOE oversight organization within the Executive Branch, issued Recommendation 95-1 regarding storage of the DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders. This document advised that DOE should take three actions: (1) start an early program to renew the protective coating on cylinders containing DUF<sub>6</sub> from the historical production of enriched uranium, (2) explore the possibility of additional measures to protect the cylinders from the damaging effects of exposure to the elements as well as any additional handling that might be called for, and (3) institute a study to determine whether a more suitable chemical form should be selected for long-term storage of depleted uranium.

In response to Recommendation 95-1, DOE began an aggressive effort to better manage its DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders, known as the *UF<sub>6</sub> Cylinder Project Management Plan*. This plan incorporated more rigorous and more frequent inspections, a multiyear schedule for painting and refurbishing cylinders, and construction of concrete-pad cylinder yards. In December 1999, the DNFSB determined that DOE's implementation of the *UF<sub>6</sub> Cylinder Project Management Plan* was successful, and, as a result, on December 16, 1999, it closed Recommendation 95-1.

Several affected states also expressed concern over the DOE DUF<sub>6</sub> inventory. In October 1992, the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency (OEPA) issued a Notice of Violation (NOV) alleging that DUF<sub>6</sub> stored at the Portsmouth facility is subject to regulation under state hazardous waste laws. The NOV stated that the OEPA had determined DUF<sub>6</sub> to be a solid waste and that DOE had violated Ohio laws and regulations by not evaluating whether such waste was hazardous. DOE disagreed with this assessment and entered into discussions with the OEPA that continued through February 1998, when an agreement was reached. Ultimately, in February 1998, DOE and the OEPA agreed to set aside the issue of whether the DUF<sub>6</sub> is subject to state hazardous waste regulation and instituted a negotiated management plan governing the storage of the Portsmouth DUF<sub>6</sub>. The agreement also requires DOE to continue its efforts to evaluate the potential use or reuse of the material. The agreement expires in 2008.

Similarly, in February 1999, DOE and the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation (TDEC) entered into a consent order that included a requirement for the performance of two environmentally beneficial projects: the implementation of a negotiated management plan governing the storage of the small inventory (relative to other sites) of all UF<sub>6</sub> (depleted, enriched, and natural) cylinders stored at the ETTP site and the removal of the DUF<sub>6</sub> from the ETTP site or the conversion of the material by December 31, 2009. The consent order further requires DOE to submit a plan, within 60 days of completing NEPA review of its long-term DUF<sub>6</sub> management strategy, that contains schedules for activities related to removal of cylinders from the ETTP site.

In Kentucky, a final Agreed Order between DOE and the Kentucky Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet concerning DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinder management was entered in October 2003. This Agreed Order requires that DOE provide the Kentucky Department of Environmental Protection with an inventory of all DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders for which DOE has management responsibility at the Paducah site and, with regard to that inventory, that DOE implement the DUF<sub>6</sub> Cylinder Management Plan, which is Attachment 1 to the Agreed Order.

### S.1.1.3 Programmatic NEPA Review and Congressional Interest

In 1994, DOE began work on a *Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Alternative Strategies for the Long-Term Management and Use of Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride* (DUF<sub>6</sub> PEIS) (DOE/EIS-0269) to evaluate potential broad management options for DOE's DUF<sub>6</sub> inventory. Alternatives considered included continued storage of DUF<sub>6</sub> in cylinders at the gaseous diffusion plant sites or at a consolidated site, and the use of technologies for converting the DUF<sub>6</sub> to a more stable chemical form for long-term storage, use, or disposal. DOE issued the draft DUF<sub>6</sub> PEIS for public review and comment in December 1997 and held hearings near each of the three sites where DUF<sub>6</sub> is currently stored (Paducah, Kentucky; Oak Ridge, Tennessee; and Portsmouth, Ohio) and in Washington, D.C. In response to its efforts, DOE received some 600 comments.

In July 1998, while the PEIS was being prepared, the President signed into law P.L. 105-204. The text of P.L. 105-204 pertinent to the management of DUF<sub>6</sub> is as follows:

- (a) *PLAN.* – *The Secretary of Energy shall prepare, and the President shall include in the budget request for fiscal year 2000, a Plan and proposed legislation to ensure that all amounts accrued on the books of the United States Enrichment Corporation for the disposition of depleted uranium hexafluoride will be used to commence construction of, not later than January 31, 2004, and to operate, an onsite facility at each of the gaseous diffusion plants at Paducah, Kentucky, and Portsmouth, Ohio, to treat and recycle depleted uranium hexafluoride consistent with the National Environmental Policy Act.*

DOE began, therefore, to prepare a responsive plan while it proceeded with the PEIS.

On March 12, 1999, DOE submitted the plan to Congress; no legislation was proposed. In April 1999, DOE issued the final DUF<sub>6</sub> PEIS. The PEIS identified conversion of DUF<sub>6</sub> to another chemical form for use or long-term storage as part of the preferred management alternative. In the Record of Decision (ROD) (64 FR 43358, August 10, 1999), DOE decided to promptly convert the DUF<sub>6</sub> inventory to a more stable uranium oxide form. DOE also stated that it would use the depleted uranium oxide as much as possible and store the remaining depleted uranium oxide for potential future uses or disposal, as necessary. In addition, DUF<sub>6</sub> would be converted to depleted uranium metal only if uses for metal were available. DOE did not select a specific site or sites for the conversion facilities but reserved that decision for subsequent NEPA review. (This EIS is that site-specific review.)

Then, in July 1999, DOE issued the *Final Plan for the Conversion of Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride as Required by Public Law 105-204*. The Conversion Plan describes the steps that would allow DOE to convert the DUF<sub>6</sub> inventory to a more stable chemical form. It incorporates information received from the private sector in response to a DOE request for expressions of interest; ideas from members of the affected communities, Congress, and other interested stakeholders; and the results of the analyses for the final DUF<sub>6</sub> PEIS. The Conversion Plan

describes DOE's intent to chemically process the DUF<sub>6</sub> to create products that would present a lower long-term storage hazard and provide a material suitable for use or disposal.

#### **S.1.1.4 DOE Request for Contractor Proposals and Site-Specific NEPA Review**

DOE initiated the final Conversion Plan on July 30, 1999, and announced the availability of a draft Request for Proposals (RFP) for a contractor to design, construct, and operate DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion facilities at the Paducah and Portsmouth sites.

In early 2000, the RFP was modified to allow for a wider range of potential conversion product forms and process technologies than had been previously reviewed in the DUF<sub>6</sub> PEIS (the PEIS considered conversion to triuranium octaoxide [U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub>] and uranium dioxide [UO<sub>2</sub>] for disposal and conversion to uranium metal for use). DOE stated that if the selected conversion technology would generate a previously unconsidered product (e.g., depleted uranium tetrafluoride [UF<sub>4</sub>]), DOE would review the potential environmental impacts as part of the site-specific NEPA review.

On October 31, 2000, DOE issued a final RFP to procure a contractor to design, construct, and operate DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion facilities at the Paducah and Portsmouth sites. The RFP stated that any conversion facilities that would be built would have to convert the DUF<sub>6</sub> within a 25-year period to a more stable chemical form that would be suitable for either beneficial use or disposal. The selected contractor would use its proposed technology to design, construct, and operate the conversion facilities for an initial 5-year period. Operation would include (1) maintaining the DUF<sub>6</sub> inventories and conversion product inventories; (2) transporting all UF<sub>6</sub> storage cylinders currently located at ETTP to a conversion facility at the Portsmouth site, as appropriate; and (3) transporting to an appropriate disposal site any conversion product for which no use was found. The selected contractor would also be responsible for preparing such excess material for disposal.

In March 2001, DOE announced the receipt of five proposals in response to the RFP, three of which proposed conversion to U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> and two of which proposed conversion to UF<sub>4</sub>. In August 2001, DOE deemed three of these proposals to be within the competitive range; two conversion to U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> proposals and one conversion to UF<sub>4</sub> proposal.

On September 18, 2001, DOE published the NOI in the *Federal Register* (66 FR 48123), announcing its intention to prepare an EIS for the proposed action to construct, operate, maintain, and decontaminate and decommission two DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion facilities at Portsmouth, Ohio, and Paducah, Kentucky. DOE held three scoping meetings to provide the public with an opportunity to present comments on the scope of the EIS and to ask questions and discuss concerns with DOE officials regarding the EIS. The scoping meetings were held in Piketon, Ohio, on November 28, 2001; in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, on December 4, 2001; and in Paducah, Kentucky, on December 6, 2001.

The alternatives identified in the NOI included a two-plant alternative (one at the Paducah site and another at the Portsmouth site), a one-plant alternative (only one plant would be

built, at either the Paducah or the Portsmouth site), an alternative using existing UF<sub>6</sub> conversion capacity at commercial nuclear fuel fabrication facilities, and a no action alternative. For alternatives that involved constructing one or two new plants, DOE planned to consider alternative conversion technologies, local siting alternatives within the Paducah and Portsmouth site boundaries, and the shipment of DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders stored at ETTP to either the Portsmouth site or to the Paducah site. The technologies to be considered in the EIS were those submitted in response to the October 2000 RFP, plus any other technologies that DOE believed must be considered.

#### **S.1.1.5 Public Law 107-206 Passed by Congress**

During the site-specific NEPA review process, Congress acted again regarding DUF<sub>6</sub> management, and on August 2, 2002, the President signed the *2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act for Further Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States* (P.L. 107-206). The pertinent part of P.L. 107-206 had several requirements: that no later than 30 days after enactment, DOE must select for award of a contract for the scope of work described in the October 2000 RFP, including design, construction, and operation of a DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion facility at each of the Department's Paducah, Kentucky, and Portsmouth, Ohio, gaseous diffusion sites; that the contract require groundbreaking for construction to occur no later than July 31, 2004; that the contract require construction to proceed expeditiously thereafter; that the contract include as an item of performance the transportation, conversion, and disposition of DU contained in cylinders located at ETTP, consistent with environmental agreements between the State of Tennessee and the Secretary of Energy; and that no later than 5 days after the date of groundbreaking for each facility, the Secretary of Energy shall submit to Congress a certification that groundbreaking has occurred. The relevant portions of the Appropriations Act are set forth in Appendix A of this EIS.

In response to P.L. 107-206, on August 29, 2002, DOE awarded a contract to UDS for construction and operation of two conversion facilities. DOE also reevaluated the appropriate scope of its site-specific NEPA review and decided to prepare two separate EISs, one for the plant proposed for the Paducah site and a second for the Portsmouth site. This change in approach was announced in the *Federal Register* on April 28, 2003 (68 FR 22368).

The two draft site-specific conversion facility EISs were mailed to stakeholders in late November 2003, and a notice of availability was published by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in the *Federal Register* on November 28, 2003 (68 FR 66824). Comments on the draft EISs were accepted during a 67-day review period, from November 28, 2003, until February 2, 2004. Public hearings on the draft EISs were held near Portsmouth, Ohio, on January 7, 2004; Paducah, Kentucky, on January 13, 2004; and Oak Ridge, Tennessee, on January 15, 2004.

### S.1.1.6 Characteristics of DUF<sub>6</sub>

The gaseous diffusion process uses uranium in the form of UF<sub>6</sub>, primarily because UF<sub>6</sub> can conveniently be used in gaseous form for processing, in liquid form for filling or emptying containers, and in solid form for storage. Solid UF<sub>6</sub> is a white, dense, crystalline material that resembles rock salt. Depleted uranium is uranium that, through the enrichment process, has been stripped of a portion of the uranium-235 that it once contained so that its proportion is lower than the 0.7 percent by weight (wt%) found in nature. The uranium in most of DOE's DUF<sub>6</sub> has between 0.2 wt% and 0.4 wt% uranium-235.

The chemical and physical characteristics of DUF<sub>6</sub> pose potential health risks, and the material is handled accordingly. Uranium and its decay products in DUF<sub>6</sub> emit low levels of alpha, beta, gamma, and neutron radiation. If DUF<sub>6</sub> is released to the atmosphere, it reacts with water vapor in the air to form HF and a uranium oxyfluoride compound called uranyl fluoride (UO<sub>2</sub>F<sub>2</sub>), which can be harmful to human health if inhaled or ingested in sufficient quantities. Uranium is a heavy metal that, in addition to being radioactive, can have toxic chemical effects (primarily on the kidneys) if it enters the bloodstream by means of ingestion or inhalation. HF is an extremely corrosive gas that can damage the lungs and cause death if inhaled at high enough concentrations. In light of such characteristics, DOE stores DUF<sub>6</sub> in a manner designed to minimize the risk to workers, the public, and the environment.

As the inventory of DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders ages, some cylinders have begun to show evidence of external corrosion. At Paducah, a total of three cylinder breaches have occurred (see text box on next page). However, since DUF<sub>6</sub> is solid at ambient temperatures and pressures, it is not readily released after a cylinder leak or breach due to corrosion. When a hole develops in a cylinder, moist air reacts with the exposed solid DUF<sub>6</sub> and iron, forming a dense plug of solid uranium and iron compounds and a small amount of HF gas. The plug limits the amount of material released from a breached cylinder. When a hole in a cylinder is identified, the cylinder is typically repaired or its contents are transferred to a new cylinder. Following a large release of solid UF<sub>6</sub> (generally possible only if a cylinder is involved in a fire), the UF<sub>6</sub> would slowly react with moisture in the air, forming UO<sub>2</sub>F<sub>2</sub> and HF, which would be dispersed downwind. The presence of a fire can result in a more rapid reaction and a larger release of UO<sub>2</sub>F<sub>2</sub> and HF.

Because reprocessed uranium was enriched in the early years of gaseous diffusion, some of the DUF<sub>6</sub> inventory is contaminated with small amounts of technetium (Tc) and the transuranic (TRU) elements plutonium (Pu), neptunium (Np), and americium (Am). The final RFP for conversion services concluded that any DUF<sub>6</sub> contaminated with TRU elements and Tc at the concentrations expected could be safely handled in a conversion facility. As discussed in this EIS, the risk associated with potential contamination would be relatively small, and those cylinders would be processed in the same manner as cylinders not containing TRU and Tc contamination.

Some of the cylinders manufactured before 1978 were painted with coatings containing polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs). (Although PCBs are no longer in production in the United States, from the 1950s to the late 1970s, PCBs were added to some paints as fungicides and to increase durability and flexibility.) The long persistence of PCBs in the environment and

the tendency for bioaccumulation in the foodchain has resulted in regulations to prevent their release and distribution in the environment. Potential issues associated with PCB-containing cylinder coatings are addressed in more detail in Appendix B of the EIS. As discussed in Appendix B, the presence of PCBs in the coatings of some cylinders is not expected to result in health and safety risks to workers or the public.

### S.1.2 Purpose and Need

DOE needs to convert its inventory of DUF<sub>6</sub> to a more stable chemical form for use or disposal. This need follows directly from (1) the decision presented in the August 1999 ROD for the PEIS, namely, to begin conversion of the DUF<sub>6</sub> inventory as soon as possible, and (2) P.L. 107-206, which directs DOE to award a contract for construction and operation of conversion facilities at both the Paducah site and the Portsmouth site.

### S.1.3 Proposed Action

The proposed action evaluated in this EIS is to construct and operate a conversion facility at the Paducah site for converting the Paducah DUF<sub>6</sub> inventory into depleted uranium oxide (primarily U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub>) and other conversion products. The action includes construction, operation, maintenance, and D&D of the proposed DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion facility at the Paducah site; transportation of depleted uranium conversion products and waste materials to a disposal facility; transportation and sale of the HF produced as a conversion co-product; and neutralization of HF to CaF<sub>2</sub> and its sale or disposal in the event that the HF product is not sold. Although not part of the proposed action, this EIS considers an option of shipping the cylinders stored at ETTP to Paducah rather than to Portsmouth (under this option, DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders would be converted and non-DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders would be stored for ultimate use) and an option of expanding facility operations.

#### Summary Data for Breached Cylinders at the Storage Sites through 2003

**Paducah Site, three breached cylinders:** One identified in 1992 was initiated by mechanical damage during stacking. The breached area was about 0.06 in. × 2 in. (0.16 cm × 5.1 cm). Estimated material loss was 0. The other two cylinder breaches were identified as breached because of missing cylinder plugs; they were identified between 1998 and 2002. Material loss from these cylinders was not estimated.

**ETTP Site, five breached cylinders:** Four were identified in 1991 and 1992. Two of these were initiated by mechanical damage during stacking, and two were caused by external corrosion due to prolonged ground contact. The breach areas for these four cylinders were about 2 in. (5.1 cm), 6 in. (15 cm), and 10 in. (25 cm) in diameter for three circular breaches, and 17 in. × 12 in. for a rectangular-shaped breach. The mass of material loss from the cylinders could not be estimated because equipment to weigh the cylinders was not available at the ETTP site. The fifth breach occurred in 1998 and was caused by steel grit blasting, which resulted in a breach at the location of an as-fabricated weld defect (immediately repaired without loss of DUF<sub>6</sub>).

**Portsmouth Site, three breached cylinders:** Two identified in 1990 were initiated by mechanical damage during stacking; the damage was not noticed immediately, and subsequent corrosion occurred at the point of damage. The largest breach size was about 9 in. × 18 in. (23 cm × 46 cm); the estimated mass of DUF<sub>6</sub> lost was between 17 and 109 lb (7.7 and 49 kg). The next largest cylinder breach had an area of about 2 in. (5.1 cm) in diameter; the estimated DUF<sub>6</sub> lost was less than 4 lb (1.8 kg). The third breached cylinder occurred in 1996 and was the result of handling equipment knocking off a cylinder plug.

#### S.1.4 Scope

The scope of an EIS refers to the range of actions, alternatives, and impacts it considers. As noted in Section S.1.1.4, on September 18, 2001, DOE published a NOI in the *Federal Register* (66 FR 48123) announcing its intention to prepare an EIS for a proposal to construct, operate, maintain, and decontaminate and decommission two DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion facilities at Portsmouth, Ohio, and Paducah, Kentucky. The NOI announced that the scoping period for the EIS would be open until November 26, 2001. The scoping period was later extended to January 11, 2002. During the scoping process, the public was given six ways to submit comments on the DUF<sub>6</sub> proposal to DOE, including public meetings, mail, facsimile transmission, voice messages, electronic mail, and through a dedicated Web site. DOE held public scoping meetings near Paducah, Kentucky, Portsmouth, Ohio, and Oak Ridge, Tennessee, to give the public an opportunity to present comments on the scope of the EIS and to ask questions and discuss concerns regarding the EIS with DOE officials. The scoping meeting in Paducah, Kentucky, was held on December 6, 2001. Approximately 140 comments were received from about 30 individuals and organizations during the scoping period via all media. These comments were examined to determine the proposed scope of this EIS. Comments were related primarily to five major issues: (1) DOE policy; (2) alternatives; (3) cylinder inventory, maintenance, and surveillance; (4) transportation; and (5) general environmental concerns. Comments received in response to the April 28, 2003, Notice of Change in NEPA Compliance Approach were similar to those made during the public scoping period and were also considered.

The alternatives that are evaluated and compared in this EIS represent reasonable alternatives for converting DUF<sub>6</sub>. Three alternative locations within the Paducah site are evaluated in detail in this EIS for the proposed action as well as a no action alternative. In addition, this EIS considers an option of shipping the cylinders at ETTP to Paducah, although current proposals call for these cylinders to be shipped to Portsmouth, and an option of expanding the conversion facility operations. These alternatives and options, as well as alternatives considered but not evaluated in detail, are described in more detail in Chapter 2.

#### S.1.5 Public Review of the Draft EIS

The two draft site-specific conversion facility EISs were mailed to stakeholders in late November 2003, and a notice of availability was published by the EPA in the *Federal Register* on November 28, 2003 (68 FR 66824). In addition, each EIS was also made available in its entirety on the Internet at the same time, and e-mail notification was sent to those on the project Web site mailing list. Stakeholders were encouraged to provide comments on the draft EISs during a 67-day review period, from November 28, 2003, until February 2, 2004. Comments could be submitted by calling a toll-free number, by fax, by letter, by e-mail, or through the project Web site. Comments could also be submitted at public hearings held near Portsmouth, Ohio, on January 7, 2004; Paducah, Kentucky, on January 13, 2004; and Oak Ridge, Tennessee, on January 15, 2004. The public hearings were announced on the project Web site and in local newspapers prior to the meetings.

A total of about 210 comments was received during the comment period. The comments received and DOE's responses to those comments are presented in Volume 2 of this EIS. Because of the similarities in the proposed actions and the general applicability of many of the comments to both the Portsmouth and the Paducah site-specific conversion facility EISs, all comments received on both EISs are included in Volume 2. In addition, all comments received were considered in the preparation of both final EISs.

The most common issues raised by reviewers were related to support for the proposed action and preferred alternative, transportation of cylinders, removal of cylinders from the ETTP site, the potential for DOE to accept additional DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders from other sources, the recently announced USEC American Centrifuge Facility, and general health and safety concerns. Several revisions were made to the two site-specific conversion facility draft EISs on the basis of the comments received (changes are indicated by vertical lines in the right margin of the document). The vast majority of the changes were made to provide clarification and additional detail. Specific responses to each comment received on the draft EISs are presented in Volume 2 of this EIS.

### **S.1.6 Relationship to Other NEPA Reviews**

This DUF<sub>6</sub> Conversion EIS, along with the Portsmouth conversion facility EIS (DOE/EIS-0360), represent the second level of a tiered environmental review process being used to evaluate and implement DOE's DUF<sub>6</sub> Management Program. The project-level review in these conversion facility EISs incorporates, by reference, the programmatic analysis, as appropriate, from the DUF<sub>6</sub> PEIS published by DOE in 1999.

In addition to the Portsmouth conversion facility EIS, which is directly related to this EIS, DOE has prepared (or is preparing) other NEPA reviews that are related to the management of DUF<sub>6</sub> or to the current DUF<sub>6</sub> storage sites. These reviews were evaluated and their results taken into consideration in the preparation of this EIS. The related reviews included continued waste management activities at Paducah, demonstration of a mixed waste vitrification process at Paducah, and long-term management for DOE's inventory of potentially reusable uranium.

In addition, DOE prepared a Supplement Analysis for the shipment of up to 1,700 DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders that meet transportation requirements from ETTP to Portsmouth in fiscal years (FYs) 2003 through 2005. Based on the Supplement Analysis, DOE issued an amended ROD to the PEIS concluding that the estimated impacts for the proposed transport of up to 1,700 cylinders were less than or equal to those considered in the PEIS and that no further NEPA documentation was required (68 FR 53603). Nonetheless, this EIS considers shipment of all DUF<sub>6</sub> and non-DUF<sub>6</sub> at ETTP to Paducah by truck and rail.

### **S.1.7 Organization of This Environmental Impact Statement**

This DUF<sub>6</sub> Conversion EIS consists of two volumes. Volume 1 contains 10 chapters and 8 appendixes. Chapter 1 describes background information, the purpose and need for the DOE

action, the scope of the assessment, and related NEPA reviews and other studies. Chapter 2 defines the alternatives and options considered in this EIS. Chapter 3 discusses the environmental setting at the Paducah and ETTP sites. Chapter 4 addresses the assumptions, approach, and methods used in the impact analyses. Chapter 5 discusses the potential environmental impacts of the alternatives, and Chapter 6 identifies the major laws, regulations, and other requirements applicable to implementing the alternatives. Chapter 7 lists the cited references used in preparing this EIS, and Chapter 8 lists the names of those who prepared this EIS. Chapter 9 is a glossary of technical terms used in this EIS, and Chapter 10 is a subject matter index.

The eight appendixes in Volume 1 include a summary of the pertinent text from P.L. 107-206 (Appendix A), a discussion of issues associated with potential TRU and Tc contamination (Appendix B), comments received during public scoping and from the Notice of Change in NEPA Compliance Approach (Appendix C), the environmental synopsis prepared to support the DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion procurement process (Appendix D), the potential sale of HF and CaF<sub>2</sub> and estimated health and socioeconomic impacts associated with their use (Appendix E), a description of discipline-specific assessment methodologies (Appendix F), letters of consultation (Appendix G), and the contractor disclosure statement (Appendix H).

Volume 2 of the EIS is the comment response document prepared after the public review of the draft EIS. Volume 2 contains an overview of the public review process, copies of the letters or other documents that contained comments to DOE, and the responses to all comments received.

## **S.2 ALTERNATIVES**

The alternatives considered in this EIS are summarized in Table S-2 and described below.

### **S.2.1 No Action Alternative**

Under the no action alternative, it is assumed that DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinder storage would continue indefinitely at the Paducah site. The no action alternative assumes that DOE would continue surveillance and maintenance activities to ensure the continued safe storage of cylinders. Potential environmental impacts are estimated through the year 2039. The year 2039 was selected to be consistent with the PEIS, which evaluated a 40-year cylinder storage period (1999–2039). In addition, long-term impacts (i.e., occurring after 2039) from potential cylinder breaches are assessed.

Specifically, the activities assumed to occur under no action include routine cylinder inspections, ultrasonic testing of the wall thicknesses of selected cylinders, painting of cylinders to prevent corrosion, cylinder yard surveillance and maintenance, reconstruction of several storage yards, and relocation of some cylinders to the new or improved yards. It was assumed that cylinders would be painted every 10 years. On the basis of these activities, an assessment of the potential impacts on workers, members of the general public, and the environment was conducted.

For assessment purposes in this EIS, two cylinder breach cases were evaluated. In the first case, it was assumed that the planned cylinder maintenance and painting program would maintain the cylinders in a protected condition and control further corrosion. For this case, it was assumed that after initial painting, some breaches would occur from handling damage; a total of 36 future breaches were estimated to occur through 2039. In the second case, it was assumed that external corrosion would not be halted by improved storage conditions, cylinder maintenance, and painting. This case was considered in order to account for uncertainties with regard to how effective painting would be in controlling cylinder corrosion and uncertainties in the future painting schedule. In this case, the number of future breaches estimated through 2039 was 444 for the Paducah site (i.e., 11 per year).

The estimated number of future breaches at the Paducah site was used to estimate potential impacts that might occur during the repair of breached cylinders and impacts from releases that might occur during continued cylinder storage.

### S.2.2 Proposed Action Alternatives

The proposed action evaluated in this EIS is to construct and operate a conversion facility at the Paducah site for converting the DUF<sub>6</sub> inventory stored at Paducah into depleted uranium oxide (primarily U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub>) and other conversion products. Three alternative locations within the Paducah site are evaluated (Table S-2). The conversion facility would convert DUF<sub>6</sub> into a stable chemical form for beneficial use/reuse and/or disposal. The off-gas from the conversion process would yield aqueous HF, which would be processed and marketed or converted to a solid for sale or disposal. To support the conversion operations, the emptied DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders would be stored, handled, and processed for reuse as uranium oxide disposal containers to the extent practicable. The time period considered is a construction period of approximately 2 years, an operational period of 25 years, and a 3-year period for the D&D of the facility. Current plans call for construction to begin in the summer of 2004. The assessment is based on the conceptual conversion facility design proposed by UDS, the selected contractor (see text box).

#### Alternatives Considered in This EIS

**No Action:** NEPA regulations require evaluation of a no action alternative as a basis for comparing alternatives. In this EIS, the no action alternative is storage of DUF<sub>6</sub> and non-DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders indefinitely in yards at the Paducah site, with continued cylinder surveillance and maintenance activities.

**Proposed Action:** Construction and operation of a conversion facility at the Paducah site for conversion of the Paducah DUF<sub>6</sub> inventory into depleted uranium oxide (primarily U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub>) and other conversion products.

**Action Alternatives:** Three action alternatives focus on where to construct the conversion facility within the Paducah site (Alternative Locations A, B, and C). The preferred alternative is Location A.

#### Proposed Action

The proposed action in this EIS is construction and operation of a conversion facility at the Paducah site for conversion of the Paducah DUF<sub>6</sub> inventory into depleted uranium oxide (primarily U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub>) and other conversion products. Three alternative locations within the Paducah site are evaluated (Locations A, B, and C).

The action alternatives focus on where to site the conversion facility within the Paducah site. The Paducah site was evaluated to identify alternative locations for a conversion facility. The three alternative locations identified at the Paducah site, denoted Locations A, B, and C, are shown in Figure S-3.

#### **S.2.2.1 Alternative Location A (Preferred Alternative)**

Location A is the preferred location for the conversion facility. It is located south of the administration building and its parking lot, immediately west of and next to the primary location of the DOE cylinder yards and east of the main plant access road. This location is an L-shaped tract consisting mostly of grassy field. However, the southeastern section is a wooded area. A drainage ditch crosses the northern part of the site, giving the cylinder yard storm water access to the Kentucky Pollution Discharge Elimination System (KPDES) Outfall 017. This location is about 35 acres (14 ha) in size. This location was identified in the RFP for conversion services as the site for which bidders were to design their proposed facilities.

#### **S.2.2.2 Alternative Location B**

Location B is directly south of the Paducah maintenance building and west of the main plant access road. The northern part of this location is mowed grass and has a slightly rolling topography. The southern part has a dense covering of trees and brush, and some high-voltage power lines cross it, limiting its use. This location has an area of about 59 acres (23 ha).

#### **S.2.2.3 Alternative Location C**

Location C is east of the Paducah pump house and cooling towers. It has an area of about 53 acres (21 ha). Dykes Road runs through the center of this location from north to south. Use of the eastern half of this location could be somewhat limited because several high-voltage power lines run through this area.

#### **S.2.2.4 Conversion Process Description**

The proposed conversion system is based on a proven commercial process in operation at the Framatome Advanced Nuclear Power fuel fabrication facility in Richland, Washington. The UDS dry conversion is a continuous process in which DUF<sub>6</sub> is vaporized and converted to

#### **Conversion Facility Design**

This EIS is based on the conversion facility design being developed by UDS, the selected conversion contractor. At the time the draft EIS was prepared, the UDS design was in the 30% conceptual stage, with several facility design options being considered.

Following the public comment period, the draft EIS was revised on the basis of comments received and on the basis of UDS 100% conceptual facility design. This final EIS identifies and evaluates design options where possible.

a mixture of uranium oxides (primarily U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub>) by reaction with steam and hydrogen in a fluidized-bed conversion unit. The hydrogen is generated using anhydrous ammonia (NH<sub>3</sub>). Nitrogen is also used as an inert purging gas and is released to the atmosphere through the building stack as part of the clean off-gas stream. The depleted U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> powder is collected and packaged for disposition. The process equipment would be arranged in parallel lines. Each line would consist of two autoclaves, two conversion units, a HF recovery system, and process off-gas scrubbers. The Paducah facility would have four parallel conversion lines. Equipment would also be installed to collect the HF co-product and process it into any combination of several marketable products. A backup HF acid neutralization system would be provided to convert up to 100% of the HF acid to CaF<sub>2</sub> for storage, sale, or disposal in the future, if necessary. Figure S-4 is an overall material flow diagram for the conversion facility; Figure S-5 is a conceptual facility site plan. A summary of key facility characteristics is presented in Table S-3.

The conversion facility will be designed to convert 18,000 t (20,000 tons) of DUF<sub>6</sub> per year, requiring 25 years to convert the Paducah inventory. The Paducah processing facility would be approximately 148 ft × 271 ft (45 m × 83 m). The conversion facility would occupy a total of approximately 10 acres (4 ha), with up to 45 acres (18 ha) of land disturbed during construction (including temporary construction lay-down areas and utility access). Some of the disturbed areas would be areas cleared for railroad or utility access, not adjacent to the construction area.

The conversion process would generate four conversion products that have a potential use or reuse: depleted U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub>, HF, CaF<sub>2</sub>, and steel from emptied DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders (if not used as disposal containers). DOE has been working with industrial and academic researchers for several years to identify potential uses for these products. Some potential uses for depleted uranium exist or are being developed, and DOE believes that a viable market exists for the HF generated during conversion. To take advantage of these to the extent possible, DOE requested in the RFP that the bidders for conversion services investigate and propose viable uses. Table S-4 summarizes the probable disposition paths identified by UDS for each of the conversion products.

#### **S.2.2.5 Option of Shipping ETTP Cylinders to Paducah**

DOE proposes to ship the DUF<sub>6</sub> and non-DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders at ETTP to Portsmouth. However, this EIS considers an option of sending the ETTP cylinders to Paducah. All shipments of ETTP cylinders would have to be made consistent with U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations for the shipment of radioactive materials as specified in Title 49 of the CFR (see text box on page S-24). A large number of the ETTP DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders do not meet the DOT requirements intended to maintain the safety of shipments during both routine and accident conditions. Some cylinders have physically deteriorated such that they no longer meet the DOT requirements. Currently, it is estimated that 1,700 cylinders are DOT compliant.

Before shipment, each cylinder would be inspected to determine if it met DOT requirements. This inspection would include a record review to determine if the cylinder was overfilled; a visual inspection for damage or defects; a pressure check to determine if the cylinder was overpressurized; and an ultrasonic wall thickness measurement (based on a visual inspection, if necessary). If a cylinder passed the inspection, the appropriate documentation would be prepared, and the cylinder would be loaded directly for shipment.

This EIS considers three options for shipping noncompliant cylinders from ETTP: obtaining an exemption from the DOT to ship the cylinders “as-is” or following repairs, use of cylinder overpacks, and use of a cylinder transfer facility. For an exemption to be granted, DOE would have to demonstrate that the proposed shipments would achieve a level of safety that would be at least equal to the level required by the regulations, likely requiring some type of compensatory measures. An overpack (the second option) is a container into which a cylinder is placed for shipment. The overpack would be designed, tested, and certified to meet all DOT shipping requirements. It would be suitable for containing, transporting, and storing the cylinder contents regardless of cylinder condition. The third option considers the transfer of the DUF<sub>6</sub> from substandard cylinders to new or used cylinders that would meet all DOT requirements. This option could require the construction of a new cylinder transfer facility at ETTP, for which there are no current plans. If a decision were made to construct such a facility, additional NEPA review would be conducted. Transportation impacts are estimated for shipment by both truck and rail after cylinder preparation.

#### **S.2.2.6 Option of Expanding Conversion Facility Operations**

The conversion facility at Paducah is currently being designed to process the DOE DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinder inventory at the site over 25 years by using four process lines (see Sections S.2.2.4 and 2.2.2). There are no current plans to operate the conversion facility beyond this time period or to increase the throughput of the facility by adding an additional process line. However, a future decision to extend conversion facility operations or increase throughput at the site could be made for several reasons. Consequently, this EIS includes an evaluation of the environmental impacts associated with expanding conversion facility operations at the site in order to provide future planning flexibility. (Impacts are discussed in Section S.5.22 and presented in detail in Section 5.2.6.) The possible reasons for expanding operations in the future are discussed below.

The DOE Office of Inspector General (OIG) issued a final audit report in March 2004 reviewing the proposed depleted uranium hexafluoride conversion project. The OIG report recommends that the Office of Environmental Management (EM) conduct a cost benefit analysis to determine the optimum size of the Portsmouth conversion facility and, on the basis of the results of that review, implement the most cost-effective approach. The report states that by adding an additional process line to the Portsmouth facility, the time to process the Portsmouth and ETTP inventories of DUF<sub>6</sub> could be shortened by 5 years at a substantial cost savings of 55 million dollars.

In contrast to the findings at Portsmouth, the OIG report notes that it would not be feasible to add an additional conversion line to the Paducah facility. Consequently, this EIS

evaluates the potential environmental impacts associated with increasing the Paducah plant throughput by implementing process improvements (see Section S.5.22). On the basis of experience with other projects, DOE believes that higher throughput rates can be achieved by improving the efficiency of the planned equipment.

A future decision to extend operations or expand throughput might also result from the fact that DOE could assume management responsibility for DUF<sub>6</sub> in addition to the current inventory. Possible reasons include future DOE management responsibility for DUF<sub>6</sub> due to regulatory changes or possible MOAs between USEC and DOE; development of an advanced enrichment technology by USEC (currently proposed for the Portsmouth site); and new commercial uranium enrichment facilities that may be built and operated in the United States by commercial companies other than USEC. In addition, because the Portsmouth facility would conclude operations approximately 7 years before the current Paducah inventory would be converted at the Paducah site, it is possible that some DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders could be transferred from Paducah to Portsmouth, particularly if DOE assumes responsibility for additional DUF<sub>6</sub> at Paducah. These possibilities are discussed and evaluated in this EIS in order to provide future planning flexibility.

#### **Transportation Requirements for DUF<sub>6</sub> Cylinders**

All shipments of UF<sub>6</sub> cylinders have to be made in accordance with applicable DOT regulations for the shipment of radioactive materials; specifically, the provisions of 49 CFR Part 173, Subpart I. The DOT regulations require that each UF<sub>6</sub> cylinder be designed, fabricated, inspected, tested, and marked in accordance with the various engineering standards that were in effect at the time the cylinder was manufactured. The DOT requirements are intended to maintain the safety of shipments during both routine and accident conditions. The following provisions are particularly important relative to DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinder shipments:

1. A cylinder must be filled to less than 62% of the certified volumetric capacity (the fill limit was reduced from 64% to 62% in about 1987).
2. The pressure within a cylinder must be less than 14.8 psia (subatmospheric pressure).
3. A cylinder must be free of cracks, excessive distortion, bent or broken valves or plugs, and broken or torn stiffening rings or skirts, and it must not have a shell thickness that has decreased below a specified minimum value. (Shell thicknesses are assessed visually by a code vessel inspector, and ultrasonic testing may be specified at the discretion of the inspector to verify wall thickness, when and in areas the inspector deems necessary.)
4. A cylinder must be designed so that it will withstand (1) a hydraulic test at an internal pressure of at least 1.4 megapascals (200 psi) without leakage; (2) a free drop test onto a flat, horizontal surface from a height of 1 ft (0.3 m) to 4 ft (1.2 m), depending on the cylinder's mass, without loss or dispersal; and (3) a 30-minute thermal test equivalent to being engulfed in a hydrocarbon fuel/air fire having an average temperature of at least 800°C (1,475°F) without rupture of the containment system.

### **S.2.3 Alternatives Considered but Not Analyzed in Detail**

#### **S.2.3.1 Use of Commercial Conversion Capacity**

An alternative examined was using existing UF<sub>6</sub> conversion capacity at commercial nuclear fuel fabrication facilities that convert natural or enriched UF<sub>6</sub> to UO<sub>2</sub> in lieu of constructing new conversion capacity for DUF<sub>6</sub>. This alternative was not analyzed in detail because the small capacity possibly available to DOE, coupled with the low interest level expressed by facility owners, indicates that the feasibility of this suggested alternative is low, and the duration of the conversion period is long (more than 125 years).

#### **S.2.3.2 Sites Other Than Paducah**

The consideration of alternative sites was limited to alternative locations within the Paducah site in response to Congressional direction. As discussed in detail in Section 1.1, Congress has acted twice regarding the construction and operation of DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion facilities at Portsmouth and Paducah. Both P.L. 105-204 and P.L. 107-206 directed DOE to construct and operate conversion facilities at these two sites.

#### **S.2.3.3 Alternative Conversion Processes**

Potential environmental impacts associated with alternative conversion processes were considered during the procurement process, including the preparation of an environmental critique and environmental synopsis (Appendix D of this EIS), which were prepared in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 1021.216. The environmental synopsis concluded that, on the basis of assessment of potential environmental impacts presented in the critique, no proposal received by DOE was clearly environmentally preferable. The potential environmental impacts associated with the proposals were found to be similar to, and generally less than, those presented in the DUF<sub>6</sub> PEIS for representative conversion technologies.

#### **S.2.3.4 Long-Term Storage and Disposal Alternatives**

There are no current plans for long-term storage of conversion products; long-term storage alternatives were analyzed in the PEIS, including storage as DUF<sub>6</sub> and storage as an oxide (either U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> or UO<sub>2</sub>). The potential environmental impacts from long-term storage were evaluated in the PEIS for representative and generic sites. Therefore, long-term storage alternatives were not evaluated in this EIS.

With respect to disposal, this EIS evaluates the impacts from packaging, handling, and transporting depleted uranium conversion products from the conversion facility to a LLW disposal facility that would be (1) selected in a manner consistent with DOE policies and orders, and (2) authorized or licensed to receive the conversion products by DOE (in conformance with

DOE orders), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) (in conformance with NRC regulations), or an NRC Agreement State agency (in conformance with state laws and regulations determined to be equivalent to NRC regulations). Assessment of the impacts and risks from on-site handling and disposal at the LLW disposal facility is deferred to the disposal site's site-specific NEPA or licensing documents. However, this EIS covers the impacts from transporting the DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion products to both the Envirocare of Utah, Inc., facility and the NTS. DOE plans to decide the specific disposal location(s) for the depleted U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> conversion product after additional appropriate NEPA review. Accordingly, DOE will continue to evaluate its disposal options and will consider any further information or comments relevant to that decision. DOE will give a minimum 45-day notice before making the specific disposal decision and will provide any supplemental NEPA analysis for public review and comment.

#### **S.2.3.5 Other Transportation Modes**

Transportation by air and barge were considered but not analyzed in detail. Transportation by air was deemed to not be reasonable for the types and quantities of materials that would be transported to and from the conversion site. Transportation by barge was also considered and deemed to be unreasonable. ETTP is the only site with a nearby barge facility. Paducah would either have to build new facilities at a distance of at least 6 mi (10 km) or use existing facilities located 20 to 30 mi (32 to 48 km) from the site, and an additional loading/unloading step and on-land transport by truck or rail over this distance would be required. If barge shipment was proposed in the future and considered to be reasonable, an additional NEPA review would be conducted.

#### **S.2.3.6 One Conversion Plant for Two Sites**

In the NOI published in the *Federal Register* on September 18, 2001, construction and operation of one conversion plant was identified as a preliminary alternative that would be considered in the conversion EIS. However, with the passage of P.L. 107-206, which mandates the award of a contract for the construction and operation of conversion facilities at both Paducah and Portsmouth, the one conversion plant alternative was considered but not analyzed in this EIS.

### **S.3 AFFECTED ENVIRONMENT**

This EIS considers the proposed action at the Paducah site for conversion of the Paducah DUF<sub>6</sub> inventory, including the option of shipping cylinders from the ETTP site to the Paducah site. Chapter 3 presents a detailed description of the affected environment at and around the Paducah and ETTP sites. Environmental resources and values that could potentially be affected include the following:

- Cylinder yards,
- Site infrastructure,
- Air quality,
- Noise,
- Soils,
- Surface and groundwater,
- Vegetation,
- Wildlife,
- Wetlands,
- Threatened and endangered species,
- Public and occupational safety and health,
- Socioeconomics,
- Waste management,
- Land use,
- Cultural resources, and
- Environmental justice.

#### **S.4 ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT APPROACH, ASSUMPTIONS, AND METHODOLOGY**

Potential environmental impacts were assessed by examining all of the activities required to implement each alternative, including construction of the required facility, operation of the facility, and transportation of materials between sites (Figure S-6). For continued cylinder storage under the no action alternative, potential long-term impacts were also estimated. For each alternative, potential impacts to workers, members of the general public, and the environment were estimated for both normal operations and for potential accidents.

The analysis for this EIS considered all potential areas of impact and emphasized those that might have a significant impact on human health or the environment, would be different under different alternatives, or would be of special interest to the public (such as potential radiation effects). The estimates of potential environmental impacts for the action alternatives were based on characteristics of the proposed UDS conversion facility.

The process of estimating environmental impacts from the conversion of DUF<sub>6</sub> is subject to some uncertainty because final facility designs are not yet available. In addition, the methods used to estimate impacts have uncertainties associated with their results. This EIS impact assessment was designed to ensure — through selection of assumptions, models, and input parameters — that impacts would not be underestimated and that relative comparisons among the alternatives would be valid and meaningful. Although uncertainty may characterize estimates of the absolute magnitude of impacts, a uniform approach to impact assessment enhances the ability to make valid comparisons among alternatives. This uniform approach was implemented in the analyses conducted for this EIS to the extent practicable.

Table S-5 summarizes the major assumptions and parameters that formed the basis of the analyses in this EIS.

## S.5 CONSEQUENCES AND COMPARISON OF ALTERNATIVES

This EIS analyzes potential impacts at the Paducah site under the no action alternative and the proposed action alternatives. Under the no action alternative, potential impacts associated with the continued storage of DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders in yards are evaluated through 2039; in addition, the long-term impacts that could result from releases of DUF<sub>6</sub> and HF from future cylinder breaches are evaluated. For the proposed action, potential impacts are evaluated at three alternative locations for a construction period of 2 years and an operational period of 25 years.

The potential environmental impacts at Paducah under the proposed action alternatives and the no action alternative are presented in Table S-6 (placed at the end of this summary). To supplement the information in Table S-6, each area of impact evaluated in this EIS is discussed below. Major similarities and differences among the alternatives are highlighted. Additional details and discussion are provided in Chapter 5 for each alternative.

### S.5.1 Human Health and Safety — Construction and Normal Facility Operations

Under the no action alternative and the action alternatives, it is estimated that potential exposures of workers and members of the general public to radiation and chemicals would be well within applicable public health standards and regulations during normal facility operations (including 10 CFR 835, 40 CFR 61 Subpart H, and DOE Order 5400.5). The estimated doses and risks from radiation and/or chemical exposures of the general public and noninvolved workers would be very low, with zero latent cancer fatalities (LCFs) expected among these groups over the time periods considered, and with minimal adverse health impacts from chemical exposures expected. (Dose and risk estimates are shown in Table S-6.) In general, the location of a conversion facility within the Paducah site would not significantly affect potential impacts (i.e., no significant differences in impacts from Location A, B, or C were identified) to workers or the general public during normal facility operations.

Construction workers at Locations A and C and cylinder yard reconstruction workers under the no action alternative would receive low doses (i.e., up to 40 mrem/yr for the action alternatives and up to 230 mrem/yr for the no action alternative) because of the proximity of the construction sites to the cylinder yards.

#### Key Concepts in Estimating Risks from Radiation

The health effect of concern from exposure to radiation at levels typical of environmental and occupational exposures is the inducement of cancer. Radiation-induced cancers may take years to develop following exposure and are generally indistinguishable from cancers caused by other sources. Current radiation protection standards and practices are based on the premise that any radiation dose, no matter how small, can result in detrimental health effects (cancer) and that the number of effects produced is in direct proportion to the radiation dose. Therefore, doubling the radiation dose is assumed to result in doubling the number of induced cancers. This approach is called the “linear-no-threshold hypothesis” and is generally considered to result in conservative estimates (i.e., over-estimates) of the health effects from low doses of radiation.

Involved workers (persons directly involved in the handling of radioactive or hazardous materials) could be exposed to low-level radiation emitted by uranium during the normal course of their work activities, and this exposure could result in a slight increase in the risk for radiation-induced LCFs to individual involved workers. (The possible presence of TRU and Tc contamination in the cylinder inventory would not contribute to exposures during normal operations.) The annual number of workers exposed could range from about 40 (under the no action alternative) to 172 under the action alternatives. Under the no action alternative, it is estimated that radiation exposure of involved workers would result in a 1-in-2 chance of one additional LCF among the entire involved worker population over the life of the project. Under the action alternatives, a 1-in-7 chance of one additional LCF among involved workers over the life of the project was estimated.

Possible radiological exposures from using groundwater potentially contaminated as a result of releases from breached cylinders or facility releases were also evaluated. In general, these exposures would be at very low levels and within applicable public health standards and regulations. However, the uranium concentration in groundwater could exceed 20 µg/L (the drinking water guideline used for comparison in this EIS) at some time in the future under the no action alternative if cylinder corrosion was not controlled. This scenario is highly unlikely because ongoing cylinder inspections and maintenance would prevent significant releases from occurring.

## **S.5.2 Human Health and Safety — Facility Accidents**

### **S.5.2.1 Physical Hazards**

Under all alternatives, workers could be injured or killed as a result of on-the-job accidents unrelated to radiation or chemical exposure. On the basis of accident statistics for similar industries, it is estimated that under the no action alternative, zero fatalities and about 84 injuries might occur through 2039 at the Paducah site (about 2 injuries per year). Under the action alternatives, the risk of physical hazards would not depend on the location of the conversion facility. No fatalities are predicted, but about 11 injuries during construction and about 200 injuries during operations could occur at the conversion facility (about 6 injuries per year during a 2-year construction period and 8 injuries per year during operations). Accidental injuries and deaths are not unusual in industries that use heavy equipment to manipulate heavy objects and bulk materials.

### **S.5.2.2 Facility Accidents Involving Radiation or Chemical Releases**

Under all alternatives, it is possible that accidents could release radiation or chemicals to the environment, potentially affecting workers and members of the general public. Of all the accidents considered, those involving DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders and those involving chemicals at the conversion facility would have the largest potential effects.

The cylinder management plan (Commonwealth of Kentucky and DOE 2003) outlines required cylinder maintenance activities and procedures to be undertaken in the event of a cylinder breach and/or release of DUF<sub>6</sub> from one or more cylinders. Under all alternatives, there is a low probability that accidents involving DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders could occur at the current storage locations. If an accident occurred, DUF<sub>6</sub> could be released to the environment. If a release occurred, the DUF<sub>6</sub> would combine with moisture in the air, forming gaseous HF and UO<sub>2</sub>F<sub>2</sub>, a soluble solid in the form of small particles. The depleted uranium and HF could be dispersed downwind, potentially exposing workers and members of the general public to radiation and chemical effects. The amount released would depend on the severity of the accident and the number of cylinders involved. The probability of cylinder accidents would decrease under the action alternatives as the DUF<sub>6</sub> was converted and the number of cylinders in storage decreased as a result.

For releases involving DUF<sub>6</sub> and other uranium compounds, both chemical and radiological effects could occur if the material was ingested or inhaled. The chemical effect of most concern associated with internal uranium exposure is kidney damage, and the radiological effect of concern is an increase in the probability of developing cancer. With regard to uranium, chemical effects occur at lower exposure levels than do radiological effects. Exposure to HF from accidental releases could result in a range of health effects, from eye and respiratory irritation to death, depending on the exposure level. Large anhydrous NH<sub>3</sub> releases could also cause severe respiratory irritation and death (NH<sub>3</sub> is used to generate hydrogen, which is required for the conversion process).

Chemical and radiological exposures to involved workers under accident conditions would depend on how rapidly the accident developed, the exact location and response of the workers, the direction and amount of the release, the physical forces causing or caused by the accident, meteorological conditions, and the characteristics of the room or building if the accident occurred indoors. Impacts to involved workers under accident conditions would likely be dominated by physical forces from the accident itself; thus, quantitative dose/effect estimates would not be meaningful. For these reasons, the impacts to involved workers during accidents are not quantified in this EIS. However, it is recognized that injuries and fatalities among involved workers would be possible if an accident did occur.

### Health Effects from Accidental Chemical Releases

The impacts from accidental chemical releases were estimated by determining the numbers of people downwind who might experience adverse effects and irreversible adverse effects:

**Adverse Effects:** Any adverse health effects from exposure to a chemical release, ranging from mild and transient effects, such as respiratory irritation or skin rash (associated with lower chemical concentrations), to irreversible (permanent) effects, including death or impaired organ function (associated with higher chemical concentrations).

**Irreversible Adverse Effects:** A subset of adverse effects, irreversible adverse effects are those that generally occur at higher concentrations and are permanent in nature. Irreversible effects may include death, impaired organ function (such as central nervous system or lung damage), and other effects that may impair everyday functions.

Under the no action alternative, for accidents involving cylinders that might happen at least once in 100 years (i.e., likely accidents [see text box]), it is estimated that the off-site concentrations of HF and uranium would be considerably below levels that would cause adverse chemical effects among members of the general public from exposure to these chemicals. However, up to 10 noninvolved workers might experience potential adverse effects from exposure to HF and uranium (mild and temporary effects, such as respiratory irritation or temporary decrease in kidney function). It is estimated that one noninvolved worker might experience potential irreversible adverse effects that are permanent in nature (such as lung damage or kidney damage), with no fatalities expected. Radiation exposures would be unlikely to result in additional LCFs among noninvolved workers or members of the general public for these types of accidents.

Cylinder accidents that are less likely to occur could be more severe, having greater consequences that could potentially affect off-site members of the general public. These types of accidents are considered extremely unlikely, expected to occur with a frequency of between once in 10,000 years and once in 1 million years of operations. Based on the expected frequency, through 2039, the probability of this type of accident was estimated to be about 1 chance in 2,500. Among all the cylinder accidents analyzed, the postulated accident that would result in the largest number of people with adverse effects (including mild and temporary as well as permanent effects) would be an accident that involves rupture of cylinders in a fire. If this type of accident occurred at the Paducah site, it is estimated that up to 2,000 members of the general public and 910 noninvolved workers might experience adverse chemical effects from HF and uranium exposure (mild and temporary effects, such as respiratory irritation or temporary decrease in kidney function). It is estimated that more adverse effects would occur among the general public than among noninvolved workers because of the buoyancy effects from the fire on contaminant plume spread (i.e., the concentrations that would occur would be higher at points farther from the release than at closer locations).

The postulated cylinder accident that would result in the largest number of persons with irreversible adverse health effects is a corroded cylinder spill under wet conditions, with an estimated frequency of between once in 10,000 years and once in 1 million years of operations. If this accident occurred, it is estimated that 1 member of the general public and 300 noninvolved workers might experience irreversible adverse effects (such as lung damage or kidney damage). No fatalities are expected among the members of the general public; there would be a potential for 3 fatalities among noninvolved workers from chemical effects. Radiation exposures would be unlikely to result in additional LCFs among noninvolved workers (1 chance in 170) or the general public (1 chance in 70).

#### **Accident Categories and Frequency Ranges**

**Likely:** Accidents estimated to occur one or more times in 100 years of facility operations (frequency  $\geq 1 \times 10^{-2}/\text{yr}$ ).

**Unlikely:** Accidents estimated to occur between once in 100 years and once in 10,000 years of facility operations (frequency = from  $1 \times 10^{-2}/\text{yr}$  to  $1 \times 10^{-4}/\text{yr}$ ).

**Extremely Unlikely:** Accidents estimated to occur between once in 10,000 years and once in 1 million years of facility operations (frequency = from  $1 \times 10^{-4}/\text{yr}$  to  $1 \times 10^{-6}/\text{yr}$ ).

**Incredible:** Accidents estimated to occur less than one time in 1 million years of facility operations (frequency  $< 1 \times 10^{-6}/\text{yr}$ ).

In addition to the cylinder accidents discussed above is a certain class of accidents that the DOE investigated; however, because of security concerns, information about such accidents is not available for public review but is presented in a classified appendix to the EIS. All classified information will be presented to state and local officials, as appropriate.

The number of persons actually experiencing adverse or irreversible adverse effects from cylinder accidents would likely be considerably fewer than those estimated for this analysis and would depend on the actual circumstances of the accident and the individual chemical sensitivities of the affected persons. For example, although exposures to releases from cylinder accidents could be life-threatening (especially with respect to immediate effects from inhalation of HF at high concentrations), the guideline exposure level of 20 parts per million (ppm) of HF used to estimate the potential for irreversible adverse effects from HF exposure is likely to result in overestimates. This is because no animal or human deaths have been known to occur as a result of acute exposures (i.e., 1 hour or less) at concentrations of less than 50 ppm; generally, if death does not occur quickly after HF exposure, recovery is complete.

Similarly, the guideline intake level of 30 mg used to estimate the potential for irreversible adverse effects from the intake of uranium in this EIS is the level suggested in NRC guidance. This level is somewhat conservative; that is, it is intended to overestimate rather than underestimate the potential number of irreversible adverse effects in the exposed population following uranium exposure. In more than 40 years of cylinder handling activities, no accidents involving releases from cylinders containing *solid* UF<sub>6</sub> have occurred that have caused diagnosable irreversible adverse effects among workers. In previous accidental exposure incidents involving *liquid* UF<sub>6</sub> in gaseous diffusion plants, some worker fatalities occurred immediately after the accident as a result of inhalation of HF generated from the UF<sub>6</sub>. However, no fatalities occurred as a result of the toxicity of the uranium exposure. A few workers were exposed to amounts of uranium estimated to be about three times the guideline level (30 mg) used for assessing irreversible adverse effects; none of these workers, however, actually experienced such effects.

Under the action alternatives, low-probability accidents involving chemicals at the conversion facility could have large potential consequences for noninvolved workers and members of the general public. At a conversion site, accidents involving chemical releases, such as NH<sub>3</sub> and HF, could occur. NH<sub>3</sub> is used to generate hydrogen for conversion, and HF can be produced as a co-product of converting DUF<sub>6</sub>. Although the UDS proposal uses NH<sub>3</sub> to generate hydrogen, hydrogen can be produced using natural gas. In that case, the accident impacts would be less than those discussed in this section for NH<sub>3</sub> accidents. (Further details are provided about potential NH<sub>3</sub> and other accidents in Section 5.2.2.2 for the conversion facility and in Section 5.2.3 for transportation.)

The conversion accident estimated to have the largest potential consequences is an accident involving the rupture of an anhydrous NH<sub>3</sub> tank. Such an accident could be caused by a large earthquake and is expected to occur with a frequency of less than once in 1 million years per year of operations. The probability of this type of accident occurring during the operation of a conversion facility is a function of the period of operation; over 25 years of operations, the accident probability would be less than 1 chance in 40,000.

If an NH<sub>3</sub> tank ruptured at the conversion facility, a maximum of up to about 6,700 members of the general public might experience adverse effects (mild and temporary effects, such as respiratory irritation or temporary decrease in kidney function) as a result of chemical exposure. A maximum of about 370 people might experience irreversible adverse effects (such as lung damage or kidney damage), with the potential for about 7 fatalities. With regard to noninvolved workers, up to about 1,600 workers might experience adverse effects (mild and temporary) as a result of chemical exposures. A maximum of about 1,600 noninvolved workers might experience irreversible adverse effects, with the potential for about 30 fatalities.

The location of the conversion facility within the Paducah site would affect the number of noninvolved workers who might experience adverse or irreversible adverse effects from an HF or NH<sub>3</sub> tank rupture accident. However, the accident analyses indicate that the impacts would not be consistently higher or lower at any of the alternative locations.

Although such high-consequence accidents at a conversion facility are possible, they are expected to be extremely rare. The risk (defined as consequence × probability) for these accidents would be less than 1 fatality and less than 1 irreversible adverse health effect for noninvolved workers and members of the public combined. NH<sub>3</sub> and HF are commonly used for industrial applications in the United States, and there are well-established accident prevention and mitigative measures for HF and NH<sub>3</sub> storage tanks. These include storage tank siting principles, design recommendations, spill detection measures, and containment measures. These measures would be implemented, as appropriate.

Under the action alternatives, the highest consequence radiological accident is estimated to be an earthquake damaging the depleted U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> product storage building. If this accident occurred, it is estimated that about 180 lb (82 kg) of depleted U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> would be released to the atmosphere outside of the building. The maximum collective dose received by the general public and the noninvolved workers would be about 70 person-rem and 1,300 person-rem, respectively. There would be about a 1-in-40 chance of an LCF among the general public and a 1-in-5 chance of an LCF among the noninvolved workers. Because the accident has a probability of occurrence that is about 1 chance in 4,000, the risk posed by the accident would be essentially zero LCFs among both the public and the workers.

### **S.5.3 Human Health and Safety — Transportation**

Under the no action alternative, only small amounts of the LLW and low-level radioactive mixed waste (LLMW) that would be generated during routine cylinder maintenance activities would require transportation (about one shipment per year). Only negligible impacts are expected from such shipments. No DUF<sub>6</sub> or non-DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders would be transported between sites.

Under the action alternatives, the number of shipments would include the following:

1. If U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> was disposed of in emptied cylinders, there would be approximately 7,240 railcar shipments of depleted U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> from the conversion facility to Envirocare (proposed) or NTS (option), or up to 36,200 truck shipments

- (alternative) to either Envirocare or NTS. The numbers of shipments would be about 16,400 for trucks or 4,100 for railcars if bulk bags were used as disposal containers.
2. About 15,300 truck or 3,060 railcar shipments of aqueous (70% and 49%) HF could occur; alternatively, the aqueous HF could be neutralized to CaF<sub>2</sub>, requiring a total of about 25,000 truck or 6,300 railcar shipments. Currently, the destination for these shipments is not known.
  3. About 1,300 truck or 650 railcar shipments of anhydrous NH<sub>3</sub> from a supplier to the site. Currently, the origin of these shipments is not known.
  4. Emptied heel cylinders to Envirocare or NTS, if bulk bags were used to dispose of the depleted U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub>.
  5. For the option of shipping ETPP cylinders to Paducah, approximately 5,400 truck or 1,400 railcar shipments of cylinders from ETPP.

During normal transportation operations, radioactive material and chemicals would be contained within their transport packages. Health impacts to crew members (i.e., workers) and members of the general public along the routes could occur if they were exposed to low-level external radiation in the vicinity of uranium material shipments. In addition, exposure to vehicle emissions (engine exhaust and fugitive dust) could potentially cause latent fatalities from inhalation.

The risk estimates for emissions are based on epidemiological data that associate mortality rates with particulate concentrations in ambient air. (Increased latent mortality rates resulting from cardiovascular and pulmonary diseases have been linked to incremental increases in particulate concentrations.) Thus, the increase in ambient air particulate concentrations caused by a transport vehicle, with its associated fugitive dust and diesel exhaust emissions, is related to such premature latent fatalities in the form of risk factors. Because of the conservatism of the assumptions made to reconcile results among independent epidemiological studies and associated uncertainties, the latent fatality risks estimated for normal vehicle emissions should be considered to be an upper bound.<sup>3</sup> For the transport of conversion products and co-products (depleted U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub>, aqueous HF, and emptied cylinders, if not used as disposal containers), it is conservatively estimated that a total of up to 20 fatalities from vehicle emissions could occur if shipments were only by truck and if aqueous HF product was sold and transported 620 mi (1,000 km) from the site (about 30 fatalities are estimated if HF was neutralized to CaF<sub>2</sub> and transported 620 mi [1,000 km]). The number of fatalities occurring from exhaust emissions if shipments were only by rail would be less than 1 if HF was sold and about 1 if the HF was neutralized to CaF<sub>2</sub>.

---

<sup>3</sup> For perspective, in a recently published EIS for a geologic repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, the same risk factors were used for vehicle emissions; however, they were adjusted to reduce the amount of conservatism in the estimated health impacts. As reported in the Yucca Mountain EIS, the adjustments resulted in a reduction in the emission risks by a factor of about 30.

Exposure to external radiation during normal transportation operations is estimated to cause less than 1 LCF under both truck and rail options. Members of the general public living along truck and rail transportation routes would receive extremely small doses of radiation from shipments, about 0.1 mrem or less over the duration of the program. This would be true even if a single person was exposed to every shipment of radioactive material during the program.

Traffic accidents could occur during the transportation of radioactive materials and chemicals. These accidents could potentially affect the health of workers (i.e., crew members) and members of the general public, either from the accident itself or from accidental releases of radioactive materials or chemicals.

The total number of traffic fatalities (unrelated to the type of cargo) was estimated on the basis of national traffic statistics for shipments by both truck and rail. If the aqueous HF was sold to users about 620 mi (1,000 km) from the site, about 2 traffic fatalities under the truck option would be estimated and 1 traffic fatality would be estimated under the rail option. If HF was neutralized to CaF<sub>2</sub>, about 4 fatalities would be estimated for the truck option, and 2 fatalities for the rail option.

Severe transportation accidents could also result in a release of radioactive material or chemicals from a shipment. The consequences of such a release would depend on the material released, location of the accident, and atmospheric conditions at the time. Potential consequences would be greatest in urban areas because more people could be exposed. Accidents that occurred when atmospheric conditions were very stable (typical of nighttime) would have higher potential consequences than accidents that occurred when conditions were unstable (i.e., turbulent, typical of daytime) because the stability would determine how quickly the released material dispersed and diluted to lower concentrations as it moved downwind.

For the action alternatives, the highest potential accident consequences during transportation activities would be caused by a rail accident involving anhydrous NH<sub>3</sub>. Although anhydrous NH<sub>3</sub> is a hazardous gas, it has many industrial applications and is commonly safely transported by industry as a pressurized liquid in trucks and rail tank cars.

The occurrence of a severe anhydrous NH<sub>3</sub> railcar accident in a highly populated urban area under stable atmospheric conditions is extremely rare. The probability of such an accident occurring if all the anhydrous NH<sub>3</sub> needed was transported 620 mi (1,000 km) is estimated to be less than 1 chance in 200,000. Nonetheless, if such an accident (i.e., release of anhydrous NH<sub>3</sub> from a railcar in a densely populated urban area under stable atmospheric conditions) occurred, up to 5,000 persons might experience irreversible adverse effects (such as lung damage), with the potential for about 100 fatalities. If the same type of NH<sub>3</sub> rail accident occurred in a typical rural area, which would have a smaller population density than an urban area, potential impacts would be considerably less. It is estimated that in a rural area, approximately 20 persons might experience irreversible adverse effects, with no expected fatalities. The atmospheric conditions at the time of an accident would also significantly affect the consequences of a severe NH<sub>3</sub> accident. The consequences of an NH<sub>3</sub> accident would be less severe under unstable conditions, the most likely conditions in the daytime. Unstable conditions would result in more rapid dispersion of the airborne NH<sub>3</sub> plume and lower downwind concentrations. Under unstable

conditions in an urban area, approximately 400 persons could experience irreversible adverse effects, with the potential for about 8 fatalities. If the accident occurred in a rural area under unstable conditions, one person would be expected to experience an irreversible adverse effect, with zero fatalities expected. When the probability of an NH<sub>3</sub> accident occurring is taken into account, it is expected that no irreversible adverse effects and no fatalities would occur over the shipment period.

For perspective, anhydrous NH<sub>3</sub> is routinely shipped commercially in the United States for industrial and agricultural applications. On the basis of information provided in the DOT *Hazardous Material Incident System (HMIS) Database*, for 1990 through 2002, 2 fatalities and 19 major injuries to the public or to transportation or emergency response personnel have occurred as a result of anhydrous NH<sub>3</sub> releases during nationwide commercial truck and rail operations. These fatalities and injuries occurred during transportation or loading and unloading operations. Over that period, truck and rail NH<sub>3</sub> spills resulted in more than 1,000 and 6,000 evacuations, respectively. Five very large spills, more than 10,000 gal (38,000 L), have occurred; however, these spills were all en route derailments from large rail tank cars. The two largest spills, both around 20,000 gal (76,000 L), occurred in rural or lightly populated areas and resulted in 1 major injury. Over the past 30 years, the safety record for transporting anhydrous NH<sub>3</sub> has significantly improved. Safety measures contributing to this improved safety record include the installation of protective devices on railcars, fewer derailments, closer manufacturer supervision of container inspections, and participation of shippers in the Chemical Transportation Emergency Center.

After anhydrous NH<sub>3</sub>, the types of accidents that are estimated to result in the second highest consequences are those involving shipment of 70% aqueous HF produced during the conversion process. The estimated numbers of irreversible adverse effects for 70% HF rail accidents are about one-third of those from the anhydrous NH<sub>3</sub> accidents. However, the number of estimated fatalities is about one-sixth of those from NH<sub>3</sub> accidents, because the percent of fatalities among the individuals experiencing irreversible adverse effects is 1% as opposed to 2% for NH<sub>3</sub> exposures. For perspective, since 1971, the period covered by DOT records, no fatal or serious injuries to the public or to transportation or emergency response personnel have occurred as a result of anhydrous HF releases during transportation. (Most of the HF transported in the United States is anhydrous HF, which is more hazardous than aqueous HF.) Over that period, 11 releases from railcars were reported to have no evacuations or injuries associated with them. The only major release (estimated at 6,400 lb [29,000 kg] of HF) occurred in 1985 and resulted in approximately 100 minor injuries. Another minor HF release during transportation occurred in 1990. The safety record for transporting HF has improved in the past 10 years for the same reasons as those discussed above for NH<sub>3</sub>. Transportation accidents involving the shipment of DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders were also evaluated, with the estimated consequences being less than those discussed above for NH<sub>3</sub> and HF (see Section 5.2.5.3).

#### **S.5.4 Air Quality and Noise**

Under the no action alternative, air quality from construction and operations would be within national and state ambient air quality standards. However, estimated concentrations of

particulate matter (PM) that could be generated during yard reconstruction activities at Paducah would be close to air quality standards; these temporary emissions could be controlled by good construction practices. Continued cylinder maintenance and painting are expected to be effective in controlling corrosion, and concentrations of HF would be kept within regulatory standards at the Paducah site.

Under the action alternatives, air quality impacts during construction were found to be similar for all three alternative locations. The total (modeled plus the measured background value representative of the site) concentrations due to emissions of most criteria pollutants — such as sulfur dioxide (SO<sub>2</sub>), nitrogen oxides (NO<sub>x</sub>), and carbon monoxide (CO) — would be well within applicable air quality standards. As is often the case for construction, the primary concern would be PM released from near-ground-level sources. Total concentrations of PM<sub>10</sub> and PM<sub>2.5</sub> (PM with an aerodynamic diameter of 10 μm or less and 2.5 μm or less, respectively) at the construction site boundary would be close to or above the standards because of the high background concentrations and the proposed facility's proximity to potentially publicly accessible areas. Accordingly, construction activities should be conducted so as to minimize further impacts on ambient air quality. To mitigate impacts, water could be sprayed on disturbed areas more often, and dust suppressant or pavement could be applied to roads with frequent traffic.

During operations, it is estimated that total concentrations for all criteria pollutants (except for PM<sub>2.5</sub>) would be well within standards. The background level of annual average PM<sub>2.5</sub> in the area of the Paducah site approaches the standard. Again, impacts during operations were found to be similar for all three alternative locations.

Noise impacts are expected to be negligible under the no action alternative. Under the action alternatives, estimated noise levels at the nearest residence (located 1.3 km [0.8 mi] from the construction location) would be below the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) guideline of 55 dB(A)<sup>4</sup> as day-night average sound level (DNL)<sup>5</sup> for residential zones during construction and operations.

### S.5.5 Water and Soil

Under the no action alternative, uranium concentrations in surface water, groundwater, and soil would remain below guidelines throughout the project duration. However, if cylinder maintenance and painting were not effective in reducing cylinder corrosion rates, the uranium concentration in groundwater could be greater than the guideline at some time in the future (no earlier than about 2100). If continued cylinder maintenance and painting were effective in

---

<sup>4</sup> dB(A) is a unit of weighted sound-pressure level, measured by the use of the metering characteristics and the A-weighting specified in the *American National Standard Specification for Sound Level Meters*, ANSI S1.4-1983, and in Amendment S1.4A-1985.

<sup>5</sup> DNL is the 24-hour average sound level, expressed in dB(A), with a 10-dB penalty artificially added to the nighttime (10 p.m.–7 a.m.) sound level to account for noise-sensitive activities (e.g., sleep) during these hours.

controlling corrosion, as expected, groundwater uranium concentrations would remain less than the guideline.

During construction of the conversion facility, construction material spills could contaminate surface water, groundwater, or soil. However, by implementing storm water management, sediment and erosion control (e.g., temporary and permanent seeding; mulching and matting; sediment barriers, traps, and basins; silt fences; runoff and earth diversion dikes), and good construction practices (e.g., covering chemicals with tarps to prevent interaction with rain, promptly cleaning up any spills), concentrations in soil and wastewater (and therefore surface water and groundwater) could be kept well within applicable standards or guidelines.

During operations, no appreciable impacts on surface water or groundwater would result from the conversion facility because no contaminated liquid effluents are anticipated, and because airborne emissions would be at very low levels (e.g., <0.25 g/yr of uranium). Impacts among the three alternative locations would be similar.

Contaminated soil associated with solid waste management unit (SWMU) 194 could be excavated during construction at Locations A and C; these soils would be managed as described in Section S.5.8.

### **S.5.6 Socioeconomics**

The socioeconomic analysis evaluates the effects of construction and operation on population, employment, income, regional growth, housing, and community resources in the region of influence (ROI) around the site. In general, socioeconomic impacts tend to be positive, creating jobs and income, with only minor impacts on housing, public finances, and employment in local public services.

The no action alternative would result in a small socioeconomic impact, creating 110 jobs during cylinder yard reconstruction (over 2 construction years) and 130 jobs during operations (direct and indirect jobs) and generating \$3.2 million in personal income during construction and \$3.8 million in personal income per operational year. No significant impacts on regional growth and housing, local finances, and public service employment in the ROI are expected.

Under the action alternatives, jobs and direct income would be generated during both construction and operation. Construction of the conversion facility would create 290 jobs and generate almost \$10 million in personal income in the peak construction year (construction occurs over a 2-year period). Operation of the conversion facility would create 330 jobs and generate \$13 million in personal income each year. Only minor impacts on regional growth and housing, local finances, and public service employment in the ROI are expected. The socioeconomic impacts are not dependent on the location of the conversion facility; therefore, the impacts would be the same for alternative Locations A, B, and C.

### **S.5.7 Ecology**

Under the no action alternative, continued cylinder maintenance and surveillance activities would have negligible impacts on ecological resources (i.e., vegetation, wildlife, threatened and endangered species). Only a small amount of yard reconstruction, in a previously disturbed area, would occur at the Paducah site. It is estimated that potential concentrations of contaminants in the environment from future cylinder breaches would be below levels harmful to biota. However, there is a potential for impacts to aquatic biota from cylinder yard runoff during painting activities.

For the action alternatives, the total area disturbed during conversion facility construction would be 45 acres (18 ha). Vegetation communities would be impacted in this area with a loss of habitat. However, for all three alternative locations, impacts could be minimized depending on exactly where the facility was placed within each location. These habitat losses would constitute less than 1% of available land at the site. It was found that concentrations of contaminants in the environment during operations would be below harmful levels. Negligible impacts to vegetation and wildlife are expected at all locations.

Wetlands at or near Locations A, B, and C could be adversely affected at the Paducah site. Impacts to wetlands could be minimized depending on where exactly the facility was placed within each location. Mitigation for unavoidable impacts may be developed in coordination with the appropriate regulatory agencies. Unavoidable impacts to wetlands that are within the jurisdiction of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers may require a Clean Water Act (CWA) Section 404 Permit, which would trigger the requirement for a CWA Section 401 water quality certification from the Commonwealth of Kentucky. A mitigation plan might be required prior to the initiation of construction.

Construction of the conversion facility in the eastern portion of Location C could impact potential habitat for cream wild indigo (state-listed as a species of special concern) and compass plant (state-listed as threatened). For construction at all three locations, impacts on deciduous forest might occur. Impacts to forested areas could be avoided if temporary construction areas were placed in previously disturbed locations. Trees with exfoliating bark, such as shagbark hickory or dead trees with loose bark, can be used by the Indiana bat (federal- and state-listed as endangered) as roosting trees during the summer. If either live or dead trees with exfoliating bark are encountered on construction areas, they should be saved if possible. If necessary, the trees should be cut before March 31 or after October 15.

### **S.5.8 Waste Management**

Under the no action alternative, LLW, LLMW, and PCB-containing waste could be generated from cylinder scraping and painting activities. The amount of LLMW generated could represent an increase of less than 1% in the site's LLMW load, representing a negligible impact on site waste management operations.

Under the action alternatives, waste management impacts would not depend on the location of the conversion facility within the site and would be the same for alternative Locations A, B, and C. Waste generated during construction and operations would have negligible impacts on the Paducah site waste management operations, with the exception of possible impacts from disposal of CaF<sub>2</sub>. Industrial experience indicates that HF, if produced, would contain only trace amounts of depleted uranium (less than 1 ppm). It is expected that HF would be sold for use. If sold for use, the sale would be subject to review and approval by DOE in coordination with the NRC, depending on the specific use (as discussed in Appendix E of this EIS).

The U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> produced during conversion would generate about 7,850 yd<sup>3</sup> (6,000 m<sup>3</sup>) per year of LLW. This is 83% of Paducah's annual projected LLW volume and could have potentially large impacts on site LLW management. However, plans for off-site disposal of this LLW are included in the proposed action.

If the HF was not sold but instead neutralized to CaF<sub>2</sub>, it is currently unknown whether (1) the CaF<sub>2</sub> could be sold, (2) the low uranium content would allow the CaF<sub>2</sub> to be disposed of as nonhazardous solid waste, or (3) disposal as LLW would be required. The low level of uranium contamination expected (i.e., less than 1 ppm) suggests that sale or disposal as nonhazardous solid waste would be most likely. If sold for use, the sale would be subject to review and approval by DOE in coordination with the NRC, depending on the specific use. Waste management for disposal as nonhazardous waste could be handled through appropriate planning and design of the facilities. If the CaF<sub>2</sub> had to be disposed of as LLW, it could represent a potentially large impact on waste management operations.

A small quantity of TRU could be entrained in the gaseous DUF<sub>6</sub> during the cylinder emptying operations. These contaminants would be captured in the filters between the cylinders and the conversion equipment. The filters would be monitored and replaced routinely to maintain concentrations below regulatory limits for TRU waste. The spent filters would be disposed of as LLW, generating up to 25 drums of LLW waste over the life of the project.

Current UDS plans are to leave the heels in the emptied cylinders, add a stabilizer, and use the cylinders as disposal containers for the U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> product, to the extent practicable. An alternative is to process the emptied cylinders and dispose of them directly as LLW. Either one of these approaches is expected to meet the waste acceptance criteria of the disposal facilities and minimize the potential for generating TRU waste through washing of the cylinders to remove the heels. Although cylinder washing is not considered a foreseeable option at this time, for completeness, an analysis of the maximum potential quantities of TRU waste that could be generated from cylinder washing is included in Appendix B of this EIS, as is a discussion of PCBs contained in some cylinder coatings.

In addition, potentially contaminated soil associated with SWMU 194 could be excavated during construction at Locations A and B. The excavated soil would be managed consistent with Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) regulations and coordinated between the Commonwealth of Kentucky (Division of Waste Management) and DOE.

### **S.5.9 Resource Requirements**

Resource requirements include construction materials, fuel, electricity, process chemicals, and containers. In general, all alternatives would have a negligible effect on the local or national availability of these resources.

### **S.5.10 Land Use**

Under the no action alternative, all activities would occur in areas previously used for conducting similar activities; therefore, no land use impacts are expected. Under the action alternatives, a total of 45 acres (18 ha) could be disturbed, with some areas cleared for railroad or utility access and not adjacent to the site. All three alternative locations are within an already-industrialized facility, and impacts to land use would be similar for the three alternative locations. The permanently altered areas represent less than 1% of available land already developed for industrial purposes. Negligible impacts on land use are thus expected.

### **S.5.11 Cultural Resources**

Under the no action alternative, impacts on cultural resources at the current storage locations would be unlikely because all activities would occur in areas already dedicated to cylinder storage. Under the action alternatives, impacts on cultural resources could be possible. Archaeological and architectural surveys have not been completed for the candidate locations and must be undertaken prior to initiation of the action alternatives. However, if archaeological resources were encountered, or historical or traditional cultural properties were identified, a mitigation plan would be required.

### **S.5.12 Environmental Justice**

No disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental impacts are expected to minority or low-income populations during normal facility operations under the action alternatives. Although the consequences of facility accidents could be high if severe accidents occurred, the risk of irreversible adverse effects (including fatalities) among members of the general public from these accidents (taking into account the consequences and probability of the accidents) would be less than 1. Furthermore, transportation accidents with high and adverse impacts are unlikely; their locations cannot be projected, and the types of persons who would be involved cannot be reliably predicted. Thus, there is no reason to expect that minority and low-income populations would be affected disproportionately by high and adverse impacts.

### **S.5.13 Option of Shipping ETTP Cylinders to Paducah**

If cylinders from ETTP were transported to Paducah, the cylinders would have to be prepared to be shipped by either truck or rail. Approximately 4,800 DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders for

conversion and about 1,100 non-DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders would require preparation for shipment at ETTP. Three cylinder preparation options are considered for the shipment of noncompliant cylinders.

In general, the use of cylinder overpacks would result in small potential impacts. Overpacking operations would be similar to current cylinder handling operations, and impacts would be limited to involved workers. No LCFs among involved workers from radiation exposure are expected. Impacts would be similar if noncompliant cylinders were shipped “as-is” or following repairs under a DOT exemption, assuming appropriate compensatory measures.

The use of a cylinder transfer facility would likely require the construction of a new facility at ETTP; there are no current plans to build such a facility. Operational impacts would generally be small and limited primarily to external radiation exposure of involved workers, with no LCFs expected. Transfer facility operations would generate a large number of emptied cylinders requiring disposition. If a decision were made to construct and operate a transfer facility at ETTP, additional NEPA review would be conducted.

Impacts from extended operations of the conversion plant from 25 to 28 years would not be expected to significantly increase overall impacts.

#### **S.5.14 Impacts Associated with Conversion Product Sale and Use**

The conversion of the DUF<sub>6</sub> inventory produces products having some potential for reuse (no large-scale market exists for depleted U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub>). These products include HF and CaF<sub>2</sub>, which are commonly used as commercial materials. An investigation of the potential reuse of HF and CaF<sub>2</sub> has been included as part of this EIS. Areas examined include the characteristics of these materials as produced within the conversion process, the current markets for these products, and the potential socioeconomic impacts should these products be provided to the commercial sector. Because there would be some residual radioactivity associated with these materials, the DOE process for authorizing release of materials for unrestricted use (referred to as “free release”) and an estimate of the potential human health effects of such free release have also been included in this investigation. The results of the analysis of HF and CaF<sub>2</sub> use are included in Table S-6.

If the products were to be released for restricted use (e.g., in the nuclear industry for the manufacture of nuclear fuel), the impacts would be less than those for unrestricted release.

Conservative estimates of the amount of uranium and technetium that might transfer into the HF and CaF<sub>2</sub> were used to evaluate the maximum expected dose to workers using the material if it was released for commercial use. On the basis of very conservative assumptions concerning use, the maximum dose to workers was estimated to be less than 1 mrem/yr, much less than the regulatory limit of 100 mrem/yr specified for members of the general public. Doses to the general public would be even lower.

Socioeconomic impact analyses were conducted to evaluate the impacts of the introduction of the conversion-produced HF or CaF<sub>2</sub> into the commercial marketplace. A

potential market for the aqueous HF has been identified as the current aqueous HF acid producers. The impact of HF sales on the local economy in which the existing producers are located and on the U.S. economy as a whole is likely to be minimal. No market for the CaF<sub>2</sub> that might be produced in the conversion facility has been identified. Should such a market be found, the impact of CaF<sub>2</sub> sales on the U.S. economy is also predicted to be minimal.

### **S.5.15 Impacts from D&D Activities**

D&D would involve the disassembly and removal of all radioactive and hazardous components, equipment, and structures. For the purposes of analysis in this EIS, it was also assumed that the various buildings would be dismantled and “greenfield” (unrestricted use) conditions would be achieved. The “clean” waste will be sent to a landfill that accepts construction debris. LLW will be sent to a licensed or DOE disposal facility, where it will likely be buried in accordance with the waste acceptance criteria and other requirements in effect at that time. Hazardous and mixed waste will be disposed of in a licensed facility in accordance with regulatory requirements. D&D impacts to involved workers would be primarily from external radiation; expected exposures would be a small fraction of operational doses; no LCFs would be expected. It is estimated that no fatalities and up to five injuries would result from occupational accidents. Impacts from waste management would include a total generation of about 275 yd<sup>3</sup> (210 m<sup>3</sup>) of LLW, 157 yd<sup>3</sup> (120 m<sup>3</sup>) of LLMW, and 157 yd<sup>3</sup> (120 m<sup>3</sup>) of hazardous waste; these volumes would result in low impacts compared with projected site annual generation volumes.

### **S.5.16 Cumulative Impacts**

The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) guidelines for implementing NEPA define cumulative effects as the impacts on the environment resulting from the incremental impact of an action under consideration when added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions (40 CFR 1508.7) Activities considered for cumulative analysis include those in the vicinity of the site.

Actions planned at the Paducah site include the continuation of uranium enrichment operations (by USEC), waste management activities, waste disposal activities, environmental restoration activities, and DUF<sub>6</sub> management activities considered in this EIS. Although Portsmouth was identified by USEC in January 2004 as the site of the American Centrifuge Facility, construction and operation of such a facility at Paducah has been included in the cumulative impacts analysis.

Actions occurring near the Paducah site that, because of their diffuse nature, could contribute to existing or future impacts on the site include continued operation of the Tennessee Valley Authority’s Shawnee power plant; the Joppa, Illinois, power plant; and the Honeywell International uranium conversion plant in Metropolis, Illinois. Cumulative impacts of these actions at Paducah would be as follows for the no action alternative and the proposed action alternatives:

- The cumulative collective radiological exposure to the off-site population would be well below the maximum DOE dose limit of 100 mrem per year to the off-site maximally exposed individual (MEI) and below the limit of 25 mrem/yr specified in 40 CFR 190 for uranium fuel cycle facilities. Annual individual doses to involved workers would be monitored to maintain exposure below the regulatory limit of 5 rem per year.
- Under the no action alternative cumulative impacts assessment, although less than 1 shipment per year of radioactive wastes is expected from cylinder management activities, up to 14,400 truck shipments could be associated with existing and planned actions (no rail shipments are expected). Under the action alternatives, up to 6,000 rail shipments and 18,600 truck shipments of radioactive material could occur. The cumulative maximum dose to the MEI along the transportation route near the site entrance would be less than 1 mrem per year under all alternatives and for all transportation modes.
- The Paducah site is located in an attainment region. However, the background annual-average PM<sub>2.5</sub> concentration is near the regulatory standard. Cumulative impacts would not affect attainment status.
- Data from the 2000 annual groundwater monitoring showed that four pollutants exceeded primary drinking water regulation levels in groundwater at the Paducah site. Good engineering and construction practices should ensure that indirect cumulative impacts on groundwater associated with the conversion facility would be minimal.
- Cumulative ecological impacts on habitats and biotic communities, including wetlands, would be negligible to minor for all alternatives. Construction of a conversion facility might remove a type of tree preferred by the Indiana bat; however, this federal- and state-listed endangered species is not known to utilize these areas.
- No cumulative land use impacts are anticipated for any of the alternatives.
- It is unlikely that any noteworthy cumulative impacts on cultural resources would occur under any alternative, and any such impacts would be adequately mitigated before activities for the chosen action would begin.
- Given the absence of high and adverse cumulative impacts for any impact area considered in this EIS, no environmental justice cumulative impacts are anticipated for the Paducah site, despite the presence of disproportionately high percentages of low-income populations in the vicinity.
- Socioeconomic impacts under all alternatives considered are anticipated to be generally positive, often temporary, and relatively small.

### S.5.17 Mitigation

On the basis of the analyses conducted for this EIS, the following recommendations can be made to reduce the impacts of the proposed action:

- Current cylinder management activities, including inspecting cylinders, carrying out cylinder maintenance activities (such as painting), and promptly cleaning up releases from any breached DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders, should be continued to avoid potential future impacts on site air and groundwater. In addition, runoff from cylinder yards should be collected and sampled so that contaminants can be detected and their release to surface water or groundwater can be avoided. If future cylinder painting results in KPDES Permit violations, treating cylinder yard runoff prior to release may be required.
- Temporary impacts on air quality from fugitive dust emissions during reconstruction of cylinder yards or construction of any new facility should be controlled by the best available practices to avoid temporary exceedances of the PM<sub>10</sub> and PM<sub>2.5</sub> standard. Technologies that will be used to mitigate air quality impacts during construction include using water sprays on dirt roadways and on bare soils in work areas for dust control; covering open-bodied trucks transporting materials likely to become airborne when full and at all times when in motion; water spraying and covering bunkered or staged excavated and replacement soils; maintaining paved roadways in good repair and in a clean condition; using barriers and windbreaks around construction areas such as soil banks, temporary screening, and/or vegetative cover; mulching or covering exposed bare soil areas until vegetation has time to recover or paving has been installed; and prohibiting any open burning.
- During construction, impacts to water quality and soil can be minimized through implementing storm water management, sediment and erosion controls (e.g., temporary and permanent seeding; mulching and matting; sediment barriers, traps, and basins; silt fences; runoff and earth diversion dikes), and good construction practices (e.g., covering chemicals with tarps to prevent interaction with rain, promptly cleaning up any spills).
- Potential impacts to wetlands at the Paducah site could be minimized or eliminated by maintaining a buffer near adjacent wetlands during construction. Mitigation for unavoidable impacts may be developed in coordination with the appropriate regulatory agencies.
- If trees (either live or dead) with exfoliating bark are encountered on construction areas, they should be saved if possible to avoid destroying potential habitat for the Indiana bat. If necessary, the trees should be cut before March 31 or after October 15.

- The quantity of radioactive and hazardous materials stored on site, including the products of the conversion process, should be minimized.
- The construction of a DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion facility at Paducah would have the potential to impact cultural resources. Neither an archaeological nor an architectural survey has been completed for the Paducah site as a whole or for any of the alternative locations, although an archaeological sensitivity study has been conducted. In accordance with Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act, the adverse effects of this undertaking must be evaluated once a location is chosen.
- Testing should be conducted either prior to or during the conversion facility startup operations to determine if the air vented from the autoclaves should be monitored or if any alternative measures would need to be taken to ensure that worker exposures to PCBs above allowable Occupational Safety and Health Administration limits do not occur.
- The nuclear properties of DUF<sub>6</sub> are such that the occurrence of a nuclear criticality is not a concern, regardless of the amount of DUF<sub>6</sub> present. However, criticality is a concern for the handling, packaging, and shipping of enriched UF<sub>6</sub>. For enriched UF<sub>6</sub>, criticality control is accomplished by employing, individually or collectively, specific limits on uranium-235 enrichment, mass, volume, geometry, moderation, and spacing for each type of cylinder. The amount of enriched UF<sub>6</sub> that may be contained in an individual cylinder and the total number of cylinders that may be transported together are determined by the nuclear properties of enriched UF<sub>6</sub>. Spacing of enriched UF<sub>6</sub> cylinders in transit during routine and accident conditions is ensured by use of regulatory approval packages that provide protection against impact and fire.
- Because of the relatively high consequences estimated for some accidents, special attention will be given to the design and operational procedures for components that may be involved in such accidents. For example, the tanks holding hazardous chemicals, such as anhydrous NH<sub>3</sub> and aqueous HF, on site would be designed to meet all applicable codes and standards, and special procedures would be in place for gaining access to the tanks and for filling the tanks. In addition, although the probabilities of occurrence for a high-consequence accident are extremely low, emergency response plans and procedures would be in place to respond to any emergencies should an accident occur.

### **S.5.18 Unavoidable Adverse Impacts**

Unavoidable adverse impacts are those impacts that cannot be mitigated by choices associated with siting and facility design options. Such impacts would be unavoidable, no matter which options were selected, and would include the following:

- Exposure of workers to radiation in the storage yards and the conversion facility that would be below applicable standards;
- Generation of vehicle exhaust and particulate air emissions during construction (emissions that would exceed air quality standards would be mitigated);
- Disturbance of up to 45 acres (18 ha) of land during construction, with approximately 10 acres (4 ha) required for the facility footprint;
- Loss of terrestrial and aquatic habitats from construction and disturbance of wildlife during operations; and
- Generation of vehicle exhaust and particulate air emissions during transportation.

### **S.5.19 Irreversible and Irrecoverable Commitment of Resources**

A commitment of a resource is considered *irreversible* when the primary or secondary impacts from its use limit the future options for its use. An *irrecoverable* commitment refers to the use or consumption of a resource that is neither renewable nor recoverable for later use by future generations. The major irreversible and irrecoverable commitments of natural and man-made resources related to the alternatives analyzed in this EIS include the land used to dispose of any conversion products, energy usage, and materials used for construction of the facility that could not be recovered or recycled.

### **S.5.20 Relationship between Short-Term Use of the Environment and Long-Term Productivity**

Disposal of solid nonhazardous waste resulting from new facility construction, operations, and D&D would require additional land at a sanitary landfill site, which would be unavailable for other uses in the long term. Any radioactive or hazardous waste generated by the various alternatives would involve the commitment of associated land, transportation, and disposal resources, and resources associated with the processing facilities for waste management. For the construction and operation of the conversion facility, the associated construction activities would result in both short-term and long-term losses of terrestrial and aquatic habitats from natural productivity. After closure of the new facility, it would be decommissioned and could be reused, recycled, or remediated.

### **S.5.21 Pollution Prevention and Waste Minimization**

Implementation of the EIS alternatives would be conducted in accordance with all applicable pollution prevention and waste minimization guidelines. A consideration of opportunities for reducing waste generation at the source, as well as for recycling and reusing material, will be incorporated to the extent possible into the engineering and design process for the conversion facility. Pollution prevention and waste minimization will be major factors in determining the final design of any facility to be constructed. Specific pollution prevention and waste minimization measures will be considered in designing and operating the final conversion facility.

### **S.5.22 Potential Impacts Associated with the Option of Expanding Conversion Facility Operations**

As discussed in Sections S.2.2.6 and 2.2.5, several reasonably foreseeable activities could result in a future decision to increase the conversion facility throughput or extend the operational period at one or both of the conversion facility sites. Although there are no current plans to do so, to account for these future possibilities and provide future planning flexibility, Section 5.2.6 includes an evaluation of the environmental impacts associated with expanding conversion facility operations at Paducah, either by increasing throughput (by process improvements) or by extending operations.

As described in Section 5.2.6, a throughput increase through process improvements would not be expected to significantly change the overall environmental impacts when compared with those of the current plant design. Efficiency improvements are generally on the order of 10%, which is within the uncertainty that is inherent in the impact estimate calculations. Slight variations in plant throughput are not unusual from year to year because of operational factors (e.g., equipment maintenance or replacement) and are generally accounted for by the conservative nature of the impact calculations.

The conversion facility operations could also be expanded by operating the facility longer than the currently anticipated 25 years. There are no current plans to operate the conversion facility beyond this period. However, with routine facility and equipment maintenance and periodic equipment replacements or upgrades, it is believed that the conversion facility could be operated safely beyond this time period to process any additional DUF<sub>6</sub> for which DOE might assume responsibility. As discussed in Section 5.2.6, if operations were extended beyond 25 years and if the operational characteristics (e.g., estimated releases of contaminants to air and water) of the facility remained unchanged, it is expected that the annual impacts would be essentially the same as those presented above and summarized in Table S-6. The overall cumulative impacts from the operation of the facility would increase proportionately with the increased life of the facility.

## **S.6 ENVIRONMENTAL AND OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH PERMITS AND COMPLIANCE REQUIREMENTS**

DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinder management as well as construction and operation of the proposed DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion facility would be subject to many federal, state, local, and other legal requirements. In accordance with such legal requirements, a variety of permits, licenses, and other consents must be obtained. Chapter 6 of this EIS contains a detailed listing of applicable requirements.

## **S.7 PREFERRED ALTERNATIVE**

The preferred alternative is to construct and operate the proposed DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion facility at alternative Location A, which is south of the administration building and its parking lot and east of the main Paducah GDP access road.

## 1 INTRODUCTION

Over the last five decades, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has enriched large quantities of uranium for nuclear applications by means of gaseous diffusion. This enrichment has taken place at three DOE sites located at Paducah, Kentucky; Portsmouth, Ohio; and the East Tennessee Technology Park (ETTP, formerly known as the K-25 site) in Oak Ridge, Tennessee (Figure 1-1). “Depleted” uranium hexafluoride (commonly referred to as DUF<sub>6</sub>) is a product of this process. It is being stored at the three sites. The total DUF<sub>6</sub> inventory at the three sites weighs approximately 700,000 metric tons (t) (770,000 short tons [tons])<sup>1</sup> and is stored in about 60,000 steel cylinders.

This document is a site-specific environmental impact statement (EIS) for construction and operation of a proposed DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion facility at the Paducah site. The proposed facility would convert the DUF<sub>6</sub> stored at Paducah to a more stable chemical form suitable for use or disposal. A separate EIS (DOE 2004a) evaluates potential impacts for a proposed conversion facility to be constructed at the Portsmouth site. The EISs have been prepared in accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) (*United States Code*, Title 42, Section 4321 et seq. [42 USC 4321 et seq.]), Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) NEPA regulations (*Code of Federal Regulations*, Title 40, Parts 1500–1508 [40 CFR Parts 1500–1508]), and DOE’s NEPA implementing procedures (10 CFR Part 1021).

This EIS addresses the potential environmental impacts at the Paducah site from the construction, operation, maintenance, and decontamination and decommissioning (D&D) of the proposed conversion facility; from the transportation of depleted uranium conversion products to a disposal facility; and from the transportation, sale, use, or disposal of the fluoride-containing conversion products (hydrogen fluoride [HF] or calcium fluoride [CaF<sub>2</sub>]). Three alternative locations within the Paducah site are evaluated for the conversion facility. Although not part of the proposed action, an option of


### National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) Regulations

For major federal actions with the potential for significant environmental impacts, NEPA regulations require federal agencies to discuss a proposed action and all reasonable alternatives in an environmental impact statement (EIS). The information in the EIS must be sufficient for reviewers to evaluate the relative merits of each alternative.

The agency must briefly discuss any alternatives that were eliminated from further analysis. The agency should identify its preferred alternatives, if one or more exist, in the draft EIS and must identify its preferred alternative in the final EIS unless another law prohibits naming a preference. After completing the final EIS and in order to implement an alternative, the federal agency must issue a Record of Decision that announces the decision that was made and identifies the alternatives that were considered.

---

<sup>1</sup> In general, in this EIS, values in English units are presented first, followed by metric units in parentheses. However, when values are routinely reported in metric units, the metric units are presented first, followed by English units in parentheses.



**FIGURE 1-1 DUF<sub>6</sub> Storage Locations**

shipping the ETTP cylinders to Paducah rather than to Portsmouth is also considered, as is an option of expanding conversion facility operations. In addition, this EIS evaluates a no action alternative, which assumes continued storage of DUF<sub>6</sub> in cylinders at the Paducah site.

## 1.1 BACKGROUND INFORMATION

The current DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion facility project is the culmination of a long history of DUF<sub>6</sub> management activities and events. To put the current project into context and provide perspective, this section provides a brief summary of this history. Additional background information on the storage and characteristics of DUF<sub>6</sub> and the DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinder inventory is provided in Section 1.2.

Uranium enrichment in the United States began as part of the atomic bomb development by the Manhattan Project during World War II. Enrichment for both civilian and military uses continued after the war under the auspices of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) and its successor agencies, including DOE. Three large gaseous diffusion plants (GDPs) were constructed to produce enriched uranium, first at the K-25 site (now called ETTP) and subsequently at Paducah and Portsmouth. The K-25 plant ceased operations in 1985, and the

Portsmouth plant ceased operations in 2001. The Paducah GDP continues to operate (see Section 1.1.1).

The DUF<sub>6</sub> produced during enrichment has been stored in large steel cylinders at all three gaseous diffusion plant sites since the 1950s. The cylinders are typically stacked two high and are stored outdoors on concrete or gravel yards. Figure 1.1-1 shows typical arrangements for storing cylinders.

### 1.1.1 Creation of USEC

In 1993, the U.S. government began the process of privatizing uranium enrichment services by creating the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC), a wholly owned government corporation, pursuant to the *Energy Policy Act of 1992* (Public Law [P.L.] 102-186). The Paducah and Portsmouth GDPs were leased to USEC, but DOE retained responsibility for storage, maintenance, and disposition of about 46,422 DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders produced before 1993 and located at the three gaseous diffusion plant sites (28,351 at Paducah, 13,388 at Portsmouth, and 4,683 at K-25). In 1996, the *USEC Privatization Act* (P.L. 104-134) transferred ownership of USEC from the government to private investors. This act provided for the allocation of USEC's liabilities between the U.S. government (including DOE) and the new private corporation, including liabilities for DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders generated by USEC before privatization.

In May and June of 1998, USEC and DOE signed two memoranda of agreement (MOAs) regarding the allocation of responsibilities for depleted uranium generated by USEC after 1993 (DOE and USEC 1998a,b). The two MOAs transferred ownership of a total of 11,400 DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders from USEC to DOE.

<b>DUF<sub>6</sub> Management Time Line</b>	
1950–1993	DOE generates DUF <sub>6</sub> stored in cylinders at the ETTP, Portsmouth, and Paducah sites.
1985	K-25 (ETTP) GDP ceases operations.
1992	Ohio EPA issues Notice of Violation (NOV) to Portsmouth.
1993	USEC is created by P.L. 102-186.
1994	DOE initiates DUF <sub>6</sub> PEIS.
1995	DNFSB issues Recommendation 95-1, Safety of Cylinders Containing Depleted Uranium. DOE initiates UF <sub>6</sub> Cylinder Project Management Plan.
1996	USEC Privatization Act (P.L. 104-134) is enacted.
1997	DOE issues Draft DUF <sub>6</sub> PEIS.
1998	DOE and Ohio EPA reach agreement on NOV. Two DOE-USEC MOAs transfer 11,400 DUF <sub>6</sub> cylinders to DOE. P.L. 105-204 is enacted.
1999	DOE and TDEC enter consent order. DOE issues Final DUF <sub>6</sub> PEIS. DOE issues conversion plan in response to P.L. 105-204. DNFSB closes Recommendation 95-1. DOE issues Draft RFP for conversion services.
2000	DOE issues Final RFP for conversion services.
2001	DOE receives five proposals in response to RFP. DOE identifies three proposals in competitive range. DOE publishes NOI for site-specific DUF <sub>6</sub> Conversion EIS. DOE prepares environmental critique to support conversion services procurement process. Portsmouth GDP ceases operations. DOE holds public scoping meetings for the site-specific DUF <sub>6</sub> Conversion EIS.
2002	DOE-USEC agreement transfers 23,000 t (25,684 tons) of DUF <sub>6</sub> to DOE. P.L. 107-206 is enacted. DOE awards conversion services contract to UDS. DOE prepares environmental synopsis to support conversion services procurement process.
2003	DOE announces Notice of Change in NEPA Compliance Approach and issues the draft EIS. DOE issues draft site-specific conversion facility EISs.
2004	Final site-specific conversion facility EISs issued.



**FIGURE 1.1-1 Storage of DUF<sub>6</sub> Cylinders: (a) Typical 14-ton (12-t) skirted cylinder. (b) New cylinder storage yard at the Paducah site. (c, d, e) Cylinders stacked two high on concrete chocks. (f) Cylinder yards at the Paducah site.**

On June 17, 2002, DOE and USEC signed a third agreement (DOE and USEC 2002) to transfer up to 23,300 t (25,684 tons) of DUF<sub>6</sub> from USEC to DOE between 2002 and 2006. The exact number of cylinders was not specified. Transfer of ownership of all the material will take place at Paducah. While title to the DUF<sub>6</sub> is transferred to DOE under this agreement, custody and cylinder management responsibility remains with USEC until DOE requests that USEC deliver the cylinders for processing in the conversion facility.

### 1.1.2 Growing Concern over the DUF<sub>6</sub> Inventory

In May 1995, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB), an independent DOE oversight organization within the Executive Branch, issued Recommendation 95-1 regarding storage of the DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders. This document advised that DOE should take three

actions: (1) start an early program to renew the protective coating on cylinders containing DUF<sub>6</sub> from the historical production of enriched uranium, (2) explore the possibility of additional measures to protect the cylinders from the damaging effects of exposure to the elements as well as any additional handling that might be called for, and (3) institute a study to determine whether a more suitable chemical form should be selected for long-term storage of depleted uranium.

In response to Recommendation 95-1, DOE began an aggressive effort to better manage its DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders, known as the *UF<sub>6</sub> Cylinder Project Management Plan* (Lockheed Martin Energy Systems, Inc. [LMES] 1997d). This plan incorporated more rigorous and more frequent inspections, a multiyear schedule for painting and refurbishing cylinders, and construction of concrete-pad cylinder yards. In December 1999, the DNFSB determined that DOE's implementation of the *UF<sub>6</sub> Cylinder Project Management Plan* was successful, and, as a result, on December 16, 1999, it closed Recommendation 95-1.

Several affected states also expressed concern over the DOE DUF<sub>6</sub> inventory. In October 1992, the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency (OEPA) issued a Notice of Violation (NOV) alleging that DUF<sub>6</sub> stored at the Portsmouth facility is subject to regulation under state hazardous waste laws. The NOV stated that the OEPA had determined DUF<sub>6</sub> to be a solid waste and that DOE had violated Ohio laws and regulations by not evaluating whether such waste was hazardous. DOE disagreed with this assessment and entered into discussions with the OEPA that continued through February 1998, when an agreement was reached. Ultimately, in February 1998, DOE and the OEPA agreed to set aside the issue of whether the DUF<sub>6</sub> is subject to state hazardous waste regulation and instituted a negotiated management plan governing the storage of the Portsmouth DUF<sub>6</sub>. The agreement also requires DOE to continue its efforts to evaluate the potential use or reuse of the material. The agreement expires in 2008.

Similarly, in February 1999, DOE and the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation (TDEC) entered into a consent order that included a requirement for the performance of two environmentally beneficial projects: the implementation of a negotiated management plan governing the storage of the small inventory (relative to other sites) of all UF<sub>6</sub> (depleted, enriched, and natural) cylinders stored at the ETTP site and the removal of the DUF<sub>6</sub> from the ETTP site or the conversion of the material by December 31, 2009. The consent order further requires DOE to submit a plan, within 60 days of completing NEPA review of its long-term DUF<sub>6</sub> management strategy, that contains schedules for activities related to removal of cylinders from the ETTP site.

In Kentucky, a final Agreed Order between DOE and the Kentucky Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet concerning DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinder management was entered in October 2003. This Agreed Order requires that DOE provide the Kentucky Department of Environmental Protection with an inventory of all DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders for which DOE has management responsibility at the Paducah site and, with regard to that inventory, that DOE implement the DUF<sub>6</sub> Cylinder Management Plan, which is Attachment 1 to the Agreed Order.

### 1.1.3 Programmatic NEPA Review and Congressional Interest

In 1994, DOE began work on a *Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Alternative Strategies for the Long-Term Management and Use of Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride* (DUF<sub>6</sub> PEIS) (DOE/EIS-0269) (DOE 1999a) to evaluate potential broad management options for DOE's DUF<sub>6</sub> inventory. Alternatives considered included continued storage of DUF<sub>6</sub> in cylinders at the gaseous diffusion plant sites or at a consolidated site, and the use of technologies for converting the DUF<sub>6</sub> to a more stable chemical form for long-term storage, use, or disposal. DOE issued the draft DUF<sub>6</sub> PEIS for public review and comment in December 1997 and held hearings near each of the three sites where DUF<sub>6</sub> is currently stored (Paducah, Kentucky; Oak Ridge, Tennessee; and Portsmouth, Ohio) and in Washington, D.C. In response to its efforts, DOE received some 600 comments.

In July 1998, while the PEIS was being prepared, the President signed into law P.L. 105-204. The text of P.L. 105-204 pertinent to the management of DUF<sub>6</sub> is as follows:

- (a) *PLAN.* – *The Secretary of Energy shall prepare, and the President shall include in the budget request for fiscal year 2000, a Plan and proposed legislation to ensure that all amounts accrued on the books of the United States Enrichment Corporation for the disposition of depleted uranium hexafluoride will be used to commence construction of, not later than January 31, 2004, and to operate, an onsite facility at each of the gaseous diffusion plants at Paducah, Kentucky, and Portsmouth, Ohio, to treat and recycle depleted uranium hexafluoride consistent with the National Environmental Policy Act.*

DOE began, therefore, to prepare a responsive plan while it proceeded with the PEIS.

On March 12, 1999, DOE submitted the plan to Congress; no legislation was proposed. In April 1999, DOE issued the final DUF<sub>6</sub> PEIS. The PEIS identified conversion of DUF<sub>6</sub> to another chemical form for use or long-term storage as part of the preferred management alternative. In the Record of Decision (ROD; *Federal Register*, Volume 64, page 43358 [64 FR 43358]), DOE decided to promptly convert the DUF<sub>6</sub> inventory to a more stable uranium oxide form (DOE 1999b). DOE also stated that it would use the depleted uranium oxide as much as possible and store the remaining depleted uranium oxide for potential future uses or disposal, as necessary. In addition, DUF<sub>6</sub> would be converted to depleted uranium metal only if uses for metal were available. DOE did not select a specific site or sites for the conversion facilities but reserved that decision for subsequent NEPA review. (This EIS is that site-specific review.)

Then, in July 1999, DOE issued the *Final Plan for the Conversion of Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride as Required by Public Law 105-204* (DOE 1999c). The Conversion Plan describes the steps that would allow DOE to convert the DUF<sub>6</sub> inventory to a more stable chemical form. It incorporates information received from the private sector in response to a DOE request for expressions of interest; ideas from members of the affected communities, Congress, and other interested stakeholders; and the results of the analyses for the final DUF<sub>6</sub> PEIS. The Conversion

Plan describes DOE's intent to chemically process the DUF<sub>6</sub> to create products that would present a lower long-term storage hazard and provide a material suitable for use or disposal.

#### 1.1.4 DOE Request for Contractor Proposals and Site-Specific NEPA Review

DOE initiated the final Conversion Plan on July 30, 1999, and announced the availability of a draft Request for Proposals (RFP) for a contractor to design, construct, and operate DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion facilities at the Paducah and Portsmouth sites.

In early 2000, the RFP was modified to allow for a wider range of potential conversion product forms and process technologies than had been previously reviewed in the DUF<sub>6</sub> PEIS (the PEIS considered conversion to triuranium octaoxide [U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub>] and uranium dioxide [UO<sub>2</sub>] for disposal and conversion to uranium metal for use). DOE stated that, if the selected conversion technology would generate a previously unconsidered product (e.g., depleted uranium tetrafluoride [UF<sub>4</sub>]), DOE would review the potential environmental impacts as part of the site-specific NEPA review.

On October 31, 2000, DOE issued a final RFP to procure a contractor to design, construct, and operate DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion facilities at the Paducah and Portsmouth sites. The RFP stated that any conversion facilities that would be built would have to convert the DUF<sub>6</sub> within a 25-year period to a more stable chemical form that would be suitable for either beneficial use or disposal. The selected contractor would use its proposed technology to design, construct, and operate the conversion facilities for an initial 5-year period. Operation would include (1) maintaining the DUF<sub>6</sub> inventories and conversion product inventories; (2) transporting all UF<sub>6</sub> storage cylinders currently located at ETTP to a conversion facility at the Portsmouth site, as appropriate; and (3) transporting to an appropriate disposal site any conversion product for which no use was found. The selected contractor would also be responsible for preparing such excess material for disposal.

In March 2001, DOE announced the receipt of five proposals in response to the RFP, three of which proposed conversion to U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> and two of which proposed conversion to UF<sub>4</sub>. In August 2001, DOE deemed three of these proposals to be within the competitive range; two conversion to U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> proposals and one conversion to UF<sub>4</sub> proposal.

On September 18, 2001, DOE published a Notice of Intent (NOI) in the *Federal Register* (66 FR 48123) announcing its intention to prepare an EIS for the proposed action to construct, operate, maintain, and decontaminate and decommission two DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion facilities at Portsmouth, Ohio, and Paducah, Kentucky. DOE held three scoping meetings to provide the public with an opportunity to present comments on the scope of the EIS and to ask questions and discuss concerns with DOE officials regarding the EIS. The scoping meetings were held in Piketon, Ohio, on November 28, 2001; in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, on December 4, 2001; and in Paducah, Kentucky, on December 6, 2001.

The alternatives identified in the NOI included a two-plant alternative (one at the Paducah site and another at the Portsmouth site), a one-plant alternative (only one plant would be

built, at either the Paducah or the Portsmouth site), an alternative using existing UF<sub>6</sub> conversion capacity at commercial nuclear fuel fabrication facilities, and a no action alternative. For alternatives that involved constructing one or two new plants, DOE planned to consider alternative conversion technologies, local siting alternatives within the Paducah and Portsmouth site boundaries, and the shipment of DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders stored at ETTP to either the Portsmouth site or to the Paducah site. The technologies to be considered in the EIS were those submitted in response to the October 2000 RFP, plus any other technologies that DOE believed must be considered.

### 1.1.5 Public Law 107-206 Passed by Congress

During the site-specific NEPA review process, Congress acted again regarding DUF<sub>6</sub> management, and on August 2, 2002, the President signed the *2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act for Further Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States* (P.L. 107-206). The pertinent part of P.L. 107-206 had several requirements: that no later than 30 days after enactment, DOE must select for award of a contract for the scope of work described in the October 2000 RFP, including design, construction, and operation of a DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion facility at each of the Department's Paducah, Kentucky, and Portsmouth, Ohio, gaseous diffusion sites; that the contract require groundbreaking for construction to occur no later than July 31, 2004; that the contract require construction proceed expeditiously thereafter; that the contract include as an item of performance the transportation, conversion, and disposition of DU contained in cylinders located at ETTP, consistent with environmental agreements between the State of Tennessee and the Secretary of Energy; and that no later than 5 days after the date of groundbreaking for each facility, the Secretary of Energy shall submit to Congress a certification that groundbreaking has occurred. The relevant portions of the Appropriations Act are set forth in Appendix A of this EIS. The relevant portions of the Appropriations Act are set forth in Appendix A.

In response to P.L. 107-206, on August 29, 2002, DOE awarded a contract to Uranium Disposition Services, LLC (hereafter referred to as UDS) for construction and operation of two conversion facilities. DOE also reevaluated the appropriate scope of its site-specific NEPA review and decided to prepare two separate EISs, one for the plant proposed for the Paducah site and a second for the Portsmouth site. This change was announced in the *Federal Register* Notice of Change in NEPA Compliance Approach on April 28, 2003 (68 FR 22368).

The two draft site-specific conversion facility EISs were mailed to stakeholders in late November 2003, and a notice of availability was published by the EPA in the *Federal Register* on November 28, 2003 (68 FR 66824). Comments on the draft EISs were accepted during a 67-day review period, from November 28, 2003, until February 2, 2004. Public hearings on the draft EISs were held near Portsmouth, Ohio, on January 7, 2004; Paducah, Kentucky, on January 13, 2004; and Oak Ridge, Tennessee, on January 15, 2004. (Section 1.6.3 provides additional information on the public review of the draft EISs).

## 1.2 CHARACTERISTICS OF DUF<sub>6</sub>

DUF<sub>6</sub> results from the process of making uranium suitable for use as fuel in nuclear reactors or for military applications. The use of uranium in these applications requires that the proportion of the uranium-235 isotope found in natural uranium, which is approximately 0.7% by weight (wt%), be increased through an isotopic separation process. To achieve this increase, a uranium-235 enrichment process called gaseous diffusion is used in the United States. The gaseous diffusion process uses uranium in the form of UF<sub>6</sub>, primarily because UF<sub>6</sub> can conveniently be used in gaseous form for processing, in liquid form for filling or emptying containers, and in solid form for storage. Solid UF<sub>6</sub> is a white, dense, crystalline material that resembles rock salt.

Depleted uranium is uranium that, through the enrichment process, has been stripped of a portion of the uranium-235 that it once contained so that its proportion is lower than the 0.7 wt% found in nature. The uranium in most of DOE's DUF<sub>6</sub> has between 0.2 wt% and 0.4 wt% uranium-235.

The chemical and physical characteristics of DUF<sub>6</sub> pose potential health risks, and the material is handled accordingly. Uranium and its decay products in DUF<sub>6</sub> emit low levels of alpha, beta, gamma, and neutron radiation. The radiation levels measured on the outside surface of filled DUF<sub>6</sub> storage cylinders are typically about 2 to 3 millirem per hour (mrem/h), decreasing to about 1 mrem/h at a distance of 1 ft (0.3 m). If DUF<sub>6</sub> is released to the atmosphere, it reacts with water vapor in air to form HF and a uranium oxyfluoride compound called uranyl fluoride (UO<sub>2</sub>F<sub>2</sub>), which can be harmful to human health if inhaled or ingested in sufficient quantities. Uranium is a heavy metal that, in addition to being radioactive, can have harmful chemical effects (primarily on the kidneys) if it enters the bloodstream by means of ingestion or

### Cylinder-Related Terms Used in This EIS

#### Types of UF<sub>6</sub>

UF <sub>6</sub>	A chemical composed of one atom of uranium combined with six atoms of fluorine. UF <sub>6</sub> is a volatile white crystalline solid at ambient conditions.
Normal UF <sub>6</sub>	UF <sub>6</sub> made with uranium that contains the isotope uranium-235 at a concentration equal to that found in nature, that is, 0.7% uranium-235.
DUF <sub>6</sub>	UF <sub>6</sub> made with uranium that contains the isotope uranium-235 in concentrations less than the 0.7% found in nature. In general, the DOE DUF <sub>6</sub> contains between 0.2% and 0.4% uranium-235.
Enriched UF <sub>6</sub>	UF <sub>6</sub> made with uranium containing more than 0.7% uranium-235. In general, DOE enriched UF <sub>6</sub> considered in this EIS contains less than 5% uranium-235.
Reprocessed UF <sub>6</sub>	UF <sub>6</sub> made with uranium that was previously irradiated in a nuclear reactor and chemically separated during reprocessing.

#### Types of Cylinders

Full DUF <sub>6</sub>	Cylinders filled to 62% of their volume with DUF <sub>6</sub> (some cylinders are slightly overfilled).
Partially Full	Cylinders that contain more than 50 lb (23 kg) of DUF <sub>6</sub> but less than 62% of their volume.
Heel	Cylinders that contain less than 50 lb (23 kg) of residual nonvolatile material left after the DUF <sub>6</sub> has been removed.
Empty	Cylinders that have had the DUF <sub>6</sub> and heel material removed and contain essentially no residual material.
Feed	Cylinders used to supply UF <sub>6</sub> into the enrichment process. Most feed cylinders contain natural UF <sub>6</sub> , although some historically contained reprocessed UF <sub>6</sub> .
Non-DUF <sub>6</sub>	A term used in this EIS to refer to cylinders that contain enriched UF <sub>6</sub> or normal UF <sub>6</sub> .

inhalation. HF is an extremely corrosive gas that can damage the lungs and cause death if inhaled at high enough concentrations. In light of such characteristics, DOE stores DUF<sub>6</sub> in a manner designed to minimize the risk to workers, the public, and the environment.

DUF<sub>6</sub> has been stored in large steel cylinders at all three storage sites since the 1950s. Several different cylinder types are in use, although the vast majority of cylinders have a 14-ton (12-t) capacity. (Typical cylinders in storage are shown in Figure 1.1-1.) The cylinders with a 14-ton (12-t) capacity are 12 ft (3.7 m) long by 4 ft (1.2 m) in diameter; most have a steel wall that is 5/16 in. (0.79 cm) thick. The cylinders have external stiffening rings that provide support. Lifting lugs for handling are attached to the stiffening rings. A small percentage of the cylinders have skirted ends (extensions of the cylinder walls past the rounded ends of the cylinder), as shown in Figure 1.1-1. Each cylinder has a single valve for filling and emptying located on one end at the 12 o'clock position. Similar but slightly smaller cylinders with a capacity of 10 tons (9 t) are also in use. Most of the cylinders were manufactured in accordance with an American National Standards Institute standard (ANSI N14.1, *American National Standard for Nuclear Materials — Uranium Hexafluoride — Packaging for Transport*) as specified in 49 CFR 173.420, the federal regulations governing transport of DUF<sub>6</sub>.

### 1.2.1 Cylinder Inventory

This EIS considers conversion of the DUF<sub>6</sub> inventory stored at the Paducah site for which DOE has responsibility. Statistics on the DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders managed by DOE at the Paducah site as of January 26, 2004, are summarized in Table 1.1-1. Approximately 36,200 cylinders containing almost 440,000 t (484,000 tons) of DUF<sub>6</sub> are managed at Paducah. In addition to the DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders, included in the Paducah inventory are approximately 1,940 DOE cylinders that contain enriched UF<sub>6</sub> or normal UF<sub>6</sub> (collectively called “non-DUF<sub>6</sub>” cylinders in this EIS) or are empty. The management of these non-DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders is included in the EIS; however, they would not be processed in the conversion facility.

The conversion facility proposed for Paducah is designed to convert 18,000 t (20,000 tons) of DUF<sub>6</sub> per year (approximately 1,400 cylinders per year). At that rate of throughput, it will take approximately 25 years to convert the Paducah cylinder inventory.

The cylinder inventory at the ETTP site is also listed in Table 1.1-1. Approximately 4,800 DUF<sub>6</sub> and 1,100 non-DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders are stored at ETTP. The non-DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders contain a total of approximately 26 t (29 tons) of UF<sub>6</sub> (7 t [8 tons] of enriched UF<sub>6</sub> plus 19 t [21 tons] of normal UF<sub>6</sub>) (Hightower 2004). 100% of the Paducah enriched UF<sub>6</sub> and over 98% of the ETTP enriched UF<sub>6</sub> contain less than 5% uranium-235.

In addition to the Paducah and ETTP inventories, approximately 16,000 cylinders are managed at the Portsmouth site. Construction and operation of a conversion facility at the Portsmouth site for conversion of the Portsmouth and ETTP inventories is the subject of a separate EIS (DOE 2004a).

**TABLE 1.1-1 Inventory of DOE UF<sub>6</sub> Cylinders Considered in This EIS<sup>a</sup>**

Location	No. of Cylinders	Weight of UF <sub>6</sub> (t)
Paducah – DUF <sub>6</sub>	36,191	436,400
Non-DUF <sub>6</sub>		
Enriched UF <sub>6</sub>	182	1,600
Normal UF <sub>6</sub>	1,485	16,000
Empty	275	0
ETTP <sup>b</sup> – DUF <sub>6</sub>	4,822	54,300
Non-DUF <sub>6</sub>		
Enriched UF <sub>6</sub>	881	7
Normal UF <sub>6</sub>	221	19
Empty	20	0
Total		
DUF <sub>6</sub>	41,013	490,700
Non-DUF <sub>6</sub>	2,769	17,625
Empty	295	0

<sup>a</sup> As of January 26, 2004 (Hightower 2004).

<sup>b</sup> The proposed action calls for shipment of the ETTP cylinders to Portsmouth.

DOE proposes to ship all ETTP cylinders to Portsmouth. However, this EIS does consider an option of shipping the ETTP cylinders to Paducah. If the ETTP cylinders were shipped to Paducah, the Paducah conversion facility would operate for approximately 28 rather than 25 years to convert the DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders. The shipment of the non-DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders to Paducah is also included. It is assumed that the normal UF<sub>6</sub> and enriched UF<sub>6</sub> cylinders from both Paducah and ETTP would be put to beneficial uses; therefore, conversion of the contents of the non-DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders is not considered.

The evaluation of the no action alternative in this EIS is based on the assessment conducted for the PEIS, which was revised to reflect updated information. To account for uncertainties related to the amount of USEC-generated DUF<sub>6</sub> to be managed in the future, the PEIS analysis used for this EIS assumed that a total of approximately 40,400 DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders at the Paducah site would need to be managed.

Several reasonably foreseeable activities could potentially result in a future increase in the number of DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders for which DOE has management responsibility. These include potential transfers of DUF<sub>6</sub> to DOE from continued USEC gaseous diffusion plant operations at Paducah; from a future USEC advanced enrichment technology plant at Portsmouth, Paducah, or elsewhere; and from some unspecified future commercial uranium enrichment facility licensed and operated in the United States. Such an inventory increase could result in a future decision to extend conversion facility operations or expand throughput at one or both of the conversion

facility sites. An option of expanding operations at the conversion facility is considered in this EIS, as discussed in more detail in Section 2.2.5 and in the assessment of impacts presented in Chapter 5.

### 1.2.2 Cylinder Condition and Potential Contamination

As the inventory of DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders ages, some cylinders have begun to show evidence of external corrosion. As of August 2002, at all three storage sites combined, 11 cylinders had developed holes (breaches) (see text box). The majority of these breaches were the result of handling damage during stacking or handling damage followed by corrosion. Only 2 of the 11 breaches are believed to have resulted from corrosion alone. At Paducah, a total of 3 cylinder breaches have occurred. However, since DUF<sub>6</sub> is solid at ambient temperatures and pressures, it is not readily released after a cylinder leak or breach. When a cylinder is breached, moist air reacts with the exposed solid DUF<sub>6</sub> and iron, forming a dense plug of solid uranium and iron compounds and a small amount of HF gas. The plug limits the amount of material released from a breached cylinder. When a cylinder breach is identified, the cylinder is typically repaired or its contents are transferred to a new cylinder.

Because reprocessed uranium was enriched in the early years of gaseous diffusion, some of the DUF<sub>6</sub> inventory is contaminated with small amounts of technetium (Tc) and the transuranic (TRU) elements plutonium (Pu), neptunium (Np), and americium (Am). In 2000, DOE, on the basis of existing process knowledge and results from additional sampling of cylinders, characterized the TRU and Tc contamination in the DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders. As indicated in a report by Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) (Hightower et al. 2000), nondetectable or very low levels of TRU elements were found to be

#### Summary Data for Breached Cylinders at the Storage Sites Through 2003

**Paducah Site, three breached cylinders:** One identified in 1992 was initiated by mechanical damage during stacking. The breached area was about 0.06 in. × 2 in. (0.16 cm × 5.1 cm). Estimated material loss was 0. The other two cylinder breaches were identified as breached because of missing cylinder plugs; they were identified between 1998 and 2002. Material loss from these cylinders was not estimated.

**ETTP Site, five breached cylinders:** Four were identified in 1991 and 1992. Two of these were initiated by mechanical damage during stacking, and two were caused by external corrosion due to prolonged ground contact. The breach areas for these four cylinders were about 2 in. (5.1 cm), 6 in. (15 cm), and 10 in. (25 cm) in diameter for three circular breaches, and 17 in. × 12 in. for a rectangular-shaped breach. The mass of material loss from the cylinders could not be estimated because equipment to weigh the cylinders was not available at the ETTP site. The fifth breach occurred in 1998 and was caused by steel grit blasting, which resulted in a breach at the location of an as-fabricated weld defect (immediately repaired without loss of DUF<sub>6</sub>).

**Portsmouth Site, three breached cylinders:** Two identified in 1990 were initiated by mechanical damage during stacking; the damage was not noticed immediately, and subsequent corrosion occurred at the point of damage. The largest breach size was about 9 in. × 18 in. (23 cm × 46 cm); the estimated mass of DUF<sub>6</sub> lost was between 17 and 109 lb (7.7 and 49 kg). The next largest cylinder breach had an area of about 2 in. (5.1 cm) in diameter; the estimated DUF<sub>6</sub> lost was less than 4 lb (1.8 kg). The third breached cylinder occurred in 1996 and was the result of handling equipment knocking off a cylinder plug.

dispersed in the DUF<sub>6</sub> stored in the cylinders. However, higher levels of TRU elements, associated with the “heels” remaining in a small number of cylinders formerly used to store reprocessed uranium, are expected to occur. (The term “heel” refers to the residual amount of nonvolatile material left in a cylinder following removal of the DUF<sub>6</sub>, typically less than 50 lb [23 kg].) The final RFP for providing conversion services concluded that any DUF<sub>6</sub> contaminated with TRU elements and Tc at the concentrations expected to be encountered could be safely handled in a conversion facility. The data and assumptions used in this EIS to evaluate potential impacts from the DUF<sub>6</sub> contaminated with Tc and TRU elements are described in Appendix B.

Some of the cylinders manufactured before 1978 were painted with coatings containing polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs). (Although PCBs are no longer in production in the United States, from the 1950s to the late 1970s, PCBs were added to some paints as fungicides and to increase durability and flexibility.) The long persistence of PCBs in the environment and the tendency for bioaccumulation in the foodchain has resulted in regulations to prevent their release and distribution in the environment. As a result, the cylinders with PCB-containing coatings may require special measures during transport, such as bagging, to ensure that PCB-containing paint chips are not released. Additionally, environmental monitoring and maintenance of cylinder storage and process areas may be required to ensure that PCBs are not released during storage or processing. Potential issues associated with PCB-containing cylinder coatings are discussed in Appendix B. As discussed in Appendix B, the presence of PCBs in the coatings of some cylinders is not expected to result in health and safety risks to workers or the public.

### **1.3 PURPOSE AND NEED**

DOE needs to convert its inventory of DUF<sub>6</sub> to a more stable chemical form for use or disposal. This need follows directly from (1) the decision presented in the August 1999 ROD for the PEIS, namely, to begin conversion of the DUF<sub>6</sub> inventory as soon as possible, and (2) P.L. 107-206, which directs DOE to award a contract for construction and operation of conversion facilities at both the Paducah site and the Portsmouth site.

### **1.4 PROPOSED ACTION**

The proposed action evaluated in this EIS is to construct and operate a conversion facility at the Paducah site for converting the Paducah DUF<sub>6</sub> inventory into depleted uranium oxide (primarily U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub>) and other conversion products. The time period considered is a construction period of approximately 2 years, an operational period of 25 years, and a 3-year period for D&D of the facility.

This EIS assesses the potential environmental impacts from the following proposed activities:

- Construction, operation, maintenance, and D&D of the proposed DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion facility at the Paducah site;

- Transportation of uranium conversion products and waste materials to a disposal facility;
- Transportation and sale of the HF produced as a co-product of conversion; and
- Neutralization of HF to CaF<sub>2</sub> and its sale or disposal in the event that the HF product is not sold.

Three alternative locations for the conversion facility within the Paducah site are considered. Although not part of the proposed action, this EIS considers an option of transporting the ETTP DUF<sub>6</sub> and non-DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders to Paducah. In addition, this EIS includes an evaluation of the impacts that would result from a no action alternative (i.e., continued DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinder storage at the Paducah site).

## 1.5 DOE DUF<sub>6</sub> MANAGEMENT PROGRAM

In fiscal year (FY) 2001, the responsibility for all uranium program activities was transferred from DOE's Office of Nuclear Energy, Science, and Technology (NE) to its Office of Environmental Management (EM). All activities related to this program are managed by the DOE's Lexington Office. The uranium program supports important government activities associated with the federal enrichment program that were not transferred to USEC under the provisions of the National Energy Policy Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-486), including management of highly enriched uranium; management of the facilities at the Paducah and Portsmouth sites; responsibility for preexisting liabilities; management of DOE's inventories of DUF<sub>6</sub> and other surplus uranium; and oversight of the construction of DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion facilities.

Within the uranium program is DOE's DUF<sub>6</sub> management program, whose mission is to safely and efficiently manage DOE's inventory of DUF<sub>6</sub> in a way that protects the health and safety of workers and the public and protects the environment until the DUF<sub>6</sub> is either used or disposed of. In addition to the conversion activities that are the subject of this EIS, the DUF<sub>6</sub> management program involves two other primary activities: (1) surveillance and maintenance of cylinders and (2) development of beneficial uses for depleted uranium.

Since it may take 25 years to convert the DUF<sub>6</sub> in the inventory to a more stable chemical form, DOE intends to ensure the continued surveillance and maintenance of the DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders currently in storage. Day-to-day management includes actions designed to cost-effectively improve cylinder storage conditions, such as:

- Performing regular inspections and general maintenance of cylinders and storage yards, including:
  - Restacking and respacing the cylinders to improve drainage and allow for more thorough inspections,
  - Repainting cylinder bodies and the ends of skirted cylinders as needed to arrest corrosion, and

- Constructing new concrete cylinder storage yards and reconditioning existing yards from gravel to concrete to improve storage conditions; and
- Performing routine cylinder valve surveys and maintenance.

DOE is committed to exploring the safe, beneficial use of depleted uranium and other materials that result from the conversion of DUF<sub>6</sub> (e.g., HF and empty carbon steel cylinders) in order to conserve more resources and increase savings over levels achieved through disposal. Accordingly, a DOE research and development (R&D) program on uses for depleted uranium has been initiated. This program is exploring the risks and benefits associated with several uses for depleted uranium, such as a radiation shielding material, a catalyst, and a semiconductor material in electronic devices. More information about DOE's R&D on depleted uranium uses is available on the *Depleted UF<sub>6</sub> Management Information Network* Web site (<http://web.ead.anl.gov/uranium>). In addition, in the RFP for conversion services, DOE requested that the bidders investigate and propose viable uses for the conversion products.

## 1.6 SCOPE

The scope of an EIS refers to the range of actions, alternatives, and impacts it considers. An agency generally determines the scope of an EIS through a two-part process: internal scoping and public scoping. Internal scoping refers to the agency's efforts to identify potential alternatives and important issues and to determine which analyses to include in an EIS. Public scoping refers to the agency's request for public comments on the proposed action and on the results from its internal scoping. It involves consultations with federal, state, and local agencies as well as requests for comments from stakeholder organizations and members of the general public. The EIS scoping process provides a means for the public to provide input into the decision-making process. DOE is committed to ensuring that the public has ample opportunity to participate in the review. This section summarizes the public scoping conducted for this EIS (Section 1.6.1), discusses the range of issues and alternatives that resulted from the internal and public scoping process (Section 1.6.2), and summarizes the public review of the draft EIS (Section 1.6.3).

### 1.6.1 Public Scoping Process for This Environmental Impact Statement

On September 18, 2001, DOE published a NOI in the *Federal Register* (66 FR 48123) announcing its intention to prepare an EIS for a proposal to construct, operate, maintain, and decontaminate and decommission DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion facilities at Portsmouth, Ohio, and/or Paducah, Kentucky. The purpose of the NOI was to encourage early public involvement in the EIS process and to solicit public comments on the proposed scope of the EIS, including the issues and alternatives it would analyze. To facilitate public comments, the NOI included a detailed discussion of the project background, a list of the preliminary alternatives and environmental impacts that DOE proposed to evaluate in the EIS, and a project schedule. The NOI announced that the scoping period for the EIS would be open until November 26, 2001. The scoping period was later extended to January 11, 2002.

During the scoping process, the public was given six ways to submit comments on the DUF<sub>6</sub> proposal to DOE:

1. Attendance at public scoping meetings held in Piketon, Ohio; Oak Ridge, Tennessee; and Paducah, Kentucky;
2. Traditional mail delivery;
3. Toll-free facsimile transmission;
4. Toll-free voice message;
5. Electronic mail; and
6. Directly through the *Depleted UF<sub>6</sub> Management Information Network* Web site on the Internet (<http://web.ead.anl.gov/uranium>).

Numerous ways to communicate about issues and submit comments were provided to encourage maximum participation. All comments, regardless of how they were submitted, received equal consideration.

A total of approximately 100 individuals attended the three scoping meetings, and 20 of these individuals provided oral comments. Individuals in attendance included federal officials, state regulators, local officials, site oversight committee members, representatives of interested companies, members of local media, and private individuals. In addition, about 20 individuals and organizations provided comments through the other means available (fax, telephone, mail, e-mail, and Web site). Some of the comments received through these other means were duplicates of comments made at the scoping meetings. During the scoping period (September 18, 2001, through January 11, 2002), the *Depleted UF<sub>6</sub> Management Information Network* Web site was used a great deal; a total of 64,366 pages were viewed (averaging 554 per day) during 9,983 user sessions (averaging 85 per day) by 4,784 unique visitors.

Approximately 140 comments were received from about 30 individuals and organizations during the scoping period. Appendix C of this EIS provides a summary of these comments. These comments were examined to finalize the proposed scope of this EIS. Comments were related primarily to five major issues: (1) DOE policy; (2) alternatives; (3) cylinder inventory, maintenance, and surveillance; (4) transportation; and (5) general environmental concerns.

Most of the comments made during the public scoping period were related to issues that DOE was already planning to discuss in this EIS. Such comments helped to clarify the need for addressing those issues. However, a few issues were raised that DOE was not able to address in this EIS. These issues and the reasons why they are not addressed are summarized below.

- One commentator stated that DOE should not consider any alternatives other than the two conversion plants alternative because Congress had mandated that two plants be built: one at Paducah and one at Portsmouth. NEPA

requires that the no action alternative be one of the alternatives considered. Therefore, the no action alternative has been included in this EIS.

- A request was made to designate specific routes and perform route-specific risk analyses for transporting the ETTP cylinders. Specific routes will not be known until the selected contractor is ready to ship the cylinders from ETTP. The exact routes will be determined on the basis of the shipment mode selected (truck or rail), applicable regulations, and other factors, as appropriate. Before the shipments occur, a transportation plan will be coordinated with the appropriate regulatory agencies. However, this EIS does present an evaluation of transportation risks for representative routes that were identified by using route prediction models for truck and rail modes.
- Requests were made to analyze the impacts associated with the use of conversion products. As described further below, no large-scale uses of the depleted uranium conversion product have been identified, and current plans assume disposal of the material. The DUF<sub>6</sub> PEIS (DOE 1999a) analyzed the generic impacts associated with the manufacture of waste containers using depleted uranium and depleted UO<sub>2</sub>. Impacts associated with actual use of any depleted uranium products will be analyzed if specific uses are identified in the future and any necessary licenses, permits, or exemptions are obtained. This EIS does evaluate impacts associated with the potential sale of fluoride-containing conversion products (i.e., HF and CaF<sub>2</sub>).

### 1.6.2 Scope of This Environmental Impact Statement

In response to the congressional mandate to build conversion plants at the Paducah and Portsmouth sites (P.L. 107-206), DOE reevaluated the appropriate scope of its NEPA review and decided to prepare two separate site-specific EISs in parallel: one EIS for the facility proposed for the Paducah site and a second EIS for the Portsmouth site. This change in approach was announced in a *Federal Register* Notice published on April 28, 2003 (DOE 2003b).

This EIS addresses the potential environmental impacts at Paducah from the construction, operation, maintenance, and D&D of the proposed conversion facility; from the transportation of depleted uranium conversion products to a disposal facility; and from the transportation, sale, or disposal of the fluoride-containing conversion products (HF or CaF<sub>2</sub>). Three alternative locations within the Paducah site are evaluated for the conversion facility. An option of shipping the ETTP cylinders to Paducah for conversion is also considered. In addition, this EIS evaluates a no action alternative, which assumes continued storage of DUF<sub>6</sub> in cylinders at the Paducah site. Additional details are provided in the sections below.

### 1.6.2.1 Alternatives

The alternatives that are evaluated and compared in this EIS include a no action alternative and three action alternatives that focus on where to site the conversion facility within the Paducah site:

1. *No Action Alternative.* Under the no action alternative, conversion would not occur. Current cylinder management activities (handling, inspection, monitoring, and maintenance) would continue; thus, the status quo would be maintained at Paducah indefinitely, consistent with the *UF<sub>6</sub> Cylinder Project Management Plan* (LMES 1997d) and consent orders, which cover actions needed to meet safety and environmental requirements.
2. *Action Alternatives.* The proposed action considers the construction and operation of a conversion facility at the Paducah site. Three alternative locations within the site are evaluated (Locations A [preferred], B, and C, which are defined in Chapter 2). In addition, an option of transporting the ETTP cylinders to Paducah is considered, as well as an option of expanding conversion facility operations.

These alternatives and options, as well as the alternatives that were considered but not evaluated in detail, are described more fully in Chapter 2.

### 1.6.2.2 Depleted Uranium Conversion Technologies and Products

As noted in Section 1.1.5, DOE awarded a conversion services contract to UDS on August 29, 2002. The proposed UDS facility would convert DUF<sub>6</sub> to a mixture of depleted uranium oxides (primarily U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub>), a form suitable for disposal if uses are not identified. In addition to depleted U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub>, the UDS conversion facility would produce aqueous HF, which is a product that has commercial value and could potentially be sold for industrial use. The evaluation of the proposed action in this EIS is based on the proposed UDS conversion technology and facility design, which is described in Section 2.2.

The conversion project RFP did not specify the conversion product technology or form. Three proposals submitted in response to the RFP were deemed to be in the competitive range; two of these proposals involved conversion of DUF<sub>6</sub> to U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> and the third involved conversion to depleted UF<sub>4</sub>. Potential environmental impacts associated with these proposals were considered during the procurement process, which involved the preparation of an environmental critique and environmental synopsis that were prepared in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 1021.216.

The environmental critique, which contains proprietary information, focuses on environmental issues pertinent to a decision among the proposals within the competitive range and includes a discussion of the purpose of the procurement and each offer, a discussion of the salient characteristics of each offer, and a comparative evaluation of the environmental impacts

of the offers. The environmental synopsis is a summary document based on the environmental critique; it does not contain proprietary information. The synopsis documents the evaluation of potential environmental impacts associated with the proposals in the competitive range and does not contain procurement-sensitive information. The environmental synopsis is presented in Appendix D.

The environmental synopsis concludes that, on the basis of the assessment of potential environmental impacts presented in the critique, no proposal was clearly environmentally preferable. Although differences in a number of impact areas were identified, none of the differences were considered to result in one proposal being preferable over the others. In addition, the potential environmental impacts associated with the proposals were found to be similar to, and generally less than, those presented in the DUF<sub>6</sub> PEIS (DOE 1999a) for representative conversion technologies.

### **1.6.2.3 Transportation Modes**

This EIS considers an option of shipping the cylinders at ETTP to Paducah, although current plans call for the shipment of these cylinders to Portsmouth. For this option, this EIS considers several transportation methods for preparing the DUF<sub>6</sub> and non-DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders and shipping them to the conversion facility. Many of the cylinders currently stored at ETTP do not meet U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) requirements for shipment without some type of preparation first. The DUF<sub>6</sub> PEIS (DOE 1999a) and a separate transportation impact assessment (Biwer et al. 2001) contain detailed information on cylinder conditions, regulations, and preparation methods. As described in detail in Section 2.2.4, three options for preparing noncompliant cylinders are considered in this EIS: (1) use of overpacks, which are large containers, certified to meet DOT shipping requirements, into which cylinders could be placed; (2) use of a cylinder transfer facility, in which the UF<sub>6</sub> contents could be transferred from noncompliant cylinders to compliant ones; and (3) obtaining an exemption from DOT allowing the cylinders to be shipped “as-is” or following repairs. This EIS also considers the transportation of conversion products to a user or disposal facility. Transportation of DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders and conversion products by two modes, truck and train, are analyzed in this EIS.

### **1.6.2.4 Conversion Product Disposition**

As noted, the products of the DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion process would consist of depleted U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> and HF. DOE has been working with industrial and academic researchers for several years to identify potential uses for both products. Some potential uses for depleted uranium exist or are being developed, and DOE believes that a viable market exists for the HF generated during conversion. To take advantage of these to the extent possible, DOE requested in the RFP that the bidders for conversion services investigate and propose viable uses.

Currently, there are several uses for depleted uranium, including (1) reactor fuel in breeder reactors; (2) conventional military applications, such as tank armor and armor-piercing projectiles; (3) biological shielding, which provides protection from x-rays or gamma rays; and

(4) counterweights for use in aircraft applications. One characteristic of all these applications is that the amount of depleted uranium that they require is small, and existing demand can be met by depleted uranium stocks separate from the DUF<sub>6</sub> considered in this EIS; thus, these applications do not and are not expected to have a significant effect on the inventory of depleted uranium contained in the DOE DUF<sub>6</sub> inventory.

In the RFP, DOE acknowledges that uses for much of the depleted uranium may not be found, thus requiring that it be dispositioned as low-level radioactive waste (LLW). In its proposal, UDS confirmed that widescale applications of the depleted U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> conversion product are not currently available and that the material will likely require disposal. Studies conducted by ORNL for DOE indicate that both the Nevada Test Site (NTS) (a DOE facility) and Envirocare of Utah, Inc. (a commercial facility) are potential disposal facilities for depleted uranium (Croff et al. 2000a,b). These studies included reviews of the LLW acceptance programs and disposal capacities of both NTS and Envirocare of Utah, Inc. It was concluded that either facility would have the capacity needed to dispose of the U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> product from the proposed DOE DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion program, and that the U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> material to be sent to these facilities would be likely to meet each site's waste acceptance criteria. In its proposal to design, construct, and operate the DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion facilities, UDS provided evidence that both sites can presently accept the U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> and identified the Envirocare facility as the primary disposal site and NTS as the secondary disposal site.

Shipments of depleted U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> to a disposal facility are expected to begin shortly after conversion facility operations commence, currently planned for late 2006. The conversion facilities are being designed with a short-term storage capacity for 6 months' worth of depleted uranium conversion products. This storage capacity is being provided in order to accommodate potential delays in disposal activities without affecting conversion operations. If a delay was to extend beyond 6 months, DOE would evaluate possible options and conduct appropriate NEPA review for those options.

This EIS evaluates the impacts from packaging, handling, and transporting depleted U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> from the conversion facility to disposal sites that would be (1) selected in a manner consistent with DOE policies and orders and (2) authorized or licensed to receive the conversion products by DOE (in conformance with DOE orders), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC; in conformance with NRC regulations), or an NRC Agreement State agency (in conformance with state laws and regulations determined to be equivalent to NRC regulations). Assessment of the impacts and risks from on-site handling and disposal at the LLW disposal facility are deferred to the disposal site's site-specific NEPA or licensing documents. DOE plans to decide the specific disposal location(s) for the depleted U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> conversion product after additional appropriate NEPA review. Accordingly, DOE will continue to evaluate its disposal options and will consider any further information or comments relevant to that decision. DOE will give a minimum 45-day notice before making the specific disposal decision and will provide any supplemental NEPA analysis for public review and comment.

In addition, UDS believes that aqueous HF generated during conversion is a valuable commercial commodity that could be readily sold for industrial use. Thus, this EIS evaluates impacts associated with HF sale and use. To account for the possibility that uses for HF will not

be identified, this EIS also evaluates a contingency for the neutralization of HF to the unreactive solid CaF<sub>2</sub> for sale or disposal.

### **1.6.2.5 Human Health and Environmental Issues**

This EIS evaluates and compares the potential impacts on human health and the environment at the Paducah site under the alternatives and options described above. In general, this EIS emphasizes those impacts that might differ under the various alternatives and those impacts that would be of special interest to the general public (such as potential radiation effects).

This EIS includes assessments of impacts on human health and safety, air, water, soil, biota, socioeconomics, cultural resources, site waste management capabilities, resource requirements, and environmental justice. Impacts judged by DOE to be of the greatest concern or public interest and to receive more detailed analysis include impacts on human health and safety, air and water, waste management capabilities, and socioeconomics. These issues are consequently treated in greater detail in this EIS.

The process of estimating environmental impacts from the conversion of DUF<sub>6</sub> is subject to some uncertainty because final facility designs are not yet available. In addition, the methods used to estimate impacts have uncertainties associated with their results. This EIS impact assessment was designed to ensure — through the selection of assumptions, models, and input parameters — that impacts would not be underestimated and that relative comparisons among the alternatives would be valid and meaningful. This approach was developed by uniformly applying common assumptions to each alternative and by choosing assumptions intended to produce conservative estimates of impacts — that is, assumptions that would lead to overestimates of the expected impacts. Although uncertainty may characterize estimates of the absolute magnitude of impacts, a uniform approach to impact assessment enhances the ability to make valid comparisons among alternatives. This uniform approach was implemented in the analyses conducted for this EIS to the extent practicable.

### **1.6.3 Public Review of the Draft EIS**

The two draft site-specific conversion facility EISs were mailed to stakeholders in late November 2003, and a notice of availability was published by the EPA in the *Federal Register* on November 28, 2003 (68 FR 66824). In addition, each EIS was also made available in its entirety on the Internet at the same time, and e-mail notification was sent to those on the project Web site mailing list. Stakeholders were encouraged to provide comments on the draft EISs during a 67-day review period, from November 28, 2003, until February 2, 2004. Comments could be submitted by calling a toll-free number, by fax, by letter, by e-mail, or through the project Web site. Comments could also be submitted at public hearings held near Portsmouth, Ohio, on January 7, 2004; Paducah, Kentucky, on January 13, 2004; and Oak Ridge, Tennessee, on January 15, 2004. The public hearings were announced on the project Web site and in local newspapers prior to the meetings.

A total of about 210 comments were received during the comment period. The comments received and DOE's responses to those comments are presented in Volume 2 of this EIS. Because of the similarities in the proposed actions and the general applicability of many of the comments to both site-specific conversion facility EISs, all comments received on the Portsmouth and Paducah EISs are included in Volume 2. In addition, all comments received were considered in the preparation of both final EISs.

Several revisions were made to the two site-specific conversion facility draft EISs on the basis of the comments received (changes are indicated by vertical lines in the right margin of the document). The vast majority of the changes were made to provide clarification and additional detail. Specific responses to each comment received on the draft EISs are presented in Volume 2 of this EIS; a summary of the most common issues raised by the reviewers and the general DOE responses to these issues are listed below.

- *Comments related to the proposed action and preferred alternative.*

Numerous reviewers expressed support for the DOE conversion project in general and agreement with the preferred alternatives identified in the draft EISs. Reviewers stressed the importance of meeting the requirements of P.L. 107-206, as well as the consent orders that DOE has signed with each of the affected states.

DOE appreciates support for the conversion project and is committed to complying with all applicable regulations, agreements, and orders.

- *Comments related to transportation of cylinders.*

Several reviewers raised concerns over the safe transportation of cylinders from the ETTP site. Common themes included a preference for the use of overpacks, opposition to transporting noncompliant cylinders "as-is" under a DOT exemption, a general desire that shipments be made in a manner protective of health and safety, and questions concerning the potential use of barge transportation.

DOE is committed to conducting all transportation activities in a manner protective of human health and safety and in compliance with all applicable regulations. A Transportation Plan will be developed for each shipping program related to the DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion facility project. Each Plan will be developed to address specific issues associated with the commodity being shipped, the origin and destination points, and concerns of jurisdictions transited by the shipments. In all cases, DOE-sponsored shipments will comply with all applicable State and Federal regulations and will be reflected in many of the operational decisions that will be made and presented in the Plan. The transportation regulations are designed to be protective of public health and safety during both accident and routine transportation conditions.

To allow flexibility in planning and future operations, the transportation analysis in each EIS evaluates a range of options for cylinder preparation and transport modes. For example, all three options for shipping noncompliant cylinders, including obtaining a DOT exemption, using overpacks, and transferring the contents from noncompliant to compliant cylinders, are evaluated in the EISs, as are both truck and rail modes. Because barge transport has not been proposed as part of the current conversion facility project and for the reasons discussed in Section 2.3.5, a detailed evaluation has not been included in the final EISs. If barge transportation was proposed in the future and considered to be a reasonable option, additional NEPA review would be conducted.

- *Comments related to removal of cylinders from the ETTP site.*

Several reviewers stressed the importance of DOE compliance with the 1999 consent order with the TDEC that requires the removal of the DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders from the ETTP site or the conversion of the material by December 31, 2009.

DOE is committed to complying with the 1999 consent order. Toward that end, the DOE contract for accelerated cleanup of the ETTP site, including removal of the DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders, calls for completion of this activity by the end of FY 2008.

- *Comments related to the potential for DOE to receive additional DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders from other sources.*

Several reviewers noted that DOE may receive additional DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders from other sources, including continued USEC operations, the proposed American Centrifuge Facility at the Portsmouth site, and other potential commercial enrichment facilities. Some reviewers requested that DOE design the conversion facilities to accommodate such an increase.

At the present time, there are no plans or proposals for DOE to accept DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders for conversion beyond the current inventory for which it has responsibility. However, Section 2.2.7 of the Portsmouth site-specific conversion facility EIS and Section 2.2.5 of the Paducah EIS discuss a number of possible future sources of additional DUF<sub>6</sub> that could require conversion. The potential environmental impacts associated with expanding plant operations (either by extending operations or by increasing the throughput) to accommodate processing of additional cylinders are discussed in Section 5.2.8 of the Portsmouth EIS and Section 5.2.6 of the Paducah EIS. Because of the uncertainty associated with possible future sources of DUF<sub>6</sub> for which DOE could assume responsibility, there is no current proposal to increase the throughputs of the conversion facilities or extend the operational period.

- *Comments related to USEC's American Centrifuge Facility.*

Several reviewers noted the January 2004 announcement by USEC that the American Centrifuge Facility would be sited at Portsmouth, and stated that the EISs should be revised accordingly, including consideration of the facility under Portsmouth cumulative impacts.

The two site-specific conversion facility EISs have been revised to reflect that Portsmouth has been selected as the site for the USEC American Centrifuge Facility. Although Location B is the likely site for construction of the centrifuge facility, it has been retained in the final Portsmouth conversion EIS as a siting alternative. The cumulative impacts analysis included in both the draft and final Portsmouth conversion facility EIS assumed that a new USEC centrifuge enrichment facility would be constructed and operated at the Portsmouth site (see Sections S.5.16 and 5.3.2). As stated in Sections S.5.16 and 5.3.2, the analysis assumed that such a plant would be sited at Portsmouth, that the existing DOE gas centrifuge technology would be used, and that the environmental impacts of such a facility would be similar to those outlined in a 1977 EIS for Expansion of the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant that considered a similar action that was never completed. It should be noted that the NRC licensing activities for the proposed centrifuge enrichment plant will include preparation of an EIS that must also evaluate cumulative impacts at the Portsmouth site. The centrifuge enrichment facility cumulative impacts analysis will be based on the anticipated USEC enrichment facility design, which does not currently exist, and will benefit from the detailed evaluation of conversion facility impacts presented in this EIS.

- *Comments related to current cylinder management.* Several reviewers raised questions and concerns about the current management of the cylinders at the three DOE storage sites.

In response to these concerns, it has been emphasized that DOE's current cylinder management program provides for safe storage of the depleted UF<sub>6</sub> cylinders. DOE is committed to the safe storage of the cylinders at each site through the implementation of the decision made in the ROD. DOE has an active cylinder management program designed to ensure the continued safety of cylinders until conversion is accomplished.

## 1.7 RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER NEPA REVIEWS

This site-specific DUF<sub>6</sub> Conversion EIS, along with the EIS prepared for the Portsmouth conversion facility (DOE/EIS-0360), represents the second level of a tiered environmental review process being used to evaluate and implement DOE's DUF<sub>6</sub> Management Program. A "tiered" process refers to a process of first addressing higher-order decisions in a PEIS and then conducting a more narrowly focused (project-level) environmental review. The project-level

review incorporates, by reference, the programmatic analysis, as appropriate, as well as additional site-specific analyses. The DUF<sub>6</sub> PEIS (DOE 1999a), issued in April 1999, represents the first level of this tiered process.

DOE prepared, or is in the process of preparing, other NEPA reviews that are related to the management of DUF<sub>6</sub> or to the current DUF<sub>6</sub> storage sites. The DUF<sub>6</sub> PEIS includes an extensive list of reviews that were prepared before 1999; that list is not repeated here. The following related NEPA reviews were conducted after publication of the DUF<sub>6</sub> PEIS; these reviews are related to this EIS primarily because they evaluate activities occurring at Paducah.

- *Supplement Analysis for Transportation of DOT Compliant Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride Cylinders from the East Tennessee Technology Park to the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant in Fiscal Years 2003 through 2005* (DOE 2003d): The purpose of this supplement analysis is to provide a basis for determining whether the existing PEIS NEPA analysis and documentation would be sufficient to allow DOE to transport up to 1,700 full cylinders containing DUF<sub>6</sub> from its ETTP location to the Portsmouth site in FYs 2003 through 2005. All of these cylinders would be compliant with DOT regulatory requirements. Details of the proposed shipment campaign are presented in a transportation plan prepared by Bechtel Jacobs Company LLC (2003). Based on the Supplement Analysis, DOE issued an amended ROD to the PEIS concluding that the estimated impacts for the proposed transport of up to 1,700 cylinders were less than or equal to those considered in the PEIS and that no further NEPA documentation was required (68 FR 53603). However, this EIS considers shipment of all DUF<sub>6</sub> and non-DUF<sub>6</sub> at ETTP to Portsmouth (proposed) and Paducah (option). No shipments were made in FY 2003, and it is expected that the planned shipments would occur in FYs 2004 and 2005.
- *Final Environmental Assessment for Waste Disposition Activities at the Paducah Site, Paducah, Kentucky* (DOE 2002a): DOE proposes disposition activities for polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) waste, LLW, low-level radioactive mixed waste (LLMW), and TRU waste from the Paducah site. All of the wastes would be transported for disposal at various locations in the United States. This environmental assessment (EA) for the disposition of various DOE wastes stored and/or generated at nonleased portions of the Paducah site was prepared in accordance with CEQ and DOE regulations and DOE orders and guidance regarding these waste types. This EA (1) provides an evaluation of the potential effects from the disposition of accumulated legacy and ongoing operational wastes at the Paducah site; (2) presents the most current volumes of Environmental Management Program wastes at the Paducah site; (3) is tiered under other currently existing NEPA documents; (4) is intended to supplement and update the previous NEPA evaluation of waste disposition activities; and (5) does not include a detailed consideration of impacts from treatment and disposal operations at commercial facilities.

- *Final Environmental Assessment, Proposed Demonstration of the Vortec Vitrification System for Treatment of Mixed Wastes at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant* (DOE 1999d): DOE prepared this document to evaluate the proposed construction and operation of a demonstration facility at the Paducah site in McCracken County, Kentucky. The objective of the demonstration is to evaluate the Vortec Cyclone Melting System™, a glass-making vitrification process for treating various wastes that resulted from previous operations at the Paducah site. Wastes to be treated include LLW, LLMW, Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA)-regulated, TSCA-regulated mixed, and Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)/TSCA-regulated mixed wastes. On the basis of the analysis in the EA, DOE determined that the demonstration would not constitute a major federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment within the meaning of NEPA. DOE concluded that the preparation of an EIS was not required.
- *Final Programmatic Environmental Assessment for the U.S. Department of Energy, Oak Ridge Operations Implementation of a Comprehensive Management Program for the Storage, Transportation, and Disposition of Potentially Re-Usable Uranium Materials* (DOE 2003c): DOE proposes to implement a comprehensive management program to safely, efficiently, and effectively manage its potentially reusable low-enriched uranium, normal uranium, and depleted uranium. Uranium materials presently located at multiple sites are to be consolidated by transporting the materials to one or several locations to facilitate disposition. Management would include the storage, transport, and ultimate disposition of these materials. This programmatic EA (PEA) addresses the proposed action to implement a long-term (more than 20 years) management plan for DOE's inventory of potentially reusable low-enriched, normal, and depleted uranium. A Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI) was approved on October 16, 2002.
- *Final Waste Management Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Managing Treatment, Storage, and Disposal of Radioactive and Hazardous Waste* (DOE 1997): This EIS (referred to herein as the WM PEIS) evaluates the impacts of different approaches to the treatment, storage, and disposal of the existing and projected DOE inventory of certain types of waste management program wastes over the next 20 years. The WM PEIS considers radioactive low-level, high-level, TRU, and mixed wastes, as well as toxic and hazardous wastes. The amounts of wastes analyzed for treatment, storage, or disposal range from thousands to millions of cubic meters and include wastes generated at the DOE sites in Paducah, Kentucky; Portsmouth, Ohio; and Oak Ridge, Tennessee. The WM PEIS does not evaluate management of DUF<sub>6</sub> because that material is considered a source material, not a waste. The draft WM PEIS was issued in September 1995, and the final was issued in May 1997.

The WM PEIS considers the impacts of waste management at Paducah, Portsmouth, and the Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR) on the basis of existing and projected inventories of waste generated during site operations. The three sites are also considered as candidate sites for regionalized waste management sites, and waste management impacts are evaluated for these scenarios as well. Cumulative impacts of current operations, waste management, and proposed future operations are also assessed for the three sites in the WM PEIS.

## **1.8 OTHER DOCUMENTS AND STUDIES RELATED TO DUF<sub>6</sub> MANAGEMENT AND CONVERSION ACTIVITIES**

In addition to the related NEPA reviews described in Section 1.7, other reports that relate to managing the DUF<sub>6</sub> inventory (covering conversion, transportation, characterization, and disposal activities) that were completed after the DUF<sub>6</sub> PEIS was published were also reviewed in preparing this EIS. A list of the reports reviewed and used as a part of the preparation for this EIS is provided here.

- *Final Plan for the Conversion of Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride as Required by Public Law 105-204* (DOE 1999b): This report is the final plan for converting DOE's DUF<sub>6</sub> inventory, as required by P.L. 105-204. This Conversion Plan describes the steps that would allow DOE to convert the DUF<sub>6</sub> inventory to a more stable chemical form. It incorporates information received from the private sector in response to DOE's request for expressions of interest; ideas from members of the affected communities, Congress, and other interested stakeholders; and the results of the analyses for the final DUF<sub>6</sub> PEIS. The Conversion Plan describes DOE's intent to chemically process the DUF<sub>6</sub> to create products that would present a lower long-term storage hazard and provide a material suitable for use or disposal.
- *U.S. Department of Energy DUF<sub>6</sub> Materials Use Roadmap* (DOE 2000a): This report meets the commitment presented in the Conversion Plan by providing a comprehensive roadmap that DOE will use to guide any future R&D activities for the materials associated with its DUF<sub>6</sub> inventory. It supports the decision presented in the ROD, namely, to begin conversion of the DUF<sub>6</sub> inventory to uranium oxide, uranium metal, or a combination of both as soon as possible, while allowing for future uses for as much of this inventory as possible. This roadmap is intended to explore potential uses for the DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion products and identify areas where further development is needed. Although it focuses on potential governmental uses of DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion products, it also incorporates a limited analysis of private sector uses. This roadmap also addresses other surplus depleted uranium, primarily in the form of depleted uranium trioxide (UO<sub>3</sub>) and depleted UF<sub>4</sub>.

- *Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride Management Program: Data Compilation for the Paducah Site in Support of Site-Specific NEPA Requirements for Continued Cylinder Storage, Cylinder Preparation, Conversion, and Long-Term Storage Activities* (Hartmann 1999): This report is a compilation of site-specific data and analyses for the Paducah site that were obtained and conducted to prepare the DUF<sub>6</sub> PEIS. The report describes the affected environment at the Paducah site and summarizes potential environmental impacts that could result from conducting the following DUF<sub>6</sub> activities at the site: continued cylinder storage, preparation of cylinders for shipment, conversion, and long-term storage.
- *Evaluation of UF<sub>6</sub>-to-UO<sub>2</sub> Conversion Capability at Commercial Nuclear Fuel Fabrication Facilities* (Ranek and Monette 2001): This report examines the capabilities of existing commercial nuclear fuel fabrication facilities to convert DUF<sub>6</sub> to depleted UO<sub>2</sub>. For domestic facilities, the information summarized includes currently operating capacity to convert DUF<sub>6</sub> to UO<sub>2</sub>; transportation distances from DUF<sub>6</sub> storage locations near Oak Ridge, Portsmouth, and Paducah to the commercial conversion facilities; and regulatory requirements for nuclear fuel fabrication and transportation of DUF<sub>6</sub>. The report concludes that current U.S. commercial nuclear fuel fabricators could convert 5,200 t (5,700 tons) of DUF<sub>6</sub> per year to UO<sub>2</sub> (which includes 666 t [734 tons] of DUF<sub>6</sub> per year of capacity that was scheduled for shutdown by the end of 2001). However, only about 300 t (330 tons) of DUF<sub>6</sub> per year of this capacity could be confirmed as being possibly available to DOE. The report also provides some limited descriptions of the capabilities of foreign fuel fabrication plants to convert DUF<sub>6</sub> to UO<sub>2</sub>.
- *Assessment of Preferred Depleted Uranium Disposal Forms* (Croff et al. 2000a): This study assesses the acceptability of various potential depleted uranium conversion products for disposal at likely LLW disposal sites. The objective is to help DOE decide the preferred form for the depleted uranium conversion product and determine a path that will ensure reliable and efficient disposal. The study was conducted under the expectation that if worthwhile beneficial uses could not be found for the converted depleted uranium product, it would be sent to an appropriate site for disposal. The depleted uranium products are considered to be LLW under both DOE orders and NRC regulations. A wide range of issues associated with disposal are discussed in the report. The report concludes that, on balance, the four potential forms of depleted uranium (uranium metal, UF<sub>4</sub>, UO<sub>2</sub>, and U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub>) considered in the study should be acceptable, with proper controls, for near-surface disposal at sites such as NTS and Envirocare.
- *Evaluation of the Acceptability of Potential Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride Conversion Products at the Envirocare Disposal Site* (Croff et al. 2000b): With regard to the Envirocare site, the earlier report (Croff et al. 2000a), concluded that “current waste acceptance criteria suggest that the acceptability

of depleted uranium hexafluoride conversion material for disposal at Envirocare of Utah is questionable. Further investigation is required before a definitive determination can be made.” The purpose of this report is to document the more thorough investigation suggested in the earlier report. It concludes that an amendment to the Envirocare license issued on October 5, 2000, has reduced the uncertainties associated with disposal of the depleted uranium product at Envirocare to the point that they are now comparable with uncertainties associated with the disposal of the depleted uranium product at NTS that were discussed in the earlier report.

- *Transportation Impact Assessment for Shipment of Uranium Hexafluoride (UF<sub>6</sub>) Cylinders from the East Tennessee Technology Park to the Portsmouth and Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plants* (Biwer et al. 2001): This report presents a transportation impact assessment for shipping the 4,683 full cylinders of DUF<sub>6</sub> (containing a total of approximately 56,000 t [62,000 tons]) stored at ETTP to the Portsmouth and Paducah sites for conversion. It also considers the transport of 2,394 cylinders stored at ETTP that contain a total of 25 t (28 tons) of enriched and normal uranium or that are empty. Shipments by both truck and rail are considered, with and without cylinder overpacks. In addition, the report contains an analysis of the current and pending regulatory requirements applicable to packaging UF<sub>6</sub> for transport by truck or rail, and it evaluates regulatory options for meeting the packaging requirements.
- *Strategy for Characterizing Transuranics and Technetium Contamination in Depleted UF<sub>6</sub> Cylinders* (Hightower et al. 2000): This report summarizes the results of a study performed to develop a strategy for characterizing low levels of radioactive contaminants (Pu, Np, Am, and Tc) in DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders at the ETTP, Portsmouth, and Paducah sites. The principal conclusion from this review and analysis is that even without additional sampling, the current body of knowledge is sufficient to give potential conversion vendors an adequate basis for designing facilities that can operate safely. The report also provides upper-bound estimates of Pu, Np, and Tc concentrations in DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders.
- *A Peer Review of the Strategy for Characterizing Transuranics and Technetium Contamination in Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride Tails Cylinders* (Brumburgh et al. 2000): This document provides the findings from a peer review of the ORNL study (Hightower et al. 2000) that set forth a strategy for characterizing low levels of radioactive contaminants in DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders at the ETTP, Portsmouth, and Paducah sites. This peer review evaluates the ORNL study in three main areas: TRU chemistry/radioactivity, statistical approach, and the uranium enrichment process. It provides both general and specific observations about the general characterization strategy and its recommendations.

## 1.9 ORGANIZATION OF THIS ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT

This DUF<sub>6</sub> Conversion EIS consists of two volumes. Volume 1 contains 10 chapters and 8 appendixes. Volume 2 contains the comment response document based on the review of the draft EIS. Brief summaries of the main components of the EIS follow:

### Volume 1 — Main Text and Appendixes:

- Chapter 1 introduces the EIS, discussing pertinent background information, the purpose of and need for the DOE action, the scope of the assessment, related NEPA reviews, other related reports and studies, and EIS organization.
- Chapter 2 defines the alternatives and implementation options considered in the EIS, defines alternatives considered but not analyzed in detail, and presents a summary comparison of the estimated environmental impacts.
- Chapter 3 discusses the environmental setting at the Paducah and ETTP sites.
- Chapter 4 addresses the assumptions on which this EIS and its analyses are based, defines the approaches to and methods for environmental impact assessment used in developing this EIS, and presents background information on the human health assessment.
- Chapter 5 discusses the potential environmental impacts of the alternatives. This chapter also discusses potential cumulative impacts at the Paducah site; possible mitigation of adverse impacts that are unavoidable; irreversible commitment of resources; the relationship between short-term use of the environment and long-term productivity; pollution prevention and waste minimization; and impacts from D&D activities.
- Chapter 6 identifies the major laws, regulations, and other requirements applicable to implementing the alternatives.
- Chapter 7 is an alphabetical listing of all the references cited in the EIS. All cited references are available to the public.
- Chapter 8 lists the names, education, and experience of persons who helped prepare the EIS. Also included are the subject areas for which each preparer was responsible.
- Chapter 9 presents brief definitions of the technical terminology used in the EIS.
- Chapter 10 is a subject matter index that provides the numbers of pages where important terms and concepts are discussed.

- Appendix A presents the pertinent text of P.L. 107-206, which mandates the construction of conversion facilities at the Portsmouth and Paducah sites.
- Appendix B discusses issues associated with potential TRU and Tc contamination of a portion of the DUF<sub>6</sub> inventory as well as PCBs contained in some cylinder coatings and describes how such contamination was addressed in this EIS.
- Appendix C summarizes the comments received during public scoping.
- Appendix D contains the environmental synopsis prepared to support the DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion procurement process.
- Appendix E discusses potential uses of HF and CaF<sub>2</sub>, the DOE-authorized release process, and impacts associated with sale and use.
- Appendix F describes the assessment methodologies used to evaluate the potential environmental impacts.
- Appendix G contains copies of consultation letters regarding the preparation of this EIS that were sent to state agencies and recognized Native American groups.
- Appendix H contains the contractor disclosure statement.

#### Volume 2— Responses to Public Comments:

- Chapter 1 provides an overview of the public participation and comment process.
- Chapter 2 provides copies of the actual letters or other documents that contain comments on the draft EIS to DOE.
- Chapter 3 lists DOE responses to all comments received.

## 2 DESCRIPTION AND COMPARISON OF ALTERNATIVES

Alternatives for building and operating a DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion facility at the Paducah site were evaluated for their potential impacts on the human and natural environment. This EIS considers the proposed action of building and operating a conversion facility and a no action alternative. Under the proposed action, three action alternatives are considered that focus on where to construct the conversion facility within the Paducah site. An option of shipping cylinders currently stored at ETTP to the Paducah facility is also considered. The no action alternative assumes that a conversion facility is not built at Paducah and that the DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders at Paducah would continue to be stored indefinitely in a manner consistent with current management practices. This chapter defines these alternatives and options in detail and discusses the types of activities that would be required under each. A summary of the alternatives considered in this EIS is presented in Table 2.1-1.

A separate EIS prepared for construction and operation of a conversion facility at the Portsmouth site (DOE 2004a) also includes a no action alternative. The no action alternative defined in the Portsmouth EIS includes an evaluation of the potential impacts of indefinite long-term storage of cylinders at the Portsmouth site as well as the continued long-term storage of cylinders at the ETTP site.

In addition to describing the alternatives evaluated in this EIS, this chapter includes a discussion of alternatives considered but not analyzed in detail (Section 2.3) and a summary comparison of the potential environmental impacts from the alternatives (Section 2.4). The comparison of alternatives is based on information about the environmental setting provided in Chapter 3, descriptions of the assessment methodologies provided in Chapter 4, and the detailed assessment results presented in Chapter 5.

### 2.1 NO ACTION ALTERNATIVE

Under the no action alternative, it is assumed that DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinder storage would

#### Alternatives Considered in This EIS

**No Action:** NEPA regulations require evaluation of a no action alternative. In this EIS, the no action alternative is storage of DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders indefinitely in yards at the Paducah site, with continued cylinder surveillance and maintenance activities.

**Proposed Action:** Construction and operation of a DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion facility at the Paducah site for conversion of the Paducah DUF<sub>6</sub> inventory into depleted uranium oxide (primarily U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub>) and other conversion products.

**Action Alternatives:** Three action alternatives focus on where to construct the conversion facility within the Paducah site (Alternative Locations A, B, and C). The preferred alternative is Location A.

#### No Action Alternative

It is assumed that the DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders would continue to be stored indefinitely at the Paducah site and that cylinder surveillance and maintenance would also continue. Impacts are evaluated through the year 2039; in addition, potential long-term (after 2039) impacts are evaluated.

**TABLE 2.1-1 Summary of Alternatives Considered**

Alternative	Description	Options Considered
No Action (Section 2.1)	Continued storage of the DUF <sub>6</sub> cylinders indefinitely at the Paducah site, with continued cylinder surveillance and maintenance.	None.
Proposed Action (Section 2.2)	<p>Construction and operation of a conversion facility at the Paducah site for conversion of the Paducah DUF<sub>6</sub> inventory into depleted uranium oxide (primarily U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub>) and other conversion products. This EIS assesses the potential environmental impacts from the following proposed activities:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Construction, operation, maintenance, and D&amp;D of the proposed DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion facility at the Paducah site;</li> <li>• Conversion to depleted U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> based on the proposed UDS technology;</li> <li>• Transportation of uranium conversion products and waste materials to a disposal facility;</li> <li>• Transportation and sale of the HF conversion product; and</li> <li>• Neutralization of HF to CaF<sub>2</sub> and its sale or disposal in the event that the HF product is not sold.</li> </ul>	<p><i>ETTP Cylinders:</i> This EIS considers an option of shipping DUF<sub>6</sub> and non-DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders at ETTP to Paducah.</p> <p><i>Transportation:</i> This EIS evaluates the shipment of cylinders and conversion products by both truck and rail.</p> <p><i>Expanded Operations:</i> This EIS discusses the impacts associated with potential expansion of plant operations by extending the operational period and by increasing throughput through efficiency improvements.</p>
Alternative Location A (Preferred) (Section 2.2.1.1)	Construction of the conversion facility at Location A, an area that encompasses 35 acres (14 ha) located south of the administration building and its parking lot, immediately west of and next to the primary location of the DOE cylinder yards and east of the main plant access road.	
Alternative Location B (Section 2.2.1.2)	Construction of the conversion facility at Location B, an area that encompasses 59 acres (23 ha) directly south of the Paducah maintenance building and west of the main plant access road.	
Alternative Location C (Section 2.2.1.3)	Construction of the conversion facility at Location C, an area that encompasses 53 acres (21 ha) east of the Paducah pump house and cooling towers.	

continue indefinitely at the Paducah site. The no action alternative assumes that DOE would continue surveillance and maintenance activities to ensure the continued safe storage of cylinders. Potential environmental impacts are estimated through the year 2039. The year 2039 was selected to be consistent with the DUF<sub>6</sub> PEIS (DOE 1999a), which evaluated a 40-year storage period (1999 through 2039). In addition, long-term impacts (i.e., occurring after 2039) from potential cylinder breaches are assessed. A similarly defined no action alternative was also evaluated in the DUF<sub>6</sub> PEIS. The assessment of the no action alternative in this EIS has been updated to reflect changes that have occurred since publication of the DUF<sub>6</sub> PEIS in 1999. Details are provided below.

Specifically, the activities assumed to occur include routine cylinder inspections, ultrasonic testing of the wall thicknesses of selected cylinders, painting of cylinders to prevent corrosion, cylinder yard surveillance and maintenance, reconstruction of several storage yards, and relocation of some cylinders to the new or improved yards. It is assumed that cylinders would be painted every 10 years. On the basis of these activities, an assessment of the potential impacts on workers, members of the public, and the environment was conducted.

Breached cylinders are cylinders that have a hole of any size at some location on the wall. The occurrence of cylinder breaches, caused by either corrosion or handling damage, is an important concern when the potential impacts of continued cylinder storage are evaluated. There is a general concern that the number of cylinder breaches at the site could increase in the future as the cylinder inventory ages.

At the time the PEIS was published (1999), 8 breached cylinders had been identified at the three storage sites; 1 of those breaches was at the Paducah site.<sup>1</sup> Investigation of these breaches indicated that 6 of the 8 were initiated by mechanical damage during stacking; the damage was not noticed immediately, and subsequent corrosion occurred at the damaged point. It was concluded that the other 2 cylinder breaches, both at ETTP, had been caused by external corrosion due to prolonged ground contact.

For assessment purposes in this EIS, two cylinder breach cases are evaluated. In the first case, it is assumed that the planned cylinder maintenance and painting program would maintain the cylinders in a protected condition and control further corrosion. In this case, it is assumed that after initial painting, some cylinder breaches would occur from handling damage; a total of 36 future breaches are estimated to occur through 2039. In the second case, it is assumed that external corrosion would not be halted by improved storage conditions, cylinder maintenance, and painting. This case is considered in order to account for uncertainties with regard to how effective painting would be in controlling cylinder corrosion and uncertainties in the future painting schedule. In this case, the number of future breaches estimated through 2039 is 444 for the Paducah site (i.e., 11 per year). These breach estimates were determined on the basis of historical corrosion rates when cylinders were stored under poor conditions (i.e., cylinders were

---

<sup>1</sup> An additional breach that occurred at the ETTP site in 1998 was discussed in Section B.2 of the PEIS (DOE 1999a). In the period 1998 through 2002, two additional breaches were discovered at the Paducah site, the result of missing cylinder plugs (Hightower 2002). A total of 11 breaches have been identified at the Portsmouth, ETTP, and Paducah sites.

stacked too close together, were stacked on wooden chocks, or came in contact with the ground). Because storage conditions have improved dramatically over the last several years as a result of cylinder yard upgrades and restacking activities, it is expected that these breach estimates based on the historical corrosion rate provide a worst case for estimating the potential impacts from continued cylinder storage. The results of this assessment were used to provide an estimate of the earliest time when continued cylinder storage could begin to raise regulatory concerns under these worst-case conditions.

The impacts to human health and safety, surface water, groundwater, soil, air quality, and ecology from uranium and HF releases from breached cylinders are assessed in this EIS. For all hypothetical cylinder breaches, it is assumed that the breach would be undetected for 4 years, which is the period between planned inspections for most of the cylinders. In practice, cylinders that show evidence of damage or heavy external corrosion are inspected annually, so it is very unlikely that a breach would be undetected for a 4-year period. For each hypothetical cylinder breach, it is further assumed that 1 lb (0.45 kg) of uranium (as UO<sub>2</sub>F<sub>2</sub>) and 4.4 lb (2 kg) of HF would be released from the cylinder annually for a period of 4 years.

The estimated number of future breaches at the Paducah site was used to estimate potential impacts that might occur during the repair of breached cylinders and impacts from releases that might occur during continued cylinder storage. Potential radiological exposures of involved workers could result from patching breached cylinders or emptying the cylinder contents into new cylinders. The impacts on groundwater and human health and safety from uranium releases were assessed by estimating the amount of uranium that could be transported from the yards in surface runoff and the amount that could migrate through the soil to the groundwater.

For this EIS, a reassessment of the no action alternative assumptions used in the PEIS was conducted. Recent cylinder surveillance and maintenance plans — including inspections, painting, and reconstruction of cylinder storage areas — were used to update the PEIS no action alternative assessments. The results of this reevaluation, together with a consideration of the changes in the on-site worker and off-site public populations at Paducah, were used to determine the impacts from the no action alternative. Additional discussion and the estimated impacts from the no action alternative are presented in Section 5.1.

**2.2 PROPOSED ACTION**

The proposed action evaluated in this EIS is to construct and operate a conversion facility at the Paducah site for converting the DUF<sub>6</sub> inventory stored at Paducah into depleted uranium oxide (primarily U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub>) and other conversion products. Three locations within the Paducah site are evaluated as alternatives (Section 2.2.1). The conversion facility would convert DUF<sub>6</sub> into a stable

<b>Proposed Action</b>
<p>The proposed action in this EIS is construction and operation of a conversion facility at the Paducah site for conversion of the Paducah DUF<sub>6</sub> inventory into depleted uranium oxide (primarily U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub>) and other conversion products. Three alternative locations within the Paducah site are evaluated (Locations A, B, and C).</p>

chemical form for beneficial use/reuse and/or disposal. The off-gas from the conversion process would yield aqueous HF, which would be processed and marketed or converted to a solid for sale or disposal. To support the conversion operations, the emptied DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders would be stored, handled, and processed for reuse as disposal containers to the extent practicable. The time period considered is a construction period of approximately 2 years, an operational period of 25 years, and a 3-year period for the D&D of the facility. Current plans call for construction to begin in the summer of 2004. The assessment is based on the conceptual conversion facility design proposed by UDS, the selected contractor (see text box).

### Conversion Facility Design

The EIS is based on the conversion facility design being developed by UDS, the selected conversion contractor. At the time the draft EIS was prepared, the UDS design was in the 30% conceptual stage, with several facility design options being considered.

Following the public comment period, the draft EIS was revised on the basis of comments received and on the basis of the 100% conceptual facility design. This final EIS identifies and evaluates design options to the extent possible.

This EIS assesses the potential environmental impacts from the following proposed activities:

- Construction, operation, maintenance, and D&D of the proposed DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion facility at the Paducah site;
- Transportation of uranium conversion products and waste materials to a disposal facility;
- Transportation and sale of the HF conversion product; and
- Neutralization of HF to CaF<sub>2</sub> and its sale or disposal in the event that the HF product is not sold.

In addition, an option of expanding operations by extending conversion facility operations or increasing throughput is discussed in this section.

#### 2.2.1 Action Alternatives

The action alternatives focus on where to site the conversion facility within the Paducah site. The Paducah site was evaluated to identify alternative facility locations for a conversion facility (Shaw 2001). Potential locations were evaluated on the basis of the following criteria:

- *Current condition of the land and site preparation required.* This criterion looked at the condition of the land from a constructability viewpoint, considering factors that would increase the construction cost over that needed for a relatively level grassy topography.

- *Legacy environmental concerns.* This criterion looked at environmental factors that would affect construction at the site.
- *Availability of utilities.* This criterion looked at the relative difficulty of bringing services from existing plant utilities to the site.
- *Location.* This criterion looked at the advantages and disadvantages of location in relation to cylinder transport between the yards and the new facility.
- *Effect on current plant operations.* This criterion looked at how the conversion facility's location could affect existing plant operations.
- *Size.* This criterion looked at size to ensure that the required minimum amount of land would be available for construction of the conversion facility (assumed to be about 30 acres [12 ha]).

The three alternative locations identified at the Paducah site, denoted Locations A, B, and C, are shown in Figure 2.2-1.

#### **2.2.1.1 Alternative Location A (Preferred Alternative)**

Location A is the preferred location for the conversion facility. It is located south of the administration building and its parking lot, immediately west of and next to the primary location of the DOE cylinder yards and east of the main plant access road. This location is an L-shaped tract consisting mostly of grassy field. However, the southeastern section is a wooded area. A drainage ditch crosses the northern part of the site, giving the cylinder yard storm water access to Kentucky Pollution Discharge Elimination System (KPDES) Outfall 017. This location is about 35 acres (14 ha) in size and was identified in the RFP for conversion services as the site for which bidders were to design their proposed facilities.

#### **2.2.1.2 Alternative Location B**

Location B is directly south of the Paducah maintenance building and west of the main plant access road. The northern part of this location is mowed grass and has a slightly rolling topography. The southern part has a dense covering of trees and brush, and some high-voltage power lines cross it, which limits its use. This location has an area of about 59 acres (23 ha).

#### **2.2.1.3 Alternative Location C**

Location C is east of the Paducah pump house and cooling towers. It has an area of about 53 acres (21 ha). Dykes Road runs through the center of this location from north to south. Use of

the eastern half of this location could be somewhat limited because several high-voltage power lines run through this area.

### 2.2.2 Conversion Process Description

This section provides a summary description of the proposed UDS conversion process and facility. The proposed UDS conversion system is based on a proven commercial process in operation at the Framatome Advanced Nuclear Power (ANP), Inc., fuel fabrication facility in Richland, Washington. The two primary sources for the information in this section are excerpts from the UDS conversion facility conceptual design report (UDS 2003a) and the UDS NEPA data package prepared for the 100% conceptual facility design (UDS 2003b).

The UDS dry conversion is a continuous process in which DUF<sub>6</sub> is vaporized and converted to a mixture of uranium oxides (primarily U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub>) by reaction with steam and hydrogen in a fluidized-bed conversion unit. The resulting depleted U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> powder is collected and packaged for disposition. The process equipment would be arranged in parallel lines. Each line would consist of two autoclaves, two conversion units, an HF recovery system, and process off-gas scrubbers. The Paducah facility would have four parallel conversion lines. Equipment would also be installed to collect the HF co-product and process it into any combination of several marketable products. A backup HF acid neutralization system would be provided to convert up to 100% of the HF acid to CaF<sub>2</sub> for storage, sale, or disposal in the future, if necessary. Figure 2.2-2 is an overall material flow diagram for the conversion facility; Figure 2.2-3 is a conceptual facility site plan. A summary of key facility characteristics is presented in Table 2.2-1.

The conversion facility will be designed to convert 18,000 t (20,000 tons) of DUF<sub>6</sub> per year, requiring 25 years to convert the Paducah inventory. The Paducah processing facility would be approximately 148 ft × 271 ft (45 m × 83 m). The conversion facility would occupy a total of approximately 10 acres (4 ha), with up to 45 acres (18 ha) of land disturbed during construction (including temporary construction lay-down areas and utility access). Some of the disturbed areas would be areas cleared for railroad or utility access, not adjacent to the construction area.

DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders would be delivered from long-term storage to the cylinder staging yard at the conversion facility by means of cylinder handling equipment already available at the site. The staging yard would accommodate short-term storage of cylinders. Cylinders in the conversion staging yard would be transferred into the conversion building airlock by using an overhead bridge crane. The cylinders would then be moved into the vaporization room to the autoclaves by an overhead monorail crane and/or rail cart. The cylinders would be loaded into autoclaves for heating and transfer of the DUF<sub>6</sub> to the conversion units.

Cylinders that could not be processed through the normal process feed system would be processed through the cylinder transfer facility. If the cylinder was overfilled, the excess DUF<sub>6</sub> would be transferred to another cylinder. This same system would be used to transfer all of the

**TABLE 2.2-1 Summary of Paducah Conversion Facility Parameters**

Parameter/Characteristic	Value
Construction start	2004
Construction period	2 years
Start of operations	2006
Operational period	25 years
Facility footprint	10 acres (4 ha)
Facility throughput	18,000 t/yr (20,000 tons/yr) DUF <sub>6</sub> (≈1,400 cylinders/yr)
Conversion products	
Depleted U <sub>3</sub> O <sub>8</sub>	14,300 t/yr (15,800 tons/yr)
CaF <sub>2</sub>	24 t/yr (26 tons/yr)
70% HF acid	3,300 t/yr (3,600 tons/yr)
49% HF acid	7,700 t/yr (8,500 tons/yr)
Steel (emptied cylinders, if not used as disposal containers)	1,980 t/yr (2,200 tons/yr)
Proposed conversion product disposition (see Table 2.2-2 for details)	
Depleted U <sub>3</sub> O <sub>8</sub>	Disposal; Envirocare (primary), NTS (secondary) <sup>a</sup>
CaF <sub>2</sub>	Disposal; Envirocare (primary), NTS (secondary)
70% HF acid	Sale pending DOE approval
49% HF acid	Sale pending DOE approval
Steel (emptied cylinders, if not used as disposal containers)	Disposal; Envirocare (primary), NTS (secondary)

<sup>a</sup> DOE plans to decide the specific disposal location(s) for the depleted U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> conversion product after additional appropriate NEPA review. Accordingly, DOE will continue to evaluate its disposal options and will consider any further information or comments relevant to that decision. DOE will give a minimum 45-day notice before making the specific disposal decision and will provide any supplemental NEPA analysis for public review and comment.

Sources: UDS (2003a,b).

contents from unacceptable cylinders to cylinders suitable for feeding into the conversion process.

After the emptied cylinder was removed from the autoclave, a stabilizing agent would be introduced into the cylinder to neutralize residual fluoride in the heel. The cylinders would then be moved out to the staging yard for an approximate 4-month aging period so that short-lived uranium decay products in the nonvolatile heel would decay, thereby reducing potential radiation exposure during the processing of emptied cylinders. Emptied cylinders would then be reused as disposal containers or processed and disposed of as LLW.

Major conversion system components are described further in the following subsections. The plant design includes several other supporting facilities and services, including an electrical

system with backup, a communications system, a deionized water system, a control system, an air supply system, a fire protection system, and a heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning system.

### **2.2.2.1 Cylinder Transfer System**

Some cylinders might be unacceptable for processing in the vaporization system autoclaves because of corrosion, damage, overfilling, or excessive size. A cylinder transfer system would be used to transfer the contents of up to four unacceptable cylinders per week to acceptable cylinders. Cylinder transfer system equipment would include two low-temperature autoclaves, four fill positions, a “hot box” containing controls and vacuum pumps, and an oversize cylinder heating room. Fill positions would include a water spray cooling system necessary for low-temperature DUF<sub>6</sub> transfer. The oversize cylinder heating room would contain radiant heating enclosure controls and connections.

### **2.2.2.2 Vaporization System**

Cylinders that met the vaporization criteria would be brought to the vaporization room and loaded into electrically heated autoclaves. Autoclaves for each process line would be used to provide continuous feed to the DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion units. The cylinders would be heated to feed DUF<sub>6</sub> vapor to the process. The design will incorporate in-line filters to provide additional assurances that TRU isotopes would not enter the conversion system. The need for in-line filters would be evaluated during operations; they would be removed if they were not needed.

The DUF<sub>6</sub> vapor would flow through a heated enclosure called a “hot box,” which would contain the equipment that would control flow to the conversion units, including vacuum pumps. The hot box would have the necessary controls to achieve stable DUF<sub>6</sub> flow to the conversion units.

The autoclaves would be used to heat DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinder by using internal electrical heating and to provide secondary DUF<sub>6</sub> containment. The selected autoclaves would be American Society of Mechanical Engineers standard pressure vessels, sufficiently designed to provide containment of DUF<sub>6</sub> and HF from a full, DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinder that had ruptured. Each autoclave system would include equipment and controls to connect to the cylinder, control DUF<sub>6</sub> flow, monitor DUF<sub>6</sub> weight, and control vaporization conditions.

Electrically heated autoclaves would provide a safety advantage over steam-heated units. If DUF<sub>6</sub> leaks in a steam autoclave, it reacts with the steam and generates HF gas, which pressurizes the autoclave and is extremely corrosive. If DUF<sub>6</sub> leaks in an electrically heated autoclave, however, the only moisture available is the humidity in the air, which limits HF generation and subsequent pressurization and corrosion. This also makes cleanup of the autoclave much easier since the autoclave is evacuated directly to the conversion unit and does not produce wet uranium recycle and liquid wastes.

### 2.2.2.3 Conversion System

DUF<sub>6</sub> vapor would be reacted with steam and hydrogen in fluidized-bed conversion units. The hydrogen would be generated by using anhydrous ammonia (NH<sub>3</sub>). Nitrogen is also used as an inert purging gas and is released to the atmosphere through the building stack as part of the clean off-gas stream. The oxide powder would be retained in the conversion unit by passing the process off-gas through sintered metal filters. Uranium oxide powder would be continuously withdrawn from the conversion unit to match the feed rate of DUF<sub>6</sub>. Each conversion unit would be electrically heated and integrated with a heating/insulation jacket.

All equipment components (vessels, filters, etc.) in the conversion system would be fabricated of corrosion-resistant alloys suited to process conditions. In the event of a system failure or an unscheduled shutdown, the DUF<sub>6</sub> shutoff valve in the autoclave would automatically close. The DUF<sub>6</sub> piping would then be purged with nitrogen. In the event of power, instrument, air, or other failure, a fail-safe design would be used for valves and for the control system.

### 2.2.2.4 Depleted Uranium Conversion Product Handling System

Depleted U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> powder would be cooled as it was discharged from the conversion unit. An in-line water-cooled heat exchanger would cool the powder before it dropped into a vacuum transfer station enclosure. The vacuum transfer station would include connections, a vacuum transfer pickup device, a support vessel, a hopper, and a secondary enclosure to facilitate packaging the depleted U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub>. A package fill station would be located below each hopper. Powder fill would be controlled by weight in the fill container, and a secondary containment enclosure would be provided at the fill station. The filled packages would be lifted and conveyed by using an overhead monorail crane through an airlock and loaded into railcars for shipment to the disposal site. Each packaging station would operate on a semicontinuous basis with intermittent package removal and installation. Continuous level control would maintain the oxide hopper at 20% to 25% of capacity. Prior to package change out, the oxide discharge would be stopped.

UDS proposes to use the emptied cylinders as disposal containers to the extent practicable. An option of using bulk bags (large capacity, strong, flexible bags) as disposal containers is also being considered. After being processed (see Section 2.2.2.6), the emptied cylinders would be moved to the conversion product transfer station and refilled with depleted U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> powder. The refilled cylinders would be sealed and loaded to railcars for shipment to the disposal site. Bulk bags would be processed similarly.

The conversion facilities are being designed with a short-term storage capacity for 6 months' worth of depleted uranium conversion products. This storage capacity is being provided in order to accommodate potential delays in disposal activities without affecting conversion operations. If a delay was to extend beyond 6 months, DOE would evaluate possible options and conduct appropriate NEPA review for those options.

### 2.2.2.5 HF Recovery System

The fluorine component of the DUF<sub>6</sub> would leave the conversion unit as HF gas through sintered metal filters that would retain nearly all (greater than 99.9%) of the uranium in the conversion unit. The HF would be condensed, along with the unreacted excess steam, and the resulting HF acid would flow by gravity to receiver tanks. In addition, the off-gas would be passed through a series of two scrubbers to recover most of the uncondensed HF. In each scrubber, process off-gas would come into contact with 20% potassium hydroxide (KOH) solution. HF vapor would combine with KOH in the solution to form potassium fluoride (KF) and water (H<sub>2</sub>O); thus HF would be removed from the process off-gas stream.

The HF acid would be automatically transferred from the receivers to interim bulk storage tanks located outside the building. An in-line uranium analyzer in each transfer line would be used as a final verification that containment of the uranium is intact. High-integrity piping and equipment made with corrosion-resistant materials would result in zero leakage of HF, either gaseous or liquid, to the environment. The HF would be stored on site at each conversion facility for approximately 2 weeks or less under normal conditions and then shipped to a vendor. The storage capacity for HF at each site would be limited, and if the material could not be moved, it would be converted to CaF<sub>2</sub> or processing would stop.

### 2.2.2.6 Emptied Cylinder Processing

UDS proposes to use the emptied cylinders as disposal containers to the extent practicable. After removal of the cylinders from the autoclaves, a stabilizing agent would be introduced to the cylinders to neutralize residual fluoride in the heels. After an approximate 4-month aging period, emptied cylinders (with heel) would be transferred to the conversion product transfer stations, as described above. Alternatively, if bulk bags were used for depleted U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> disposal containers, after an approximate 4-month aging period, emptied cylinders (with heel) would be transported into the cylinder disposition facility. A forklift would be used to move the cylinders to the feed queue outside the facility airlock. Cylinders would then be brought into the disposition facility via an overhead monorail crane and placed into a compactor feed station. The plugs would be removed from the cylinder to vent the cylinder during crushing. The cylinder would then be pushed by a ram into the compactor itself, where it would be compacted radially to a maximum thickness of 8 in. (20 cm). The compacted cylinder would then be pushed to the cutting station, where it would be cut in half to reduce the length. The two pieces of metal would be picked up with an overhead crane and placed into an intermodal shipping container. Debris from these operations would then be collected in a container by a vacuum system and loaded into the intermodal container.

Secondary containment would be provided for the intermodal container loadout. In addition, small cylinders that had not been compacted, as well as valves, plugs, and facility secondary waste, might also be loaded into the intermodal containers. Cylinders that were destined for disposal at NTS would not be introduced into the facility but would instead be loaded directly onto trucks or railcars for transport.

### 2.2.2.7 Management of Potential Transuranic and PCB Contamination

As discussed in Section 1.2.2, as a result of enrichment of reprocessed uranium in the early years of gaseous diffusion, some of the DUF<sub>6</sub> inventory is contaminated with small amounts of Tc and the TRU elements Pu, Np, and Am. In addition, a portion of the cylinder inventory was originally painted with coatings containing PCBs.

TRU contamination in the cylinders would exist as fluoride compounds that would be both insoluble in liquid DUF<sub>6</sub> and nonvolatile but capable of being entrained from the cylinders during the vaporization and feeding of DUF<sub>6</sub> into the conversion process. The TRU contamination would exist primarily as (1) small particulates dispersed throughout the DUF<sub>6</sub> contents and (2) small quantities in the residual heels from the original feed cylinders in a relatively small but unknown number of cylinders (see Appendix B for more details). Tc contamination would exist as fluoride and oxyfluoride compounds that would be stable and partially volatile, and the contamination would be present both uniformly dispersed throughout the DUF<sub>6</sub> and in the heel material referred to previously.

The TRU contaminants that are dispersed throughout the DUF<sub>6</sub> might be entrained in the gaseous DUF<sub>6</sub> during the cylinder emptying operations and carried out of the cylinders. These contaminants could be captured in filters between the cylinders and the conversion units. These filters would be monitored and changed out periodically to prevent buildup of TRU. They would be disposed of as LLW.

It is also expected that the nonvolatile forms of Tc that exist in the cylinders would remain in the heels or be captured in the filters. However, because of the existence of some volatile technetium fluoride compounds, and for the purposes of analyses in this EIS, it is assumed that all of the Tc dispersed in the DUF<sub>6</sub> would volatilize with DUF<sub>6</sub> and be carried into the conversion process equipment. Any Tc compounds transferred into the conversion units would be oxidized along with the DUF<sub>6</sub>. For this EIS, it is also assumed that the Tc in the form of oxides would partition into the U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> and HF products in the same ratio as the uranium. It is assumed that Tc left in the heels from the original feedstock would remain behind after the DUF<sub>6</sub> was vaporized.

If bulk bags were used for depleted U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> disposal, the emptied cylinders would be processed as described in Section 2.2.2.6. The emptied cylinders would be surveyed by using nondestructive assay techniques to determine the presence of a significant quantity of TRU isotopes. If TRU isotopes were detected, samples would be taken and analyzed. Cylinders that exceeded the disposal site limits at the Envirocare of Utah, Inc., facility would be treated to immobilize the heel (e.g., with grout) within the cylinder, compacted, and sectioned; then the cylinder/heel waste stream would be sent to NTS and disposed of as LLW.

As noted in Section 1.2.2, the paints applied to some cylinders prior to 1978 included PCBs, which were typically added as a fungicide and to increase durability and flexibility. Records of the PCB concentrations in the paints used were not kept, so it is currently unknown how many cylinders are coated with paint containing PCBs. However, paint chips from a representative sample of cylinders at the ETPP site have been analyzed for PCBs. The results

indicate that up to 50% of the cylinders at ETTP may have coatings containing PCBs. Because the Portsmouth and Paducah inventories contain a large number of cylinders produced before 1978, it is reasonable to assume that a significant number of cylinders at those sites also are coated with paint containing PCBs.

For each of the three storage sites, the PCBs in cylinder paints constitute an extremely small proportion of the PCBs that were previously and are currently at the sites. For example, although the Paducah site has been working for several years to dispose of PCB-containing equipment, the site still had about 870 liquid PCB-containing items (mostly capacitors) in service at the end of 2001. The Portsmouth and ETTP sites also still have a large number of liquid PCB-containing items in service. The three sites are suspected to have had spills of PCB liquids during past operations, prior to the identification of the health and environmental hazards of PCBs.

Each of the three current DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinder storage sites has an existing program for managing PCB-contaminated waste under the TSCA. In addition, the environmental monitoring program at each site includes monitoring of PCB concentrations in soil, sediment, groundwater, surface water, and biota on and in the vicinity of the sites (see Sections 3.1 and 3.2). These programs would be expected to continue throughout cylinder management activities.

Under the proposed action, storage, conversion, transportation, and disposal operations will comply with applicable TSCA regulations. Additional details are provided in Appendix B.

### **2.2.3 Conversion Product Disposition**

The conversion process would generate four conversion products that have a potential use or reuse: depleted U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub>, HF, CaF<sub>2</sub>, and steel from emptied DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders (if not used as disposal containers). DOE has been working with industrial and academic researchers for several years to identify potential uses for these products. Some potential uses for depleted uranium exist or are being developed, and DOE believes that a viable market exists for the HF generated during conversion. To take advantage of these to the extent possible, DOE requested in the RFP that the bidders for conversion services investigate and propose viable uses. The probable disposition paths identified by UDS for each of the conversion products are summarized in Table 2.2-2 (UDS 2003b).

According to UDS, of the four conversion products, only HF has a viable commercial market currently interested in the product. Therefore, UDS expects that the HF would be sold to a commercial vendor pending DOE approval of the residual contamination limits and the sale. Commercial-grade HF produced at the Framatome ANP, Inc. (a UDS partner), facility in Richland, Washington, is currently sold commercially under an NRC-approved license. UDS is currently working with DOE through a formal process to evaluate and establish authorized release limits for the HF. Details on this process and on HF sale and use are provided in Appendix E. Should the release of the HF not be allowed, it would be neutralized to CaF<sub>2</sub> for sale or disposal, creating about 2 t (2.2 tons) per 1 t (1.1 ton) of HF. UDS will seek to obtain DOE approval to sell this material as well. However, the market is not as strong as that for the HF; thus, the CaF<sub>2</sub> produced during normal operations might become waste.

**TABLE 2.2-2 Summary of Proposed Conversion Product Treatment and Disposition**

Conversion Product	Packaging/Storage	Proposed Disposition	Optional Disposition
Depleted U <sub>3</sub> O <sub>8</sub>	U <sub>3</sub> O <sub>8</sub> would be loaded into emptied cylinders, which would be loaded onto railcars. An option of using bulk bags as disposal containers is also considered.	Disposal at Envirocare of Utah, Inc. <sup>a</sup>	Disposal at NTS. <sup>a</sup>
CaF <sub>2</sub>	Packaged for sale or disposal.	Commercial sale pending DOE approval of authorized release limits, as appropriate.	Disposal at Envirocare of Utah, Inc. <sup>a</sup>
HF acid (49% and 70%)	HF produced by the dry conversion facility would be commercial grade. HF would be stored on site until loaded into rail tank cars.	Sale to commercial HF acid supplier pending DOE approval of authorized release limits, as appropriate.	Neutralization of HF to CaF <sub>2</sub> for use or disposal.
Steel (empty cylinders)	Emptied cylinders would be reused as disposal containers to the extent practicable. If bulk bags were used, emptied cylinders would have a stabilizing agent added to neutralize residual fluorine, be stored for 4 months, crushed to reduce the size, sectioned, and packaged in intermodal containers.	Disposal at Envirocare of Utah, Inc. <sup>a</sup>	Disposal at NTS. <sup>a</sup>

<sup>a</sup> DOE plans to decide the specific disposal location(s) for the depleted U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> conversion product after additional appropriate NEPA review. Accordingly, DOE will continue to evaluate its disposal options and will consider any further information or comments relevant to that decision. DOE will give a minimum 45-day notice before making the specific disposal decision and will provide any supplemental NEPA analysis for public review and comment.

Although the depleted U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> and emptied cylinders have the potential for use or reuse, currently none of the uses have been shown to be viable because of cost, perception, feasibility, or the need for additional study. Thus, UDS expects that most, if not all, of the uranium oxide and emptied cylinders would require disposal. These materials would be processed and maybe shipped to Envirocare for disposal, as summarized in Table 2.2-2.

The EIS evaluation of conversion product disposition considers:

- Transportation of the uranium oxide conversion product and emptied cylinders by truck and rail to both Envirocare (proposed) and NTS (option) for disposal. DOE plans to decide the specific disposal location(s) for the depleted U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> conversion product after additional appropriate NEPA review. Accordingly, DOE will continue to evaluate its disposal options and will consider any further information or comments relevant to that decision. DOE will give a minimum 45-day notice before making the specific disposal

decision and will provide any supplemental NEPA analysis for public review and comment.

- Transportation and sale of the HF conversion product, and
- Neutralization of HF to CaF<sub>2</sub> and its sale or disposal in the event that the HF product is not sold.

Because specific destinations are unknown at this time, impacts from the shipment of HF and CaF<sub>2</sub> for use are based on a range of representative route distances. Additional details concerning the transportation assessment are provided in Appendix F, Section F.3.

**2.2.4 Option of Shipping ETTP Cylinders to Paducah**

DOE proposes to ship the DUF<sub>6</sub> and non-DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders at ETTP to Portsmouth. However, this EIS considers an option of sending the ETTP cylinders to Paducah. If the ETTP DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders were converted at Paducah, the Paducah facility would have to operate an additional 3 years, resulting in a total operational period of 28 years. For this option, this EIS evaluates the preparation of DUF<sub>6</sub> and non-DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders at ETTP and the transportation of those cylinders to Paducah by several different methods, as described below.

All shipments of ETTP cylinders would have to be made consistent with DOT regulations for the shipment of radioactive materials as specified in Title 49 of the CFR (see text box and Chapter 6). The cylinders could be shipped by truck or rail.

The majority of DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders were designed, built, tested, and certified to meet the

**Transportation Requirements for DUF<sub>6</sub> Cylinders**

All shipments of UF<sub>6</sub> cylinders have to be made in accordance with applicable DOT regulations for the shipment of radioactive materials; specifically, the provisions of 49 CFR Part 173, Subpart I. The DOT regulations require that each UF<sub>6</sub> cylinder be designed, fabricated, inspected, tested, and marked in accordance with the various engineering standards that were in effect at the time the cylinder was manufactured. The DOT requirements are intended to maintain the safety of shipments during both routine and accident conditions. The following provisions are particularly important relative to DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinder shipments:

1. A cylinder must be filled to less than 62% of the certified volumetric capacity (the fill limit was reduced from 64% to 62% in about 1987).
2. The pressure within a cylinder must be less than 14.8 psia (subatmospheric pressure).
3. A cylinder must be free of cracks, excessive distortion, bent or broken valves or plugs, and broken or torn stiffening rings or skirts, and it must not have a shell thickness that has decreased below a specified minimum value. (Shell thicknesses are assessed visually by a code vessel inspector, and ultrasonic testing may be specified at the discretion of the inspector to verify wall thickness, when and in areas the inspector deems necessary.)
4. A cylinder must be designed so that it will withstand (1) a hydraulic test at an internal pressure of at least 1.4 megapascals (200 psi) without leakage; (2) a free drop test onto a flat, horizontal surface from a height of 1 ft (0.3 m) to 4 ft (1.2 m), depending on the cylinder's mass, without loss or dispersal; and (3) a 30-minute thermal test equivalent to being engulfed in a hydrocarbon fuel/air fire having an average temperature of at least 800°C (1,475°F) without rupture of the containment system.

DOT requirements. The DOT requirements are intended to maintain the safety of shipments during both routine and accident conditions. A summary of the applicable transportation regulations for shipment of UF<sub>6</sub> is provided in Chapter 6 of this EIS; a detailed discussion of pertinent transportation regulations is presented in Biwer et al. (2001). Cylinders meeting the DOT requirements could be loaded directly onto specially designed truck trailers or railcars for shipment. However, after several decades in storage, some cylinders have physically deteriorated such that they no longer meet the DOT requirements.

It is unknown exactly how many DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders do not meet DOT transportation requirements. As discussed in Section 1.7, it is estimated that up to 1,700 cylinders are DOT compliant, with the remainder not meeting the DOT requirements. Problems are related to the following DOT requirements that must be satisfied before shipment: (1) documentation must be available showing that each cylinder was properly designed, fabricated, inspected, and tested prior to being filled; (2) cylinders must be filled to less than 62% of the maximum capacity; (3) the pressure within cylinders must be less than atmospheric pressure; (4) cylinders must not leak or be damaged so they are unsafe; and (5) cylinders must have a specified minimum wall thickness. Cylinders not meeting these requirements are referred to as “noncompliant.” Some cylinders might fail to meet more than one requirement.

Three options exist for shipping noncompliant cylinders (Biwer et al. 2001):

1. The DUF<sub>6</sub> contents could be transferred from noncompliant cylinders into new or compliant cylinders.
2. An exemption could be obtained from DOT that would allow the DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinder to be transported either “as is” or following repairs. The primary finding that DOT would have to make to justify granting an exemption is this: the proposed alternative would have to achieve a safety level that would be at least equal to the level required by the otherwise applicable regulation or, if the otherwise applicable regulation did not establish a required safety level, would be consistent with the public interest and adequately protect against the risks to life and property that are inherent when transporting hazardous materials in commerce.
3. Noncompliant cylinders could be shipped in a protective overpack. In this case, the shipper would have to obtain an exemption from DOT that would allow the existing cylinder, regardless of its condition, to be transported if it was placed in an overpack. The overpack would have to be specially designed. Furthermore, DOT would have to determine that, if the overpack was fabricated, inspected, and marked according to its design, the resulting packaging (including the cylinder and the overpack) would have a safety level at least equal to the level required for a new UF<sub>6</sub> cylinder.

Before shipment, each cylinder would be inspected to determine if it met DOT requirements. This inspection would include a record review to determine if the cylinder was overfilled; a visual inspection for damage or defects; a pressure check to determine if the

cylinder was overpressurized; and an ultrasonic wall thickness measurement (based on a visual inspection, if necessary). If a cylinder passed the inspection, the appropriate documentation would be prepared, and the cylinder would be loaded directly for shipment. The preparation of compliant cylinders (cylinders that meet DOT requirements) would include inspection activities, unstacking, on-site transfer, and loading onto a truck trailer or railcar. The cylinders would be secured by using the appropriate tiedowns, and the shipment would be labeled in accordance with DOT requirements. Handling and support equipment and the procedures for on-site movement and for loading the cylinders would be of the same type currently used for cylinder management activities at the storage sites.

This EIS considers three options for shipping noncompliant cylinders from ETTP. The information on these activities is based on preconceptual design data provided in the Engineering Analysis Report (Dubrin et al. 1997) prepared for the PEIS and the analysis of potential environmental impacts presented in Appendix E of the DUF<sub>6</sub> PEIS (DOE 1999a).

An overpack is a container into which a cylinder is placed for shipment. The overpack would be designed, tested, and certified to meet all DOT shipping requirements. It would be suitable for containing, transporting, and storing the cylinder contents regardless of cylinder condition. For transportation, a noncompliant cylinder would be placed into an overpack that was already on a truck trailer or railcar. The overpack would be closed and secured, and the shipment would be labeled in accordance with DOT requirements. The overpacks could be reused following shipment. If a decision were made to construct a transfer facility at ETTP, additional NEPA review would be conducted.

The second cylinder preparation option for transporting noncompliant cylinders considered in this EIS is the transfer of the DUF<sub>6</sub> from substandard cylinders to new or used cylinders that would meet all DOT requirements. This option could require the construction of a new cylinder transfer facility, for which there are no current plans. Following transfer of the DUF<sub>6</sub>, the compliant cylinders could be shipped by placing them directly onto appropriate trucks or railcars.

The third option is to ship the cylinders “as-is” under a DOT exemption. As discussed above, for this to occur, it must be demonstrated that the cylinders would be shipped in a manner achieving a level of safety that would be at least equal to the level required by the regulations, which would likely require some compensatory measures.

In this EIS, transportation impacts are estimated for shipment by either truck or rail after cylinder preparation. The impacts are assessed by determining truck and rail routes between ETTP and the Paducah site.

### **2.2.5 Option of Expanding Conversion Facility Operations**

The conversion facility at Paducah is currently being designed to process the DOE DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinder inventory at the site over 25 years by using four process lines. There are no current plans to operate the conversion facility beyond this time period or to increase the throughput of

the facility by adding an additional process line. However, a future decision to extend conversion facility operations or increase throughput at the site could be made for several reasons. Consequently, this EIS includes an evaluation of the environmental impacts associated with expanding conversion facility operations at the site (either by process improvements or by extending operations beyond 25 years) in order to provide future planning flexibility. (Impacts are presented in Section 5.2.6.) The possible reasons for expanding operations in the future are discussed below.

The DOE Office of Inspector General (OIG) issued a final audit report in March 2004 reviewing the proposed DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion project (DOE 2004c). The OIG report recommends that EM conduct a cost benefit analysis to determine the optimum size of the Portsmouth conversion facility and, on the basis of the results of that review, implement the most cost-effective approach. The report states that by adding an additional process line to the Portsmouth facility, the time to process the Portsmouth and ETTP inventories of DUF<sub>6</sub> could be shortened by 5 years at a substantial cost savings of 55 million dollars.

In contrast to the findings at Portsmouth, the OIG report notes that it would not be feasible to add an additional conversion line to the Paducah facility (DOE 2004c). Consequently, this EIS evaluates the potential environmental impacts associated with increasing the Paducah plant throughput by implementing process improvements (see Section 5.2.6). The conversion contract provides significant incentives to the conversion contractor to improve efficiency. For example, the current facility designs are based on an assumption that the conversion plant would have an 84% on-line availability (percent of time system is on line and operational). However, Framatome's experience at the Richland plant indicates that the on-line availability is expected to be at least 90%. Therefore, there is additional capacity expected to be realized in the current design.

A future decision to extend operations or expand throughput might also result from the fact that DOE could assume management responsibility for DUF<sub>6</sub> in addition to the current inventory. Two statutory provisions make this possible. First, Sections 161v. [42 USC 2201(v)] and 1311 [42 USC 2297b-10] of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of 1954 [P.L. 83-703], as amended, provide that DOE may supply services in support of USEC. In the past, these provisions were used once to transfer DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders from USEC to DOE for disposition in accordance with DOE orders, regulations, and policies. Second, Section 3113(a) of the USEC Privatization Act [42 USC 2297h-11(a)] requires DOE to accept LLW, including depleted uranium that has been determined to be LLW, for disposal upon request and reimbursement of costs by USEC or any other person licensed by the NRC to operate a uranium enrichment facility. This provision has not been invoked, and the form in which depleted uranium would be transferred to DOE by a uranium enrichment facility invoking this provision is not specified. However, DOE believes depleted uranium transferred under this provision in the future would most likely be in the form of DUF<sub>6</sub>, thus adding to the inventory of material needing conversion at the DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion facilities and disposition.

Several possible sources of additional DUF<sub>6</sub> generated from uranium enrichment activities include the following:

1. USEC continues to operate the gaseous diffusion plant at the Paducah site, generating approximately 1,000 cylinders per year of DUF<sub>6</sub>. In the past, DOE signed MOAs with USEC transferring DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders to DOE (DOE and USEC 1998a,b); the latest was signed in June 2002 for DUF<sub>6</sub> generated from 2002 through 2005. Future MOAs are possible. Consequently, DOE may assume responsibility for additional DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders at the Paducah site.
2. USEC is currently in the process of developing and demonstrating an advanced enrichment technology based on gas centrifuges. A license for a lead test facility to be operated at the Portsmouth site was issued by the NRC in February 2004. In January 2004, USEC announced that its future enrichment facility using the advanced technology would be sited at the Portsmouth site. Consequently, additional DUF<sub>6</sub> could be generated at that site that ultimately could be transferred to DOE.
3. New commercial uranium enrichment facilities may be built and operated in the United States by commercial companies other than USEC. Although there are no agreements for DOE to accept DUF<sub>6</sub> from such commercial sources, it is possible in the future.

If DOE took responsibility for additional DUF<sub>6</sub> in the future, it is reasonable to assume that the conversion facilities at Portsmouth and/or Paducah could be operated longer than specified in the current plans in order to convert this material or that the throughput of the facilities could be increased. The duration of extended operations or the size of a throughput increase would depend on the quantity of material transferred and the location of the transfer.

In addition, because, under the current plans, the Portsmouth facility could conclude operations approximately 7 years before the current Paducah inventory would be converted at the Paducah site, it is possible that DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders could be transferred from Paducah to Portsmouth to facilitate conversion of the entire inventory, particularly if DOE assumed responsibility for additional DUF<sub>6</sub> at Paducah.

The potential environmental impacts associated with extended plant operations, increased facility throughput through process improvements, and Paducah-to-Portsmouth cylinder shipments are discussed in Section 5.2.6.

## 2.3 ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED BUT NOT ANALYZED IN DETAIL

### 2.3.1 Utilization of Commercial Conversion Capacity

During the scoping process for the PEIS, it was suggested that DOE consider using existing UF<sub>6</sub> conversion capacity at commercial nuclear fuel fabrication facilities that convert natural or enriched UF<sub>6</sub> to UO<sub>2</sub> in lieu of constructing new conversion capacity for DUF<sub>6</sub>. Accordingly, in May 2001, DOE investigated the capabilities of existing commercial nuclear fuel fabrication facilities in the United States to determine whether this suggested approach would be a reasonable alternative. Publicly available information was reviewed, and an informal telephone survey of U.S. commercial fuel cycle facilities was conducted. The investigation report concluded that if 100% of the UF<sub>6</sub> conversion capacity of domestic commercial nuclear fuel fabrication facilities operating in May 2001 could be devoted to converting DOE's DUF<sub>6</sub> inventory, approximately 5,500 t (6,000 tons) of DUF<sub>6</sub> could be converted per year. On the basis of this conclusion, the investigation report estimated that it would take more than 125 years to convert DOE's DUF<sub>6</sub> inventory by using only existing conversion capacity. Furthermore, during the informal telephone survey, U.S. commercial fuel fabrication facilities were willing to confirm a capacity of only about 300 t (331 tons) of UF<sub>6</sub> per year as being possibly available to DOE. The investigation report indicated that there seems to be a general lack of interest on the part of the facility owners in committing existing operating or mothballed capacity to conversion of the DOE DUF<sub>6</sub> inventory (Ranek and Monette 2001).

Even though UF<sub>6</sub> conversion capacity at commercial nuclear fuel fabrication facilities might become available in the future, the small capacity identified in 2001 as being possibly available to DOE, coupled with the low interest level expressed at that time by facility owners, indicates that the feasibility of this suggested alternative is low. Therefore, this EIS does not analyze in detail the alternative of using existing capacity at commercial nuclear fuel fabrication facilities.

### 2.3.2 Other Sites

The consideration of alternative sites was limited to alternative locations within the Paducah site in response to Congressional direction. As discussed in detail in Section 1.1, Congress has acted twice regarding the construction and operation of DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion plants at Portsmouth and Paducah.

First, in July 1998, P.L. 105-204 directed DOE to make a plan consistent with NEPA for the construction and operation of conversion facilities at Portsmouth and Paducah. Consequently, DOE prepared a plan (DOE 1999b) and published an NOI in the *Federal Register* on September 18, 2001 (68 FR 48123) that identified the range of alternatives to be considered in a conversion facility EIS, including the alternative of constructing only one conversion plant.

Second, while the preparation of the conversion facility EIS was underway, Congress acted again regarding DUF<sub>6</sub> management by passing P.L. 107-206 in August 2002. The pertinent

part of P.L. 107-206 directed DOE to award a contract for construction and operation of conversion facilities at the Portsmouth and Paducah sites and to commence construction no later than July 31, 2004. Subsequently, DOE reevaluated the appropriate approach of the NEPA review and decided to prepare two separate site-specific EISs. This change was announced in the *Federal Register* on April 28, 2003 (68 FR 22368). Consistent with the direction of P.L. 107-206, the alternatives for placing the conversion facilities were limited in each site-specific EIS to locations within the Portsmouth and Paducah sites, respectively.

### 2.3.3 Other Conversion Technologies

This EIS provides a detailed analysis of impacts associated with the proposed UDS conversion of DUF<sub>6</sub> to depleted U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub>. As discussed in Section 1.6.2.2, the conversion project RFP did not specify the conversion product technology or form. Three proposals submitted in response to the RFP were deemed to be in the competitive range; two of these proposals involved conversion of DUF<sub>6</sub> to U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> and the third involved conversion to depleted UF<sub>4</sub>. Potential environmental impacts associated with these proposals were considered during the procurement process, including the preparation of an environmental critique and environmental synopsis, which were prepared in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 1021.216.

The environmental synopsis is presented in Appendix D. The environmental synopsis concluded that, on the basis of assessment of potential environmental impacts presented in the critique, no proposal was clearly environmentally preferable. Although differences in a number of impact areas were identified, none of the differences were considered to result in one proposal being preferable over the others. In addition, the potential environmental impacts associated with the proposals were found to be similar to, and generally less than, those presented in the DUF<sub>6</sub> PEIS (DOE 1999a) for representative conversion technologies.

### 2.3.4 Long-Term Storage and Disposal Alternatives

This EIS considers the site-specific impacts from conversion operations at the Paducah site, impacts from the transportation of depleted uranium conversion products to NTS and Envirocare for disposal, and impacts from the potential sale of HF and CaF<sub>2</sub> produced from conversion. Environmental impacts are not explicitly evaluated for the long-term storage of conversion products or for disposal.

At this time, there are no specific proposals for the long-term storage of conversion products that would warrant more detailed analysis. Long-term storage alternatives were analyzed in the PEIS, including storage as DUF<sub>6</sub> and storage as an oxide (either U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> or UO<sub>2</sub>). For long-term storage of DUF<sub>6</sub>, the options considered were storage in outdoor yards, buildings, and an underground mine. For long-term storage as an oxide, storage in buildings, underground vaults, and an underground mine were considered. The potential environmental impacts from long-term storage were evaluated for representative and generic sites. Preconceptual designs presented in the Engineering Analysis Report (Dubrin et al. 1997) were used as the basis for the analysis, and the evaluation of environmental impacts considered a 40-year period.

This EIS evaluates the impacts from packaging, handling, and transporting conversion products from the conversion facility to a LLW disposal facility. The disposal facility would be (1) selected in a manner consistent with DOE policies and orders and (2) authorized or licensed to receive the conversion products by either DOE (in conformance with DOE orders), the NRC (in conformance with NRC regulations), or an NRC Agreement State agency (in conformance with state laws and regulations determined to be equivalent to NRC regulations). Assessment of the impacts and risks from on-site handling and disposal at the LLW disposal facility is deferred to the disposal site's site-specific NEPA or licensing documents. However, this EIS covers the impacts from transporting the DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion products to both Envirocare and NTS.

### **2.3.5 Other Transportation Modes**

Transportation by air and barge were considered but not analyzed in detail. Transportation by air was deemed to not be reasonable for the types and quantities of materials that would be transported to and from the conversion site. Any transportation by air would involve only small quantities of specialty materials or items generally carried through mail delivery services.

Transportation by barge was also considered, but deemed to be unreasonable and was not analyzed in detail. As explained more fully in Section 4.1 of the Engineering Analysis Report (Dubrin et al. 1997), ETTP is the only site with a nearby barge facility. Paducah would either have to build new facilities or use existing facilities that are located 20 to 30 mi (32 to 48 km) from the Paducah site. Use of existing facilities would require on-land transport by truck or rail over the 20- to 30-mi (32- to 48-km) distance, and the cylinders would have to go through one extra unloading/loading step at the end of the barge transport. Currently, there are no initiatives to build new barge facilities closer to the Paducah site. The closest distance to the Ohio River from the Paducah site is 6 mi (10 km). Therefore, even if a new barge facility was built, on-land transport of cylinders and an extra unloading/loading step would still be required at this site. If barge shipment was proposed in the future and considered to be a reasonable option, additional NEPA review would be conducted.

### **2.3.6 One Conversion Plant Alternative**

In the NOI published in the *Federal Register* on September 18, 2001, construction and operation of one conversion plant was identified as a preliminary alternative that would be considered in the conversion EIS. However, with the passage of P.L. 107-206, which mandates the award of a contract for the construction and operation of conversion facilities at both Paducah and Portsmouth, the one conversion plant alternative was considered but not analyzed in this EIS.

## 2.4 COMPARISON OF ALTERNATIVES

### 2.4.1 General

This EIS includes analyses of a no action alternative and the proposed action of building and operating a conversion facility at three alternative locations within the Paducah site. Listed below is a general comparison of the activities required for each alternative and the types of environmental impacts that could be expected from each. A detailed comparison of the estimated environmental impacts associated with the alternatives is provided in Section 2.4.2.

- The no action alternative would consist of the continued surveillance and maintenance of the DUF<sub>6</sub> inventory at the Paducah site. No conversion facility would be constructed or operated. Only minor yard reconstruction would be required, and no cylinders would be shipped off site. Cylinder breaches could occur as a result of damage during handling or external corrosion.

Potential environmental impacts associated with the no action alternative would be primarily limited to (1) the exposure of involved workers to external radiation in the cylinder yards during surveillance and maintenance activities, (2) impacts from reconstruction of three cylinder yards, (3) impacts associated with the possible release of depleted uranium and HF from breached cylinders and their dispersal in the environment (before the breaches were identified and repaired), and (4) potential accidents that could damage cylinders and result in a release of DUF<sub>6</sub>.

- The proposed action would involve the construction and operation of a conversion facility at Paducah. Three alternative locations are considered. It would take the conversion facility approximately 25 years to convert the entire DUF<sub>6</sub> inventory to U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> at a rate of approximately 1,400 cylinders (18,000 t [20,000 tons]) per year. Aqueous HF could also be produced for sale during the conversion process, or the HF could be neutralized to CaF<sub>2</sub> for sale or disposal.

The option of shipping approximately 5,900 cylinders (approximately 4,800 DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders for conversion and about 1,100 non-DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders) from ETPP to Paducah is also evaluated. This option would extend the period of operation from 25 to 28 years.

After conversion, the conversion products (U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub>, aqueous HF or CaF<sub>2</sub>, and emptied cylinders, if not used as disposal containers for U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub>) would be shipped by truck or rail to a user or disposal facility (NTS or Envirocare).

Potential environmental impacts associated with the proposed action alternatives would include (1) impacts to local air, water, soil, ecological, and

cultural resources during conversion facility construction; (2) impacts to workers from facility construction and operations; (3) impacts from small amounts of depleted uranium and other hazardous compounds released to the environment through normal conversion plant air effluents; (4) impacts from the shipment of cylinders, conversion products, and waste products; and (5) impacts from potential accidents involving the release of radioactive material or hazardous chemicals.

## 2.4.2 Summary and Comparison of Potential Environmental Impacts

This EIS includes analyses of potential impacts at the Paducah site under the no action alternative and the proposed action alternatives. Under the no action alternative, potential impacts associated with the continued storage of DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders in yards are evaluated through 2039; in addition, the long-term impacts that could result from releases of DUF<sub>6</sub> and HF from future cylinder breaches are evaluated. For the proposed action, potential impacts are evaluated at three alternative locations for the following:

- The conversion facility construction period of approximately 2 years;
- The operational period required to convert the Paducah DUF<sub>6</sub> inventory, which would equal 25 years (28 years if the ETTP inventory was shipped to Paducah instead); and
- A facility D&D period of 3 years.

Under each alternative, potential consequences are evaluated in many areas: human health and safety (during normal operations, accidents, and transportation), air quality, noise, water, soil, socioeconomics, ecology, waste management, resource requirements, land use, cultural resources, and environmental justice. (Methodologies are discussed in Chapter 4 and Appendix F.) The assessment considers impacts that could result from the construction of necessary facilities, normal operations of facilities, accidents, preparation of cylinders for shipment, transportation of materials, and the D&D of facilities after conversion is complete. In addition, the production and sale of aqueous HF is evaluated, as is the possibility of neutralizing HF to CaF<sub>2</sub> for sale or disposal.

The potential environmental impacts at Paducah under the action alternatives and the no action alternative are presented in Table 2.4-1 (placed at the end of this chapter). To supplement the information in Table 2.4-1, each area of impact evaluated in the EIS is discussed below. Major similarities and differences among the alternatives are highlighted. This section provides a summary comparison; additional details and discussion are provided in Chapter 5 for each alternative and area of impact.

### **2.4.2.1 Human Health and Safety — Construction and Normal Facility Operations**

Under the no action alternative and the action alternatives, it is estimated that potential exposures of workers and members of the public to radiation and chemicals would be well within applicable public health standards and regulations during normal facility operations (including 10 CFR 835, 40 CFR 61 Subpart H, and DOE Order 5400.5). The estimated doses and risks from radiation and/or chemical exposures of the general public and noninvolved workers would be very low, with zero latent cancer fatalities (LCFs) expected among these groups over the time periods considered, and with no adverse health impacts from chemical exposures expected. (Dose and risk estimates are shown in Table 2.4-1.) In general, the location of a conversion facility within the Paducah site would not significantly affect potential impacts to workers or the public during normal facility operations (i.e., no significant differences in impacts were identified at alternative Locations A, B, or C). Construction workers at Locations A and C and cylinder yard reconstruction workers under the no action alternative would receive low doses (i.e., up to 40 mrem/yr for the action alternatives and up to 230 mrem/yr for the no action alternative) because of the proximity of the construction sites to the cylinder yards.

Involved workers (persons directly involved in the handling of radioactive or hazardous materials) could be exposed to low-level radiation emitted by uranium during the normal course of their work activities, and this exposure could result in a slight increase in the risk for radiation-induced LCFs to individual involved workers. (The possible presence of TRU and Tc contamination in the cylinder inventory would not contribute to exposures during normal operations.) The annual number of workers exposed could range from about 40 (under the no action alternative) to 172 under the action alternatives. Under the no action alternative, it is estimated that radiation exposure of involved workers would result in a 1-in-2 chance of one additional LCF among the entire involved worker population over the life of the project. Under the action alternatives, a 1-in-7 chance of one additional LCF among involved workers over the life of the project was estimated.

Possible radiological exposures from using groundwater potentially contaminated as a result of releases from breached cylinders or facility releases were also evaluated. In general, these exposures would be at very low levels and within applicable public health standards and regulations. However, the uranium concentration in groundwater could exceed 20 µg/L (the drinking water guideline used for comparison in this EIS) at some time in the future under the no action alternative if cylinder corrosion was not controlled. This scenario is highly unlikely because ongoing cylinder inspections and maintenance would prevent significant releases from occurring.

### **2.4.2.2 Human Health and Safety — Facility Accidents**

**2.4.2.2.1 Physical Hazards.** Under all alternatives, workers could be injured or killed as a result of on-the-job accidents unrelated to radiation or chemical exposure. On the basis of accident statistics for similar industries, it is estimated that under the no action alternative, zero fatalities and about 84 injuries might occur through 2039 at the Paducah site (about 2 injuries per

year). Under the action alternatives, the risk of physical hazards would not depend on the location of the conversion facility. No fatalities are predicted, but about 11 injuries during construction and about 200 injuries during operations could occur at the conversion facility (about 6 injuries per year during a 2-year construction period and 8 injuries per year during operations). Accidental injuries and deaths are not unusual in industries that use heavy equipment to manipulate weighty objects and bulk materials.

**2.4.2.2.2 Facility Accidents Involving Radiation or Chemical Releases.** Under all alternatives, it is possible that accidents could release radiation or chemicals to the environment, potentially affecting workers and members of the public. Of all the accidents considered, those involving DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders and those involving chemicals at the conversion facility would have the largest potential effects.

The cylinder management plan (Commonwealth of Kentucky and DOE 2003) outlines required cylinder maintenance activities and procedures to be undertaken in the event of a cylinder breach and/or release of DUF<sub>6</sub> from one or more cylinders. Under all alternatives, there is a low probability that accidents involving DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders could occur at the current storage locations. If an accident occurred, DUF<sub>6</sub> could be released to the environment. The DUF<sub>6</sub> would combine with moisture in the air, forming gaseous HF and UO<sub>2</sub>F<sub>2</sub>, a soluble solid in the form of small particles. The depleted uranium and HF could be dispersed downwind, potentially exposing workers and members of the general public to radiation and chemical effects. The amount released would depend on the severity of the accident and the number of cylinders involved. The probability of cylinder accidents would decrease under the action alternatives as the DUF<sub>6</sub> was converted and the number of cylinders in storage decreased as a result.

For releases involving DUF<sub>6</sub> and other uranium compounds, both chemical and radiological effects could occur if the material was ingested or inhaled. The chemical effect of most concern associated with internal uranium exposure is kidney damage, and the radiological effect of concern is an increase in the probability of developing cancer. With regard to uranium, chemical effects occur at lower exposure levels than do radiological effects. Exposure to HF from accidental releases could result in a range of health effects, from eye and respiratory irritation to death, depending on the exposure level. Large anhydrous NH<sub>3</sub> releases could also cause severe respiratory irritation and death. (NH<sub>3</sub> is used to generate hydrogen, which is required for the conversion process.)

Chemical and radiological exposures to involved workers (those within 100 m [329 ft] of the release) under accident conditions would depend on how rapidly the accident developed, the exact location and response of the workers, the direction and amount of the release, the physical forces causing or caused by the accident, meteorological conditions, and the characteristics of the room or building if the accident occurred indoors. Impacts to involved workers under accident conditions would likely be dominated by physical forces from the accident itself; thus quantitative dose/effect estimates would not be meaningful. For these reasons, the impacts to involved workers during accidents are not quantified in this EIS. However, it is recognized that injuries and fatalities among involved workers would be possible if an accident did occur.

Under the no action alternative, for accidents involving cylinders that might happen at least once in 100 years (i.e., likely accidents [see Section 5.1.2.1.2]), it is estimated that the off-site concentrations of HF and uranium would be considerably below levels that would cause adverse chemical effects among members of the general public from exposure to these chemicals. However, up to 10 noninvolved workers might experience potential adverse effects from exposure to HF and uranium (mild and temporary effects, such as respiratory irritation or temporary decrease in kidney function). It is estimated that one noninvolved worker might experience potential irreversible adverse effects that are permanent in nature (such as lung damage or kidney damage), with no fatalities expected. Radiation exposures would be unlikely to result in additional LCFs among noninvolved workers or members of the general public for these types of accidents.

Cylinder accidents that are less likely to occur could be more severe, having greater consequences that could potentially affect off-site members of the general public. These types of accidents are considered extremely unlikely, expected to occur with a frequency of between once in 10,000 years and once in 1 million years of operations. Based on the expected frequency, through 2039, the probability of this type of accident was estimated to be about 1 chance in 2,500. Among all the cylinder accidents analyzed, the postulated accident that would result in the largest number of people with adverse effects (including mild and temporary as well as permanent effects) would be an accident that involves rupture of cylinders in a fire. If this type of accident occurred at the Paducah site, it is estimated that up to 2,000 members of the general public and 910 noninvolved workers might experience adverse chemical effects from HF and uranium exposure (mild and temporary effects, such as respiratory irritation or temporary decrease in kidney function). It is estimated that more adverse effects would occur among the general public than among noninvolved workers because of the buoyancy effects from the fire on contaminant plume spread (i.e., the concentrations that would occur would be higher at points farther from the release than at closer locations).

The postulated cylinder accident that would result in the largest number of persons with irreversible adverse health effects is a corroded cylinder spill under wet conditions, with an estimated frequency of between once in 10,000 years and once in 1 million years of operations. If this accident occurred, it is estimated that 1 member of the general public and 300 noninvolved workers might experience irreversible adverse effects (such as lung damage or kidney damage). No fatalities are expected among the members of the general public; there would be a potential for three fatalities among noninvolved workers from chemical effects. Radiation exposures would be unlikely to result in additional LCFs among noninvolved workers (1 chance in 170) or the general public (1 chance in 70).

In addition to the cylinder accidents discussed above is a certain class of accidents that the DOE investigated; however, because of security concerns, information about such accidents is not available for public review but is presented in a classified appendix to the EIS. All classified information will be presented to state and local officials, as appropriate.

The number of persons actually experiencing adverse or irreversible adverse effects from cylinder accidents would likely be considerably fewer than those estimated for this analysis and would depend on the actual circumstances of the accident and the individual chemical

sensitivities of the affected persons. For example, although exposures to releases from cylinder accidents could be life-threatening (especially with respect to immediate effects from inhalation of HF at high concentrations), the guideline exposure level of 20 parts per million (ppm) of HF used to estimate the potential for irreversible adverse effects from HF exposure is likely to result in overestimates. This is because no animal or human deaths have been known to occur as a result of acute exposures (i.e., 1 hour or less) at concentrations of less than 50 ppm; generally, if death does not occur quickly after HF exposure, recovery is complete.

Similarly, the guideline intake level of 30 mg used to estimate the potential for irreversible adverse effects from the intake of uranium in this EIS is the level suggested in NRC guidance. This level is somewhat conservative; it is intended to overestimate (not underestimate) the potential number of irreversible adverse effects in the exposed population after uranium exposure. In more than 40 years of cylinder handling, no accidents involving releases from cylinders containing *solid* UF<sub>6</sub> have occurred that have caused diagnosable irreversible adverse effects among workers. In previous accidental exposure incidents involving *liquid* UF<sub>6</sub> in gaseous diffusion plants, some worker fatalities occurred immediately after the accident as a result of inhalation of HF generated from the UF<sub>6</sub>. However, no fatalities occurred as a result of the toxicity of the uranium exposure. A few workers were exposed to amounts of uranium estimated to be about three times the guideline level (30 mg) used for assessing irreversible adverse effects; none of these workers, however, actually experienced such effects.

Under the action alternatives, low-probability accidents involving chemicals at the conversion facility could have large potential consequences for noninvolved workers and members of the public. At a conversion site, accidents involving chemical releases, such as NH<sub>3</sub> and HF, could occur. NH<sub>3</sub> is used to generate hydrogen for conversion, and HF can be produced as a co-product of converting DUF<sub>6</sub>. Although the UDS proposal uses NH<sub>3</sub> to produce hydrogen, hydrogen can also be produced using natural gas. In that case, the accident impacts would be much less than those discussed here for NH<sub>3</sub> accidents. (Details on potential NH<sub>3</sub> and other accidents are in Section 5.2.2.2 [conversion facility] and Section 5.2.3 [transportation].)

The conversion accident estimated to have the largest potential consequences is an accident involving the rupture of an anhydrous NH<sub>3</sub> tank. Such an accident could be caused by a large earthquake and is expected to occur with a frequency of less than once in 1 million years per year of operations. The probability of this type of accident occurring during the operation of a conversion facility is a function of the period of operation; over 25 years of operations, the accident probability would be less than 1 chance in 40,000.

If an NH<sub>3</sub> tank ruptured at the conversion facility, a maximum of up to about 6,700 members of the general public might experience adverse effects (mild and temporary effects, such as respiratory irritation or temporary decrease in kidney function) as a result of chemical exposure. A maximum of about 370 people might experience irreversible adverse effects (such as lung damage or kidney damage), with the potential for about 7 fatalities. With regard to noninvolved workers, up to about 1,600 workers might experience adverse effects (mild and temporary) as a result of chemical exposures. A maximum of about 1,600 noninvolved workers might experience irreversible adverse effects, with the potential for about 30 fatalities.

The location of the conversion facility within the Paducah site would affect the number of noninvolved workers who might experience adverse or irreversible adverse effects from an NH<sub>3</sub> tank rupture accident. However, the accident analyses indicate that the impacts would not be consistently higher or lower at any of the alternative locations.

Although such high-consequence accidents at a conversion facility are possible, they are expected to be extremely rare. The risk (defined as consequence × probability) for these accidents would be less than 1 fatality and less than 1 irreversible adverse health effect for noninvolved workers and members of the public combined. NH<sub>3</sub> and HF are commonly used for industrial applications in the United States, and there are well-established accident prevention and mitigative measures for HF and NH<sub>3</sub> storage tanks. These include storage tank siting principles, design recommendations, spill detection measures, and containment measures. These measures would be implemented, as appropriate.

Under the action alternatives, the highest consequence radiological accident is estimated to be an earthquake damaging the depleted U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> product storage building. If this accident occurred, it is estimated that about 180 lb (82 kg) of depleted U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> would be released to the atmosphere outside of the building. The maximum collective dose received by the general public and noninvolved workers would be about 70 person-rem and 1,300 person-rem, respectively. There would be about a 1-in-40 chance of an LCF among the public and a 1-in-5 chance of an LCF among the noninvolved workers. Because the accident has a probability of occurrence that is about 1 chance in 4,000, the risk posed by the accident would be essentially zero LCFs among both the public and the workers.

### 2.4.2.3 Human Health and Safety — Transportation

Under the no action alternative, only small amounts of the LLW and LLMW that would be generated during routine cylinder maintenance activities would require transportation (about one shipment per year). Only negligible impacts are expected from such shipments. No DUF<sub>6</sub> or non-DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders would be transported between sites.

Under the action alternatives, the number of shipments would include the following:

1. If U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> was disposed of in emptied cylinders, there would be approximately 7,240 railcar shipments of depleted U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> from the conversion facility to Envirocare (proposed) or NTS (option) or up to 36,200 truck shipments (alternative) to either Envirocare or NTS. The numbers of shipments would be about 16,400 for trucks or 4,100 for railcars if bulk bags were used as disposal containers.
2. About 15,300 truck or 3,060 railcar shipments of aqueous (70% and 49%) HF could occur; alternatively, the aqueous HF could be neutralized to CaF<sub>2</sub>, requiring a total of about 25,000 truck or 6,300 railcar shipments. Currently, the destination for these shipments is not known.

3. About 1,300 truck or 650 railcar shipments of anhydrous NH<sub>3</sub> from a supplier to the site. Currently, the origin of these shipments is not known.
4. Emptied heel cylinders to Envirocare or NTS, if bulk bags were used to dispose of the depleted U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub>.
5. For the option of shipping ETTP cylinders to Paducah, approximately 5,400 truck or 1,400 railcar shipments of cylinders from ETTP.

During normal transportation operations, radioactive material and chemicals would be contained within their transport packages. Health impacts to crew members (i.e., workers) and members of the general public along the routes could occur if they were exposed to low-level external radiation in the vicinity of uranium material shipments. In addition, exposure to vehicle emissions (engine exhaust and fugitive dust) could potentially cause latent fatalities from inhalation.

The risk estimates for emissions are based on epidemiological data that associate mortality rates with particulate concentrations in ambient air. (Increased latent mortality rates resulting from cardiovascular and pulmonary diseases have been linked to incremental increases in particulate concentrations.) Thus, the increase in ambient air particulate concentrations caused by a transport vehicle, with its associated fugitive dust and diesel exhaust emissions, is related to such premature latent fatalities in the form of risk factors. Because of the conservatism of the assumptions made to reconcile results among independent epidemiological studies and associated uncertainties, the latent fatality risks estimated for normal vehicle emissions should be considered to be an upper bound (Biwer and Butler 1999).<sup>2</sup> For the transport of conversion products and co-products (depleted U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub>, aqueous HF, and emptied cylinders, if not used as disposal containers), it is conservatively estimated that a total of up to 20 fatalities from vehicle emissions could occur if shipments were only by truck and if aqueous HF product was sold and transported 620 mi (1,000 km) from the site (about 30 fatalities are estimated if HF was neutralized to CaF<sub>2</sub> and transported 620 mi [1,000 km]) from the site. The number of fatalities occurring from exhaust emissions if shipments were only by rail would be less than 1 if HF was sold and about 1 if the HF was neutralized to CaF<sub>2</sub>.

Exposure to external radiation during normal transportation operations is estimated to cause less than 1 LCF under both truck and rail options. Members of the general public living along truck and rail transportation routes would receive extremely small doses of radiation from shipments, about 0.1 mrem or less over the duration of the program. This would be true even if a single person was exposed to every shipment of radioactive material during the program.

Traffic accidents could occur during the transportation of radioactive materials and chemicals. These accidents could potentially affect the health of workers (i.e., crew members)

---

<sup>2</sup> For perspective, in a recently published EIS for a geologic repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada (DOE 2002h), the same risk factors were used for vehicle emissions; however, they were adjusted to reduce the amount of conservatism in the estimated health impacts. As reported in the Yucca Mountain EIS, the adjustments resulted in a reduction in the emission risks by a factor of about 30.

and members of the general public, either from the accident itself or from accidental releases of radioactive materials or chemicals.

The total number of traffic fatalities (unrelated to the type of cargo) was estimated on the basis of national traffic statistics for shipments by both truck and rail. If the aqueous HF was sold to users about 620 mi (1,000 km) from the site, about 2 traffic fatalities under the truck option would be estimated and 1 traffic fatality would be estimated under the rail option. If HF was neutralized to CaF<sub>2</sub>, about 4 fatalities would be estimated for the truck option, and 2 fatalities for the rail option.

Severe transportation accidents could also result in a release of radioactive material or chemicals from a shipment. The consequences of such a release would depend on the material released, location of the accident, and atmospheric conditions at the time. Potential consequences would be greatest in urban areas because more people could be exposed. Accidents that occurred when atmospheric conditions were very stable (typical of nighttime) would have higher potential consequences than accidents that occurred when conditions were unstable (i.e., turbulent, typical of daytime) because the stability would determine how quickly the released material dispersed and diluted to lower concentrations as it moved downwind.

A detailed discussion of the accident scenarios modeled for the action alternatives is provided in Section 5.2.3.3. For the action alternatives, the highest potential accident consequences during transportation activities would be caused by a rail accident involving anhydrous NH<sub>3</sub>. Although anhydrous NH<sub>3</sub> is a hazardous gas, it has many industrial applications and is commonly safely transported by industry as a pressurized liquid in trucks and rail tank cars.

The probability of a severe anhydrous NH<sub>3</sub> railcar accident occurring in a highly populated urban area under stable atmospheric conditions is extremely rare. The probability of such an accident occurring if all the anhydrous NH<sub>3</sub> needed was transported 620 mi (1,000 km) is estimated to be less than 1 chance in 200,000. Nonetheless, if such an accident (i.e., release of anhydrous NH<sub>3</sub> from a railcar in a densely populated urban area under stable atmospheric conditions) occurred, up to 5,000 persons might experience irreversible adverse effects (such as lung damage), with the potential for about 100 fatalities. If the same type of NH<sub>3</sub> rail accident occurred in a typical rural area, which would have a smaller population density than an urban area, potential impacts would be considerably less. It is estimated that in a rural area, approximately 20 persons might experience irreversible adverse effects, with no expected fatalities. The atmospheric conditions at the time of an accident would also significantly affect the consequences of a severe NH<sub>3</sub> accident. The consequences of an NH<sub>3</sub> accident would be less severe under unstable conditions, the most likely conditions in the daytime. Unstable conditions would result in more rapid dispersion of the airborne NH<sub>3</sub> plume and lower downwind concentrations. Under unstable conditions in an urban area, approximately 400 persons could experience irreversible adverse effects, with the potential for about 8 fatalities. If the accident occurred in a rural area under unstable conditions, 1 person would be expected to experience an irreversible adverse effect, with zero fatalities expected. When the probability of an NH<sub>3</sub> accident occurring is taken into account, it is expected that no irreversible adverse effects and no fatalities would occur over the shipment period.

For perspective, anhydrous NH<sub>3</sub> is routinely shipped commercially in the United States for industrial and agricultural applications. On the basis of information provided in the DOT *Hazardous Material Incident System (HMIS) Database* (DOT 2003b), for 1990 through 2002, 2 fatalities and 19 major injuries to the public or to transportation or emergency response personnel have occurred as a result of anhydrous NH<sub>3</sub> releases during nationwide commercial truck and rail operations. These fatalities and injuries occurred during transportation or loading and unloading operations. Over that period, truck and rail NH<sub>3</sub> spills resulted in more than 1,000 and 6,000 evacuations, respectively. Five very large spills, more than 10,000 gal (38,000 L), have occurred; however, these spills were all en-route derailments from large rail tank cars. The two largest spills, both around 20,000 gal (76,000 L), occurred in rural or lightly populated areas and resulted in one major injury. Over the past 30 years, the safety record for transporting anhydrous NH<sub>3</sub> has significantly improved. Safety measures contributing to this improved safety record include the installation of protective devices on railcars, fewer derailments, closer manufacturer supervision of container inspections, and participation of shippers in the Chemical Transportation Emergency Center.

After anhydrous NH<sub>3</sub>, the types of accidents that are estimated to result in the second highest consequences are those involving shipment of 70% aqueous HF produced during the conversion process. The estimated numbers of irreversible adverse effects for 70% HF rail accidents are about one-third of those from the anhydrous NH<sub>3</sub> accidents. However, the number of estimated fatalities is about one-sixth of those from NH<sub>3</sub> accidents, because the percent of fatalities among the individuals experiencing irreversible adverse effects is 1% as opposed to 2% for NH<sub>3</sub> exposures (Policastro et al. 1997). For perspective, since 1971, the period covered by DOT records, no fatal or serious injuries to the public or to transportation or emergency response personnel have occurred as a result of anhydrous HF releases during transportation. (Most of the HF transported in the United States is anhydrous HF, which is more hazardous than aqueous HF.) Over that period, 11 releases from railcars were reported to have no evacuations or injuries associated with them. The only major release (estimated at 6,400 lb [29,000 kg] of HF) occurred in 1985 and resulted in approximately 100 minor injuries. Another minor HF release during transportation occurred in 1990. The safety record for transporting HF has improved in the past 10 years for the same reasons as those discussed above for NH<sub>3</sub>. Transportation accidents involving the shipment of DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders were also evaluated, with the estimated consequences being less than those discussed above for NH<sub>3</sub> and HF (see Section 5.2.5.3).

#### **2.4.2.4 Air Quality and Noise**

Under the no action alternative, air quality from construction and operations would be within national and state ambient air quality standards. However, estimated concentrations of particulate matter (PM) that could be generated during yard reconstruction activities at Paducah would be close to air quality standards; these temporary emissions could be controlled by good construction practices. Continued cylinder maintenance and painting are expected to be effective in controlling corrosion, and concentrations of HF would be kept within regulatory standards at the Paducah site.

Under the action alternatives, it was found that air quality impacts during construction would be similar for all three alternative locations. The total (modeled plus the measured background value representative of the site) concentrations due to emissions of most criteria pollutants — such as sulfur dioxide (SO<sub>2</sub>), nitrogen oxides (NO<sub>x</sub>), and carbon monoxide (CO) — would be well within applicable air quality standards. As is often the case for construction, the primary concern would be PM released from near-ground-level sources. Total concentrations of PM<sub>10</sub> and PM<sub>2.5</sub> (PM with a mean aerodynamic diameter of 10 μm or less and 2.5 μm or less, respectively) at the construction site boundary would be close to or above the standards because of the high background concentrations and the proposed facility's proximity to potentially publicly accessible areas. Accordingly, construction activities should be conducted so as to minimize further impacts on ambient air quality. To mitigate impacts, water could be sprayed on disturbed areas more often, and dust suppressant or pavement could be applied to roads with frequent traffic.

During operations, it is estimated that total concentrations for all criteria pollutants (except for PM<sub>2.5</sub>) would be well within standards. The background level of annual average PM<sub>2.5</sub> in the area of the Paducah site approaches the standard. Again, impacts during operations were found to be similar for all three alternative locations.

Noise impacts are expected to be negligible under the no action alternative. Under the action alternatives, estimated noise levels at the nearest residence (located 1.3 km [0.8 mi] from the construction location) would be below the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) guideline of 55 dB(A)<sup>3</sup> as day-night average sound level (DNL)<sup>4</sup> for residential zones during construction and operations.

#### 2.4.2.5 Water and Soil

Under the no action alternative, uranium concentrations in surface water, groundwater, and soil would remain below guidelines throughout the project duration. However, if cylinder maintenance and painting were not effective in reducing cylinder corrosion rates, the uranium concentration in groundwater could be greater than the guideline at some time in the future (no earlier than about 2100). If continued cylinder maintenance and painting were effective in controlling corrosion, as expected, groundwater uranium concentrations would remain less than the guideline.

During construction of the conversion facility, construction material spills could contaminate surface, water, groundwater, or soil. However, by implementing storm water management, sediment and erosion control (e.g., temporary and permanent seeding; mulching and matting; sediment barriers, traps, and basins; silt fences; runoff and earth diversion dikes),

---

<sup>3</sup> dB(A) is a unit of weighted sound-pressure level, measured by the use of the metering characteristics and the A-weighting specified in the *American National Standard Specification for Sound Level Meters*, ANSI S1.4-1983, and in Amendment S1.4A-1985 (Acoustical Society of America 1983, 1985).

<sup>4</sup> DNL is the 24-hour average sound level, expressed in dB(A), with a 10-dB penalty artificially added to the nighttime (10 p.m.–7 a.m.) sound level to account for noise-sensitive activities (e.g., sleep) during these hours.

and good construction practices (e.g., covering chemicals with tarps to prevent interaction with rain; promptly cleaning up any spills), concentrations in soil and wastewater (and therefore surface water and groundwater) could be kept well within applicable standards or guidelines.

During operations, no appreciable impacts on surface water or groundwater would result from the conversion facility because no contaminated liquid effluents are anticipated, and because airborne emissions would be at very low levels (e.g., <0.25 g/yr of uranium). Impacts would be similar for all three alternative locations.

Contaminated soil associated with solid waste management unit (SWMU) 194 could be excavated during construction at Locations A and C. these soils would be managed as described in Section 2.4.2.8.

#### **2.4.2.6 Socioeconomics**

The socioeconomic analysis evaluates the effects of construction and operation on population, employment, income, regional growth, housing, and community resources in the region of influence (ROI) around the site. In general, socioeconomic impacts tend to be positive, creating jobs and income, with only minor impacts on housing, public finances, and employment in local public services.

The no action alternative would result in a small socioeconomic impact, creating 110 jobs during cylinder yard reconstruction (over 2 construction years) and 130 jobs during operations (direct and indirect jobs) and generating \$3.2 million in personal income during construction and \$3.8 million in personal income per operational year. No significant impacts on regional growth and housing, local finances, and public service employment in the ROI are expected.

Under the action alternatives, jobs and direct income would be generated during both construction and operation. Construction of the conversion facility would create 290 jobs and generate almost \$10 million in personal income in the peak construction year (construction occurs over a 2-year period). Operation of the conversion facility would create 330 jobs and generate \$13 million in personal income each year. Only minor impacts on regional growth and housing, local finances, and public service employment in the ROI are expected. The socioeconomic impacts would not depend on the location of the conversion facility; therefore, the impacts would be the same for alternative Locations A, B, and C.

#### **2.4.2.7 Ecology**

Under the no action alternative, continued cylinder maintenance and surveillance activities would have negligible impacts on ecological resources (i.e., vegetation, wildlife, wetlands, and threatened and endangered species). Only a small amount of yard reconstruction, in a previously disturbed area, would occur at the Paducah site. It is estimated that potential concentrations of contaminants in the environment from future cylinder breaches would be

below levels harmful to biota. However, there is a potential for impacts to aquatic biota from cylinder yard runoff during painting activities.

Under the action alternatives, the total area disturbed during conversion facility construction would be 45 acres (18 ha). Vegetative communities would be impacted in this area from a loss of habitat. However, for all three alternative locations, impacts could be minimized depending on exactly where the facility was placed within each location. These habitat losses would constitute less than 1% of available land at the site. It was found that concentrations of contaminants in the environment during operations would be below harmful levels. Impacts to vegetation and wildlife would be negligible at all three locations.

Wetlands at or near Locations A, B, and C could be adversely affected at the Paducah site. Impacts to wetlands could be minimized depending on where exactly the facility was placed within each location. Mitigation for unavoidable impacts may be developed in coordination with the appropriate regulatory agencies. Unavoidable impacts to wetlands that are within the jurisdiction of the USACE might require a Clean Water Act (CWA) Section 404 Permit, which would trigger the requirement for a CWA Section 401 water quality certification from the Commonwealth of Kentucky. A mitigation plan might be required prior to the initiation of construction.

Construction of the conversion facility in the eastern portion of Location C could impact potential habitat for cream wild indigo (state-listed as a species of special concern) and compass plant (state-listed as threatened). For construction at all three locations, impacts on deciduous forest might occur. Impacts to forested areas could be avoided if temporary construction areas were placed in previously disturbed locations. Trees with exfoliating bark, such as shagbark hickory, or dead trees with loose bark can be used by the Indiana bat (federal- and state-listed as endangered) as roosting trees during the summer. If either live or dead trees with exfoliating or loose bark are encountered on construction areas, they should be saved if possible. If necessary, the trees should be cut before March 31 or after October 15.

#### **2.4.2.8 Waste Management**

Under the no action alternative, LLW, LLMW, and PCB-containing waste could be generated from cylinder scraping and painting activities. The amount of LLMW generated could represent an increase of less than 1% in the site's LLMW load, representing a negligible impact on site waste management operations.

Under the action alternatives, waste management impacts would not be dependent on the location of the conversion facility within the site and would be the same for alternative Locations A, B, and C. Waste generated during construction and operations would have negligible impacts on the Paducah site waste management operations, with the exception of possible impacts from disposal of CaF<sub>2</sub>. Industrial experience indicates that HF, if produced, would contain only trace amounts of depleted uranium (less than 1 ppm). It is expected that HF would be sold for use. If sold for use, the sale would be subject to review and approval by DOE in coordination with the NRC, depending on the specific use (as discussed in Appendix E).

The U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> produced during conversion would generate about 7,850 yd<sup>3</sup> (6,000 m<sup>3</sup>) per year of LLW. This is 83% of Paducah's annual projected LLW volume and could have potentially large impacts on site LLW management. However, plans for off-site disposal of this LLW are included in the proposed action.

If the HF was not sold but instead neutralized to CaF<sub>2</sub>, it is currently unknown whether (1) the CaF<sub>2</sub> could be sold, (2) the low uranium content would allow the CaF<sub>2</sub> to be disposed of as nonhazardous solid waste, or (3) disposal as LLW would be required. The low level of uranium contamination expected (i.e., less than 1 ppm) suggests that sale or disposal as nonhazardous solid waste would be most likely. If sold for use, the sale would be subject to review and approval by DOE in coordination with the NRC, depending on the specific use. Waste management for disposal as nonhazardous waste could be handled through appropriate planning and design of the facilities. If the CaF<sub>2</sub> had to be disposed of as LLW, it could represent a potentially large impact on waste management operations.

A small quantity of TRU could be entrained in the gaseous DUF<sub>6</sub> during the cylinder emptying operations. These contaminants would be captured in the filters between the cylinders and the conversion equipment. The filters would be monitored and replaced routinely to maintain concentrations below regulatory limits for TRU waste. The spent filters would be disposed of as LLW, generating up to 25 drums of LLW over the life of the project.

Current UDS plans are to leave the heels in the emptied cylinders, add a stabilizer, and use the cylinders as disposal containers for the U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> product to the extent practicable. An alternative is to process the emptied cylinders and dispose of them directly as LLW. Either one of these approaches is expected to meet the waste acceptance criteria of the disposal facilities and minimize the potential for generating TRU waste through washing of the cylinders to remove the heels. Although cylinder washing is not considered a foreseeable option at this time, for completeness, an analysis of the maximum potential quantities of TRU waste that could be generated from cylinder washing is included in Appendix B, as is a discussion of PCBs contained in some cylinder coatings.

In addition, potentially contaminated soil associated with SWMU 194 could be excavated during construction at Locations A and B. The excavated soil would be managed consistent with RCRA regulations and coordinated between the Commonwealth of Kentucky (Division of Waste Management) and DOE.

#### **2.4.2.9 Resource Requirements**

Resource requirements include construction materials, fuel, electricity, process chemicals, and containers. In general, all alternatives would have a negligible effect on the local or national availability of these resources.

#### **2.4.2.10 Land Use**

Under the no action alternative, all activities would occur in areas previously used for conducting similar activities; therefore, no land use impacts are expected. Under the action alternatives, a total of 45 acres (18 ha) could be disturbed, with some areas cleared for railroad or utility access and not adjacent to the site. All three alternative locations are within an already-industrialized facility, and impacts to land use would be similar for the three alternative locations. The permanently altered areas would represent less than 1% of available land already developed for industrial purposes. Negligible impacts on land use are thus expected.

#### **2.4.2.11 Cultural Resources**

Under the no action alternative, impacts on cultural resources at the current storage locations would be unlikely because all activities would occur in areas already dedicated to cylinder storage. Under the action alternatives, impacts on cultural resources could be possible at all three alternative locations. Archaeological and architectural surveys have not been completed for the candidate locations and would have to be undertaken prior to initiation of the action alternatives. If archaeological resources were encountered, or historical or traditional cultural properties were identified, a mitigation plan would be required.

#### **2.4.2.12 Environmental Justice**

No disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental impacts are expected to minority or low-income populations during normal facility operations under the action alternatives. Although the consequences of facility accidents could be high if severe accidents occurred, the risk of irreversible adverse effects (including fatalities) among members of the general public from these accidents (taking into account the consequences and probability of the accidents) would be less than 1. Furthermore, transportation accidents with high and adverse impacts are unlikely; their locations cannot be projected, and the types of persons who would be involved cannot be reliably predicted. Thus, there is no reason to expect that minority and low-income populations would be affected disproportionately by high and adverse impacts.

#### **2.4.2.13 Option of Shipping ETTP Cylinders to Paducah**

If cylinders from ETTP were transported to Paducah, the cylinders would have to be prepared to be shipped by either truck or rail. Approximately 4,800 DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders for conversion and about 1,100 non-DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders would require preparation for shipment at ETTP. As discussed in Chapter 5 in this EIS, three cylinder preparation options are considered for the shipment of noncompliant cylinders.

In general, the use of cylinder overpacks would result in small potential impacts. Overpacking operations would be similar to current cylinder handling operations, and impacts would be limited to involved workers. No LCFs among involved workers from radiation

exposure are expected. Impacts would be similar if noncompliant cylinders were shipped “as-is” or following repairs under a DOT exemption, assuming appropriate compensatory measures.

The use of a cylinder transfer facility would likely require the construction of a new facility at ETTP; there are no current plans to build such a facility. Operational impacts would generally be small and limited primarily to external radiation exposure of involved workers, with no LCFs expected. Transfer facility operations would generate a large number of emptied cylinders requiring disposition. If a decision were made to construct and operate a transfer facility at ETTP, additional NEPA review would be conducted.

Impacts from extended operations of the conversion plant from 25 to 28 years would not be expected to significantly increase overall impacts.

#### **2.4.2.14 Impacts Associated with Conversion Product Sale and Use**

The conversion of the DUF<sub>6</sub> inventory produces products having some potential for reuse. These products would include HF and CaF<sub>2</sub>, which are commonly used as commercial materials (no large-scale market exists for depleted U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub>). An investigation of the potential reuse of HF and CaF<sub>2</sub> is included as part of this EIS (Chapter 5 and Appendix E). Areas examined include the characteristics of these materials as produced within the conversion process, the current markets for these products, and the potential socioeconomic impacts should these products be provided to the commercial sector. Because there would be some residual radioactivity associated with these materials, the DOE process for authorizing release of materials for unrestricted use (referred to as “free release”) and an estimate of the potential human health effects of such free release are also considered in this investigation. The results of the analysis of HF and CaF<sub>2</sub> use are included in Table 2.4-1.

If the products were released for restricted use (e.g., in the nuclear industry for the manufacture of nuclear fuel), the impacts would be less than those for unrestricted release.

Conservative estimates of the amount of uranium and technetium that might transfer into the HF and CaF<sub>2</sub> were used to evaluate the maximum expected dose to workers using the material if it was released for commercial use. On the basis of very conservative assumptions concerning use, the maximum dose to workers was estimated to be less than 1 mrem/yr, much less than the regulatory limit of 100 mrem/yr specified for members of the general public. Doses to the general public would be even lower.

Socioeconomic impact analyses were conducted to evaluate the impacts of the introduction of the conversion-produced HF or CaF<sub>2</sub> into the commercial marketplace. A potential market for the aqueous HF has been identified as the current aqueous HF acid producers. The impact of HF sales on the local economy in which the existing producers are located and on the U.S. economy as a whole is likely to be minimal. No market for the CaF<sub>2</sub> that might be produced in the conversion facility has been identified. Should such a market be found, the impact of CaF<sub>2</sub> sales on the U.S. economy is also predicted to be minimal.

#### 2.4.2.15 Impacts from D&D Activities

D&D would involve the disassembly and removal of all radioactive and hazardous components, equipment, and structures. For the purposes of analysis in this EIS, it was also assumed that the various buildings would be dismantled and “greenfield” (unrestricted use) conditions would be achieved. The “clean” waste would be sent to a landfill that accepts construction debris. LLW would be sent to a licensed or DOE disposal facility, where it would likely be buried in accordance with the waste acceptance criteria and other requirements in effect at that time. Hazardous and mixed waste would be disposed of in a licensed facility in accordance with applicable regulatory requirements. D&D impacts to involved workers would be primarily from external radiation; expected exposures would be a small fraction of operational doses; no LCFs would be expected. It is estimated that no fatalities and up to 5 injuries would result from occupational accidents. Impacts from waste management would include a total generation of about 275 yd<sup>3</sup> (210 m<sup>3</sup>) of LLW, 157 yd<sup>3</sup> (120 m<sup>3</sup>) of LLMW, and 157 yd<sup>3</sup> (120 m<sup>3</sup>) of hazardous waste; these volumes would result in low impacts compared with projected site annual generation volumes.

#### 2.4.2.16 Cumulative Impacts

The CEQ guidelines for implementing NEPA define cumulative effects as the impacts on the environment resulting from the incremental impact of an action under consideration when added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions (40 CFR 1508.7) Activities considered for cumulative analysis include those in the vicinity of the site.

Actions planned at the Paducah site include the continuation of uranium enrichment operations (by USEC), waste management activities, waste disposal activities, environmental restoration activities, and DUF<sub>6</sub> management activities considered in this EIS. Although Portsmouth was identified by USEC in January 2004 as the site of the American Centrifuge Facility, construction and operation of such a facility at Paducah has been included in the cumulative impacts analysis.

Actions occurring near the Paducah site that, because of their diffuse nature, could contribute to existing or future impacts on the site include continued operation of the Tennessee Valley Authority’s (TVA’s) Shawnee power plant; the Joppa, Illinois, power plant; and the Honeywell International uranium conversion plant in Metropolis, Illinois. Cumulative impacts of these actions at Paducah would be as follows for the no action alternative and the proposed action alternatives:

- The cumulative collective radiological exposure to the off-site population would be well below the maximum DOE dose limit of 100 mrem per year to the off-site maximally exposed individual (MEI) and below the limit of 25 mrem/yr specified in 40 CFR 190 for uranium fuel cycle facilities. Annual individual doses to involved workers would be monitored to maintain exposure below the regulatory limit of 5 rem per year.

- Under the no action alternative cumulative impacts assessment, although less than one shipment per year of radioactive wastes is expected from cylinder management activities, up to 14,400 truck shipments could be associated with existing and planned actions (no rail shipments are expected). Under the action alternatives, up to 6,000 rail shipments and 36,200 truck shipments of radioactive material could occur. The cumulative maximum dose to the MEI along the transportation route near the site entrance would be less than 1 mrem per year under all alternatives and for all transportation modes.
- The Paducah site is located in an attainment region. However, the background annual average PM<sub>2.5</sub> concentration is near the regulatory standard. Cumulative impacts would not affect attainment status.
- Data from the 2000 annual groundwater monitoring showed that four pollutants exceeded primary drinking water regulation levels in groundwater at the Paducah site. Good engineering and construction practices should ensure that indirect cumulative impacts on groundwater associated with the conversion facility would be minimal.
- Cumulative ecological impacts on habitats and biotic communities, including wetlands, would be negligible to minor for all alternatives. Construction of a conversion facility might remove a type of tree preferred by the Indiana bat; however, this federal- and state-listed endangered species is not known to utilize these areas.
- No cumulative land use impacts are anticipated for any of the alternatives.
- It is unlikely that any noteworthy cumulative impacts on cultural resources would occur under any alternative, and any such impacts would be adequately mitigated before activities for the chosen action would start.
- Given the absence of high and adverse cumulative impacts for any impact area considered in this EIS, no environmental justice cumulative impacts are anticipated for the Paducah site, despite the presence of disproportionately high percentages of low-income populations in the vicinity.
- Socioeconomic impacts under all alternatives considered are anticipated to be generally positive, often temporary, and relatively small.

#### **2.4.2.17 Potential Impacts Associated with the Option of Expanding Conversion Facility Operations**

As discussed in Section 2.2.5, several reasonably foreseeable activities could result in a future decision to increase the conversion facility throughput or extend the operational period at one or both of the conversion facility sites. Although there are no current plans to do so, to

account for these future possibilities and provide future planning flexibility, Section 5.2.6 includes an evaluation of the environmental impacts associated with expanding conversion facility operations at Paducah, either by increasing throughput (by process improvements) or by extending operations.

As described in Section 5.2.6, a throughput increase through process improvements would not be expected to significantly change the overall environmental impacts when compared with those of the current plant design. Efficiency improvements are generally on the order of 10%, which is within the uncertainty that is inherent in the impact estimate calculations. Slight variations in plant throughput are not unusual from year to year because of operational factors (e.g., equipment maintenance or replacement) and are generally accounted for by the conservative nature of the impact calculations.

The conversion facility operations could also be expanded by operating the facility longer than the currently anticipated 25 years. There are no current plans to operate the conversion facility beyond this period. However, with routine facility and equipment maintenance and periodic equipment replacements or upgrades, it is believed that the conversion facility could be operated safely beyond this time period to process any additional DUF<sub>6</sub> for which DOE might assume responsibility. As discussed in Section 5.2.6, if operations were extended beyond 25 years and if the operational characteristics (e.g., estimated releases of contaminants to air and water) of the facility remained unchanged, it is expected that the annual impacts would be essentially the same as those presented above and summarized in Table 2.4-1. The overall cumulative impacts from the operation of the facility would increase proportionately with the increased life of the facility.

## **2.5 PREFERRED ALTERNATIVE**

DOE's preferred alternative is to construct and operate the proposed DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion facility at alternative Location A, which is located south of the administration building and its parking lot and east of the main Paducah GDP site access road.

### 3 AFFECTED ENVIRONMENT

This EIS considers the proposed action of building and operating a conversion facility at the Paducah site for conversion of the Paducah DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinder inventory. Section 3.1 presents a detailed description of the affected environment for the Paducah site. The option of shipping cylinders from the ETTP site in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, to the Paducah site for conversion is also considered in this EIS. Therefore, information on the affected environment for the ETTP site is provided in Section 3.2.

#### 3.1 PADUCAH SITE

The Paducah site is located in rural McCracken County, Kentucky, approximately 10 mi (16 km) west of the City of Paducah and 3.6 mi (6 km) south of the Ohio River (Figure 3.1-1). The Paducah site consists of 3,556 acres (1,439 ha) currently held by DOE (DOE 2001b). The site is surrounded by the West Kentucky Wildlife Management Area, an additional 2,781 acres (1,125 ha) conveyed by DOE to the Commonwealth of Kentucky for use in wildlife conservation and for recreational purposes. The City of Paducah is the largest urban area in the six counties surrounding the site. The six-county area is primarily rural, with industrial uses accounting for less than 5% of land use.

The Paducah GDP occupies a 750-acre (303-ha) complex within the Paducah site and is surrounded by a security fence (Figure 3.1-1). The Paducah GDP, previously operated by DOE and now operated by USEC, includes about 115 buildings with a combined floor space of approximately 8.2 million ft<sup>2</sup> (0.76 million m<sup>2</sup>). The Paducah GDP has operated since 1955.

In 1994, the Paducah site was placed on the EPA National Priorities List (NPL), a list of sites across the nation that the EPA has designated as high priority for site remediation. The NPL designation was assigned primarily because of groundwater contamination with trichloroethylene (TCE) and Tc-99, first detected in 1988. Being placed on the NPL meant that the cleanup requirements of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) would be met in conducting remediation efforts at the Paducah site. Hazardous waste and mixed waste management at the Paducah site must comply with RCRA regulations, which are administered by the Commonwealth of Kentucky (Division of Waste Management). The RCRA regulations also address implementation of corrective actions for SWMUs. Thus, both CERCLA and RCRA have requirements for remedial actions for contaminated environmental media. A Federal Facilities Agreement (FFA) has been developed to coordinate CERCLA/RCRA requirements into a single remediation procedure for the Paducah site.

The northern part of Location A and the southern part of Location B for the proposed conversion facility are located in an area that has been designated as SWMU 194 under the ongoing CERCLA/RCRA investigation. SWMU 194 previously was the site of several support facilities (e.g., administration building, hospital, boiler house, two leach fields) during the construction of the gaseous diffusion plant. These facilities are no longer present. In 2000, preferred Location A was characterized by using surface and subsurface soils samples, surface

water and sediment samples, and groundwater data (Tetra Tech, Inc. 2000). Although several metals and radionuclides were detected above background levels in these environmental media, the study concluded that the site was suitable for constructing industrial facilities.

### 3.1.1 Cylinder Yards

The Paducah site has a total of 36,191 DOE-managed DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders (Table 3.1-1). The cylinders are located in about 15 storage yards (Figure 3.1-2). Most of the cylinders are in yards managed by DOE, but a small number of cylinders are still stored in USEC-managed yards. Over several years, most of the storage yards that previously had gravel bases have been reconstructed with concrete bases for control of infiltration and runoff. Currently, only three DOE-managed yards have not been reconstructed: C-745-F (which is located on a former building foundation) and C-745-N and C-745-P (which both have gravel bases). The C-745-F yard has an area of about 247,000 ft<sup>2</sup> (23,000 m<sup>2</sup>); the C-745-N and C-745-P yards have a combined area of about 164,000 ft<sup>2</sup> (15,000 m<sup>2</sup>).

**TABLE 3.1-1 DOE-Managed DUF<sub>6</sub> Cylinders at the Paducah Site**

Cylinder Type	No. of Cylinders
Full	35,908
Partially full	136
Heel	147
Total	36,191

Source: Hightower (2004).

### 3.1.2 Site Infrastructure

The Paducah site is located in an area with an established transportation network. The area is served by two interstate highways, several U.S. and state highways, several rail lines, and a regional airport.

All water used by the site is obtained from the Ohio River through an intake at the steam plant near the Shawnee Power Plant north of the site. Before use, the water is treated on site. Water usage is approximately 15 million gal/d (57 million L/d). The maximum site capacity is 30 million gal/d (115 million L/d) (DOE 1996).

Electric Energy, Inc., supplies electric power to the Paducah site. The electrical need is about 1,600 MW, with a maximum capacity of 3,040 MW. The coal system uses 82 tons (74 t) per day, with a maximum capacity of 180 to 200 tons (160 to 180 t) (DOE 1996).

### 3.1.3 Climate, Air Quality, and Noise

#### 3.1.3.1 Climate

The Paducah site is located in the humid continental zone, characterized by warm summers and moderately cold winters (DOE 2001b). For the period 1961 through 1990, the annual average temperature was 14.0°C (57.2°F), with the highest monthly average temperature of 26.0°C (78.8°F) in July and the lowest of 0.3°C (32.6°F) in January (Wood 1996). Annual precipitation averages about 125 cm (49.3 in.), mostly occurring as rain. Precipitation is relatively evenly distributed throughout the seasons, but the highest occurs in spring. For the period 1985 through 1993, average annual relative humidity was about 73%, ranging from 82% to 86% at midnight and 6 a.m. and from 58% to 64% at noon and 6 p.m.


Wind data collected at Barkley Regional Airport about 8 km (5 mi) to the southeast of the Paducah site were evaluated. For the period 1990 through 1994, the average wind speed at the 10-m (33-ft) level was about 3.8 m/s (8.6 mph), as shown in Figure 3.1-3 (National Climatic Data Center undated). The dominant wind direction was from the south, with a secondary peak from the south-southwest. Directional wind speeds ranged from 3.1 m/s (6.9 mph) from the east to 4.7 m/s (10.5 mph) from the north-northwest, and the wind speed from the dominant wind direction was also high, at about 4.6 m/s (10.3 mph).

Tornadoes are rare in the area surrounding the Paducah site, and the ones that do occur are less frequent and destructive than those occurring in the Midwest. For the period 1950 through 1995, 402 tornadoes were reported in Kentucky, with an average of 9 tornadoes per year (Storm Prediction Center 2002). For the same period, 6 tornadoes were reported in McCracken County, but most of those tornadoes were relatively weak — at most, F2 of the Fujita tornado scale.

#### 3.1.3.2 Existing Air Emissions

Major air pollution sources around the Paducah site in Kentucky include USEC and the TVA's coal-fired Shawnee Power Plant, about 5 km (3 mi) northeast of the Paducah site (EPA 2003a). In Illinois, the Joppa Power Plant and Lafarge Corporation, located about 11 km (7 mi) north-northwest of the Paducah site, are major sources across the Ohio River. Table 3.1-2 lists the annual emissions from the four plants and total criteria pollutant and volatile organic compound (VOC) emissions for the respective counties. As a result of the transfer of the production part of the Paducah GDP to USEC, major air emission sources were transferred to USEC. Accordingly, air emissions from the DOE facilities at Paducah are negligible, and DOE does not currently hold any air quality permits (Knaus 2002). USEC is qualified as a major source and in 1998 applied for a Title V permit to the Kentucky Division of Air Quality. However, its emissions account for less than 1% of areawide emission totals.

Site : Barkley Regional Airport, KY (10-m level)  
 Period : 1990-1994



**FIGURE 3.1-3 Wind Rose for the Barkley Regional Airport (10-m level), 1990-1994 (Source: National Climatic Data Center undated)**

The Commonwealth of Kentucky and the EPA regulate airborne emissions of radionuclides from DOE facilities under 40 CFR Part 61, Subpart H, the National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAPs) regulations (DOE 2001b). Potential radionuclide sources from the Paducah site in 2000 were the Drum Mountain Removal Project, Northwest Plume Groundwater System, and fugitive emission sources.

**TABLE 3.1-2 Annual Criteria Pollutant and Volatile Organic Compound Emissions from Selected Major Point Sources around the Paducah Site in 1999**

Major Emission Source	Emission Rate (tons/yr)					
	SO <sub>2</sub>	NO <sub>x</sub>	CO	VOCs	PM <sub>10</sub>	PM <sub>2.5</sub>
TVA Shawnee Plant	35,874	23,956	3,699	112	75	46
USEC	427	320	8	1	9	5
McCracken County, Ky., total	36,317	24,283	3,713	352	126	74
Electric Energy, Inc., Joppa	23,744	8,447	1,250	152	927	680
Lafarge Corporation	11,466	1,516	0	0	204	113
Massac County, Ill., total	35,597	10,174	1,316	484	1,383	922

Source: EPA (2003a).

### 3.1.3.3 Air Quality

The Kentucky State Ambient Air Quality Standards (SAAQS) for six criteria pollutants — SO<sub>2</sub>, nitrogen dioxide (NO<sub>2</sub>), CO, ozone (O<sub>3</sub>), PM (PM<sub>10</sub> and PM<sub>2.5</sub>), and lead (Pb) — are the same as the National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS)<sup>1</sup> (Kentucky Division for Air Quality 2002), as shown in Table 3.1-3. In addition, the state has adopted standards for hydrogen sulfide (H<sub>2</sub>S), gaseous fluorides (expressed as HF), total fluorides, and odors, as presented in Table 3.1-4.

The Paducah site is located in the Paducah-Cairo Interstate Air Quality Control Region (AQCR), which covers the westernmost parts of Kentucky. McCracken County currently is designated as being in attainment for all criteria pollutants (40 CFR 81.318). Current ambient monitoring data for criteria pollutants, H<sub>2</sub>S, and HF immediately around the site are not available (Knaus 2002). However, on the basis of 1997 through 2002 monitoring data, the highest concentration levels for SO<sub>2</sub>, NO<sub>2</sub>, CO, PM<sub>10</sub>, 24-hour PM<sub>2.5</sub>, and Pb around the Paducah site are less than or equal to 53% of their respective NAAQS, as given in Table 3.1-3 (EPA 2003a). The highest O<sub>3</sub> and annual PM<sub>2.5</sub> concentrations, however, are near to or somewhat higher than the applicable NAAQS. The high ozone concentrations of regional concern are associated with high precursor emissions from the Ohio Valley region and long-range transport from southern states.

Ambient air monitoring stations in and around the site mainly collect data on radionuclides released from the site. These data were used to assess whether air emissions from the Paducah GDP would affect air quality in the surrounding area. Monitoring results showed that all airborne radionuclide concentrations in the surrounding area were at or below background levels (DOE 2001b).

<sup>1</sup> The EPA promulgated new O<sub>3</sub> 8-hour and PM<sub>2.5</sub> standards in July 1997.

**TABLE 3.1-4 Additional Commonwealth of Kentucky Ambient Air Quality Standards<sup>a</sup>**

Pollutant	Averaging Time	Primary Standard	Secondary Standard	Highest Background Concentration (µg/m <sup>3</sup> )
Hydrogen sulfide	1 hour	– <sup>b</sup>	14 µg/m <sup>3</sup> (0.01 ppm) <sup>c</sup>	-
Gaseous fluorides (expressed as HF)	12 hours	–	3.68 µg/m <sup>3</sup> (4.50 ppb) <sup>c</sup>	-
	24 hours	800 µg/m <sup>3</sup> (1.0 ppm) <sup>c</sup>	2.86 µg/m <sup>3</sup> (3.50 ppb) <sup>c</sup>	-
	1 week	–	1.64 µg/m <sup>3</sup> (2.00 ppb) <sup>c</sup>	0.50
	1 month	–	0.82 µg/m <sup>3</sup> (1.00 ppb) <sup>c</sup>	-
	Annual	400 µg/m <sup>3</sup> (0.5 ppm)	–	0.17
Total fluorides <sup>d</sup>	1 month	–	80 ppm (w/w) <sup>e</sup>	-
	2 months	–	60 ppm (w/w)	-
	Growing season <sup>f</sup>	–	40 ppm (w/w)	-
Odors			At any time when 1 volume unit of ambient air is mixed with 7 volume units of odorless air, the mixture must have no detectable odor	

<sup>a</sup> These standards are in addition to the Kentucky SAAQS for criteria pollutants listed in Table 3.1-3.

<sup>b</sup> A dash indicates that no standard exists.

<sup>c</sup> This average is not to be exceeded more than once per year.

<sup>d</sup> Dry weight basis (as fluoride ion) in and on forage for consumption by grazing ruminants. The listed concentrations are not to be exceeded.

<sup>e</sup> w/w = weight of fluoride ion per weight of forage unit.

<sup>f</sup> Average concentration of monthly samples over the growing season (not to exceed six consecutive months).

Source: Appendix A of 401 *Kentucky Administrative Regulations* (KAR) 53:010 and ANL (1991a).

Prevention of significant deterioration (PSD) regulations (40 CFR 52.21) limit the maximum allowable incremental increases in ambient concentrations of SO<sub>2</sub>, NO<sub>2</sub>, and PM<sub>10</sub> above established baseline levels, as shown in Table 3.1-3. The PSD regulations, which are designed to protect ambient air quality in Class I and Class II attainment areas, apply to major new sources and major modifications to existing sources. The nearest Class I PSD areas are Mingo National Wildlife Refuge in Missouri, about 113 km (70 mi) west of the Paducah site, and Mammoth Cave National Park, about 225 km (140 mi) east of the Paducah site. These Class I areas are not located downwind of prevailing winds at the Paducah GDP (Figure 3.1-3).

### 3.1.3.4 Existing Noise Environment

The Noise Control Act of 1972, along with its subsequent amendments (Quiet Communities Act of 1978; 42 USC 4901–4918), delegates authority to the states to regulate environmental noise and directs government agencies to comply with local community noise statutes and regulations. The Commonwealth of Kentucky and McCracken County, where the Paducah site is located, have no quantitative noise-limit regulations.

The EPA has recommended a maximum noise level of 55 dB(A) as the DNL to protect against outdoor activity interference and annoyance (EPA 1974). This is not a regulatory goal, but it is “intentionally conservative to protect the most sensitive portion of the American population” with “an additional margin of safety.” For protection against hearing loss in the general population from nonimpulsive noise, the EPA guideline recommends an  $L_{eq}(24\text{ h})$  of 70 dB(A) or less.<sup>2</sup>

The noise-producing activities within the Paducah site are associated with processing and construction activities and local traffic, similar to those at any other industrial site. During site operations, noise levels near the cooling towers are relatively high, but most noise sources are enclosed in the buildings. Another noise source is associated with rail traffic in and out of the Paducah site. In particular, train whistle noise, at a typical noise level of 95 to 115 dB(A), is high at public grade crossings. Currently, rail traffic noise is not a factor in the local noise environment because of infrequent traffic (one train per week).

The Paducah site is in a rural setting, and no residences or other sensitive receptor locations (e.g., schools, hospitals) are located in the immediate vicinity of any noisy on-site operations. (The nearest sensitive receptor is located about 1 mi (2 km) from the proposed conversion facility.) Ambient noise levels around the site are relatively low. Measurements taken at the nearest residence ranged from 44 to 47 dB(A) when the site was in full operation (Pennington 2001; Argonne National Laboratory [ANL] 1991a). At nearby residences, noise emissions from the plant were reported as undetectable from background noise.

## 3.1.4 Geology and Soil

### 3.1.4.1 Topography, Structure, and Seismic Risk

The topography of the Paducah site is relatively flat. Western Kentucky has gently rolling terrain between 330 and 500 ft (101 and 152 m) above mean sea level (DOE 1999h). Within the boundaries of the Paducah GDP security fence, the maximum variation in elevation is about 10 ft (3 m) (ERC/EDGe 1989). The site is underlain by bedrock composed of limestone and shale. Several zones of faulting, including the New Madrid Seismic Zone, occur in the vicinity of the site (ANL 1991a).

---

<sup>2</sup>  $L_{eq}$  is the equivalent steady sound level that, if continuous during a specific time period, would contain the same total energy as the actual time-varying sound. For example,  $L_{eq}(24\text{ h})$  is the 24-hour equivalent sound level.

The Paducah site is located near the northern end of the Mississippian Embayment, which is characterized by unconsolidated Cretaceous, Tertiary, and Quaternary sediments overlying indurated Paleozoic bedrock that dip gently to the south. The Mississippian Embayment was a large sedimentary trough oriented nearly north to south that existed during Cretaceous and Tertiary time and received sediments from the central portion of the North American continent (Early et al. 1989).

The sedimentary sequence found in the vicinity of the Paducah site consists mainly of fine- to medium-grained clastic materials (sedimentary rocks formed from particles that were mechanically transported), including (from youngest to oldest) a basal gravel (Tuscaloosa Formation), the McNairy Formation (clay interlaminated with silt and fine-grained sand), the Porters Creek Clay (clay facies and variable thicknesses of sand and silt), and undifferentiated Eocene sands (fine sand with variable amounts of interbedded and interlensing silt and clay). The Eocene sands are thought to be thin and discontinuous beneath the northern portion of the Paducah site. At depth, the site is underlain by dense bedrock of Mississippian limestone and shale.

In the vicinity of the site, a unit designated as Continental Deposits lies immediately beneath variable thicknesses of Pleistocene Loess, which is typically an unstratified, silty clay-clayey silt (EDGE 1987). The loess originated as windblown material generated by glacial activity to the north. The Continental Deposits lie directly on an ancient unconformity (erosional surface) that truncates several formations. The angular nature of the unconformity — coupled with the fact that the Eocene sands, Porters Creek Clay and McNairy Formation lie unconformably on each other — creates a complex stratigraphy. The Continental Deposits resemble a large low-gradient alluvial fan deposited at the confluence of the ancestral Ohio and Tennessee Rivers.

Erosion and reworking of alluvial fan deposits modified the thickness and distribution of the Continental Deposits (DOE 1999h). The Continental Deposits can be subdivided into two components or facies: a lower gravel or sandy gravel unit that varies in thickness from 0 to 106 ft (0 to 32 m) and an upper clay-sand unit that has a comparable thickness (Early et al. 1989). Deposition of the gravel probably occurred in a high-energy braided stream environment closely associated with alluvial fans. Of particular interest is the presence of a prominent channel that passes in a northerly direction through the site and a second, less-prominent channel that occurs near the eastern side of the site boundary. The upper clay-sand unit represents sediments deposited in a fluvial and lacustrine (lake) environment (DOE 1999h).

Several zones of faulting occur in the vicinity of the site. These zones include the St. Genevieve, Rough Creek, Cottage Grove, Wabash Valley, and Shawneetown fault zones. In addition, there is a northeast-trending rift zone (ERC/EDGE 1989). A rift zone is a fault through a divergence zone (i.e., an area in which tectonic plates are moving away from each other) or other area of tension. These features are overlain by younger Cretaceous, Tertiary, and Quaternary sediments. The rift zone is inferred from seismic reflection profiling.

The New Madrid Seismic Zone lies within the central Mississippi Valley and extends from northeast Arkansas, through southeast Missouri, western Tennessee, and western Kentucky

to southern Illinois (Saint Louis University Earthquake Center 2002). The area near the site has been the location of some of the largest earthquakes that have occurred in North America. The largest recorded earthquakes that occurred in the vicinity of the site happened between 1811 and 1812. Four of the earthquakes had Modified Mercalli intensities that ranged from IX to XI (Nuttli 1973). (The Modified Mercalli intensity scale relates an earthquake's intensity to a series of key responses of surface structures and people, such as people awakening, movement of furniture, damage to chimneys, and, finally, total destruction.) In an earthquake with a Modified Mercalli intensity of XI, few, if any, masonry structures remain standing, bridges are destroyed, and rails are greatly bent.

The series of 1811 to 1812 earthquakes completely destroyed the town of New Madrid. The epicenter of the largest 1812 earthquakes was about 60 mi (96 km) southwest of what is now the Paducah site (LMES 1997b). Hundreds of aftershocks occurred over a period of several years. The largest earthquakes that have occurred since then were on January 4, 1843, and October 31, 1895, with body wave magnitude estimates of 6.0 and 6.2, respectively. In addition to these events, seven events of magnitude greater than 5.0 have occurred in the area. Since 1895, more than 4,000 earthquakes have been located in the zone. Most of them were too small to be felt. On average, one earthquake per year is large enough to be felt in the area (Saint Louis University Earthquake Center 2002). On June 18, 2002, a moderate earthquake with a preliminary estimated magnitude of 5.0 occurred in southern Indiana with an epicenter near Evansville (CNN 2002). This earthquake occurred on the northern arm of the New Madrid Seismic Zone. There were no immediate reports of damage.

The seismic hazards at the Paducah site have been extensively studied. The safety analysis report (SAR) completed for this site in March 1997 provided comprehensive analyses and discussions of seismic hazards at the site (see Sections 1.5 and 3.3 of the SAR; LMES 1997b). The analyses considered the possibility of large-magnitude earthquakes similar to the New Madrid earthquakes of 1811 to 1812. The analyses performed by DOE were independently reviewed by the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS). The independent review indicated that the seismic sources, recurrence rates, maximum magnitudes, and attenuation functions used in the SAR analyses were representative of a wide range of professional opinion and were suitable for obtaining probabilistically based seismic hazard estimates. Because of the proximity of the site to the New Madrid Seismic Zone, special deterministic analyses were also performed to estimate the ground motions at the site in the case of recurrence of an earthquake of the same magnitude as the 1811 to 1812 New Madrid earthquakes. The results of the deterministic analyses were similar to the probabilistic seismic hazard results for the probabilities associated with the recurrence of the New Madrid earthquakes of 1811 to 1812.

For the Paducah site, the evaluation basis earthquake (EBE) was designated by DOE to have a return period of 250 years. A detailed analysis indicated that the peak ground motion for the EBE was 0.15 times the acceleration of gravity (LMES 1997b). An earthquake of this size would have an equal probability of occurring any time during a 250-year period.

### 3.1.4.2 Soils

Soils of the Calloway-Henry Association cover most of the Paducah site; soils of the Grenada-Calloway Association cover the remainder. Soils of the Calloway-Henry Association, which are nearly level and somewhat poorly drained soils of medium texture, occur on uplands. Soils of the Grenada-Calloway Association, which are nearly level to sloping and moderately well-drained, medium-textured soils, also occur on uplands. Calloway, Henry, and Granada soils have a slight potential for erosion, a low shrink-swell potential, and permeabilities ranging from 0.51 to 5.1 cm/h (0.20 to 2.0 in./h) (Humphrey 1976).

Undisturbed soils typically contain a low-permeability layer (fragipan) that occurs at a depth from 1 to 4 ft (0.30 to 1.22 m). Site development has destroyed much of this layer. In areas in which the fragipan is present, perched water may occur (ANL 1991a). Substances in soil possibly associated with past and present cylinder management activities would be uranium and fluoride compounds, which could be released in cases of breached cylinders or faulty valves. For the evaluation of ongoing activities at the Paducah site, soil sampling has been conducted to identify the accumulation of any airborne pollutants deposited on the ground. Annual soil samples have been collected from 10 off-site locations — 4 at the site boundary, 4 at distances of 5 mi (8 km) beyond the boundary, and 2 at more remote locations — to characterize background levels (LMES 1996a; Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc. [MMES] 1994a). In 1994, uranium concentrations for the 10 sampling locations ranged from 2.0 to 5.8 µg/g; plant boundary concentrations ranged from 2.3 to 4.9 µg/g (LMES 1996a).

Since the transfer of responsibility for air point sources from DOE to USEC, concentrations of nonradiological parameters in soil at these sampling locations are no longer monitored; however, analytical results for PCBs and metals are available. In 1993, no detectable concentrations of PCBs were found in any of the samples; however, elevated concentrations of bismuth, lead, manganese, thallium, and thorium were detected in several samples (MMES 1994a). Fluoride was not analyzed in soil samples, but it occurs naturally in soils and is of low toxicity.

As part of ongoing CERCLA/RCRA investigations of Paducah site operable units, soils in several areas have been identified as contaminated with radionuclides and chemicals, such as PCBs and metals. This contamination is not associated with the DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinder yards.

An investigation of Location A soils was conducted in 2000 (Tetra Tech, Inc. 2000). The results of several limited soil investigations for SWMU 194, incorporating parts of both Locations A and B, are also summarized in a subsequent risk assessment (DOE 2001a). These reports indicate a limited number of samples in both locations with elevated concentrations of uranium, polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs), and metals in comparison with human-health based guidelines. No characterization of soils in Location C has been conducted. There is no known past or current source of contamination at Location C.

### 3.1.5 Water Resources

The affected environment for water resources consists of surface water within and in the vicinity of the site boundary and groundwater beneath the site. Analyses of surface water, stream sediment, and groundwater samples have indicated the presence of some contamination resulting from previous site operations.

#### 3.1.5.1 Surface Water

The Paducah site is located in the western part of the Ohio River drainage basin. Surface water from the site drains into tributaries of the Ohio River (Rogers et al. 1988). Bayou Creek (formerly Big Bayou Creek) is located on the western side of the site, and Little Bayou Creek is located on the eastern side (Figure 3.1-1). These two streams join north of the site and discharge to the Ohio River at about River Kilometer 1,524, which is about 34 mi (55 km) upstream from the confluence of the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers. The site is located about 3.5 mi (5.6 km) south of the Ohio River. The historical mean flow for this section of the river is about 200 million gal/min (757 million L/min) (DOE 2001b). All water used by the Paducah site is obtained from the Ohio River through an intake at the steam plant near the Shawnee Power Plant (ANL 1991a), which is located adjacent to the Ohio River north of the facility. Current water use is approximately 15 million gal/d (57 million L/d). Flow in Bayou Creek and Little Bayou Creek fluctuates greatly as a result of precipitation; however, during most of the year, most of the flow in both streams is derived from plant effluents. Bayou Creek has a mean flow of about 67,300 gal/min (254,758 L/min), with a stage (depth) of about 2 ft (0.6 m). The average annual low flow for this stream is about 22,400 gal/min (84,793 L/min) (Pennington 2001). The mean flow rate for Little Bayou Creek is approximately 44,900 gal/min (169,965 L/min), with a depth of about 1 to 2 ft (0.3 to 0.6 m). The average annual low flow for Little Bayou Creek is generally too low to be monitored or sampled. Annual precipitation in the vicinity of the site is about 49.3 in. (125 cm).

A number of wetlands and drainage ditches occur on the three sites identified as potential DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion facility locations. The Paducah site is not located in a 100-year floodplain (elevation of 333 ft [102 m]), nor would it be affected by the historical high-water elevation of 342 ft (104 m).

Most of the liquid effluents from the Paducah site consist of once-through non-contact cooling water, although a variety of the liquid wastes (contaminated with uranium and noncontaminated) are produced by activities such as metal finishing, uranium recovery, and facility cleaning (Rogers et al. 1988). In addition to these discharges, a large variety of conventional liquid wastes, including treated domestic sewage, steam plant wastewater, and coal pile runoff, enter the surface water system.

All effluent discharges are regulated under permits from the KPDES. Currently, there are a total of 15 outfalls — 10 outfalls authorized to USEC (KY0102083) and 5 outfalls authorized to DOE (KY000409). Three of the DOE outfalls are to Bayou Creek and one is to an unnamed tributary of Little Bayou Creek. The average discharge of wastewater to Bayou Creek is approximately 4 million gal/d (15 million L/d). The average discharge to the Ohio River through

Bayou and Little Bayou Creeks is about 4.1 million gal/d (16 million L/d). The average flow in the Ohio River is  $1.7 \times 10^{11}$  gal/d ( $6.5 \times 10^{11}$  L/d).

Results of surface water monitoring in 2000 indicated that the maximum concentration of uranium from 20 surface water sampling locations monitored 3 to 5 times annually was 0.017 mg/L in the downstream portion of Little Bayou Creek (DOE 2001b). The maximum average concentration of fluoride was less than 0.224 mg/L in the north/south diversion ditch within the Paducah GDP grounds (MMES 1994b). Comparable data on fluoride were not reported for 1994, 1995, or 1996 (LMES 1996a, 1997a,c).

The KPDES-permitted outfalls are monitored for inorganic substances and about 45 organic substances, including PCBs. The monitoring frequency for most substances is two to four times per year; several substances are monitored monthly or quarterly to comply with KPDES Permit requirements. The maximum average uranium concentration in effluents from the DOE outfalls from 1994 through 1996 was 0.037 mg/L (LMES 1996a, 1997a,c). In 2000, the maximum uranium concentration from DOE outfalls was 0.09 mg/L (about 62 pCi/L) (DOE 2001b). This value is below the derived concentration guide (DCG) of 600 pCi/L.

KPDES Outfall 017 is located at the central-western edge of alternative Location B. This outfall receives runoff from the cylinder storage yards and from the cylinder painting facility area. Starting in 1998, and again in 2000 and 2001, acute toxicity tests at this outfall exceeded specified limits (DOE 2001b, 2002e). Zinc in runoff from painting activities was suspected of being the leading contributor to the toxicity exceedances (DOE 2001b), but the cause has not been established (DOE 2002e).

Sediment samples are also collected annually from six locations and analyzed for uranium, PCBs, and metals. In 1993, concentrations of uranium and PCBs were detected at levels substantially higher than background levels in Little Bayou Creek (Sampling Location SS2). The uranium concentration of 200 mg/kg at the measuring location was two times higher than it was in 1992. However, levels decreased in 1994 (22 mg/kg maximum uranium concentration, 1.4 mg/kg maximum PCB concentration) (LMES 1996a) and again in 1995 (13 mg/kg maximum uranium concentration, <0.1 mg/kg maximum PCB concentration) (LMES 1997a). In 1996, the uranium concentration in sediment at Location SS2 was 44 mg/kg; the PCB concentration was 1.3 mg/kg. A new sampling location (SS29) was added on Little Bayou Creek closer to the Paducah GDP. The uranium concentration at this location was 360 mg/kg; no PCB value was reported (LMES 1997c). In 2000, the maximum uranium concentration measured for all sediment sampling locations was 60 mg/kg (DOE 2001b).

### 3.1.5.2 Groundwater

Two near-surface aquifers are important at the Paducah site. The upper aquifer is a shallow, perched-water aquifer composed of upper continental deposits of sand and of sand and clay mixtures that are discontinuous. Water yields from this aquifer are very low, and the hydraulic gradient (change in water elevation with distance) is difficult to detect. Water movement is generally considered to be vertically downward (DOE 2001a).

The lower aquifer is a good-yielding gravel aquifer that has an upper surface at a depth of about 39 ft (12 m) and a thickness that ranges from about 20 to 59 ft (6 to 18 m). This aquifer appears to be continuous beneath the site. Hydraulic conductivity is estimated to be 0.0001 to 1 cm/s for the regional gravel aquifer and 0.00001 to 0.01 cm/s for the upper Continental Deposits (sands). Water movement is 2 to 5 ft/yr (0.6 to 1.5 m/yr) and toward the north-northeast (DOE 2001a).

Groundwater is sampled from about 200 monitoring wells, residential wells, and TVA wells on and off the Paducah site. Off-site sampling is performed to monitor three separate TCE and Tc plumes first detected in 1988 (LMES 1996a). Paducah has provided a municipal water supply to all residents whose wells are within the area of groundwater contamination from the site; wells that are no longer sampled are locked and capped.

Although the magnitude of groundwater contamination originating from the Paducah site is greatest for TCE and Tc, the primary drinking water standards or DCGs for several other inorganic, volatile organic, and radionuclide substances were also exceeded in one or more of the monitoring wells on or near the Paducah site in sampling conducted from 1993 through 1996 (MMES 1994b; LMES 1996a, 1997a,c). The DCG is equivalent to the maximum concentration limit (MCL); it is the concentration of a radionuclide that under conditions of continuous exposure for 1 year would result in an effective dose equivalent of 4 mrem (EPA 1996; DOE 1990). The uranium guideline of 20 µg/L in 1996 was exceeded in four wells, and the fluoride guideline of 4 mg/L was exceeded in two wells. The wells with uranium and fluoride exceedances are not located near the cylinder yards. Alternative Location C lies within the area of the northeastern groundwater plume that is contaminated with TCE.

Data from the 2000 annual groundwater monitoring program (DOE 2001b) showed that three pollutants exceeded primary drinking water regulation levels in groundwater at the Paducah site; chromium was present in all wells, nitrogen as nitrate in one well, and TCE in two wells. Beta activity was found in seven wells.

### **3.1.6 Biotic Resources**

#### **3.1.6.1 Vegetation**

The Paducah site includes the highly developed Paducah GDP, which has few natural vegetation communities. The DOE property between the Paducah GDP and the surrounding West Kentucky Wildlife Management Area consists primarily of open, frequently mowed grassy areas. The DOE property also includes several small upland areas of mature forest, old-field, and transitional habitats. The banks of Bayou Creek and Little Bayou Creek support mature riparian forest with river birch, black willow, and cottonwood (ANL 1991a). The West Kentucky Wildlife Management Area contains wooded areas, from early and mid-successional stages to mature forest communities, as well as restored prairie. Nonforested areas are managed by controlled burns, mowing, and planting to promote the development of native prairie species.

Location A, one of the three potential facility locations for DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion at the Paducah site, is approximately 35 acres (14 ha) in size and includes previously disturbed and undisturbed areas. The northern portion of Location A is relatively level and previously contained facilities during the initial construction of the Paducah GDP. It now supports an open vegetation cover of grasses maintained as mowed lawn. The southern portion of Location A is relatively undisturbed and primarily supports a mature deciduous hardwood forest community of about 10 acres (4 ha). The dominant species in the forested area are red maple, sweet gum, cherry bark oak, and pin oak; swamp chestnut oak, swamp white oak, and hickories are also present (Pennington 2001). Saplings of red maple, American elm, green ash, white ash, and sweet gum are the primary species of the shrub layer. Vines are primarily Virginia creeper and poison ivy, while the dominant species of the herbaceous layer are stiff marsh bedstraw, blunt broom sedge, narrow-leaved cat tail sedge, Japanese chess, swamp rose, and water parsnip. An open grassland lies immediately south of the forested area within the electric power line right-of-way. A small area of shrubs is located adjacent to the forest and extends into the grassland.

Location B covers about 59 acres (24 ha) and consists of a previously disturbed open area in the northern half and mature deciduous hardwood forest in the southern half of the location. The northern portion of Location B (north of Curlee Road), as well as the northeastern area of the southern portion, is flat to gently sloping and is vegetated primarily with grasses maintained as mowed lawn. Two open woodland groves occur in the northern portion and are also mowed. A number of drainage channels within this portion are bordered by steep banks supporting a mosaic of upland herbaceous and immature woodland communities, which include willows, maples, sycamore, sweet gum, tulip tree, milkweed, dogbane, poison ivy, and fleabane. A large mature deciduous hardwood forest is located south of Curlee Road and extends south and west of Location B. Dominant species in the forested area are oaks and hickories, with sassafras and sweet gum also common. Virginia creeper and honeysuckle are common vines within the forested area.

Location C is approximately 53 acres (21 ha) in size and is relatively level throughout. The western half has been previously disturbed and supports a deciduous hardwood forest that includes many young trees and saplings. The dominant species are oaks and hickories. The western margin of this area is located under the electric power lines and consists of an open grassland area that is periodically mowed. A margin of shrubs and saplings borders the western edge of the forested area. The eastern half of Location C consists primarily of an open old-field community with scattered groves of mature deciduous trees, primarily oaks. The vegetation of the open field is predominantly herbaceous and consists primarily of grasses such as fescue and broom-sedge.

### **3.1.6.2 Wildlife**

The habitats at the Paducah site support a relatively high diversity of wildlife species. Common species of the surrounding West Kentucky Wildlife Management Area and undeveloped areas of the Paducah site outside the Paducah GDP fence line include white-tailed deer, red fox, raccoon, opossum, coyote, turkey, and bobwhite quail. Ground-nesting species

include the white-footed mouse, bobwhite, and eastern box turtle. Bayou Creek, upstream of the Paducah site, supports aquatic fauna indicative of oxygen-rich, clean water, including 14 fish species. Aquatic species just downstream of the Paducah site discharge points include 11 fish species (LMES 1997c). The abundance and diversity of aquatic organisms are generally lower near the outfalls than in upstream areas for both Little Bayou and Bayou Creeks (DOE 1994b).

The habitats within Locations A, B, and C support wildlife species typical of similar habitats in the vicinity. Species common to forested areas include slimy salamander, red-bellied woodpecker, Kentucky warbler, red-eyed vireo, white-footed mouse, eastern gray squirrel, and eastern fox squirrel. The forest and woodland communities within the three candidate locations provide foraging habitat for neotropical migratory songbirds during spring and fall migrations. Open areas and old-field habitats support bobwhite, indigo bunting, common grackle, and southeastern shrew. Species found in or near wetlands include American toad, Woodhouse's toad, green frog, red-eared turtle, snapping turtle, beaver, mink, and muskrat. Southern leopard frogs occur near the forested area of Location A.

### **3.1.6.3 Wetlands**

Although no wetlands are identified on the Paducah GDP by the National Wetlands Inventory, approximately 5 acres (2 ha) of jurisdictional wetlands have been identified in drainage ditches scattered throughout the Paducah GDP (ANL 1991a; CDM Federal Programs Corporation 1994; Sadri 1995). Outside the Paducah GDP, a large number of wetlands are scattered throughout the Paducah site. These include forested wetlands, ponds, wet meadows, vernal pools, and wetlands converted to agriculture (U.S. Department of the Army 1994c). Palustrine forested wetlands occur extensively along the banks of Bayou and Little Bayou Creeks. The National Wetlands Inventory identifies many wetlands on the Paducah site, primarily ponds and forested wetlands. A forested wetland dominated by tupelo trees in the West Kentucky Wildlife Management Area has been designated by the Kentucky Nature Preserves Commission and Kentucky Department of Fish and Wildlife as an area of ecological concern (DOE 1996).

Several wetland areas occur at Location A (Figure 3.1-4) and total approximately 7.2 acres (2.9 ha) (Tetra Tech, Inc. 2000). The open area in the northern portion of this location is crossed by several drainage ditches and swales that contain wetlands. The northernmost of these drainages conveys storm water from the cylinder storage yard to KPDES Outfall 017, located west of the Paducah GDP entrance road. Two small isolated wetland areas occur about 300 ft (90 m) south of this drainage. Wetlands also occur in drainage ditches that border the gaseous diffusion plant entrance road and the service road that passes through this area. These areas support palustrine emergent wetlands, which are characterized by herbaceous vegetation in saturated or shallowly inundated soils. The dominant vegetation species in these wetlands are spikerush, green bulrush, needle-pod rush, fowl manna grass, field paspalum, twig-rush, and blunt broom sedge. These wetlands are seasonally flooded. They receive surface water runoff from adjacent areas and possibly groundwater discharge, and they generally drain through

culverts into drainage channels west of the entrance road. The two isolated wetlands lack a surface outflow. Surface water also remains in the drainages except during periods of high water levels, when excess water is conveyed through the culvert system.

Two small isolated wetlands, as well as a drainage from the adjacent storage yard, also occur immediately east of the forested area. The drainage flows to the west and provides surface water input to a large wetland within the forested area. This area supports palustrine forested wetland, which is characterized by woody vegetation (over 20 ft [60 m] tall) in saturated or shallowly inundated soils. This wetland, approximately 6.3 acres (2.6 ha) in size, lacks a surface outflow and is seasonally flooded. Surface water is present early in the growing season but is absent by mid-summer. The dominant species are similar to those listed above for the forest community. The dominant canopy trees are red maple, sweet gum, cherry bark oak, and pin oak, with swamp chestnut oak, and swamp white oak also present. Saplings of red maple, American elm, green ash, white ash, and sweet gum are the primary species of the shrub layer. Vines are primarily Virginia creeper and poison ivy. The dominant species of the herbaceous layer are stiff marsh bedstraw, blunt broom sedge, narrow-leaved cat tail sedge, swamp rose, and water parsnip, with sensitive fern and fox sedge also present.

Location B contains a series of drainage channels that support riverine and palustrine emergent wetland and flow into Bayou Creek (Figure 3.1-4) (DOE 1994b). In the forested areas of the southern portion of Location B, trees and shrubs overhang these drainages. Two small palustrine emergent wetlands are also located immediately south of Curlee Road. The forested areas support a number of palustrine forested wetlands totaling approximately 1.8 acres [0.7 ha] in area. The dominant canopy species in two of these wetlands are silver maple and cherry bark oak, with green ash present in the shrub layer. Birch is the dominant species in three small forested wetlands; two wetlands are dominated by black willow and buttonbush; and one wetland is dominated by maple. Two wetlands are open water. The predominant forested wetland types are maple/oak, willow/buttonbush, and maple. The total area of wetlands within Location B is approximately 2.9 acres (1.2 ha).

The western portion of Location C contains several palustrine forested wetlands. Pin oak and cherry bark oak are the dominant canopy species in a large wetland area (3.3 acres [1.3 ha]); black gum and red maple are also present. Other forested wetlands in this area are also dominated by cherry bark oak. Small palustrine emergent wetlands along an open pathway support bulrush. Drainage ditches along both sides of Dyke Road contain wetlands with bulrush, sedge, and willow. The eastern portion of Location C contains four small wetlands. Birch is the dominant species of one forested wetland. A small palustrine emergent wetland is located in the southeast corner, and open water wetlands occur to the north. The total area of wetlands within Location C is approximately 5.6 acres (2.3 ha), with 5.3 acres (2.2 ha) in the western portion and 0.3 acre (0.1 ha) in the eastern portion.

### 3.1.6.4 Threatened and Endangered Species

Federal- and state-listed species in the vicinity of the Paducah site are identified in Table 3.1-5. Although no occurrence of federal-listed plant or animal species on the Paducah site itself has been documented, the Indiana bat (federal- and state-listed as endangered) has been found near the confluence of Bayou Creek and the Ohio River 3 mi (5 km) north of the Paducah GDP. Indiana bats use trees with loose bark (such as shagbark hickory or standing dead trees) in forested areas as roosting sites during spring or summer. Potential roosting habitat for this species occurs on the Paducah site outside the gaseous diffusion plant (U.S. Department of the Army 1994d) and in adjacent wooded areas (Figure 3.1-5). Good-quality habitat contains large trees, provides a dense canopy cover, and is located within 0.25 mi (0.4 km) of potential foraging areas (water bodies). Poor-quality habitat contains less mature trees, provides minimal amounts of canopy cover, and is greater than 0.25 mi (0.4 km) from potential foraging areas. Fair-quality habitat meets some of the requirements for good-quality habitat. Areas within 1,640 ft (500 m) of paved roads are not considered potential Indiana bat habitat.

**TABLE 3.1-5 Federal- and State-Listed Endangered, Threatened, and Special Concern Species near the Paducah Site**

Category and Scientific Name	Common Name	Status <sup>a</sup>	
		Federal	State
<b>Mammals</b>			
<i>Myotis sodalis</i>	Indiana bat	E	E
<b>Birds</b>			
<i>Ardea herodias</i>	Great blue heron		S
<i>Vireo bellii</i>	Bell's vireo		S
<b>Amphibians</b>			
<i>Rana areolata circulosa</i>	Northern crawfish frog		S
<b>Fish</b>			
<i>Erimyzon sucetta</i>	Lake chubsucker		T
<b>Plants</b>			
<i>Baptisia bracteata leucophaea</i>	Cream wild indigo		S
<i>Silphium laciniatum</i>	Compass plant		T

<sup>a</sup> E = endangered; S = special concern; T = threatened.

Source: U.S. Department of the Army (1994d).

The compass plant, listed by the Commonwealth of Kentucky as threatened, and cream wild indigo, listed by Kentucky as a species of special concern, are prairie species known to occur in several locations on the Paducah site. State-listed species of special concern that occur on or near the Paducah site include Bell's vireo, great blue heron, and Northern crawfish frog. The lake chubsucker, listed by the state as threatened, is known from early, but not recent, surveys of Bayou Creek and Little Bayou Creek.

No federal- or state-listed species have been found to occur on Location A, B, or C (U.S. Department of the Army 1994d). Potential habitat for the Indiana bat has not been identified at any of the candidate locations (see Figure 3.1-5). The mature forest areas of Location B, near Bayou Creek, may provide good-quality summer roosting sites; however, their proximity to roads reduces their suitability. Trees in other wooded areas of the locations have the potential to be used by Indiana bats; however, their proximity to roads, their distance from foraging areas, and the presence of higher-quality habitat in the vicinity reduce their potential for being used. The nearest potential Indiana bat habitat is west of Bayou Creek, about 0.15 mi (0.24 km) from Location B and 0.35 mi (0.56 km) from Location A. It is rated as having poor potential habitat quality. Another area slightly farther south is rated as having fair potential habitat quality. The nearest location at which a state-listed species has been found is about 0.2 mi (0.3 km) west of Location A and southwest of Location B, where a population of cream wild indigo occurs.

Foraging habitat for the great blue heron includes ponds and other open water areas. Open water wetlands occur in the northeast portion of Location C. The Northern crawfish frog occurs approximately 0.35 mi (0.56 km) northeast of Location C and 0.6 mi (1 km) west of Location B. Habitat for the Northern crawfish frog is native prairie, particularly near fishless ponds or similar surface waters. Compass plant occurs about 0.3 mi (0.5 km) north of Location C. Although Location C supports an herbaceous old-field vegetation community, native prairie species are generally lacking. Prairie restoration and management activities in the vicinity of Location C, however, may increase the occurrence of prairie species in that area. These activities may also increase the potential for occurrence of cream wild indigo in or near Location C. Foraging habitat for the great blue heron includes ponds and other open water areas.

### **3.1.7 Public and Occupational Safety and Health**

#### **3.1.7.1 Radiation Environment**

Operations at the Paducah site result in radiation exposure of both on-site workers and off-site members of the general public (Table 3.1-6). Exposures of on-site workers generally are associated with the handling of radioactive materials used in the on-site facilities and with the inhalation of radionuclides released from processes conducted on site. Off-site members of the public are exposed to radionuclides discharged from on-site facilities with airborne and/or waterborne emissions and, in some cases, to radiation emanated from radioactive materials handled in the on-site facilities.

The total radiation dose to a MEI of the general public is estimated to be 1.9 mrem/yr, which is much lower than the maximum radiation dose limit set for the general public of 100 mrem/yr (DOE 1990). The MEI dose is also a small fraction of the 95 mrem/yr dose received by an average individual living close to Paducah from natural background and medical sources. In 2001, the measured external radiation doses for cylinder yard workers ranged from 170 to 427 mrem, with an average of 254 mrem (Hicks 2002a). The measured doses are well below the maximum dose limit of 5,000 mrem/yr set for radiation workers (10 CFR Part 835).

### 3.1.7.2 Chemical Environment

Table 3.1-7 gives the estimated hazard quotients from chemical exposures for members of the general public under existing environmental conditions near the Paducah site. The hazard quotient represents a comparison of the estimated human intake level of a contaminant with an intake level below which adverse effects are very unlikely to occur (see Appendix F for further details). The estimated hazard quotients indicate that exposures to DUF<sub>6</sub>-related contaminants in environmental media near the Paducah site are generally only a small fraction of those that might be associated with adverse health effects. An exception is groundwater, for which the hazard quotients for uranium and several other substances could exceed the threshold of 1. However, because this groundwater is not a drinking water source, there is no exposure. The residents near the Paducah site whose wells have been contaminated have been provided with alternative water sources.

The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) has proposed permissible exposure limits (PELs) for uranium compounds and HF in the workplace (29 CFR Part 1910, Subpart Z, as of February 2003) as follows: 0.05 mg/m<sup>3</sup> for soluble uranium compounds, 0.25 mg/m<sup>3</sup> for insoluble uranium compounds, and 2.5 mg/m<sup>3</sup> for HF. Paducah worker exposures are kept below these limits.

### 3.1.8 Socioeconomics

Socioeconomic data for the Paducah site focus on a ROI surrounding the site consisting of six counties: Ballard, Carlisle, Graves, Marshall, and McCracken Counties in Kentucky, and Massac County in Illinois. The ROI is defined on the basis of the current residential locations of government workers directly connected to Paducah site activities and includes the area in which these workers spend much of their wages. More than 92% of Paducah workers currently reside in these counties (Sheppard 2002). Data are presented in the following sections for each of the counties in the ROI. However, the majority of Paducah site workers live in McCracken County and in the City of Paducah, and it is expected that the majority of impacts from the Paducah site would occur in these locations. Therefore, more emphasis is placed on these two areas.

### 3.1.8.1 Population

The population of the ROI in 2000 was 161,465 people (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2002a) and was projected to reach 165,000 by 2003 (Table 3.1-8). In 2000, 65,514 people (41% of the ROI total) resided in McCracken County, with 26,307 of them residing in the City of Paducah (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2002a). During the 1990s, each of the counties in the ROI experienced a small increase in population, with an ROI average of 0.6%. The City of Paducah experienced a decline of -0.4% in its population during that period. Over the same period, the population grew at a rate of 0.9% in Kentucky and 0.8% in Illinois.

### 3.1.8.2 Employment

Total employment in McCracken County in 2000 was 37,426, and it was projected to reach 40,500 by 2003. The economy of the county is dominated by the trade and service industries, with employment in these activities currently contributing almost 71% of all employment in the county (see Table 3.1-9). Excluding mining, which grew from a very small base, employment growth in the highest growth sector (services) was 6.7% during the 1990s, compared with 2.7% in the county for all sectors as a whole (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1992, 2002b).

In 2000, total employment in the ROI was 67,866, and it was projected to reach 69,300 by 2003. The economy of the ROI is dominated by the trade and service industries, with employment in these activities currently contributing 60% of all employment in the ROI

**TABLE 3.1-8 Population in the Paducah Region of Influence, Kentucky, and Illinois in 1990, 2000, and 2003**

Location	1990	2000	Growth Rate (%), 1990–2000 <sup>a</sup>	2003 (Projected) <sup>b</sup>
City of Paducah	27,256	26,307	-0.4	26,000
McCracken County	62,879	65,514	0.4	66,300
Ballard County	7,902	8,286	0.5	8,400
Carlisle County	5,238	5,351	0.2	5,400
Graves County	33,550	37,028	1.0	38,100
Marshall County	27,205	30,125	1.1	31,100
Massac County	14,752	15,161	0.3	15,300
ROI total	151,526	161,465	0.6	164,600
Kentucky	3,685,296	4,041,769	0.9	4,155,000
Illinois	11,430,602	12,419,293	0.8	12,732,000

<sup>a</sup> Average annual rate.

<sup>b</sup> ANL projections, as detailed in Appendix F.

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census (2002a), except as noted.

**TABLE 3.1-9 Employment in McCracken County by Industry in 1990 and 2000**

Sector	No. of People Employed in 1990 <sup>a</sup>	Percentage of County Total	No. of People Employed in 2000 <sup>b</sup>	Percentage of County Total	Growth Rate (%), 1990–2000
Agriculture	785 <sup>c</sup>	2.7	489 <sup>d</sup>	1.3	-4.62 <sup>e</sup>
Mining	10	0.0	175	0.5	33.1
Construction	1,604	5.6	1,786	4.8	1.1
Manufacturing	3,965	13.8	4,210	11.2	0.6
Transportation and public utilities	2,316	8.0	3,400	9.1	3.9
Trade	9,951	34.6	9,258	24.7	-0.7
Finance, insurance, and real estate	1,042	3.6	914	2.4	-1.3
Services	9,022	31.3	17,174	45.9	6.7
Total	28,791		37,426		2.7

<sup>a</sup> U.S. Bureau of the Census (1992).

<sup>b</sup> U.S. Bureau of the Census (2002b).

<sup>c</sup> These agricultural data are for 1992 and are taken from USDA (1994).

<sup>d</sup> These agricultural data are for 1999 and are taken from USDA (1999).

<sup>e</sup> Agricultural data are for 1992 and 1997.

(see Table 3.1-10). Employment growth in the highest growth sector, services, was 6.4% during the 1990s, compared with 0.7% in the ROI for all sectors as a whole (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1992, 2002b). Employment at the Paducah site currently stands at 1,799 (Sheppard 2002).

Unemployment in McCracken County steadily declined during the late 1990s from a peak rate of 6.2% in 1990 to the current rate of 5.4% (Table 3.1-11) (Bureau of Labor Statistics [BLS] 2002). Unemployment in the ROI in December 2002 was 6.0% compared with 5.4% for the state.

### 3.1.8.3 Personal Income

Personal income in McCracken County was about \$1.9 billion (in 2002 dollars) in 2000, and it was projected to reach \$2.2 billion in 2003, with an annual average rate of growth of 2.1% over the period 1990 through 2000 (Table 3.1-12). County per capita income also rose in the 1990s, and it was projected to reach \$33,200 in 2003, compared with \$24,771 at the beginning of the period. In the ROI, total personal income grew at an annual rate of 2.1% over the period 1990 through 2000, and it was expected to reach \$4.8 billion by 2003. ROI per capita income was expected to grow from \$22,054 in 1990 to \$29,000 in 2003, an average annual growth rate of 1.5%.

**TABLE 3.1-10 Employment in the Paducah Region of Influence by Industry in 1990 and 2000**

Sector	No. of People Employed in 1990 <sup>a</sup>	Percentage of ROI Total	No. of People Employed in 2000 <sup>b</sup>	Percentage of ROI Total	Growth Rate (%), 1990–2000
Agriculture	5,758 <sup>c</sup>	9.1	4,652 <sup>d</sup>	6.9	-2.1 <sup>e</sup>
Mining	245	0.4	175	0.3	-3.3
Construction	3,730	5.9	3,651	5.4	-0.2
Manufacturing	14,748	23.3	11,866	17.5	-2.2
Transportation and public utilities	4,335	6.8	4,795	7.1	1.0
Trade	17,803	28.1	13,639	20.1	-2.6
Finance, insurance, and real estate	2,356	3.7	1,842	2.7	-2.4
Services	14,578	23.0	27,170	40.0	6.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>63,410</b>		<b>67,866</b>		<b>0.7</b>

<sup>a</sup> U.S. Bureau of the Census (1992).

<sup>b</sup> U.S. Bureau of the Census (2002b).

<sup>c</sup> These agricultural data are for 1992 and are taken from U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) (1994).

<sup>d</sup> These agricultural data are for 1999 and are taken from USDA (1999).

<sup>e</sup> Agricultural data are for 1992 and 1997.

### 3.1.8.4 Housing

Housing stock in McCracken County grew at an annual rate of 1.0% over the period 1990 through 2000 (Table 3.1-13) (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2002a), with total housing units projected to reach 30,900 in 2003, reflecting the relatively slow growth in county population. Growth in the City of Paducah was slight at 0.1% per year, with total housing units projected to reach 13,100 in 2003.

Almost 2,800 new units were added to the existing housing stock in the county during the 1990s; fewer than 100 of those units were constructed in Paducah. Vacancy rates in 2000 stood at 10.6% in the city and 8.6% in the county as a whole for all types of housing. On the basis of annual population growth rates, 2,700 vacant housing units were expected in the county in 2003. About 850 of these were expected to be rental units available to incoming construction workers at the proposed facility.

In the ROI as a whole, housing grew at a higher rate than in McCracken County or Paducah during the 1990s, with an overall growth rate of 1.1% per year. Total housing units were expected to reach 76,600 by 2003, with more than 7,800 housing units added in the 1990s. On the basis of vacancy rates in 2000, which stood at 10.5%, more than 2,000 rental units were expected to be available for incoming construction workers at the proposed facility.

**3.1.8.5 Community Resources**

**3.1.8.5.1 Community Fiscal Conditions.**

Revenues and expenditures for local government jurisdictions, including counties, cities, and school districts constitute community fiscal conditions. Revenues would come primarily from state and local sales tax revenues associated with employee spending during construction and operation and would be used to support additional local community services currently provided by each jurisdiction. Tables 1 and 2 in Allison (2002) present information on revenues and expenditures by the various local government jurisdictions in the ROI.

**TABLE 3.1-11 Unemployment Rates in McCracken County, the Paducah Region of Influence, and Kentucky**

Location and Period	Rate (%)
<b>McCracken County</b>	
1992–2002 average	4.6
Dec. 2002 (current rate)	5.4
<b>ROI</b>	
1992–2002 average	5.8
Dec. 2002 (current rate)	6.0
<b>Kentucky</b>	
1992–2002 average	5.4
Dec. 2002 (current rate)	5.4

Source: BLS (2002).

**TABLE 3.1-12 Personal Income in McCracken County and the Paducah Region of Influence in 1990, 2000, and 2003**

Location and Type of Income	1990	2000	Growth Rate (%), 1990–1997	2003 (Projected) <sup>a</sup>
<b>McCracken County</b>				
Total personal income (millions of 2002 \$)	1,558	1,910	2.1	2,200
Personal per capita income (2002 \$)	24,771	29,147	1.6	33,200
<b>Total ROI</b>				
Total personal income (millions of 2002 \$)	3,342	4,125	2.1	4,800
Personal per capita income (2002 \$)	22,054	25,548	1.5	29,000

<sup>a</sup> ANL projections, as detailed in Appendix F.

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce (2002).

**3.1.8.5.2 Community Public Services.**

Construction and operation of the proposed facility would increase demand for community services in the counties, cities, and school districts likely to host relocating construction workers and operations employees. Additional demands would also be placed on local medical facilities and physician services. Tables 3.1-14 and 3.1-15 present data on employment and levels of service (number of employees per 1,000 population) for public safety, general local government services, and physicians. Tables 3.1-16 and 3.1-17 provide staffing data for school districts and hospitals.

**3.1.9 Waste Management**

The Paducah site generates wastewater, solid LLW, solid and liquid LLMW, nonradioactive hazardous waste, and nonradioactive nonhazardous solid waste. Wastes generated from site operations and environmental restoration are managed by DOE. DOE also manages the disposal of waste generated from ongoing management of the DOE-generated DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders currently in storage. The cylinder storage yards at Paducah currently generate only a very small amount of waste compared with the volume of waste generated from ongoing gaseous diffusion plant operations and environmental restoration. Cylinder yard waste consists of small amounts of metal, scrapings from cylinder maintenance operations, potentially contaminated soil, and miscellaneous items.

The site has an active program to minimize the generation of solid LLW, hazardous waste, and LLMW. Waste minimization efforts for radioactive waste include preventing packaging material from entering radiological areas and replacing wood pallets used in radiological areas. Hazardous waste and LLMW minimization actions include using chlorinated solvents less, recycling paint waste, and compacting PCB wastes. Solid waste minimization actions include recycling of paper and cardboard and off-site recycling of fluorescent bulbs and used batteries.

Table 3.1-18 lists the Paducah site waste loads assumed for the analysis of impacts of projected activities.

**TABLE 3.1-13 Housing Characteristics in the City of Paducah, McCracken County, and the Paducah Region of Influence in 1990 and 2000**

Location and Type of Unit	No. of Units	
	1990	2000
<b>City of Paducah</b>		
Owner-occupied	6,501	6,254
Rental	5,454	5,571
Total unoccupied	1,195	1,396
Total	13,150	13,221
<b>McCracken County</b>		
Owner-occupied	17,470	19,054
Rental	8,155	8,682
Total unoccupied	1,956	2,625
Total	27,581	30,361
<b>ROI Total</b>		
Owner-occupied	45,815	50,412
Rental	15,181	16,441
Total unoccupied	5,935	7,856
Total	66,931	74,709

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census (2002a).

**TABLE 3.1-14 Public Service Employment in the City of Paducah, McCracken County, and Kentucky in 2002**

Employment Category	City of Paducah		McCracken County		Kentucky <sup>b</sup>
	No. of Workers	Level of Service <sup>a</sup>	No. of Workers	Level of Service <sup>a</sup>	Level of Service <sup>a</sup>
Police	74	2.8	41	1.0	1.5
Fire <sup>c</sup>	77	2.9	0	0	1.3
General	174	6.6	180	4.5	34.1
Total	325	12.4	221	5.6	36.9

<sup>a</sup> Level of service represents the number of employees per 1,000 persons in each jurisdiction.

<sup>b</sup> 2000 data.

<sup>c</sup> Does not include volunteers.

Sources: City of Paducah: Moriarty (2002); McCracken County: Brown (2002); Kentucky: U.S. Bureau of the Census (2002d).

**TABLE 3.1-15 Number of Physicians in McCracken County and Kentucky in 1997**

Employment Category	McCracken County		Kentucky
	No.	Level of Service <sup>a</sup>	Level of Service <sup>a</sup>
Physicians	205	3.1	2.2

<sup>a</sup> Level of service represents the number of physicians per 1,000 persons in each jurisdiction.

Source: American Medical Association (1999).

**TABLE 3.1-16 School District Data for McCracken County and Kentucky in 2001**

Employment Category	McCracken County		Kentucky
	No.	Student-to-Teacher Ratio <sup>a</sup>	Student-to-Teacher Ratio <sup>a</sup>
Teachers	510	12.6	12.4

<sup>a</sup> The number of students per teacher in each school district.

Source: Kentucky Department of Education (2002).

**TABLE 3.1-17 Medical Facility Data for McCracken County in 1998**

Hospital	No. of Staffed Beds	Occupancy Rate (%) <sup>a</sup>
Carter Behavioral Health System	56	NA <sup>b</sup>
Lourdes Hospital	290	55
Western Baptist Hospital	325	57
McCracken County total	671	NA

<sup>a</sup> Percentage of staffed beds occupied.

<sup>b</sup> NA = not available.

Source: Healthcare InfoSource, Inc. (1998).

**3.1.9.1 Wastewater**

Wastewater at the Paducah site consists of nonradioactive sanitary and process-related wastewater streams, cooling water blowdown, and radioactive process-related liquid effluents. Wastewater is processed at on-site treatment facilities and is discharged to Bayou Creek or Little Bayou Creek through eight permitted outfalls. The total capacity of the site wastewater control facilities is approximately 1.75 million gal/d (6.6 million L/d).

**3.1.9.2 Solid Nonhazardous, Nonradioactive Waste**

Solid waste — including sanitary refuse, cafeteria waste, industrial waste, and construction and demolition waste — is collected and disposed of at the on-site landfill, which consists of three cells. The landfill is permitted for 1 million yd<sup>3</sup> (764,600 m<sup>3</sup>) per Permit KY073-00045.

**TABLE 3.1-18 Projected Waste Generation Volumes for the Paducah Site<sup>a</sup>**

Waste Category	Waste Treatment Volume (m <sup>3</sup> /yr)
LLW	7,200
LLMW	7,600
TRU	0.6
Hazardous waste	370
Nonhazardous waste <sup>b</sup>	
Solids	18,900
Wastewater	72

<sup>a</sup> Volumes include operational and environmental restoration wastes projected from FY 2002 to FY 2025.

<sup>b</sup> Volumes include sanitary and industrial wastes.

Source: Cain (2002c).

### 3.1.9.3 Nonradioactive Hazardous and Toxic Waste

Nonradioactive waste that is considered hazardous waste according to RCRA or contains PCBs as defined under the TSCA requires special handling, storage, and disposal. The Paducah site generates hazardous waste, including spent solvents, heavy-metal-contaminated waste, and PCB-contaminated toxic waste. The site has a permit that authorizes it to treat and store hazardous waste in 10 treatment units, 16 tanks, and 4 container storage areas at the site. Several additional 90-day storage areas for temporary storage of hazardous waste are located on the site.

Certain hazardous/toxic wastes are sent to permitted off-site contractors for final treatment and/or disposal. Much of the hazardous/toxic waste load consists of PCB-contaminated waste. Some liquid hazardous and/or mixed waste streams are shipped to the ETTP site for incineration in a TSCA incinerator with a capacity of 1,800 yd<sup>3</sup>/yr (1,400 m<sup>3</sup>/yr).

### 3.1.9.4 Low-Level Radioactive Waste

LLW generated at the Paducah site is stored on site pending shipment to a commercial facility in Tennessee for volume reduction. Solid LLW generated at the Paducah site includes refuse, sludge, and debris contaminated with radionuclides, primarily uranium and technetium. Site wastewater treatment facilities can process up to 1,480 yd<sup>3</sup> (1,140 m<sup>3</sup>) per year of aqueous LLW.

### 3.1.9.5 Low-Level Radioactive Mixed Waste

LLW that contains PCBs or RCRA hazardous components is considered to be LLMW. On-site capacity for storing LLMW containers at the Paducah site is 3,600 yd<sup>3</sup> (2,800 m<sup>3</sup>). The site can treat up to 204 ft<sup>3</sup>/yr (156 m<sup>3</sup>/yr) of aqueous LLMW (DOE 1996).

### 3.1.10 Land Use

The Paducah site is located in western Kentucky, in the northwestern portion of rural McCracken County about 10 mi (16 km) west of the City of Paducah. On the basis of an analysis of Landsat satellite imagery from 1992, dominant land cover categories in McCracken County include pasture/hay (27.8%), row crops (27.0%), and deciduous forest (17.8%) (Figure 3.1-6). The most recent agricultural census recorded 457 farms in McCracken County in 1997, covering more than 66,500 acres (26,900 ha) (U.S. Department of Agriculture [USDA] 1999). Residential land use occurs throughout much of McCracken County; most of it occurs in the eastern half of the county in the communities of Concord, Hendron, Lone Oak, Massac, Paducah, Reidland, and Woodlawn-Oakdale. The western half of the county, where the site lies, consists primarily of pasture/hay and row crops.

The Paducah site encompasses 3,556 acres (1,439 ha) currently held by DOE (DOE 2001b). It is surrounded by the West Kentucky Wildlife Management Area, an additional 2,781 acres (1,125 ha) conveyed by DOE to the Commonwealth of Kentucky for use in wildlife conservation and for recreational purposes. According to a 1953 agreement granting the land to the Kentucky Department of Fish and Wildlife Resources, DOE can use any or all of this surrounding land whenever the need arises (MMES 1990). The Paducah GDP occupies a 750-acre (303-ha) complex within the Paducah site and is surrounded by a security fence (see Figure 3.1-1). The site is heavily developed and includes about 115 buildings with a combined floor space of about 8.2 million ft<sup>2</sup> (0.76 million m<sup>2</sup>). The areas between buildings consist primarily of mowed grassy areas, while the area immediately surrounding the Paducah site generally features a combination of pasture, row crops, and deciduous forest.

### 3.1.11 Cultural Resources

Prehistoric and historic cultural resources are present at the Paducah site and within its immediate surroundings. Prehistoric archaeological sites at the Paducah site, found chiefly on floodplains, include remains from the Archaic (8000–1000 B.C.), Woodland (1000 B.C.–A.D. 1000), and Mississippian (A.D. 1000–1700) periods. The Paducah GDP is located in what were once traditional Chickasaw hunting grounds, and Chickasaw were reported in the Paducah area as late as 1827. In addition, the Peoria of Oklahoma have land claims in McCracken County. Consultation with these groups as well as the Kentucky State Historic Preservation Officer (SHPO) has been initiated (see Appendix G for consultation letters). No religious or sacred sites, burial sites, or resources significant to Native Americans have been identified at the Paducah site to date.

Historically, what is now the Paducah GDP site was included in the Jackson Purchase — land purchased from the Chickasaw in 1818. Uplands included dispersed 19th century farmsteads, settlements, and three associated cemeteries. The Paducah site was initially acquired in 1942 for the construction of the Kentucky Ordnance Works (KOW). Some KOW structures still remain. The AEC acquired KOW for the construction of a gaseous diffusion plant in 1950 as part of the nation's Cold War nuclear armament program. Construction began in 1951 (U.S. Department of the Army 1994a). The plant was completed in 1954, with enriched uranium production beginning in 1955. The plant's mission has continued unchanged, and the upgraded and refurbished original enrichment facilities remain in operation under lease to USEC (DOE 2001b).

Although the Paducah GDP has not undergone a complete archaeological survey, 32 archaeological sites have been recorded. Of these, at least three prehistoric sites and one historic site are potentially eligible for the *National Register of Historic Places* (NRHP) (U.S. Department of the Army 1994a,b). In 1994, a 20% stratified random sample archaeological survey was conducted at the Paducah GDP. Results of a sensitivity analysis based on this survey indicate that, for the most part, the candidate DUF<sub>6</sub> construction locations have a “low” to “very low” sensitivity index (low to very low probability of containing significant archaeological resources) (U.S. Department of the Army 1994a,b).

No archaeological sites are known from Location A, which was not included in the 1994 survey of the site. Several temporary buildings were located at this site during the construction of the Paducah GDP. These buildings have since been removed, but their foundations may remain. The southern end of the location includes old growth forest and appears to be relatively undisturbed. Only this southern portion of Location A appears to have been considered in the archaeological sensitivity analysis. It has a “low” to “very low” sensitivity index (U.S. Department of the Army 1994b).

The undeveloped portion of Location B includes rolling fields and the margins of the Bayou Creek floodplain. The rolling fields appear to have been created by the dumping of spoil during the construction or operation of the Paducah GDP. The portions of the site directly overlooking Bayou Creek appear to be undisturbed and have a “high” archaeological sensitivity. The remaining undeveloped sections vary in archaeological sensitivity from “low” to “very low” (U.S. Department of the Army 1994b).

Location C is a flat, densely wooded area outside the eastern fences of the Paducah GDP main compound. About half the location was included in the 1994 survey, but no archaeological sites were identified. The location has a “low” to “very low” sensitivity index (U.S. Department of the Army 1994b).

A pending programmatic agreement (PA) among DOE, the Kentucky SHPO, and the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation calls for a complete cultural resource survey of the Paducah GDP, including an architectural survey of Cold War era scientific facilities. That survey will be undertaken once the agreement is finalized. The PA also stipulates the development and implementation of a cultural resource management plan (CRMP).

### **3.1.12 Environmental Justice**

#### **3.1.12.1 Minority Populations**

This EIS uses data from the most recent decennial census in 2000 to evaluate environmental justice implications of the proposed action and the no action alternative with respect to minority populations. The CEQ guidelines on environmental justice recommend that “minority” be defined as members of American Indian or Alaska Native, Asian or Pacific Islander, Black non-Hispanic, and Hispanic populations (CEQ 1997). The earliest release of 2000 census data that included information necessary to identify minority populations identified individuals both according to race and Hispanic origin (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2001). It also identified individuals claiming multiple racial identities (up to six races). To remain consistent with the CEQ guidelines, the phrase “minority populations” in this document refers to persons who identified themselves as partially or totally Black (including Black or Negro, African American, Afro-American, Black Puerto Rican, Jamaican, Nigerian, West Indian, or Haitian), American Indian or Alaska Native, Asian, Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander, or “Other Race.” The minority category also includes White individuals of Hispanic origin, although the latter is technically an ethnic category. To avoid double counting, tabulations included only

White Hispanics; the above racial groups already account for non-White Hispanics. In sum, then, the minority population considered under environmental justice consisted of all non-White persons (including those of multiple racial affiliations) plus White persons of Hispanic origin.

To identify census tracts with disproportionately high minority populations, this EIS uses the percentage of minorities in each state containing a given tract as a reference point. Using the individual states to identify disproportionality acknowledges that minority distributions in the state can differ from those found in the nation as a whole. In 2000, of the 173 census tracts within 50 mi (80 km) of the proposed conversion facility at Paducah, 42 had minority populations in excess of state-specific thresholds — a total of 47,093 minority persons in all (Figure 3.1-7). In McCracken County, 13.2% of the population in 2000 was minority (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2002c).


### **3.1.12.2 Low-Income Populations**

As recommended by the CEQ guidelines, the environmental justice analysis identifies low-income populations as those falling below the statistical poverty level identified annually by the U.S. Bureau of the Census in its Series P-60 documents on income and poverty. The Census Bureau defines poverty levels on the basis of a statistical threshold that considers for each family both overall family size and the number of related children younger than 18 years old. For example, in 1999, the poverty threshold annual income for a family of three with one related child younger than 18 was \$13,410, while the poverty threshold for a family of five with one related child younger than 18 was \$21,024 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2000). The 2000 census used 1999 thresholds, because 1999 was the most recent year for which annual income data were available when the census was conducted. If a family fell below the poverty line for its particular composition, the census considered all individuals in that family to be below the poverty line.

To identify census tracts with disproportionately high low-income populations, this EIS uses the percentage of low-income persons living in each state containing a given tract as a reference point. In 1999, of the 204 census tracts within 50 mi (80 km) of the proposed conversion facility at Paducah, 109 had low-income populations in excess of state-specific thresholds — a total of 118,029 low-income persons in all (Figure 3.1-8). In McCracken County in 1999, 15.1% of the individuals for whom poverty status was known were low-income (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2002c).

## **3.2 EAST TENNESSEE TECHNOLOGY PARK**

ETTP is located in eastern Roane County about 25 mi (40 km) west of Knoxville, Tennessee (Figure 3.2-1). ETTP is part of the ORR in the City of Oak Ridge, Tennessee. The site was established in 1940 with initiation of construction of the Oak Ridge Gaseous Diffusion Plant. Uranium enrichment was the site's mission until the mid-1980s, when gaseous diffusion operations ceased. In 1990, the site was renamed as the K-25 Site, and it was renamed again in 1997 as the ETTP. Previous missions were waste management and restoration; the current



**FIGURE 3.2-1 Regional Map of the ETP Vicinity**

mission is to “reindustrialize and reuse site assets through leasing of vacated facilities and incorporation of commercial industrial organizations as partners in the ongoing environmental restoration (ER), D&D, waste treatment and disposal, and diffusion technology development activities” (DOE 2001b).


**3.2.1 Cylinder Yards**

There are 4,822 DUF<sub>6</sub> storage cylinders located in ETP site cylinder yards (Table 3.2-1, Figure 3.2-2). Cylinders are stacked two high to conserve space. About 30% of the cylinders are stored in yard K-1066-E (constructed with a concrete base), and 30% are stored in yard K-1066-K (constructed with a gravel base). The other cylinders are stored in four smaller yards.

**TABLE 3.2-1 DOE-Managed DUF<sub>6</sub> Cylinders at the ETP Site**

Cylinder Type	No. of Cylinders
Full	4,719
Partially full	83
Heel	20
<b>Total</b>	<b>4,822</b>

Source: Hightower (2004).



**FIGURE 3.2-2 Locations of Storage Yards at ETTP That Are Used to Store DOE-Managed Cylinders**

In storage at ETTP, in addition to the cylinders that contain DUF<sub>6</sub>, are a number of cylinders in various sizes that contain enriched UF<sub>6</sub> or normal UF<sub>6</sub> or are empty. The non-DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders total 1,102 and contain a total of about 26 t (29 tons) of UF<sub>6</sub> (7 t [8 tons] of enriched UF<sub>6</sub> plus 19 t [21 tons] of normal UF<sub>6</sub>) (Hightower 2004). About 20 cylinders are empty. Of the 881 non-DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders that contain enriched uranium, fewer than 30 contain uranium enriched to greater than 5% uranium-235, and all of these are small, sample cylinders containing less than 3 lb (1.4 kg) of UF<sub>6</sub> each. Over 98% of the enriched uranium in cylinders at ETTP contains less than 5% uranium-235. It is assumed that the natural and enriched UF<sub>6</sub> would be put to beneficial uses; therefore, conversion of the contents of the non-DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders is not considered in this EIS. This EIS does, however, include these cylinders in its evaluation of an alternative that considers the transportation of cylinders from ETTP to Paducah for conversion.

It is expected that many of the full DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders at the ETTP site would not meet DOT transportation requirements because of damage and corrosion from poor historical storage conditions. It was estimated in the PEIS that a range of one-half to all of the full DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders would not meet DOT transportation requirements (DOE 1999a). More recent estimates indicate that 1,700 cylinders are DOT compliant, with the remainder not meeting DOT requirements (see Section 1.7). No similar estimate of the condition of the non-DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders at ETTP is available.

### **3.2.2 Site Infrastructure**

The ETTP site is located in an area with a well-established transportation network. The site is near two interstate highways, several U.S. and state highways, two major rail lines, and a regional airport (Figure 3.2-1).

The ETTP water supply is pumped from Clinch River. The water is treated and stored in two storage tanks. This system, with a capacity of 4 million gal/d (15 million L/d), provides water to the Transportation Safeguards Facility and the ETTP site.

Electric power is supplied by the TVA. The distribution of power is managed through the ETTP Power Operations Department. The average demand for electricity by all of the DOE facilities at Oak Ridge, including the ETTP site, is approximately 100 MVA. The maximum capacity of the system is 920 MVA (DOE 1995). Natural gas is supplied by the East Tennessee Natural Gas Company; the daily capacity of 7,600 decatherms can be increased, if necessary. The average daily usage in 1994 was 3,600 decatherms (DOE 1995).

### **3.2.3 Climate, Air Quality, and Noise**

#### **3.2.3.1 Climate**

The climate of the region, including the ETTP site, may be broadly classified as humid continental. The region is located in a broad valley between the Cumberland Mountains to the northwest and the Great Smoky Mountains to the southeast, which influence meteorological patterns over the region (Wood 1996). During the summer, tropical air masses from the south provide warm and humid conditions that often produce thunderstorms. In winter, the Cumberland Mountains have a moderating influence on local climate by shielding the region from cold air masses from the north and west.

For the period 1961 through 1990, the annual average temperature was 13.7°C (56.6°F), with the highest monthly average temperature of 24.3°C (75.8°F) occurring in July and the lowest of 1.7°C (35.0°F) occurring in January (Wood 1996). Annual precipitation averages about 137 cm (53.8 in.), including about 25 cm (9.8 in.) of snowfall. Precipitation is evenly distributed throughout the season, with the highest occurring in spring.

Winds in the region are controlled in large part by the valley-and-ridge topography. Prevailing wind directions are from the northeast and southwest, reflecting the channeling of winds parallel to the ridges and valleys in the area. The average wind speed at Oak Ridge is about 2.0 m/s (4.4 mph); the dominant wind direction is from the southwest (Wood 1996). For 2001, the average wind speed at the 10-m (33-ft) level of the ETTP K1209 meteorological tower was 1.5 m/s (3.4 mph), as shown in Figure 3.2-3 (ORNL 2002). The lower wind speed in the region reflects the air stagnation relatively common in eastern Tennessee. The dominant wind direction is southwest, with secondary peaks from the south-southwest and the east.

Tornadoes rarely occur in the valley surrounding the ETTP site between the Cumberlands and the Great Smokies, and they historically have been less destructive than those in the Midwest. For the period 1950 through 1995, 541 tornadoes were reported in Tennessee, with an average of 12 tornadoes per year (Storm Prediction Center 2002). For the same period, 3 tornadoes were reported in Anderson and Roane Counties each, but these tornadoes were relatively weak, being F3 of the Fujita tornado scale, at most.

### **3.2.3.2 Existing Air Emissions**

At the end of calendar year 2001, there were 88 active air emission sources under DOE control at ETTP (DOE 2002c). Of these 88 sources, ETTP operated 30; these were covered under 8 major air emission sources subject to rules in the Tennessee Title V Major Source Operating Permit Program under an application shield granted by the TDEC Division of Air Pollution Control. All remaining active air emission sources are exempt from permitting requirements.

Major sources for criteria pollutants and VOCs in Anderson and Roane Counties in Tennessee include TVA steam plants and DOE operations, including the Y-12, ORNL, and ETTP sites. Annual emissions from major sources and total county emissions are presented in Table 3.2-2. The SO<sub>2</sub> and NO<sub>x</sub> emissions from ETTP operations are negligible compared with those from the two TVA steam plants in Anderson and Roane Counties. However, VOC emissions account for about 39% of the Roane County emission total, and PM (PM<sub>10</sub> and PM<sub>2.5</sub>) emissions account for about 8% of the Roane County emission total. The amount of actual emissions from the ETTP site is much less than the amount of allowable emissions presented in Table 3.2-2 (DOE 2002c).

The State of Tennessee and the EPA regulate airborne emissions of radionuclides from DOE facilities under 40 CFR Part 61, Subpart H, NESHAPs regulations (DOE 2002c). The three ETTP major sources that operated during 2000 were the TSCA incinerator and the two stacks in the K-33 building operated by British Nuclear Fuels, Ltd. Emissions from these exhaust stacks are controlled by a particulate filtration system, and continuous sampling for radionuclides emissions is conducted at these stacks to assess the dose to the public.

**TABLE 3.2-2 Annual Criteria Pollutant and Volatile Organic Compound Emissions from Selected Major Point Sources around the ETTP Site in 1999**

Major Emission Source	Emission Rate (tons/yr)					
	SO <sub>2</sub>	NO <sub>x</sub>	CO	VOC	PM <sub>10</sub>	PM <sub>2.5</sub>
TVA Bull Run Steam Plant, Clinton	38,179	13,528	420	50	529	267
Y-12 Plant (DOE)	13,375	1,672	38	19	61	21
Anderson County, Tenn., total	51,555	15,237	460	405	731	365
TVA Kingston Steam Plant, Kingston	109,194	26,055	995	122	95	98
ORNL (DOE)	361	25	53	14	363	267
ETTP (formerly K-25) (DOE)	222	60	29	86	41	34
	(0.20%, 0.14%) <sup>a</sup>	(0.23%, 0.14%)	(2.5%, 1.8%)	(39%, 14%)	(8.2%, 3.2%)	(8.5%, 4.5%)
Roane County, Tenn., total	109,777	26,149	1,157	222	498	399

<sup>a</sup> First and second values in parentheses are ETTP emissions as percentages of Roane County emissions total and combined Anderson and Roane Counties emissions total, respectively.

Source: EPA (2003a).

### 3.2.3.3 Air Quality

The Tennessee SAAQS for six criteria pollutants — SO<sub>2</sub>, NO<sub>2</sub>, CO, O<sub>3</sub>, PM (PM<sub>10</sub> and PM<sub>2.5</sub>), and Pb — are almost the same as the NAAQS (Waynick 2002), as shown in Table 3.2-3. In addition, the state has adopted standards for gaseous fluorides (expressed as HF), as presented in Table 3.2-4.

The ETTP site in Roane County is located in the Eastern Tennessee-Southwestern Virginia Interstate AQCR. Currently, the county is designated as being in attainment for all criteria pollutants (40 CFR 81.343).

Although uranium enrichment activities at ETTP were discontinued in 1985, ambient air monitoring for radionuclides, criteria pollutants (PM<sub>10</sub> and Pb),<sup>3</sup> and several metals has continued at on-site and off-site locations (DOE 2002c). Monitoring indicates that no standards were exceeded, and there was no statistically significant elevation of pollutant concentrations associated with site operations. On the basis of modeling radionuclide emissions from all major and minor point sources, the effective dose equivalent to the most exposed member of the public was 0.8 mrem/yr in 2001, well below the NESHAPs dose limit of 10 mrem/yr (DOE 2002c).

<sup>3</sup> At the end of 2001, all PM<sub>10</sub> sampling was discontinued after a review of PM<sub>10</sub> data over a 10-year period (1991 through 2000) in which all concentrations were below the ambient air quality standards.

**TABLE 3.2-4 Additional Tennessee Ambient Air Quality Standards<sup>a</sup>**

Pollutant	Averaging Time	Primary Standard	Secondary Standard
Gaseous fluorides (as HF)	12 hours	– <sup>b</sup>	3.7 µg/m <sup>3</sup> (4.5 ppb) <sup>c</sup>
	24 hours	–	2.9 µg/m <sup>3</sup> (3.5 ppb) <sup>c</sup>
	7 days	–	1.6 µg/m <sup>3</sup> (2.0 ppb) <sup>c</sup>
	30 days	–	1.2 µg/m <sup>3</sup> (1.5 ppb) <sup>c</sup>
Gaseous fluorides (as HF) <sup>d</sup>	30 days	–	0.5 µg/m <sup>3</sup> (0.6 ppb) <sup>c</sup>

<sup>a</sup> These standards are in addition to the Tennessee SAAQS listed in Table 3.2-3.

<sup>b</sup> A dash indicates that no standard exists.

<sup>c</sup> This average is not to be exceeded more than once per year.

<sup>d</sup> Applied in the vicinity of primary aluminum reduction plants in operation on or before December 31, 1973.

Source: TDEC (1999).

Also, the airborne dose from all ETTP radionuclide emissions was still less than the ORR maximum. The highest concentration levels for SO<sub>2</sub>, NO<sub>2</sub>, CO, PM<sub>10</sub>, 24-hour PM<sub>2.5</sub>, and Pb around and within the ETTP site are less than or equal to 78% of their respective NAAQS in Table 3.2-3 (EPA 2003; DOE 2002c). However, the highest O<sub>3</sub> and annual PM<sub>2.5</sub> concentrations that are of regional concern are approaching or somewhat higher than the applicable NAAQS.

PSD regulations (40 CFR 52.21) limit the maximum allowable incremental increases in ambient concentrations of SO<sub>2</sub>, NO<sub>2</sub>, and PM<sub>10</sub> above established baseline levels, as shown in Table 3.2-3. The PSD regulations, which are designed to protect ambient air quality in Class I and Class II attainment areas, apply to major new sources and major modifications to existing sources. The nearest Class I PSD is the Great Smoky Mountains National Park, about 55 km (34 mi) southeast of ETTP. The Joyce Kilmer-Slickrock Wilderness Area just south of the western end of Great Smoky Mountains National Park is also a Class I area. These Class I areas are not located downwind of prevailing winds at the ETTP (see Figure 3.2-3).

### 3.2.3.4 Existing Noise Environment

The Noise Control Act of 1972, along with its subsequent amendments (Quiet Communities Act of 1978, 42 USC Parts 4901–4918), delegates to the states the authority to regulate environmental noise and directs government agencies to comply with local community noise statutes and regulations. Anderson County has quantitative noise-limit regulations, as

shown in Table 3.2-5 (Anderson County 2002), although the State of Tennessee and Roane County do not.

The EPA has recommended a maximum noise level of 55 dB(A) as DNL to protect against outdoor activity interference and annoyance (EPA 1974). This level is not a regulatory goal but is “intentionally conservative to protect the most sensitive portion of the American population,” with “an additional margin of safety.” For protection against hearing loss in the general population from nonimpulsive noise, the EPA guideline recommends an  $L_{eq}(24\text{ h})$  of 70 dB(A) or less over a 40-year period.

The noise-producing activities within the ETTP site are associated with the DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinder project and local traffic, similar to that at any other industrial site. Major noise sources within the ETTP site consist of heavy equipment, forklift, and crane operations associated with cylinder handling, steel grit blasting operations, welding/burning/hotwork activities during breach repairs, etc. (Cain 2002a).

ETTP is in a rural setting, and no residences and sensitive receptors (e.g., schools, hospitals) are located in the immediate vicinity. As part of hearing protection for workers, industrial hygiene measurements of noise associated with the DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinder project have been made since 1998. Ambient noise levels around the site are relatively low. Measurements taken at the nearby residence along Poplar Creek Road (off Blair Road) to the north of the site on June 1991 at 8:30 a.m. was about 39 dB(A), typical of a rural environment (ANL 1991b). At three residences on Blair Road nearest the site, noises from the K-25 activities were not distinguishable from background noise. To date, there have been no complaints about noise from neighboring communities.

**TABLE 3.2-5 Allowable Noise Level by Zoning District in Anderson County, Tennessee**

Zoning		Allowable Noise Level (dBA)	
District	Abbreviation	7 a.m.–10 p.m.	10 p.m.–7 a.m.
Suburban-residential	R-1	60	55
Rural-residential	A-2	65	60
Agriculture-forest	A-1	65	60
General commercial	C-1	70	65
Light industrial	I-1	70	70
Heavy industrial	I-2	80	80
Floodway	F-1	80	80

Source: Anderson County (2002).

### 3.2.4 Geology and Soil

#### 3.2.4.1 Topography, Structure, and Seismic Risk

The topography of the Oak Ridge site is varied; the maximum change in elevation across the site is about 420 ft (130 m). The site is underlain by sedimentary rocks composed of limestone and dolomite. Sinkholes, large springs, and other karst features can occur in the limestone formations adjacent to the site (DOE 1995).

The ETTP site is situated in the Valley and Ridge Subregion of the Appalachian Highlands Province near the boundary with the Cumberland Plateau (DOE 1995). This subregion consists of a series of northeast-southwest trending ridges bounded by the Cumberland Escarpment on the west and by the Blue Ridge Front on the east.

The major stratigraphic units underlying the site and its confining ridges are the Rome Formation (silty shale and shale), the Conasauga Group (calcareous shale interbedded with limestone and siltstone), the Knox Group (silty dolomite), and the Chickamauga Limestone (interbedded with layers of bentonite). These units range in age from Lower Cambrian (Rome Formation) to Middle Ordovician (Chickamauga Limestone). Contacts between the members are gradational and discontinuous. Sinkholes, large springs, and other karst features are common in the Knox Group, and areas underlain with limestone or dolomites are, for the most part, classified as karst terrains (DOE 1995).

The most important structural feature near the site is a fault system consisting of the Whiteoak Mountain Fault, which runs through the southeastern corner of the Oak Ridge facility; the Kingston Fault, a parallel fault that occurs north of Poplar Creek; and the Copper Creek Fault, located in Melton Valley. A branch of the Whiteoak Mountain Fault originates just south of the facility and runs due north through its center. None of these faults appear to have any topographic expression, and it is assumed that displacement took place prior to the development of the present surface of erosion (DOE 1979). These faults can probably be considered inactive; no seismic events have been associated with these faults near the site, and no surface movement has been reported along the faults.

#### 3.2.4.2 Soils

The typical soil types of the Valley and Ridge Province at ETTP are red-yellow podsols, reddish-brown laterites, or lithosols (DOE 1979). They are usually strongly leached and acidic and have a low organic content. The thickness of alluvium beneath the site ranges from nearly 0 to 60 ft (0 to 18 m). Soils developed on the Chickamauga Formation, which underlies most of the site, are typically yellow to yellow-brown montmorillonites. The Conasauga Shale, which underlies the southeastern corner of the site, develops a silty brown, tan, greenish, and maroon clay that is micaceous and contains fragments of unweathered parent rock. In upland areas around the site, the Fullerton Soil Series is dominant. This soil has moderate infiltration rates and is moderately drained to well drained. The Nolichucky and Talbott Series soils are the most

abundant valley and terrace soils within the site proper. The Nolichucky and Talbott Series soils are similar to the Fullerton Series soils (Geraghty & Miller, Inc. 1989).

Soil and groundwater data have been collected to determine whether contamination is associated with the Oak Ridge cylinder yards (DOE 1994a). Substances in soil possibly associated with cylinder management activities are uranium and fluoride compounds, which could be released to soil if breached cylinders or faulty valves were present. In 1991, 122 systematic soil samples were collected at the K-yard; these samples had maximum concentrations of 0.14 mg/kg of uranium-235 and 13 mg/kg of uranium-238. Soil samples collected in March 1992 at the K-yard had a maximum uranium concentration of  $36 \pm 2$  mg/kg.

In 1994, 200 systematic and 28 biased soil samples were collected in areas surrounding the cylinder yards; the maximum concentrations detected in these samples were 0.83 mg/kg of uranium-235 at the K-1066-F yard (F-yard) and 75 mg/kg of uranium-238 at the E-yard. Groundwater concentrations of total uranium (measured as gross alpha and gross beta) for upgradient and downgradient wells indicate that although some elevated levels of uranium have been detected in cylinder yard soil, no migration to groundwater has occurred (DOE 1994a).

Soil samples collected as part of general site monitoring in the immediate surrounding area in 1994 had the following maximum concentrations: uranium, 6.7 mg/kg; Aroclor<sup>®</sup> 1254 (a PCB), 0.16 mg/kg; cadmium, 0.34 mg/kg; mercury, 0.15 mg/kg; and nickel, 33 mg/kg (LMES 1996c). Fluoride was not analyzed in the soil samples, but it is naturally occurring and of low toxicity. Concentrations of uranium in 1995 and 1996 soil monitoring were lower than the previous results (LMES 1996b, 1997b).


As part of ongoing CERCLA/RCRA investigations, several areas of soil at the ETTP site have been identified as contaminated with radionuclides and/or chemicals. Remediation of this contamination is being implemented as a part of ongoing CERCLA/RCRA activities at the site.

### **3.2.5 Water Resources**

The affected environment for water resources consists of surface water within and in the vicinity of the site boundary and groundwater beneath the site. Analyses of surface water, stream sediment, and groundwater samples have indicated the presence of some contamination resulting from previous gaseous diffusion plant operations. Although several contaminants are present in the water, only small amounts of uranium and fluoride compounds are related to releases from the cylinders.

#### **3.2.5.1 Surface Water**

The ETTP site is located near the confluence of the Clinch River (a tributary of the Tennessee River) and Poplar Creek (Figure 3.2-4). Effluent discharge points are located on both Poplar Creek and the Clinch River, and two water withdrawal points are on the Clinch River (DOE 1979).



**FIGURE 3.2-4 Surface Water Features in the Vicinity of ETTP**

All waters that drain the ETTP site eventually reach the Tennessee-Ohio-Mississippi river system. The Clinch River provides the most immediate destination for waters discharged from the site and flows southwest into the Tennessee River near Kingston, Tennessee (Geraghty & Miller, Inc. 1989). A dam constructed in 1963 at River Mile 23.1 created the Melton Hill Reservoir, which establishes the eastern and southeastern boundaries of the Oak Ridge facility. Before this dam was constructed, flows were regulated by Watts Bar Dam, which is located about 38 mi [61 km] downstream from the mouth of the Clinch River. Because of the presence of Melton Hill and Watts Bar dams, the hydrology of the Clinch River-Poplar Creek system is very complex. Average flows in Melton Branch, Whiteoak Creek, and the East Fork of Poplar Creek were 1,120, 4,320, and 21,680 gal/min (4,240, 16,350, and 82,060 L/min), respectively, for a period of record circa 1960. The average daily discharge below Melton Hill Dam was 2 million gal/min (128.5 m<sup>3</sup>/s) for a 39-year period of record (Geraghty & Miller, Inc. 1989).

The ETTP site contains a series of limited drainage basins through which small streams traverse and ultimately join with the Clinch River (DOE 1979). Poplar Creek (Figure 3.2-4) is one such stream; it receives drainage from an area of 136 mi<sup>2</sup> (352 km<sup>2</sup>), including the northwestern sector of the site. The headwaters of the East Fork are collected in the vicinity of Y-12, where they receive treated wastewater in the form of cooling tower blowdown, waste stream condensate, and process cooling water. In the uplands around the site, surface runoff is largely controlled by soil cover. Within the site, runoff is largely controlled by subsurface drains and diversion ditches. Annual precipitation is 54.8 in. (139 cm). In the vicinity of ETTP, most of the facilities are free from flood hazards for both the 100-year and 500-year maximum probable floods in Poplar Creek (Rothschild et al. 1984).

The ORR site takes water from the Clinch River for makeup cooling water for its reactors at a rate of approximately 20 million gal/d (76 million L/d). An additional 4 million gal/d (15 million L/d) is withdrawn for other process water. These withdrawals occur at Clinch River Miles 11.5 and 14.4. About 25% of this water is returned to the river as treated effluent or blowdown water. As of 1979, no withdrawals were reported from Poplar Creek (DOE 1979). Average water consumption for ETTP in 1994 was 1,324 gal/min (5,011 L/min), equaling about 700 million gal (2.6 billion L) per year.

As of 2000, surface water was being monitored at seven locations at ETTP (DOE 2002c). In the last quarter of 1999, sampling at most monitoring stations was scaled back to a semiannual frequency. Uranium levels were well within permitted levels based on radiological standards. In most instances, results for nonradiological parameters were also well within their applicable Tennessee water quality standards. Heavy metals were detected, but they were always well within applicable standards. In general, analytical results for samples collected upstream of ETTP were chemically similar to those collected downstream of the site, indicating that the site has little effect on chemical concentrations in surface water.

Sediment samples have also been collected at points that coincided with the ORR water sampling locations. The sediment samples were analyzed for uranium and other parameters. For 1994, the following maximum concentrations were measured: uranium, 43 mg/kg; mercury, 6 mg/kg; nickel, 89 mg/kg; and Aroclor 1254, 10 mg/kg (LMES 1996c).

### **3.2.5.2 Groundwater**

Groundwater occurs in a surficial aquifer and in bedrock aquifers in the vicinity of ETTP. The surficial aquifer consists of man-made fill, alluvium, and the residuum of weathered bedrock (Geraghty & Miller, Inc. 1989). The depth to unweathered bedrock varies from less than 10 to more than 50 ft (<3 to >15 m), depending on the characteristics of the underlying rocks.

Bedrock aquifers in the area are composed of Cambrian to Ordovician sandstones, siltstones, shales, dolostones, and limestones. The uppermost bedrock aquifer occurs in the Chickamauga Group. This formation disconformably overlies the Knox Dolostone and is the most extensive bedrock unit underlying the site. Shale beds restrict groundwater flow in the

aquifer, resulting in concentrated flow along the limestone-shale contact, with resultant solution cavities.

The next-lower aquifer occurs in the Knox Group. It is composed of dolostone with interbeds of limestone. Solution features such as sinkholes and caverns are common and are an important route for groundwater flow. This unit is the principal aquifer on the site (Rothschild et al. 1984); the mean yield of wells and springs is about 268 gal/min (1,014 L/min).

As in the Knox Group, solution cavities in the Conasauga Group are an important controlling influence for groundwater flow. Because shale beds within the group are generally less transmissive, groundwater flow is concentrated in the limestone strata. In addition to solution features, folds and faults can also control flow in this unit (Rothschild et al. 1984). The oldest units in the area are the Shady Dolomite and the Rome Formation. Groundwater in these units is largely controlled by fractures and vugs (Geraghty & Miller, Inc. 1989).

During the late spring and summer of 1981, a series of tests to determine properties of the bedrock aquifers directly across the Clinch River from site K-770 were conducted (Geraghty & Miller, Inc. 1989). Transmissivity values for the bedrock aquifers (Upper Rome Formation, Chickamauga and Knox Groups) ranged from 22 to 15,000 gal/d per foot (270 to 185,000 L/d per meter), with most values ranging from 22 to 6,000 gal/d per foot (270 to 73,600 L/d per meter). Slug tests performed in the unconsolidated surficial aquifer indicated that the hydraulic conductivity ranged from  $1 \times 10^{-7}$  to 0.01 cm/s. Bedrock values ranged from  $1 \times 10^{-6}$  to  $1 \times 10^{-3}$  cm/s.

On May 29 and 30, 1991 water-level measurements were collected from 185 of 191 monitoring wells at the ETTP site (Geraghty & Miller, Inc. 1991). Inferred directions of groundwater flow are to the south and southwest toward Poplar Creek. Recharge to the groundwater system occurs from surface water bodies and infiltrating precipitation.

Groundwater contamination is a significant problem on the site (Rothschild et al. 1984). The problem is compounded by use of land underlain by shallow groundwater (found in most of the valleys on the reservation) and by the presence of direct conduits to groundwater (e.g., solution features and fractures), which are common. Contamination is associated with waste disposal activities, buried pipelines, and accidental spills.

In 1994 and 1995, groundwater samples were collected from a network of between 200 and 225 monitoring wells at the site (LMES 1996b,c). The number of wells monitored was greatly decreased in 1996 as a result of the reorganization of the site into six watersheds and reduced monitoring requirements (LMES 1997b). In the 1994 and 1995 sampling conducted for the larger network of monitoring wells, the following substances were detected at levels exceeding their associated primary drinking water standards: antimony, arsenic, barium, cadmium, chromium (up to 0.741 mg/L), fluoride (only at two wells), lead, nickel (up to 0.626 mg/L), thallium (up to 0.021 mg/L), benzene (up to 6 µg/L), carbon tetrachloride, 1,1-dichloroethene (greater than 1,000 µg/L), chloroform, 1,2 dichloroethene (greater than 1,000 µg/L), methylene chloride, toluene (greater than 1,000 µg/L), 1,1,2-trichloro-1,2,2-trifluoroethane (greater than 1,000 µg/L), TCE (up to 11,000 µg/L), 1,1,1-trichloroethane

(up to 140,000 µg/L), 1,1,2-trichloroethane, tetrachloroethene (up to 17 µg/L), vinyl chloride, gross alpha activity (up to 43 pCi/L), and gross beta activity (up to 6,770 pCi/L) (LMES 1996b,c). Aluminum, iron, and manganese also consistently exceeded secondary, non-health-based standards because of the natural geochemical nature of the groundwater underlying the site (LMES 1996b).

Data from the 2000 annual groundwater monitoring program showed that aluminum and lead exceeded maximum contaminant levels for groundwater at ETTP (DOE 2002c). Copper, iron, and zinc were also found at elevated concentrations, but MCLs are not available for these analytes.

Exit-pathway groundwater surveillance monitoring was conducted in 1994 and 1995 at convergence points where shallow groundwater flows from relatively large areas of the site and converges before discharging to surface water locations (LMES 1996b,c). The exit-pathway monitoring data are representative of maximum groundwater contamination levels associated with the site at areas to which the general public might possibly have access in the future. For 1994, monitoring indicated that thallium, bis(2-ethylhexyl)phthalate, and TCE were present in at least one exit-pathway well sample at concentrations exceeding primary drinking water standards (LMES 1996c). The following average concentrations of these constituents were measured: thallium, 0.007 mg/L; bis(2-ethylhexyl)phthalate, 0.169 mg/L; and TCE, 0.008 mg/L. Alpha activity and fluoride levels were also measured but did not exceed reference levels (the average concentration was 4.4 pCi/L for alpha activity and 0.4 mg/L for fluoride). For 1995, monitoring indicated that no inorganic or organic substances exceeded primary drinking water standards; however, alpha activity exceeded the reference level in one well during the spring sampling event (level of 17 pCi/L) (LMES 1996b).

### **3.2.6 Biotic Resources**

#### **3.2.6.1 Vegetation**

About 65% of the land within a 5-mi (8-km) radius of the ETTP site is forested, although most of the ETTP site consists of mowed grasses. Oak-hickory forest is the predominant community on ridges and dry slopes. Mixed pine forests or pine plantations, many of which are managed, have replaced former agricultural fields. Selective logging occurred over much of the site before 1986. Cedar barrens are small communities, primarily on shallow limestone soils, that support drought-tolerant species such as little bluestem, dropseed, eastern red cedar, and stunted oak. A cedar barrens across the Clinch River from the ETTP site may be the best example of this habitat in the state and has been designated as a State Natural Area.

#### **3.2.6.2 Wildlife**

The high diversity of habitats in the area supports many wildlife species. Ground-nesting species commonly occurring on the ETTP site include red fox, ruffed grouse, and eastern box

turtle. Canada geese are also common in the ETTP area, and most are probably residents (ANL 1991b). Waterfowl, wading birds, and shorebirds are numerous along the Clinch River, in its backwaters, and in ponds. Two great blue heron rookeries are located north of the ETTP site on Poplar Creek (ANL 1991b). Species commonly associated with streams and ponds include muskrat, beaver, and several species of turtles and frogs.

The aquatic communities within the Clinch River and Poplar Creek support a high diversity of fish species and other aquatic fauna. Mitchell Branch supports fewer fish species, although the diversity of fish species has increased downstream of most ETTP discharges since 1990 (DOE 2002c; LMES 1996b).

### **3.2.6.3 Wetlands**

Numerous wetlands occur in the vicinity of ETTP, including three small wetlands along Mitchell Branch (ANL 1991b). Extensive forested wetlands occur along Poplar Creek, East Fork Poplar Creek, Bear Creek, and their tributaries. Shallow water embayments of Melton Hill Reservoir and Watts Bar Reservoir support large areas of palustrine emergent wetlands with persistent vegetation. Forested wetlands occur along these marshy areas and extend into tributaries (DOE 1995).

### **3.2.6.4 Threatened and Endangered Species**

No occurrence of federal- or state-listed threatened or endangered species on the ETTP site has been documented. Table 3.2-6 gives the federal- and state-listed species that occur on the ORR. Gray bats, which are federal and state listed as endangered, have been observed on ORR as transient individuals (DOE 2002c). The bald eagle, federal listed as threatened, is a winter visitor on the reservation (DOE 2001c). Bachman's sparrow, state listed as endangered, may be present on ORR, although it has not been observed recently (DOE 2002c). Suitable nesting habitat on the reservation includes open pine woods with shrubs and dense ground cover (ANL 1991b).

## **3.2.7 Public and Occupational Safety and Health**

### **3.2.7.1 Radiation Environment**

Table 3.2-7 gives the radiation doses to the ETTP cylinder yard workers and to off-site members of the general public. Exposure to airborne emissions from ETTP operations is approximately 13% of that from operations of the entire ORR. Radiation exposure of the general public MEI is estimated to be 6.7 mrem/yr. This dose is about 7% of the maximum dose limit of 100 mrem/yr set for the general public (DOE 1990) and much smaller than the average dose from natural background radiation in the State of Tennessee. The estimated dose of 6.7 mrem/yr for the MEI was based on the assumption that the off-site public would stay far away from the

cylinder yards, which is the case under normal conditions. However, potential external exposure could occur and reach 100 mrem/yr if an off-site individual spends more than 90 hours in a year immediately at the cylinder yard fence line.

Between 1991 and 1995, the average annual dose to cylinder yard workers ranged from 32 to 92 mrem/yr, which is less than 2% of the maximum radiation dose limit of 5,000 mrem/yr set for radiation workers (10 CFR Part 835). In 1998, 400 cylinders were repainted; the maximum worker exposure was 107 mrem/yr (Cain 2002b).

### **3.2.7.2 Chemical Environment**

Table 3.2-8 gives the estimated hazard quotients for members of the general public under existing environmental conditions near the ETTP site. The hazard quotient represents a comparison of the estimated human intake level of a contaminant with an intake level below which adverse effects are very unlikely to occur. The estimated hazard quotients indicate that exposures to DUF<sub>6</sub>-related contaminants in environmental media near the ETTP site are generally a small fraction of those that might be associated with adverse health effects. An exception is groundwater, for which the hazard quotient for fluoride could exceed the threshold of 1. However, it is highly unlikely that this groundwater would be used as a drinking water source.

OSHA has proposed PELs for uranium compounds and HF in the workplace (29 CFR Part 1910, Subpart Z, as of February 2003) as follows: 0.05 mg/m<sup>3</sup> for soluble uranium compounds, 0.25 mg/m<sup>3</sup> for insoluble uranium compounds, and 2.5 mg/m<sup>3</sup> for HF. ETTP worker exposures are kept below these limits.

### **3.2.8 Socioeconomics**

Socioeconomic data for the ETTP site focus on an ROI comprising four Tennessee counties surrounding the site: Anderson, Knox, Loudon, and Roane. The counties included in the ROI were selected on the basis of the current residential locations of government workers directly involved in ETTP activities. The ROI is defined on the basis of the current residential locations of government workers directly connected to ETTP site activities and includes the area in which these workers spend much of their salaries. More than 90% of ETTP workers currently reside in these counties (Cain 2002b). Because the majority of ETTP workers live in Anderson and Knox Counties and the City of Knoxville, the majority of impacts from ETTP would be expected to occur in these locations; therefore, the following discussions emphasize those areas.

#### **3.2.8.1 Population**

The population of the ROI in 2000 was 544,358 people (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2002a) and was expected to reach 565,000 by 2003 (Table 3.2-9). In 2000, 382,032 people (70%

**TABLE 3.2-9 Population in the ETTP Region of Influence and Tennessee in 1990, 2000, and 2003**

Location	1990	2000	Growth Rate (%), 1990–2000 <sup>a</sup>	2003 <sup>b</sup> (Projected)
City of Knoxville	165,121	173,890	0.5	176,600
Knox County	335,749	382,032	1.3	397,100
Anderson County	68,250	71,330	0.4	72,300
Loudon County	31,255	39,086	2.3	41,800
Roane County	47,227	51,910	1.0	53,400
ROI total	482,481	544,358	1.2	564,600
Tennessee	4,877,185	5,689,283	1.6	5,958,000

<sup>a</sup> Average annual rate.

<sup>b</sup> ANL projections, as detailed in Appendix F.

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census (2002a), except as noted.

of the ROI total) resided in Knox County, 71,330 people resided in Anderson County, and 173,890 people resided in the City of Knoxville itself (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2002a). During the 1990s, each of the counties in the ROI and the City of Knoxville experienced moderate increases in population, with an ROI average growth of 1.2%. A slightly higher growth rate was experienced in Loudon County (2.3%), which had the smallest population in the ROI. Over the same period, the population in Tennessee grew at a rate of 1.6%.

### 3.2.8.2 Employment

Total employment in Knox County was 188,114 in 2000; it was projected to reach 199,400 by 2003. The economy of the county is dominated by the trade and service sectors, with employment in those sectors currently contributing more than 75% of all employment in the county (Table 3.2-10). Employment growth in the highest growth sector, the service sector, was 7.1% during the 1990s, compared with 2.0% in the county for all sectors as a whole (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1992, 2002b).

Total employment in Anderson County was 39,797 in 2000; it was projected to reach 42,000 by 2003. The economy of the county is dominated by the manufacturing and service sectors, with employment in those sectors currently contributing more than 82% of all employment in the county (Table 3.2-11). Employment growth in the highest growth sector, services, was 5.5% during the 1990s, compared with 1.8% in the county for all sectors as a whole (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1992, 2002b).

**TABLE 3.2-10 Employment in Knox County by Industry in 1990 and 2000**

Sector	No. of People Employed in 1990 <sup>a</sup>	Percentage of County Total	No. of People Employed in 2000 <sup>b</sup>	Percentage of County Total	Growth Rate (%), 1990–2000
Agriculture	2,010 <sup>c</sup>	1.3	951 <sup>d</sup>	0.5	-7.2 <sup>e</sup>
Mining	775	0.5	315	0.2	-8.6
Construction	9,817	6.3	12,225	6.5	2.2
Manufacturing	22,720	14.7	16,912	9.0	-2.9
Transportation and public utilities	9,823	6.3	5,272	2.8	-6.0
Trade	52,258	33.7	41,951	22.3	-2.2
Finance, insurance, and real estate	7,228	4.7	10,668	5.7	4.0
Services	50,032	32.3	99,707	53.0	7.1
Total	154,968		188,114		2.0

<sup>a</sup> U.S. Bureau of the Census (1992).

<sup>b</sup> U.S. Bureau of the Census (2002b).

<sup>c</sup> These agricultural data are for 1992 and are taken from USDA (1994).

<sup>d</sup> These agricultural data are for 1997 and are taken from USDA (1999).

<sup>e</sup> Agricultural data are for 1992 and 1997.

Total employment in the ROI was 248,003 in 2000; it was projected to reach 262,600 by 2003. The economy of the ROI is dominated by the trade and service sectors; combined, they contribute 72% of all employment in the ROI (Table 3.2-12). Employment growth in the highest growth sector, services, was almost 6.8% during the 1990s, compared with 1.9% in the ROI for all sectors as a whole (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1992, 2002b). Employment at the ETTP site currently stands at 1,740 (Cain 2002b).

Unemployment in the Knoxville Metropolitan Statistical Area was 2.8% in December 2002, slightly lower than the average rate during the 1990s (Table 3.2-13). Unemployment for the state was 4.1% in December 2002, which is also slightly lower than the average rates for the last 10 years.

### 3.2.8.3 Personal Income

Personal income in Knox County totaled about \$11.3 billion in 2000 (in 2002 dollars) and was projected to reach \$13.5 billion by 2003. The annual average rate of growth was 2.8%

over the period 1990 through 2000 (Table 3.2-14). County per capita income also rose in the 1990s and was expected to reach \$34,400 in 2003, compared with \$29,600 at the beginning of the period.

Personal income in Anderson County was almost \$2 billion in 2000 (in 2002 dollars) and was expected to reach \$2.2 billion by 2003. The annual average rate of growth was 1.9% over the period 1990 through 2000 (Table 3.2-14). County per capita income also rose in the 1990s and was expected to reach \$31,100 in 2003, compared with about \$27,200 at the beginning of the period.

Growth rates in total personal income in the ROI as a whole were the same as those for Knox County and slightly higher than those for Anderson County. Total personal income in the ROI grew at a rate of 2.8% over the period 1990 through 2000 and was expected to reach almost \$18.5 billion by 2003. ROI per capita income was expected to grow from about \$28,500 in 1990 to \$33,000 by 2003, which is an average annual growth rate of 1.4%.

**TABLE 3.2-13 Unemployment Rates in the Knoxville Metropolitan Statistical Area and Tennessee**

Location and Period	Rate (%)
<b>Knoxville MSA<sup>a</sup></b>	
1992–2002 average	3.7
Dec. 2002 (current rate)	2.8
<b>Tennessee</b>	
1992–2002 average	4.6
Dec. 2002 (current rate)	4.1

<sup>a</sup> Knoxville Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) consists of Anderson, Blount, Knox, Loudon, Sevier, and Union Counties.

Source: BLS (2002).

**TABLE 3.2-14 Personal Income in Knox and Anderson Counties and the ETTP Region of Influence in 1990, 2000, and 2003**

Location and Type of Income	1990	2000	Growth Rate (%), 1990–2000	2003 (Projected) <sup>a</sup>
<b>Knox County</b>				
Total personal income (millions of 2002 \$)	8,790	11,308	2.8	13,500
Personal per capita income (2002 \$)	26,180	29,599	1.4	34,400
<b>Anderson County</b>				
Total personal income (millions of 2002 \$)	1,643	1,938	1.9	2,200
Personal per capita income (2002 \$)	24,074	27,173	1.4	31,100
<b>Total ROI</b>				
Total personal income (millions of 2002 \$)	12,118	15,516	2.8	18,500
Personal per capita income (2002 \$)	25,115	28,503	1.4	33,000

<sup>a</sup> ANL projections, as detailed in Appendix F.  
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce (2002).

### 3.2.8.4 Housing

Housing stock in Knox County grew at an annual rate of 1.8% over the period 1990 through 2000 (Table 3.2-15) (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2002a), with 178,000 housing units expected by 2002, reflecting the growth in county population. Growth in the City of Knoxville during this period was 1.1%, with total housing units expected to reach 86,300 by 2003. During the 1990s, 27,900 new units were added to the existing housing stock in the county, with 8,528 of these units in the City of Knoxville in 2000. Vacancy rates in 2000 stood at 9.8% in the city and 7.9% in the county as a whole for all types of housing. On the basis of annual population growth rates, 14,900 housing units were expected to be vacant in the county in 2003; 4,800 of these were expected to be rental units.

Housing stock in Anderson County grew at an annual rate of 1.0% over the period 1990 to 2000 (Table 3.2-15) (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2002a), with total housing units expected to reach 33,500 in 2003, reflecting moderate growth in county population. Almost 3,130 new units were added to the existing housing stock in the county during the 1990s. Vacancy rates in 2000 stood at 8.2% in the county for all types of housing. On the basis of annual population growth rates, 2,900 housing units were expected to be vacant in the county in 2003, of which 800 were expected to be rental units.

Housing stock grew at a slightly slower rate in the ROI as a whole than it did in Knox County during the 1990s, with an overall growth rate of 1.7%. Total housing units were expected to reach 257,400 by 2003, with more than 38,300 housing units added in the 1990s. On the basis of vacancy rates in 2000, which stood at 8.1%, more than 6,400 rental units were expected to be available in 2003.

**TABLE 3.2-15 Housing Characteristics in the City of Knoxville, Knox and Anderson Counties, and the ETPP Region of Influence in 1990 and 2000**

Location and Type of Unit	No. of Units	
	1990	2000
<b>City of Knoxville</b>		
Owner-occupied	34,892	39,208
Rental	35,081	37,442
Total unoccupied	6,480	8,331
Total	76,453	84,981
<b>Knox County</b>		
Owner-occupied	85,369	105,562
Rental	48,270	52,310
Total unoccupied	9,943	13,567
Total	143,582	171,439
<b>Anderson County</b>		
Owner-occupied	19,401	21,592
Rental	7,983	8,188
Total unoccupied	1,939	2,671
Total	29,323	32,451
<b>ROI Total</b>		
Owner-occupied	128,300	156,219
Rental	63,331	68,577
Total unoccupied	14,603	19,740
Total	206,234	244,536

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census (2002a).

### **3.2.8.5 Community Resources**

**3.2.8.5.1 Community Fiscal Conditions.** Construction and operation of the proposed facility might result in increased revenues and expenditures for local government jurisdictions, including counties, cities, and school districts. Revenues would come primarily from state and local sales tax revenues associated with employee spending during construction and operations, and they would be used to support additional local community services currently provided by each jurisdiction. Tables 1 and 2 of Allison (2002) present information on revenues and expenditures by the various local government jurisdictions in the ROI.

**3.2.8.5.2 Community Public Services.** Construction and operation of the proposed facility would result in increased demand for community services in the counties, cities, and school districts likely to host relocating construction workers and operations employees. Additional demands would also be placed on local medical facilities and physician services. Table 3.2-16 presents data on employment and levels of service (number of employees per 1,000 population) for public safety and general local government services, and Table 3.2-17 covers physicians. Tables 3.2-18 and 3.2-19 provide staffing data for school districts and hospitals.

### **3.2.9 Waste Management**

The ETTP site generates industrial and sanitary waste, including wastewater, solid nonhazardous waste, solid and liquid hazardous waste, radioactive waste, and radioactive hazardous mixed waste. The ETTP site is an active participant in the waste minimization and recycling program within the ORR complex. Much of the waste generated at ETTP is from the ongoing environmental remediation efforts at the site. The ETTP site has the capability to treat wastewater and certain radioactive and hazardous wastes. Some of the wastes generated at ETTP can also be processed or disposed of at facilities located at the Y-12 Plant and ORNL. The ETTP facilities also store and process waste generated at Y-12, ORNL, and from other DOE installations at Paducah, Portsmouth, and Fernald. Most radioactive waste at ETTP is contaminated with uranium and uranium decay products, with small amounts of fission products and TRU radionuclides from nuclear fuel recycling programs. Table 3.2-20 lists the ETTP site waste loads assumed for the analysis of impacts of projected activities.

#### **3.2.9.1 Wastewater**

Treated wastewater at the ETTP site is discharged under a National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit. Sanitary wastewater is processed at an on-site sewage treatment plant with a capacity of 0.92 million gal/d (3.5 million L/d).

**3.2.9.2 Solid Nonhazardous, Nonradioactive Waste**

About 35,000 yd<sup>3</sup>/yr (27,500 m<sup>3</sup>/yr) of solid nonhazardous waste is generated at ORR, which includes waste from the ETTP site. The waste is disposed of at the Y-12 landfill; it is projected that about 50% of the landfill's capacity, or about 920,000 yd<sup>3</sup> (700,000 m<sup>3</sup>), would be available in the year 2020.

**3.2.9.3 Nonradioactive Hazardous and Toxic Waste**

The ETTP site generates both RCRA-hazardous and TSCA-hazardous waste. The site operates several RCRA hazardous waste treatment and storage facilities. The site also operates a permitted TSCA incinerator to treat hazardous and LLMW liquids contaminated with PCBs. The incinerator also processes PCB waste from other facilities at ORR and from off-site DOE installations.

**3.2.9.4 Low-Level Radioactive Waste**

Current ORR policy for newly generated LLW is to perform necessary packaging for direct shipment to appropriate on- and off-site treatment, storage, and disposal facilities. LLW that is not treated or disposed of at ORR is placed in storage, pending either treatment or disposal, or both, at off-site facilities.

**3.2.9.5 Low-Level Radioactive Mixed Waste**

The majority of radioactive waste generated at ETTP is LLMW, which consists of two categories: (1) aqueous RCRA-hazardous radioactive waste contaminated with corrosives or metals and (2) organic liquids contaminated with PCBs.

Aqueous LLMW is treated on site, and resulting wastewaters are discharged to the NPDES-permitted discharges, which have a capacity of 450,000 yd<sup>3</sup>/yr (340,000 m<sup>3</sup>/yr). Organic LLMW liquids contaminated with PCBs are treated by the ETTP TSCA incinerator, which has a capacity of 1,800 yd<sup>3</sup>/yr (1,400 m<sup>3</sup>/yr).

**TABLE 3.2-20 Projected Waste Generation Volumes for ETTP<sup>a</sup>**

Waste Category	Waste Treatment Volume (m <sup>3</sup> /yr)
LLW	41,000
LLMW	2,700
TRU	0
Hazardous waste	350
Nonhazardous waste <sup>b</sup>	
Solids	12,000
Wastewater	47,000

<sup>a</sup> Volumes include operational and environmental restoration waste projected from FY 2002 to FY 2025. However, it is projected that the majority of the waste would be generated by FY 2008.

<sup>b</sup> Volumes include sanitary and industrial wastes.

Source: Cain (2002c).

ETTP has the capacity to treat approximately 6,500 yd<sup>3</sup>/yr (5,000 m<sup>3</sup>/yr) of liquid LLMW via grout stabilization. The site has the capacity to store 88,600 yd<sup>3</sup> (67,800 m<sup>3</sup>) of LLMW containers.

### 3.2.10 Land Use

ETTP is located in east-central Tennessee, in the eastern part of Roane County about 25 mi (40 km) west of the City of Knoxville. An analysis of Landsat satellite imagery from 1992 shows that the dominant land cover categories in Roane County include deciduous forest (42.0%), mixed forest (19.7%), evergreen forest (13.6%), and pasture/hay (10.3%) (Figure 3.2-5). The 1997 agricultural census recorded 99 farms in Roane County, covering more than 53,100 acres (21,489 ha) (USDA 1999). Human settlement is sparse throughout much of the county, with most of the population residing in the communities of Harriman, Kingston, Oak Ridge, and Rockwood. The eastern third of Roane County, where ETTP is located, is dominated by deciduous and mixed forest and pasture.

The 1,700-acre (690-ha) ETTP site contains more than 300 buildings with a combined floor space of 13 million ft<sup>2</sup> (1.2 million m<sup>2</sup>) (MMES 1994b).

Land use at ETTP focuses on the reuse of facilities, equipment, materials, and utilities previously associated with the gaseous diffusion plant, with an emphasis on reindustrialization (Bechtel Jacobs Company LLC 2002). Activities at the site include a range of operations associated with environmental management at the DOE Oak Ridge Operations facilities, such as management of the TSCA incinerator and the treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous and radioactive waste (including DUF<sub>6</sub>) (Operations Management International, Inc. 2002a). Currently, ETTP is home to two business centers: Heritage Center and Horizon Center. The Heritage Center encompasses 125 of the main buildings of the former gaseous diffusion facility, which are currently leased to more than 40 companies (Operations Management International, Inc. 2002b). The Horizon Center encompasses 1,000 acres (447 ha) of building sites aimed primarily at high-tech companies.

### 3.2.11 Cultural Resources

The ETTP site falls under the CRMP for ORR. That plan, which contains procedures for managing archaeological sites, historic structures, traditional cultural properties, and Native American sacred sites, was finalized in July 2001 (Souza et al. 2001). Under the plan, ETTP has responsibility for cultural resources at the eastern end of the reservation.

Cultural resource surveys at ORR have provided a considerable body of knowledge regarding the history and prehistory of the area. Archaeological evidence indicates that there has been a human presence at ORR for at least 12,000 years. All the major prehistoric Eastern Woodland archaeological periods are represented there: Paleo-Indian (10,000 B.C.–8,000 B.C.), Archaic (8,000 B.C.–900 B.C.), Woodland (900 B.C.–A.D. 900), and Mississippian

(A.D. 900–A.D. 1600). While the ETTP area has not been completely surveyed, six prehistoric sites were identified there. Three of them were determined to be eligible for the NRHP. Five of the six sites lie outside the ETTP security fences. The area within the ETTP security fences underwent massive earthmoving operations during the construction of the gaseous diffusion plant. It is unlikely that unidentified intact archaeological sites remain within the fences (Morris 1998; Souza et al. 2001).

The Overhill Cherokee occupied part of eastern Tennessee from the 1700s until their relocation to Oklahoma in 1838. DOE Oak Ridge Operations has initiated consultations with the Eastern Band of the Cherokee Indians and the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma regarding Native American issues related to the DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion project at ORR (see Appendix G). No religious or sacred sites, burial sites, or resources significant to the Cherokee have been identified at ETTP to date. However, there are mounds and other prehistoric sites at ORR thought likely to contain prehistoric burials. Similar resources could exist in the unsurveyed portions of the ETTP area (Souza et al. 2001).

Euro-American settlers began entering eastern Tennessee after 1798, and by 1804, settlement of the area that would become ORR in the 20th century had begun. An economy based on subsistence farming and, later, on coal mining developed. A survey of pre-World War II historic structures at ORR was conducted; 254 structures were evaluated, and 41 were recommended as being eligible for the NRHP, in addition to the 6 that were already listed (DuVall and Souza 1996). Two historic archaeological districts were proposed. Of these, the Wheat Community Historic District lies within the ETTP area. It includes 28 contributing structures; one (the George Jones Memorial Church) is already listed on the NRHP. The ETTP site also includes six historic cemeteries (Morris 1998; Souza et al. 2001).

In 1942, the U.S. Army began to acquire land in eastern Tennessee for the Manhattan Project's "Site X." Renamed the Clinton Engineer Works in 1943, the new facility included a gaseous diffusion plant at the K-25 Site. The K-25 Site played a significant role in the production of highly enriched uranium for weapons manufacture between 1944 and 1964, materially contributing to the development of nuclear weapons during World War II and the Cold War. The K-25 site forms the heart of ETTP. Buildings at the ETTP site were evaluated for their historical significance in 1994. One historic district, the Main Plant Historic District, is eligible for the NRHP. The district consists of 157 buildings, 120 of which contribute to the district (37 do not). Eleven additional buildings not adjacent to the district are also considered eligible by virtue of their supporting roles in the uranium-235 enrichment process (DuVall and Souza 1996; Holcombe-Burdette 1998; Souza et al. 2001).

### **3.2.12 Environmental Justice**

#### **3.2.12.1 Minority Populations**

This EIS uses data from the most recent decennial census in 2000 to evaluate environmental justice implications of the proposed action and all alternatives with respect to

minority populations. The CEQ guidelines on environmental justice recommend that “minority” be defined as members of American Indian or Alaska Native, Asian or Pacific Islander, Black non-Hispanic, and Hispanic populations (CEQ 1997). The earliest release of 2000 census data that included information necessary to identify minority populations identified individuals both according to race and Hispanic origin (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2001). It also identified individuals claiming multiple racial identities (up to six races). To remain consistent with the CEQ guidelines, the term “minority population” in this document refers to persons who identified themselves as partially or totally Black (including Black or Negro, African American, Afro-American, Black Puerto Rican, Jamaican, Nigerian, West Indian, or Haitian), American Indian or Alaska Native, Asian, Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander, or “Other Race.” The minority category also includes White individuals of Hispanic origin, although the latter is technically an ethnic category. To avoid double counting, tabulations included only White Hispanics; the above racial groups already account for non-White Hispanics. In sum, then, the minority population considered under environmental justice consisted of all non-White persons (including those of multiple racial affiliations) plus White persons of Hispanic origin.

To identify census tracts with disproportionately high minority populations, this EIS uses the percentage of minorities in each state containing a given tract as the reference point. Using the individual states to identify disproportionality acknowledges that minority distributions in the state can differ from those found in the nation as a whole. In 2000, of the 240 census tracts within 50 mi (80 km) of the storage facility at ETTP, 19 had minority populations in excess of state-specified thresholds — a total of 24,235 minority persons in all (Figure 3.2-6). In 2000, 5.2% of the Roane County population was minority (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2002e).

### **3.2.12.2 Low-Income Populations**

As recommended by the CEQ guidelines, the environmental justice analysis identifies low-income populations as those falling below the statistical poverty level identified annually by the U.S. Bureau of the Census in its Series P-60 documents on income and poverty. The Census Bureau defines poverty levels on the basis of a statistical threshold that considers for each family both overall family size and the number of related children younger than 18 years old. For example, in 1999, the poverty threshold annual income for a family of three with one related child younger than 18 was \$13,410, while the poverty threshold for a family of five with one related child younger than 18 was \$21,024 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2000). The 2000 census used 1999 thresholds because 1999 was the most recent year for which annual income data were available when the census was conducted. If a family fell below the poverty line for its particular composition, the census considered all individuals in that family to be below the poverty line.

To identify census tracts with disproportionately high low-income populations, this EIS uses the percentage of low-income persons in each state containing a given tract as a reference point. In 1999, of the 240 census tracts within 50 mi (80 km) of the storage facility at ETTP, 128 had low-income populations in excess of state-specified thresholds — a total of 157,843 low-income persons in all (Figure 3.2-7). In 1999, in Roane County, 13.9% of those individuals for whom poverty status was known were low-income (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2002e).

## **4 ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT APPROACH, ASSUMPTIONS, AND METHODOLOGY**

This EIS evaluates potential impacts on human health and the natural environment from building and operating a DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion facility at three alternative locations at the Paducah site and for a no action alternative. These impacts might be positive, in that they would improve conditions in the human or natural environment, or negative, in that they would cause a decline in those conditions. This chapter provides an overview of the methods used to estimate the potential impacts associated with the EIS alternatives, summarizes the major assumptions that formed the basis of the evaluation, and provides some background information on human health impacts. More detailed information on the assessment methods used to evaluate potential environmental impacts is provided in Appendix F.

### **4.1 GENERAL APPROACH**

Potential environmental impacts were assessed by examining all of the activities required to implement each alternative, including construction of the required facility, operation of the facility, and transportation of materials between sites. Potential long-term impacts from cylinder breaches occurring at Paducah were also estimated. For each alternative, potential impacts to workers, members of the general public, and the environment were estimated for both normal operations and for potential accidents.

The analysis for this EIS considered all potential areas of impact but emphasized those that might have a significant impact on human health or the environment, would be different under different alternatives, or would be of special interest to the public (such as potential radiation effects). The environmental characteristics of the Paducah site, where the conversion facility would be built and operated, are described in Section 3.1. The environmental setting of the ETTP site, where cylinders would be prepared for shipment if they were to be transported to Paducah, is described in Section 3.2.

The estimates of potential environmental impacts for the proposed action were based on characteristics of the proposed UDS conversion facility. The two primary sources of information were excerpts from the UDS conversion facility conceptual design report (UDS 2003a) and the updated UDS NEPA data package (UDS 2003b). As noted in Section 2.2, current facility designs are at the 100% conceptual design stage. Several design options are considered in the EIS to provide future flexibility.

The NEPA data package (UDS 2003b) was prepared by UDS to support preparation of this EIS. For the proposed Paducah conversion facility, the NEPA data package includes facility descriptions, process descriptions and material flows, anticipated waste generation, anticipated air emissions, anticipated liquid effluents, waste minimization and pollution prevention approaches, anticipated water usage, anticipated energy consumption, anticipated materials usage, anticipated toxic or hazardous chemical storage, floodplain and wetland information,

anticipated noise levels, estimated land use, employment needs, anticipated transportation needs, and safety analysis data.

The NEPA data and a variety of assessment tools and methods were used to evaluate the potential impacts that construction and operation of the conversion facility would have on human health and the environment. These methods are described by technical discipline in Appendix F. The following sections summarize the major assessment assumptions and provide overview information on the estimation of human health impacts from radiation and chemical exposures.

## **4.2 MAJOR ASSUMPTIONS AND PARAMETERS**

Table 4.2-1 gives the major assumptions and parameters that formed the basis of the analyses in this EIS. The primary source for conversion facility data was the updated UDS NEPA data package (UDS 2003b). Discipline-specific information and technical assumptions are provided in the methods described in Appendix F.

## **4.3 METHODOLOGY**

In general, the activities assessed in this EIS could affect workers, members of the general public, and the environment during construction of the new facility, during routine facility operations, during transportation, and during facility or transportation accidents. Activities could have adverse effects (e.g., human health impairment) or positive effects (e.g., regional socioeconomic benefits, such as the creation of jobs). Some impacts would result primarily from the unique characteristics of the uranium and other chemical compounds handled or generated under the alternatives. Other impacts would occur regardless of the types of materials involved, such as the impacts on air and water quality that can occur during any construction project and the vehicle-related impacts that can occur during transportation.


The areas of potential environmental impacts evaluated in this EIS are shown and described in Figure 4.3-1 (the order of presentation does not imply relative importance). For each area, different analytical methods were used to estimate the potential impacts from construction, operations, and accidents for each of the alternatives. The assessment methodologies are summarized in Appendix F.

Because of the chemical and radioactive nature of the materials being processed and produced, and the fact that the conversion facility would be built on a previously disturbed industrialized site, the potential impact to the health of workers and the public is one of the areas of primary concern in this EIS. Therefore, the following sections provide background information on radiation and chemical health effects and on the approach used to evaluate accidents. The information is presented to aid in the understanding and interpretation of the potential human health impacts presented in Chapters 2 and 5.

**TABLE 4.2-1 Summary of Major EIS Data and Assumptions**

Parameter/Characteristic	Data/Assumption
<b>General</b>	
Paducah DUF <sub>6</sub> inventory	36,191 cylinders, 436,400 t (484,000 tons)
Paducah non-DUF <sub>6</sub> inventory	1,667 cylinders; 17,600 t (19,400 tons)
ETTP DUF <sub>6</sub> inventory	4,822 cylinders; 54,300 t (60,000 tons)
ETTP Non-DUF <sub>6</sub> cylinder inventory	1,102 cylinders; 26 t (29 tons)
<b>No Action Alternative</b>	
	No conversion facility constructed; continued long-term storage of DUF <sub>6</sub> in cylinders at Paducah.
Assessment period	Through 2039, plus long-term groundwater impacts
Construction	3 storage yards reconstructed
Cylinder management	Continued surveillance and maintenance activities consistent with current plans and procedures.
Assumed total number of future cylinder breaches:	
Controlled-corrosion case	36
Uncontrolled-corrosion case	444
<b>Action Alternatives</b>	
	Build and operate a conversion facility at the Paducah site for conversion of the Paducah DUF <sub>6</sub> inventory.
Construction start	2004
Construction period	≈2 years
Start of operations	2006
Operational period	25 years (28 years if ETTP cylinders are converted at Paducah)
Facility footprint	10 acres (4 ha)
Facility throughput	18,000 t/yr (20,000 tons/yr) DUF <sub>6</sub>
Conversion products	
Depleted U <sub>3</sub> O <sub>8</sub>	14,300 t/yr (15,800 tons/yr)
CaF <sub>2</sub>	24 t/yr (26 tons/yr)
70% HF acid	3,300 t/yr (3,600 tons/yr)
49% HF acid	7,700 t/yr (8,500 tons/yr)
Steel (empty cylinders, if not used as disposal containers)	1,980 t/yr (2,200 tons/yr)
Proposed conversion product disposition (see Table 2.2-2 for details):	
Depleted U <sub>3</sub> O <sub>8</sub>	Disposal; Envirocare (primary), NTS (secondary) <sup>a</sup>
CaF <sub>2</sub>	Disposal; Envirocare (primary), NTS (secondary)
70% HF acid	Sale pending DOE approval
49% HF acid	Sale pending DOE approval
Steel (empty cylinders, if not used as disposal containers)	Disposal; Envirocare (primary), NTS (secondary)

<sup>a</sup> DOE plans to decide the specific disposal location(s) for the depleted U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> conversion product after additional appropriate NEPA review. Accordingly, DOE will continue to evaluate its disposal options and will consider any further information or comments relevant to that decision. DOE will give a minimum 45-day notice before making the specific disposal decision and will provide any supplemental NEPA analysis for public review and comment.



GMA7659

**FIGURE 4.3-1 Areas of Potential Impact Evaluated for Each Alternative**

### 4.3.1 Overview of the Human Health Assessment

Human health impacts were estimated for three types of potential exposures: exposure to radiation, exposure to chemicals, and exposure to physical hazards (e.g., on-the-job injuries or fatalities from falls, lifting, or equipment malfunctions). These potential human exposures could occur in and around facilities or during transportation of materials. Exposures could take place during incident-free (normal) operations or following accidents in the facilities or during transportation.

The nature of the potential impacts resulting from the three types of exposure differ. Table 4.3-1 lists and compares the key features of these types of exposures. Because of the differences in these features, it is not always appropriate to combine impacts from different exposures to get a total impact for a given human receptor.

### 4.3.2 Radiation

All of the alternatives would involve handling compounds of the element uranium, which is radioactive. Radiation, which occurs naturally, is released when one form of an element (an isotope) changes into some other atomic form. This process, called radioactive decay, occurs because unstable isotopes tend to transform into a more stable state. The radiation emitted may be in the form of particles, such as neutrons, alpha particles, or beta particles, or waves of pure energy, such as gamma rays.

The radiation released by radioactive materials (i.e., alpha, beta, neutron, and gamma radiation) can impart sufficient localized energy to living cells to cause cell damage. This damage may be repaired by the cell, the cell may die, or the cell may reproduce other altered cells, sometimes leading to the induction of cancer. An individual may be exposed to radiation from outside the body (called external exposure) or, if the radioactive material has entered the body through inhalation (breathing) or ingestion (swallowing), from inside the body (called internal exposure).

#### 4.3.2.1 Background Radiation

Everyone is exposed to radiation on a daily basis, primarily from naturally occurring cosmic rays, radioactive elements in the soil, and radioactive elements incorporated in the body. Man-made sources of radiation, such as medical x-rays or fallout from historical nuclear weapons testing, also contribute, but to a lesser extent. About 80% of background radiation originates from naturally occurring sources, with the remaining 20% resulting from man-made sources.

The amount of exposure to radiation is commonly referred to as “dose.” The estimation of radiation dose takes into account many factors, including the type of radiation exposure (neutron, alpha, gamma, or beta), the different effects each type of radiation has on living tissues,

**TABLE 4.3-1 Key Features of Potential Human Exposures to Radiological, Chemical, and Physical Hazards**

Feature	Potential Exposures		
	Radiological	Chemical	Physical Hazard
Materials of concern	Uranium and its compounds.	Uranium and its compounds, HF, and NH <sub>3</sub> .	Physical hazards associated with all facilities and transportation conditions.
Health effects	Radiation-induced cancer incidence and potential fatalities would occur a considerable time after exposure (typically 10 to 50 years). The risks were assessed in terms of LCFs above background levels.	Adverse health effects (e.g., kidney damage and respiratory irritation or injury) could be immediate or could develop over time (typically less than 1 year).	Impacts would result from occurrences in the workplace or during transportation that were unrelated to the radiological and/or chemical nature of the materials being handled. Potential impacts would include bodily injury or death due to falls, lifting heavy objects, electrical fires, and traffic accidents.
Receptor	Generally the whole body of the receptor would be affected by external radiation, with internal organs affected by ingested or inhaled radioactive materials. Internal and external doses were combined to estimate the effective dose equivalent (see Appendix F).	Generally certain internal organs (e.g., kidneys and lungs) of the receptor would be affected.	Generally any part of the body of the receptor could be affected.
Threshold	No radiological threshold exists before the onset of impacts, that is, any radiation exposure could result in a chance of LCFs. To show the significance of radiation exposures, the estimated number of LCFs is presented, and radiation doses are compared with existing regulatory limits.	A chemical threshold exposure level exists (different for each chemical) below which exposures are considered safe (see Section 4.3.3). Where exposures were calculated at below threshold levels, “no impacts” are reported.	No threshold exists for physical hazards. Impact estimates are based on the statistical occurrence of impacts in similar industries and on the amount of labor required.

the type of exposure (i.e., internal or external), and, for internal exposure, the fact that radioactive material may be retained in the body for long periods of time. The common unit for radiation dose that accounts for these factors is the rem (1 rem equals 1,000 mrem).

In the United States, the average dose from background radiation is about 360 mrem/yr per person, of which about 300 mrem is from natural sources. For perspective, Table 4.3-2 provides the radiation doses resulting from a number of common activities. The total dose to an individual member of the general public from DOE and other federal activities is limited by law to 100 mrem/yr (in addition to background radiation), and the dose to a member of the public from airborne emissions released from DOE facilities must be below 10 mrem/yr (40 CFR Part 61).

#### 4.3.2.2 Radiation Doses and Health Effects

Radiation exposure can cause a variety of adverse health effects in humans. Very large doses of radiation (about 450,000 mrem) delivered rapidly can cause death within days to weeks from tissue and organ damage. The potential adverse effect associated with the low doses typical of most environmental and occupational exposures is the inducement of cancers that may be fatal. This latter effect is called a “latent” cancer fatality (LCF) because the cancer may take years to develop and cause death. In general, cancer caused by radiation is indistinguishable from cancer caused by other sources.

For this EIS, radiation effects were estimated by first calculating the radiation dose to workers and members of the general public from the anticipated activities required under each alternative. Doses were estimated for internal and external exposures that might occur during normal (or routine) operations and following hypothetical accidents. The analysis considered three groups of people: (1) involved workers, (2) noninvolved workers, and (3) members of the general public.

For each of these groups, doses were estimated for the group as a whole (population or collective dose). For noninvolved workers and the general public, doses were also estimated for an MEI. The MEI was defined as a hypothetical person who — because of proximity, activities, or living habits — could receive the highest possible dose. The MEI for noninvolved workers and members of the

#### **Key Concepts in Estimating Risks from Radiation**

The health effect of concern from exposure to radiation at levels typical of environmental and occupational exposures is the inducement of cancer. Radiation-induced cancers may take years to develop following exposure and are generally indistinguishable from cancers caused by other sources. Current radiation protection standards and practices are based on the premise that any radiation dose, no matter how small, can result in detrimental health effects (cancer) and that the number of effects produced is in direct proportion to the radiation dose. Therefore, doubling the radiation dose is assumed to result in doubling the number of induced cancers. This approach is called the “linear-no-threshold hypothesis” and is generally considered to result in conservative estimates (i.e., over-estimates) of the health effects from low doses of radiation.

**TABLE 4.3-2 Comparison of Radiation Doses from Various Sources**

Radiation Source	Dose to an Individual
Annual background radiation — U.S. average	
Total	360 mrem/yr
From natural sources (cosmic, terrestrial, radon)	300 mrem/yr
From man-made sources (medical, consumer products, fallout)	60 mrem/yr
Daily background radiation — U.S. average	1 mrem/d
Increase in cosmic radiation dose due to moving to a higher altitude, such as from Miami, Florida, to Denver, Colorado	25 mrem/yr
Chest x-ray	10 mrem
U.S. transcontinental flight (5 hours)	2.5 mrem
Dose from naturally occurring radioactive material in agricultural fertilizer — U.S. average	1 to 2 mrem/yr
Dose from standing 6 ft (2 m) from a full DUF <sub>6</sub> cylinder for 5 hours	1 mrem

Sources: National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP 1987).

general public usually was assumed to be at the location of the highest on-site or off-site air concentrations of contaminants, respectively — even if no individual actually worked or lived there. Under actual conditions, all radiation exposures and releases of radioactive material to the environment are required to be kept as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA), a practice that has as its objective the attainment of dose levels as far below applicable limits as possible.

Following estimation of the radiation dose, the number of potential LCFs was calculated by using health risk conversion factors. These factors relate the radiation dose to the potential number of expected LCFs on the basis of comprehensive studies of groups of people historically exposed to large doses of radiation, such as the Japanese atomic bomb survivors. The factors used for the analysis in this EIS were 0.0004 LCF/person-rem of exposure for workers and 0.0005 LCF/person-rem of exposure for members of the general public (International Commission on Radiological Protection [ICRP] 1991). The latter factor is slightly higher because some individuals in the public, such as infants, are more sensitive to radiation than the average worker. These factors imply that if a population of workers receives a total dose of 2,500 person-rem, on average, 1 additional LCF will occur among the workers. Similarly, if the general public receives a total dose of 2,000 person-rem, on average, 1 additional LCF will occur.

The calculation of human health effects from radiation is relatively straightforward. For example, assume the following situation:

- Each of 100,000 persons receives a radiation dose equal to background, or 360 mrem/yr (0.36 rem/yr), and
- The health risk conversion factor for the public is 0.0005 LCF/person-rem.

In this case, the number of radiation-induced LCFs caused by 1 year of exposure among the population would be  $1 \text{ yr} \times 100,000 \text{ persons} \times 0.36 \text{ rem/yr} \times 0.0005 \text{ LCF/person-rem}$ , or about 18 cancer cases, which would occur over the lifetimes of the individuals exposed. For perspective, in the same population of 100,000 persons, a total of about 23,000 (23%) would be expected to die of cancer from all causes over their lifetimes (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 1996).

Sometimes the estimation of number of LCFs does not yield whole numbers and, especially in environmental applications, yields numbers less than 1. For example, if 100,000 persons were exposed to 1 mrem (0.001 rem) each, the estimated number of LCFs would be 0.05. The estimate of 0.05 LCF should be interpreted statistically — as the average number of deaths if the same radiation exposure was applied to many groups of 100,000 persons. In most groups, no one (zero persons) would incur an LCF from the 1-mrem exposure each person received. In some groups, 1 LCF would occur, and in exceptionally few groups, 2 or more LCFs would occur. The average number of deaths would be 0.05 (just as the average of 0, 0, 0, and 1 is 0.25). The result, 0.05 LCF, may also be interpreted as a 5% chance (1 in 20) of 1 radiation-induced LCF in the exposed population. In this EIS, fractional estimates of LCFs were rounded to the nearest whole number for purposes of comparison. Therefore, if a calculation yielded an estimate of 0.6 LCF, the outcome is presented as 1 LCF, the most likely outcome.

The same concept is assumed to apply to exposure of a single individual, such as the MEI. For example, the chance that an individual exposed to 360 mrem/yr (0.36 rem/yr) over a lifetime of 70 years would die from a radiation-induced cancer is about 0.01 ( $0.36 \text{ rem/yr} \times 0.0005 \text{ LCF/rem} \times 70 \text{ yr} = 0.01 \text{ LCF}$ ). Again, this should be interpreted statistically; the estimated effect of radiation on this individual would be a 1% (1 in 100) increase in the chance of incurring an LCF over the individual's lifetime. In this EIS, the risk to individuals is generally presented as the increased chance that the individual exposed would die from a radiation-induced cancer. As noted, the baseline chance of dying from cancer in the United States is approximately 1 in 4.

### 4.3.3 Chemicals

For this EIS, the chemicals of greatest concern are soluble and insoluble uranium compounds, HF, and anhydrous NH<sub>3</sub>. Uranium compounds can cause chemical toxicity to the kidneys; soluble compounds are more readily absorbed into the body and thus are more toxic to the kidneys. HF and NH<sub>3</sub> are corrosive gases that can cause respiratory irritation in humans, with

tissue destruction or death resulting from exposure to large concentrations. Both have a pungent and irritating odor. No deaths are known to have occurred as a result of short-term (i.e., 1 hour or less) exposures to 50 ppm or less of HF, or 1,000 ppm or less of NH<sub>3</sub>. Uranium compounds, HF, and NH<sub>3</sub> are not chemical carcinogens; thus, cancer risk calculations are not applicable for the chemical hazard assessment.

For long-term, low-level (chronic) exposures to uranium compounds and HF emitted during normal operations, potential adverse health effects for the hypothetical MEI in the noninvolved worker and general public populations were calculated by estimating the intake levels associated with anticipated activities. Intake levels were then compared with reference levels below which adverse effects are very unlikely. Risks from normal operations were quantified as hazard quotients and hazard indices (see text box).

#### 4.3.4 Accidents

This EIS considers a range of potential accidents that could occur during conversion operations and transportation. An accident is defined as a series of unexpected or undesirable events leading to a release of radioactive or hazardous material within a facility or into the natural environment. Because an accident could involve a large and uncontrolled release, such an event potentially could pose considerable health risks to workers and members of the general public. Two important elements must be considered in the assessment of risks from accidents: the consequence of the accident and the expected frequency (or probability) of the accident.

##### 4.3.4.1 Accident Consequences

The term accident consequence refers to the estimated impacts if an accident were to occur — including health effects such as fatalities. For accidents involving releases of radioactive material, the consequences are expressed in the same way as the consequences from

### Key Concepts in Estimating Risks from Low-Level Chemical Exposures

#### Reference Level

- Intake level of a chemical below which adverse effects are very unlikely.

#### Hazard Quotient

- A comparison of the estimated intake level or dose of a chemical with its reference dose.
- Expressed as a ratio of estimated intake level to reference dose.
- Example:
  - The EPA reference level (reference dose) for ingestion of soluble compounds of uranium is 0.003 mg/kg of body weight per day.
  - If a 150-lb (70-kg) person ingested 0.1 mg of soluble uranium per day, the daily rate would be  $0.1 \div 70 \approx 0.001$  mg/kg, which is below the reference dose and thus unlikely to cause adverse health effects. This would yield a hazard quotient of  $0.001 \div 0.003 = 0.33$ .

#### Hazard Index

- Sum of the hazard quotients for all chemicals to which an individual is exposed.
- A value less than 1 indicates that the exposed person is unlikely to develop adverse human health effects.

routine operations — that is, LCFs are estimated for the MEI and for populations on the basis of estimated doses from all important exposure pathways.

Assessing the consequences of accidental releases of chemicals differs from assessing routine chemical exposures, primarily because the reference doses used to generate hazard indices for long-term, low-level exposures were not intended for use in the evaluation of the short-term (e.g., duration of several hours or less), higher-level exposures often accompanying accidents. In addition, the analysis of accidental releases often requires evaluation of different chemicals, especially irritant gases, which can cause tissue damage at higher levels associated with accidental releases but are not generally associated with adverse effects from chronic, low-level exposures.

To estimate the consequences of chemical accidents, two potential health effects endpoints were evaluated: (1) adverse effects and (2) irreversible adverse effects (see text box). In addition, the number of fatalities from accidental chemical exposures was estimated. For exposures to uranium and HF, it was estimated that the number of fatalities occurring would be about 1% of the number of irreversible adverse effects (EPA 1993; Policastro et al. 1997). Similarly, for exposure to NH<sub>3</sub>, the number of fatalities was estimated to be about 2% of the number of irreversible adverse effects (Policastro et al. 1997).

Human responses to chemicals do not occur at precise exposure levels but can extend over a wide range of concentrations. However, in this EIS, the values used to estimate the number of potential chemical effects should be applicable to most individuals in the general population. In all populations, there are hypersensitive individuals who will show adverse responses at exposure concentrations far below levels at which most individuals would normally respond (American Industrial Hygiene Association [AIHA] 2002). Similarly, many individuals will show no adverse response at exposure concentrations even somewhat higher than the guideline values. For comparative purposes in this EIS analysis, use of the guideline values discussed above allowed a uniform comparison of the impacts from potential accidental chemical releases across all alternatives.

### Health Effects from Accidental Chemical Releases

The impacts from accidental chemical releases were estimated by determining the numbers of people downwind who might experience adverse effects and irreversible adverse effects:

**Adverse Effects:** Any adverse health effects from exposure to a chemical release, ranging from mild and transient effects, such as respiratory irritation or skin rash (associated with lower chemical concentrations), to irreversible (permanent) effects, including death or impaired organ function (associated with higher chemical concentrations).

**Irreversible Adverse Effects:** A subset of adverse effects, irreversible adverse effects are those that generally occur at higher concentrations and are permanent in nature. Irreversible effects may include death, impaired organ function (such as central nervous system or lung damage), and other effects that may impair everyday functions.

#### 4.3.4.2 Accident Frequencies

The expected frequency of an accident is the chance that the accident might occur while an operation is being conducted. If an accident is expected to happen once every 50 years, the frequency of occurrence is 0.02 per year: 1 occurrence every 50 years =  $1 \div 50 = 0.02$  occurrence per year. A frequency estimate can be converted to a probability statement. If the frequency of an accident is 0.02 per year, the probability of the accident occurring sometime during a 10-year program is 0.2 (10 years  $\times$  0.02 occurrence per year).

The accidents evaluated in this EIS were anticipated to occur over a wide range of frequencies, from once every few years to less than once in 1 million years. In general, the more unlikely it would be for an accident to occur (the lower its probability), the greater the expected consequences. Accidents were evaluated for each activity required for four frequency categories: likely, unlikely, extremely unlikely, and incredible (see text box). To interpret the importance of a predicted accident, the analysis considered the estimated frequency of occurrence of that accident. Although the predicted consequences of an incredible accident might be high, the lower consequences of a likely accident (i.e., one much more likely to occur) might be considered more important.

#### 4.3.4.3 Accident Risk

The term “accident risk” refers to a quantity that considers both the severity of an accident (consequence) and the probability that the accident will occur. Accident risk is calculated by multiplying the consequence of an accident by the accident frequency. For example, if the frequency of occurrence of a facility accident is estimated to be once in 100 years (0.01 per year) and if the consequence, should the accident occur, is estimated to be 10 LCFs among the people exposed, then the risk of the accident would be reported as 0.1 LCF per year (0.01 per year  $\times$  10 LCFs). If the facility was operated for a period of 20 years, the accident risk over the operational phase of the facility would be 2 LCFs (20 years  $\times$  0.1 LCF per year).

This definition of accident risk was used to compare accidents that have different frequencies and consequences. Certain high-frequency accidents that have relatively low consequences might pose a larger overall risk than low-frequency accidents that have potentially high consequences. When calculating accident risk, the consequences are expressed in terms of

#### Accident Categories and Frequency Ranges

**Likely (L):** Accidents estimated to occur one or more times in 100 years of facility operations (frequency  $\geq 1 \times 10^{-2}/\text{yr}$ ).

**Unlikely (U):** Accidents estimated to occur between once in 100 years and once in 10,000 years of facility operations (frequency = from  $1 \times 10^{-2}/\text{yr}$  to  $1 \times 10^{-4}/\text{yr}$ ).

**Extremely Unlikely (EU):** Accidents estimated to occur between once in 10,000 years and once in 1 million years of facility operations (frequency = from  $1 \times 10^{-4}/\text{yr}$  to  $1 \times 10^{-6}/\text{yr}$ ).

**Incredible (I):** Accidents estimated to occur less than one time in 1 million years of facility operations (frequency  $< 1 \times 10^{-6}/\text{yr}$ ).

LCFs for radiological releases or adverse health effects, irreversible adverse health effects, and fatalities for chemical releases.

#### **4.3.4.4 Physical Hazard (On-the-Job) Accidents**

Physical hazards, unrelated to radiation or chemical exposures, were assessed for each alternative by estimating the number of on-the-job fatalities and injuries that could occur among workers. These impacts were calculated by using industry-specific statistics from the BLS. The injury incidence rates were for injuries involving lost workdays (excluding the day of injury). The analysis calculated the predicted number of worker fatalities and injuries as the product of the appropriate annual incidence rate, the number of years estimated for the project, and the number of FTEs required for the project each year. Estimates for construction and operation of the facilities were computed separately because these activities have different incidence statistics. The calculation of fatalities and injuries from industrial accidents was based solely on historical industrywide statistics and therefore did not consider a threshold (i.e., any activity would result in some estimated risk of fatality and injury).

### **4.4 UNCERTAINTY IN ESTIMATED IMPACTS**

Estimates of the environmental impacts from DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion are subject to considerable uncertainty. This uncertainty is a consequence primarily of characteristics of the methods used to estimate impacts. To account for this uncertainty, the impact assessment was designed to ensure — through uniform and careful selection of assumptions, models, and input parameters — that impacts would not be underestimated and that relative comparisons among the alternatives would be meaningful. This goal was accomplished by uniformly applying common assumptions to each alternative and by choosing assumptions that would produce conservative estimates of impacts (i.e., assumptions that would lead to overestimates of the expected impacts). Although using a uniform approach to assess impacts can still result in some uncertainty in estimates of the absolute magnitude of impacts, this approach enhances the ability to make valid comparisons among alternatives.

## 5 ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF ALTERNATIVES

This chapter discusses estimated potential impacts to the environment, including impacts to workers and members of the general public, under the no action alternative (Section 5.1) and the action alternatives (Section 5.2). The general assessment methodologies and major assumptions used to estimate the impacts are described in Chapter 4 and Appendix F of this EIS.

This EIS evaluates the proposed action, which is construction and operation of a conversion facility at the Paducah site for conversion of the Paducah inventory into depleted uranium oxide and other conversion products. Three alternative locations at the site are evaluated, one of which has been selected as the preferred location. This EIS also discusses impacts from preparation of cylinders for shipment at ETTP and shipment of these cylinders to the Paducah site. Shipment of ETTP cylinders to Paducah is evaluated as a reasonable option to the proposed action.

Under the no action alternative, potential environmental impacts from continued storage and maintenance of the cylinders at their current locations at the Paducah site are evaluated primarily through the year 2039, although potential long-term impacts from releases of DUF<sub>6</sub> and HF from future cylinder breaches are also evaluated. The potential impacts from no action at the ETTP site (i.e., continued storage and maintenance of the ETTP cylinders in their current locations) are not presented in this EIS, but in the EIS for construction and operation of a conversion facility at the Portsmouth site (DOE 2003b), the location to which the ETTP cylinder inventory is planned to be shipped.

This chapter also discusses the potential cumulative impacts of the alternatives (Section 5.3), potential mitigation actions (Section 5.4), unavoidable adverse impacts of the alternatives (Section 5.5), irreversible and irretrievable commitment of resources (Section 5.6), the relationship between short-term use of the environment and long-term productivity (Section 5.7), pollution prevention and waste minimization (Section 5.8), and D&D of the conversion facility (Section 5.9).

### 5.1 NO ACTION ALTERNATIVE

#### 5.1.1 Introduction

Under the no action alternative, it is assumed that storage of DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders would continue indefinitely at the Paducah site and that DOE surveillance and maintenance activities would be ongoing to ensure the continued safe storage of cylinders. Potential environmental impacts from this alternative are estimated through 2039 in this EIS, and

#### No Action Alternative

The no action alternative assumes that storage of the DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders would continue for an indefinite period at the Paducah site, along with continued cylinder surveillance and maintenance. Impacts were evaluated through the year 2039, and potential long-term (beyond 2039) impacts were also evaluated.

long-term impacts (i.e., those that would occur after 2039) from cylinder breaches are also estimated. A similarly defined no action alternative is evaluated in the DUF<sub>6</sub> PEIS (DOE 1999a). The assessment of the no action alternative in this EIS has been updated to reflect changes that have occurred since publication of the PEIS (e.g., changes in plans for new cylinder yard construction and changes in noninvolved worker and general population numbers).

A detailed discussion of the assumptions about and impacts from continued cylinder storage activities is included in Appendix D of the PEIS; changes in impacts due to the addition of USEC-generated cylinders are discussed in Section 6.3.1 of the PEIS (DOE 1999a). Updated information on ongoing and planned cylinder maintenance activities as of June 2002 has been compiled from a database on the cylinders at the three sites and from life-cycle baseline documents for cylinder maintenance (Hightower 2002). This information was compiled prior to awarding the conversion contract to UDS and thus represents DOE's plans for long-term maintenance of cylinders without conversion, as would be the case under the no action alternative. In Section 5.1.1.1, the ongoing and planned cylinder maintenance activities assumed for the Paducah site under the no action alternative are reviewed.

Impacts associated with the following activities under the no action alternative are considered in both the PEIS and this EIS: (1) storage yard reconstruction and cylinder relocations, (2) routine and ultrasonic test inspections of cylinders and radiological monitoring and maintenance of the cylinder exteriors and valves, (3) cylinder painting, and (4) repair and removal of the contents of any cylinders that might be breached during the storage period. The frequencies for each activity assumed for the Paducah site in the PEIS are compared with planned future frequencies in Table 5.1-1. Overall, the assumptions in the PEIS result in the PEIS impacts bounding the actual impacts that could occur under current and planned future activities.

#### **5.1.1.1 Cylinder Maintenance Activities**

The PEIS assessment covered maintenance of an upper bound of 40,351 cylinders at the Paducah site. The actual inventory of cylinders actively managed by DOE is changing over time as USEC transfers cylinders to DOE under three MOAs. As of January 2004, the DOE inventory at the Paducah site consisted of 36,191 full, partially full, and heels DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders (Hightower 2004). Maintenance efforts completed or underway include (1) relocation of some cylinders that either are too close to one another to allow for adequate inspections or are located in yards that require reconstruction, and (2) construction of new storage yards or reconstruction of existing storage yards to provide a stabilized concrete base and monitored drainage for the cylinder storage areas. Over the last several years, more cylinders have been relocated annually than the number assumed in the PEIS (Table 5.1-1). This relocation effort has been undertaken to achieve optimal storage conditions for all cylinders. It is expected to be completed over the next several years; consequently, after about 2008, the annual number of relocations will decrease.

**TABLE 5.1-1 No Action Alternative: Comparison of Frequencies Assumed in the PEIS with Planned Frequencies for Activities at the Paducah Site**

Activity	Activity-Specific Assumption	PEIS-Assumed Average Annual Activity Frequency <sup>a</sup>	Planned Average Annual Frequency for 2003–2007 <sup>b</sup>
Routine cylinder inspections	30-min exposure at 1-ft (0.30-m) distance per inspection	17,200	11,500
Ultrasonic inspections	90-min exposure at about 2-ft (0.61-m) distance per inspection	440	100
Radiological monitoring and valve maintenance	1-h exposure at 1-ft (0.30-m) distance per inspection	12	860
Cylinder relocations	4-h exposure at about 8-ft (2.44-m) distance per relocation	1,020	2,800 <sup>c</sup>
Cylinder painting	7-h exposure at 1- to 10-ft (0.30- to 3.05-m) distance per cylinder, 2 gal (8 L) of paint used, 2 gal (8 L) of LLMW generated per cylinder	4,200	1,100

<sup>a</sup> Source: Parks (1997), with the addition of the assumption that there would be an overall increase of 42% in activities to address the addition of USEC cylinders.

<sup>b</sup> Maintenance activities will be conducted in accordance with the approved cylinder management plan (Commonwealth of Kentucky and DOE, 2003). These activities are consistent with planned activities for 2003-2007 presented in this table, except the Agreed Order does not include requirements for painting.

<sup>c</sup> Value is the average for 2003 to 2007; after that time, few relocations are expected.

Under the DOE approved cylinder management plan (Commonwealth of Kentucky and DOE 2003), the stored cylinders are regularly inspected for evidence of damage or accelerated corrosion. Each cylinder must be inspected at least once every 4 years; however, annual inspections are required for cylinders that were previously stored in substandard conditions and those that show areas of heavy pitting or corrosion. In addition to these routine inspections, ultrasonic inspections are conducted on some of the relocated cylinders. The ultrasonic testing is a nondestructive method of measuring the thickness of cylinder walls. Radiological monitoring

of the cylinder surface, especially around the valves, is also conducted for cylinders that exhibit discoloration of the valve or surrounding area during routine inspections. Leaking valves are replaced in the field. Impacts from routine inspections, ultrasonic inspections, and radiological monitoring and valve maintenance are evaluated as components of the no action alternative. In the PEIS assessment, the assumed frequencies of routine and ultrasonic inspections were overestimated by factors of about 1.5 and 4.4, respectively, in comparison with rates planned for 2003 to 2007. Radiological monitoring and valve maintenance was underestimated by a factor of about 70; however, this activity is of short duration, with little radiological exposure.

At the time the PEIS was prepared, a painting program was undertaken in an effort to arrest corrosion of the cylinders. Because the long-term painting schedule was unknown at the time, the PEIS assessment of the no action alternative assumed that as an upper bound, each cylinder would be painted every 10 years. However, after the PEIS was prepared, it was discovered that painting the cylinders increased toxicity indicators in cylinder yard runoff, such that NPDES Permit violations were occurring at the Paducah site (DOE 2000b; see Section 5.1.2.4). Also, the ongoing rate of cylinder breaches was found to be much less than the rate that had been predicted on the basis of theoretical estimates of cylinder corrosion rates, indicating that the other steps that had been taken to improve storage conditions (e.g., regular inspections and relocating cylinders out of ground contact onto concrete saddles in well-drained, concrete storage yards) were also effective in controlling corrosion. Therefore, continued cylinder maintenance plans call for a greatly reduced frequency of cylinder painting in comparison with the frequency that was assumed in the PEIS (overestimated by a factor of 3.8; Table 5.1-1). The most frequent ongoing painting activity is partial painting of the ends of skirted cylinders, which are problem areas for corrosion.

The levels of worker activity, worker exposure, and waste generation associated with cylinder painting are much higher than the levels associated with inspection, relocation, and radiological monitoring and valve maintenance activities (Table 5.1-1). Therefore, because the PEIS assumed a high frequency of cylinder painting, its estimates of impacts in several technical areas (e.g., radiological exposures of involved workers, socioeconomics, waste management) represent an upper bound on the impacts that are expected under the current and planned future cylinder maintenance programs. For this EIS, the continued storage impacts for the Paducah site estimated in the PEIS were used as the basis for the no action alternative impacts. The data have been revised as appropriate (e.g., the worker and general population numbers have been updated).

With respect to impacts on air quality, yard reconstruction results in criteria pollutant emissions from vehicle exhaust and fugitive dust generation. The quantity of emissions is generally proportional to the disturbed land area. The PEIS modeled the maximum annual impacts from reconstruction of four yards at the Paducah site. The largest yard (C-745-L) was estimated to be about 310,000 ft<sup>2</sup> (28,800 m<sup>2</sup>). Since publication of the PEIS, reconstruction of four yards has been completed. If no conversion facility was constructed, the cylinder management plan for the site calls for the reconstruction of C-745-N and C-745-P (N-yard and P-yard) concurrently over about 6 months in 2006, and the reconstruction of C-745-F (F-yard) over 7 months in the following year. The combined area of N-yard and P-yard is about 164,000 ft<sup>2</sup> (15,200 m<sup>2</sup>); the area of F-yard is about 250,000 ft<sup>2</sup> (23,200 m<sup>2</sup>).

This EIS includes the reconstruction of N-yard, P-yard, and F-yard in the impacts assessment. It is assumed that the PEIS air quality impact estimates are representative and bounding for the estimate of impacts of new yard construction under the no action alternative for the following reasons: (1) both planned yard reconstruction projects are smaller than the largest project modeled for the PEIS, (2) the PEIS projects and the planned reconstruction projects are located in close proximity to one another on the site; and (3) air quality impacts are measured on an annual basis (they are not cumulative). Also, because all of the recently constructed or to-be-constructed yards are in previously disturbed areas, impacts to cultural resources and ecological resources would be similar to impacts discussed in the PEIS. The specific impacts of yard reconstruction under the no action alternative for each technical area are discussed in Section 5.1.2.

#### **5.1.1.2 Assumptions and Methods Used to Assess Impacts Associated with Cylinder Breaches**

To estimate the impacts from continued cylinder storage, it is necessary to predict the number of cylinder breaches that might occur in the future. A cylinder is considered breached if it has a hole of any size at some location on the cylinder wall. At the time the PEIS was published (1999), 8 breached cylinders had been identified at the three storage sites; 1 of these was at the Paducah site. Investigation of these breaches indicated that 6 of the 8 were initiated by mechanical damage during stacking; the damage was not noticed immediately, and subsequent corrosion occurred at the point of damage. It was concluded that the other 2 cylinder breaches (both at the ETTP site) had been caused by external corrosion due to prolonged ground contact. The breached cylinders were patched, pending decisions on long-term management. However, these breached cylinders may eventually require emptying through cold-feeding (a lengthy process of heating a cylinder to a temperature just below the UF<sub>6</sub> liquefaction point so that the UF<sub>6</sub> changes directly from solid to gaseous form).

From 1998 through 2002, 2 additional breaches were discovered at the Paducah site (Hightower 2002).<sup>1</sup> These breaches were the result of missing cylinder plugs. The breach rate over this time period was 0.4 per year (2 breaches in 5 years). The breached cylinders were repaired.

For assessment purposes in this EIS, 2 cylinder breach cases were evaluated. The first is a case in which it was assumed that the planned cylinder maintenance and painting program would maintain the cylinders in a protected condition and control further corrosion. It was assumed that after the initial painting, some cylinder breaches would result from handling damage. For this case, the total number of future breaches estimated to occur through 2039 at the Paducah site is 36 (i.e., about 1 per year). In the second case, it was assumed that external corrosion would not be halted by improved storage conditions, cylinder maintenance, and/or painting. This case was considered in order to account for uncertainties in both the effectiveness of painting in controlling cylinder corrosion and uncertainties in the future painting schedule. For this scenario,

---

<sup>1</sup> A breach that occurred at the ETTP site in 1998 was discussed in Section B.2 of the PEIS (DOE 1999a). A total of 11 breaches have been identified at the Portsmouth, ETTP, and Paducah sites (Hightower 2002).

the number of breaches estimated through 2039 was 444 for the Paducah site (i.e., 11 per year). This breach estimate is based on the historical corrosion rate determined when the cylinders were stored under poor conditions (i.e., cylinders were stacked too close together, were stacked on wooden chocks, or came in contact with the ground). Details concerning development of the breach estimates are provided in Appendix B of the PEIS (DOE 1999a).

The impacts to human health and safety, surface water, groundwater, soil, air quality, and ecology from uranium and HF releases from breached cylinders are assessed in this EIS. For all hypothetical cylinder breaches, it was assumed that the breach would go undetected for 4 years, which is the period between planned inspections for most of the cylinders. In practice, cylinders that show evidence of damage or heavy external corrosion are inspected annually, so it is very unlikely that a breach would go undetected for a 4-year period. For each hypothetical cylinder breach, it was further assumed that 1 lb (0.45 kg) of uranium (as UO<sub>2</sub>F<sub>2</sub>) and 4.4 lb (2 kg) of HF would be released from the cylinder annually for a period of 4 years. The cylinder management plan (Commonwealth of Kentucky and DOE 2003) outlines procedures to be taken in the event of a cylinder breach and/or release of DUF<sub>6</sub> from one or more cylinders.

Radiological exposures of involved workers could result from patching breached cylinders or emptying the contents of breached cylinders into new cylinders. The assumptions used to estimate impacts to involved workers were that (1) it would require 32 hours of exposure at a distance of 1 ft (0.30 m) to temporarily patch each cylinder, and (2) it would require an additional 961 hours of exposure at a distance of about 10 ft (3.05 m) to empty a cylinder by cold-feeding.

Groundwater impacts were assessed by first estimating the amount of uranium that could be transported from the yards in surface runoff, and then by estimating migration through the soil to groundwater. HF air concentrations were also modeled.

The lower breach estimate for breaches due to cylinder handling is likely to be a reasonable upper-bound estimate of a breach rate that would occur during long-term continued storage under a no action alternative (e.g., the actual rate over the last 5 years was 0.4 breach per year; the model estimates 1 breach per year). Because storage conditions have improved dramatically as a result of cylinder yard upgrades and restacking activities over the last several years, the breach estimate based on the historical corrosion rate (i.e., 11 breaches per year) is likely a worst-case estimate of what could occur if DOE discontinued active management of the cylinders. In this assessment, the worst-case scenario is used to estimate the earliest time when continued cylinder storage could begin to raise regulatory concerns, such as when drinking water standards would be exceeded in groundwater or when air quality criteria would be exceeded (see Sections 5.1.2.3 and 5.1.2.4.2).

### **5.1.2 Impacts of No Action at the Paducah Site**

The impacts described in this section are similar to those presented in Section 3.5.2 of the data compilation report for the Paducah site (Hartmann et al. 1999); however, they have been

adjusted to account for changes in noninvolved worker and general population numbers since the time of that assessment.

### **5.1.2.1 Human Health and Safety**

Under the no action alternative, impacts to human health and safety could result from cylinder maintenance operations during both routine conditions and accidents. In general, the impacts during normal operations at the Paducah site would be limited to workers directly involved in handling cylinders. Under accident conditions, the health and safety of both workers and members of the general public around the site could be affected.

#### **5.1.2.1.1 Normal Facility Operations**

**Workers.** Cylinders containing DUF<sub>6</sub> emit low levels of gamma and neutron radiation. Involved workers would be exposed to this radiation when near cylinders, such as during routine cylinder monitoring and maintenance activities, cylinder yard reconstruction, cylinder relocation and painting, and cylinder patching or repair. It is estimated that an average of about 43 cylinder yard maintenance workers would be required at the Paducah site. These workers would be trained to work in a radiation environment, they would use protective equipment as necessary, and their radiation exposure levels would be measured and monitored by safety personnel at the sites. Radiation exposure of workers is required by law to be maintained ALARA and not to exceed 5,000 mrem/yr (10 CFR Part 835).

Involved workers reconstructing existing cylinder yards would incur external radiation from the DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders stored at nearby yards. According to radiation survey data for two empty cylinder yards, C-745-K and C-745-K1, in February 2002, the average dose rate within the empty yards was about 0.2 mrem/h (Hicks 2002b). On the basis of the assumptions that the reconstruction projects would last for a maximum of 7 months and the workers would spend, at most, 1,170 hours per reconstruction project working in the vicinity of the storage yards, it is estimated that the maximum dose a worker would receive would be about 230 mrem per reconstruction project. If the same workers conducted both planned reconstruction projects, the maximum total dose over 2 years would be 460 mrem. This is well within the standard required by law of 5,000 mrem/yr for radiation workers (10 CFR Part 835).

The radiation exposure of involved workers (cylinder yard workers) in future years through 2039 is estimated to be well within public health standards (10 CFR Part 835). If the same 43 workers conducted all cylinder management activities, the average annual dose to individual involved workers would be about 740 mrem/yr. The estimated future doses do not account for standard ALARA practices that would be used to keep the actual doses as far below the limit as practicable. Thus, the future doses to workers are expected to be less than those estimated because of the conservatism in the assumptions and models used to generate the estimates. In fact, in 2001, the measured doses to cylinder yard workers ranged from about 170 to 427 mrem/yr, with an average of 254 mrem/yr (Hicks 2002a). The radiation exposure of the noninvolved workers was estimated to be less than 0.15 mrem/yr.

It is estimated that the total collective dose to all involved cylinder maintenance workers at the Paducah site from 1999 through 2039 would be about 1,300 person-rem. (The collective dose to noninvolved workers would be negligible [i.e., less than 0.01%], compared with the collective dose to involved workers.) This dose would be distributed among all of the workers involved with cylinder activities over the no action period. Although about 43 workers would be required each year, the actual number of different individuals involved over the period would probably be much greater than 43 because workers could be rotated to different jobs and could change jobs. It is estimated that this level of exposure could potentially result in less than 1 LCF (i.e., 0.5 LCF) among all the workers exposed, in addition to the cancer cases that would result from all other causes not related to the no action alternative activities.

As discussed in Chapter 1 and Appendix B of this EIS, some portion of the DUF<sub>6</sub> inventory contains TRU and Tc contamination. The contribution of these contaminants to potential external radiation exposures under normal operations was evaluated on the basis of the bounding concentrations presented in Appendix B. The dose from these contaminants was estimated and compared with the dose from the depleted uranium and uranium decay products in the DUF<sub>6</sub>. It is estimated that under typical cylinder maintenance conditions, the TRU and Tc contaminants would make only a very small contribution to the radiation doses, amounting to approximately 0.2% of the dose from the depleted uranium and its decay products.

No impacts to involved workers are expected from exposure to chemicals during normal cylinder maintenance operations. Exposures to chemicals during cylinder painting operations would be monitored to ensure that airborne chemical concentrations were within applicable health standards protective of human health and safety. If planned work activities were likely to expose involved workers to chemicals, those workers would be provided with appropriate protective equipment as necessary.

Chemical exposures to noninvolved workers could result from airborne emissions of UO<sub>2</sub>F<sub>2</sub> and HF that could be dispersed from hypothetical cylinder breaches into the atmosphere and to ground surfaces. It is estimated that the potential chemical exposures of noninvolved workers from any airborne releases during normal operations would be below levels expected to cause adverse effects. (The hazard index was estimated to be less than 0.1 for noninvolved workers.)

**General Public.** Potential health impacts to members of the general public could occur if material released from breached cylinders entered the environment and was transported from the site through the air, surface water, or groundwater. Off-site releases of uranium and HF from breached cylinders are possible. However, it is estimated that the off-site concentrations of these contaminants in the future would be much less than levels expected to cause adverse effects. Potential exposures of members of the general public would be well within public health standards. No adverse effects (LCFs or chemical effects) are expected to occur among members of the general public residing within 50 mi (80 km) of the Paducah site as a result of DUF<sub>6</sub> continued storage activities.

If all the uranium and HF assumed to be released from hypothetical breached cylinders through 2039 were dispersed from the site through the air, the total collective radiation dose to the general public (all persons within 50 mi [80 km]) would be less than 0.3 person-rem. This level of exposure would most likely result in zero cancer fatalities among members of the general public. For comparison, the total collective radiation dose from natural background and medical sources to the same population group in 40 years would be about  $7.4 \times 10^6$  person-rem. The maximum radiation dose to an individual near the site would be less than 0.1 mrem/yr, well within health standards. Radiation doses to the general public are required by health regulations to be maintained at below 10 mrem/yr from airborne sources (40 CFR Part 61) and below a total of 100 mrem/yr from all sources combined (DOE 1990). If an individual received the maximum estimated dose every year, the total dose would be less than 4 mrem, resulting in an additional chance of dying from a latent cancer of about 1 in 500,000. No noncancer health effects from exposure to airborne uranium and HF releases are expected; the estimated hazard index for an MEI is less than 0.1. This means that the total exposure would be at least 10 times less than exposure levels that might cause adverse effects.

The material released from breached cylinders could also have the potential to be transported from the site in water, either in surface water runoff or by infiltrating the soil and contaminating groundwater. Members of the general public could be exposed if they used this contaminated surface water or groundwater as a source of drinking water. The results of the surface water and groundwater analyses indicate that the maximum estimated uranium concentrations in surface water accessible to the general public and in groundwater beneath the site would be less than 20 µg/L (the proposed EPA drinking water standard has now been finalized at 30 µg/L and became effective in December 2003 [EPA 2003b]). Drinking water standards, meant to apply to water “at the tap” of the user, are set at levels protective of human health. In this assessment, 20 µg/L was used as a guideline level for the surface water and groundwater analyses.

If a member of the general public used contaminated water at the maximum concentrations estimated, adverse effects would be unlikely. Even if a member of the general public used contaminated surface water or groundwater as his or her primary water source, the maximum radiation dose in the future would be less than 0.5 mrem/yr. The corresponding increased risk to this individual of dying from a latent cancer would be less than 1 in 1 million per year. Noncancer health effects from exposure to possible water contamination are not expected; the estimated maximum hazard index for an individual assumed to use the groundwater is less than 0.05. This result means that the total exposure would be 20 times less than the exposure that might cause adverse effects.

If no credit was taken for the reduction in cylinder corrosion rates as a result of cylinder maintenance and painting activities, the groundwater analysis indicates that the uranium concentration in groundwater could exceed 20 µg/L at some time in the future (see Section 5.1.2.4). This scenario is highly unlikely because ongoing cylinder inspection and maintenance would prevent significant releases from occurring, especially for as many cylinders as are assumed here (i.e., 444 breaches). Nonetheless, if contamination of groundwater used as drinking water occurred in the future, treating the water or supplying an alternative source of water might be required to ensure the safety of those potentially using the water.

### 5.1.2.1.2 Facility Accidents

**Physical Hazards (On-the-Job Injuries and Fatalities).** Accidents occur in all work environments. In 2000, about 5,200 people in the United States were killed in accidents while at work, and approximately 3.9 million disabling work-related injuries were reported (National Safety Council 2002). Although all work activities would be conducted in as safe a manner as possible, there is a chance that workers could be accidentally killed or injured under the no action alternative, unrelated to any radiation or chemical exposures.

The numbers of accidental worker injuries and fatalities that might occur through 2039 were estimated on the basis of the number of workers required and the historical accident fatality and injury rates in similar types of industries. It is estimated that a total of less than 1 accidental fatality (i.e., about 0.07, or about 7 chances in 100 of a single fatality) might occur at the Paducah site over the no action period evaluated. A total of about 82 accidental injuries (defined as injuries resulting in lost workdays) are estimated for cylinder maintenance activities. Two accidental injuries would be associated with cylinder yard reconstruction. The rates are not unique to the activities required for the no action alternative but are typical of any industrial project of similar size and scope.

**Accidents Involving Radiation or Chemical Releases.** Under the no action alternative, accidents could release radiation and chemicals from cylinders. Several types of accidents were evaluated. Included were those initiated by operational events, such as equipment or operator failure; external hazards, such as aircraft crashes; and natural phenomena, such as earthquakes. The assessment considered accidents ranging from those that would be reasonably likely to occur (one or more times in 100 years on average) to those that would be extremely rare (estimated to occur less than once in 1 million years on average).

The accidents of most concern at the Paducah site under the no action alternative would be accidents that could cause a release of  $UF_6$  from cylinders. In a given accident, the amount potentially released would depend on the severity of the accident and the number of cylinders involved. Following a release, the  $UF_6$  could combine with moisture in the air, forming gaseous HF and  $UO_2F_2$ , a soluble solid in the form of small particles. The depleted uranium and HF could be dispersed downwind, potentially exposing workers and members of the general public living near the site to radiation and chemical effects. The workers considered in the accident assessment were those noninvolved workers not immediately in the vicinity of the accident; fatalities and injuries among involved workers would be possible if accidents were severe.

The estimated consequences of cylinder accidents are summarized in Table 5.1-2 for chemical effects and Table 5.1-3 for radiation effects. The impacts are the maximums estimated for the Paducah site. The impacts are presented separately for likely accidents and for rare, low-probability accidents estimated to result in the largest potential impacts. Although other accidents were evaluated (see Hartmann 1999, Section 3.2.2), the estimated consequences of those other accidents would be less than the consequences of the accidents summarized in these tables. The estimated consequences are conservative in that they were based on the assumption

**TABLE 5.1-2 No Action Alternative: Estimated Consequences of Chemical Exposures for Cylinder Accidents at the Paducah Site<sup>a</sup>**

Receptor <sup>b</sup>	Accident Scenario	Accident Frequency Category <sup>c</sup>	Potential Effect <sup>d</sup>	Consequence <sup>e</sup> (no. of persons affected)
<i>Likely Accidents</i>				
General public	Corroded cylinder spill, dry conditions	L	Adverse effects	0
	Corroded cylinder spill, dry conditions	L	Irreversible adverse effects	0
	Corroded cylinder spill, dry conditions	L	Fatalities	0
Noninvolved workers	Corroded cylinder spill, dry conditions	L	Adverse effects	0–10
	Corroded cylinder spill, dry conditions	L	Irreversible adverse effects	0–1
	Corroded cylinder spill, dry conditions	L	Fatalities	0
<i>Low Frequency-High Consequence Accidents</i>				
General public	Rupture of cylinders – fire	EU	Adverse effects	3–2,000
	Corroded cylinder spill, wet conditions – water pool	EU	Irreversible adverse effects	0–1
	Corroded cylinder spill, wet conditions – water pool	EU	Fatalities	0
Noninvolved workers	Rupture of cylinders – fire	EU	Adverse effects	4–910
	Corroded cylinder spill, wet conditions – water pool	EU	Irreversible adverse effects	1–300
	Corroded cylinder spill, wet conditions – water pool	EU	Fatalities	0–3

**Footnotes on next page.**

**TABLE 5.1-2 (Cont.)**

- 
- <sup>a</sup> The accidents listed are those estimated to result in the greatest impacts among all the accidents considered (except for certain accidents with security concerns). The site-specific impacts for a range of accidents at the Paducah site are given in Hartmann et al. (1999).
- <sup>b</sup> Noninvolved workers are persons who work at the site but who are not involved in handling materials. Depending on the circumstances of the accident, injuries and fatalities among involved workers are possible for all accidents.
- <sup>c</sup> Accident frequencies: L = likely, estimated to occur one or more times in 100 years of facility operations ( $> 10^{-2}/\text{yr}$ ); EU = extremely unlikely, estimated to occur between once in 10,000 years and once in 1 million years of facility operations ( $10^{-4}$  to  $10^{-6}/\text{yr}$ ).
- <sup>d</sup> Potential adverse effects include exposures that could result in mild and transient injury, such as respiratory irritation. Potential irreversible adverse effects include exposures that could result in permanent injury (e.g., impaired organ function) or death. The majority of the adverse effects would be mild and temporary in nature. It is estimated that less than 1% of the predicted potential irreversible adverse effects would result in fatalities (see text).
- <sup>e</sup> The consequence is expressed as the number of individuals with a predicted exposure level sufficient to cause the corresponding health endpoint. The range of estimated consequences reflects different atmospheric conditions at the time of an accident assumed to occur at the cylinder yard closest to the site boundary. In general, maximum risks would occur under atmospheric conditions of F stability with a 1-m/s (2-mph) wind speed; minimum risks would occur under D stability with a 4-m/s (9-mph) wind speed. For both conditions, it was assumed that the wind would be blowing in the direction of the highest density of worker or public populations.

that the wind would be blowing in the direction of the greatest number of people at the time of the accident. In addition, the effects of protective measures, such as evacuation, were not considered.

An exception to the discussion above would be a certain class of accidents that DOE investigated; however, because of security concerns, information about such accidents is not available for public review but is presented in a classified appendix to this EIS. All classified information will be presented to state and local officials, as appropriate.

**Chemical Effects.** The potential likely accident (defined as an accident estimated to occur one or more times in 100 years) that would cause the largest chemical health effects is the failure of a corroded cylinder that would spill part of its contents under dry weather conditions. Such an accident could occur, for example, during cylinder handling activities. It is estimated that about 24 lb (11 kg) of DUF<sub>6</sub> could be released in such an accident. The potential consequences from this type of accident would be limited to on-site workers. The off-site concentrations of HF and uranium were calculated to be less than the levels that would cause adverse effects from exposure to these chemicals, so that zero adverse effects would occur among members of the general public. It is estimated that if this accident did occur, up to 10 noninvolved workers might experience potential adverse effects from exposure to HF and

**TABLE 5.1-3 No Action Alternative: Estimated Consequences from Radiation Exposures for Cylinder Accidents at the Paducah Site<sup>a</sup>**

Receptor <sup>b</sup>	Accident Scenario	Accident Frequency Category <sup>c</sup>	MEI		Population	
			Dose (rem)	Lifetime Risk of LCF	Dose (person-rem)	Number of LCFs
<b><i>Likely Accidents</i></b>						
General public	Corroded cylinder spill, dry conditions	L	0.0023	$1 \times 10^{-6}$	0.27	0.0001
Noninvolved workers	Corroded cylinder spill, dry conditions	L	0.077	$3 \times 10^{-5}$	1.4	0.0006
<b><i>Low Frequency-High Consequence Accidents</i></b>						
General public	Rupture of cylinders – fire	EU	0.015	$7 \times 10^{-6}$	29	0.01
Noninvolved workers	Rupture of cylinders – fire	EU	0.02	$8 \times 10^{-6}$	15	0.006

<sup>a</sup> The accidents listed are those estimated to have the greatest impacts among all the accidents considered (except for certain accidents with security concerns). The site-specific impacts for a range of accidents at the Paducah site are given in Hartmann et al. (1999). The estimated consequences were based on the assumption that at the time of the accident, the wind would be blowing in the direction of the highest density of workers or public population and that weather conditions would limit dispersion.

<sup>b</sup> Noninvolved workers are persons who work at the site but who are not involved in handling materials. Depending on the circumstances of the accident, injuries and fatalities among involved workers are possible for all accidents.

<sup>c</sup> Accident frequencies: L = likely, estimated to occur one or more times in 100 years of facility operations ( $> 10^{-2}/\text{yr}$ ); EU = extremely unlikely, estimated to occur between once in 10,000 years and once in 1 million years of facility operations ( $10^{-4}$  to  $10^{-6}/\text{yr}$ ).

uranium (mostly mild and transient effects, such as respiratory irritation or temporary decrease in kidney function). It is estimated that one noninvolved worker might experience potential irreversible adverse effects (such as lung or kidney damage). The number of fatalities following an HF or uranium exposure is expected to be somewhat less than 1% of the number of potential irreversible adverse effects (Policastro et al. 1997). Therefore, no fatalities are expected.

For assessment purposes, the estimated frequency of a corroded cylinder spill accident is assumed to be about once in 10 years. Therefore, over the no action period, about four such accidents are expected. The accident risk (defined as consequence  $\times$  probability) would be about 40 workers with potential adverse effects, and 4 workers with potential irreversible adverse effects. The number of workers actually experiencing these effects would probably be considerably less, depending on the actual circumstances of the accidents and the individual chemical sensitivity of the workers. In previous accidental exposure incidents involving liquid

UF<sub>6</sub> in gaseous diffusion plants, a few workers were exposed to amounts of uranium estimated to be approximately three times the guidelines used for assessing irreversible adverse effects in this EIS, and none actually experienced irreversible adverse effects (McGuire 1991).

Accidents that are less likely to occur could have higher consequences. The potential cylinder accident at the site estimated to result in the greatest total number of adverse chemical effects would be an accident involving several cylinders in a fire. It is estimated that about 24,000 lb (11,000 kg) of DUF<sub>6</sub> could be released in such an accident. If this accident occurred, it is estimated that up to 2,000 members of the general public and 910 noninvolved workers might experience adverse effects from HF and uranium exposure (mostly mild and transient effects, such as respiratory irritation or temporary decrease in kidney function). This accident is considered extremely unlikely, it is estimated to occur between once in 10,000 years and once in 1 million years. If the frequency is assumed to be once in 100,000 years, the accident risk over the no action period would be less than 1 adverse effect for both workers and members of the general public.

The potential cylinder accident estimated to result in the largest total number of irreversible adverse effects is a corroded cylinder spill under wet conditions, for which the UF<sub>6</sub> is assumed to be released into a pool of standing water. This accident is also considered extremely unlikely; that is, it is expected to occur between once in 10,000 years and once in 1 million years. It is estimated that if this accident did occur, about 1 member of the general public and 300 noninvolved workers might experience irreversible adverse effects (such as lung damage) from HF and uranium exposure. The number of fatalities would be somewhat less than 1% of the estimated number of potential irreversible adverse effects (Policastro et al. 1997). Thus, no fatalities are expected among the general public, although three fatalities could occur among noninvolved workers (1% of 300). If the frequency of this accident is assumed to be once in 100,000 years, the accident risk through 2039 would be less than 1 (0.1) irreversible adverse health effect among workers and the general public combined.

**Radiation Effects.** Potential cylinder accidents could release uranium, which is radioactive in addition to being chemically toxic. The potential radiation exposures of members of the general public and noninvolved workers were estimated for the same cylinder accidents as those for which chemical effects were estimated (Table 5.1-3). For all cylinder accidents considered, it is estimated that the radiation doses from released uranium would be considerably below levels likely to cause radiation-induced effects among noninvolved workers and the general public and below the 25-rem total effective dose equivalent established by DOE as a guideline for assessing the adequacy of protection of public health and safety from potential accidents (DOE 2000c).

For the corroded cylinder spill accident (dry conditions), it is estimated that the radiation dose to a maximally exposed member of the general public would be less than 3 mrem (lifetime dose), resulting in an increased risk of death from cancer of about 1 in 1 million. The total population dose to the general public within 50 mi (80 km) would be less than 1 person-rem, most likely resulting in zero LCFs. Among noninvolved workers, the dose to an MEI would be 77 mrem, resulting in an increased risk of death from cancer of about 1 in 30,000. The total dose

to all noninvolved workers would be about 1.4 person-rem. It is estimated that this dose to workers would result in no LCFs. The risk (consequence  $\times$  probability) of additional LCFs among members of the general public and workers combined would be much less than 1 through 2039.

The cylinder accident estimated to result in the largest potential radiation doses would be the accident involving several cylinders in a fire. For this accident, it is estimated that the radiation dose to a maximally exposed member of the general public would be about 15 mrem, resulting in an increased risk of death from cancer of about 1 in 150,000. The total population dose to the general public within 50 mi (80 km) would be 29 person-rem, most likely resulting in no LCFs. Among noninvolved workers, the dose to an MEI would be about 20 mrem, resulting in an increased risk of death from cancer of about 1 in 100,000. The total dose to all noninvolved workers would be about 15 person-rem. This dose to workers would result in no LCFs. The risk (consequence  $\times$  probability) of additional LCFs among members of the general public and workers combined would be much less than 1 through 2039.

#### **5.1.2.2 Transportation**

Continued cylinder storage under the no action alternative would have the potential to generate small amounts of LLW and LLMW during cylinder monitoring and maintenance activities. This material could require transportation to a treatment or disposal facility. Shipments would be made in accordance with all DOE and DOT regulations and guidelines. It is estimated that less than one waste shipment would be required each year. Because of the small number of shipments and the low concentrations of contaminants expected, the potential environmental impacts from these shipments would be negligible.

#### **5.1.2.3 Air Quality and Noise**

The assessment of potential impacts to air quality under the no action alternative included a consideration of air pollutant emissions from continued cylinder storage activities, including emissions from reconstruction of cylinder yards (engine exhaust and particulate matter emissions [i.e., dust]), emissions from operations (cylinder painting and vehicle emissions), and HF emissions from breached cylinders. An atmospheric dispersion model was used to estimate the concentrations of criteria pollutants at the site boundaries: SO<sub>2</sub>, NO<sub>2</sub>, CO<sub>2</sub>, O<sub>3</sub>, PM (PM<sub>10</sub> and PM<sub>2.5</sub>), and Pb. The site boundary concentrations were compared with existing air quality standards given in Chapter 3. For the no action alternative, it is estimated that concentrations of criteria pollutants and HF would be within applicable standards. However, because potential PM<sub>10</sub> concentrations during yard reconstruction activities would be very close to the standards, mitigation measures to reduce these emissions might have to be implemented during construction.

The highest levels of criteria pollutants generally would be generated by yard reconstruction activities. Except for PM, the air concentrations of all criteria pollutants resulting from no action alternative activities would be less than or equal to 0.02% of the respective

standards. PM emissions from construction could result in maximum 24-hour average PM<sub>10</sub> concentrations just below the standards (about 90% of the 24-hour standard value of 150 µg/m<sup>3</sup>), although the estimated annual average concentrations would be lower (about 33% of the standard value of 50 µg/m<sup>3</sup>). During yard reconstruction activities, mitigative measures, such as spraying the soil with water and covering excavated soil, would be taken to reduce the generation of particulate matter. Such measures are commonly employed during construction but were not accounted for in the modeling. Planned construction activities at the Paducah site for the no action alternative are the reconstruction of cylinder yards C-745-N and C-745-P (combined area of 164,000 ft<sup>2</sup> [15,200 m<sup>2</sup>] in 2006, and of C-745-F, with an area of about 250,000 ft<sup>2</sup> (23,000 m<sup>2</sup>), in 2007.

Operations would emit much lower concentrations of criteria pollutants than would reconstruction. Criteria pollutant emissions would all be lower than 0.3% of standards. Painting of cylinders could generate hydrocarbon emissions. Although no explicit air quality standard has been set for hydrocarbon emissions, these emissions are associated with ozone formation. Standards have been set for ozone. For the Paducah site, hydrocarbon emissions from painting activities were estimated to be less than 1.2% of the hydrocarbon emissions from the entire surrounding county. Because ozone formation is a regional issue affected by emissions for an entire area, this small additional contribution to the county total would be unlikely to substantially alter the ozone levels of the county. In addition, the actual frequency of cylinder painting is expected to be greatly reduced from the level assumed.

When credit is taken for reduced corrosion from better maintenance and painting, the estimated maximum 24-hour and annual average site boundary HF concentrations from hypothetical cylinder breaches occurring under the no action alternative at the Paducah site are 0.08 µg/m<sup>3</sup> and 0.0093 µg/m<sup>3</sup>, respectively. The Kentucky HF standards are 2.9 µg/m<sup>3</sup> (secondary standard for 24-hour maximum average) and 400 µg/m<sup>3</sup> (primary annual average standard). The annual average HF concentration for the Paducah site is estimated to be less than 0.002% of the standard; the maximum 24-hour average is estimated to be 2.8% of the standard.

Calculations indicate that if no credit was taken for the reduction in corrosion as a result of painting and continued maintenance and if storage continued at the Paducah site indefinitely, breaches occurring at the site by around 2039 could result in maximum 24-hour average HF concentrations at the site boundary of 2 µg/m<sup>3</sup>, about 69% of the state secondary standard. Because of the ongoing maintenance program, it is not expected that a breach rate this high would occur at the Paducah site.

At Paducah, planned reconstruction of cylinder yards over several months could result in increased noise levels. At the nearest residence, located about 1.9 km (1.2 mi) from the cylinder yards, estimated noise levels would be well below the EPA guideline of 55 dB(A) as DNL for residential zones (EPA 1974). Adverse noise impacts from cylinder yard reconstruction activities are not expected.

Continued storage operations could result in somewhat increased noise levels at the site as a result of activities such as painting or repairing any infrequent cylinder breaches. However,

it is expected that the noise levels at off-site residences would not increase noticeably. Noise impacts are expected to be negligible under the no action alternative.

#### 5.1.2.4 Water and Soil

Under the no action alternative, continued storage of the cylinders at the Paducah site would have the potential to affect surface water, groundwater, and soil. Important elements in assessing potential impacts on surface water include changes in runoff, floodplain encroachment, and water quality. Groundwater impacts were assessed in terms of changes in recharge to the underlying aquifers, depth to groundwater, direction of groundwater flow, and groundwater quality. Potential soil impacts considered were changes in topography, permeability, erosion potential, and soil quality.

Under the no action alternative, the planned cylinder yard reconstruction activity would occur in previously developed areas. Water use and wastewater discharge would be limited. Therefore, the assessment area in which potentially important impacts might occur was determined to be quality of surface water, groundwater, and soil. All the other potential impacts would depend on changes in permeable land areas at the sites as a result of construction activities or would depend on water use, effluent volumes, and effluent composition and concentrations.

A contaminant of concern for evaluating surface water, groundwater, and soil quality is uranium. Surface water and groundwater concentrations of contaminants are generally evaluated through comparison with EPA MCLs, as given in Safe Drinking Water Act regulations (40 CFR Part 141), although these limits are only directly applicable “at the tap” of the water user. The water concentration value for uranium used for comparison in this EIS is 20 µg/L (i.e., the proposed MCL for uranium has now been finalized at 30 µg/L and became effective in December 2003 [EPA 2003b]). The 20-µg/L level is used as a guideline for evaluating surface water and groundwater concentrations of uranium in this EIS, even though it is not directly applicable as a standard. There is also no standard available for limiting concentrations of uranium in soil. A health-based value of 230 µg/g (EPA 1995), applicable for residential settings, is used as a guideline for comparison.

The nearest surface water to the Paducah site is Little Bayou Creek, which is a tributary to the Ohio River. The Ohio River is used as a drinking water source. Because of very large dilution effects, even high levels of contaminants in Little Bayou Creek would not be expected to cause levels exceeding guidelines at the drinking water intakes of the Ohio River.

Reconstruction of storage yards is estimated to require approximately 0.5 million gal (2 million L) of water for each of the two projects. Maximum water use for continued maintenance activities would be 230,000 gal/yr (870,000 L/yr).

**5.1.2.4.1 Surface Water.** Potential impacts on the nearest receiving water at the site (i.e., Little Bayou Creek) were estimated for uranium released from hypothetical cylinder

breaches occurring through 2039. The estimated maximum concentration of uranium in Little Bayou Creek would be 0.3 µg/L, considerably below the 20-µg/L level used for comparison.

At the Paducah site, KPDES Outfall 017 receives runoff from the cylinder storage yards and from the cylinder painting facility area. Cylinder painting operations were ongoing in 1998; the entire bodies of 1,200 cylinders were painted in that year (Hightower 2002). Toward the end of 1998, results from two separate acute toxicity tests of water fleas (*Ceriodaphnia dubia*) conducted at KPDES Outfall 017 exceeded specified limits; the runoff was not toxic to flathead minnows (*Pimephales promelas*). Evaluations seemed to indicate that zinc in runoff from recent painting activities was the leading contributor to the toxicity of the runoff (DOE 2000b). No cylinder painting was conducted at the site in 1999, and effluent from KPDES Outfall 017 did not exceed toxicity limits in that year (DOE 2001b). In 2000 and 2001, acute toxicity tests at the outfall again exceeded toxicity limits, although no cylinder painting was occurring (DOE 2002e). It is possible that cylinder painting activities at the Paducah site might result in KPDES Permit violations in the future. Mitigating actions, such as treating runoff, could be implemented if this problem arose.

**5.1.2.4.2 Groundwater.** Groundwater in the vicinity of the Paducah site is used for domestic and industrial supplies. Existing groundwater quality at the site is discussed in Section 3.1-5. The Paducah site provides a municipal water supply to residents whose wells are within an area of groundwater contaminated with TCE and Tc-99. Activities associated with the no action alternative would not affect migration of existing groundwater contamination or further impact off-site water supplies.

Potential impacts on groundwater quality from hypothetical releases of uranium from breached cylinders were also assessed. The maximum future concentration of uranium in groundwater directly below the Paducah site is estimated to be 6 µg/L, which is considerably below the 20-µg/L level used for comparison. It is estimated that if the rate of uranium migration was rapid, this concentration would occur sometime after 2070. A lower concentration would occur if uranium migration through the soil was slower than assumed for this analysis.

Calculations indicate that if no credit was taken for the reduction in corrosion as a result of cylinder painting and maintenance and if storage continued at the Paducah site indefinitely, uranium releases from future cylinder breaches occurring before about 2020 could result in a sufficient amount of uranium in the soil column to increase the groundwater concentration of uranium to 20 µg/L in the future. The groundwater concentration would not actually reach 20 µg/L at the site until about 2100 or later. However, because of the ongoing cylinder maintenance program, it is expected that breaches occurring prior to 2039 would not be sufficient to increase the groundwater concentration of uranium to 20 µg/L at the site.

**5.1.2.4.3 Soil.** Potential impacts on soil that could receive contaminated rainwater runoff from the cylinder storage yards were estimated. The source is assumed to be uranium released from hypothetical breached cylinders. It is assumed that any releases from future cylinder painting activities would be controlled or treated to avoid soil contamination. The estimated

maximum soil concentration is 1 µg/g for the Paducah site, considerably below the 230-µg/g guideline used for comparison.

#### **5.1.2.5 Socioeconomics**

The potential socioeconomic impacts of reconstruction and operational activities under the no action alternative at the Paducah site would be low. Reconstruction activities would create short-term employment (30 direct jobs, 110 total jobs over each of 2 construction years), and operational activities at the site would create 90 direct jobs and 130 total jobs per year. Direct and total income from reconstruction in the peak year would be \$1.6 million and \$3.2 million, respectively. During operations, direct and total income would be \$3.0 million/yr and \$3.8 million/yr, respectively.

The employment created in the ROI for the Paducah site would represent a change of less than 0.1 of a percentage point in the projected average annual growth in employment over the period 2004 to 2039. With no in-migration into the ROI expected during continued storage, no impacts on housing, local public finances, or local service employment are expected.

#### **5.1.2.6 Ecology**

The no action alternative would have a negligible impact on ecological resources in the area of the Paducah site. Very limited construction activity is planned, and all activities that are expected would occur in previously developed areas. Thus, impacts on wetlands and federal- and state-protected species from construction are expected to be negligible.

The assessment results indicate that impacts to ecological resources from continued storage, including hypothetical cylinder breaches, would be negligible. Analysis of potential impacts was based on exposure of biota to airborne contaminants or contaminants released to soil, groundwater, or surface water (e.g., from painting activities or from breached cylinders). Predicted concentrations of contaminants in environmental media were compared with benchmark values for toxic and radiological effects (see Appendix F). At the Paducah site, air, soil, and surface water concentrations would be below levels harmful to biota. However, as discussed in Section 5.1.2.4.1, cylinder painting activities may potentially result in future reductions in surface water quality, and they may consequently cause impacts to aquatic biota downstream at KPDES Outfall 017. Although groundwater uranium concentrations (6 to 20 µg/L) would be below the lowest effects level (150 µg/L) and below radiological benchmark levels ( $4.55 \times 10^3$  pCi/L), they would exceed the ecological screening value for surface water (2.6 µg/L). However, contaminants in groundwater discharging to a surface water body, such as a local stream, would be quickly diluted to negligible concentrations.

### **5.1.2.7 Waste Management**

Under the no action alternative, construction and operations at the Paducah site would generate relatively small amounts of LLW and LLMW (including PCB-containing wastes). The volume of LLW generated by continued storage activities would represent less than 1% of the annual generation at the site from all activities. The maximum annual amount of LLMW generation from stripping/painting operations at the Paducah site would be about 30 yd<sup>3</sup>/yr (23 m<sup>3</sup>/yr), which is about 0.3% of the site's total annual LLMW load. Thus, the overall impact on waste management operations from the no action alternative would be negligible.

### **5.1.2.8 Resource Requirements**

Cylinder yard reconstruction and operations under the no action alternative would require supplies of electricity, fuel, concrete, steel and other metals, and miscellaneous chemicals. The total quantities of commonly used materials would be small compared with local sources and would not affect local, regional, or national availability of these materials. No strategic or critical materials are expected to be consumed. The anticipated utilities requirements would be within the supply capacities at the Paducah site. The required material resources would be readily available.

### **5.1.2.9 Land Use**

For the Paducah site, reconstruction of three storage yards within the boundaries of existing yards is planned, so additional land clearing would not be necessary. Therefore, impacts of the no action alternative on land use would be negligible.

### **5.1.2.10 Cultural Resources**

Impacts to cultural resources under the no action alternative would not be likely at the Paducah site. The existing storage yards at Paducah are located in previously disturbed areas unlikely to contain cultural properties or resources listed on or eligible for listing on the NRHP. Three cylinder yards are scheduled for reconstruction at their existing locations. Cylinder breaches are not expected to result in HF or criteria pollutant emissions sufficient to impact cultural resources (see Section 5.1.2.3).

### **5.1.2.11 Environmental Justice**

A review of the potential human health and safety impacts anticipated under the no action alternative indicates that no disproportionately high and adverse effects to minority or low-income populations are expected in the vicinity of the Paducah site during continued cylinder storage. Although such populations occur in certain areas on or within the 50-mi (80-km) radius used to identify the maximum geographic extent of human health impacts

(see Section 3.1.12), no noteworthy impacts are expected. The results of accident analyses for the no action alternative also did not identify high and adverse impacts to the general public; the risk of accidents (consequence × probability) is less than 1 fatality for all accidents considered.

## 5.2 PROPOSED ACTION ALTERNATIVES

This section presents the estimated potential environmental impacts for the proposed action alternatives, including:

- Impacts from construction of the conversion facility at three alternative locations within the Paducah site (Section 5.2.1);
- Impacts from operation of the conversion facility at the three alternative locations (Section 5.2.2);
- Impacts from the transportation of uranium conversion products and waste materials to a disposal facility (Section 5.2.3);
- Impacts associated with the potential sale and use of HF and CaF<sub>2</sub> (Section 5.2.4);
- Impacts that would occur if the cylinders at ETTP were shipped to Paducah for conversion rather than to Portsmouth (Section 5.2.5); and
- Impacts from expanded plant operations, including extending the operational period and increasing throughput (Section 5.2.6).

In general, within each technical area, impacts are discussed for the construction and operation of the facility at the preferred location (Location A) as well as for two alternative locations (Locations B and C). The time period considered is a construction period of approximately 2 years and an operational period of 25 years.

### 5.2.1 Conversion Facility Construction Impacts

This section discusses the potential environmental impacts during construction of a conversion facility at the three alternative locations within the Paducah site. When completed, the conversion facility would occupy approximately 10 acres (4 ha), including process and support buildings and parking areas. However, up to 45 acres (18 ha) of land might be disturbed during construction, including temporary lay-down areas (areas for staging construction material and equipment or for excavated material) and for utility access. Some of the disturbed areas would not be adjacent to the construction area. The disturbed area includes access roads, rail lines, and utility corridors.

### 5.2.1.1 Human Health and Safety — Normal Construction Activities

**5.2.1.1.1 Radiological Impacts.** Three alternative locations at the Paducah site are considered for construction of the conversion facility (Figure 2.2-1). Location A is next to the current cylinder storage yards managed by DOE and is the preferred location for constructing the conversion facility. According to on-site radiation monitoring data, potential external radiation exposure also could be incurred by construction workers at Location C during construction activities because of the location's proximity to a USEC storage area. On-site radiation monitoring data near Location B are near background levels; thus, direct radiation from the cylinders would be negligible.

On the basis of the closest site monitoring data (DOE 2001b), direct external radiation would range from 0 to 0.035 mrem/h (data from thermoluminescence dosimeter [TLD]-1) across Location A and from 0 to 0.04 mrem/h (data from TLD-3) across Location C. The estimated external radiation exposure would be 35 mrem/yr for a hypothetical construction worker working 1,000 hours per year (4 hours per day and 250 days per year) at the spot of the highest radiation level within Location A. For a similar employee working within Location C, the potential dose would be about 40 mrem/yr. The potential doses were estimated on the basis of conservative assumptions; in reality, a worker would work at various spots around the project and would likely spend much less time than 1,000 hours per year at the same location. Furthermore, external radiation would be reduced by the construction of walls around the conversion facility. The radiation dose limit set to protect the general public from operations of the DOE facilities is 100 mrem/yr (DOE 1990); radiation workers are limited to a dose of 5,000 mrem/yr (10 CFR Part 835).

**5.2.1.1.2 Chemical Impacts.** Chemical exposures during construction at the Paducah site are expected to be low and mitigated by using personal protective equipment and engineering controls to comply with OSHA PELs that are applicable for construction activities. No differences between the three alternative locations are expected.

### 5.2.1.2 Human Health and Safety — Accidents

The risk of on-the-job fatalities and injuries to conversion facility construction workers would not depend on the location of the facility. The estimated injuries and fatalities were calculated by using industry-specific statistics from the BLS, as reported by the National Safety Council (2002). Annual fatality and injury rates from the BLS construction industry division were used for the 20-month construction phase. Construction of the conversion facility is estimated to require approximately 164 FTEs per year. For all three alternative locations, no on-the-job fatalities are predicted during the conversion facility construction phase; however, approximately 11 injuries are predicted (Table 5.2-1).

**TABLE 5.2-1 Potential Impacts to Human Health from Physical Hazards during Conversion Facility Construction and Operations at the Paducah Site**

Activity	Impacts to Conversion Facility Workers <sup>a</sup>			
	Incidence of Fatalities		Incidence of Injuries	
	Construction	Operations	Construction	Operations
Conversion to U <sub>3</sub> O <sub>8</sub>	0.04	0.14	11	197
Conversion to U <sub>3</sub> O <sub>8</sub> (with ETTP cylinders)	0.04	0.16	11	221

<sup>a</sup> Potential hazards were estimated for all conversion facility workers over the entire construction (20 months) and operation (28 and 25 years, with and without ETTP cylinders, respectively) phases.

Source: Injury and fatality rates used in calculations were taken from National Safety Council (2002).

### 5.2.1.3 Air Quality and Noise

**5.2.1.3.1 Air Quality Impacts.** Currently, detailed information on the location of facility boundaries is available only for preferred Location A. For modeling air quality impacts at Locations B and C, the proposed facilities were assumed to be placed in the middle of the alternative locations.

Emissions of criteria pollutants — SO<sub>2</sub>, NO<sub>x</sub> (emissions are in NO<sub>x</sub> but the ambient air quality standards are in NO<sub>2</sub>), CO, and PM (PM<sub>10</sub> and PM<sub>2.5</sub>) — and of VOCs would occur during the construction period. These emissions would include fugitive dust emissions from earthmoving activities and exhaust emissions from heavy equipment and commuter/delivery vehicles. The annual emissions of criteria pollutants and VOCs expected during facility construction are presented in Table 5.2-2. Estimated maximum pollutant concentrations during construction are shown in Table 5.2-3 for the three alternative locations.

All of the pollutant concentration increments would remain below NAAQS and SAAQS. For SO<sub>2</sub>, NO<sub>2</sub>, and CO, concentration increments would be below 20% of their applicable standards. The highest concentration increment would occur for 24-hour average PM<sub>10</sub>, which is predicted to be about 52% of the standard. Concentration increments for PM<sub>2.5</sub> are predicted to be less than 29% of the standard.

**TABLE 5.2-2 Annual Criteria Pollutant and Volatile Organic Compound Emissions from Construction of the Conversion Facility at the Paducah Site**

Emission Source	Emission Rate (tons/yr)					
	SO <sub>2</sub>	NO <sub>x</sub>	CO	VOCs	PM <sub>10</sub>	PM <sub>2.5</sub>
Exhaust	1.5	21.7	14.6	6.1	2.2	2.2 <sup>a</sup>
Fugitive	– <sup>b</sup>	–	–	–	17.1 <sup>c</sup>	2.5 <sup>c</sup>

<sup>a</sup> For exhaust emissions, PM<sub>2.5</sub> emissions were conservatively assumed to be 100% of PM<sub>10</sub> emissions.

<sup>b</sup> A dash indicates no emissions.

<sup>c</sup> Fugitive dust emissions were estimated under the assumption that the conversion facility construction area would continuously disturb about 9.1 acres (3.7 ha); this is the maximum amount of the approximately 10-acre (4-ha) facility footprint that would be disturbed at one time. A conventional control measure of water spraying with an emission control efficiency of 50% would be applied over the disturbed area. For fugitive dust emissions from earthmoving activities, PM<sub>2.5</sub> emissions were assumed to be 15% of PM<sub>10</sub> emissions (EPA 2002).

Source: Folga (2003).

To obtain the total concentrations for comparison with applicable air quality standards, the modeled concentration increments were added to measured background values (given in Table 3.1-3). The total concentrations for SO<sub>2</sub>, NO<sub>2</sub>, and CO would be below 42% of their standards. The total concentrations for annual PM<sub>10</sub> and 24-hour PM<sub>2.5</sub> are estimated to be 87% and 72% of their applicable standards, respectively. For all three alternative locations, total 24-hour PM<sub>10</sub> and annual PM<sub>2.5</sub> concentrations would be above their applicable standards. In fact, annual average concentrations of PM<sub>2.5</sub> at most statewide monitoring stations either approach or are above the standard. PM (PM<sub>10</sub> and PM<sub>2.5</sub>) concentration increments at the site boundaries would be relatively high because the conversion facility would be constructed outside the current gaseous diffusion plant boundaries; thus, the general public would theoretically have access right at the conversion plant boundary.<sup>2</sup> Accordingly, construction activities should be conducted so as to minimize potential impacts on ambient air quality. Water could be sprayed on disturbed areas frequently, as needed, and dust suppressant or pavement could be applied to roads with frequent traffic.

<sup>2</sup> Formerly, the general public had access to the existing fenced boundaries. However, since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack, site access for the general public has been restricted indefinitely to the DOE property boundaries.

**TABLE 5.2-3 Maximum Air Quality Impacts at the Construction Site Boundary Due to Emissions from Activities Associated with Construction of the Conversion Facility at the Paducah Site**

Location	Pollutant <sup>a</sup>	Averaging Time	Concentration ( $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$ )				Percent of NAAQS/SAQS <sup>e</sup>	
			Maximum Increment <sup>b</sup>	Back-ground <sup>c</sup>	Total <sup>d</sup>	NAAQS and SAAQS	Increment	Total
A	SO <sub>2</sub>	3 hours	30.0	169	199	1,300	2.3	15.3
		24 hours	11.1	86	97.1	365	3.0	26.6
		Annual	1.3	13.3	14.6	80	1.7	18.3
	NO <sub>2</sub>	Annual	19.9	22.6	42.5	100	19.8	42.4
	CO	1 hour	868	6,970	7,840	40,000	2.2	19.6
		8 hours	332	3,220	3,550	10,000	3.3	35.5
PM <sub>10</sub>	24 hours	78.0	79	157	150	52.0	105	
	Annual	18.3	25	43.3	50	36.6	86.6	
PM <sub>2.5</sub>	24 hours	15.1	31.1	46.2	65	23.3	71.1	
	Annual	4.4	14.7	19.1	15	29.2	127	
B	SO <sub>2</sub>	3 hours	29.8	169	199	1,300	2.3	15.3
		24 hours	11.2	86	97.2	365	3.1	26.6
		Annual	1.3	13.3	14.6	80	1.7	18.3
	NO <sub>2</sub>	Annual	19.8	22.6	42.4	100	19.8	42.4
	CO	1 hour	895	6,970	7,860	40,000	2.2	19.7
		8 hours	336	3,220	3,560	10,000	3.4	35.6
PM <sub>10</sub>	24 hours	75.4	79	154	150	50.3	103	
	Annual	18.2	25	43.2	50	36.4	86.4	
PM <sub>2.5</sub>	24 hours	15.2	31.1	46.3	65	23.4	71.3	
	Annual	4.4	14.7	19.1	15	29.1	127	
C	SO <sub>2</sub>	3 hours	30.1	169	199	1,300	2.3	15.3
		24 hours	11.2	86	97.2	365	3.1	26.6
		Annual	1.3	13.3	14.6	80	1.7	18.3
	NO <sub>2</sub>	Annual	19.8	22.6	42.4	100	19.8	42.4
	CO	1 hour	904	6,970	7,870	40,000	2.3	19.7
		8 hours	337	3,220	3,560	10,000	3.4	35.6
PM <sub>10</sub>	24 hours	77.6	79	157	150	51.7	104	
	Annual	18.3	25	43.3	50	36.5	86.5	
PM <sub>2.5</sub>	24 hours	15.5	31.1	46.6	65	23.8	71.6	
	Annual	4.4	14.7	19.1	15	29.2	127	

Footnotes on next page.

**TABLE 5.2-3 (Cont.)**

- 
- <sup>a</sup> Emissions are from equipment and vehicle engine exhaust, except for PM<sub>10</sub> and PM<sub>2.5</sub>, which are also from soil disturbance.
  - <sup>b</sup> Data represent the maximum concentration increments estimated, except that the fourth- and eighth-highest concentration increments estimated are listed for 24-hour PM<sub>10</sub> and PM<sub>2.5</sub>.
  - <sup>c</sup> See Table 3.1-3.
  - <sup>d</sup> Total equals maximum modeled concentration plus background concentration.
  - <sup>e</sup> The values in the next-to-last column are maximum concentration increments as a percent of NAAQS and SAAQS. The values in the last column are total concentration increments as a percent of NAAQS and SAAQS.

The potential impacts of PM (PM<sub>10</sub> and PM<sub>2.5</sub>) released from near-ground level would be limited to the immediate vicinity of the site boundaries — areas that the general public is expected to occupy only infrequently. The PM concentrations would decrease rapidly with distance from the source. At the nearest residence on McCall Road just east of the DOE boundary (about 1.3 km [0.8 mi] southeast of candidate Location C), predicted concentrations would be less than 5% of the highest concentration increments at the site boundaries.

Among the three alternative locations, potential air quality impacts due to construction activities would be similar, with the highest at Locations A and C, and the lowest at Location B, as shown in Table 5.2-3. However, as mentioned previously, the locations of facility boundaries for Locations B and C are assumed arbitrarily; thus, the results for the two alternative locations should be interpreted in that context.

**5.2.1.3.2 Noise Impacts.** Noise levels from construction would be similar among the alternative locations. During construction, the commuting/delivery vehicular traffic around the facilities would generate intermittent noise. However, the contribution to noise from these intermittent sources would be limited to the immediate vicinity of the traffic route and would be minor in comparison with the contribution from continuous noise sources such as compressors or bulldozers during construction. Sources of noise during construction of the conversion facility would include standard commercial and industrial activities for moving earth and erecting concrete and steel structures. Noise levels from these activities would be comparable to those from other construction sites of similar size.

The noise levels would be highest during the early phases of construction, when heavy equipment would be used to clear the site. This early phase of construction would be about 6 months of the entire construction period of 1.5 years. Average noise levels for construction equipment range from 76 dB(A) for a pump, to 85 dB(A) for a bulldozer, to 101 dB(A) at peak for a pile driver (Harris Miller Miller & Hanson, Inc. [HMMH] 1995). To estimate noise levels at the nearest residence, it was assumed that the two noisiest pieces of equipment would operate simultaneously. A scraper and a heavy truck operating continuously typically generate noise

levels of 89 and 88 dB(A), respectively, at a distance of 15 m (50 ft) from the source (HMMH 1995),<sup>3</sup> which result in a combined noise level of about 91.5 dB(A) at a distance of 15 m (50 ft).

The nearest residence to alternative Locations A, B, and C would be the same one; it is located at McCall Road just off the DOE boundary. This residence, located about 1.3 km (0.8 mi) southeast of Location C, was selected as the receptor for the analysis of potential noise impacts. Noise levels decrease about 6 dB per doubling of distance from the point source because of the way sound spreads geometrically over an increasing distance. Thus, construction activities would result in estimated noise levels of about 53 dB(A) at the nearest residence. This level would be 48 dB(A) as DNL if it is assumed that construction activities would be limited to an 8-hour daytime shift. This 48-dB(A) estimate is below the EPA guideline of 55 dB(A) as DNL for residential zones (see Section 3.1.3.4), which was established to prevent interference with activity, annoyance, or hearing impairment. This 48-dB(A) estimate is probably an upper bound because it does not account for other types of attenuation, such as air absorption and ground effects due to terrain and vegetation. If only ground effects were considered (HMMH 1995), more than 10 dB(A) of attenuation would occur at the nearest residence, which would result in less than 38 dB(A), which is below background levels.

Most of these construction activities would occur during the day, when noise is tolerated better than at night, because of the masking effects of background noise. Nighttime noise levels would drop for all three alternative locations to the background levels of a rural environment because construction activities would cease at night.

#### 5.2.1.4 Water and Soil

Construction of a conversion facility at the Paducah site would disturb land, use water, and produce liquid wastes. The following sections discuss impacts to surface water, groundwater, and soil resources at Paducah during construction. Because site-specific impacts were not identified, impacts to water and soil at alternative Locations A, B, and C would be the same.

**5.2.1.4.1 Surface Water.** Construction of a conversion facility at the Paducah site would produce increased runoff to nearby surface waters because soils and vegetation would be replaced with either buildings or paved areas. The amount of increased runoff from the new, impermeable land surface would be negligible (less than about 1.3% of the site area) compared with the existing area that contributes to runoff. None of the construction activities would measurably affect the existing floodplains.

Water would be required during construction. Peak water use would be 5,500 gal/d (20,800 L/d) or 2 million gal/yr (7.6 million L/yr). About 1,500 gal/d (5,700 L/d) of water would be used in actual construction; 4,000 gal/d (15,140 L/d) of water would be used by the

---

<sup>3</sup> Pile drivers were excluded because piles would not be required for buildings at the site.

workforce. Construction water would be obtained from the Ohio River. If the rate of withdrawal was constant in time, about 3.8 gal/min (14 L/min) would be needed. This rate of withdrawal would be about 0.000003% of the mean flow in the Ohio River.

Wastewater would also be produced during construction. For the assumed workforce, about 4,000 gal/d (15,140 L/d) or 1.5 million gal/yr (5.7 million L/yr) of sanitary wastewater would be generated. There would be no sanitary wastewater discharged to the environment because portable toilets would be used.

**5.2.1.4.2 Groundwater.** Potential impacts to groundwater could occur during construction. These impacts could include changes in effective recharge to underlying aquifers, changes in the depth to groundwater, changes in the direction of groundwater flow, and changes in groundwater quality.

Because all water used at the Paducah site would be obtained from the Ohio River, there would be no direct impacts to groundwater recharge, depth, or flow direction from construction activities. However, these parameters could be minutely affected by changes in the permeability of the surface soil produced by construction activities and building and parking lot construction. Because of the small associated operational areas (less than 1.3% of the total site area), these changes would not be measurable. Similarly, the quality of groundwater beneath the selected site could be affected by surface construction activities through infiltration of surface water contaminated from spills of construction materials. These impacts would be indirect because there would be no direct releases of contaminants to groundwater. Indirect contamination could result from the mobilization of exposed chemicals by precipitation, followed by infiltration of contaminated runoff water. Following good engineering and construction practices and implementing storm water and erosion control measures would minimize impacts to groundwater quality.

**5.2.1.4.3 Soils.** Impacts to soil could occur during construction for the Paducah conversion facility. These impacts could include changes in topography, permeability, quality, and erosion potential.

All three of the alternative locations (A, B, and C) would be sufficiently large (35, 59, and 53 acres [14, 24, and 21 ha], respectively) to accommodate the conversion facility and most of the disturbed area (45 acres [18 ha]). Because the sites are relatively flat there would be no significant changes to topography, and the maximum amount of land needed for construction would be small relative to the total land available at the site (less than about 1.3%). Erosion potential would increase during construction; the impacts, however, would be local, temporary, and about the same for each of the three alternative locations.

Construction activities could also affect the quality of the land at the selected location for the conversion facility. Impacts on quality could result from spills and other construction activities that could release contaminants to the surface. Following good engineering and construction practices would minimize impacts to soil quality.

Contaminated soil associated with SWMU 194 could be excavated during construction at either Location A or B. Management of these soils is discussed in Section 5.2.1.7.

**5.2.1.5 Socioeconomics**

The socioeconomic analysis covers the effects of construction on population, employment, income, regional growth, housing, and community resources in the ROI around the Paducah site. Impacts from construction are summarized in Table 5.2-4. The socioeconomic impacts are not dependent on the location of the conversion facility; thus, the impacts would be the same for alternative Locations A, B, and C.

The potential socioeconomic impacts would be relatively small. It is estimated that construction activities would create direct employment of about 190 people in the peak construction year and about 100 additional indirect jobs in the ROI. Construction activities would increase the annual average employment growth rate by about 0.1 of a percentage point over the duration of construction. A conversion facility would produce about \$10 million in personal income in the peak year of construction.

It is estimated that about 290 people would in-migrate to the ROI in the peak year of construction. However, in-migration would have only a marginal effect on population growth and would require only about 5% of vacant rental housing in the peak year. No significant impact on public finances would occur as a result of in-migration. Fewer than five local public service employees would be required to maintain existing levels of service in the various local public service jurisdictions in McCracken County.

**TABLE 5.2-4 Socioeconomic Impacts from Construction of the Conversion Facility at the Paducah Site**

Impact Area	Construction Impacts <sup>a</sup>
Employment	
Direct	190
Total	290
Income (millions of 2002 \$)	
Direct	5.3
Total	9.5
Population (no. of new ROI residents)	290
Housing (no. of units required)	100
Public finances (% impact on fiscal balance)	
Cities in McCracken County <sup>b</sup>	0.3
McCracken County	0.2
Schools in McCracken County <sup>c</sup>	0.3
Public service employment (no. of new employees in McCracken County) <sup>c</sup>	
Police	0
Firefighters	0
General	1
Physicians	0
Teachers	1
No. of new staffed hospital beds in McCracken County	1

<sup>a</sup> Impacts are shown for the peak year of construction (2005).

<sup>b</sup> Includes impacts that would occur in the City of Paducah.

<sup>c</sup> Includes impacts that would occur in the McCracken County school district.

### 5.2.1.6 Ecology

Potential impacts to vegetation, wildlife, wetlands, and threatened and endangered species that would result from the construction of a conversion facility are described below. Additional information regarding wetlands and federally-listed species can be found in Van Lonkhuyzen (2004).

**5.2.1.6.1 Vegetation.** Existing vegetation within the disturbed area would be destroyed during land clearing activities. Construction of a conversion facility at any of the three alternative locations at the Paducah site is not expected to threaten the local population of any species. Replanting disturbed areas with native species would comply with Executive Order 13148, *Greening the Government through Leadership in Environmental Management* (U.S. President 2000). Erosion of exposed soil at construction sites could reduce the effectiveness of restoration efforts and create sedimentation downgradient of the construction site. However, the implementation of standard erosion control measures, installation of storm water retention ponds, and immediate replanting of disturbed areas with native species would help minimize impacts to vegetation. Deposition of fugitive dust resulting from construction activities could adversely affect vegetation; however, the use of control measures to reduce dust production could minimize impacts (see Section 5.2.1.3).

Constructing a facility at Location A, the preferred location, would result in the loss of approximately 10 acres (4 ha) of previously disturbed managed grassland vegetation that is maintained by frequent mowing. The facility would not replace undisturbed natural communities. Managed grassland comprises most of the vegetation on the Paducah site. The loss of 10 acres (4 ha) would therefore represent a minor decrease in this habitat on the Paducah site. This area represents about 29% of the area available at the 35-acre (14-ha) Location A. The total area of construction-related disturbance, however, would be approximately 45 acres (18 ha) in size. Although construction-related activities would primarily affect managed grassland vegetation, impacts to the wooded area at this location could also occur during the construction period, unless temporary construction areas, such as lay-down areas, were positioned outside the southern portion of Location A in adjacent, previously disturbed areas. If facility construction required the disturbance of all of Location A, the undisturbed mature deciduous forest at this location would potentially be eliminated. Although deciduous forest is not uncommon in the vicinity of the Paducah site, impacts to mature deciduous forest communities would generally be considered a greater adverse impact than those to managed grassland because of the (1) undisturbed condition of mature forest, (2) high biodiversity and habitat value, and (3) considerably greater length of time required for restoration of mature forest. The construction of utility lines and rail lines would extend beyond Location A and would result in additional impacts to vegetation. Construction of rail lines west of Location A would affect previously disturbed areas supporting both managed grassland and scrub-shrub communities within the existing railroad bed. Mature deciduous hardwood forest adjacent to the railroad bed could be affected by the construction of the new rail line if construction-related activities occur beyond the railroad bed.

The specific vegetation communities impacted by construction at Location B would depend on the placement of the facility within the available area. A facility of 10 acres (4 ha) would occupy 17% of the area available at this 59-acre (24-ha) location. Placement of the facility at the northern end of Location B would primarily result in impacts to areas that are predominantly already disturbed and support managed grassland vegetation (consisting of 38 acres [15 ha]). The groves of mature trees in this area might be affected by facility construction. However, depending on the placement of the facility, these impacts might be avoided. Avoidance of the tree groves during construction might not be possible unless temporary construction areas were positioned outside Location B in adjacent, previously disturbed areas. Impacts to the undisturbed mature deciduous forest at Location B may be avoided, although impacts would be expected to occur if facility construction required the disturbance of 45 acres (18 ha) of this location.

The specific vegetation communities impacted by construction at Location C would also depend on the placement of the facility within the available area. A facility of 10 acres (4 ha) would occupy 19% of the area available at this 53-acre (21-ha) location. Placement of the facility in the western portion of this location (west of Dyke Road) would primarily impact a previously disturbed immature deciduous forest community. Facility placement in the eastern portion of the location would impact primarily old-field open grassland community, with likely impacts to the small groves of mature trees in this area. Facility construction would disturb a total area of up to 45 acres (18 ha) and potentially result in impacts to both deciduous forest and grassland areas.

**5.2.1.6.2 Wildlife.** Wildlife would be disturbed by land clearing, noise, and human presence. Wildlife with restricted mobility, such as burrowing species or juveniles of nesting species, would be destroyed during land clearing activities. More mobile individuals would relocate to adjacent available areas with suitable habitat: abundant habitat is available on the Paducah site and the adjacent West Kentucky Wildlife Management Area. Population densities, and thus competition for food and nesting sites, would increase in these areas, potentially reducing the survivability or reproductive capacity of displaced individuals. Some wildlife species would be expected to recolonize replanted areas near the conversion facility following completion of construction. Construction of a conversion facility at any of the three alternative locations at the Paducah site is not expected to threaten the local population of any wildlife species because similar habitat would be available in the vicinity of the site.

Constructing a conversion facility at Location A would primarily impact those species commonly associated with managed grasslands maintained by frequent mowing; however, larger areas of similar habitat would be available nearby. Construction could also impact habitat for species associated with mature deciduous forest, such as neotropical migratory birds, unless temporary construction areas were positioned outside the southern portion of Location A in previously disturbed areas. Noise associated with construction activities up to 79.5 dB(A) at 60 m (200 ft) may reduce the suitability of the forest habitat at Location A for some species during the construction period. The construction of utility lines and rail lines would result in additional impacts to wildlife habitat. Habitat for species associated with both managed grassland and scrub-shrub communities within the existing railroad bed could be lost during construction of rail lines west of Location A. If construction-related activities occur beyond the

railroad bed, species supported by mature deciduous hardwood forest could be affected. In addition, noise associated with rail construction might reduce the suitability of the forest habitat for some species.

Constructing a conversion facility in the northern portion of Location B would impact habitat for those species commonly associated with frequently mowed grasslands and other disturbed areas, such as along drainage channels. Similar habitat would be abundant in other areas of the Paducah site. Impacts to habitat for species associated with mature deciduous forest could likely be avoided by placing the facility in the northern portion of this location. Construction of a facility immediately adjacent to the forest could reduce that habitat's suitability for some wildlife species. Species that occur in the tree groves at this location, such as neotropical migratory birds, might be impacted during construction; however, impacts may potentially be avoided if temporary construction areas were positioned outside Location B in adjacent disturbed areas. If facility construction required the disturbance of 45 acres (18 ha) of this location, however, impacts to the mature forest habitat at Location B would be expected to occur.

Species associated with deciduous forest or open grassland habitat could be impacted by construction of a conversion facility at Location C. Construction west of Dyke Road would primarily impact forested habitat, while construction in the eastern half would impact old field grassland habitat. In addition, species such as neotropical migratory birds, which are associated with the groves of mature trees in the eastern half of this location, would likely be impacted by construction in that area. Although these habitats are not uncommon in the vicinity of the Paducah site, open grassland areas provide opportunities for restoration of native prairie habitat. Construction of a conversion facility at Location C may decrease the suitability of the remainder of the location for some wildlife species.

**5.2.1.6.3 Wetlands.** Wetlands could potentially be impacted by filling or draining during construction of a conversion facility. Wetlands could be impacted by alteration of surface water runoff patterns, soil compaction, or groundwater flow if the conversion facility was located immediately adjacent to wetland areas. Impacts to wetlands would be minimized, however, by maintaining a buffer area around them during facility construction. Executive Order 11990, *Protection of Wetlands* (U.S. President 1977a), requires federal agencies to minimize the destruction, loss, or degradation of wetlands, and to preserve and enhance the natural and beneficial uses of wetlands. 10 CFR Part 1022 sets forth DOE regulations for implementing Executive Order 11990 as well as Executive Order 11988, *Floodplain Management* (U.S. President 1977b). Mitigation for unavoidable impacts may be developed in coordination with the appropriate regulatory agencies. Unavoidable impacts to wetlands within the jurisdiction of the USACE might require a CWA Section 404 Permit, which would trigger the need for a CWA Section 401 Water Quality Certification from the Commonwealth of Kentucky. An approved mitigation plan might be required prior to the initiation of construction.

Water-level changes in the Ohio River because of water withdrawal for construction would be negligible. Regional groundwater changes due to the increase in impermeable surface related to facility construction would also be negligible. Therefore, except for the potential local

indirect impacts noted above, impacts to regional wetlands due to changes in groundwater or surface water levels or flow patterns would be expected to be negligible.

Construction of a conversion facility at Location A could result in impacts to wetlands located in the central and southern portion of this location (Figure 5.2-1). Although the wetlands within the open, previously disturbed area are outside of the facility footprint, construction of access roads and rail lines could eliminate a portion of the wetlands in this area. The larger, undisturbed forested wetland in the southern portion of Location A, however, could likely be avoided. Two new rail lines, an access road from Patrol Road A, and a walkway leading from the south parking area to Building C1100, would cross the wetland within the drainage swale leading to KPDES Outfall 017 and Bayou Creek. Direct impacts to this wetland could occur from the placement of fill material and culverts for the crossings.

Impacts could also occur to the wetlands located in drainage swales to the south, which would be crossed by a new rail line and an access road from Patrol Road 4. In addition, two small isolated wetlands in the open, grassy area could be filled as a result of the construction of the rail line and access road. The drainage swale along the south margin of Patrol Road 4 may be impacted if widening or other improvements to that road are made, and impacts to wetlands in drainages along the Entrance Highway could potentially result from improvements to the adjacent roadway to the east. Approximately 6,900 ft<sup>2</sup> (640 m<sup>2</sup>) of palustrine emergent wetland would likely be eliminated by culvert construction or direct placement of fill material within Location A. Wetland areas that are not filled may be indirectly affected by an altered hydrologic regime, due to the proximity of construction, possibly resulting in a decreased frequency or duration of inundation or soil saturation and potential loss of hydrology necessary to sustain wetland conditions. Indirect impacts could be minimized by maintaining a buffer near adjacent wetlands. In addition, placement of temporary construction areas outside Location A might be necessary to avoid additional direct or indirect impacts to these wetlands.

The increase in impervious surface and discharge of storm water runoff, due to construction of a conversion facility, could result in alteration of hydrology in the drainage system within Location A or downstream in Bayou Creek, with greater fluctuations in high and low flows, as well as in the other headwater drainages immediately west of the Entrance Highway. However, because only a small portion of the Bayou Creek watershed would be involved, impacts would likely be small. Downstream wetlands could be affected by sedimentation during construction; however, the implementation of erosion control measures would reduce the likelihood of such impacts. The total area of construction-related disturbance would be up to 45 acres (18 ha). The forested wetland at this location could be impacted unless temporary construction areas were positioned outside the southern portion of Location A in adjacent, previously disturbed areas.

Wetlands could also be impacted by the construction of infrastructure for facility utility requirements or new rail lines extending outside of Location A. Although the rail lines would primarily be constructed on an existing railroad bed, wetlands in drainages along the margin of the rail bed, forested wetlands adjacent to the south margin east of Bayou Creek, or forested wetlands along each side of the rail bed west of Bayou Creek could be impacted if rail bed




FIGURE 5.2-1 Wetlands within Location A at the Paducah Site

repairs or reconstruction are necessary, or by the operation of heavy equipment within these wetlands while laying track (Figure 5.2-2). The drainage along the north side of the rail bed, just west of the Entrance Highway, may potentially be affected by construction of the new rail line serving the western portion of the conversion facility. In addition, impacts to Bayou Creek and adjacent wetlands could result from reconstruction of the rail bridge crossing Bayou Creek; however, wetland impacts from replacement of bridge supports would be expected to be small.

Construction of a conversion facility at Location B might also impact wetlands. Placement of a facility in the northern, disturbed portion of this location would minimize wetland impacts and avoid impacts to the forested wetlands in the southern portion. However, the drainage channels in the northern area would likely be impacted. The channels could be rerouted to continue to convey flows to Bayou Creek. Wetlands could also be impacted by the construction of infrastructure for facility utility requirements, transportation corridors from cylinder storage yards, or rail lines. In addition, placement of temporary construction areas outside Location B may be necessary to avoid additional direct or indirect impacts to wetlands, including forested wetlands in the southern portion of this location. Indirect impacts to wetlands could also occur. The hydrologic characteristics of wetlands could be indirectly affected by adjacent construction, possibly resulting in a decreased frequency or duration of inundation or soil saturation. Indirect impacts could be minimized by maintaining a buffer near adjacent wetlands. Facility construction could result in alteration of hydrology in the drainage system within Location B, or downstream in Bayou Creek, with greater fluctuations in high and low flows. However, because of the small portion of the watershed involved, impacts would likely be small. Downstream wetlands could be impacted by sedimentation during construction; however, the implementation of erosion control measures would reduce the likelihood of such impacts.

Construction of a facility at Location C could potentially result in impacts to wetlands. Facility placement in the western or northeastern portions of this location would likely result in direct impacts to wetlands. Placement of a facility in the southeastern portion of Location C may best avoid direct impacts to wetlands; however, wetlands located in drainage ditches along Dyke Road may be impacted. Indirect impacts, however, could result from construction of a facility immediately adjacent to wetlands in this area. The total area disturbed during construction would be up to 45 acres (18 ha), resulting in direct impacts unless temporary construction areas were located outside of Location C. Facility construction could result in alteration of hydrology in the drainage channel southeast of Location C, or downstream in Little Bayou Creek, with greater fluctuations in high and low flows. However, because of the small portion of the watershed involved, impacts would likely be small. Downstream wetlands could be impacted by sedimentation during construction; the likelihood of such impacts would be reduced, however, with the implementation of erosion control measures.

**5.2.1.6.4 Threatened and Endangered Species.** Construction of a conversion facility at Location A is not expected to directly impact federal- or state-listed species. However, impacts to deciduous forest may occur unless temporary construction areas were positioned outside the southern portion of Location A. Trees with exfoliating bark, such as shagbark hickory or dead trees with loose bark, could potentially be used by the Indiana bat (federal- and state-listed as




FIGURE 5.2-2 Wetlands along the Proposed Rail Line at the Paducah Site

endangered) as roosting trees during summer, although the forested area at the southern portion of Location A has not been identified as summer habitat. If trees (either live or dead) with exfoliating bark were encountered on construction areas, they should be saved if possible. If necessary, the trees should be cut only before March 31 or after October 15 to avoid the period when they might be used by Indiana bats, according to recommendations of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) (Andrews 2004).

Disturbance due to increased noise, lighting, and human presence during construction could decrease the quality of mature forested habitats for the Indiana bat. However, Indiana bats using habitat near the Paducah site would be currently exposed to noise and other effects of human disturbance. Consequently, these effects related to construction activities would be expected to be minor. Construction of the conversion facility or new rail lines in Location A could disturb Indiana bats that may use the forested area in the southern portion of that location. In addition, construction of rail lines adjacent to the mature deciduous forest habitats west of Entrance Highway could likely disturb Indiana bats. In addition to trees east of Bayou Creek that might potentially be used by Indiana bats (such as in or near Location B), portions of the forested area west of the creek are identified as fair quality Indiana bat habitat (Figure 5.2-3), with additional areas identified as poor potential habitat. Because good Indiana bat habitat is not available in that immediate area, bats might likely be disturbed in, or prevented from using, the fair quality habitat.

Impacts to the forested area at Location B could likely be avoided; however, construction of a conversion facility in the southern portion of Location B could result in the removal of trees potentially used by Indiana bats and indirectly impact the Indiana bat by reducing the quality of potential habitat west of Bayou Creek. Construction activities and the presence of a facility in proximity to potential habitat may decrease the suitability of these areas for summer habitat.

Impacts to either the forested area or groves at Location C could occur and result in the removal of trees potentially used by Indiana bats. Construction in the eastern portion of Location C could impact potential habitat for cream wild indigo (state-listed as a species of special concern) and compass plant (state-listed as threatened). Although these species are not known to occur at or near this location, current restoration efforts are increasing the suitability of the open grassland habitat for these species. Impacts to wetlands with open water, such as the drainage channels in Location B or the small ponds in the eastern portion of Location C, could reduce habitat for the great blue heron (state-listed as a species of special concern).

#### **5.2.1.7 Waste Management**

Potential waste management impacts for construction were evaluated by determining the types and estimating the volumes of wastes that would be generated. These estimates were then compared with projected site generation volumes.

Construction of the facility would generate both hazardous and nonhazardous waste. Hazardous waste would be sent to off-site permitted contractors for disposal. Nonhazardous



FIGURE 5.2-3 Areas of Potential Indiana Bat Habitat at the Paducah Site

waste would be disposed of on site at a state-permitted landfill. Table 5.2-5 presents the total waste volumes that would be generated. No radioactive waste would be generated during the construction phase of the conversion facility. Overall, only minimal waste management impacts would result from construction-generated wastes.

In addition to construction-related waste that would be generated, potentially contaminated soil could be excavated during construction of the facility at either Location A or B at Paducah. On the basis of SWMU 194 investigation results and the site characterization report for Location A (Tetra Tech, Inc. 2000), contaminated soil may be located at both locations (see Section 3.1.4.2). The excavated soil would be managed consistent with RCRA regulations and coordinated between the Commonwealth of Kentucky (Division of Waste Management) and DOE.

### 5.2.1.8 Resource Requirements

The resources required for facility construction would not depend on the location of the facility. Materials related to construction would include concrete, sand, gravel, steel, and other metals (Table 5.2-6). At this time, no unusual construction material requirements have been identified. The construction resources, except for those that could be recovered and recycled with current technology, would be irretrievably lost. None of the identified construction resources is in short supply, and all should be readily available in the local region.

Small to moderate amounts of specialty materials (i.e., Monel and Inconel) would be required for construction of the conversion facility in quantities that would not seriously reduce the national or world supply. This material would be used throughout the facilities and is used in the generation of HF in the conversion process. The autoclaves and conversion units (process reactors) are long-lead-time procurements with few qualified bidders. Many suppliers are available for the remainder of the equipment.

### 5.2.1.9 Land Use

The preferred location for the facility (Location A) covers approximately 35 acres (14 ha) and consists primarily of a grassy field, with a wooded area in the southeastern section of the tract. Although constructing a conversion facility at this location would involve modifying existing land use on the specified tract, the resulting facility would be consistent with the heavy

**TABLE 5.2-5 Wastes Generated from Construction Activities for the Conversion Facility at the Paducah Site<sup>a</sup>**

Waste Category	Volume
Hazardous waste	115 m <sup>3</sup>
Nonhazardous waste	
Solids	700 m <sup>3</sup>
Wastewater	3.8 × 10 <sup>6</sup> L
Sanitary wastewater	1.1 × 10 <sup>7</sup> L

<sup>a</sup> Total waste generated during a construction period of 2 years. Because data were not available for the UDS conversion facility, data developed for the DUF<sub>6</sub> PEIS (Dubrin et al. 1997) were used.

**TABLE 5.2-6 Materials/Resources Consumed during Construction of the Conversion Facility at the Paducah Site**

Materials/Resources	Total Consumption	Unit	Peak Demand	Unit
<i>Utilities</i>				
Water	4 × 10 <sup>6</sup>	gal	1,500	gal/h
Electricity	1,500	MWh	7.2	MWh/d
<i>Solids</i>				
Concrete	9,139	yd <sup>3</sup>	NA <sup>a</sup>	NA
Steel	511	tons	NA	NA
Inconel/Monel	33	tons	NA	NA
<i>Liquids</i>				
Fuel	73,000	gal	250	gal/d
<i>Gases</i>				
Industrial gases (propane)	15,000	gal	50	gal/d

<sup>a</sup> NA = not applicable.

industrialized land use currently found at the Paducah site — a consequence of producing enriched uranium and its DUF<sub>6</sub> by-product. As a consequence, at most, negligible land use impacts are anticipated as a result of constructing the facility at Location A.

Constructing a conversion facility on either of the two other locations being considered would have land use impacts similar to those from construction on Location A. Both locations are slightly larger than Location A; Location B covers about 59 acres (23 ha) and Location C covers roughly 53 acres (21 ha), with both comprising largely undeveloped tracts on the Paducah site. As with Location A, constructing a conversion facility on either of these alternate locations would require modifying existing land use on the tract of land involved; however, the resulting facility would be consistent with the heavy industrialized land use currently found at the Paducah site. Once again, at most, negligible land use impacts are anticipated from constructing the facility.

#### 5.2.1.10 Cultural Resources

Construction could potentially impact cultural resources. Neither an archaeological nor an architectural survey has been completed for the Paducah site as a whole or for any of the alternative locations, although an archaeological sensitivity study has been conducted (see Section 3.1.11). Consultations with the SHPO and Native American groups regarding traditional Native American cultural properties at these locations have been initiated (see Appendix G). In accordance with Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, the adverse effects of this undertaking must be evaluated once a location is chosen.

- *Location A.* While no archaeological survey has been completed for Location A, the southern, undisturbed portion of this location has a “low” to “very low” archaeological sensitivity index (U.S. Department of the Army 1994b). Although a low sensitivity index suggests a low probability for encountering significant archaeological resources in Location A, further archaeological analysis would be required if this location was chosen and the southern undisturbed portion was disturbed. If significant archaeological resources were discovered or if traditional properties were identified, a mitigation plan must be prepared and executed in consultation with the Kentucky SHPO and appropriate Tribal governments.
- *Location B.* Location B has not been surveyed for archaeological resources but contains areas of high archaeological sensitivity overlooking Bayou Creek (U.S. Department of the Army 1994b) and a standing structure. An additional cultural resource survey would be required in consultation with the Kentucky SHPO if this location was chosen. If archaeological sites were encountered and determined to be significant, or if the known structure proved to be historically significant, or if traditional cultural properties were identified, a mitigation plan must be prepared and executed in consultation with the Kentucky SHPO and appropriate Tribal governments.
- *Location C.* About 50% of Location C has undergone an archaeological survey. No archaeological sites were recorded in the surveyed area, and the remainder of the location has “low” to “very low” archaeological sensitivity. The access roads that lead to this location would have to be widened if this location was chosen as the site for the conversion facility. A small segment of Dyke Road borders land with high archaeological sensitivity (U.S. Department of the Army 1994b). If this location was chosen, an archaeological survey of the unsurveyed portion of the location and areas likely to be affected by road widening would have to be completed. If significant archaeological resources were encountered or if traditional cultural properties were identified, mitigation plans must be prepared and executed in consultation with the Kentucky SHPO and appropriate Tribal governments.

#### **5.2.1.11 Environmental Justice**

The evaluation of environmental justice impacts associated with construction is based on the identification of high and adverse impacts in other impact areas considered in this EIS, followed by a determination of whether those impacts would affect minority and low-income populations disproportionately. Disproportionate impacts could take two forms: (1) when the environmental justice population is present at a higher percentage in the affected area than in the reference population (i.e., the state in which a potentially impacted population occurs), and (2) when the environmental justice population is more susceptible to impacts than the population as a whole. In either case, high and adverse impacts are a necessary precondition for environmental justice concerns in an EIS.

Analyses of construction-related impacts under the proposed action do not indicate the presence of high and adverse impacts for any of the other impact areas considered in this EIS (see Section 5.2.1). Despite the presence of disproportionately high percentages of both minority and low-income populations within 50 mi (80 km) of the site, no environmental justice impacts from constructing a conversion facility at the Paducah site are anticipated for Locations A, B, or C. Similarly, no evidence indicates that minority or low-income populations would experience high and adverse impacts from the proposed construction in the absence of such impacts in the population as a whole.

## **5.2.2 Operational Impacts**

This section discusses the potential environmental impacts during operation of a conversion facility at the three alternative locations within the Paducah site. During normal operations, the facility would emit only small amounts of contaminants through air emissions; no contaminated liquid effluents would be produced during the dry conversion process. The operational period would be 25 years. If the ETTP cylinders were transported to and converted at Paducah (considered as an option), the operational period would be 28 years.

### **5.2.2.1 Human Health and Safety — Normal Facility Operations**

**5.2.2.1.1 Radiological Impacts.** Radiological impacts to involved workers during normal operation of the conversion facility would result primarily from external radiation from the handling of depleted uranium materials. Potential impacts to noninvolved workers and members of the public would result primarily from trace amounts of uranium compounds released to the environment. Impacts to involved workers, noninvolved workers, and the general public would be similar for the three alternative locations. Background information on radiation exposure is provided in Chapter 4; details on the methodologies are provided in Appendix F.

Radiation exposures of the involved workers in the conversion facility were estimated on the basis of the measurement data on worker exposures in the Framatome ANP, Inc., facility in Richland, Washington. The Framatome ANP facility uses a dry conversion process to convert UF<sub>6</sub> into uranium oxide and has been in operation since 1997. UDS would implement a similar conversion technology in the Paducah facility, and the key components would be similar to those of the Framatome facility. Therefore, conditions for potential worker exposures at Paducah are expected to be similar to those at Framatome. However, the annual processing rate of uranium at Paducah (50 t [55 tons] per day) would be greater than that of Framatome (9 t [10 tons] per day). To process more uranium materials, four conversion lines would be installed, and more workers or longer work hours from each worker would be required. On the other hand, the specific activity of the uranium materials handled at Framatome (about  $3.5 \times 10^6$  pCi/g [Edgar 1994]) is greater than that of depleted uranium (about  $4.0 \times 10^5$  pCi/g). Consequently, the total radiological activities contained in each key component at Paducah would be less than those at Framatome, resulting in a smaller radiation dose rate from each component at Paducah. Because the actual worker activities and the activity duration and frequencies are not available for the

conversion facility at this time, using worker exposure data from the Framatome facility is expected to provide a reasonable estimate of the potential radiation exposures of the involved workers at the Paducah facility. According to UDS (2003a,b), the conversion process would be very automated; therefore, the requirement of working at close distances to radiation sources would be limited. Potential radiation exposures of workers would be monitored by a dosimetry program and be kept below the regulatory limit. The implementation of ALARA practices would further reduce the potential for exposures.

Potential radiation exposures of the involved cylinder yard workers would result mainly from maintenance of both DUF<sub>6</sub> and non-DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders and preparing and transferring DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders to the conversion facility. Under the action alternatives, cylinder maintenance activities during the 25-year conversion period would most likely be the same as those currently being implemented, except that the number of DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders would decrease steadily from the current level. Therefore, potential radiation exposures caused by maintenance activities were estimated by scaling the cylinder yard exposure data.

Potential exposures resulting from transferring cylinders to the conversion facility were estimated using the following assumptions: (1) retrieving each cylinder onto transportation equipment would require two workers to each work half an hour at a distance of 3 ft (1 m) from the cylinder, (2) inspecting a cylinder would require two workers to each work half an hour at a distance of 1 ft (0.30 m) from the cylinder, and (3) each transfer from the cylinder yard to the conversion facility would require two workers for about half an hour at a distance of 6 ft (2 m) from the cylinders. These assumptions were developed for the purpose of modeling potential radiation exposures; in actuality, preparing and transferring cylinders would probably take less time and involve fewer workers. As a result, radiation doses estimated on the basis of these assumptions are conservative.

Noninvolved workers would be those who would work in the conversion facility but would not perform hands-on activities, and those who would work elsewhere on the Paducah site. Depending on the location of the conversion facility, the location of the MEI would be different, and the associated radiation exposure might also vary. However, according to the previous analyses in the DUF<sub>6</sub> PEIS and the small uranium emission rate provided by UDS (2003b) for the conversion facility, potential radiation exposures of the noninvolved workers would be very small. An estimate of the bounding exposure, on the basis of the estimated maximum downwind air concentrations, is provided for the MEI in this section. According to the estimated bounding exposure, which is less than  $1 \times 10^{-5}$  mrem/yr, it is anticipated that the potential collective exposure of the noninvolved workers would also be very small and would be less than the product of the bounding MEI dose and the number of the noninvolved workers.

The location of the conversion facility within the Paducah site would have very little impact on collective exposures of the off-site public because of the much larger area (a circle with a radius of 50 mi [80 km]) considered for the collective exposures than the area of the Paducah site. The estimate of the collective exposure was obtained by using the emission rate ( $< 0.25$  g/yr for uranium) provided by UDS (2003b) and the population distribution information obtained from the 2000 census. The actual location of the off-site public MEI would depend on the selected location of the conversion facility and the site boundary. The potential exposure

would be bounded by the exposure associated with the maximum air concentrations, which are the same as those used for estimating the bounding exposure of the noninvolved worker MEI. The bounding exposure of the off-site public MEI would be greater than that of the noninvolved worker MEI because of the longer exposure duration (8,760 h/yr versus 2,000 h/yr) assumed for the off-site public than for the noninvolved workers, and because of consideration of the food ingestion pathway for the general public (see Appendix F for more detailed information).

As discussed in Chapter 1 and Appendix B, some portion of the DUF<sub>6</sub> inventory contains TRU and Tc contamination. The TRU materials and most of the Tc material are expected to remain in the emptied cylinders after the withdrawal of DUF<sub>6</sub>. A small quantity of Tc might become vaporized and end up in the conversion process equipment, having been converted to technetium oxide. However, airborne emission of Tc is not anticipated because the oxide particles would be captured in the U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> product. The contribution to the potential external radiation exposures from these contaminants under normal operations were evaluated on the basis of bounding concentrations presented in Appendix B. The dose from these contaminants was estimated and compared with the dose from the depleted uranium and uranium decay products in the DUF<sub>6</sub>. It is estimated that under normal operational conditions, the TRU and Tc contaminants would result in a very small contribution to the radiation doses to the involved workers — approximately 0.2% of the dose from the depleted uranium and its decay products.

Estimated potential annual radiation exposures and the corresponding estimates of potential LCFs of the various receptors as a result of normal operations of the conversion facility are presented in Table 5.2-7 (impacts would be the same for all three alternative locations). The average individual dose for involved workers in the conversion facility is estimated to be about 75 mrem/yr (UDS 2003b). The average individual dose for workers working at the cylinder yards was estimated to range from about 430 to 690 mrem/yr, assuming a total of eight workers each year (UDS 2003b). The larger exposure corresponds to the first year of conversion operations and the smaller exposure corresponds to the last year of operations. The estimated average doses for the involved workers are well below the dose limit of 5,000 mrem/yr set for radiation workers (10 CFR Part 835). The corresponding latent cancer risk for an average cylinder yard worker would be about  $3 \times 10^{-4}$  per year (1 chance in 3,300 of developing 1 LCF per year) or less. UDS has proposed 30 workers for cylinder management activities; therefore, the actual average dose and risk to individual workers would likely be less than the above estimated values that are based on 8 workers.

Collective exposures of the involved workers would depend on the number of workers required in the conversion facility. The estimated number of involved workers in the Paducah facility would be about 142 (UDS 2003b). The total collective exposure of the involved workers would then be about 10.7 person-rem/yr. The collective exposure of the cylinder yard workers is expected to range from 5.5 person-rem/yr for the first year of conversion operation to 3.4 person-rem/yr for the last year of conversion operation. Excess LCFs estimated for all the involved workers (both in the conversion facility and in the cylinder yards) would be less than  $6 \times 10^{-3}$ /yr (i.e., 1 chance in 160 of developing 1 LCF per year).

**TABLE 5.2-7 Estimated Radiological Doses and Cancer Risks under Normal Conversion Facility Operations at the Paducah Site<sup>a</sup>**

Locations	Receptors					
	Involved Workers <sup>b</sup>		Noninvolved Workers <sup>c</sup>		General Public	
	Average Dose/Risk (mrem/yr)/(risk/yr)	Collective Dose/Risk (person-rem/yr)/ (fatalities/yr)	MEI Dose/Risk <sup>d</sup> (mrem/yr)/ (risk/yr)	Collective Dose/Risk (person-rem/yr)/ (fatalities/yr)	MEI Dose/Risk <sup>e</sup> (mrem/yr)/ (risk/yr)	Collective Dose/Risk <sup>f</sup> (person-rem/yr)/ (fatalities/yr)
<b>Radiation doses</b>						
Conversion facility	75	10.7	$< 1.0 \times 10^{-5}$	$< 1.9 \times 10^{-5}$	$< 3.9 \times 10^{-5}$	$4.7 \times 10^{-5}$
Cylinder yards	430 – 690	3.4 – 5.5	– <sup>g</sup>	–	–	–
<b>Cancer risks</b>						
Conversion facility	$3 \times 10^{-5}$	$4 \times 10^{-3}$	$< 5 \times 10^{-12}$	$< 1 \times 10^{-8}$	$< 2 \times 10^{-11}$	$2 \times 10^{-8}$
Cylinder yards	$2 \times 10^{-4}$ – $3 \times 10^{-4}$	$1 \times 10^{-3}$ – $2 \times 10^{-3}$	–	–	–	–

<sup>a</sup> Impacts are reported as best estimates or bounding values. They are the same regardless of the location of the conversion facility.

<sup>b</sup> Involved workers are those workers directly involved with handling radioactive materials. For the conversion facility, 142 involved workers were assumed. Calculation results are presented as average individual dose and collective dose for the worker population.

<sup>c</sup> Noninvolved workers include individuals who work at the conversion facility but are not directly involved in handling materials, and individuals who work at the Paducah site but not within the conversion facility. The population size of noninvolved workers is about 1,900.

<sup>d</sup> The noninvolved worker MEI doses are the bounding estimates corresponding to the estimated maximum downwind air concentrations. The exposures would result from inhalation, external radiation, and incidental soil ingestion.

<sup>e</sup> The general public MEI doses are the bounding estimates corresponding to the estimated maximum downwind air concentrations. The exposure would result from inhalation; external radiation; and ingestion of plant foods, meat, milk, and soil.

<sup>f</sup> Collective exposures were estimated for the population (about 520,000 persons) within a 50-mi (80-km) radius around the Paducah site. The exposure pathways considered were inhalation; external radiation; and ingestion of plant foods, meat, milk, and soil.

<sup>g</sup> A dash indicates that potential air emissions from cylinder maintenance or preparation activities are expected to be negligible. Therefore, no impacts were estimated for the noninvolved workers and the off-site general public.

Because of the small airborne release rates of depleted uranium during normal operations, potential radiation exposures of the noninvolved workers would be very small regardless of where the conversion facility was located within the Paducah site. The radiation dose incurred by the MEI was modeled to be less than  $1.0 \times 10^{-5}$  mrem/yr. This small radiation dose would correspond to potential excess latent cancer risks of less than  $5 \times 10^{-12}$  per year (1 chance in 200 billion of developing 1 LCF per year). For comparison, the dose limit set for airborne releases from operations of DOE facilities is 10 mrem/yr (40 CFR 61).

Radiation exposures of the off-site public also would be very small regardless of the location of the conversion facility. The MEI dose was modeled to be less than  $3.9 \times 10^{-5}$  mrem/yr. This dose is insignificant compared with the radiation dose limits of 100 mrem/yr (DOE 1990) from all pathways and 10 mrem/yr (40 CFR Part 61) from airborne pathways set to protect the general public from operations of DOE facilities. The corresponding latent cancer risk would be less than  $2 \times 10^{-11}$  per year (1 chance in 50 billion of developing 1 LCF per year). Because of no waterborne discharge of uranium (UDS 2003b), radiation exposure to the off-site public from using surface water near the facility would be negligible.

**5.2.2.1.2 Chemical Impacts.** Potential chemical impacts to human health from normal operations at the conversion facility would result primarily from exposure to trace amounts of the insoluble uranium compound U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> and to HF released from the process exhaust stack. Risks from normal operations were quantified on the basis of calculated hazard indices. General information concerning the chemical impact analysis methodology is provided in Chapter 4.

The hazard indices were calculated on the basis of air dispersion modeling, which identified the locations of maximum ground-level concentrations of uranium compounds and HF emitted from the conversion facility. Since the maximum concentration locations were used for modeling both noninvolved worker and general public exposures, the impacts would be the same for the three alternative locations assessed.

Conversion to U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> would result in very low levels of exposure to hazardous chemicals. No adverse health effects to noninvolved workers or the general public are expected during normal operations. Human health impacts resulting from exposure to hazardous chemicals during normal operations of the conversion facilities are estimated as hazard indices of  $1.3 \times 10^{-6}$  and  $1.4 \times 10^{-4}$  for the noninvolved worker and general public MEIs, respectively. The hazard indices for the conversion process would be at least four orders of magnitude lower than the hazard index of 1, which is the level at which adverse health effects might be expected to occur in some exposed individuals.

Impacts to involved workers from exposure to chemicals during normal operations are not expected. The workplace would be monitored to ensure that airborne chemical concentrations were within applicable health standards that are protective of human health and safety. If planned work activities were likely to expose involved workers to chemicals, workers would be provided with appropriate protective equipment, as necessary.

### 5.2.2.2 Human Health and Safety — Facility Accidents

A range of accidents covering the spectrum from high-frequency/low-consequence events to low-frequency/high-consequence accidents was considered for DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion operations. The accident scenarios considered such events as releases due to cylinder damage, fires, plane crashes, equipment leaks and ruptures, hydrogen explosions, earthquakes, and tornadoes. The accident scenarios considered in the assessment were those identified in the DUF<sub>6</sub> PEIS (DOE 1999a); the scenarios were modified to take into account the specific conversion technology and facility design proposed by UDS (UDS 2003b; Folga 2003). A list of bounding radiological and chemical accidents — that is, those accidents expected to result in the highest consequences in each frequency category should the accident occur — for the UDS conversion facility is provided in UDS (2003b). The bounding accident scenarios and their estimated consequences are discussed below for both radiological and chemical impacts.

**5.2.2.2.1 Radiological Impacts.** Potential radiation doses from accidents were estimated for noninvolved workers at the Paducah site and members of the public within a 50-mi (80-km) radius of the site for both MEIs and the collective populations. Impacts to involved workers under accident conditions would likely be dominated by physical forces from the accident itself; thus quantitative dose/effect estimates would not be meaningful. For these reasons, the impacts to involved workers during accidents are not quantified in this EIS. However, it is recognized that injuries and fatalities among involved workers would be possible if an accident occurred.

Table 5.2-8 lists the bounding accidents in each frequency category (i.e., the accidents that were found to have the highest consequences) for radiological impacts. The estimated radiation doses to members of the public and noninvolved workers (both MEIs and collective populations) for these accidents are presented in Table 5.2-9. Table 5.2-10 gives the corresponding risks of LCFs associated with the estimated doses for these accidents. The doses and risks are presented as ranges (minimum and maximum) because two different atmospheric conditions were considered for each accident. The estimated doses and LCFs were calculated on the basis of the assumption that the accidents would occur, without taking into account the probability of the accident's occurring. The probability of occurrence for each accident is indicated by the frequency category to which it is assigned. For example, accidents in the extremely unlikely category have an estimated probability of occurrence of between 1 in 10,000 and 1 in 1 million per year.

The accident assessment took into account the three alternative locations within the Paducah site. Because of the close proximity of the alternative locations to the site boundary and the uncertainty associated with both the wind direction at the time of the accident and the exact location of the release point, it was conservatively assumed that both the noninvolved worker MEI and the general public MEI would be located 328 ft (100 m) from accidents with a ground-level release. For accidents with the potential for plume rise due to a fire or for releases from a stack, both the worker and public MEIs were assumed to be located at the point of maximum ground-level concentrations of the released contaminants. As discussed in Appendix F, the noninvolved worker MEI was assumed to be exposed to the passing plume for

**TABLE 5.2-8 Bounding Radiological Accidents Considered for Conversion Operations at the Paducah Site<sup>a</sup>**

Accident Scenario	Accident Description	Chemical Form	Amount (lb)	Duration (min)	Release Level <sup>b</sup>
<i>Likely Accidents (frequency: 1 or more times in 100 years)</i>					
Corroded cylinder spill, dry conditions	A 1-ft (0.30-m) hole results during handling, with solid UF <sub>6</sub> forming a 4-ft <sup>2</sup> (0.37-m <sup>2</sup> ) area on the dry ground.	UF <sub>6</sub>	24	60 (continuous)	Ground
U <sub>3</sub> O <sub>8</sub> drum spill	A single U <sub>3</sub> O <sub>8</sub> drum is damaged by a forklift and spills its contents onto the ground outside the storage facility.	U <sub>3</sub> O <sub>8</sub>	2.4	30	Ground
<i>Extremely Unlikely Accidents (frequency: 1 time in 10,000 years to 1 time in 1 million years)</i>					
Earthquake	The U <sub>3</sub> O <sub>8</sub> storage building is damaged during a design-basis earthquake, and 10% of the containers are breached.	U <sub>3</sub> O <sub>8</sub>	180	30	Stack
Rupture of cylinders – fire	Several cylinders hydraulically rupture during a fire.	UF <sub>6</sub>	0 11,500 8,930 3,580	0–12 12 12–30 30–121	Ground
Tornado	A windblown missile from a design-basis tornado pierces a single U <sub>3</sub> O <sub>8</sub> container in the storage building.	U <sub>3</sub> O <sub>8</sub>	1,200	0.5	Ground

<sup>a</sup> The accident assessment considered a spectrum of accidents in four categories, likely, unlikely, extremely unlikely, and incredible. Potential accidents in the unlikely and incredible frequency categories would not result in radiological releases, but they are considered in the chemical assessment.

<sup>b</sup> Ground-level releases were assumed to occur outdoors on concrete pads in the cylinder storage yards. To prevent contaminant migration, cleanup of residuals was assumed to begin immediately after the release was stopped.

2 hours after the accident, after which time he or she would be evacuated; the public MEI was assumed to remain indefinitely in the path of the passing plume and consume contaminated food grown on site.

The estimated doses and risks to the noninvolved worker and public MEIs are presented in Tables 5.2-9 and 5.2-10. The estimated impacts to the noninvolved worker MEI and public MEI are similar because 99% of the dose is due to the inhalation pathway within the first 2 hours after the accident.

**TABLE 5.2-9 Estimated Radiological Doses per Accident Occurrence during Conversion at the Paducah Site<sup>a</sup>**

Conversion Product/Accident <sup>b</sup>	Frequency Category <sup>c</sup>	Maximum Dose				Minimum Dose			
		Noninvolved Workers		General Public		Noninvolved Workers		General Public	
		MEI (rem)	Population <sup>d</sup> (person-rem)	MEI (rem)	Population (person-rem)	MEI (rem)	Population <sup>d</sup> (person-rem)	MEI (rem)	Population (person-rem)
Corroded cylinder spill, dry conditions	L	$7.8 \times 10^{-2}$	1.1/2.4/0.6	$7.8 \times 10^{-2}$	$2.4 \times 10^{-1}$	$3.3 \times 10^{-3}$	(4.7/9.9/2.8) $\times 10^{-2}$	$3.3 \times 10^{-3}$	$2.5 \times 10^{-3}$
Failure of U <sub>3</sub> O <sub>8</sub> container while in transit	L	$5.3 \times 10^{-1}$	7.1/17/4.0	$5.3 \times 10^{-1}$	1.0	$2.2 \times 10^{-2}$	(3.2/6.6/1.9) $\times 10^{-1}$	$2.3 \times 10^{-2}$	$1.7 \times 10^{-1}$
Earthquake	EU	40	(5.3/12.7/3.0) $\times 10^2$	40	73	1.7	(2.4/5.0/1.4) $\times 10^{-1}$	1.7	13
Rupture of cylinders – fire	EU	$2.0 \times 10^{-2}$	9.5/6.8/8.0	$2.0 \times 10^{-2}$	21	$3.7 \times 10^{-3}$	(9.6/6.7/11) $\times 10^{-1}$	$3.7 \times 10^{-3}$	1.2
Tornado <sup>e</sup>	EU	7.5	110/230/64	7.5	34	7.5	110/230/64	7.5	34

<sup>a</sup> Maximum and minimum doses reflect differences in meteorological conditions at the time of the accident. In general, maximum doses would occur under meteorological conditions of F stability with a 1-m/s wind (2-mph) speed; minimum doses would occur under D stability with a 4-m/s (9-mph) wind speed.

<sup>b</sup> The bounding accident chosen to represent each frequency category is the one that would result in the highest dose to the general public MEI. Health impacts in that row represent that accident only and not the range of impacts among accidents in that category. Absence of an accident in a certain frequency category indicates that the accident would not result in a release of radioactive material.

<sup>c</sup> Accident frequencies: L = likely, estimated to occur one or more times in 100 years of facility operations ( $> 10^{-2}$ /yr); EU = extremely unlikely, estimated to occur between once in 10,000 years and once in 1 million years of facility operations ( $10^{-4}$  to  $10^{-6}$ /yr).

<sup>d</sup> For the noninvolved worker population dose, three estimates are provided, corresponding to Locations A, B, and C within the Paducah site.

<sup>e</sup> Meteorological conditions analyzed for the tornado were D stability with a 20-m/s (45-mph) wind speed.

**TABLE 5.2-10 Estimated Radiological Health Risks per Accident Occurrence during Conversion at the Paducah Site**

Conversion Product/Accident <sup>b</sup>	Frequency Category <sup>c</sup>	Maximum Risk (LCFs) <sup>a</sup>				Minimum Risk (LCFs) <sup>a</sup>			
		Noninvolved Workers		General Public		Noninvolved Workers		General Public	
		MEI	Population <sup>d</sup>	MEI	Population	MEI	Population <sup>d</sup>	MEI	Population
Corroded cylinder spill, dry conditions	L	$3 \times 10^{-5}$	$(0.4/1/0.2) \times 10^{-3}$	$3 \times 10^{-5}$	$3 \times 10^{-5}$	$1 \times 10^{-6}$	$2/5/1 \times 10^{-5}$	$1 \times 10^{-6}$	$1 \times 10^{-5}$
U <sub>3</sub> O <sub>8</sub> drum spill	L	$2 \times 10^{-4}$	$(3/7/2) \times 10^{-3}$	$3 \times 10^{-4}$	$5 \times 10^{-4}$	$9 \times 10^{-6}$	$2/3/0.9 \times 10^{-4}$	$1 \times 10^{-5}$	$8 \times 10^{-5}$
Earthquake	EU	$2 \times 10^{-2}$	$(2/5/1) \times 10^{-1}$	$2 \times 10^{-2}$	$4 \times 10^{-2}$	$7 \times 10^{-4}$	$1/2/0.7 \times 10^{-3}$	$8 \times 10^{-4}$	$6 \times 10^{-3}$
Rupture of cylinders – fire	EU	$8 \times 10^{-6}$	$(4/3/3) \times 10^{-3}$	$8 \times 10^{-6}$	$1 \times 10^{-2}$	$1 \times 10^{-6}$	$5/3/6 \times 10^{-4}$	$1 \times 10^{-6}$	$5 \times 10^{-4}$
Tornado <sup>e</sup>	EU	$3 \times 10^{-3}$	$(5/10/3) \times 10^{-2}$	$4 \times 10^{-3}$	$2 \times 10^{-2}$	$3 \times 10^{-3}$	$5/10/3 \times 10^{-2}$	$4 \times 10^{-3}$	$2 \times 10^{-2}$

<sup>a</sup> Maximum and minimum risks reflect differences in meteorological conditions at the time of the accident. In general, maximum risks would occur under meteorological conditions of F stability with a 1-m/s (2-mph) wind speed; minimum risks would occur under D stability with a 4-m/s (9-mph) wind speed. Values shown are the consequences if the accident did occur. The risk of an accident is the consequence (LCFs) times the estimated frequency times 25 years of operations.

<sup>b</sup> The bounding accident chosen to represent each frequency category is the one that would result in the highest risks to the general public MEI. Health impacts in that row represent that accident only and not the range of impacts among accidents in that category. Absence of an accident in a certain frequency category indicates that the accident would not result in a release of radioactive material.

<sup>c</sup> Accident frequencies: L = likely, estimated to occur one or more times in 100 years of facility operations ( $> 10^{-2}/\text{yr}$ ); EU = extremely unlikely, estimated to occur between once in 10,000 years and once in 1 million years of facility operations ( $10^{-4} - 10^{-6}/\text{yr}$ ).

<sup>d</sup> For the noninvolved worker population dose, three estimates are provided, corresponding to Locations A, B, and C within the Paducah site.

<sup>e</sup> Meteorological conditions analyzed for the tornado were D stability with a 20-m/s (45-mph) wind speed.

For the off-site public, the location of the conversion facility within the Paducah site would have very little impact on collective exposures because the area considered (a circle with a radius of 80 km [50 mi]) would be so much larger than the area of the Paducah site. The population dose estimates are based on population distributions from the 2000 census. The collective dose to noninvolved workers, however, would depend on the location of the conversion facility with respect to other buildings within the site. Therefore, for the noninvolved worker population, three estimates are provided in Tables 5.2-9 and 5.2-10, corresponding to Locations A, B, and C within the site.

The postulated accident estimated to have the largest consequence is the extremely unlikely accident caused by an earthquake involving the conversion facility. In this scenario, it is assumed that the U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> storage building would be damaged during the earthquake and that 10% of the stored containers would be breached. Under conservative meteorological conditions (F stability class with a 1-m/s [2 mph] wind speed) expected to result in the highest possible exposures, it is estimated that the dose to the MEI member of the public and noninvolved worker from this accident would be approximately 40 rem if it is assumed that the product storage building contained 6 month's worth of production. The RFP for conversion services required the bidders to provide enough capacity to be able to store up to 6 month's worth of inventory on site. The estimated MEI doses are well below levels expected to cause immediate fatalities from radiation exposure (approximately 450 rem) and would result in a lifetime increase in the probability of developing an LCF of about 0.02 (about 1 chance in 50) in the public MEI and about 0.02 (1 chance in 50) in the worker MEI.

It is estimated that the collective doses from the U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> storage building earthquake accident would be 300 to 1,270 person-rem to the worker population and 73 person-rem to the off-site general population. These collective doses would result in less than 1 additional LCF in the worker population (0.5 LCF) and in the general population (0.04 LCF).

The accident scenario with the second-highest impacts was the extremely unlikely scenario caused by a tornado strike. In this scenario, it is assumed that a windblown missile from a tornado would pierce a single U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> container in storage. In this hypothetical accident, and if bulk bags were being used to transport and dispose of the U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> product, approximately 1,200 lb (550 kg) of U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> could be released at ground level. Under conservative meteorological conditions, it is estimated that the dose to the MEI and noninvolved worker would be 7.5 rem. The collective doses would be up to 230 person-rem to the worker population and up to 35 person-rem to the general population. If the emptied cylinders were used rather than the bulk bags as U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> containers, the resulting doses would be approximately half of the above results.

To account for the possible TRU and Tc contamination in some of the cylinders, a ratio of the dose from the TRU and Tc radionuclides at bounding maximum concentrations to the dose from the depleted uranium was calculated (see Appendix B for details). For accidents involving full DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders, the relative dose contribution from TRU and Tc was found to be less than 0.02% of the dose from the depleted uranium. This approach is conservative because only a fraction of the cylinders in the inventory are contaminated with TRU, and because it is expected that the concentration in any one cylinder would be less than the bounding concentrations assumed in the analysis.

The following conclusions may be drawn from the radiological health impact results:

- No cancer fatalities are predicted for any of the accidents.
- The maximum radiological dose to the noninvolved worker and general public MEIs (assuming that an accident occurred) would be about 7.5 to 40 rem, depending on the quantity of product stored on site at the time of the accident. This dose could thus be greater than the 25-rem total effective dose equivalent established by DOE as a guideline for assessing the adequacy of protection of public health and safety from potential accidents (DOE 2000c). Therefore, more detailed analysis during facility design and siting may be necessary.
- The overall radiological risk to noninvolved worker and general public MEI receptors (estimated by multiplying the risk per occurrence [Table 5.2-10] by the annual probability of occurrence by the number of years of operations) would be less than 1 for all of the conversion facility accidents.
- At most, there would be a factor of 5 difference in noninvolved worker population impacts among the three locations. Location C would have the lowest impact for the earthquake bounding scenario. Location B would have the highest impact for this scenario.

**5.2.2.2.2 Chemical Impacts.** This section presents the results for chemical health impacts for the highest-consequence accident in each frequency category for conversion operations at the Paducah site. The estimated numbers of adverse and irreversible adverse effects among noninvolved workers and the general public were calculated separately for each of the three alternative locations within the site by using 2000 census data for the off-site population. The methodology and assumptions used in the calculations are summarized in Appendix F, Section F.4.

The bounding conversion facility chemical accidents are listed in Table 5.2-11 and cover events that could occur during conversion. Note that an anhydrous NH<sub>3</sub> tank rupture is one of the bounding chemical accidents and the accident expected to cause the greatest impacts. NH<sub>3</sub> is used to produce hydrogen required for the conversion process. Although the use of NH<sub>3</sub> for hydrogen production is part of the UDS facility design, the use of natural gas for hydrogen production, which would eliminate the need for NH<sub>3</sub>, is also possible.

The consequences from accidental chemical releases derived from the accident consequence modeling for conversion are presented in Tables 5.2-12 and 5.2-13. The results are presented as the number of people with the potential for (1) adverse effects and (2) irreversible adverse effects. Within each frequency category, the tables present the results for the accident that would affect the largest number of people (total of workers and off-site population). The numbers of noninvolved workers and members of the off-site public represent the impacts if the associated accident occurred. The accident scenarios given in Tables 5.2-12 and 5.2-13 are not

**TABLE 5.2-11 Bounding Chemical Accidents during Conversion Operations at the Paducah Site**

Frequency Category/ Accident Scenario	Accident Description	Chemical Form of Release	Release Amount (lb)	Release Duration (min)	Release Level/ Medium
<b>Likely Accidents (frequency: 1 or more times in 100 years)</b>					
Corroded cylinder spill, dry conditions	A 1-ft (0.30-m) hole results during handling, with solid UF <sub>6</sub> forming a 4-ft <sup>2</sup> (0.37-m <sup>2</sup> ) area on the dry ground.	UF <sub>6</sub>	24	60	Ground/ air
<b>Unlikely Accidents (frequency: 1 in 100 years to 1 in 10,000 years)</b>					
Corroded cylinder spill, wet conditions – rain	A 1-ft (0.30-m) hole results during handling, with solid UF <sub>6</sub> forming a 4-ft <sup>2</sup> (0.37-m <sup>2</sup> ) area on the wet ground.	HF	96	60	Ground/ air
Aqueous HF pipe rupture	An earthquake ruptures an aboveground pipeline transporting aqueous HF, releasing it to the ground.	HF	910 <sup>a</sup>	10	Ground/ air-soil
Anhydrous NH <sub>3</sub> line leak	An NH <sub>3</sub> fill line is momentarily disconnected, and NH <sub>3</sub> is released at grade.	NH <sub>3</sub>	255	1	Ground/ air
<b>Extremely Unlikely Accidents (frequency: 1 in 10,000 years to 1 in 1 million years)</b>					
Corroded cylinder spill, wet conditions – water pool	A 1-ft (0.30-m) hole results during handling, with solid UF <sub>6</sub> forming a 4-ft <sup>2</sup> (0.37-m <sup>2</sup> ) area into a 0.25-in. (0.64-cm)-deep water pool.	HF	147	60	Ground/ air
Rupture of cylinders – fire	Several cylinders hydraulically rupture during a fire.	UF <sub>6</sub>	0 11,500 8,930 3,580	0 to 12 12 12 to 30 30 to 121	Ground/ air
<b>Incredible Accidents (frequency: less than 1 in 1 million years)</b>					
Aqueous HF (70%) tank rupture	Large seismic or beyond-design-basis event causes rupture of a filled HF storage tank.	HF	F1: 8,710 <sup>b</sup> D4: 25,680 <sup>b</sup>	120	Ground/ air
Anhydrous NH <sub>3</sub> tank rupture	Large seismic or beyond-design-basis event causes rupture of a filled NH <sub>3</sub> storage tank.	NH <sub>3</sub>	29,500	20	Ground/ air

<sup>a</sup> The estimate assumes that 10% of the spill evaporates, with the remainder absorbed into the soil. It should be noted that the soil/groundwater assessment conservatively assumes that 100% of the spill is absorbed into the soil.

<sup>b</sup> The two different atmospheric conditions considered would cause different amounts to be released. These release amounts were computed on the basis of evaporation rates estimated by assuming 77°F (25°C; F-1 conditions) and 95°F (35°C; D-4 conditions).

**TABLE 5.2-12 Consequences of Chemical Accidents during Conversion at the Paducah Site: Number of Persons with the Potential for Adverse Effects<sup>a</sup>**

Accident <sup>b</sup>	Freq. Cat. <sup>c</sup>	Maximum No. of Persons per Location <sup>d</sup>												Minimum No. of Persons per Location <sup>d</sup>											
		Noninvolved Worker						General Public						Noninvolved Workers			General Public								
		MEI <sup>e</sup>			No. Affected			MEI <sup>e</sup>			No. Affected			MEI <sup>e</sup>			No. Affected			MEI <sup>e</sup>			No. Affected		
		A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C
Corroded cylinder spill, dry conditions	L	Yes	Yes	Yes	13	110	71	No	No	No	0	0	0	Yes <sup>f</sup>	Yes <sup>f</sup>	Yes <sup>f</sup>	0	0	0	No	No	No	0	0	0
Corroded cylinder spill, wet conditions – rain	U	Yes	Yes	Yes	730	590	670	Yes	Yes	Yes	18	13	11	Yes	Yes	Yes	0	22	0	No	No	No	0	0	0
Rupture of cylinders – fire	EU	Yes	Yes	Yes	800	440	1,000	Yes	Yes	Yes	1,300	1,400	3,100	Yes	Yes	Yes	260	120	270	Yes	Yes	Yes	7	4	5
HF tank rupture	I	Yes	Yes	Yes	1,400	1,100	1,100	Yes	Yes	Yes	3,800	3,500	4,400	Yes	Yes	Yes	1,080	930	900	Yes	Yes	Yes	42	29	24
NH <sub>3</sub> tank rupture	I	Yes	Yes	Yes	1,600	1,400	1,600	Yes	Yes	Yes	4,800	4,900	6,700	Yes	Yes	Yes	1,100	1,100	1,400	Yes	Yes	Yes	26	14	17

<sup>a</sup> The values shown are the consequences if the accident did occur. The risk of an accident is the consequence (number of persons) times the estimated frequency, times 25 years of operations. The estimated frequencies are as follows: L = likely, 0.1; U = unlikely, 0.001; EU = extremely unlikely, 0.00001; I = incredible, 0.000001.

<sup>b</sup> The bounding accident chosen to represent each frequency category is the one in which the largest number of people (workers plus off-site population) would be affected. Health impacts in that row represent that accident only and not the range of impacts among accidents in that category.

<sup>c</sup> Accident frequencies: L = likely, estimated to occur one or more times in 100 years of facility operations ( $> 10^{-2}/\text{yr}$ ); U = unlikely, estimated to occur between once in 100 years and once in 10,000 years of facility operations ( $10^{-2}$  to  $10^{-4}/\text{yr}$ ); EU = extremely unlikely, estimated to occur between once in 10,000 years and once in 1 million years of facility operations ( $10^{-4}$  to  $10^{-6}/\text{yr}$ ); I = incredible, estimated to occur less than one time in 1 million years of facility operations ( $< 10^{-6}/\text{yr}$ ).

<sup>d</sup> Maximum and minimum values reflect differences in assumed meteorological conditions at the time of the accident. In general, the maximum risks would occur under meteorological conditions of F stability with a 1-m/s (2-mph) wind speed; the minimum risks would occur under D stability with a 4-m/s (9-mph) wind speed.

<sup>e</sup> At the MEI location, the determination is either “Yes” or “No” for potential adverse effects to an individual.

<sup>f</sup> MEI locations were evaluated at 100 m (328 ft) from ground-level releases for workers and at the location of highest off-site concentration for members of the general public; the population risks are 0 because the worker and general public population distributions for the site were used, which did not show receptors at the MEI locations.

**TABLE 5.2-13 Consequences of Chemical Accidents during Conversion at the Paducah Site: Number of Persons with the Potential for Irreversible Adverse Effects<sup>a</sup>**

Conversion Product/Accident <sup>b</sup>	Freq. Cat. <sup>c</sup>	Maximum No. of Persons per Location <sup>d</sup>												Minimum No. of Persons per Location <sup>d</sup>											
		Noninvolved Worker						General Public						Noninvolved Workers			General Public								
		MEI <sup>e</sup>			No. Affected			MEI <sup>e</sup>			No. Affected			MEI <sup>e</sup>			No. Affected			MEI <sup>e</sup>			No. Affected		
		A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C	A	B	C
<b>Conversion to U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub></b>																									
Corroded cylinder spill, dry conditions	L	Yes <sup>f</sup>	Yes	Yes	0	9	0	No	No	No	0	0	0	No	Yes	Yes	0	0	0	No	No	No	0	0	0
Corroded cylinder spill, wet conditions – rain	U	Yes	Yes	Yes	130	310	71	No	No	No	0	0	0	Yes	Yes	Yes	0	7	0	No	No	No	0	0	0
Corroded cylinder spill, wet conditions – water pool	EU	Yes	Yes	Yes	400	410	71	Yes	Yes	Yes	0	0	0	Yes	Yes	Yes	0	19	0	No	No	No	0	0	0
NH <sub>3</sub> tank rupture <sup>g</sup>	I	Yes	Yes	Yes	1,600	1,400	1,600	Yes	Yes	Yes	370	320	220	Yes	Yes	Yes	600	700	130	Yes	Yes	Yes	2	0	1

<sup>a</sup> The values shown are the consequences if the accident did occur. The risk of an accident is the consequence (number of persons) times the estimated frequency, times 25 years of operations. The estimated frequencies are as follows: L = likely, 0.1; U = unlikely, 0.001; EU = extremely unlikely, 0.00001; I = incredible, 0.000001.

<sup>b</sup> The bounding accident chosen to represent each frequency category is the one in which the largest number of people (workers plus off-site population) would be affected. Health impacts in that row represent that accident only and not the range of impacts among accidents in that category.

<sup>c</sup> Accident frequencies: L = likely, estimated to occur one or more times in 100 years of facility operations (> 10<sup>-2</sup>/yr); U = unlikely, estimated to occur between once in 100 years and once in 10,000 years of facility operations (10<sup>-2</sup> to 10<sup>-4</sup>/yr); EU = extremely unlikely, estimated to occur between once in 10,000 years and once in 1 million years of facility operations (10<sup>-4</sup> to 10<sup>-6</sup>/yr); I = incredible, estimated to occur less than one time in 1 million years of facility operations (< 10<sup>-6</sup>/yr).

<sup>d</sup> Maximum and minimum values reflect differences in assumed meteorological conditions at the time of the accident. In general, the maximum risks would occur under meteorological conditions of F stability with a 1-m/s (2-mph) wind speed; the minimum risks would occur under D stability with a 4-m/s (9-mph) wind speed.

<sup>e</sup> At the MEI location, the determination is either “Yes” or “No” for potential adverse effects to an individual.

<sup>f</sup> MEI locations were evaluated at 100 m (328 ft) from ground-level releases for workers and at the location of highest off-site concentration for members of the general public; the population risks are 0 because the worker and general public population distributions for the site were used, which did not show receptors at the MEI locations.

<sup>g</sup> Under D-stability, 4-m/s (9-mph) meteorological conditions (minimum no. of persons affected), an aqueous HF tank rupture would have higher consequences to noninvolved workers than would the NH<sub>3</sub> tank rupture, resulting in about 200 to 300 more irreversible adverse effects at Locations A and B, respectively. However, under F-stability, 1-m/s (2-mph) meteorological conditions (maximum number of persons affected), the NH<sub>3</sub> tank rupture would have the maximum consequences to noninvolved workers and the general public.

identical because an accident with the largest impacts for adverse effects might not lead to the largest impacts for irreversible adverse effects. The impacts may be summarized as follows:

- The largest impacts would be caused by the following accident scenarios: an HF storage tank rupture; a corroded cylinder spill under wet conditions (i.e., rain and formation of a water pool); an NH<sub>3</sub> tank rupture; and rupture of several cylinders in a fire. Accidents involving stack emissions would have smaller impacts than would accidents involving releases at ground level because of the relatively larger dilution rates and smaller release rates (due to filtration) involved with the stack emissions.
- If the accidents identified in Tables 5.2-12 and 5.2-13 did occur, the number of persons in the off-site population with the potential for adverse effects would range from 0 to around 6,700 (maximum corresponding to a release from an NH<sub>3</sub> pressurized tank rupture at Location C), and the number of off-site persons with the potential for irreversible adverse effects would range from 0 to around 370 (maximum corresponding to a release from an NH<sub>3</sub> pressurized tank rupture at Location A).
- If the accidents identified in Tables 5.2-12 and 5.2-13 did occur, the number of noninvolved workers with the potential for adverse and irreversible adverse effects would be about the same, ranging from 0 to around 1,600 (maximum corresponding to an NH<sub>3</sub> pressurized tank rupture at Locations A and C). Although the calculated hazard distances for adverse effects are over twice the hazard distances for irreversible affects (i.e., 7 mi [11 km] versus 2 mi [4 km]), the hazard zones for each of the health effect levels (Emergency Response Planning Guide [ERPG]-1 and ERPG-2) cover approximately the same noninvolved worker areas near the release locations for Locations A, B, or C.
- For over half of the bounding accident scenarios (NH<sub>3</sub> pressurized tank rupture, HF tank rupture, and rupture of cylinders in a fire), the greatest number of adverse effects among the off-site public and noninvolved workers would occur at Location C. The NH<sub>3</sub> pressurized tank rupture and the rupture of cylinders at Location C would result in the greatest number of affected noninvolved workers, while the HF tank rupture and corroded cylinder spill in wet conditions at Location A would result in the greatest number of affected noninvolved workers. For the cylinder spill scenario under either dry or wet conditions, the maximum number of adverse effects would occur at Locations A or B.
- The greatest number of irreversible adverse effects (associated with an NH<sub>3</sub> pressurized tank rupture) would occur at Location A for the off-site public and at Locations A or C for the noninvolved workers. For corroded cylinder spill scenarios, the greatest number of irreversible adverse effects for noninvolved workers would occur at Location B.

- For the most severe accidents in each frequency category, the noninvolved worker MEI and the public MEI would have the potential for both adverse effects and irreversible adverse effects. The likely accidents for each conversion option (frequency of more than 1 chance in 100 per year) would result in no potential adverse or irreversible adverse effects for the general public. The generally reduced impacts to the public compared with the noninvolved worker would be related to the dispersion or dilution of the chemical plume with downwind distance (except for a UF<sub>6</sub> cylinder rupture in a fire). The buoyancy effect of the plume in a fire tends to move the location of maximum impacts away from the accident and closer to the higher population areas.
- The maximum risk was computed as the product of the consequence (number of people) times the frequency of occurrence (occurrences per year) times the number of years of operations (25 years). These risk values presented below are conservative because the numbers of people affected were based on the following assumptions: (1) occurrence of very low wind speed and moderately stable meteorological conditions that would result in the maximum reasonably foreseeable plume size (i.e., F stability and a 1-m/s [2-mph] wind speed), and (2) steady or nonmeandering wind direction, lasting up to 3 hours and blowing toward locations that would lead to the maximum number of individuals exposed for noninvolved workers or for the general population. The results indicate that the maximum risk values would be less than 1 for all accidents except the following:
  - *Potential Adverse Effects:*
    - Corroded cylinder spill, dry conditions (L, likely), workers  
Assuming the accident occurred once every 10 years (frequency = 0.1 per year), about 33 workers would potentially experience an adverse effect over the 25-year operational period at alternative Location A, about 280 at alternative Location B, and about 180 at alternative Location C.
    - Corroded cylinder spill, wet conditions – rain (U, unlikely), workers  
Assuming the accident occurred once every 1,000 years (frequency = 0.001 per year), about 18 workers would potentially experience an adverse effect over the 25-year operational period at alternative Location A, about 15 at alternative Location B, and about 17 at alternative Location C.
  - *Potential Irreversible Adverse Effects:*
    - Corroded cylinder spill, dry conditions (L, likely), workers  
Assuming the accident occurred once every 10 years (frequency = 0.1 per year), the expected numbers of workers who would potentially experience an irreversible adverse effect over the 25-year operational period at alternative Locations A, B, and C would be 0, 23, and 0, respectively.

Corroded cylinder spill, wet conditions – rain (U, unlikely), workers

Assuming the accident occurred once every 1,000 years (frequency = 0.001 per year), about 3 workers would potentially experience an irreversible adverse effect over the 25-year operational period at alternative Location A, about 8 at alternative Location B, and about 2 at alternative Location C.

The number of fatalities that could potentially be associated with the estimated irreversible adverse effects was also calculated. Previous analyses indicated that exposure to HF and uranium compounds, if sufficiently high, could result in death to 1% or less of the persons experiencing irreversible adverse effects (Policastro et al. 1997). Similarly, it was estimated that exposure to NH<sub>3</sub> could result in death to about 2% of the persons experiencing irreversible adverse effects (Policastro et al. 1997). Therefore, if the corroded cylinder spill, wet conditions – rain accident occurred (Table 5.2-13), about 1 fatality might be expected among the noninvolved workers at alternative Locations A and C; about 3 fatalities might be expected if the accident occurred at alternative Location B. However, this accident is classified as an unlikely accident, meaning that it is estimated to occur between once in 100 years and once in 10,000 years of facility operation. Assuming that it would occur once every 1,000 years, the risk of fatalities among the noninvolved workers from this accident over the 25-year operational period would be less than 1 ( $1 \times 0.0001 \times 25 = \approx 0.03$  at Locations A and C, and  $3 \times 0.001 \times 25 = \approx 0.08$  at Location B). (See Section 4.3 for discussion on interpretation of risk numbers that are less than 1.)

Similarly, if the higher-consequence accident in the extremely unlikely frequency category (corroded cylinder spill, wet conditions – water pool) in Table 5.2-13 occurred, approximately 4 fatalities might be expected among the noninvolved workers at alternative Locations A and B, and about 1 fatality at alternative Location C. However, because of the low frequency of this accident, the risk of a fatality over the lifetime of the conversion facility would be about 0.001 at Locations A and C and about 0.0003 at Location B, assuming a frequency of 0.00001 per year.

For the NH<sub>3</sub> tank rupture accident, which belongs to the incredible frequency category (frequency of less than 0.000001 per year), the expected numbers of fatalities among the noninvolved workers would be about 32, 28, and 32 for Locations A, B, and C, respectively, if the accident occurred. However, the risk of a fatality would be much less than 1 at any of the locations (about 0.0004, assuming a frequency of  $5 \times 10^{-7}$  per year) over the facility lifetime. Among the general public, about 7, 6, or 4 fatalities might be expected if the same accident occurred at Locations A, B, or C, respectively. However, because of the low frequency of the accident, the risk of fatalities would be much less than 1 (about 0.0001).

Even though the risks are relatively low, the consequences for a few of the accidents are considered to be high. These high-consequence accidents are generally associated with the storage of anhydrous NH<sub>3</sub> and aqueous HF on site. The consequences can be reduced or mitigated through design (e.g., by limiting their capacity), operational procedures (e.g., by controlling accessibility to the tanks), and emergency response actions (e.g., by sheltering, evacuation, and interdiction of contaminated food materials following an accident.) As an

example, UDS is proposing to reduce the size of the anhydrous NH<sub>3</sub> storage tanks from 9,200 gal to 3,300 gal (34,826 L to 12,492 L). This change would reduce the consequences of an ammonia release accident. However, to conservatively estimate the consequences of an anhydrous ammonia tank rupture and preserve process flexibility, this analysis retained the assumption of a 9,200-gal (34,826-L) tank size.

**5.2.2.2.3 Physical Hazards.** The risk of on-the-job fatalities and injuries to conversion facility workers was calculated by using industry-specific statistics from the BLS, as reported by the National Safety Council (2002). Annual fatality and injury rates from the BLS manufacturing industry division were used for the 25-year operations phase, assuming no ETP cylinders are processed. Operation of the conversion facility is estimated to require approximately 175 FTEs per year. No on-the-job fatalities are predicted during the conversion facility operational phase. It is estimated, however, that about 197 injuries would occur (Table 5.2-1).

### 5.2.2.3 Air Quality and Noise

**5.2.2.3.1 Air Quality Impacts.** Three alternative locations (Locations A, B, and C) were considered for air quality impacts. Detailed information on facility boundaries and the orientations and locations of buildings and stacks is currently available for preferred Location A only. For Locations B and C, the layout of the facility for Location A was assumed to be placed in the middle of the other two locations.

At the conversion facility, air pollutants would be emitted from four point sources: the boiler stack, backup generator stack, conversion building stack, and HF processing building stack. UDS is proposing to use electrical heating in the conversion facility, but it is evaluating other options. If natural gas was chosen, furnaces or boilers could be used. To assess bounding air quality impacts, a boiler option was analyzed because it would result in more emissions than furnaces or electric heat. The boilers could be used to generate process steam and building heat, and a backup generator would be used to provide emergency electricity. Primary emission sources for criteria pollutants and VOCs would be the boiler and emergency generator. The conversion building stack would release uranium, fluoride, criteria pollutants, and VOCs in minute amounts, while the HF processing building stack would release fluorides into the atmosphere. Although nitrogen would be used as a purge gas in the process, its use would not generate additional NO<sub>x</sub> emissions, because of the absence of oxygen in contact with the nitrogen stream at high temperatures. Annual total stack emission rates during operations are given in the Engineering Support Document (Folga 2003), and these emission rates are presented in Table 5.2-14. Other sources during operations would include vehicular traffic to and from the facility, associated with cylinder transfer, commuting, and material delivery. Parking lots and access roads to the facility would be paved with asphalt or concrete to minimize fugitive dust emissions. In addition, fugitive emissions would include those from storage tanks, silos, cooling towers, etc., but in negligible amounts.

**TABLE 5.2-14 Annual Point Source Emissions of Criteria Pollutants, Volatile Organic Compounds, Uranium, and Fluoride from Operation of the Conversion Facility at the Paducah Site**

Pollutant	Emission Rate <sup>a</sup>			
	Boiler <sup>b</sup>	Backup Generator	Conversion Building Stack	HF Processing Building Stack
SO <sub>2</sub>	0.01	0.17	$1.3 \times 10^{-3}$	– <sup>c</sup>
NO <sub>x</sub>	2.09	1.20	$3.4 \times 10^{-2}$	–
CO	1.25	0.17	$5.3 \times 10^{-2}$	–
VOC	0.08	0.17	$1.5 \times 10^{-2}$	–
PM <sub>10</sub> <sup>d</sup>	0.11	0.07	$9.0 \times 10^{-3}$	–
Uranium	–	–	< 0.25 g/yr	–
Fluoride	–	–	< 0.05 ppm <sup>e</sup>	< 0.05 ppm <sup>f</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Tons/yr unless otherwise noted.

<sup>b</sup> Boiler emissions were estimated on the basis of annual natural gas usage given in Table 5.2-19.

<sup>c</sup> A dash indicates no or negligible emissions.

<sup>d</sup> PM<sub>2.5</sub> emissions are assumed to be the same as PM<sub>10</sub> emissions.

<sup>e</sup> Annual emission is about 1.1 kg (2.4 lb) as HF.

<sup>f</sup> Annual emission is about 70.5 kg (155 lb) as HF.

The modeling results for concentration increments of SO<sub>2</sub>, NO<sub>2</sub>, CO, PM<sub>10</sub>, PM<sub>2.5</sub>, and HF due to emissions from operations of the proposed facility are summarized in Table 5.2-15. The results are maximum modeled concentrations at or beyond the conversion facility boundary. The total concentrations (modeled concentration increments plus background concentrations) are also presented in this table for comparison with applicable NAAQS and SAAQS.

Because of the low emissions during facility operations, all air pollutant concentration increments during operations would be well below applicable standards. As shown in Table 5.2-15, the estimated maximum concentration increments due to operation of the proposed facility would amount to about 16% of the applicable standard for 24-hour average SO<sub>2</sub>. This concentration increment is primarily due to a backup generator, which is located next to the conversion building and the site boundaries and within the building cavity/wake region. However, the generator would be operating on an intermittent basis, and thus air quality impacts would be limited to the period of its operation. The total concentrations except for annual-average PM<sub>2.5</sub>, would be well below their applicable standards. The total annual average PM<sub>2.5</sub> concentration is predicted to be about 99% of its standard, but its background concentration would approach its standard (about 98%). As previously mentioned, the annual average PM<sub>2.5</sub> concentration at most statewide monitoring stations would either approach or exceed the standard.

**TABLE 5.2-15 Maximum Air Quality Impacts Due to Emissions from Activities Associated with Operation of the Conversion Facility at the Paducah Site**

Location	Pollutant	Averaging Time	Concentration ( $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$ )					
			Maximum Increment <sup>a</sup>	Background <sup>b</sup>	Total <sup>c</sup>	NAAQS and SAAQS	Percent of NAAQS/SAAQS <sup>d</sup>	
							Increment	Total
A	SO <sub>2</sub>	3 hours	178	169	347	1,300	13.7	26.7
		24 hours	57.2	86.0	143	365	15.7	39.2
		Annual	0.2	13.3	13.5	80	0.2	16.8
	NO <sub>2</sub>	Annual	1.2	22.6	23.8	100	1.2	23.8
	CO	1 hour	245	6,970	7,220	40,000	0.6	18.0
		8 hours	106	3,220	3,330	10,000	1.1	33.3
	PM <sub>10</sub>	24 hours	14.8	79.0	93.8	150	9.9	62.6
		Annual	0.07	25.0	25.1	50	0.1	50.1
	PM <sub>2.5</sub>	24 hours	2.2	31.1	33.3	65	3.4	51.3
		Annual	0.07	14.7	14.8	15	0.5	98.5
	HF	12 hours	0.14	1.04	1.18	3.68	3.8	32.1
		24 hours	0.09	0.86	0.95	2.86	3.1	33.2
		1 week	0.04 <sup>e</sup>	0.50	0.54	1.64	2.5	33.1
		1 month	0.02	0.34	0.35	0.82	1.9	42.8
		Annual	0.01	0.17	0.18	400	0.002	0.04
B	SO <sub>2</sub>	3 hours	162	169	331	1,300	12.5	25.5
		24 hours	48.8	86	135	365	13.4	36.9
		Annual	0.1	13.3	13.4	80	0.2	16.8
	NO <sub>2</sub>	Annual	1.0	22.6	23.6	100	1.0	23.6
	CO	1 hour	252	6,970	7,220	40,000	0.6	18.1
		8 hours	97.3	3,220	3,320	10,000	1.0	33.2
	PM <sub>10</sub>	24 hours	14.9	79.0	93.9	150	9.9	62.6
		Annual	0.06	25.0	25.1	50	0.1	50.1
	PM <sub>2.5</sub>	24 hours	1.9	31.1	33.0	65	2.9	50.8
		Annual	0.06	14.7	14.8	15	0.4	98.4
	HF	12 hours	0.07	1.04	1.12	3.68	2.0	30.3
		24 hours	0.06	0.86	0.92	2.86	2.0	32.1
		1 week	0.03 <sup>e</sup>	0.50	0.53	1.64	1.6	32.2
		1 month	0.01	0.34	0.35	0.82	1.4	42.3
		Annual	0.007	0.17	0.17	400	0.002	0.04
C	SO <sub>2</sub>	3 hours	86.6	169	256	1,300	6.7	19.7
		24 hours	32.4	86	118	365	8.9	32.4
		Annual	0.06	13.3	13.4	80	0.1	16.7

**TABLE 5.2-15 (Cont.)**

Location	Pollutant	Averaging Time	Maximum Increment <sup>a</sup>	Background <sup>b</sup>	Total <sup>c</sup>	NAAQS and SAAQS	Concentration (µg/m <sup>3</sup> )	
							Percent of NAAQS/SAAQS <sup>d</sup>	
							Increment	Total
	NO <sub>2</sub>	Annual	0.5	22.6	23.1	100	0.5	23.1
	CO	1 hour	206	6,970	7,180	40,000	0.5	17.9
		8 hours	54.7	3,220	3,270	10,000	0.5	32.7
	PM <sub>10</sub>	24 hours	7.7	79.0	86.7	150	5.1	57.8
		Annual	0.03	25.0	25.0	50	0.1	50.1
	PM <sub>2.5</sub>	24 hours	1.0	31.1	32.1	65	1.6	49.4
		Annual	0.03	14.7	14.7	15	0.2	98.2
	HF	12 hours	0.07	1.04	1.11	3.68	1.8	30.1
		24 hours	0.05	0.86	0.91	2.86	1.7	31.8
		1 week	0.02 <sup>e</sup>	0.50	0.52	1.64	1.3	31.9
		1 month	0.01	0.34	0.34	0.82	1.1	42.1
		Annual	0.006	0.17	0.17	400	0.001	0.04

<sup>a</sup> Data represent the maximum concentration increments estimated, except that the fourth- and eighth-highest concentration increments estimated are listed for 24-hour PM<sub>10</sub> and PM<sub>2.5</sub>.

<sup>b</sup> See Table 3.1-3 for criteria pollutants and ANL (1991a) for highest weekly and annual HF. Background HF for other averaging times was estimated based on highest weekly and annual background concentrations.

<sup>c</sup> Total equals the maximum modeled concentration increment plus background concentration.

<sup>d</sup> The values in the next-to-last column are maximum concentration increments as a percent of NAAQS and SAAQS. The values presented in the last column are total concentration as a percent of NAAQS and SAAQS.

<sup>e</sup> Estimated by interpolation.

The air quality impacts would be limited to the immediate vicinity of site boundaries. For example, the maximum predicted concentration at the nearest residence on McCall Road would be less than 3% of the highest concentration. Accordingly, it is expected that potential impacts from the proposed facility operations on the air quality of nearby communities would be negligible.<sup>4</sup>

The maximum 3-hour, 24-hour, and annual SO<sub>2</sub> concentration increments predicted to result from the proposed facility operations would be about 63% of the applicable PSD increments (Table 3.1-3). The maximum predicted increments in annual-average NO<sub>2</sub> concentrations due to the proposed facility operations would be about 5% of the applicable PSD.

<sup>4</sup> Formerly, the general public had access to the existing fenced gaseous diffusion plant boundaries. However, since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack, site access for the general public has been restricted indefinitely to the DOE property boundaries.

The 24-hour and annual PM<sub>10</sub> concentration increases predicted to result from the proposed operations would be about 50% of the applicable PSD increments. As mentioned earlier, this is due to a backup generator, only when it is in operation. The predicted concentration increment at a receptor located 30 mi (50 km) from the proposed facility (the maximum distance for which the Industrial Source Complex 3 [ISC3] short-term model [EPA 1995] could reliably estimate concentrations) in the direction of the nearest Class I PSD area (Mingo National Wildlife Refuge, Missouri) would be less than 0.5% of the applicable PSD increments. Concentration increments at this refuge, which is located about 70 mi (113 km) west of Paducah, would be much lower.

Concentration increments for the two remaining criteria pollutants, Pb and O<sub>3</sub>, were not modeled. As a direct result of the phase-out of leaded gasoline in automobiles, average Pb concentrations in urban areas throughout the country have decreased dramatically. It is expected that emissions of Pb from the proposed facility operations would be negligible and would therefore have no adverse impacts on Pb concentrations in surrounding areas. Contributions to the production of O<sub>3</sub>, a secondary pollutant formed from complex photochemical reactions involving O<sub>3</sub> precursors, including NO<sub>x</sub> and VOCs, cannot be accurately quantified. As discussed in Section 3.1.3, McCracken County, including the Paducah site, is currently in attainment for O<sub>3</sub> (40 CFR 81.318). The O<sub>3</sub> precursor emissions from the proposed facility operations would be insignificant, making up less than 0.01% and 0.08% of 1999 McCracken County emissions of NO<sub>x</sub> and VOCs, respectively. As a consequence, the cumulative impacts of potential releases from Paducah GDP operations on regional O<sub>3</sub> concentrations would not be of concern.

Maximum HF air quality impacts are also listed in Table 5.2-15. The estimated maximum short-term (≤1 month) HF concentration increment and total concentration would be about 3.8% and 42.8% of the state standard, respectively, which are still well below the standards. The annual average concentration increment and total concentration would be several orders of magnitude lower than any applicable HF air quality standard.

In summary, except for annual average PM<sub>2.5</sub>, total concentrations would be below their applicable standards. Total maximum estimated concentrations, except for annual average PM<sub>2.5</sub>, would be less than 63% of NAAQS and SAAQS. Total maximum estimated concentrations for PM<sub>2.5</sub> would approach NAAQS and SAAQS; however, their concentration increments associated with site operations would account for about only 0.5% of the standards. In particular, the annual average PM<sub>2.5</sub> concentrations at most sitewide monitoring stations would either approach or exceed the standard.

**Accidents.** Among chemicals released as a result of accidents, HF would be the only one subject to an ambient air quality standard (the Commonwealth of Kentucky HF standard). Most accidental releases would occur over a short duration, about 2 hours at most. The passage time of a plume with an elevated concentration for any receptor location would be a little longer than its release duration. The HF concentration in the plume's path would exceed the 12-hour or 24-hour state ambient standard for the HF tank rupture accident scenario; however, when concentrations

are averaged over a year, the annual ambient air quality standard would not be exceeded. Therefore, potential impacts of accidental releases on ambient air quality would be short-term and limited to along the plume path, and long-term impacts would be negligible.

**5.2.2.3.2 Noise Impacts.** Many noise sources associated with operation would be inside the buildings. The highest noise levels are expected inside the conversion facility in the area of the powder receiver vessels, with measured readings at 77 to 79 dB(A), and in the area of dry conversion, with a reading of 72 to 74 dB(A) (UDS 2003b). Ambient facility noise levels, measured in various processing areas (inside buildings) for continuous operations of a similar facility at Richland, Washington, ranged from 70 to 79 dB(A). Major outdoor noise sources associated with operation would include the cooling tower, trucks and heavy equipment for moving cylinders, and traffic moving to and from the facility, which are typical industrial noise sources. Heavy equipment and truck traffic would be intermittent; thus, noise levels would be low except when equipment was moving or operating. For noise impact analysis, a continuous noise source during operation was assumed to be 79 dB(A) at a distance of 15 m (50 ft),<sup>5</sup> on the basis of the highest noise level measured inside buildings at the Richland facility (UDS 2003b).

The nearest residence, located about 1.3 km (0.8 mi) southeast of Location C and just off DOE's eastern boundary on McCall Road, was selected as the receptor for the analysis of potential noise impacts. Noise levels decrease about 6 dB per doubling of distance from the point source because of the way sound spreads geometrically over increasing distance. The estimated noise level would result in about 40 dB(A) at the nearest residence. This level would be about 46 dB(A) as DNL, if 24-hour continuous operation is assumed. This level is below the EPA guideline of 55 dB(A) as DNL for residential zones (see Section 3.1.3.4), which was established to prevent interference with activity, annoyance, and hearing impairment. If other attenuation mechanisms, such as ground effects or air absorption, are considered, noise levels at the nearest residence would decrease to below background levels of about 44 to 47 dB(A) (see Section 3.1.3.4).

Most trains would blow their whistles loud enough to ensure that all motorists and pedestrians nearby would be aware of an approaching train. These excessive noises could disturb those who live or work near the train tracks. Typical noise levels of train whistles would range from 95 to 115 dB(A) at a distance of 30 m (100 ft), comparable to those of low-flying aircraft or emergency vehicle sirens (DOT 2003b). Associated with facility operations, the total number of shipments (railcars) would be less than 10,000 railcars. It would be equivalent to about two trains per week, assuming five railcars per train. Accordingly, the noise level from train operations would be high along the rail tracks and, in particular, near the crossings. However, noise impacts would be infrequent and of short duration.

In general, facility and infrequent rail traffic operations produce less noise than construction activities. For all three alternative locations, except for intermittent vehicular traffic, the noise level at the nearest residence would be comparable to the ambient background level

---

<sup>5</sup> Noise level from one of the continuous outdoor noise sources, a cooling tower, to be used at this size of a facility, would be less than 79 dB(a) at a distance of 15 m (50 ft).

discussed in Section 3.1.3.4, and it would be barely or not distinguishable from the background level, depending on the time of day. In conclusion, noise levels generated by facility operation would have negligible impacts on the residence located nearest to the proposed facility and would be well below the EPA guideline limits for residential areas.

#### 5.2.2.4 Water and Soil

Operation of a conversion facility at Paducah would disturb land, use water, and produce liquid wastes. The following sections discuss impacts to surface water, groundwater, and soil resources during operations. Because no site-specific impacts to water and soil were identified, impacts at alternative Locations A, B, and C would be the same.

**5.2.2.4.1 Surface Water.** All of the water needed for a conversion facility at Paducah would be withdrawn from the Ohio River. Potable water consumption would be 3 million gal/yr (11.4 million L/yr). An additional 37 million gal/yr (140 million L/yr) would be needed for nonpotable uses (e.g., cooling tower makeup). The total water needed would be about 0.00004% of the average flow in the Ohio River. Impacts of this withdrawal would be negligible.

About 4,000 to 8,000 gal/d (15,100 to 30,200 L/d) of sanitary wastewater would be produced by the conversion facility. If sanitary wastewater were released at a constant rate of 2.8 to 5.6 gal/min (11 to 22 L/min) after treatment in the wastewater treatment plant, impacts to the receiving water (Bayou Creek) would not be measurable.

There would be about 4,000 gal/d (15,000 L/min) of process wastewater produced during normal operations. This water would not contain any radionuclides. About 31,000 gal/d (117,000 L/d) (11.3 million gal/yr [42.8 million L/yr]) of wastewater would be produced by cooling tower blowdown. These wastewaters would not contain any radionuclides and could be disposed of to the existing process wastewater treatment system at Paducah, or discharged under a KPDES permit, or treated and reused at the conversion facility. Disposition of these wastewaters is under evaluation.

**Accidents.** An earthquake could rupture an aboveground pipeline carrying liquid HF from the conversion building to the storage building at a rate of 10 gal/min (38 L/min). For assessing potential surface water or groundwater impacts of this accident scenario, it was assumed that 100% of the HF would drain onto the ground during a 10-minute release period. Approximately 910 lb (410 kg) of liquid HF would be released. Because response and cleanup would occur within a relatively short time after the release (i.e., days or weeks), the HF would have little time to migrate into the soil. Removal of the contaminated soil would prevent any problems of contamination of either surface or groundwater resources. Therefore, there would be no impacts to surface water or groundwater from this type of accident. A similar quick response and cleanup would minimize the impacts of an HF spill to the ground during transfer to railcars.

**5.2.2.4.2 Groundwater.** Because all water used at the Paducah site would be obtained from the Ohio River and there would be no direct discharges to the underlying aquifers, there would be no impacts to groundwater recharge, depth, or flow direction from operation of a conversion plant at Paducah. However, the quality of groundwater beneath the selected site could be affected by infiltration of contaminated surface water from spills. Indirect contamination could result from the dissolution and mobilization of exposed chemicals by precipitation and subsequent infiltration of the contaminated runoff into the surficial aquifers. Again, following good engineering and operating practices would minimize impacts to groundwater quality.

**Accidents.** An earthquake could rupture an aboveground HF pipeline that would carry liquid HF from the conversion building to the storage building, or HF could be spilled during transfer to a railcar. Rapid removal of the contaminated soil would prevent any problems of contamination to underlying groundwater resources. Therefore, there would be no impacts to groundwater from these accidents.

**5.2.2.4.3 Soils.** Normal operations of a conversion facility at the Paducah site would have no direct impacts to soil at all three alternative locations.

**Accidents.** The only accidents identified that could potentially affect soil would be an HF pipeline rupture and an HF spill during transfer to railcars. Because mitigation would be rapidly initiated and because the volume of HF released would be small (910 lb [410 kg]), impacts to soil would be negligible.

### **5.2.2.5 Socioeconomics**

The socioeconomic analysis covers the effects on population, employment, income, regional growth, housing, and community resources in the ROI around the Paducah site. Impacts from operations, which are the same for all three alternative locations, are summarized in Table 5.2-16.

The potential socioeconomic impacts from operating a conversion facility at Paducah would be relatively small. It is estimated that operational activities would create about 160 direct jobs annually, and about 170 more indirect jobs in the ROI. A conversion facility would produce approximately \$13 million in personal income annually during operations.

It is estimated that about 220 people would move to the area at the beginning of operations. However, in-migration would have only a marginal effect on population growth and would require about 1% of vacant owner-occupied housing during facility operations. No significant impact on public finances would occur as a result of in-migration. Fewer than five new local public service employees would be required to maintain existing levels of service in the various local public service jurisdictions in McCracken County.

**5.2.2.6 Ecology**

**5.2.2.6.1 Vegetation.** A portion of the conversion product released from the process stack of the conversion facility would become deposited on the soils surrounding the site at Locations A, B, or C. Uptake of uranium-containing compounds can cause adverse effects to vegetation. Deposition of uranium compounds on soils, resulting from atmospheric emissions, would result in soil uranium concentrations considerably below the lowest concentration known to produce toxic effects in plants. Because there would not be a release of process effluent from the facility to surface waters, impacts to vegetation along nearby streams would not occur. Therefore, toxic effects on vegetation from uranium uptake would be expected to be negligible.

**5.2.2.6.2 Wildlife.** Noise generated by the operation of a conversion facility at Location A and disturbance from human presence would likely result in a minor disturbance to wildlife in the vicinity. Movement of railcars along the new rail line southwest of the facility might potentially cause the adjacent mature deciduous forest habitat to be unsuitable for some species.

During operations, ecological resources in the vicinity of the conversion facility would be exposed to atmospheric emissions from the boiler stack, cooling towers, and process stack; however, emission levels are expected to be extremely low. The highest average air concentration of uranium compounds would result in a radiation exposure to the general public (nearly 100% due to inhalation) of  $3.9 \times 10^{-5}$  mrem/yr, well below the DOE guideline of 100 mrem/yr. Wildlife species are less sensitive to radiation than humans. (DOE guidelines require an absorbed dose limit to terrestrial animals of less than 0.1 rad/d [DOE 2002d].) Therefore, impacts to wildlife from radiation are expected to be negligible. Toxic effect levels of chronic inhalation of uranium are many orders of magnitude greater than expected emissions from the conversion facility. Therefore, toxic effects on wildlife as a result of inhalation of uranium compounds are also expected to be negligible.

**TABLE 5.2-16 Socioeconomic Impacts from Operation of the Conversion Facility at the Paducah Site**

Impact Area	Operation Impacts <sup>a</sup>
Employment	
Direct	160
Total	330
Income (millions of 2002 \$)	
Direct	5.8
Total	13.2
Population (no. of new ROI residents)	220
Housing (no. of units required)	80
Public finances (% impact on fiscal balance)	
Cities in McCracken County <sup>b</sup>	0.2
McCracken County	0.1
Schools in McCracken County <sup>c</sup>	0.2
Public service employment (no. of new employees in McCracken County)	
Police	0
Firefighters	0
General	1
Physicians	0
Teachers	1
No. of new staffed hospital beds (McCracken County)	1

<sup>a</sup> Impacts are shown for the first year of operations (2006).

<sup>b</sup> Includes impacts that would occur in the City of Paducah.

<sup>c</sup> Includes impacts that would occur in the McCracken County school district.

The maximum annual average air concentration of HF due to operation of a conversion facility would be 0.01 µg/m<sup>3</sup>. Toxic effect levels of chronic inhalation of HF are many orders of magnitude greater than expected emissions. Therefore, toxic effects to wildlife from HF emissions would be expected to be negligible.

Impacts to wildlife from the operation of a conversion facility at Locations B or C would be similar to impacts at Location A. Noise and human presence would likely result in a minor disturbance to wildlife in the vicinity.

**5.2.2.6.3 Wetlands.** Liquid process effluents would not be discharged to surface waters during the operation of the conversion facility (Section 5.2.2.4). In addition, water level changes in the Ohio River because of water withdrawal for operations would be negligible. Regional groundwater changes due to the increase in impermeable surface related to the presence of the facility would also be negligible. Therefore, except for potential local indirect impacts near the facility, impacts to regional wetlands due to changes in groundwater or surface water levels or flow patterns would be expected to be negligible. As a result, adverse effects on wetlands or aquatic communities from effluent discharges or water use are not expected.

Storm water runoff from conversion facility parking areas and other paved surfaces might carry contaminants commonly found on these surfaces to local streams. Biota in receiving streams might be affected by these contaminants, resulting in reduced species diversity or changes in community composition. Storm water discharges from the conversion facility would be addressed under a new or existing KPDES Permit for industrial facility storm water discharge. The streams near Locations A, B, and C currently receive runoff and associated contaminants from various roadways and storage yards on the Paducah site, and their biotic communities are likely indicative of developed areas.

**5.2.2.6.4 Threatened and Endangered Species.** Direct impacts to federal- or state-listed species during operation of a conversion facility at Location A are not expected. The wooded area at Location A has not been identified as summer roosting habitat for the Indiana bat (federal- and state-listed as endangered). Disturbances from increased noise, lighting, and human presence due to facility operation, and the movement of railcars along the new rail line south of the facility might decrease the quality of the adjacent forest habitat for use by Indiana bats. However, Indiana bats that might currently be using habitat near the Paducah site would already be exposed to noise and other effects of human disturbance due to operation of the site, including vehicle traffic. Consequently, disturbance effects related to conversion facility operation would be expected to be minor.

In addition, noise from railcar movement along the new rail line may result in a disturbance to Indiana bats that may use habitat, identified as fair potential and poor potential, west of the Entrance Highway, where existing levels of disturbance are relatively low. Indiana bats have been observed to tolerate increased noise levels (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service [USFWS] 2002). Consequently, disturbances from rail traffic are not expected to result in loss of suitability of these habitat areas. The operation of a conversion facility at Locations B and C

might similarly decrease the quality of wooded areas at those locations for Indiana bat summer habitat, although these locations have not been identified as containing Indiana bat habitat.

### 5.2.2.7 Waste Management

Operations at the conversion facility would generate radioactive, hazardous, and nonhazardous wastes. The annual waste volumes generated by conversion would be the same for all three alternative locations and are presented in Table 5.2-17. The total volumes of wastes that would be generated during the 25 years of operations would be 1,440 yd<sup>3</sup> (1,100 m<sup>3</sup>) of LLW and 180 yd<sup>3</sup> (140 m<sup>3</sup>) of hazardous waste. These volumes would result in low impacts on site annual projected volumes.

If ETTP cylinders are processed for conversion at Paducah, an additional 26 yd<sup>3</sup> (20 m<sup>3</sup>) of LLW and 5 yd<sup>3</sup> (4 m<sup>3</sup>) of hazardous waste would be generated. These volumes constitute negligible impacts on site annual generation volumes.

CaF<sub>2</sub> would be produced in the U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> conversion and is assumed to have a low uranium content. It is currently unknown whether this CaF<sub>2</sub> could be sold (e.g., as feedstock for commercial production of anhydrous HF) or whether the low uranium content would force disposal. If CaF<sub>2</sub> disposal is necessary, it could be either as a nonhazardous solid waste (provided that authorized limits have been established in accordance with DOE Order 5400.5 [DOE 1990] and its associated guidance) or as LLW. It is currently unknown whether it would require disposal as either a nonhazardous solid waste or as LLW because of its low uranium content. The nonhazardous solid waste generation estimates for conversion to U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> in Table 5.2-17 are based on the assumption that CaF<sub>2</sub> would be disposed of as nonhazardous solid waste, generating approximately 17 yd<sup>3</sup>/yr (13 m<sup>3</sup>/yr) of nonhazardous solid waste. This represents a negligible impact (less than 1%) to the projected annual nonhazardous solid waste volume at Paducah. If CaF<sub>2</sub> was disposed of as LLW, it would represent less than 1% of the projected annual LLW load and constitute negligible impact.

If the HF was not marketable, it would be converted to CaF<sub>2</sub>. Neutralization of HF to CaF<sub>2</sub> would produce approximately 4,900 yd<sup>3</sup>/yr (3,780 m<sup>3</sup>/yr) of CaF<sub>2</sub>. This volume represents approximately 20% and 53% of nonhazardous solid waste and LLW, respectively, of projected annual generation volumes for Paducah. These potential

**TABLE 5.2-17 Wastes Generated from Operation of the Conversion Facility at the Paducah Site**

Waste Category	Annual Volume
LLW	
Combustible waste	34 m <sup>3</sup>
Noncombustible	8.5 m <sup>3</sup>
Others	1.0 m <sup>3</sup>
Total <sup>a</sup>	44 m <sup>3</sup>
Hazardous waste	5.5 m <sup>3</sup>
Nonhazardous waste	
Solids <sup>b</sup>	180 m <sup>3</sup>
Sanitary wastewater	5.5 × 10 <sup>6</sup> L

<sup>a</sup> Includes LLW from high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters and laboratory acids and residues.

<sup>b</sup> Includes volumes of CaF<sub>2</sub> generated from the conversion process.

Source: UDS (2003b).

waste volumes would result in a moderate to large impact relative to site annual waste generation volumes and on-site waste management capacities. It is also unknown whether CaF<sub>2</sub> LLW would be considered DOE waste if the conversion was performed by a private commercial enterprise. If CaF<sub>2</sub> could be sold, the nonhazardous solid waste or LLW management impacts would be lower.

The U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> produced from the conversion process would generate about 7,850 yd<sup>3</sup>/yr (6,000 m<sup>3</sup>/yr) of LLW. This volume is about 83% of the annual site-projected LLW volume and constitutes a relatively large impact on site LLW management. However, plans for off-site (to Envirocare or NTS) disposal of this potential volume of LLW are considered in the proposed action.

Current UDS plans are to leave the heels in the emptied cylinders, fill them with the depleted U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> product, and dispose of them at either Envirocare or NTS. This approach is expected to meet the waste acceptance criteria of the disposal facilities and eliminate the potential for generating TRU waste (see Appendix B for additional information concerning TRU and PCB contamination). However, it is possible that the heels could be washed from the emptied cylinders if, instead, it was decided to reuse the cylinders for other purposes. In this case, the TRU in the heels of some cylinders at the maximum postulated concentrations could also result in the generation of some TRU waste at the conversion facility. It is estimated that up to 30% (or 244 drums) of the heels could contain enough TRU to qualify this material as TRU waste if it was disposed of as waste. In this case, it is estimated that a volume of about 2.6 yd<sup>3</sup>/yr (2.0 m<sup>3</sup>/yr) of TRU and 6.0 yd<sup>3</sup>/yr (4.4 m<sup>3</sup>/yr) of LLW would be generated.

In addition, a small quantity of TRU could be entrained in the gaseous DUF<sub>6</sub> during the cylinder emptying operations and carried out of the cylinders. These contaminants would be captured in the filters between the cylinders and the conversion equipment. The filters would be monitored and replaced routinely to prevent buildup of TRU. The spent filters would be disposed of as LLW. It is estimated that the amount of LLW generated in the form of spent filters would be about 1 drum per year for a total of 25 drums (drums are 55 gal [208 L] in size) for the duration of the conversion operations (see Appendix B). This converts to a total volume of 6.8 yd<sup>3</sup> (5.2 m<sup>3</sup>) of LLW. Current site projections include the generation of a small amount of TRU waste (about 0.8 yd<sup>3</sup>/yr [0.6 m<sup>3</sup>/yr]). In the unlikely event that small amounts of TRU waste are generated from the conversion facility, the wastes would be managed in accordance with DOE's policy for TRU waste, which includes the packaging and transport of these wastes to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in New Mexico for disposal.

#### **5.2.2.8 Resource Requirements**

Resource requirements during operation would not depend on the location of the conversion facility. Facility operations would consume electricity, fuel, and miscellaneous chemicals that are generally irretrievable resources. Estimated annual consumption rates for operating materials are given in Table 5.2-18. The total quantity of commonly used materials is not expected to be significant and would not affect their local, regional, or national availability. In general, facility operational resources required are not considered rare or unique.

Operation of the proposed conversion facility could include the consumption of fossil fuels used to generate steam and heat and electricity (Table 5.2-19). Energy also would be expended in the form of diesel fuel and gasoline for cylinder transport equipment and transportation vehicles. The existing infrastructure at the site appears to be sufficient to supply the required utilities.

**5.2.2.9 Land Use**

Because the preferred location (Location A) consists primarily of a previously disturbed grassy field with a wooded area in the southeastern section of the tract, the proposed action would involve a change from current land use. Despite this localized change, operating the facility would be consistent with the activity currently found at the heavily industrialized Paducah site — a result of producing enriched uranium and its DUF<sub>6</sub> by-product. As a consequence, only negligible land use impacts are anticipated.

Impacts of operations on land use for a conversion facility at Location B or Location C would be similar to those of a facility placed at Location A. Although localized changes in land use would occur in both cases, activities would be consistent with those currently found at the heavily industrialized site. Once again, only negligible impacts are expected as a consequence of operating the facility at either of these localities.

**5.2.2.10 Cultural Resources**

The routine operation of a DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion facility at Paducah is unlikely to adversely affect cultural resources at all three alternative locations because no ground-disturbing activities are associated with facility operation.

Air emissions or chemical releases from the facility were evaluated to determine their potential to affect significant cultural resources in the surrounding area. On the basis of the analysis of air emissions in Section 5.2.2.3 and the secondary standards given in Section 3.1.3, no secondary standards would be exceeded during the operation phase beyond the facility itself.

**TABLE 5.2-18 Materials Consumed Annually during Normal Conversion Facility Operations at the Paducah Site<sup>a</sup>**

Chemical	Quantity (tons/yr)
<b>Solid</b>	
Lime (CaO) <sup>b</sup>	19
<b>Liquid</b>	
Ammonia (99.95% minimum NH <sub>3</sub> )	670
Potassium hydroxide (45% KOH)	8
<b>Gas</b>	
Nitrogen (N <sub>2</sub> )	10,000

- <sup>a</sup> Material estimates are based on facility conceptual-design-status data (UDS 2003b). A number of studies are planned to evaluate design alternatives, the results of which may affect the above materials needs.
- <sup>b</sup> Assuming lime is used only for potassium hydroxide regeneration. If HF neutralization is required, the annual lime requirement would be approximately 9,300 tons/yr (8,437 t/yr).

**TABLE 5.2-19 Utilities Consumed during Conversion Facility Operations at the Paducah Site<sup>a</sup>**

Utility	Annual Average Consumption	Unit	Peak Demand <sup>b</sup>	Unit
Electricity	37,269	MWh	7.1	MW
Liquid fuel	4,000	gal	NA <sup>c</sup>	NA
Natural gas <sup>d,e</sup>	$4.4 \times 10^7$	scf <sup>f</sup>	190	scfm <sup>f</sup>
Process water	$37 \times 10^6$	gal	215	gal/min
Potable water	$3 \times 10^6$	gal	350	gal/min

<sup>a</sup> Utility estimates are based on facility conceptual-design-status data (UDS 2003b). A number of studies are planned to evaluate design alternatives, the results of which may affect the above utility needs.

<sup>b</sup> Peak demand is the maximum rate expected during any hour.

<sup>c</sup> NA = not applicable.

<sup>d</sup> Standard cubic feet measured at 14.7 psia and 60°F (17°C).

<sup>e</sup> The current facility design (UDS 2003b) uses electrical heating. An option of using natural gas is being evaluated.

<sup>f</sup> scf = standard cubic feet; scfm = standard cubic feet per minute.

Thus, emissions from operation of the facility would not have any adverse effect on cultural resources.

Accidental radiological and chemical releases, including HF, uranium compounds, and NH<sub>3</sub>, would be possible, although unlikely, during the operation of the plant (see Section 5.2.2.2). It is projected that HF emissions would not exceed secondary standards beyond site boundaries and would have no effect on cultural resources. Any release of uranium compounds would be as PM and would affect only the surfaces of buildings in close proximity to the facility. NH<sub>3</sub> releases would be gaseous and quickly disperse, although some surface deposits could occur. Careful washing of building surfaces could be required to remove such deposits if any contamination was detected following an accidental release.

#### 5.2.2.11 Environmental Justice

The evaluation of environmental justice impacts is predicated on the identification of high and adverse impacts in other impact areas considered in this EIS, followed by a determination if those impacts would affect minority and low-income populations disproportionately. Analyses of impacts from operating the proposed facility do not indicate high and adverse impacts for any of the other impact areas considered in this EIS (see Section 5.2.2). Despite the presence of disproportionately high percentages of both minority and low-income populations within 50 mi (80 km) of the Paducah site, no environmental justice impacts are anticipated at any of the three alternative locations because of the lack of high and adverse

impacts. Similarly, no evidence exists indicating that minority or low-income populations would experience high and adverse impacts from operating the proposed facility in the absence of such impacts in the population as a whole.

### 5.2.3 Transportation

The action alternatives involve transportation of the conversion products to a disposal site or to commercial users. All products are proposed to be shipped primarily by rail. However, a viable option is to ship some material by truck. For purposes of this EIS, transportation of all cargo is considered for both truck and rail modes of transport. In a similar fashion, conversion products declared to be wastes are expected to be sent to Envirocare in Utah for disposal; another viable option is to send the wastes to the NTS. Thus, both options are evaluated. The emptied heel cylinders, if not used as disposal containers for the U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> product, would be crushed and shipped in 20-ft (6-m) cargo containers, approximately 10 to a container. However, up to 10% of these cylinders might not meet Envirocare acceptance criteria and would be shipped “as is” to NTS for disposal (UDS 2003b). The HF is expected to be produced in concentrations of both 49% and 70%. Thus, the total impacts for HF transportation are the sum of the impacts presented for each concentration.

As discussed in Appendix F, Section F.3, the impacts of transportation were calculated in three areas: (1) collective population risks during routine conditions and accidents (Section 5.2.3.1), (2) radiological risks to MEIs during routine conditions (Section 5.2.3.2), and (3) consequences to individuals and populations after the most severe accidents involving a release of radioactive or hazardous chemical material (Section 5.2.3.3).

#### 5.2.3.1 Collective Population Risk

The collective population risk is a measure of the total risk posed to society as a whole by the actions being considered. For a collective population risk assessment, the persons exposed are considered as a group, without specifying individual receptors. The collective population risk is used as the primary means of comparing various options. Collective population risks are calculated for both vehicle- and cargo-related causes for routine transportation and accidents. Vehicle-related risks are independent of the cargo in the shipment and include risks from vehicular exhaust emissions and traffic accidents (fatalities caused by physical trauma).

Under the action alternatives, anhydrous NH<sub>3</sub> would be transported to the conversion facility for generation of hydrogen, which would be used in the conversion process. Collective population risks associated with the transport of NH<sub>3</sub> to the site are shown in Table 5.2-20 for three different distances between the origin of NH<sub>3</sub> and the site. By assuming a distance of 620 mi (1,000 km) from the site and using average accident rates and population densities, the number of adverse effects that would be expected among the crew and the population along the transportation route would be about 10 for the truck option and about 2 for the rail option. For the same distance, it is expected that there would be about 1 irreversible adverse effect for the

**TABLE 5.2-20 Collective Population Transportation Risks for Shipment of Anhydrous NH<sub>3</sub> to the Paducah Conversion Facility**

Mode	Distance to Conversion Facility (km)		
	250	1,000	5,000
<b>Truck Option</b>			
Shipment summary			
Number of shipments	1,300	1,300	1,300
Total distance (km)	324,000	1,296,000	6,480,000
Cargo-related <sup>a</sup>			
Chemical impacts			
Adverse effects	2.4	9.7	49
Irreversible adverse effects	0.36	1.4	7.1
Vehicle-related <sup>b</sup>			
Emission fatalities	0.03	0.1	0.6
Accident fatalities	0.0048	0.019	0.097
<b>Rail Option</b>			
Shipment summary			
Number of shipments	648	648	648
Total distance (km)	162,000	648,000	3,240,000
Cargo-related <sup>a</sup>			
Chemical impacts			
Adverse effects	0.53	2.1	11
Irreversible adverse effects	0.076	0.3	1.5
Vehicle-related <sup>b</sup>			
Emission fatalities	0.002	0.007	0.03
Accident fatalities	0.013	0.051	0.25

<sup>a</sup> Cargo-related impacts are impacts attributable to the radioactive or chemical nature of the material being transported.

<sup>b</sup> Vehicle-related impacts are impacts independent of the cargo in the shipment.

truck option and less than 1 irreversible adverse effect for the rail option. No fatalities would be expected for either transportation mode. As indicated on Table 5.2-20, the risks would be smaller for distances less than 620 mi (1,000 km) and higher for greater distances.

The transportation assessment for the shipment of depleted uranium conversion products for disposal considers several options. The proposed disposal site is the Envirocare facility. (A small number of empty cylinders may require disposal at NTS.) For shipments to Envirocare, rail is evaluated as the proposed mode and truck is evaluated as an alternative. In addition, NTS is considered as an alternative disposal site. For this alternative, both truck and rail modes are evaluated, although neither is currently proposed.

For assessment of the rail option to NTS, it is assumed that a rail spur that would be built in the future would provide rail access to NTS. Currently, the nearest rail terminal is about 70 mi (113 km) from NTS. If a rail spur was not available in the future and if NTS was selected as the disposal site, shipments could be made by truck, or rail could be used with an intermodal transfer to trucks at some place near NTS. (Transportation impacts for the intermodal option would be slightly greater than those presented for rail assuming NTS rail access, but less than those presented for the truck alternative.) If a rail spur was built to NTS, the impacts would require additional NEPA review.

Estimates of the collective population risks for shipment of the U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> product, emptied cylinders, and CaF<sub>2</sub> to Envirocare over the entire 25-year operational period are presented in Table 5.2-21, assuming the U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> was shipped in bulk bags. As an option, risks for the shipment of these materials to NTS are provided in Table 5.2-22. No radiological LCFs, traffic fatalities, or emission fatalities are expected for rail transport under either option. No radiological LCFs would be expected for the truck option either. However, approximately 1 traffic fatality might occur, and up to 11 fatalities from vehicle emissions might occur over the project period if the truck option was used.

If the emptied DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders were refilled with the U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> product and used to transport the product to the disposal facility, as proposed, the risks shown in Tables 5.2-21 and 5.2-22 for transportation of emptied cylinders would not be applicable, and the risks associated with transportation of CaF<sub>2</sub> would be the same. The risks of transporting the U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> product in cylinders would be about the same as the sum of risks for transporting the product in bulk bags and the risk of shipping the crushed cylinders for the truck option (Table 5.2-23) with two refilled cylinders per truck. If one cylinder per truck were shipped, routine risks to the crew and vehicle-related risks would be approximately double, because the number of shipments would double. If the rail option was used, the risks would be slightly higher for the cylinder refill option primarily because the quantity of U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> shipped in a single railcar would be less under the cylinder refill option than under the use of the bulk bag option, and the number of shipments would be proportionally higher.

The risks for shipping the HF co-product are presented in Table 5.2-24 for representative shipment distances of 250, 1,000, and 5,000 km (155, 620, and 3,100 mi), by using U.S. average accident rates and population densities. For shipment distances up to 5,000 km (3,107 mi), 1 traffic fatality is expected for shipment of the HF by either truck or rail; however, up to 7 emission fatalities could occur for shipment by truck, with none expected for rail shipments. For chemical risks, approximately 2 irreversible adverse effects are estimated for either truck or rail transport. Thus, no chemical fatalities are expected because approximately 1% of the cases with irreversible adverse effects are expected to result in fatality (Policastro et al. 1997). Table 5.2-25 presents the risks associated with the shipment of CaF<sub>2</sub> to either Envirocare or NTS should the HF be neutralized and disposed of as waste, as discussed in Section 5.2.4. Shipment of the CaF<sub>2</sub> to either Envirocare or NTS would have similar impacts; approximately 10 emission fatalities for truck and 0 for rail, and about 2 traffic fatalities for shipment by truck.

**TABLE 5.2-21 Collective Population Transportation Risks for Shipment of Conversion Products to Envirocare as the Primary Disposal Site, Assuming the U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> Is Disposed of in Bulk Bags**

Mode	U <sub>3</sub> O <sub>8</sub>		Emptied Cylinders				CaF <sub>2</sub>	
	Paducah to Envirocare		Paducah to Envirocare <sup>a</sup>		Paducah to NTS <sup>b</sup>		Paducah to Envirocare	
	Truck (option)	Rail (proposed) <sup>c</sup>	Truck (option)	Rail (proposed) <sup>c</sup>	Truck (proposed)	Rail (option) <sup>c</sup>	Truck (option)	Rail (proposed) <sup>c</sup>
Shipment summary								
Number of shipments	16,420	4,105	3,715	1,858	4,150	1,038	28	7
Total distance (km)	41,710,000	11,010,000	9,436,000	4,985,000	11,690,000	3,559,000	71,120	18,780
Cargo-related <sup>d</sup>								
Radiological impacts								
Dose risk (person-rem)								
Routine crew	240	560	55	140	120	270	NA <sup>e</sup>	NA
Routine public								
Off-link	4.3	11	1.1	2.7	1.7	4.6	NA	NA
On-link	12	0.35	3.1	0.085	4.4	0.16	NA	NA
Stops	97	9.5	26	2.3	36	4.6	NA	NA
Total	110	21	30	5.1	42	9.4	NA	NA
Accident <sup>f</sup>	35	9.9	0.35	0.076	0.02	0.0085	NA	NA
Latent cancer fatalities <sup>g</sup>								
Crew fatalities	0.1	0.2	0.02	0.06	0.05	0.1	NA	NA
Public fatalities	0.07	0.02	0.02	0.003	0.02	0.005	NA	NA
Chemical impacts								
Adverse effects	0.002	0.0004	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Irreversible adverse effects	0.0002	0.0001	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Vehicle-related <sup>h</sup>								
Emission fatalities	8	0.2	2	0.1	2	0.06	0.01	0.0004
Accident fatalities	1.0	0.24	0.23	0.11	0.27	0.08	0.0018	0.00041

Footnotes on next page.

**TABLE 5.2-21 (Cont.)**

---

- <sup>a</sup> Emptied cylinders are crushed and shipped 10 per cargo container, with 1 container per truck or 2 containers per railcar.
- <sup>b</sup> Cylinders assumed not to meet the waste acceptance criteria for Envirocare. Shipped “as is,” one per truck or four per railcar.
- <sup>c</sup> Risks are presented on a railcar basis. One shipment is equivalent to one railcar. For assessment purposes, it was assumed that rail access to NTS would be available in the future.
- <sup>d</sup> Cargo-related impacts are impacts attributable to the radioactive or chemical nature of the material being transported.
- <sup>e</sup> NA = not applicable.
- <sup>f</sup> Dose risk is a societal risk and is the product of accident probability and accident consequence.
- <sup>g</sup> Latent cancer fatalities were calculated by multiplying the dose by the ICRP Publication 60 health risk conversion factors of  $4 \times 10^{-4}$  fatal cancers per person-rem for workers, and  $5 \times 10^{-4}$  for the public (ICRP 1991).
- <sup>h</sup> Vehicle-related impacts are impacts independent of the cargo in the shipment.

**TABLE 5.2-22 Collective Population Transportation Risks for Shipment of Conversion Products to NTS as an Optional Disposal Site, Assuming the U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> Is Disposed of in Bulk Bags**

Mode	U <sub>3</sub> O <sub>8</sub>		Emptied Cylinders				CaF <sub>2</sub>	
	Paducah to NTS		Paducah to NTS <sup>a</sup>		Paducah to NTS <sup>b</sup>		Paducah to Envirocare	
	Truck (option)	Rail (option) <sup>c</sup>	Truck (option)	Rail (option) <sup>c</sup>	Truck (option)	Rail (option) <sup>c</sup>	Truck (option)	Rail (option) <sup>c</sup>
Shipment summary								
Number of shipments	16,420	4,105	3,715	1,858	4,150	1,038	28	7
Total distance (km)	46,240,000	14,080,000	10,460,000	6,371,000	11,690,000	3,559,000	71,120	18,780
Cargo-related <sup>d</sup>								
Radiological impacts								
Dose risk (person-rem)								
Routine crew	270	670	61	170	120	270	NA <sup>e</sup>	NA
Routine public								
Off-link	5.2	11	1.4	2.7	1.7	4.6	NA	NA
On-link	13	0.39	3.6	0.094	4.4	0.16	NA	NA
Stops	110	11	29	2.7	36	4.6	NA	NA
Total	130	22	34	5.4	42	9.4	NA	NA
Accident <sup>f</sup>	14	9.9	0.18	0.076	0.02	0.0085	NA	NA
Latent cancer fatalities <sup>g</sup>								
Crew fatalities	0.1	0.3	0.02	0.07	0.05	0.1	NA	NA
Public fatalities	0.07	0.02	0.02	0.003	0.02	0.005	NA	NA
Chemical impacts								
Adverse effects	0.002	0.0006	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Irreversible adverse effects	0.0002	0.0002	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA
Vehicle-related <sup>h</sup>								
Emission fatalities	9	0.2	2	0.1	2	0.06	0.01	0.0004
Accident fatalities	1.1	0.32	0.24	0.14	0.27	0.08	0.0018	0.00041

Footnotes on next page.

**TABLE 5.2-22 (Cont.)**

---

- <sup>a</sup> Emptied cylinders are crushed and shipped 10 per cargo container, with 1 container per truck or 2 containers per railcar.
- <sup>b</sup> Cylinders shipped “as is.” One cylinder per truck or four cylinders per railcar.
- <sup>c</sup> Risks are presented on a railcar basis. One shipment is equivalent to one railcar. For assessment purposes, it was assumed that rail access to NTS would be available in the future.
- <sup>d</sup> Cargo-related impacts are impacts attributable to the radioactive or chemical nature of the material being transported.
- <sup>e</sup> NA = not applicable.
- <sup>f</sup> Dose risk is a societal risk and is the product of accident probability and accident consequence.
- <sup>g</sup> Latent cancer fatalities were calculated by multiplying the dose by the ICRP Publication 60 health risk conversion factors of  $4 \times 10^{-4}$  fatal cancers per person-rem for workers, and  $5 \times 10^{-4}$  for the public (ICRP 1991).
- <sup>h</sup> Vehicle-related impacts are impacts independent of the cargo in the shipment.

**TABLE 5.2-23 Collective Population Transportation Risks for Shipment of U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> Conversion Products in Emptied Cylinders**

Mode	Paducah to Envirocare (proposed)			Paducah to NTS (option)		
	Truck (option)		Rail (proposed)	Truck (option)		Rail (option) <sup>a</sup>
	1 Cylinder	2 Cylinders		1 Cylinder	2 Cylinders	
<b>Shipment summary</b>						
Number of shipments	36,200	18,100	7,240	36,200	18,100	7,240
Total distance (km)	91,950,000	45,970,000	19,420,000	101,900,000	50,970,000	24,830,000
<b>Cargo-related<sup>b</sup></b>						
<b>Radiological impacts</b>						
Dose risk (person-rem)						
Routine crew	490	260	770	540	290	930
Routine public						
Off-link	6.8	6.9	17	8.1	8.3	17
On-link	18	18	0.53	21	21	0.59
Stops	150	150	14	170	170	17
Total	180	180	31	200	200	34
Accident	35	35	9.8	14	14	9.8
Latent cancer fatalities						
Crew fatalities	0.2	0.1	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.4
Public fatalities	0.1	0.1	0.02	0.1	0.1	0.02
<b>Chemical impacts</b>						
Adverse effects	0.001	0.001	0.0005	0.001	0.001	0.0007
Irreversible adverse effects	0.0002	0.0002	0.0002	0.0002	0.0002	0.0002
<b>Vehicle-related<sup>c</sup></b>						
Emission fatalities	20	8	0.4	20	10	0.4
Accident fatalities	2.3	1.1	0.42	2.4	1.2	0.56

<sup>a</sup> For assessment purposes, it was assumed that rail access to NTS would be available in the future.

<sup>b</sup> Cargo-related impacts are impacts attributable to the radioactive or chemical nature of the material being transported.

<sup>c</sup> Vehicle-related impacts are impacts independent of the cargo in the shipment.

The results of the transportation analysis discussed above indicate that the largest impact during normal transportation conditions would be associated with vehicle exhaust and fugitive dust emissions (unrelated to the cargo). Health risks from cardiovascular and pulmonary diseases have been linked to incremental increases in particulate concentrations in air. However, estimating the health risks associated with vehicle emissions is subject to a great deal of uncertainty. The estimates presented in this EIS were based on very conservative health risk factors presented in Biwer and Butler (1999) and should be considered an upper bound. For perspective, in a recently published EIS for a geologic repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada (DOE 2002g), the same risk factors were used for vehicle emissions; however, they were adjusted to reduce the amount of conservatism in the estimated health impacts. As reported in the

**TABLE 5.2-24 Collective Population Transportation Risks for Shipment of the HF Conversion Co-Product from the Paducah Site to Commercial Users**

Mode	49% HF			70% HF		
	250 km	1,000 km	5,000 km	250 km	1,000 km	5,000 km
<b>Truck Option</b>						
Shipment summary						
Number of shipments	10,867	10,867	10,867	4,430	4,430	4,430
Total distance (km)	2,716,750	10,867,000	54,335,000	1,107,500	4,430,000	22,150,000
Cargo-related <sup>a</sup>						
Chemical impacts						
Adverse effects	0.25	1.0	5.0	0.92	3.7	18
Irreversible adverse effects	0.021	0.085	0.43	0.074	0.30	1.5
Vehicle-related <sup>b</sup>						
Emission fatalities	0.3	1	5	0.1	0.4	2
Accident fatalities	0.04	0.16	0.81	0.017	0.066	0.33
<b>Rail Option</b>						
Shipment summary						
Number of shipments	2,174	2,174	2,174	886	886	886
Total distance (km)	543,500	2,174,000	10,870,000	221,500	886,000	4,430,000
Cargo-related <sup>a</sup>						
Chemical impacts						
Adverse effects	0.35	1.4	7.0	0.89	3.5	18
Irreversible adverse effects	0.022	0.088	0.44	0.073	0.29	1.5
Vehicle-related <sup>b</sup>						
Emission fatalities	0.005	0.02	0.1	0.002	0.009	0.04
Accident fatalities	0.043	0.17	0.85	0.017	0.069	0.35

<sup>a</sup> Cargo-related impacts are impacts attributable to the radioactive or chemical nature of the material being transported.

<sup>b</sup> Vehicle-related impacts are impacts independent of the cargo in the shipment.

**TABLE 5.2-25 Collective Population Transportation Risks for Shipment of CaF<sub>2</sub> for the Neutralization Option**

Parameter	Truck (option)	Rail (proposed)
Number of shipments	25,262	6,316
Paducah to Envirocare Option		
Total distance (km)	64,170,000	16,950,000
Emission fatalities	10	0.4
Accident fatalities	1.6	0.37
Paducah to NTS Option		
Total distance (km)	71,140,000	21,660,000
Emission fatalities	10	0.4
Accident fatalities	1.6	0.49

Yucca Mountain EIS, the adjustments resulted in a reduction in the emission risks by a factor of about 30.

### 5.2.3.2 Maximally Exposed Individuals during Routine Conditions

During the routine transportation of radioactive material, specific individuals may be exposed to radiation in the vicinity of a shipment. RISKIND (Yuan et al. 1995) has been used to estimate the risk to these individuals for a number of hypothetical exposure-causing events. The receptors include transportation crew members, inspectors, and members of the public exposed during traffic delays, while working at a service station, or while living near an origin or a destination site. The assumptions about exposure are given in Biwer et al. (2001). The scenarios for exposure are not meant to be exhaustive; they were selected to provide a range of representative potential exposures. Doses were assessed and are presented in Table 5.2-26 on a per-event basis for the shipments of U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> and emptied cylinders with heels.

The highest potential routine radiological exposure to an MEI, with an LCF risk of  $2 \times 10^{-7}$ , would be for a person stopped in traffic near a rail shipment of 4 heel cylinders for 30 minutes at a distance of 3 ft (1 m). There is also the possibility for multiple exposures. For example, if an individual lived near the Paducah site and all shipments of U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> were made by rail in bulk bags, the resident could receive a combined dose of approximately  $4.5 \times 10^{-5}$  rem if present for all shipments (calculated as the product of 4,105 shipments and an estimated exposure per shipment of  $1.1 \times 10^{-8}$  rem). The individual's dose would increase by approximately a factor of 2 if the U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> product would be shipped in refilled cylinders. However, this dose is still very low, more than 3,000 times lower than the individual average annual exposure of 0.3 rem from natural background radiation.

### 5.2.3.3 Accident Consequence Assessment

Whereas the collective accident risk assessment considers the entire range of accident severities and their related probabilities, the accident consequence assessment assumes that an accident of the highest severity category has occurred. The consequences, in terms of committed dose (rem) and LCFs for radiological impacts and in terms of adverse affects and irreversible adverse effects for chemical impacts, were calculated for both exposed populations and individuals in the vicinity of an accident. Tables 5.2-27 and 5.2-28 present the radiological and chemical consequences, respectively, to the population from severe accidents involving shipment of depleted U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub>, emptied heel cylinders, anhydrous NH<sub>3</sub>, and aqueous HF. No LCFs would be expected for accidents involving heel cylinders; however, up to 3 LCFs might occur following a severe urban rail accident involving a railcar of U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub>. Severe rail accidents could have higher consequences than truck accidents because each railcar would carry more material than each truck.

A comparison of Tables 5.2-27 and 5.2-28 indicates that severe accidents involving chemicals transported to and from the conversion facility site could have higher consequences

**TABLE 5.2-26 Estimated Radiological Impacts to the MEI from Routine Shipment of Radioactive Materials from the Paducah Conversion Facility**

Material	Mode	Inspector	Resident	Person in Traffic	Person at Gas Station	Person near Rail Stop
<b><i>Routine Radiological Dose from a Single Shipment (rem)</i></b>						
Depleted U <sub>3</sub> O <sub>8</sub> (in bulk bags) <sup>a</sup>	Truck	$4.0 \times 10^{-5}$	$3.1 \times 10^{-9}$	$1.6 \times 10^{-4}$	$4.4 \times 10^{-6}$	NA <sup>b</sup>
	Rail	$9.3 \times 10^{-5}$	$1.1 \times 10^{-8}$	$2.7 \times 10^{-4}$	NA	$6.9 \times 10^{-7}$
Crushed heel cylinders <sup>c</sup>	Truck	$5.3 \times 10^{-5}$	$5.7 \times 10^{-9}$	$1.6 \times 10^{-4}$	$7.7 \times 10^{-6}$	NA
	Rail	$6.6 \times 10^{-5}$	$9.4 \times 10^{-9}$	$1.7 \times 10^{-4}$	NA	$6.1 \times 10^{-7}$
Heel cylinders <sup>d</sup>	Truck	$6.8 \times 10^{-5}$	$5.4 \times 10^{-9}$	$2.7 \times 10^{-4}$	$7.5 \times 10^{-6}$	NA
	Rail	$1.5 \times 10^{-4}$	$2.0 \times 10^{-8}$	$4.0 \times 10^{-4}$	NA	$1.3 \times 10^{-6}$
<b><i>Routine Radiological Risk from a Single Shipment (lifetime risk of a LCF)<sup>e</sup></i></b>						
Depleted U <sub>3</sub> O <sub>8</sub> (in bulk bags)	Truck	$2 \times 10^{-8}$	$2 \times 10^{-12}$	$8 \times 10^{-8}$	$2 \times 10^{-9}$	NA
	Rail	$5 \times 10^{-8}$	$6 \times 10^{-12}$	$1 \times 10^{-7}$	NA	$4 \times 10^{-10}$
Crushed heel cylinders <sup>c</sup>	Truck	$3 \times 10^{-8}$	$3 \times 10^{-12}$	$8 \times 10^{-8}$	$4 \times 10^{-9}$	NA
	Rail	$3 \times 10^{-8}$	$5 \times 10^{-12}$	$8 \times 10^{-8}$	NA	$3 \times 10^{-10}$
Heel cylinders <sup>d</sup>	Truck	$3 \times 10^{-8}$	$3 \times 10^{-12}$	$1 \times 10^{-7}$	$4 \times 10^{-9}$	NA
	Rail	$7 \times 10^{-8}$	$1 \times 10^{-11}$	$2 \times 10^{-7}$	NA	$6 \times 10^{-10}$

<sup>a</sup> Per-shipment doses and LCFs would be approximately the same as for the cylinder refill option.

<sup>b</sup> NA = not applicable.

<sup>c</sup> Crushed heel cylinders are shipped 10 cylinders per cargo container, with 1 container per truck or 2 containers per railcar.

<sup>d</sup> Shipped "as is," one cylinder per truck or four cylinders per railcar.

<sup>e</sup> LCFs were calculated by multiplying the dose by the ICRP Publication 60 health risk conversion factors of  $4 \times 10^{-4}$  fatal cancers per person-rem for workers and  $5 \times 10^{-4}$  for the public (ICRP 1991).

than radiological accidents. For example, a severe rail accident involving transportation of anhydrous NH<sub>3</sub> to a site in an urban area under stable weather conditions could lead to 5,000 irreversible adverse effects. Among the individuals experiencing these irreversible effects, there could be close to 100 fatalities (about 2% of the irreversible adverse effects [Policastro et al. 1997]). Similarly, a 70% aqueous HF rail accident under the same conservative assumptions could result in approximately 1,800 irreversible adverse effects and 18 fatalities (about 1% of the irreversible adverse effects [Policastro et al. 1997]). As indicated in Table 5.2-28, the consequences would be considerably less if the accident occurred in a less populated area under neutral meteorological conditions. Consequences would also be less if a truck was involved in the accident rather than a railcar because the truck would carry less material than a railcar.

**TABLE 5.2-27 Potential Radiological Consequences to the Population from Severe Transportation Accidents<sup>a</sup>**

Material	Mode	Neutral Meteorological Conditions			Stable Meteorological Conditions		
		Rural	Suburban	Urban <sup>b</sup>	Rural	Suburban	Urban <sup>b</sup>
<b>Radiological Dose (person-rem)</b>							
Depleted U <sub>3</sub> O <sub>8</sub> (in bulk bags)	Truck	250	250	550	630	610	1,400
	Rail	1,000	990	2,200	2,500	2,400	5,400
Depleted U <sub>3</sub> O <sub>8</sub> (1 cylinder)	Truck	120	110	250	280	280	620
	Rail	290	280	630	710	690	1,500
Depleted U <sub>3</sub> O <sub>8</sub> (2 cylinders)	Truck	230	230	500	570	550	1,200
	Rail	580	560	1,300	1,400	1,400	3,100
Crushed heel cylinders <sup>c</sup>	Truck	2.5	0.67	1.5	4.4	1.2	2.6
	Rail	5	1.3	3	8.7	2.3	5.2
Heel cylinders <sup>d</sup>	Truck	0.25	0.067	0.15	0.44	0.12	0.26
	Rail	1	0.27	0.6	1.7	0.47	1
<b>Radiological Risk (LCF)<sup>e</sup></b>							
Depleted U <sub>3</sub> O <sub>8</sub> (in bulk bags)	Truck	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.7
	Rail	0.5	0.5	1	1	1	3
Depleted U <sub>3</sub> O <sub>8</sub> (1 cylinder)	Truck	0.06	0.06	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.3
	Rail	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.4	0.3	0.8
Depleted U <sub>3</sub> O <sub>8</sub> (2 cylinders)	Truck	0.1	0.1	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.6
	Rail	0.3	0.3	0.6	0.7	0.7	2
Crushed heel cylinders <sup>c</sup>	Truck	0.001	0.0003	0.0007	0.002	0.0006	0.001
	Rail	0.002	0.0007	0.001	0.004	0.001	0.003
Heel cylinders <sup>d</sup>	Truck	0.0001	3 × 10 <sup>-5</sup>	7 × 10 <sup>-5</sup>	0.0002	6 × 10 <sup>-5</sup>	0.0001
	Rail	0.0005	0.0001	0.0003	0.0009	0.0002	0.0005

<sup>a</sup> National average population densities were used for the accident consequence assessment, corresponding to densities of 6 persons/km<sup>2</sup>, 719 persons/km<sup>2</sup>, and 1,600 persons/km<sup>2</sup> for rural, suburban, and urban zones, respectively. Potential impacts were estimated for the population within a 50-mi (80-km) radius, assuming a uniform population density for each zone.

<sup>b</sup> It is important to note that the urban population density generally applies to a relatively small urbanized area; very few, if any, urban areas have a population density as high as 1,600 persons/km<sup>2</sup>, extending as far as 50 mi (80-km). The urban population density corresponds to approximately 32 million people within the 50-mi (80-km) radius, well in excess of the total populations along the routes considered in this assessment.

<sup>c</sup> Crushed heel cylinders are shipped 10 cylinders per cargo container, with 1 container per truck or 2 containers per railcar.

<sup>d</sup> Shipped "as is," one cylinder per truck or four cylinders per railcar.

<sup>e</sup> LCFs were calculated by multiplying the dose by the ICRP Publication 60 health risk conversion factors of 4 × 10<sup>-4</sup> fatal cancers per person-rem for workers and 5 × 10<sup>-4</sup> for the public (ICRP 1991).

**TABLE 5.2-28 Potential Chemical Consequences to the Population from Severe Transportation Accidents<sup>a</sup>**

Chemical Effect	Mode	Neutral Meteorological Conditions			Stable Meteorological Conditions		
		Rural	Suburban	Urban <sup>b</sup>	Rural	Suburban	Urban <sup>b</sup>
<i>Number of Persons with the Potential for Adverse Health Effects</i>							
Depleted U <sub>3</sub> O <sub>8</sub> (in bulk bags)	Truck	0	1	1	0	12	28
	Rail	0	3	9	0	47	103
Depleted U <sub>3</sub> O <sub>8</sub> (in cylinders)	Truck (1 cylinder)	0	0	1	0	6	13
	Truck (2 cylinders)	0	1	1	0	11	26
	Rail	0	2	5	0	27	58
Anhydrous NH <sub>3</sub>	Truck	6	710	1,600	55	6,600	15,000
	Rail	10	1,100	2,500	90	11,000	24,000
49% HF	Truck	0.35	42	93	3.4	400	900
	Rail	0.99	120	270	7.3	880	1,900
70% HF	Truck	2.8	340	760	44	5,200	12,000
	Rail	9.3	1,100	2,500	110	14,000	30,000
<i>Number of Persons with the Potential for Irreversible Adverse Health Effects<sup>c</sup></i>							
Depleted U <sub>3</sub> O <sub>8</sub> (in bulk bags)	Truck	0	0	0	0	5	10
	Rail	0	0	0	0	17	38
Depleted U <sub>3</sub> O <sub>8</sub> (in cylinders)	Truck (1 cylinder)	0	0	0	0	2	5
	Truck (2 cylinders)	0	0	0	0	4	8
	Rail	0	1	1	0	10	22
Anhydrous NH <sub>3</sub>	Truck	0.8	100	200	10	1,000	3,000
	Rail	1	200	400	20	2,000	5,000
49% HF	Truck	0.025	3.0	6.6	0.25	30	66
	Rail	0.081	9.7	22	0.62	74	160
70% HF	Truck	0.23	27	60	2.0	240	540
	Rail	0.77	92	210	6.7	800	1,800

**Footnotes on next page.**

**TABLE 5.2-28 (Cont.)**

- 
- <sup>a</sup> National average population densities were used for the accident consequence assessment, corresponding to densities of 6 persons/km<sup>2</sup>, 719 persons/km<sup>2</sup>, and 1,600 persons/km<sup>2</sup> for rural, suburban, and urban zones, respectively. Potential impacts were estimated for the population within a 50-mi (80-km) radius, assuming a uniform population density for each zone.
- <sup>b</sup> It is important to note that the urban population density generally applies to a relatively small urbanized area — very few, if any, urban areas have a population density as high as 1,600 persons/km<sup>2</sup> extending as far as 50 mi (80 km). The urban population density corresponds to approximately 32 million people within the 50-mi (80-km) radius, well in excess of the total populations along the routes considered in this assessment.
- <sup>c</sup> The potential for irreversible adverse effects from chemical exposures. Exposure to HF or uranium compounds is estimated to result in fatality to approximately 1% or less of those persons experiencing irreversible adverse effects (Policastro et al. 1997). Exposure to anhydrous NH<sub>3</sub> is estimated to result in fatality to approximately 2% of those persons experiencing irreversible adverse effects (Policastro et al. 1997).

Accidents for which consequences are provided in Tables 5.2-27 and 5.2-28 are extremely rare. For example, the average accident rate for interstate-registered heavy combination trucks is approximately  $3.0 \times 10^{-7}$  per kilometer (Saricks and Tompkins 1999). The conditional probability that a given accident would be a severe accident is on the order of 0.06 in rural and suburban areas and about 0.007 in urban areas (NRC 1977). Therefore, the frequency of a severe accident per kilometer of travel in an urban area is about  $2 \times 10^{-9}$ . For shipment of NH<sub>3</sub> to the site, the total distance traveled is estimated to be about 808,000 mi (1,300,000 km) if the NH<sub>3</sub> was transported from a location 620 mi (1,000 km) away from the conversion site (Table 5.2-20). The fraction of the distance traveled in urban areas is generally less than 5% (DOE 2002f, Table 6.10). If 5% is assumed, the total distance traveled in urban areas would be about 40,000 mi (65,000 km). On the basis of these assumptions, over the life of the project, the probability of a severe NH<sub>3</sub> truck accident occurring in an urban area is about  $1 \times 10^{-4}$  (1 chance in 10,000). In general, stable weather conditions occur only about one-third of the time, resulting in a probability for the most severe anhydrous NH<sub>3</sub> accident listed in Table 5.2-28 of about  $4 \times 10^{-5}$  (or a 1-in-25,000 chance of occurrence) during the 25-year operational period. Similarly, for shipment of 70% HF 620 mi (1,000 km) from the site, the total distance traveled is estimated to be 3,000,000 mi (4,430,000 km) (Table 5.2-24). The average distance traveled in urban areas would be about 137,000 mi (220,000 km [ $4,430,000 \times 0.05$ ]). Therefore, the probability of a severe 70% HF truck accident occurring in an urban area under stable meteorological conditions is about  $1 \times 10^{-4}$  (or a 1-in-10,000 chance of occurrence) over the 25-year operational period.

The probability of a rail accident involving anhydrous NH<sub>3</sub> or 70% HF of the kind listed in Table 5.2-28 is even less than  $4 \times 10^{-5}$  and  $1 \times 10^{-4}$ , respectively, over the 25-year operational period, because the accident rates for railcars are lower and the total distance travelled by train is less. In fact, the probabilities of severe rail accidents for the same origin-destination pairs and for transportation of the same cargo are approximately 10 to 20 times less than the probabilities for severe truck accidents. As stated above, this can be attributed to train accident rates being about

5 times less (see Table 6 in Saricks and Tompkins 1999), and the total distance traveled by train being generally about 2 to 4 times shorter.

Conservative estimates of consequences to the MEI located 100 ft (30 m) away from the accident site along the transportation route are also made for shipment of depleted U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub>, emptied heel cylinders (assuming they are not used as containers for depleted U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub>), anhydrous NH<sub>3</sub>, and aqueous HF. The results for radiological impacts are shown in Table 5.2-29. Under the conservative assumptions described above for consequences to the population, it is estimated that the MEI could receive up to 1.3 rem from accidents involving emptied cylinders. However, for shipment of the depleted U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> product by train, the MEI could receive a dose as high as 670 rem if the product was shipped in bulk bags, and 380 rem if it was shipped in emptied DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders. For shipment by truck, the MEI dose would be 170 rem with bulk bags and 150 rem with refilled cylinders, assuming 2 cylinders per truck. The dose received by the individual would decrease quickly as the person's distance from the accident site increased. For example, at a distance of 330 ft (100 m), the dose would be reduced by about a factor of 6 (to about 110 rem and 60 rem for train accidents with bulk bags and refilled cylinders, respectively, and to about 28 rem and 25 rem for truck accidents with bulk bags and refilled cylinders, respectively.) If the person was located at a distance of 100 ft (30 m) and if the accident occurred under the most severe conditions described above, the individual could suffer acute and potentially lethal consequences from both radiation exposure and the chemical effects of uranium. However, if the MEI was 330 ft (100 m) or farther from the accident, the individual would not be expected to suffer acute effects. However, the chance of the MEI developing a latent cancer would increase by about 10% for the train accident and about 3% for the truck accident. For accidents involving anhydrous NH<sub>3</sub> and aqueous HF, the MEI would likely experience an irreversible health effect or death depending on the severity of the accident, weather conditions, and distance at the time of the accident.

Even though the risks are relatively low (because of low probability of occurrence), the consequences of a few of the transportation accidents considered would be high if they did occur. These high-consequence accidents are generally associated with the transportation of anhydrous NH<sub>3</sub> to the site and aqueous HF from the site. The consequences could be reduced or mitigated through design (e.g., limiting the quantity of material per vehicle), operational procedures (e.g., judicious selection of routes and times of travel, increased protection and tracking of transport vehicles), and emergency response actions (e.g., sheltering, evacuation, and interdiction of contaminated food materials following an accident).

#### **5.2.3.4 Historical Safety Record of Anhydrous NH<sub>3</sub> and HF Transportation in the United States**

Anhydrous NH<sub>3</sub> is routinely shipped commercially in the United States for industrial and agricultural applications. Information provided in the DOT *Hazardous Material Incident System (HMIS) Database* (DOT 2003b) for 1990 through 2002 indicates that 2 fatalities and 19 major injuries to the public or to transportation or emergency response personnel occurred as a result of

**TABLE 5.2-29 Potential Radiological Consequences to the MEI from Severe Transportation Accidents Involving Shipment of Radioactive Materials**

Mode	Neutral Weather Conditions		Stable Weather Conditions	
	Dose (rem)	Radiological Risk (LCF) <sup>a</sup>	Dose (rem)	Radiological Risk (LCF) <sup>a</sup>
Depleted U <sub>3</sub> O <sub>8</sub> (in bulk bags)				
Truck	11	0.005	170 <sup>b</sup>	0.08
Rail	42	0.02	670 <sup>b</sup>	0.3
Depleted U <sub>3</sub> O <sub>8</sub> (1 cylinder)				
Truck	4.8	0.002	76	0.04
Rail	12	0.006	190	0.09
Depleted U <sub>3</sub> O <sub>8</sub> (2 cylinders)				
Truck	9.6	0.005	150 <sup>b</sup>	0.08
Rail	24	0.01	380 <sup>b</sup>	0.2
Crushed heel cylinders <sup>c</sup>				
Truck	0.28	0.0001	0.63	0.0003
Rail	0.55	0.0003	1.3	0.0006
Heel cylinders <sup>d</sup>				
Truck	0.028	1 × 10 <sup>-5</sup>	0.063	3 × 10 <sup>-5</sup>
Rail	0.11	6 × 10 <sup>-5</sup>	0.25	0.0001

<sup>a</sup> LCFs were calculated by multiplying the dose by the ICRP Publication 60 health risk conversion factors of 4 × 10<sup>-4</sup> fatal cancers per person-rem for workers and 5 × 10<sup>-4</sup> for the public (ICRP 1991).

<sup>b</sup> See text for discussion. Because of the conservative assumptions made in deriving the numbers in this table, the MEI is likely to receive a dose that is less than that shown here. However, if the doses were as high as those shown in the table, the MEI could develop acute radiation effects. The individual might also suffer from chemical effects due to uranium intake.

<sup>c</sup> Crushed heel cylinders are shipped 10 cylinders per cargo container, with 1 container per truck or 2 containers per railcar.

<sup>d</sup> Shipped “as is,” one cylinder per truck or four cylinders per railcar.

anhydrous NH<sub>3</sub> releases during truck and rail operations. These fatalities and injuries occurred during transportation or loading and unloading operations. Over that period, truck and rail NH<sub>3</sub> spills resulted in more than 1,000 and 6,000 evacuations, respectively. Five very large spills, greater than 10,000 gal (38,000 L), occurred; however, these spills were en route derailments from large rail tank cars. The two largest spills, both around 20,000 gal (76,000 L), occurred in rural or lightly populated areas of Texas and Idaho and resulted in 1 major injury. The Idaho spill in 1990 required the evacuation of 200 people. For highway shipments, one truck transport and 3 loading/unloading accidents occurred that involved large anhydrous NH<sub>3</sub> spills of between 4,000 and 8,000 gal (15,000 and 30,000 L). The 1 en route truck accident involving the largest truck spill (in Iowa on May 3, 1996) resulted in 1 fatality and the evacuation of 40 people. The other 3 large truck shipment spills occurred during loading/unloading operations but did not result in any fatalities. However, one of the spills involved a major injury and required the evacuation of 14 people in addition to the treatment of 26 with minor injuries.

Over the past 30 years, the safety record for transporting anhydrous NH<sub>3</sub> has significantly improved as a result of several factors. Hazardous compressed gas truck shipment loading and unloading operations require strict conformance with DOT standards for safety valve design and specifications in addition to requirements on the installation of measuring and sampling devices. Federal rules governing the transportation of hazardous materials (49 CFR 173) require that valves installed for tank venting, loading, and unloading operations must be “of approved design, made of metal not subject to rapid deterioration by the lading, and must withstand the tank test pressure without leakage.” The MC331 compressed gas tanker trucks, which would most likely be used to ship anhydrous NH<sub>3</sub> to the DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion facility, must be equipped with check valves to prevent the occurrence of a large spill (e.g., a spill from a feed line disconnection during a loading operation). These valves are typically located near the front end of a MC331 tanker truck and close to the driver’s cab. Although not specifically required by DOT regulations, excess flow valves may be installed to prevent a catastrophic spill in the event that the driver is unable to reach the manual check valve to cut off flow from a failed feed line or loading tank valve. Safety measures contributing to the improved safety record over the past 30 years include the installation of protective devices on railcars, fewer derailments, closer manufacturer supervision of container inspections, and participation of shippers in the Chemical Transportation Emergency Center.

Most of the HF transported in the United States is anhydrous HF, which is more hazardous than the aqueous HF. Since 1971, which is the period covered by DOT records (DOT 2003b), no fatal or serious injuries to the public or to transportation or emergency response personnel have occurred as a result of anhydrous HF releases during transportation. Over the period 1971 to 2003, 11 releases from railcars were reported to have no evacuations or injuries associated with them. The only major release (estimated at 6,400 lb [29,000 kg] of HF) occurred in 1985 and resulted in approximately 100 minor injuries. Another minor HF release during transportation occurred in 1990. The safety record for transporting HF has improved in the past 10 years for the same reasons discussed above for NH<sub>3</sub>.

#### 5.2.4 Impacts Associated with HF and CaF<sub>2</sub> Conversion Product Sale and Use

During the conversion of the DUF<sub>6</sub> inventory to depleted uranium oxide, products having some potential for reuse would be produced. These products would include HF and CaF<sub>2</sub>, which are commonly used as commercial materials. An analysis of impacts associated with the potential reuse of HF and CaF<sub>2</sub> has been included as part of this EIS. Areas examined include the characteristics of these materials as produced within the conversion process, the current markets for these products, and the potential socioeconomic impacts within the United States if the products were sold. Because there would be some residual radioactivity associated with these materials, a description of the DOE process for authorizing the release of contaminated materials for unrestricted use (referred to as “free release”) and a bounding estimate of the potential human health effects of such free release have also been included in the analysis. Details on the analysis are presented in Appendix E and are summarized below.

One of the chemicals produced during conversion would be an aqueous HF-water solution of approximately 55% strength. The predominate markets for HF acid call for 49% and 70% HF solutions; thus, this product would be further processed to yield these strengths. In the preferred design, a small amount of solid CaF<sub>2</sub> would also be produced.

Table 5.2-30 gives the approximate quantities of HF and CaF<sub>2</sub> that would be produced annually in the preferred designs. The quantities in Table 5.2-30 are based on the assumption that there would be a viable economic market for the aqueous HF produced. If such a market did not exist, UDS proposes that it would convert all of the HF to CaF<sub>2</sub> and then either sell this product or dispose of it as LLW or as solid waste. The approximate quantity of CaF<sub>2</sub> produced in this scenario would be 11,800 t (13,000 tons).

Because it is expected that the UDS-produced HF and CaF<sub>2</sub> would contain small amounts of volumetrically distributed residual radioactive material, neither could be sold for unrestricted use, and CaF<sub>2</sub> could not be disposed of as solid waste unless DOE established authorized limits for radiological contamination in HF and CaF<sub>2</sub>. UDS will be required to apply for appropriate authorized limits, according to whether the HF and CaF<sub>2</sub> were sold or CaF<sub>2</sub> was disposed of as solid waste. In this context, authorized limits would be the maximum concentrations of radioactive contaminants allowed to remain volumetrically distributed within the HF and CaF<sub>2</sub> being sold. The dose analysis presented in this EIS was not conducted to establish authorized limits.

**TABLE 5.2-30 Products from DUF<sub>6</sub> Conversion (t/yr)**

Product	Portsmouth	Paducah	Total
Depleted uranium oxide	10,700	14,300	25,000
HF acid (55% solution)	8,200	11,000	19,300
CaF <sub>2</sub>	18	24	42

Estimates of the potential, bounding exposure for a hypothetical worker working in close proximity to an HF storage tank were made under very conservative assumptions. The estimated annual exposure under such extreme conditions is 0.034 mrem/yr. Similar bounding estimates of the exposure to a worker in close proximity to a CaF<sub>2</sub> handling process yielded an estimate of 0.23 mrem/yr. The bounding exposure to HF resulted from external radiation and inhalation. For CaF<sub>2</sub>, in addition to external radiation and inhalation, the bounding exposure also resulted from an assumed incidental ingestion. Given more realistic exposure conditions, the potential dose would be much smaller than the bounding estimates. Potential exposures to product users would be much smaller than those to workers. Detailed discussions on the assumptions for bounding exposures are provided in Appendix E.

Socioeconomic impact analyses were conducted to evaluate the impacts of the introduction of the UDS-produced HF or CaF<sub>2</sub> into the commercial marketplace. The current aqueous HF acid producers have been identified as a potential market for the aqueous HF (UDS 2003a), with UDS-produced aqueous HF replacing some or all of current U.S. production. The impact of HF sales on the local economy in which the existing producers were located and on the U.S. economy as a whole would likely be minimal.

No market for the 22,000 t (24,251 tons) of CaF<sub>2</sub> that might be produced in the proposed conversion facilities at Paducah and Portsmouth has been identified (UDS 2003a). Should such a market be found, the impact of CaF<sub>2</sub> sales on the U.S. economy is likely to be minimal.

In the event that no market for either HF or CaF<sub>2</sub> is established, the HF would be neutralized in a process that would produce additional CaF<sub>2</sub>. It is likely that the CaF<sub>2</sub> would be disposed of as waste. This would require shipping it to an approved solid waste or LLW disposal facility. While disposal activities would produce a small number of transportation jobs and might lead to additional jobs at the waste disposal facility, the impact of these activities in the transportation corridors, at the waste disposal site(s), and on the U.S. economy would be minimal.

### **5.2.5 Impacts If ETTP Cylinders Are Shipped to Paducah Rather Than to Portsmouth**

Current DOE plans call for the cylinders stored at ETTP to be shipped to Portsmouth. However, the option of sending the ETTP cylinders to Paducah for conversion is considered in this section. If the ETTP DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders were converted at Paducah, the Paducah facility would have to operate an additional 3 years, resulting in a total operational period of 28 years. Potential environmental impacts associated with conversion facility operations, cylinder preparation activities at ETTP, and transportation of the cylinders to Paducah are discussed below.

#### **5.2.5.1 Construction and Operation Impacts**

If the ETTP cylinders were shipped to Paducah rather than to Portsmouth, the Paducah facility would have to operate an additional 3 years, resulting in a total operational period of 28 years. Facility construction impacts would be the same as those discussed in Section 5.2.1.

The annual operational impacts would be the same as those described in Section 5.2.2 because the facility throughput would be the same; however, impacts would occur over the additional 3 years necessary to process the ETTP DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders. The shipment of the cylinders to Paducah would result in some incremental increase in the annual radiation dose to workers, as described below.

The involved workers in the cylinder yards would need to unload the cylinders arriving from ETTP, inspect them, transfer them to cylinder yards, and put them into storage. Regular cylinder maintenance activities would be performed until they are transferred to the conversion facility. The shipment of ETTP cylinders to Paducah could last up to 6 years (from 2004 up to December 2009, when all the cylinders need to be removed from ETTP). However, for the purpose of analysis and to provide bounding estimates of annual impacts, it is assumed that the duration of the shipment campaign would be 2 years. Worker exposure at the cylinder yards would increase significantly for the first 2 years because of the handling of ETTP cylinders. It then would decrease steadily but would be slightly greater than that presented in Section 5.2.1.1 because of maintaining the additional ETTP cylinders.

Potential radiation exposures for handling the arriving cylinders were estimated using the following assumptions: (1) unloading a cylinder would require 2 workers to each work half an hour at a distance of 3 ft (1 m) from the cylinder; (2) inspecting a cylinder would require 2 workers to each work half an hour at a distance of 1 ft (0.30 m) from the cylinder; (3) each shipment to the cylinder yard would require 2 workers for about half an hour at a distance of 6 ft (2 m) from the cylinders; and (4) placing each cylinder to its storage position would require 2 workers to each work half an hour at a distance of 3 ft (1 m) from the cylinder. These assumptions were developed for the purpose of modeling potential radiation exposures; in actuality, the number of workers required and the exposure duration of each activity could be less. The collective exposure from handling all the ETTP cylinders was estimated to be about 12.3 person-rem. Distributing it evenly among the 8 workers for 2 years would result in an extra exposure of 770 mrem/yr for each worker.

Because the number of ETTP cylinders is about 12% of the number of Paducah cylinders, potential radiation exposure from routine maintenance activities was assumed to increase by the same percentage. Annual radiation exposure from preparing and transferring cylinders to the conversion facility would not be affected because the cylinder processing rate would stay the same.

Combining the above assumptions, the potential average radiation exposure of the cylinder yard workers would be about 1,460 mrem/yr for the first 2 years. It then would drop from 720 mrem/yr to 430 mrem/yr steadily for the rest of the 26 years. The maximum average cancer risk for individual workers would be less than  $6 \times 10^{-4}$ /yr (1 chance in 1,600 of developing 1 LCF each year). Considering the conservative assumptions used to estimate the potential exposures, actual worker exposures are expected to be less than the estimated values. In reality, worker exposures would be monitored by a dosimetry program and would be kept ALARA.

No on-the-job fatalities are predicted with an additional 3 years during the conversion facility operational phase; it is estimated, however, that a total of about 221 injuries would occur, compared with 197 injuries over 25 years (Table 5.2-1).

It might be necessary to construct a new cylinder yard at Paducah if it was decided to transport the ETTP cylinders to Paducah. If such a decision was made in the future, an additional environmental or NEPA review would be required for construction of a new yard.

### 5.2.5.2 Cylinder Preparation Impacts at ETTP

Transporting the cylinders at ETTP to Paducah could result in potential environmental impacts at ETTP from the preparation of the cylinders for shipment. As described in Chapter 2, some of the DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders in storage no longer meet DOT requirements for the shipment of radioactive materials. It is currently unknown exactly how many cylinders do not meet DOT requirements, although current estimates are that 1,700 cylinders are DOT-compliant. Before transportation, cylinders would have to be prepared to meet the requirements. As described in Chapter 2, for the purposes of this EIS, environmental impacts were evaluated for three options for preparing cylinders for shipment: use of cylinder overpacks, cylinder transfer, and obtaining a DOT exemption.

An overpack is a container into which a cylinder would be placed for shipment. The metal overpack would be designed, tested, and certified to meet all DOT shipping requirements. The overpack would be suitable to contain, transport, and store the cylinder contents regardless of cylinder condition. According to UDS (2003b), the use of cylinder overpacks is considered the most likely approach for shipping noncompliant cylinders.

The cylinder transfer option would involve the transfer of the DUF<sub>6</sub> from noncompliant cylinders to cylinders that meet all DOT requirements. If selected, this option would likely require the construction of a cylinder transfer facility at ETTP. Currently, there are no plans or proposals to build or use a cylinder transfer facility to prepare DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders for shipment. If such a decision were made, additional NEPA review would be conducted. The use of a cylinder transfer facility for cylinder preparation is considered much less likely than the use of overpacks, because the former approach would be more resource intensive and costly and would generate additional contaminated emptied cylinders requiring treatment and disposal.

The third option is to obtain an exemption from DOT that would allow the DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders to be transported either "as is" or following repairs. The primary finding that DOT would have to make to justify granting an exemption is this: the proposed alternative would have to achieve a safety level that would be at least equal to the level required by the otherwise applicable regulation or, if the otherwise applicable regulation did not establish a required safety level, would be consistent with the public interest and adequately protect against the risks to life and property that are inherent when transporting hazardous materials in commerce. It is likely that some type of compensatory measures during the transportation would have to be employed to justify the granting of an exemption. No specific measures were evaluated in this EIS. However, because the granting of an exemption would be based on a demonstration of

equivalent safety, the transportation impacts for this option would be similar to those presented for the overpack and cylinder transfer options. Therefore, transportation impacts for the exemption option are not presented separately in this section.

The site-specific impacts of preparing both compliant and noncompliant cylinders (using overpacks and cylinder transfer) for shipment at ETTP were evaluated in Appendix E of the DUF<sub>6</sub> PEIS (DOE 1999a). In that evaluation, it was assumed for ETTP that the total number of cylinders not meeting DOT requirements ranged from 2,342 to 4,683 (50% to 100% of the ETTP DUF<sub>6</sub> inventory); correspondingly, from 0 to 2,342 compliant cylinders would require preparation for shipment.

The following paragraphs summarize the impacts from the cylinder preparation activities at ETTP as presented in Appendix E of the DUF<sub>6</sub> PEIS (DOE 1999a). The site-specific impacts from operation of a transfer facility at ETTP were evaluated on the basis of the assumption that the facility would be located at the center of the site, since no proposal exists for such a facility and no specific location has been proposed. For the same reasons, the site-specific impacts from construction were not evaluated. Therefore, an additional NEPA review might be required to construct a cylinder transfer facility if a decision was made to do so in the future.

**5.2.5.2.1 Cylinder Overpack Option.** For normal operations, the PEIS analysis concluded that the potential on-site impacts from preparing compliant cylinders and from placing noncompliant cylinders into overpacks would be small and limited to involved workers. No impacts to the off-site public or the environment would occur, since no releases are expected and no construction activities would be required. The only equipment required would be similar to the equipment currently used during routine cylinder handling and maintenance activities.

It is estimated that at ETTP, the total collective dose to involved workers would range from 42 to 85 person-rem (resulting in less than 0.03 LCF) for overpacking operations and from 0 to 27 person-rem (resulting in less than 0.01 LCF) for preparation of compliant cylinders. The total collective dose to workers preparing all the ETTP cylinders would range from 69 to 85 person-rem (resulting in less than 0.03 LCF). This dose to workers would be incurred over the duration of the cylinder preparation operations (annual doses can be estimated by dividing the total dose by the duration of the operation in years). It should be noted that the assumptions used in the PEIS for estimating worker exposure were very conservative, with the purpose of bounding potential exposures. In practice, cylinder preparation activities, such as inspecting, unstacking, and loading cylinders, would involve fewer workers and be of shorter duration, resulting in significantly lower worker exposures than the estimates presented here.

The PEIS also evaluated the potential for accidents during cylinder preparation operations. The types of accident considered were the same as those considered for the continued storage of cylinders under the no action alternative in this EIS, such as spills from corroded cylinders during wet and dry conditions and vehicle accidents causing cylinders to be involved in fires. The consequences of such accidents are described under the no action alternative in Section 5.1.

**5.2.5.2.2 Cylinder Transfer Option.** A summary of environmental parameters associated with the construction and operation of a cylinder transfer facility with various throughputs is presented in Table 5.2-31. In the PEIS, it was assumed that the ETTP transfer facility would process 320 cylinders per year, requiring about 15 years to transfer 4,683 cylinders. Although the three facility sizes shown in Table 5.2-31 have vastly different throughputs (ranging over a factor of 5), the differences in the environmental parameters among them are relatively small because of economies of scale. If transfer operations at ETTP occurred over a shorter period of time than 15 years, a larger facility would be required, with environmental parameters similar to those listed for the 1,600-cylinder/yr facility or the 960-cylinder/yr facility.

For the cylinder transfer option, impacts during construction and normal operations would generally be small and limited primarily to involved workers. It is estimated that at ETTP, the total collective dose to involved workers would range from 410 to 480 person-rem (resulting in less than 0.2 LCF) for cylinder transfer operations, and it would range from 0 to 27 person-rem (resulting in less than 0.01 LCF) for preparing compliant cylinders. The total collective dose to workers preparing all the ETTP cylinders would range from 437 to 480 person-rem (resulting in less than 0.2 LCF). This dose to workers would be incurred over the duration of the cylinder preparation operations (annual doses can be estimated by dividing the total dose by the duration of the operation in years).

In the PEIS, the size of the transfer facility was estimated to be less than about 20 acres (8 ha); such a facility would likely be constructed in a previously disturbed area. Some small off-site releases of hazardous and nonhazardous materials could occur, although such releases would have negligible impacts on the off-site public and the environment. Construction activities could temporarily impact air quality, but all criteria pollutant concentrations would be within applicable standards.

**TABLE 5.2-31 Summary of Environmental Parameters for a Cylinder Transfer Facility**

Affected Parameter	Annual Facility Throughput		
	1,600 Cylinders	960 Cylinders	320 Cylinders
Disturbed land area (acres)	21	14	12
Paved area (acres)	15	10	8
Construction water (million gal/yr)	10	8	6.5
Construction wastewater (million gal/yr)	5	4	3.3
Operations water (million gal/yr)	9	7	6
Operations wastewater (million gal/yr)	7.1	5.7	4.4
Radioactive release (Ci/yr)	0.00078	0.00063	0.00049

Source: Appendix E in DOE (1999a).

Impacts on cultural resources would be possible if a transfer facility was built at ETTP. Depending on the location chosen, the K-25 Main Plant Historical District, significant archaeological resources, or traditional cultural properties could be adversely affected. The ORR CRMP has been approved by the Tennessee SHPO. It includes procedures for determining the effect of an undertaking on cultural resources, consulting with the Tennessee SHPO and Native American groups, and mitigating adverse effects (Souza et al. 2001). These procedures, including additional surveys and any necessary mitigation, would have to be completed before any ground-disturbing activities for construction of a new facility could begin.

### 5.2.5.3 Transportation of Cylinders from ETTP to Paducah

The estimated potential environmental impacts from transportation of UF<sub>6</sub> cylinders are presented in this section for shipments from ETTP to the Paducah site. Potential impacts for the shipment of DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders are presented in Section 5.2.5.3.1; potential impacts for the shipment of non-DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders are presented in Section 5.2.5.3.2. The impacts of transportation were calculated in three areas: (1) collective population risks during routine conditions and accidents, (2) radiological risks to MEIs during routine conditions, and (3) consequences to individuals and populations after the most severe accidents involving a release of UF<sub>6</sub>. Shipments of cylinders by both truck and rail were assessed.

#### 5.2.5.3.1 DUF<sub>6</sub> Cylinder Shipments

**Collective Population Risk.** The total collective population risks for shipment of the entire ETTP inventory to Paducah are presented in Table 5.2-32 for the DUF<sub>6</sub> and non-DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders. Annual impacts would depend on the duration of the shipping campaign and can be computed by dividing the total risk by the campaign duration. No fatalities are expected as a result of the shipping campaign because all estimated collective fatality risks are much less than 0.5. The estimated radiation doses from the shipments are much less than levels expected to cause an appreciable increase in the risk of cancer in crew members and the public. The highest fatality risks are from vehicle-related causes; the risks for truck shipments are higher than for rail.

The highest radiological risks are for routine transport by general train (0.04 crew LCFs) followed by truck (0.008 crew LCFs). In RADTRAN, rail crew risks are calculated for railcar inspectors in rail yards. During transport, members of the rail crew are assumed to be shielded completely by the locomotive(s) and any intervening railcars. The radiological risks from accidents are approximately 10 times lower than those for routine transport. No chemical impacts would occur under normal transport conditions because the package contents are assumed to remain confined. Chemical accident risks for the entire shipping campaign would be negligible for any transport option. No adverse effects ( $1.7 \times 10^{-6}$  or less) or irreversible adverse effects ( $1.2 \times 10^{-6}$  or less) are expected.

**TABLE 5.2-32 ETTP UF<sub>6</sub> Cylinder Shipments to Paducah**

Mode	DUF <sub>6</sub>		Non-DUF <sub>6</sub>	
	Truck	Rail <sup>a</sup>	Truck	Rail <sup>a</sup>
<b>Shipment summary</b>				
Number of shipments	4,900	1,225	503	181
Total distance traveled (km)	2,370,000	1,010,000	243,000	149,000
<b>Cargo-related<sup>b</sup></b>				
<b>Radiological impacts</b>				
Dose risk (person-rem)				
Routine crew	21	88	2.8	18
Routine public				
Off-link	0.26	0.89	0.1	0.18
On-link	0.72	0.036	0.28	0.0074
Stops	6.5	1.2	2.6	0.25
Total	7.4	2.2	3.0	0.44
Accident <sup>c</sup>	0.11	0.015	0.00053	$3.7 \times 10^{-5}$
Latent cancer fatalities <sup>d</sup>				
Crew fatalities	0.008	0.04	0.001	0.007
Public fatalities	0.004	0.001	0.001	0.0002
<b>Chemical impacts</b>				
Adverse effects	$1.7 \times 10^{-6}$	$6.1 \times 10^{-8}$	0	0
Irreversible adverse effects	$1.2 \times 10^{-6}$	$4.8 \times 10^{-8}$	0	0
<b>Vehicle-related<sup>e</sup></b>				
Emission fatalities	0.2	0.01	0.02	0.002
Accident fatalities	0.054	0.031	0.0055	0.0047

<sup>a</sup> Risks are presented on a railcar basis. One shipment is equivalent to one railcar.

<sup>b</sup> Cargo-related impacts are impacts attributable to the radioactive or chemical nature of the material being transported.

<sup>c</sup> Dose risk is a societal risk and is the product of accident probability and accident consequence.

<sup>d</sup> LCFs were calculated by multiplying the dose by the ICRP Publication 60 health risk conversion factors of  $4 \times 10^{-4}$  fatal cancers per person-rem for workers and  $5 \times 10^{-4}$  for the public (ICRP 1991).

<sup>e</sup> Vehicle-related impacts are impacts independent of the cargo in the shipment.

**Maximally Exposed Individuals during Routine Conditions.** During the routine transportation of radioactive material, specific individuals may be exposed to radiation in the vicinity of a shipment. RISKIND (Yuan et al. 1995) has been used to estimate the risk to these individuals for a number of hypothetical exposure-causing events. The receptors include transportation crew members, inspectors, and members of the public exposed during traffic delays, while working at a service station, or while living near an origin or destination site. The assumptions about exposure are given in DOE (1999a) and Biwer et al. (2001). The scenarios for

exposure are not meant to be exhaustive; they were selected to provide a range of representative potential exposures. Doses were assessed and are presented in Table 5.2-33 on a per-event basis — no attempt was made to estimate the frequency of exposure-causing events. The highest potential routine radiological exposure to an MEI, with an LCF risk of  $1 \times 10^{-7}$ , would be for a person stopped in traffic near a shipment for 30 minutes at a distance of 3.3 ft (1 m). There is also the possibility for multiple exposures. For example, if an individual lived near either the ETTP or Paducah sites and all shipments were made by truck, the resident could receive a combined dose of less than 0.03 mrem if present for all shipments (calculated as the product of 4,900 shipments and an estimated exposure per truck shipment of  $5.4 \times 10^{-9}$  rem). However, this dose is very low, approximately 10,000 times lower than the individual average annual exposure of 0.3 rem from natural background radiation. Truck inspectors would receive a higher dose per shipment ( $6.3 \times 10^{-5}$  rem/event) than the hypothetical resident and might also be exposed to multiple shipments. If the same inspector were present for all shipments, that person would receive a combined dose of approximately 300 mrem distributed over the duration of the shipping campaign, about the same as would be received from an average annual exposure to natural background radiation.

**Accident Consequence Assessment.** Whereas the collective accident risk assessment considers the entire range of accident severities and their related probabilities, the accident consequence assessment assumes that an accident of the highest severity category has occurred. The consequences, in terms of committed dose (rem) and LCFs for radiological impacts and in terms of adverse affects and irreversible adverse effects for chemical impacts, were calculated for both exposed populations and individuals in the vicinity of an accident. Tables 5.2-34 and 5.2-35 present the radiological and chemical consequences, respectively, to the population from severe accidents involving shipment of DUF<sub>6</sub>. Tables 5.2-36 and 5.2-37 present the radiological

**TABLE 5.2-33 Estimated Radiological Impacts to the MEI from Routine Shipment of DUF<sub>6</sub> Cylinders**

Mode	Inspector	Resident	Person in Traffic	Person at Gas Station	Person near Rail Stop
<b><i>Routine Radiological Dose from a Single Shipment (rem)</i></b>					
Truck	$6.3 \times 10^{-5}$	$5.4 \times 10^{-9}$	$2.3 \times 10^{-4}$	$7.5 \times 10^{-6}$	NA <sup>a</sup>
Rail	$1.1 \times 10^{-4}$	$1.5 \times 10^{-8}$	$2.6 \times 10^{-4}$	NA	$9.3 \times 10^{-7}$
<b><i>Routine Radiological Risk from a Single Shipment (lifetime risk of an LCF)<sup>b</sup></i></b>					
Truck	$3 \times 10^{-8}$	$3 \times 10^{-12}$	$1 \times 10^{-7}$	$4 \times 10^{-9}$	NA
Rail	$6 \times 10^{-8}$	$8 \times 10^{-12}$	$1 \times 10^{-7}$	NA	$5 \times 10^{-10}$

<sup>a</sup> NA = not applicable.

<sup>b</sup> LCFs were calculated by multiplying the dose by the ICRP Publication 60 health risk conversion factors of  $4 \times 10^{-4}$  fatal cancers per person-rem for workers and  $5 \times 10^{-4}$  for the public (ICRP 1991).

**TABLE 5.2-34 Potential Radiological Consequences to the Population from Severe Transportation Accidents Involving Shipment of DUF<sub>6</sub> Cylinders<sup>a</sup>**

Mode	Neutral Meteorological Conditions			Stable Meteorological Conditions		
	Rural	Suburban	Urban <sup>b</sup>	Rural	Suburban	Urban <sup>b</sup>
<b>Radiological Dose (person-rem)</b>						
Truck	590	580	1,300	15,000	15,000	32,000
Rail	2,400	2,300	5,200	60,000	58,000	130,000
<b>Radiological Risk (LCF)<sup>c</sup></b>						
Truck	0.3	0.3	0.6	7	7	20
Rail	1	1	3	30	30	60

<sup>a</sup> National average population densities were used for the accident consequence assessment, corresponding to densities of 6 persons/km<sup>2</sup>, 719 persons/km<sup>2</sup>, and 1,600 persons/km<sup>2</sup> for rural, suburban, and urban zones, respectively. Potential impacts were estimated for the population within a 50-mi (80-km) radius, assuming a uniform population density for each zone.

<sup>b</sup> It is important to note that the urban population density generally applies to a relatively small urbanized area — very few, if any, urban areas have a population density as high as 1,600 persons/km<sup>2</sup>, extending as far as 50 mi (80 km). That urban population density corresponds to approximately 32 million people within the 50-mi (80-km) radius, well in excess of the total populations along the routes considered in this assessment.

<sup>c</sup> LCFs were calculated by multiplying the dose by the ICRP Publication 60 health risk conversion factors of  $4 \times 10^{-4}$  fatal cancers per person-rem for workers and  $5 \times 10^{-4}$  for the public (ICRP 1991).

Source: DOE (1999b).

and chemical consequences, respectively, to the MEI from severe accidents involving shipment of DUF<sub>6</sub>.

The potential consequences of severe cylinder accidents were estimated for rail shipments on the basis of the assumption that the accident occurred in an urban area under stable weather conditions (such as at nighttime). In such a case, it was estimated that approximately four persons might experience irreversible adverse effects (such as lung or kidney damage) from exposure to HF and uranium. The number of fatalities expected following an HF or uranium chemical exposure is expected to be somewhat less than 1% of the potential irreversible adverse effects. Thus, no fatalities would be expected (1% of 4).

**TABLE 5.2-35 Potential Chemical Consequences to the Population from Severe Transportation Accidents Involving Shipment of DUF<sub>6</sub> Cylinders<sup>a</sup>**

Mode	Neutral Weather Conditions			Stable Weather Conditions		
	Rural	Suburban	Urban <sup>b</sup>	Rural	Suburban	Urban <sup>b</sup>
<b><i>Number of Persons with the Potential for Adverse Health Effects</i></b>						
Truck	0	2	4	6	760	1,700
Rail	4	420	940	110	13,000	28,000
<b><i>Number of Persons with the Potential for Irreversible Adverse Health Effects<sup>c</sup></i></b>						
Truck	0	1	2	0	1	3
Rail	0	1	3	0	2	4

<sup>a</sup> National average population densities were used for the accident consequence assessment, corresponding to densities of 6 persons/km<sup>2</sup>, 719 persons/km<sup>2</sup>, and 1,600 persons/km<sup>2</sup> for rural, suburban, and urban zones, respectively. Potential impacts were estimated for the population within a 50-mi (80-km) radius, assuming a uniform population density for each zone.

<sup>b</sup> It is important to note that the urban population density generally applies to a relatively small urbanized area — very few, if any, urban areas have a population density as high as 1,600 persons/km<sup>2</sup>, extending as far as 50 mi (80 km). That urban population density corresponds to approximately 32 million people within the 50-mi (80-km) radius, well in excess of the total populations along the routes considered in this assessment.

<sup>c</sup> Potential for irreversible adverse effects from chemical exposures. Exposure to HF or uranium compounds is estimated to result in fatality of approximately 1% or less of those persons experiencing irreversible adverse effects (Policastro et al. 1997).

Source: DOE (1999b).

Over the long term, radiation effects are possible from exposure to the uranium released. In a highly populated urban area, it was estimated that about 3 million people could be exposed to small amounts of uranium as it was dispersed by the wind. Among those exposed, it was estimated that approximately 60 LCFs could occur in the urban population in addition to those occurring from all other causes. For comparison, in a population of 3 million people, approximately 700,000 would be expected to die of cancer from all causes. The occurrence of a severe rail accident in an urban area under stable weather conditions would be expected to be rare. The consequences of cylinder accidents occurring in rural environments during unstable weather conditions (typical of daytime) or involving a truck shipment were also assessed. The consequences of all other accident conditions were estimated to be considerably less than those described above for the severe urban rail accident.

**TABLE 5.2-36 Potential Radiological Consequences to the MEI from Severe Transportation Accidents Involving Shipment of DUF<sub>6</sub> Cylinders**

Mode	Neutral Weather Conditions		Stable Weather Conditions	
	Dose (mrem)	Radiological Risk of LCF <sup>a</sup>	Dose (mrem)	Radiological Risk of LCF <sup>a</sup>
Truck	0.43	$2 \times 10^{-4}$	0.91	$5 \times 10^{-4}$
Rail	1.7	$9 \times 10^{-4}$	3.7	$2 \times 10^{-3}$

<sup>a</sup> LCFs were calculated by multiplying the dose by the ICRP Publication 60 health risk conversion factors of  $4 \times 10^{-4}$  fatal cancers per person-rem for workers and  $5 \times 10^{-4}$  for the public (ICRP 1991).

Source: DOE (1999b).

**TABLE 5.2-37 Potential Chemical Consequences to the MEI from Severe Transportation Accidents Involving Shipment of DUF<sub>6</sub> Cylinders**

Mode	Neutral Weather Conditions		Stable Weather Conditions	
	Adverse Effects	Irreversible Adverse Effects <sup>a</sup>	Adverse Effects	Irreversible Adverse Effects <sup>a</sup>
Truck	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Rail	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

<sup>a</sup> Potential for irreversible adverse effects from chemical exposures. Exposure to HF or uranium compounds is estimated to result in fatality of approximately 1% or less of those persons experiencing irreversible adverse effects (Policastro et al. 1997).

Source: DOE (1999b).

### 5.2.5.3.2 Non-DUF<sub>6</sub> Cylinder Shipments

**Collective Population Risk.** The total collective population risks for shipment of the non-DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders to Paducah are presented earlier in Table 5.2-32. Annual impacts would depend on the duration of the shipping campaign and can be computed by dividing the total risk by the campaign duration. On a per-shipment basis, the radiological risks during routine transportation would be slightly higher for non-DUF<sub>6</sub> shipments than for DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinder shipments because a higher external dose rate was assumed for the non-DUF<sub>6</sub> shipments. Conversely, radiological accident risks per shipment would be much less for the non-DUF<sub>6</sub> shipments than for the DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinder shipments. This is because the average uranium content per non-DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinder shipment is much less than that for a DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinder shipment: the *total* amount of UF<sub>6</sub> in the non-DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders is approximately 25 t (28 tons), compared with approximately 12 t (13 tons) in *each* DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinder.

In general, the total potential impacts from radiological and vehicular causes would be small for the shipment of non-DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders; no fatalities are expected as a result of the shipping campaign because all estimated collective fatality risks are much less than 0.5. Overall, the estimated total impacts from non-DUF<sub>6</sub> shipments are about a factor of 10 less than the total impacts from DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinder shipments (primarily because of the difference in the numbers of shipments).

**Maximally Exposed Individuals during Routine Conditions.** For MEIs, radiological doses and risks were assessed and are presented in Table 5.2-38 on a per-event basis for the shipment of non-DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders — no attempt was made to estimate the frequency of

**TABLE 5.2-38 Estimated Radiological Impacts to the MEI from Routine Shipment of Non-DUF<sub>6</sub> Cylinders**

Mode	Inspector	Resident	Person in Traffic	Person at Gas Station	Person near Rail Stop
<b><i>Routine Radiological Dose from a Single Shipment (rem)</i></b>					
Truck	$1.4 \times 10^{-4}$	$2.0 \times 10^{-8}$	$5.0 \times 10^{-4}$	$2.7 \times 10^{-5}$	NA <sup>a</sup>
Rail	$1.8 \times 10^{-4}$	$2.5 \times 10^{-8}$	$5.0 \times 10^{-4}$	NA	$1.6 \times 10^{-6}$
<b><i>Routine Radiological Risk from a Single Shipment (lifetime risk of an LCF)<sup>b</sup></i></b>					
Truck	$9 \times 10^{-8}$	$1 \times 10^{-11}$	$3 \times 10^{-7}$	$1 \times 10^{-8}$	NA
Rail	$9 \times 10^{-8}$	$1 \times 10^{-11}$	$3 \times 10^{-7}$	NA	$8 \times 10^{-10}$

<sup>a</sup> NA = not applicable.

<sup>b</sup> LCFs were calculated by multiplying the dose by the ICRP Publication 60 health risk conversion factors of  $4 \times 10^{-4}$  fatal cancers per person-rem for workers and  $5 \times 10^{-4}$  for the public (ICRP 1991).

exposure-causing events. On a per-shipment basis, the radiological risks to an MEI during routine transportation would be slightly higher for non-DUF<sub>6</sub> shipments than for DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinder shipments because a higher external dose rate was assumed. The highest potential routine radiological exposure to an MEI, with a LCF risk of  $3 \times 10^{-7}$ , would be for a person stopped in traffic near a shipment for 30 minutes at a distance of 3 ft (1 m).

There is also the possibility for multiple exposures. For example, if an individual lived near either the ETTP or Paducah sites and all non-DUF<sub>6</sub> shipments were made by truck, that person could receive a combined dose of approximately 0.01 mrem if present for all shipments (calculated as the product of 500 shipments and an estimated exposure per shipment of  $2.0 \times 10^{-8}$  rem). However, this dose is still very low, approximately 10,000 times lower than the individual average annual exposure of 0.3 rem from natural background radiation. Truck inspectors would receive a higher dose per shipment ( $1.4 \times 10^{-4}$  rem/event) than the hypothetical resident and might also be exposed to multiple shipments. If the same inspector were present for all shipments, that person would receive a combined dose of approximately 70 mrem distributed over the duration of the shipping campaign, much less than the average annual exposure to natural background radiation.

**Accident Consequence Assessment.** Because the average uranium content of each non-DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinder shipment is much less than that for a DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinder shipment (the *total* amount of UF<sub>6</sub> in the non-DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders is approximately 25 t [28 tons], compared with approximately 12 t [13 tons] in *each* DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinder), a separate accident consequence assessment was not conducted for non-DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinder shipments. The potential impacts of the highest consequence accidents for non-DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinder shipments would be much less than those presented in Tables 5.2-34 through 5.2-37 for DUF<sub>6</sub> shipments.

The nuclear properties of DUF<sub>6</sub> are such that the occurrence of a nuclear criticality is not a concern, regardless of the amount of DUF<sub>6</sub> present. However, criticality is a concern for the handling, packaging, and shipping of enriched UF<sub>6</sub>. For enriched UF<sub>6</sub>, criticality control is accomplished by employing, individually or collectively, specific limits on uranium-235 enrichment, mass, volume, geometry, moderation, and spacing for each type of cylinder. The amount of UF<sub>6</sub> that may be contained in an individual cylinder and the total number of cylinders that may be transported together are determined by the nuclear properties of enriched UF<sub>6</sub>. Spacing of cylinders of enriched UF<sub>6</sub> in transit during routine and accident conditions is ensured by use of regulatory approval packages that provide protection against impact and fire. Consequently, because of these controls and the relatively small number of shipments containing enriched UF<sub>6</sub>, the occurrence of an inadvertent criticality is not considered to be credible and therefore is not analyzed in the accident consequence assessment conducted in this EIS.

## 5.2.6 Potential Impacts Associated with the Option of Expanding Conversion Facility Operations

As discussed in Section 2.2.5, several reasonably foreseeable activities could result in a future decision to increase the conversion facility throughput or extend the operational period at

one or both of the conversion facility sites. Specifically, the throughput of the facility could be increased through process improvements at Paducah. The facility also could be operated beyond the currently planned 25-year period in order to process additional DUF<sub>6</sub> that might be transferred to DOE at some time in the future (such as DUF<sub>6</sub> generated by USEC or another commercial enrichment facility). In addition, it is possible that DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders could be transferred from Paducah to Portsmouth to facilitate conversion of the entire inventory, particularly if DOE assumes responsibility for additional DUF<sub>6</sub> at Paducah.

To account for these future possibilities and provide future planning flexibility, this section includes an evaluation of the environmental impacts associated with expanding conversion facility operations at Paducah, either by increasing throughput or by extending operations. In addition, potential environmental impacts associated with possible Paducah-to-Portsmouth cylinder shipments are also evaluated in this section.

#### **5.2.6.1 Potential Impacts Associated with Increasing Plant Throughput**

DOE believes that higher throughput rates can be achieved by improving the efficiency of the planned equipment (DOE 2004b). The conversion contract provides significant incentives to the conversion contractor to improve efficiency. For example, the current facility designs are based on an assumption that the conversion plant would have an 84% on-line availability (percent of time system is on line and operational). However, on the basis of Framatome's experience at the Richland plant, the on-line availability is expected to be at least 90%. Therefore, there is additional capacity expected to be realized in the current design.

If the plant throughput was marginally increased by process improvements, the environmental impacts during operations could increase for some areas but still would be similar to those discussed in Section 5.2.2 for the base design. For example, annual radiation doses to workers and the public from site emissions might increase in proportion to throughput. Slight variations in plant throughput are not unusual from year to year because of operational factors (e.g., equipment maintenance or replacement) and are generally accounted for by the conservative nature of the impact calculations. As discussed in Section 5.2.2, the estimated annual impacts during operations are well within applicable guidelines and regulations, with collective and cumulative impacts being quite low.

#### **5.2.6.2 Potential Impacts Associated with Extending the Plant Operational Period**

As noted above, the Paducah conversion facility is currently being designed to process the Paducah cylinder inventory over 25 years. There are no current plans to operate the conversion facilities beyond this period. However, with routine facility and equipment maintenance and periodic equipment replacements or upgrades, it is believed that the conversion facility could be operated safely beyond this time period to process any additional DUF<sub>6</sub> for which DOE might assume responsibility.

The estimated annual environmental impacts during conversion facility operations are presented and discussed in Section 5.2.2; these impacts are expected to continue each year for the planned 25 years of operations at Paducah. If operations were extended beyond 25 years and if the operational characteristics (e.g., estimated releases of contaminants to air and water) of the facility remained unchanged, it is expected that the annual impacts would be essentially the same as those presented in Section 5.2.2. However, continued operations would result in the impacts being incurred over a greater number of years. The total radiation dose to the workers and the public would increase in proportion to the number of additional years that the facility operated. Although the annual frequency of accidents would remain unchanged, the overall probability of a severe accident would increase proportionately with the additional operational time period. In addition, the total quantities of depleted uranium and secondary waste products requiring disposal would increase proportionately, as would the amount of HF or CaF<sub>2</sub> produced. As discussed in Section 5.2.2, the estimated annual impacts during operations are within applicable guidelines and regulations, with collective and cumulative impacts being quite low. This would also be expected during extended operations.

### **5.2.6.3 Potential Impacts Associated with Possible Future Paducah-to-Portsmouth Cylinder Shipments**

As noted above, it is possible that in the future, DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders could be transferred from Paducah to Portsmouth to facilitate conversion of the entire inventory, particularly if DOE assumed responsibility for additional DUF<sub>6</sub> at Paducah. At this time, it is uncertain whether such transfers would take place and how many cylinders would be transferred if such a decision was made. Therefore, for comparative purposes, this section provides estimates of the potential impacts from transporting 1,000 DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders from Paducah to Portsmouth by either truck or rail. Shipment of 1,000 cylinders per year roughly corresponds to the annual base design throughput of the Portsmouth conversion facility.

The transportation assessment methodology discussed in Appendix F, Section F.3, was used to estimate the collective population risk for shipment of 1,000 cylinders between Paducah and Portsmouth by both truck and rail. It was assumed that only compliant cylinders that met DOT requirements would be shipped between the sites. The estimated highway and rail route distances between the sites are 395 mi (636 km) and 478 mi (769 km), respectively. The estimated collective risks are provided in Table 5.2-39. No cargo-related or vehicle-related fatalities are expected for the shipment of 1,000 cylinders per year between the sites.

The estimated consequences of severe accidents and the potential impacts to MEIs would be the same as presented and described in Section 5.2.5 for the shipment of ETTP cylinders.

**TABLE 5.2-39 Annual Transportation Impacts for the Shipment of DUF<sub>6</sub> Cylinders from Paducah to Portsmouth, Assuming 1,000 DUF<sub>6</sub> Cylinders Shipped per Year**

Route	Mode	No. of Shipments	Total Distance (10 <sup>6</sup> mi)	Cargo-Related			Vehicle-Related	
				Radiological Risk (LCF) <sup>a</sup>		Irreversible Adverse Effects	Latent Emission Fatalities	Accident Fatalities
				Crew	Public			
Paducah to Portsmouth	Truck	1,000	0.395	0.002	0.001	5 × 10 <sup>-7</sup>	0.1	0.01
	Rail <sup>b</sup>	250	0.12	0.007	0.0003	2 × 10 <sup>-8</sup>	0.008	0.006

<sup>a</sup> The lifetime risk of an LCF for an individual was estimated from the calculated doses by using a dose-to-risk conversion factor of 0.0005 fatality per person-rem for members of the general public, as recommended in ICRP Publication 60 (ICRP 1991). The approximate corresponding dose received for each radiological fatality risk listed in this table may be obtained by multiplying the fatality risk by 2,000 (i.e., 1 ÷ 0.0005).

<sup>b</sup> Assumes four DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders per railcar.

## 5.3 CUMULATIVE IMPACTS

### 5.3.1 Issues and Assumptions

The CEQ guidelines for implementing NEPA define cumulative effects as the impacts on the environment resulting from the incremental impacts of an action when added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions (40 CFR 1508.7). Cumulative effects include other actions regardless of what agency (federal or nonfederal), organization, or person undertakes them. Noteworthy cumulative impacts can result from individually minor, but collectively significant, effects of all actions.

The activities considered in this cumulative analysis include those that might affect environmental conditions at or near the Paducah site; they also include activities occurring on the site itself and activities occurring nearby that would have similar effects. Tabular summaries of impacts associated with various actions are presented in Table 5.3-1 for impacts associated with the various technical areas assessed in this EIS. When possible, these summaries are quantitative; however, some are, by necessity, qualitative. For technical areas without data that can be aggregated, this analysis evaluates potential cumulative impacts in a qualitative manner as systematically as possible. When it is not appropriate for estimates of impacts to be accumulated, they are not included in the table. For example, it is not appropriate to accumulate chemical impacts (anticipated to be extremely small under the alternatives considered in this EIS) because hazard index estimates are not expected to be additive for different materials and conditions.



**TABLE 5.3-1 (Cont.)**

Impact Category	Existing Conditions	Impacts of DUF <sub>6</sub> Management <sup>a</sup>		Impacts of Other Actions <sup>b</sup>	Cumulative Impacts <sup>c</sup>	
		No Action	Action Alternatives		No Action	Action Alternatives
Cultural resources (adverse impacts)	None	Unlikely	Low to high archeological sensitivity; impacts mitigated	Unlikely	Unlikely	Low to high archeological sensitivity; impacts mitigated
Environmental justice (impacts)	None	None	None	None	None	None

<sup>a</sup> Based on the results in Chapter 5 of this EIS.

<sup>b</sup> Includes impacts related to the worst-case LLW management at the Paducah site (DOE 1997; see also DOE 2002b); continued enrichment of uranium and storage of DUF<sub>6</sub> by USEC and DOE (management only) (DOE 1999a); continued conversion of uranium ore into UF<sub>6</sub> at the Honeywell International, Inc., plant at Metropolis, Illinois (NRC 1995). Future actions would also include construction and operation of a uranium enrichment facility at the Paducah site, per the 2002 agreement between USEC and DOE that would place such a facility at the Paducah or Portsmouth site (U.S. Energy Research and Development Administration [ERDA] 1977; Platts Nuclear Fuel 2002). Other actions assume that air quality impacts from the TVA's Shawnee power plant and the Joppa Electric Energy, Inc., power plant (see DOE 1999d) would continue.

<sup>c</sup> Cumulative impacts equal the sum of the impacts of the DUF<sub>6</sub> management alternative and other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions.

<sup>d</sup> Total collective dose, assuming a 25-year period.

<sup>e</sup> Assumes 0.0005 LCF/person-rem.

<sup>f</sup> Off-site MEI includes exposures resulting from airborne and waterborne emissions. Cumulative impacts assume all facilities operate simultaneously and are located at the same point.

<sup>g</sup> No worker dose given for possible enrichment facility, thus cumulative figures will be slightly low; the individual dose would still be monitored to remain under 5 rem/person annually.

<sup>h</sup> Estimated for 25 years to enable comparison with proposed action.

<sup>i</sup> Includes both facility workers and noninvolved workers; assumes 0.0004 LCF/person-rem.

<sup>j</sup> The following assumptions were made to estimate the transportation impacts under the DUF<sub>6</sub> management alternatives: (1) number of shipments includes all radiological shipments to and from the site (rounded to the nearest hundred); (2) number of truck or rail shipments is for the mode proposed; there may be other shipments by the other mode.

<sup>k</sup> Air impacts not discussed for the enrichment facility (see ERDA 1977).

<sup>l</sup> Exceedance of the EPA MCL for drinking water; the exceedance is temporary for certain conversion options and involves local, small waterways.

<sup>m</sup> Beta activity, chromium, nitrate as nitrogen, and TCE were evaluated in terms of maximum contaminant levels adopted by the Commonwealth of Kentucky.

Sources: DOE (1997, 1999a,d, 2001b, 2002b); NRC (1995).

### 5.3.2 Paducah Site

Past, ongoing, and future actions at the Paducah site include uranium enrichment operations (under management of USEC), waste management activities, waste disposal activities (DOE 1997, 2002b), environmental restoration activities (DOE 2001b), and continued management of DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders by USEC. Other actions occurring near the Paducah site that could contribute to past, present, or future impacts near the Paducah site (because of their diffuse nature) include continued operation of the TVA's Shawnee Power Plant; the Joppa Electric Energy, Inc., power plant in Joppa, Illinois (see DOE 1999d); and the Honeywell International, Inc., uranium conversion plant in Metropolis, Illinois (NRC 1995).

One action that is considered in this analysis and that deserves special mention is the future development of a uranium enrichment facility at the Paducah site. In January 2004, USEC announced that it had selected Portsmouth as the site of its American Centrifuge Facility. However, this cumulative assessment assumes that the facility could be sited at Paducah and would use existing gas centrifuge technology; the assessment further assumes that the impacts of such a facility would be the same as those outlined in a 1977 analysis of environmental consequences for such an action (Energy Research and Development Administration [ERDA] 1977). (The facility proposed in 1977 was never completed.)

Together with the alternatives assessed in Sections 5.1 and 5.2 of this EIS, the cumulative analysis (data columns 4 through 6 of Table 5.3-1) includes the following:

- *No Action Alternative:* The cumulative impacts of no action include the impacts of UF<sub>6</sub> generation and management activities by USEC and DOE (management only) (DOE 1999a) and continued storage of cylinders under the no action alternative; waste management activities (DOE 1997); conversion of uranium ore into UF<sub>6</sub> at the Honeywell International, Inc., plant in Metropolis, Illinois (NRC 1995); electrical power generation at the TVA's Shawnee power plant and at the Joppa Electric Energy, Inc., power plant (DOE 1999d); and environmental restoration activities that have proceeded to a point that their consequences can be defined (DOE 2001b). Future actions could also include construction, operation, and D&D of a uranium enrichment facility at the Paducah site.
- *Proposed Action Alternatives:* The cumulative impacts of the proposed action alternatives include impacts related to the preferred alternative for waste management at the Paducah site (DOE 1997; see also DOE 2002b); continued enrichment of uranium and storage of DUF<sub>6</sub> by USEC and DOE (management, only) (DOE 1999a), conversion of DUF<sub>6</sub> without or with cylinders from ETTP (proposed action alternatives in this EIS); continued conversion of uranium ore into UF<sub>6</sub> at the Honeywell International, Inc., plant at Metropolis, Illinois (NRC 1995), electrical power generation at the TVA's Shawnee power plant and at the Joppa Electric Energy, Inc., power plant (DOE 1999d); and environmental restoration activities that have proceeded to a point that their consequences can be defined (DOE 2001b). Future actions

could also include construction, operation, and D&D of a uranium enrichment facility at the Paducah site.

### 5.3.3 Results

The results of the cumulative analysis are summarized in Table 5.3.1. The first two data columns of the table summarize the results of the assessment of impacts of alternatives presented in Sections 5.1 and 5.2 of this EIS. The second two data columns identify the anticipated cumulative impacts of the alternatives when added to other actions.

#### 5.3.3.1 Radiological Releases — Normal Operations

For the no action and the proposed action alternatives, impacts to human health and safety could result from radiological facility operations. As shown in Table 5.3-1, the cumulative collective radiological exposure to the off-site population would be well below the maximum DOE dose limit of 100 mrem/yr to the off-site MEI for both alternatives and below the limit of 25 mrem/yr specified in 40 CFR 190 for uranium fuel cycle facilities. Annual individual doses to involved workers at radiological facilities would be monitored to maintain exposure below the regulatory limits.

#### 5.3.3.2 Accidental Releases — Radiological and Chemical Materials

For the no action and the proposed action alternatives, doses and consequences of releases of radiological materials were considered for a range of accidents from likely (occurring an average of 1 or more times in 100 years) to extremely rare (occurring an average of less than once in a million years). Because of the low probability of two accidents happening at the same time, the consequences of these accidents are not considered to be cumulative. The probability of likely accidents occurring at the same time is very low, even for the most frequently expected accidents, because this risk is the product of their fractional probabilities (1 in 100 years multiplied by 1 in 100 years equals both occurring 1 in 10,000 years [ $0.01 \times 0.01 = 0.0001$ ]). In the unlikely event that two facility accidents from the “likely” category occurred at the same time, the consequences for the public would be low. The additive impacts would be for no chemical effects and for no LCFs.

#### 5.3.3.3 Transportation

The number of shipments of wastes with a radiological component and of empty cylinders, from the conversion facility and from the option of transportation of ETTP cylinders to the Paducah site, would involve about 4,000 truck shipments of intact heel cylinders to NTS and about 6,000 rail shipments of U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> and crushed heel cylinders to Envirocare. Since none of the other actions have shipped or would ship by rail, the annual dose to the MEI is determined by the dose from the proposed action alternatives. For truck transportation, other actions have a

larger dose than any DUF<sub>6</sub> management alternative, and annual cumulative dose to the MEI is determined by other actions. All cumulative doses are less than 0.1 mrem/yr.

#### **5.3.3.4 Chemical Exposure — Normal Operations**

Impacts associated with chemical exposure are expected to be very small under the no action alternative and the proposed action alternative considered in this EIS. As noted above, the calculation of cumulative impacts is not possible because of the absence of necessary measures (hazard indices) for other actions and the difficulty of aggregating these measures across the different chemicals used in different industries.

#### **5.3.3.5 Air Quality**

The Paducah site is currently located in an attainment region where criteria air pollutants do not exceed regulatory standards. During construction at the site for on-site conversion, continued storage, or cylinder preparation, total pollutant concentrations for SO<sub>2</sub>, NO<sub>2</sub>, and CO would be well below their applicable air quality standards. However, total concentrations of PM (PM<sub>10</sub> and PM<sub>2.5</sub>) are predicted to approach or exceed air quality standards during yard construction or during facility construction. These impacts would be temporary and could be minimized by using good engineering and construction practices and standard dust suppression methods. During the operational period, total annual average PM<sub>2.5</sub> concentrations would approach (99%) their applicable standards, primarily because of high background concentrations.

#### **5.3.3.6 Noise**

No cumulative noise impacts are expected because noise energy dissipates within short distances from the sources and because significant noise impacts are not expected in the vicinity of the conversion facility under all alternatives.

#### **5.3.3.7 Water and Soil**

Local impacts on surface water would not exceed the 20 µg/L of uranium used for comparison in discharges to Little Bayou Creek under low-flow conditions for the no action alternative. Impacts on water and soils would be localized and temporary, with adequate dilution occurring once the creek entered nearby larger waterways. Past impacts from the site included aquatic toxicity at KPDES Outfall 017 during cylinder painting/refurbishment. Under the no action alternative, care would be taken during cylinder painting to prevent a further toxicity effect. For the proposed action alternatives, no radioactive contamination would be released to surface water.

Data from the 2000 annual groundwater monitoring results showed that four pollutants exceeded primary drinking water standards in groundwater at the Paducah site: beta activity

(seven wells), chromium (all wells), nitrogen as nitrate (one well), and TCE (trichloroethene) (two wells) (DOE 2001b). The groundwater analysis indicates that current cylinder maintenance programs would control cylinder corrosion under the no action alternative, and that the maximum uranium concentration in groundwater (from cylinder breaches) would be 6 µg/L, considerably below the 20 µg/L guideline level used for comparison (EPA 1996). Direct contamination of groundwater could occur during the construction and operation of a conversion facility — for example, from the dissolution and infiltration of stockpiled chemicals into aquifers. However, good engineering and construction practices should ensure that indirect impacts associated with either a conversion or treatment facility would be minimal and would not change existing groundwater conditions.

Because impacts to soils during construction and operation would be local, there would be no cumulative soil impacts.

#### **5.3.3.8 Ecology**

Cumulative ecological impacts should be negligible to minor under any alternative considered in this EIS in conjunction with the effects of other activities. At all three alternative locations, construction of a conversion facility could remove trees that are of a type preferred by the Indiana bat; however, this federally endangered species is not known to utilize these areas. No impacts on individuals or populations of Indiana bat are expected.

#### **5.3.3.9 Land Use**

All DUF<sub>6</sub> activities under all alternatives would be confined to the Paducah site, which is already used for similar activities. No land use impacts are expected.

#### **5.3.3.10 Cultural Resources**

The probability of encountering significant archaeological resources would vary, depending on the proposed location. Further cultural resource surveys would be required. Consultation with the SHPO and Native Americans has been initiated. If significant cultural resources were encountered, adverse effects would need to be mitigated. If any structures at the Paducah GDP were determined to be historically significant and there was a potential for a short-term adverse effect from the deposit of particulate matter on building surfaces, these adverse effects would be mitigated. All additional survey and mitigation would be conducted in consultation with the Kentucky SHPO.

#### **5.3.3.11 Environmental Justice**

No environmental justice cumulative impacts are anticipated for the Paducah site despite the presence of disproportionately high percentages of minority and low-income populations in

the vicinity. This is because cumulative impacts in the vicinity of the Paducah site are not both high and adverse.

### 5.3.3.12 Socioeconomics

Socioeconomic impacts under any of the alternatives considered are anticipated to be generally positive, often temporary, and relatively small. Growth in population would not place demands on existing housing or public services that could not be met by existing capabilities. Cumulative socioeconomic impacts are expected to be similarly small and positive, although some would be more long-lived than others.

## 5.4 MITIGATION

In general, the impacts presented in this chapter are conservative estimates of impacts expected for each alternative. Factors such as flexibility in siting at and within the three alternative locations at Paducah and facility design and construction options could be used to reduce impacts from these conservative levels. This section identifies what impacts could be mitigated to reduce adverse impacts. On the basis of the analyses conducted for this EIS, the following recommendations can be made:

- Potential future impacts on site air and groundwater could be avoided by inspecting cylinders, carrying out cylinder maintenance activities (such as painting), and promptly cleaning up releases from any breached DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders. In addition, runoff from cylinder yards should be collected and sampled so that contaminants can be detected and their release to surface water or groundwater can be avoided. If future cylinder painting results in KPDES Permit violations, treating cylinder yard runoff prior to release may be required.
- Temporary impacts on air quality from fugitive dust emissions during reconstruction of cylinder yards or construction of any new facility should be controlled by the best available practices to avoid temporary exceedances of the PM<sub>10</sub> and PM<sub>2.5</sub> standard. Technologies that will be used to mitigate air quality impacts during construction include using water sprays on dirt roadways and on bare soils in work areas for dust control; covering open-bodied trucks transporting materials likely to become airborne when full and at all times when in motion; water spraying and covering bunkered or staged excavated and replacement soils; maintaining paved roadways in good repair and in a clean condition; using barriers and windbreaks around construction areas such as soil banks, temporary screening, and/or vegetative cover; mulching or covering exposed bare soil areas until vegetation has time to recover or paving has been installed; and prohibiting any open burning.

- During construction, impacts to water quality and soil can be minimized through implementing storm water management, sediment and erosion controls (e.g., temporary and permanent seeding; mulching and matting; sediment barriers, traps, and basins; silt fences; runoff and earth diversion dikes), and good construction practices (e.g., covering chemicals with tarps to prevent interaction with rain; promptly cleaning up any spills).
- Potential impacts to wetlands at the Paducah site could be minimized or eliminated by maintaining a buffer near adjacent wetlands during construction. Mitigation for unavoidable impacts may be developed in coordination with the appropriate regulatory agencies.
- If trees (either live or dead) with exfoliating bark are encountered on construction areas, they should be saved if possible to avoid destroying potential habitat for the Indiana bat. If necessary, the trees should be cut only before March 31 or after October 15, according to recommendations of the USFWS (Andrews 2004).
- The quantity of radioactive and hazardous materials stored on site, including the products of the conversion process, should be minimized.
- The construction of a DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion facility at Paducah would have the potential to impact cultural resources. Neither an archaeological nor an architectural survey has been completed for the Paducah site as a whole or for any of the alternative locations, although an archaeological sensitivity study has been conducted. In accordance with Section 106 of the NHPA, the adverse effects of this undertaking must be evaluated once a location is chosen.
- Testing should be conducted either prior to or during the conversion facility startup operations to determine if the air vented from the autoclaves should be monitored or if any alternative measures would need to be taken to ensure that worker exposures to PCBs above allowable OSHA limits do not occur.
- The nuclear properties of DUF<sub>6</sub> are such that the occurrence of a nuclear criticality is not a concern, regardless of the amount of DUF<sub>6</sub> present. However, criticality is a concern for the handling, packaging, and shipping of enriched UF<sub>6</sub>. For enriched UF<sub>6</sub>, criticality control is accomplished by employing, individually or collectively, specific limits on uranium-235 enrichment, mass, volume, geometry, moderation, and spacing for each type of cylinder. The amount of enriched UF<sub>6</sub> that may be contained in an individual cylinder and the total number of cylinders that may be transported together are determined by the nuclear properties of enriched UF<sub>6</sub>. Spacing of cylinders of enriched UF<sub>6</sub> in transit during routine and accident conditions is ensured by use of regulatory approval packages that provide protection against impact and fire.

- Because of the relatively high consequences estimated for some accidents, special attention will be given to the design and operational procedures for components that may be involved in such accidents. For example, the tanks holding hazardous chemicals, such as anhydrous NH<sub>3</sub> and aqueous HF, on site would be designed to meet all applicable codes and standards, and special procedures would be in place for gaining access to the tanks and for filling the tanks. In addition, although the probabilities of occurrence for a high-consequence accident are extremely low, emergency response plans and procedures would be in place to respond to any emergencies should an accident occur. Additional details are discussed below.

Although the probability of transportation accidents involving hazardous chemicals such as HF and NH<sub>3</sub> is very low, the consequences could be severe. For this EIS, the assessment of transportation accidents involving HF and NH<sub>3</sub> assumed conservative conditions. Currently, a number of industry practices are commonly employed to minimize the potential for large releases, as discussed below.

HF is usually shipped in 100-ton (91-t), 23,000-gal (87,000-L) shell, full, noncoiled, noninsulated tank cars. Most HF railcars today meet DOT Classification 112S500W, which represents the current state of the art. To minimize the potential for accidental releases, these railcars have head protection and employ shelf couplers, which help prevent punctures during an accident. The use of these improved tank cars has led to an improved safety record with respect to HF accidents over the last several years. In fact, the HF transportation accident rate has steadily decreased since 1985. Industry recommendations for the new tank car guideline appear in *Recommended Practices for the Hydrogen Fluoride Industry* (Hydrogen Fluoride Industry Practices Institute 1995b).

Accidents involving HF and NH<sub>3</sub> at a conversion facility could have potentially serious consequences. However, a wide variety of good engineering and mitigative practices are available that are related to siting, design, and accident mitigation for HF and NH<sub>3</sub> storage tanks, which might be present at a conversion facility. Many are summarized in the *Guideline for the Bulk Storage of Anhydrous Hydrogen Fluoride* (Hydrogen Fluoride Industry Practices Institute 1995a). There is an advanced set of accident prevention and mitigative measures that is recommended by industry for HF storage tanks, including storage tank siting principles (e.g., evaluating seismic, high wind, and drainage conditions), design recommendations, and tank appurtenances, as well as spill detection, containment, and mitigation. Measures to mitigate the consequences of an accident include HF detection systems, spill containment systems such as dikes, remote storage tank isolation valves, water spray systems, and rapid acid deinventory systems (that rapidly remove acid from a leaking vessel). Details on these mitigative strategies are also provided in the Hydrogen Fluoride Industry Practices Institute (1995a) guidelines.

## 5.5 UNAVOIDABLE ADVERSE IMPACTS

Unavoidable adverse impacts are those impacts that cannot be mitigated by choices associated with siting and facility design options. They are impacts that would be unavoidable, no matter which options were selected.

The cylinders currently in storage would require continued monitoring and maintenance under all alternatives. These activities would result in the exposure of workers in the vicinity of the cylinders to low levels of radiation. The radiation exposure of workers could be minimized, but some level of exposure would be unavoidable. The radiation doses to workers are estimated to be well within public health standards under all alternatives. Radiation exposures of workers would be monitored at each facility and would be kept ALARA. Cylinder monitoring and maintenance activities would also emit air pollutants, such as vehicle exhaust and dust (PM<sub>10</sub>), and produce small amounts of sanitary waste and LLW. Concentrations of air emissions during operations are estimated to be within applicable standards and guidelines, and waste generation would not appreciably affect waste management operations.

Under all alternatives, workers would have a potential for accidental on-the-job injuries and fatalities that would be unrelated to radiation or chemical exposures. These would be a consequence of unanticipated events in the work environment, typical of all workplaces. On the basis of statistics in similar industries, it is estimated that less than 1 fatality and on the order of several hundred injuries would occur under the alternatives, including the required transportation among sites associated with the alternatives. The chance of fatalities and injuries occurring would be minimized by conducting all work activities in as safe a manner as possible, in accordance with occupational health and safety rules and regulations. However, the chance of these types of impacts cannot be completely avoided.

Conversion would require the construction of a new facility at the Paducah site. Up to 45 acres (18 ha) of land could be disturbed during construction, with approximately 10 acres (4 ha) required for the facility footprint. Construction of the facility could result in losses of terrestrial and aquatic habitats. Dispersal of wildlife and temporary elimination of habitats would result from land clearing and construction activities involving movement of construction personnel and equipment. The construction of the facility could cause both short-term and long-term disturbances of some biological habitats. Although some destruction would be inevitable during and after construction, these losses could be minimized by careful site selection and construction practices.

## 5.6 IRREVERSIBLE AND IRRETRIEVABLE COMMITMENT OF RESOURCES

The major irreversible and irretrievable commitments of natural and man-made resources related to the alternatives analyzed in this EIS are discussed below. A commitment of a resource is considered *irreversible* when the primary or secondary impacts from its use limit the future options for its use. An *irretrievable* commitment refers to the use or consumption of a resource that is neither renewable nor recoverable for later use by future generations.

The decisions to be made in the ROD following the publication of this EIS would commit resources required for implementing the selected alternative. Three major resource categories would be committed irreversibly or irretrievably under the alternatives considered in this EIS: land, materials, and energy.

### **5.6.1 Land**

Land that is currently occupied by cylinder storage or selected for the conversion facility could ultimately be returned to open space if the yards, buildings, roads, and other structures were removed, the areas were cleaned up, and the land was revegetated. Future use of these tracts of land, although beyond the scope of this EIS, could include restoring them for unrestricted use. Therefore, the commitment of this land would not necessarily be irreversible. However, the land used to dispose of any conversion products or construction or D&D wastes would represent an irretrievable commitment, because wastes in belowground disposal areas could not be completely removed, the land could not be restored to its original condition, and the site could not feasibly be used for other purposes following the closure of the disposal facility. All disposal activities associated with the alternatives analyzed in this EIS would take place at DOE or commercial disposal facilities that would be permitted or licensed to accept such wastes.

### **5.6.2 Materials**

The irreversible and irretrievable commitment of material resources for the various EIS alternatives would include construction materials that could not be recovered or recycled, materials rendered radioactive that could not be decontaminated, and materials consumed or reduced to unrecoverable forms of waste. Materials related to construction could include wood, concrete, sand, gravel, steel, aluminum, and other metals (Table 5.6-1). At this time, no unusual construction material requirements have been identified. The construction resources, except for those that could be recovered and recycled with current technology, would be irretrievably lost. None of the identified construction resources is in short supply, and all should be readily available in the local region.

Strategic and critical materials (e.g., Monel and Inconel) would not be required in quantities that would seriously reduce the national or world supply. This material would be used throughout the facilities and would be used in the generation of HF in the conversion process. The autoclaves and conversion units (process reactors) are long-lead-time procurements with few qualified bidders. Many suppliers are available for the remainder of the equipment.

Estimated annual consumption rates of raw materials are provided in Table 5.6-2. Consumption of operating supplies (e.g., miscellaneous chemicals such as lime and potassium hydroxide, and gases such as nitrogen), although irretrievable, would not constitute a permanent drain on local sources or involve any material in critically short supply in the United States as a whole.

**TABLE 5.6-1 Materials/Resources Consumed during Conversion Facility Construction at the Paducah Site**

Materials/Resources	Total Consumption	Unit	Peak Demand	Unit
<b>Utilities</b>				
Water	4 × 10 <sup>6</sup>	gal	1,500	gal/h
Electricity	1,500	MWh	7.2	MWh/d
<b>Solids</b>				
Concrete	9,139	yd <sup>3</sup>	NA <sup>a</sup>	NA
Steel	511	tons	NA	NA
Inconel/Monel	33	tons	NA	NA
<b>Liquids</b>				
Fuel	73,000	gal	250	gal/d
<b>Gases</b>				
Industrial gases (propane)	15,000	gal	50	gal/d

<sup>a</sup> NA = not applicable.

**5.6.3 Energy**

The irretrievable commitment of energy resources during the operation of the various facilities considered under the alternatives would include the consumption of fossil fuels used to generate steam and heat and electricity for the facilities (Table 5.6-3). Energy would also be expended in the form of diesel fuel and gasoline for cylinder transport equipment and transportation vehicles. Consumption of these utilities, although irretrievable, would not constitute a permanent drain on local sources or involve any utility in critically short supply in the United States as a whole.

**TABLE 5.6-2 Materials Consumed Annually during Conversion Facility Operations at the Paducah Site<sup>a</sup>**

Chemical	Quantity (tons/yr)
<b>Solid</b>	
Lime (CaO) <sup>b</sup>	19
<b>Liquid</b>	
Ammonia (99.95% minimum NH <sub>3</sub> )	670
Potassium hydroxide (45% KOH)	8
<b>Gas</b>	
Nitrogen (N <sub>2</sub> )	10,000

<sup>a</sup> Material estimates are based on conceptual-design-status data (UDS 2003b). A number of studies are planned to evaluate design alternatives, the results of which may affect the above materials needs.

<sup>b</sup> Assuming lime is used only for potassium hydroxide regeneration. If HF neutralization is required, the annual lime requirement would be approximately 9,300 tons/yr (8,437 t/yr).

**TABLE 5.6-3 Utilities Consumed during Conversion Facility Operations at the Paducah Site<sup>a</sup>**

Utility	Annual Average Consumption	Unit	Peak Demand <sup>b</sup>	Unit
Electricity	37,269	MWh	7.1	MW
Liquid fuel	4,000	gal	NA <sup>c</sup>	NA
Natural gas <sup>d,e</sup>	$4.4 \times 10^7$	scf <sup>f</sup>	190	scfm <sup>f</sup>
Process water	$37 \times 10^6$	gal	215	gal/min
Potable water	$3 \times 10^6$	gal	350	gal/min

<sup>a</sup> Utility estimates are based on conceptual design status data (UDS 2003b). A number of studies are planned to evaluate design alternatives, the results of which may affect the above utility needs.

<sup>b</sup> Peak demand is the maximum rate expected during any hour.

<sup>c</sup> NA = not applicable.

<sup>d</sup> Standard cubic feet measured at 14.7 psia and 60°F (16°C).

<sup>e</sup> The current facility design (UDS 2003b) uses electrical heating. An option of using natural gas is being evaluated.

<sup>f</sup> scf = standard cubic feet; scfm = standard cubic feet per minute.

## 5.7 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SHORT-TERM USE OF THE ENVIRONMENT AND LONG-TERM PRODUCTIVITY

For this EIS, *short term* is considered the period of construction activities for the alternatives analyzed — the time when most short-term (or temporary) environmental impacts would occur. Disposal of solid nonhazardous waste resulting from new facility construction, operations, and D&D would require additional land at a sanitary landfill site, which would be unavailable for other uses in the long term. Any radioactive or hazardous waste generated by the various alternatives would involve the commitment of associated land, transportation, and disposal resources, and resources associated with the processing facilities for waste management.

For the construction and operation of the conversion facility, the associated construction activities would result in both short- and long-term losses of terrestrial and aquatic habitats from natural productivity. Dispersal of wildlife and temporary elimination of habitats would result from land clearing and construction activities involving movement and staging of construction personnel and equipment. The building of new facilities could cause long-term disturbances of some biological habitats, potentially causing long-term reductions in the biological activity of an area. Although some habitat loss would be inevitable during and after construction, these losses would be minimized by careful site selection and by thorough environmental reviews of specific proposals. Short-term impacts would be reduced and mitigated as necessary. After closure of the new facilities, they would be decommissioned and could be reused, recycled, or remediated.

## 5.8 POLLUTION PREVENTION AND WASTE MINIMIZATION

Implementation of the EIS alternatives would be conducted in accordance with all applicable pollution prevention and waste minimization guidelines. Pollution prevention is designed to reduce risk to public health, safety, welfare, and the environment through source reduction techniques and environmentally acceptable recycling processes. The Pollution Prevention Act of 1990 (42 USC 11001–11050) established a national policy that pollution should be prevented or reduced at the source, whenever feasible. The act indicates that when pollution cannot be prevented, polluted products should be recycled in an environmentally safe manner. Disposal or other releases into the environment should be employed only as a last resort. Executive Order 12856, *Federal Compliance with Right-to-Know Laws and Pollution Prevention Requirements* (U.S. President 1993), and DOE Order 5400.1, *General Environmental Protection Program* (DOE 1988), implement the provisions of the Pollution Prevention Act of 1990. Pollution prevention measures could include source reduction, recycling, treatment, and disposal. The emphasis would be on source reduction and recycling to prevent the creation of wastes (i.e., waste minimization).

Waste minimization is the reduction, to the extent feasible, of the generation of radioactive and hazardous waste. Source reduction and waste minimization techniques include good operating practices, technology modifications, changes in input material, and product changes. An example of waste minimization would be to substitute nonhazardous materials, when possible, for materials that contribute to the generation of hazardous or mixed waste.

A consideration of opportunities for reducing waste generation at the source, as well as for recycling and reusing material, will be incorporated to the extent possible into the engineering and design process for the conversion facility. Pollution prevention and waste minimization will be major factors in determining the final design of any facility to be constructed. Specific pollution prevention and waste minimization measures will be considered in designing and operating the final conversion facility.

## 5.9 DECONTAMINATION AND DECOMMISSIONING OF THE CONVERSION FACILITY

When operations at the conversion facility are complete, D&D would be performed to protect both public health and safety and the environment from accidental releases of any remaining radioactivity and hazardous materials. The conversion facility is being designed to facilitate D&D activities. This analysis assumes that the D&D activity would provide for the disassembly and removal of all radioactive and hazardous components, equipment, and structures associated with the conversion facilities. The objective assumed in this EIS would be to completely dismantle the various buildings and achieve “greenfield” (unrestricted use) conditions. The design requirements for the D&D of these facilities can be found in two DOE Directives from 1999: DOE Guide 430.1-3, *Deactivation Implementation Guide*, and DOE Guide 430.1-4, *Decommissioning Implementation Guide* (DOE 1999e,f).

Because the D&D of the proposed facility is not expected to occur for at least 25 years, it is likely that an additional environmental review would need to be performed before it occurred. It is also expected that such a review would be based on the actual condition of the facilities and a more definite identification of the resulting waste materials.

### 5.9.1 Human Health and Safety — Off-Site Public

It is expected that D&D of the DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion facility would result in low radiation doses to members of the public and would be accomplished with no significant adverse environmental impacts.

DOE has established a primary dose limit for any member of the public of 0.1 rem (1 mSv) total effective dose equivalent (TEDE) per year for protection of public health and safety. Compliance with the limit is based not just on an individual DOE source or practice but on the sum of internal and external doses resulting from all modes of exposure to all radiation sources other than background and medical sources (DOE 1993). However, it could be very difficult to determine doses from all radiation sources for the purpose of demonstrating compliance. Therefore, DOE elements are instructed to apply a public dose constraint of 0.025 rem (0.25 mSv) of TEDE per year to each DOE source or practice (DOE 2002g). Also, DOE elements are required to implement a process to ensure, on a case-specific basis, that public radiation exposures will be ALARA below the dose constraint (DOE 1993).

To be consistent with DOE's general approach to protecting the public from radiation exposure explained above, the release of radioactive material from D&D activities at a DOE-controlled site, such as a DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion or cylinder treatment facility, would be limited to an amount determined on a case-specific basis through the ALARA process to be ALARA but, in any event, less than 0.025 rem/yr (0.25 mSv/yr). This would ensure that doses to the public from DOE real property releases following D&D are consistent with NRC requirements for commercial nuclear facilities, as stated in 10 CFR 20, Subpart E, "Radiological Criteria for License Termination."

In its final generic EIS for decommissioning of NRC-licensed nuclear facilities (NRC 1994), the NRC concluded that at any site where the 0.025-rem/yr (0.25-mSv/yr) dose criterion established in 10 CFR 20, Subpart E is met, the likelihood that individuals who use the site would be exposed to multiple sources with cumulative doses approaching 0.1 rem/yr (1 mSv/yr) would be very low. Accordingly, the likelihood would also be very low that a member of the public would be exposed in excess of the DOE primary dose limit after D&D of the DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion and cylinder treatment facilities to meet site-specific limits that are ALARA below the dose constraint of 0.025 mrem/yr (0.25 mSv/yr).

The total public dose from D&D of the DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion facility is estimated to range from 4 to 5 person-rem. This estimate was scaled from data on public exposure doses found in NRC (1988) to account for the capacity of the conversion facility and the effort required for its D&D. Because of the low specific activity of uranium, the estimate is very small and primarily would result from the transportation of D&D wastes for ultimate disposition (NRC 1988).

Radiation doses to the public resulting from accidents during D&D activities would be low enough to be considered insignificant (NRC 1988).

**5.9.2 Human Health and Safety — On-Site Workforce**

Radiological impacts to involved workers during D&D of the conversion facility would result primarily from external radiation due to the handling of depleted uranium materials. Because of the low radiation exposures from depleted uranium, one of the initial D&D activities would be removal of any residual uranium from the process equipment, significantly reducing radiation exposure to the involved workforce.

Radiation exposure estimates for the involved workforce during D&D activities involving nuclear facilities licensed by the NRC are provided in NRC (1988) and NRC (1994). These nuclear facilities include UF<sub>6</sub> production plants and uranium fuel fabrication plants that are similar to the conversion facilities considered in this EIS. Average radiation dose rates in the conversion facility during the initial cleaning are expected to be much less than 2 mrem/h, which is the radiation dose rate from bulk quantities of uranium (NRC 1988).

Table 5.9-1 lists the estimated LCFs of the involved workforce during decontamination and cleanup activities at the facility as a function of the residual dose rate (NRC 1994). The radiological impacts in Table 5.9-1 were estimated on the basis of the dose rates to which the workers are subjected and the collective effort required to reduce the residual contamination levels.

One of the most critical parameters in developing the decommissioning plan would be the release criterion applicable for the project. Subpart E of 10 CFR Part 20 addresses release criteria for NRC licensees, while DOE Order 5400.5 (DOE 1990) governs the development of authorized release limits for DOE facilities. On the basis of a residual dose rate of 25 mrem/yr, the estimated LCFs of the involved workforce would be much lower than unity (i.e., no radiation-related fatalities), since the radiation dose to involved workers would be a small fraction of the exposure experienced over the operating lifetime of the facility and well within the occupational exposure limits imposed

**TABLE 5.9-1 Estimated Latent Cancer Fatalities from Radiation Exposure Resulting from Conversion Facility D&D Activities at the Paducah Site<sup>a</sup>**

Residual Dose Rate (mrem/yr)	Low <sup>b</sup>	High <sup>c</sup>
100	$2.12 \times 10^{-3}$	$3.61 \times 10^{-3}$
60	$2.12 \times 10^{-3}$	$3.63 \times 10^{-3}$
30	$2.12 \times 10^{-3}$	$3.65 \times 10^{-3}$
15	$2.14 \times 10^{-3}$	$3.66 \times 10^{-3}$
10	$2.16 \times 10^{-3}$	$3.67 \times 10^{-3}$
3	$2.18 \times 10^{-3}$	$3.68 \times 10^{-3}$
1	$2.19 \times 10^{-3}$	$3.69 \times 10^{-3}$
0.3	$2.19 \times 10^{-3}$	$3.70 \times 10^{-3}$
0.1	$2.20 \times 10^{-3}$	$3.71 \times 10^{-3}$
0.03	$2.20 \times 10^{-3}$	$3.72 \times 10^{-3}$

<sup>a</sup> Values in this table are unscaled values taken directly from NRC (1994).  
<sup>b</sup> Based on the D&D of a uranium fuel fabrication plant that converts enriched UF<sub>6</sub> into UO<sub>2</sub> for production of light-water reactor fuel (DOE 1999g).  
<sup>c</sup> Based on the D&D of a UF<sub>6</sub> production plant where yellowcake is converted to UF<sub>6</sub>.

by regulatory requirements. Radiation exposure of the involved D&D workers would be monitored by a dosimetry program and maintained below regulatory limits.

The risk of on-the-job fatalities and injuries to conversion facility D&D workers was calculated by using industry-specific statistics from the BLS, as reported by the National Safety Council (2002). Annual fatality and injury rates from the BLS construction industry division were used for the D&D phase. On the basis of D&D cost information provided in Elayat et al. (1997), it is assumed that the D&D workforce would be approximately 10% of the construction workforce. On the basis of these assumptions and information provided in UDS (2003b), the estimated incidences of fatalities and injuries for the D&D of the conversion facilities are 0.01 and 5, respectively.

### **5.9.3 Air Quality**

Before structural dismantlement, all contaminated surfaces would be cleaned manually. Best construction management practices, such as dust control measures, would be used to protect air quality and to mitigate any airborne releases during the D&D process. As discussed in Section 5.9.1, it is anticipated that the D&D activities would not produce any significant radiological emissions that would affect the off-site public.

D&D can be considered to be the reverse of the construction of buildings and structures. Available information (Elayat et al. 1997) indicates that the level of construction-related activities during D&D would be an order of magnitude lower than during conversion facility construction. Air quality during D&D activities would thus be bounded by the results presented in Sections 5.2.1.3 and 5.2.2.3 for construction activities, if it is assumed that the existing emission control systems were efficiently maintained.

### **5.9.4 Socioeconomics**

The potential consequences from D&D of the conversion facilities would be lower than those discussed in Section 5.2.1.5 for conversion facility construction, because the total D&D workforce would be smaller for facility D&D than for facility construction.

To decommission the conversion facility, many of the same people who operated the facility could do the cleaning; however, the dismantling and moving of equipment would have to be performed by electricians, plumbers, mechanics, and equipment operators, most of whom would be hired or contracted (NRC 1988) specifically for this purpose.

### **5.9.5 Waste Management**

The major challenge of the D&D activity would be to remove and dispose of radioactive and hazardous wastes while keeping occupational and other exposures ALARA. Section 3.7 of DOE Guide 420.1-1 (DOE 2000c) requires facilities where radioactive or other hazardous

contaminating materials will be used to be designed so as to simplify periodic decontamination and ultimate decommissioning. For example, if necessary, all cracks, crevices, and joints would have to be caulked or sealed and finished smooth to prevent the accumulation of contaminated material in inaccessible areas. These design features should minimize the generation of radioactive and/or hazardous materials during D&D activities.

There are three major classes of D&D waste, based on the composition and radioactivity of the materials involved: LLW, mixed LLW, and hazardous waste. It is assumed that TRU waste would not be present (any TRU waste generated during facility operations would be removed prior to D&D activities). A fourth class is “clean” material; this is any material resulting from D&D activities, including metal, which can be safely reused or recycled without any further radiological or hazardous controls. If no further need is established for these clean materials, they can be disposed of at sanitary landfills without requiring any further radiological or hazardous controls.

D&D-related waste can also be categorized into two general groups: contaminated materials and other wastes. Contaminated materials are standard materials such as steel and concrete that contain or have embedded trace amounts of radioactivity. In general, contamination is caused by the settling or adherence of uranium and its progeny products on internal surfaces such as piping. The average concentrations of the radionuclides contaminating the conversion facility are expected to be generally low enough to rank these materials as Class-A LLW.

Other wastes, the second general group of D&D-related wastes, are composed of materials that can become radioactively contaminated when plant workers use them. They include gloves, rags, tools, plastic sheeting, and chemical decontaminants. These wastes are also expected to have an average radioactivity low enough to be ranked as Class-A LLW. This analysis assumes that the quantities of other wastes would be much lower than those generated during facility deconstruction.

It is assumed that the soil within the conversion facility perimeters would not be contaminated with radiological or hazardous materials as a result of normal facility operations and therefore would not require excavation and subsequent treatment and disposition. If soil was contaminated due to an accidental release, it would be cleaned up as quickly as possible after the release occurred and would not be part of the D&D wastes.

The methodology outlined in Forward et al. (1994) was used to estimate the volumes and types of wastes that would be generated from the D&D of the conversion facility. Because contaminant inventories for these facilities are unavailable, reference data on the contaminant inventory data compiled by the NRC were applied. Facilities are categorized in Forward et al. (1994) into different types on the basis of their function, structure, design, and degree of D&D difficulty. This analysis assumes that the conversion facilities could be considered to be “radioactively contaminated buildings” with a “low” degree of D&D difficulty.

On the basis of the above assumptions and information provided in UDS (2003a), the annual and total waste generation rates from the D&D of the conversion facility were estimated

and are provided in Table 5.9-2. Of the total materials generated during the D&D of the conversion facility, both LLMW and hazardous wastes would make up 2% to 3% of the total, and LLW would constitute about 6% to 7%. The majority of the D&D materials (approximately 88% of the total) would be “clean.”

The “clean” waste would be sent to a landfill that accepts construction debris. LLW would be sent to a licensed disposal facility where it would likely be buried in accordance with the waste acceptance criteria and other requirements in effect at that time. Hazardous and mixed waste would be disposed of in a licensed facility in accordance with applicable regulatory requirements.

**TABLE 5.9-2 Annual and Total Waste Volume Estimates from Conversion Facility D&D Activities at the Paducah Site**

Waste Type	Annual D&D Waste (m <sup>3</sup> /yr) <sup>a</sup>	Total D&D Waste (m <sup>3</sup> )
LLMW	40	110
Hazardous waste	40	110
LLW	70	200
Clean	1,200	4,000

<sup>a</sup> Annual rates based on 3-year D&D.

## 6 ENVIRONMENTAL AND OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH PERMITS AND COMPLIANCE REQUIREMENTS

### 6.1 DUF<sub>6</sub> CYLINDER MANAGEMENT AND CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION OF A DUF<sub>6</sub> CONVERSION FACILITY

DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinder management as well as construction and operation of the proposed DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion facility would be subject to many federal, state, and local requirements. In accordance with such legal requirements, a variety of permits, licenses, and other consents must be obtained. Table 6.1 at the end of this chapter lists those that may be needed. The status of each is indicated on the basis of currently available information. However, because the DUF<sub>6</sub> project is still at an early stage, the information in Table 6.1 should not be considered comprehensive or binding. UDS may determine that additional consents not listed in Table 6.1 apply, or that the DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinder management and/or the conversion facility qualify for exemptions or exclusions from some listed consents.

### 6.2 TRANSPORTATION OF UF<sub>6</sub>

Transportation of UF<sub>6</sub> (depleted, natural, or slightly enriched) is governed by the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act (HMTA), as amended by the Hazardous Materials Transportation Uniform Safety Act of 1990 and other acts (49 USC 5101 et seq.). This law is implemented by the DOT through its hazardous materials regulations (HMRs) (i.e., 49 CFR Parts 171 through 180). Since UF<sub>6</sub> presents hazards because of both its radioactivity and corrosivity, the DOT HMRs impose specific packaging requirements on UF<sub>6</sub> shipments in addition to the otherwise applicable radioactive material transportation requirements. The specific packaging requirements for shipments of UF<sub>6</sub> appear in 49 CFR 173.420 and are summarized below.

- Other than Model 30A cylinders and certain cylinders manufactured before June 30, 1987, DUF<sub>6</sub> packaging must be designed, fabricated, inspected, tested, and marked in accordance with the version of ANSI Standard N14.1, *Uranium Hexafluoride — Packaging for Transport*, that was in effect at the time the packaging was manufactured.
- Each UF<sub>6</sub> packaging must be designed so that it will withstand a hydraulic test at an internal pressure of at least 1.4 megapascals (MPa) (200 lb/in.<sup>2</sup>) without leakage.
- Each UF<sub>6</sub> packaging must be designed so that it will withstand a free drop test without loss or dispersal of UF<sub>6</sub>. The specimen must drop onto a flat, horizontal surface of such a character that any increase in its resistance to displacement or deformation upon impact by the specimen would not significantly increase the damage to the specimen. The drop must occur so that the specimen will suffer maximum damage in respect to the safety

features to be tested. Mandatory drop heights, which must be measured from the lowest point of the specimen to the upper surface of the target, vary depending on the packaging mass from 1 ft (0.3 m) if the packaging mass exceeds 33,000 lb (15,000 kg) to 4 ft (1.2 m) if the packaging mass is less than 11,000 lb (5,000 kg).

- Each UF<sub>6</sub> packaging must be designed so that it will withstand, without rupture of the containment system, a thermal test as follows: Exposure for a period of 30 minutes to a thermal environment that provides a heat flux at least equivalent to that of a hydrocarbon fuel/air fire in sufficiently quiescent ambient conditions to give a minimum average flame emissivity coefficient of 0.9 and an average temperature of at least 800 degrees C (1,475 degrees F), fully engulfing the specimen, with a surface absorptivity coefficient that is the greater of 0.8 or the value the package may be expected to possess if exposed to the fire specified and a convective coefficient that must be the value that the package may be demonstrated to have if exposed to the fire specified.
- The UF<sub>6</sub> must be in solid form.
- The volume of solid DUF<sub>6</sub> must not exceed 62% of the certified capacity of the package at 20°C (68°F). For natural and slightly enriched UF<sub>6</sub>, this requirement is 61%.
- The pressure in the package at 20°C (68°F) must be less than 101.3 kPa (14.8 lb/psia).
- Before initial filling and during periodic inspection and tests, UF<sub>6</sub> packaging must be cleaned in accordance with ANSI N14.1.
- UF<sub>6</sub> packaging must be periodically inspected, tested, marked, and otherwise conform to ANSI N14.1.
- Each repair to UF<sub>6</sub> packaging must be performed in accordance with ANSI N14.1.

If, at the time transportation occurs, the DUF<sub>6</sub> is being stored in a cylinder for which compliance with the then-applicable transportation requirements in 49 CFR 173.420 cannot be verified, UDS may implement one of the following options before shipping the DUF<sub>6</sub>:

- Obtain an exception, pursuant to 49 CFR 173.3(b), to allow the cylinder to be transported either “as is” or following repairs, or
- Transfer the DUF<sub>6</sub> from its noncompliant cylinder into a compliant cylinder.
- Ship the noncompliant cylinder in a compliant overpack.

A detailed discussion of regulatory considerations associated with transporting UF<sub>6</sub> is presented in Biwer et al. (2001).

### **6.3 WORKER SAFETY AND HEALTH**

The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (P.L. 91-596) gives OSHA the authority to prescribe and enforce standards and regulations affecting the occupational safety and health of private-sector employees. However, at facilities where another federal agency has exercised its statutory authority to prescribe or enforce occupational safety and health standards, Section 4(b)(1) of the act waives OSHA's jurisdiction. Relying on this section of the act, in 1974, OSHA explicitly recognized the authority of the AEC to establish and enforce occupational safety and health standards at AEC-sponsored, contractor-operated facilities covered by the AEA. Since then, the AEC and its successor agencies, including DOE, have regulated worker health and safety at most of their own facilities. This approach will be used to regulate worker safety at DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinder management and conversion facilities.

DOE exercises its authority over working conditions at its facilities through an extensive program of internal oversight and a system of DOE regulations and directives that require DOE contractors to comply with relevant worker protection standards and regulations (e.g., 29 CFR Part 1910, *Occupational Safety and Health Standards*, and 29 CFR Part 1926, *Safety and Health Regulations for Construction*) and impose additional radiation and chemical exposure standards developed by DOE (DOE Order 440.1A). DOE enforces its regulations, which have the power of law, by levying fines or by referring the offending contractor to the Department of Justice for other punishment. Most of DOE's worker radiation protection regulations are located in 10 CFR Part 835, *Occupational Radiation Protection*. Pertinent DOE directives are listed in site-specific contract provisions and are enforced by invoking contractual remedies such as contract cancellation. Accordingly, UDS is required by its contract to comply with applicable health, safety, and environmental laws, orders, regulations, and national consensus standards and to develop and execute a radiation protection plan and an integrated safety management plan (DOE 2000d).

**TABLE 6.1 Potentially Applicable Consents for the Construction and Operation of a DUF<sub>6</sub> Conversion Facility**

License, Permit, or Other Consent	Responsible Agency	Authority	Relevance and Status
<b>Air Quality Protection</b>			
<p><b>Title V Operating Permit:</b> Required for sources that are not exempt and are major sources, affected sources subject to the Acid Rain Program, sources subject to new source performance standards (NSPS), or sources subject to National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAPs).</p>	<p>Kentucky Department of Environmental Protection (KDEP); U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)</p>	<p>Clean Air Act (CAA), Title V, Sections 501–507 (<i>U.S. Code</i>, Title 42, Sections 7661–7661f [42 USC 7661–7661f]); 401 <i>Kentucky Administrative Regulation</i> (KAR) 52:020</p>	<p>Uranium Disposition Services, LLC (UDS), has determined that the DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion facility is not an affected source subject to the Acid Rain Program and is not a source subject to NSPS. However, UDS has not yet confirmed whether the DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion facility would be a major source of hazardous air pollutants (HAPs). Also, the facility is subject to <i>Code of Federal Regulations</i>, Title 40, Part 61, Subpart H (40 CFR Part 61, Subpart H), “National Emission Standards for Emissions of Radionuclides Other Than Radon from Department of Energy Facilities” (NESHAPs), although emissions are expected to result in an effective dose equivalent to the maximally exposed individual (MEI) of well below the standard (i.e., 10 mrem/yr). Accordingly, UDS is seeking official verification from the KDEP as to whether a Title V Operating Permit is needed. KDEP representatives have verbally stated that no Title V Operating Permit will be required.</p>
<p><b>Kentucky Federally Enforceable State Origin Permit for Air Quality (FE SOP):</b> Required for sources that accept permit conditions that are legally and practically enforceable to limit their potential to emit (PTE) to below the major source thresholds that would make them subject to the requirement to obtain a Title V Operating Permit.</p>	<p>KDEP</p>	<p><i>Kentucky Revised Statute</i> (KRS) 224.10–100 and 224.20–100; 401 KAR 52.030; 401 KAR 52:040</p>	<p>Assuming that a Title V Operating Permit will not be required, UDS expects that the DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion facility will be required to obtain either a Kentucky FE SOP or a Kentucky SOP for Air Quality. UDS is seeking verification from the KDEP concerning which of these permits is needed and has plans to submit a timely application for the appropriate permit.</p>
<p>— OR —</p>			
<p><b>Kentucky State Origin Permit for Air Quality (SOP):</b> Required for (1) sources that emit or have the PTE (a) more than 25 tons (28 t)/yr and less than 100 tons (110 t)/yr of a nonhazardous regulated air pollutant and (b) less than 10 tons (28 t)/yr of a HAP and less than 25 tons (110 t)/yr of combined HAPS; or (2) certain minor source incinerators, unless the source is exempt. Among others, a source required to obtain a Title V Operating Permit or a Federally Enforceable Permit for a Non-Major Source is exempt.</p>			

**TABLE 6.1 (Cont.)**

License, Permit, or Other Consent	Responsible Agency	Authority	Relevance and Status
<i>Air Quality Protection (Cont.)</i>			
<b>Risk Management Plan (RMP):</b> Required for any stationary source that has a regulated substance (e.g., hydrogen fluoride, anhydrous ammonia, ammonia, nitric acid) in any process (including storage) in a quantity that is over the threshold level.	EPA; KDEP	CAA, Title 1, Section 112(r)(7) (42 USC 7412); 40 CFR Part 68; 401 KAR, Chapter 68	UDS has determined that certain regulated substances would be stored at the DUF <sub>6</sub> conversion facility in quantities that could potentially exceed the threshold levels. Accordingly, an RMP may be required. UDS will verify this with the KDEP and, if necessary, prepare an RMP.
<b>CAA Conformity Determination:</b> Required for each criteria pollutant (i.e., sulfur dioxide, particulate matter, carbon monoxide, ozone, nitrogen dioxide, and lead) where the total of direct and indirect emissions in a nonattainment or maintenance area caused by a federal action would equal or exceed threshold rates.	DOE; KDEP; Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation (TDEC)	CAA, Title 1, Section 176(c) (42 USC 7506); 40 CFR 93; 401 KAR 50:065; TDEC Regulations 1200-3-34-.02	McCracken County, Kentucky, and Roane County, Tennessee, have both been designated as “Cannot be Classified or Better Than Standard” for all criteria pollutants. Because these counties are in attainment with National Ambient Air Quality Standards for all criteria pollutants and contain no maintenance areas, no CAA conformity determination is required for any criteria pollutant that would be emitted as a result of the proposed federal action.
<i>Water Resources Protection</i>			
<b>Kentucky Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (KPDES) Permit – Construction Site Storm Water:</b> Required before making point source discharges into waters of the state of storm water from a construction project that disturbs more than 5 acres (2 ha) of land.	KDEP	Clean Water Act (CWA) (33 USC 1251 et seq.); 40 CFR Part 122; 401 KAR 5:055 and 5:060	UDS has determined that a KPDES Permit for construction site storm water would be required. However, storm water from the DUF <sub>6</sub> conversion facility construction area could be managed such that discharge would occur through an existing outfall covered by KPDES Permit No. 0004049, which was issued to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) for surface water discharges from the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant (GDP). Accordingly, UDS plans to coordinate with DOE and the KDEP to determine whether a separate KPDES Permit is needed for storm water discharges from the DUF <sub>6</sub> conversion facility construction site. If a separate permit is needed, UDS will, at the appropriate time, either submit a Notice of Intent (NOI) to discharge under the General KPDES Permit No. KYR10 for storm water discharges from construction activities or submit an application for an individual KPDES Permit to the KDEP.

**TABLE 6.1 (Cont.)**

License, Permit, or Other Consent	Responsible Agency	Authority	Relevance and Status
<i>Water Resources Protection (Cont.)</i>			
<p><b>Kentucky Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (KPDES) Permit – Industrial Facility Storm Water:</b>                      Required before making point source discharges into waters of the state of storm water from an industrial site.</p>	KDEP	CWA (33 USC 1251 et seq.); 40 CFR Part 122; 401 KAR 5:055 and 5:060	UDS has determined that storm water would be discharged from the DUF <sub>6</sub> conversion facility site during operations. Therefore, a KPDES Permit for Industrial Facility Storm Water discharge may be required, unless arrangements can be made to discharge such storm water through an existing outfall covered by KPDES Permit No. 0004049, already held by DOE for the Paducah GDP. UDS plans to consult with DOE and the KDEP concerning discharges of storm water during operations through an existing outfall. If this cannot be arranged and a separate KPDES Permit is needed, UDS will, at the appropriate time, submit an application for an individual KPDES Permit to the KDEP.
<p><b>Kentucky Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (KPDES) Permit – Process Water Discharge:</b>                      Required before making point source discharges into waters of the state of industrial process wastewater.</p>	KDEP	CWA (33 USC 1251 et seq.); 40 CFR Part 122; 401 KAR 5:055 and 5:060	UDS is studying options for management of process water/blowdown discharges. The need for a KPDES permit for such discharges will be determined based on the outcome of the study. If it is determined that a KPDES permit is required, UDS will apply for the permit at the appropriate time.
<p><b>Construction Permit for Sewer Line Extension:</b>                      Required before beginning construction of sewer line extensions, pump stations, and force mains, or before modification of existing facilities.</p>	KDEP	401 KAR 5:0005	UDS has determined that a Construction Permit for Sewer Line Extension would be required before beginning construction of sewer lines and pump stations at the DUF <sub>6</sub> conversion facility site. Accordingly, UDS plans to submit an application to the KDEP at the appropriate time.
<p><b>Approval of Plans and Specifications for Water Line Extension:</b> Required before altering any existing facilities in a public or semipublic water system.</p>	KDEP	401 KAR 8:100	UDS will submit the information required to obtain approval for a water line extension at the appropriate time.

**TABLE 6.1 (Cont.)**

License, Permit, or Other Consent	Responsible Agency	Authority	Relevance and Status
<b>Water Resources Protection (Cont.)</b>			
<b>CWA Section 404 (Dredge and Fill) Permit:</b> Required to place dredged or fill material into waters of the United States, including areas designated as wetlands, unless such placement is exempt or authorized by a nationwide permit or a regional permit; a notice must be filed if a nationwide or regional permit applies.	U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE)	CWA (33 USC 1251 et seq.); 33 CFR Parts 323 and 330	UDS believes that construction of the DUF <sub>6</sub> conversion facility would not result in dredging or placement of fill material into wetlands within the jurisdiction of the USACE. However, construction of a rail crossing at Big Bayou Creek may require a Section 404 Permit. Accordingly, UDS plans to consult with the USACE concerning the project and, if appropriate, submit either a preconstruction notification about activities covered by a nationwide permit or an application for an individual Section 404 Permit.
<b>Floodplain Construction Permit:</b> Required prior to beginning construction of an obstruction across or along any stream or in the floodway of any stream.	KDEP	401 KAR 4:020 and 4:060	Construction of a rail crossing at Big Bayou Creek may require a Floodplain Construction Permit. UDS plans to consult with the KDEP to verify the need for this permit and will submit an application, as appropriate.
<b>Groundwater Protection Plan:</b> Required for conducting specified activities that may result in the pollution of groundwater.	KDEP	401 KAR 5:037	Certain activities at the DUF <sub>6</sub> conversion facility, such as storage of wastes in tanks and/or drums and storage of bulk quantities of potential pollutants in tanks, may require development of a Groundwater Protection Plan. UDS will consult with the KDEP to verify the need for such a plan and will develop the plan, if required.
<b>Spill Prevention Control and Countermeasures (SPCC) Plan:</b> Required for any facility that could discharge oil in harmful quantities into navigable waters or onto adjoining shorelines.	EPA	CWA (33 USC 1251 et seq.); 40 CFR Part 112	If it is determined that a SPCC plan would be required, UDS will submit the plan to the EPA and KDEP at the appropriate time.
<b>CWA Section 401 Water Quality Certification:</b> Required to be submitted to the agency responsible for issuing any federal license or permit to conduct an activity that may result in a discharge of pollutants into waters of a state.	KDEP	CWA, Section 401 (33 USC 1341); KRS 224.70	UDS would be required to obtain a CWA Section 401 Water Quality Certification if construction or operation associated with the DUF <sub>6</sub> conversion facility, such as construction of a rail spur, requires a federal license or permit. If it is determined that a federal license or permit is required (e.g., a CWA Section 404 Permit), UDS will request a CWA Section 401 Water Quality Certification from the KDEP at the appropriate time.

**TABLE 6.1 (Cont.)**

License, Permit, or Other Consent	Responsible Agency	Authority	Relevance and Status
<b>Waste Management and Pollution Prevention</b>			
<b>Registration and Hazardous Waste Generator Identification Number:</b> Required before a person who generates over 220 lb (100 kg) per calendar month of hazardous waste ships the hazardous waste off site.	EPA; KDEP	Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), as amended (42 USC 6901 et seq.), Subtitle C; 401 KAR 32:010	At the appropriate time, UDS plans to apply to the KDEP for an EPA Hazardous Waste Generator Identification Number.
<b>Hazardous Waste Treatment, Storage, or Disposal Facility Permit:</b> Required if hazardous or mixed waste will undergo nonexempt treatment by the generator, be stored on site by the generator of 2,205 lb (1,000 kg) or more of hazardous waste per month for longer than 90 days, be stored on site by the generator of between 220 and 2,205 lb (100 and 1,000 kg) of hazardous waste per month for longer than 180 days, be disposed of on site, or be received from off site for treatment or disposal.	EPA; KDEP	RCRA, as amended (42 USC 6901 et seq.), Subtitle C; 401 KAR 38:010, Section 4	Hazardous waste would not be disposed of on site at the DUF <sub>6</sub> conversion facility, nor would nonexempt treatment be conducted. Also, UDS does not plan to store any hazardous wastes that are generated on site for more than 90 days. Accordingly, UDS believes that no Hazardous Waste Treatment, Storage, or Disposal Facility Permit would be required. UDS plans to verify this determination with the KDEP.
<b>Solid Waste Site or Facility Permit:</b> Required to establish, construct, operate, and maintain a solid waste site or facility in Kentucky.	KDEP	401 KAR 47:080 and 47:100	Solid waste would not be disposed of on site at the DUF <sub>6</sub> conversion facility. Therefore, no Solid Waste Site or Facility Permit would be required.
<b>Notification for Underground Storage Tank (UST) System:</b> Required within 30 days of bringing a new UST system into service.	EPA; KDEP	RCRA, as amended, Subtitle I (42 USC 6991a–6991i); 40 CFR 280.22; 401 KAR 42:020	No UST systems would be installed at the DUF <sub>6</sub> conversion facility. Therefore, no Notification for UST System form would be submitted.
<b>Notification of PCB Waste Activity</b>	EPA	Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), as amended (15 USC 2601 et seq.); 40 CFR Part 761	UDS would be required to notify EPA of PCB waste activities at the time that DUF <sub>6</sub> cylinders to which paints containing PCBs have been applied are designated for disposal, either alone or as containers for depleted uranium oxide. At the appropriate time, UDS will notify the EPA by filing the required form.

**TABLE 6.1 (Cont.)**

License, Permit, or Other Consent	Responsible Agency	Authority	Relevance and Status
<i>Emergency Planning and Response</i>			
<b>List of Material Safety Data Sheets:</b> Submission of a list of Material Safety Data Sheets is required for hazardous chemicals (as defined in 29 CFR Part 1910) that are stored on site in excess of their threshold quantities.	Local Emergency Planning Commission (LEPC); Kentucky Emergency Response Commission	Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 (EPCRA), Section 311 (42 USC 11021); 40 CFR 370.20	UDS will prepare and submit a List of Material Safety Data Sheets at the appropriate time.
<b>Annual Hazardous Chemical Inventory Report:</b> Submission of the report is required when hazardous chemicals have been stored at a facility during the preceding year in amounts that exceed threshold quantities.	LEPC; Kentucky Emergency Response Commission; local fire department	EPCRA, Section 312 (42 USC 11022); 40 CFR 370.25; 106 KAR 1:081	UDS will cooperate with other DOE tenants at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant (PGDF) site regarding submission of a site-wide Annual Hazardous Chemical Inventory Report each year. For the purpose of preparing the site-wide report, the total quantities of hazardous chemicals stored by all tenants at the PGDF site, including those stored at the depleted UF <sub>6</sub> conversion facility, will be considered.
<b>Notification of On-Site Storage of an Extremely Hazardous Substance:</b> Submission of the notification is required within 60 days after on-site storage begins of an extremely hazardous substance in a quantity greater than the threshold planning quantity.	Kentucky Emergency Response Commission	EPCRA, Section 304 (42 USC 11004); 40 CFR 355.30; 106 KAR 1:081	UDS will prepare and submit the Notification of On-Site Storage of an Extremely Hazardous Substance at the appropriate time, if such substances are determined to be stored in a quantity greater than the threshold planning quantity at the DUF <sub>6</sub> conversion facility.

**TABLE 6.1 (Cont.)**

License, Permit, or Other Consent	Responsible Agency	Authority	Relevance and Status
<i>Transportation of Radioactive Wastes and Conversion Products</i>			
<b>Certificate of Registration:</b> Required to authorize the registrant to transport hazardous material or cause a hazardous material to be transported or shipped.	U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT)	Hazardous Materials Transportation Act (HMTA), as amended by the Hazardous Materials Transportation Uniform Safety Act of 1990 and other acts (49 USC 1501 et seq.); 49 CFR 107.608(b)	UDS will obtain a Certificate of Registration at the appropriate time.
<b>Packaging, Labeling, and Routing Requirements for Radioactive Materials:</b> Required for packages containing radioactive materials that will be shipped by truck or rail.	DOT	HMTA (49 USC 1501 et seq.); Atomic Energy Act (AEA), as amended (42 USC 2011 et seq.); 49 CFR Parts 172, 173, 174, 177, and 397	When shipments of radioactive materials are made, UDS will comply with DOT packaging, labeling, and routing requirements.
<i>Biotic Resources</i>			
<b>Threatened and Endangered Species Consultation:</b> Required between the responsible federal agencies and affected states to ensure that the project is not likely to (1) jeopardize the continued existence of any species listed at the federal or state level as endangered or threatened or (2) result in destruction of critical habitat of such species.	DOE; U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service; Kentucky Department of Fish and Wildlife Resources	Endangered Species Act of 1973, as amended (16 USC 1531 et seq.); KRS 150.183, 150.990, and 146.600–619	No species listed at the federal or state level as endangered or threatened or the critical habitat of such a species has been identified that would be affected by construction or operation of the DUF <sub>6</sub> conversion facility.

TABLE 6.1 (Cont.)

License, Permit, or Other Consent	Responsible Agency	Authority	Relevance and Status
<b><i>Nuclear Facility Operations</i></b>			
<b>Approval to Start Up a Nuclear Facility:</b> Required before start-up of new nuclear facilities, which are activities or operations that involve radioactive and/or fissionable materials in such form or quantity that a nuclear hazard potentially exists to the employees or the general public.	DOE	AEA, as amended (42 USC 2011 et seq.); DOE Order 425.1B	UDS will obtain approval from DOE to start up the DUF <sub>6</sub> conversion facility at the appropriate time.
<b>Approval to Release Materials Containing Residual Radioactive Contamination:</b> Required before releasing (1) nonuranium products from the DUF <sub>6</sub> conversion process (such as hydrogen fluoride [HF] or calcium fluoride [CaF <sub>2</sub> ]) for unregulated use and (2) decontaminated DUF <sub>6</sub> cylinders for unregulated use as scrap metal.	DOE	AEA, as amended (42 USC 2011 et seq.); DOE Order 5400.5	UDS will obtain approval from DOE before releasing HF, CaF <sub>2</sub> , or decontaminated cylinders for unregulated use.
<b><i>Cultural Resources</i></b>			
<b>Archaeological and Historical Resources Consultation:</b> Required before a federal agency approves a project in an area where archaeological or historic resources might be located.	DOE; Advisory Council on Historic Preservation; Kentucky State Historic Preservation Officer (SHPO)	National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, as amended (16 USC 470 et seq.); Archaeological and Historical Preservation Act of 1974 (16 USC 469–469c-2); Antiquities Act of 1906 (16 USC 431 et seq.); Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979, as amended (16 USC 470aa–mm)	DOE has coordinated with the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation and the Kentucky SHPO. A programmatic agreement (PA) calling for a complete cultural resource survey of the Paducah GDP, as well as development and implementation of a Cultural Resource Management Plan (CRMP), has been negotiated. The survey will proceed when the PA has been finalized; the CRMP will include any cultural resources found on the area to be occupied by the DUF <sub>6</sub> conversion facility.

**TABLE 6.1 (Cont.)**

License, Permit, or Other Consent	Responsible Agency	Authority	Relevance and Status
<i>Cultural Resources (Cont.)</i>			
<b>Government-to-Government Tribal Consultation:</b> Required to ensure that project activities have been designed to protect access to, physical integrity of, and confidentiality of traditional cultural and religious sites.	DOE	American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978 (42 USC 1996 and 1996a); Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act of 1990 (25 USC 3001 et seq.); National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, as amended (16 USC 470f); 36 CFR Part 800, Subpart B; 43 CFR Part 10	DOE has initiated government-to-government consultations with Native American tribes in the area of the DUF <sub>6</sub> conversion facility. No religious or sacred sites, burial sites, or resources significant to Native Americans have been identified to date.
<i>Other</i>			
<b>Environmental Impact Statement (EIS):</b> Required to evaluate the potential environmental impacts of a proposed major federal action that may significantly affect the quality of the human environment and to consider alternatives to the proposed action.	DOE	National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as amended (NEPA) (42 USC 4321 et seq.); 40 CFR Parts 1500–1508; 10 CFR Part 1021	The requirements of NEPA are satisfied by publication of this EIS for the DUF <sub>6</sub> conversion facility.
<b>Annual Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) Report:</b> Required for facilities that have 10 or more full-time employees and are assigned certain Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes.	EPA	EPCRA, Section 313 (42 USC 11023); 40 CFR Part 372	UDS will prepare and submit a TRI report to the EPA each year.

TABLE 6.1 (Cont.)

License, Permit, or Other Consent	Responsible Agency	Authority	Relevance and Status
<i>Other (Cont.)</i>			
<b>Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation Consent Order (issued February 2, 1999):</b> Establishes requirements for management, surveillance, testing, maintenance, and disposition of the UF <sub>6</sub> cylinders at the East Tennessee Technology Park.	DOE; Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation (TDEC)		UDS will implement the requirements of the TDEC Consent Order.
<b>Kentucky Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet Agreed Order (entered October 2, 2003):</b> Establishes requirements for management, surveillance, testing, and maintenance of the DUF <sub>6</sub> storage yards and cylinders for which DOE accepts and exercises regulatory authority and responsibility at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant site.	DOE; KDEP	KRS 224	UDS will implement the requirements of the Kentucky Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet Agreed Order.
<b>Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Notice of Construction:</b> Required prior to constructing a structure that could affect navigable airspace.	FAA	49 USC 44718; 14 CFR 77.11	UDS has notified the FAA that construction of the air emissions vent will occur within approximately 4 miles of the Barkley Regional Airport.

## 7 REFERENCES

Acoustical Society of America, 1983, *American National Standard Specification for Sound Level Meters*, ANSI S1.4-1983, New York, N.Y., Feb.

Acoustical Society of America, 1985, *American National Standard Specification for Sound Level Meters*, ANSI S1.4A-1985, Amendment to ANSI S1.4-1983, New York, N.Y., June.

AIHA (American Industrial Hygiene Association), 2002, *The AIHA 2002 Emergency Response Planning Guidelines and Workplace Environmental Exposure Level Guides Handbook*, Fairfax, Va.

Allison, T., 2002, "DUF<sub>6</sub> County, City, and School District Financial Data," intraoffice memo from Allison (Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Ill.) to H. Avci (Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Ill.), Aug. 1.

American Medical Association, 1999, *Physician Characteristics and Distribution in the U.S.*, Chicago, Ill.

Anderson County, 2002, *The Zoning Resolution of Anderson County, Tennessee*, Department of Engineering and Public Works, Clinton, Tenn.

Andrews, V.L., Jr., 2004, *FWS #04-0582; Biological Assessment for the Indiana Bat, Informal Consultation for the Proposed Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride Facility, McCracken County, Kentucky*, personal correspondence from Andrews (U.S. Department of the Interior, Fish and Wildlife Service, Frankfort, Ky.) to J.L. Elmore (U.S. Department of Energy, Oak Ridge Operations Office, Oak Ridge, Tenn.), March 2.

ANL (Argonne National Laboratory), 1991a, *Environmental Site Description for a Uranium Atomic Vapor Laser Isotope Separation (U-AVLIS) Production Plant at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant Site*, ANL/EAIS/TM-59, Argonne, Ill., Sept.

ANL, 1991b, *Environmental Site Description for a Uranium Atomic Vapor Laser Isotope Separation (U-AVLIS) Production Plant at the Oak Ridge Gaseous Diffusion Plant Site*, ANL/EAIS/TM-58, Argonne, Ill., Sept.

Bechtel Jacobs Company LLC, 2002, *East Tennessee Technology Park*, Oak Ridge, Tenn. Available at <http://www.bechteljacobs.com/ettp/orpublic.htm>. Accessed July 26, 2002.

Bechtel Jacobs Company LLC, 2003, *Transportation Plan for the Transport of ANSI N14.1-Compliant UF<sub>6</sub> Cylinders from the East Tennessee Technology Park to the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant in Years 2003 through 2005*, BJC/OR-1432, prepared for U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Environmental Management, Oak Ridge, Tenn., April.

Biwer, B.M., and J.P. Butler, 1999, "Vehicle Emission Unit Risk Factors for Transportation Risk Assessments," *Risk Analysis* 19:1157–1171.

Biwer, B.M., et al., 2001, *Transportation Impact Assessment for Shipment of Uranium Hexafluoride (UF<sub>6</sub>) Cylinders from the East Tennessee Technology Park to the Portsmouth and Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plants*, ANL/EAD/TM-112, Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Ill., Oct.

BLS (Bureau of Labor Statistics), 2002, *Local Area Unemployment Statistics*, Washington, D.C. Available at <ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/time.series/la/>.

Brown, A., 2002, personal communication from Brown (McCracken County, Ky.) to L. Nieves (Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Ill.), May 20.

Brumburgh, G.P., et al., 2000, *A Peer Review of the Strategy for Characterizing Transuranics and Technetium Contamination in Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride Tails Cylinders*, UCRL-ID-140343, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, Calif., Sept. 1.

Cain, W., 2002a, personal communication from Cain (U.S. Department of Energy, ETTP Site Office, Oak Ridge, Tenn.) to H. Hartmann (Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Ill.), July 5.

Cain, W., 2002b, personal communication from Cain (U.S. Department of Energy, ETTP Site Office, Oak Ridge, Tenn.) to H. Hartmann (Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Ill.), July 22.

Cain, W., 2002c, personal communication from Cain (U.S. Department of Energy, ETTP Site Office, Oak Ridge, Tenn.) to H. Hartmann (Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Ill.), July 30.

CDM Federal Programs Corporation, 1994, *Investigation of Sensitive Ecological Resources inside the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant*, Document Control Number 7916-003-FR-BBRY, prepared by CDM, Paducah, Ky., for U.S. Department of Energy, Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant, and Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc., Paducah, Ky., Aug. 19.

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 1996, "Advance Report of Final Mortality Statistics, 1994," *Monthly Vital Statistics Report* 45(3) Supplement, U.S. Public Health Service, Washington, D.C., Sept. 30, p. 7.

CEQ (Council on Environmental Quality), 1997, *Environmental Justice Guidance under the National Environmental Policy Act*, Executive Office of the President, Washington D.C., Dec.

CNN, 2002, *Moderate Earthquake Shakes Indiana, Illinois, Kentucky*, Internet posting, 5:05 p.m., June 18.

Commonwealth of Kentucky and U.S. Department of Energy, 2003, Agreed Order Attachment 1: Cylinder Management Plan for Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride (DUF<sub>6</sub>), Sept. 29.

Croff, A.G., et al., 2000a, *Assessment of Preferred Depleted Uranium Disposal Forms*, ORNL/TM-2000/161, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tenn., June.

Croff, A.G. et al., 2000b, *Evaluation of the Acceptability of Potential Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride Conversion Products at the Envirocare Disposal Site*, ORNL/TM-2000/355, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tenn., Dec.

DOE (U.S. Department of Energy), 1979, *Environmental Assessment of the Oak Ridge Gaseous Diffusion Plant Site*, DOE/EA-0106, Oak Ridge, Tenn., Dec.

DOE, 1988, *General Environmental Protection Program*, DOE Order 5400.1, Washington, D.C., Nov. 9.

DOE, 1990, *Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment*, DOE Order 5400.5, Washington, D.C., Feb. 8.

DOE, 1992, *Radiological Control Manual*, DOE/EH-0256T, Assistant Secretary for Environment, Safety and Health, Washington, D.C., June.

DOE, 1993, *Nonnuclear Consolidation, Environmental Assessment, Volume I: Nuclear Weapons Complex Reconfiguration Program*, DOE/EA-0792, Office of Defense Programs, Washington, D.C., June.

DOE, 1994a, *Technical Review of UF<sub>6</sub> Cylinders Management, Oak Ridge K-25 Site, December 13–14, 1994*, presentation.

DOE, 1994b, *Remedial Investigation Addendum for Waste Area Grouping 23, PCB Sites at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant, Paducah, Kentucky*, DOE/OR/07-1149 & D2 (KY/ER-32 & D2), Rev. 2, Sept.

DOE, 1995, *Department of Energy Programmatic Spent Nuclear Fuel Management and Idaho National Engineering Laboratory Environmental Restoration and Waste Management Programs Final Environmental Impact Statement*, DOE/EIS-0203-F, Office of Environmental Management, Idaho Operations Office, Idaho Falls, Idaho, April.

DOE, 1996, *Technical Report on Affected Environment for the DOE Sites Considered in the DOE Waste Management Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (WM PEIS)*, Vols. I and II, META/Berger-SR-01, prepared by META/Berger, Gaithersburg, Md., for DOE, Office of Environmental Management, Dec.

DOE, 1997, *Final Waste Management Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Managing Treatment, Storage, and Disposal of Radioactive and Hazardous Waste*, DOE/EIS-0200-F, Office of Environmental Management, Washington, D.C.,

DOE, 1999a, *Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Alternative Strategies for the Long-Term Management and Use of Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride*, DOE/EIS-0269, Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology, Germantown, Md., April.

DOE, 1999b, *Final Plan for the Conversion of Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride as Required by Public Law 105-204*, Office of Nuclear Energy, Science, and Technology, Washington, D.C., July.

DOE, 1999c, *Record of Decision for Long-Term Management and Use of Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride*, 6450-01-P, Washington, D.C., Aug. 2.

DOE, 1999d, *Final Environmental Assessment, Proposed Demonstration of the Vortec Vitrification System for Treatment of Mixed Wastes at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant*, DOE/EA-1230, Oak Ridge Operations, Oak Ridge, Tenn., Dec.

DOE, 1999e, *Deactivation Implementation Guide*, DOE G 430.1-3, Office of Field Integration, Sept. 29. Available at <http://www.directives.doe.gov>. Accessed July 2002.

DOE, 1999f, *Decommissioning Implementation Guide*, DOE G 430.1-4, Office of Field Integration, Sept. 2. Available at <http://www.directives.doe.gov>. Accessed July 2002.

DOE, 1999g, *Final Environmental Impact Statement for the Production of Tritium in a Commercial Light Water Reactor*, DOE/EIS-0288, Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs, Washington, D.C., March.

DOE, 1999h, *Remedial Investigation Report for Waste Area Grouping 27 at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant, Paducah, Kentucky*, Vol. 1, Sections 1-8, DOE/OR/07-1777/V1&V2, June.

DOE, 2000a, *U.S. Department of Energy DUF<sub>6</sub> Materials Use Roadmap*, ORNL-6968, M.J. Haire and A.G. Croff (editors), Aug. 27. Available at <http://web.anl.ead.gov/uranium/pdf/DURoadmap.pdf>.

DOE, 2000b, *Paducah Site, Annual Site Environmental Report for 1999*, BJC/PAD-206, prepared by CDM, Kevil, Ky., for Bechtel Jacobs Company LLC and U.S. Department of Energy, Paducah, Ky., Dec.

DOE, 2000c, *Non-Reactor Nuclear Safety Design Criteria and Explosives Safety Criteria Guide for Use with DOE O 420.1, Facility Safety*, DOE G 420.1-1, Washington, D.C., March 28. Available at <http://www.directives.doe.gov/serieslist.html>. Accessed July 2002.

DOE, 2000d, *Request for Proposals (No. DE-RP05-01OR22717) Design, Construction, and Operation of DUF<sub>6</sub> Conversion Facilities*, Oak Ridge Operations Office, Oak Ridge, Tenn., Oct. 31.

DOE, 2001a, *Baseline Human Health Risk Assessment and Screening Ecological Risk Assessment for the Proposed Site of the UF<sub>6</sub> Conversion Facility, Including the Eastern Portion of SWMU 194, McGraw Construction Facilities (South Side), at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant, Paducah, Kentucky*, DOE/OR/07-1928&D1, prepared by Science Applications International Corp., for U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Environmental Management, Aug.

DOE, 2001b, *Paducah Site, Annual Site Environmental Report for Calendar Year 2000*, BJC/PAD-237, prepared by CDM Federal Services, Inc., Kevil, Ky., for Bechtel Jacobs Company LLC and U.S. Department of Energy, Paducah, Ky., Oct.

DOE, 2001c, *Oak Ridge Reservation Annual Site Environmental Report for 2000*, DOE/ORO/2119, prepared by Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge Y-12 National Security Complex, and East Tennessee Technology Park, Oak Ridge, Tenn., for U.S. Department of Energy, Sept. Available at <http://www.ornl.gov/aser>.

DOE, 2002a, *Final Environmental Assessment for Waste Disposition Activities at the Paducah Site, Paducah, Kentucky*, DOE/EA-1339, Nov.

DOE, 2002b, *Oak Ridge Reservation Annual Site Environmental Report for 2001*, DOE/ORO/2133, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tenn., Sept. Available at <http://www.ornl.gov/aser>.

DOE, 2002c, *A Graded Approach for Evaluating Radiation Doses to Aquatic and Terrestrial Biota*, DOE-STD-1153-2002, Washington, D.C., July.

DOE, 2002d, "Chapter 7: Nonradiological Effluent Monitoring," in *Paducah Site, Annual Site Environmental Report for Calendar Year 2001*, BJC/PAD-219, prepared by CDM Federal Services, Kevil, Ky., for Bechtel Jacobs Company LLC and U.S. Department of Energy, Paducah, Ky., Sept. Available at <http://www.bchteljacobs.com/pad/aser2001.htm>.

DOE, 2002e, *A Resource Handbook on DOE Transportation Risk Assessment*, DOE/EM/NTP/HB-01, Office of Environmental Management, National Transportation Program, Washington, D.C., July.

DOE, 2002f, *Implementation Guide, Control and Release of Property with Residual Radioactive Material for Use with DOE 5400.5, Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment*, DOE G 441.1-XX, draft, Washington, D.C., April 4.

DOE, 2002g, *Final Environmental Impact Statement for a Geologic Repository for the Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Waste at Yucca Mountain, Nye County, Nevada*, DOE/EIS-0250, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, Feb.

DOE, 2003b, "Notice of Change in National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) Compliance Approach for the Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride (DUF<sub>6</sub>) Conversion Facilities Project," *Federal Register*, Vol. 68, pp. 22368–22369, April 28.

DOE, 2003c, *Final Programmatic Environmental Assessment for the U.S. Department of Energy, Oak Ridge Operations Implementation of a Comprehensive Management Program for the Storage, Transportation, and Disposition of Potentially Reusable Uranium Materials*, DOE/EA-1393, Oak Ridge Operations, Oak Ridge, Tenn., Feb.

DOE, 2003d, *Final Supplement Analysis for Transportation of DOT Compliant Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride Cylinders from the East Tennessee Technology Park to the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant in Fiscal Years 2003 through 2005*, DOE/EIS-0269/SA-1, Oak Ridge Operations Office, Oak Ridge, Tenn., Aug.

DOE 2004a, *Final Environmental Impact Statement for Construction and Operation of a Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride Conversion Facility at the Portsmouth, Ohio, Site*, DOE/EIS-0360, Oak Ridge Operations, Office of Environmental Management, Oak Ridge, Tenn., June.

DOE 2004b, "Draft Audit Report on 'Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride Conversion,'" memorandum from J.H. Roberson, Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management, to F.D. Doggett, Deputy Assistant Inspector General for Audit Services, Feb. 4.

DOE, 2004c, *Audit Report, Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride Conversion*, DOE/IG-0642, Office of Inspector General, Office of Audit Services, March.

DOE and USEC (United States Enrichment Corporation), 1998a, *Memorandum of Agreement Relating to Depleted Uranium Generated Prior to the Privatization Date*, May 18.

DOE and USEC, 1998b, *Memorandum of Agreement Relating to Depleted Uranium*, June 30.

DOE and USEC, 2002, *Memorandum of Agreement Relating to Uranium Enrichment Capacity and Nuclear Nonproliferation Programs in Russia*, June 17.

DOT (U.S. Department of Transportation), 2003a, *Questions and Answers About: Locomotive Horn Noise Assessment*, Federal Railroad Administration, Washington, D.C. Available at [http://www.fra.dot.gov/rdv/environmental\\_impact\\_assesment/noiseqa.htm](http://www.fra.dot.gov/rdv/environmental_impact_assesment/noiseqa.htm). Accessed May 2003.

DOT, 2003b, *Hazardous Material Incident System (HMIS) Database*. Available at <http://hazmat.dot.gov/files/hazmat/10year/10yearfrm.htm>. Accessed May 23.

Dubrin, J.W., et al., 1997, *Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride Management Program: The Engineering Analysis Report for the Long-Term Management of Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride*, UCRL-AR-124080, Vols. I and II, prepared by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Science Applications International Corporation, Bechtel, and Lockheed Martin Energy Systems for U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, D.C., May.

Duvall, G.D., and P.A. Souza, 1996, *An Evaluation of Previously Recorded and Inventoried Archeological Sites on the Oak Ridge Reservation, Anderson and Roane Counties, Tennessee*, ORNL/M-4946, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tenn., Jan.

Early, T.O., et al., 1989, *Groundwater Monitoring Plan for the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant*, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tenn. Aug.

Edgar, J.B., 1994, *Siemen-By-Product Hydrofluoric Acid Release Limit Proposal*, letter with attachment from Edgar (Siemens Power Corporation, Richland, Wash.) to R.C. Pierson (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C.), June 28.

EDGE, 1987, *Groundwater Monitoring Plan for U.S. Department of Energy Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant (DOE/PGDP) Reservation, EDGe Project No. 1001*, prepared by the Design Geosciences Group, Inc., Nashville, Tenn., March.

Elayat, H., et al., 1997, *Cost Analysis Report for the Long-Term Management of Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride*, UCRL-AR-127650, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, Calif., May.

EPA (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency), 1974, *Information on Levels of Environmental Noise Requisite to Protect Public Health and Welfare with an Adequate Margin of Safety*, EPA-550/9-74-004, Washington, D.C.

EPA, 1993, *Hydrogen Fluoride Study, Report to Congress, Section 112(n)(6), Clear Air Act as Amended, Final Report*, EPA550-R-93-001, Chemical Emergency Preparedness and Prevention Office, Washington, D.C., Sept.

EPA, 1995, *User's Guide for the Industrial Source Complex (ISC3) Dispersion Models, Volume I—User Instructions*, EPA-454/B-95-003a, Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards, Research Triangle Park, N.C., Sept.

EPA, 1996, *Drinking Water Regulations and Health Advisories*, EPA 882-B-96-002, Office of Water, Washington, D.C., Oct.

EPA, 2002, *Compilation of Air Pollutant Emission Factors*, AP-42, 5th ed. Available at <http://www.epa.gov/ttn/chief/ap42/index.html>. Accessed June and July 2002.

EPA, 2003a, *AirData*, "NET Facility Emissions Report." Available at <http://www.epa.gov/air/data/index.html>. Accessed Feb. 2003.

EPA, 2003b, *Ground Water and Drinking Water, Radionuclides in Drinking Water, Final Standards*. Available at [wysiwig://45/http://www.epa.gov/safewater/standard/pp/radnucpp.html](http://www.epa.gov/safewater/standard/pp/radnucpp.html). Accessed Aug. 2003.

ERC/EDGE, 1989, *The Geologic Setting of the DOE Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant, Paducah, Kentucky*, Knoxville, Tenn., Oct. 17.

ERDA (U.S. Energy Research and Development Administration), 1977, *Final Environmental Statement, Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant Expansion, Piketon, Ohio*, ERDA-1549.

Folga, S.M., 2003, "Fluoride Emissions," intraoffice e-mail with attached spreadsheets from Folga to Y. Chang (Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Ill.), March 10.

Forward, M.M., et al., 1994, *Methodology for Selecting Technologies and Estimating Waste Volumes, Costs and Labor Requirements for Environmental Restoration*, Pacific Northwest Laboratory, Richland, Wash., April.

Geraghty & Miller, Inc., 1989, *Hydrogeology of the Oak Ridge Gaseous Diffusion Plant*, revised draft report, Oak Ridge, Tenn., Dec.

Geraghty & Miller, Inc., 1991, *Ground-Water Levels at the Oak Ridge K-25 Site, Oak Ridge, TN*, Oak Ridge, Tenn., June.

Hartmann, H.M., et al., 1999, *Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride Management Program: Data Compilation for the Paducah Site in Support of Site-Specific NEPA Requirements for Continued Cylinder Storage, Cylinder Preparation, Conversion, and Long-Term Storage Activities*, ANL/EAD/TM-109, Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Ill., Aug.

Hatfield, V., 2002, personal communication from Hatfield (City of Knoxville, Tenn.) to L. Nieves (Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Ill.), June 4.

Hayden, J., 2002, personal communication from Hayden (City of Lake City, Tenn.) to L. Nieves (Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Ill.), May 31.

Healthcare InfoSource, Inc., 1998, *AHA™ Guide to the Health Care Field*, Chicago, Ill.

Hicks, J.M., 2002a, *2001 Summary for Paducah Cylinder Workers Personnel External Dose*, personal communication from Hicks (U.S. Department of Energy, Paducah, Ky.) to J.-J. Cheng (Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Ill.), Aug. 2.

Hicks, J.M., 2002b, *Quarterly Routine Survey/Inspection Report, PDGP February 2002*, personal communication from Hicks (U.S. Department of Energy, Paducah, Ky.) to J.-J. Cheng (Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Ill.), Aug. 2.

Hightower, J.R., 2002, "Final Report Updating No Action Alternative in PEIS," e-mail with attachment entitled *PEIS for DUF<sub>6</sub> No-Action Alternative Update*, dated July 11, 2002, from Hightower (Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tenn.) to J.R. Gasper (Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Ill.), July 31.

Hightower, J.R., 2004, "All-Site UF<sub>6</sub> Inventory," e-mail dated January 26, 2004, from Hightower (Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tenn.) to H. Hartmann (Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Ill.), Jan. 26.

Hightower, J.R., et al., 2000, *Strategy for Characterizing Transuranics and Technetium Contamination in Depleted UF<sub>6</sub> Cylinders*, ORNL/TM-2000/242, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tenn., Oct.

HMMH (Harris Miller Miller & Hanson, Inc.), 1995, *Transit Noise and Vibration Impact Assessment*, prepared by HMMH, Burlington, Mass., for Office of Planning, Federal Transit Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation, Washington, D.C., April.

Hodges, J., 1996, *Average Exposure Data for Cylinder Yard Workers*, attachment to facsimile transmittal from Hodges (Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant, Paducah, Ky.) to C.E. Bradley (U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, D.C.), Jan. 23.

Holcombe-Burdette, D., 1998, *K-25 Site Cultural Resources Survey, Volume 1*, JE/EM-41, prepared by Jacobs Environmental Management Team, Oak Ridge, Tenn., for U.S. Department of Energy, March.

Humphrey, M.E., 1976, *Soil Survey of Ballard and McCracken Counties, Kentucky*, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Soil Conservation Service, Feb.

Hydrogen Fluoride Industry Practices Institute, 1995a, *Recommended Practices for the Hydrogen Fluoride Industry, Volume 1 — Guideline for the Bulk Storage of Anhydrous Hydrogen Fluoride*, Storage Systems Task Group, Washington, D.C., Jan. 24.

Hydrogen Fluoride Industry Practices Institute, 1995b, *Recommended Practices for the Hydrogen Fluoride Industry, Volume 1 — New Tank Car Guideline for Anhydrous Hydrogen Fluoride*, Transportation Task Group, Washington, D.C., Jan. 25.

ICRP (International Commission on Radiological Protection), 1991, *1990 Recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection*, ICRP Publication 60, Annals of the ICRP, Vol. 21, Nos. 1–3, Pergamon Press, New York, N.Y.

Kentucky Department of Education, 2002, *Kentucky Department of Education*. Available at <http://www.kde.state.ky.us/KDE/About+Schools+and+Districts/default.htm>. Accessed Aug. 2002.

Kentucky Division for Air Quality, 2002, *Kentucky Ambient Air Quality Annual Report 2001*, Frankfort, Ky., June.

Knaus, S., 2002, personal communication from Knaus (Lan-Con, Paducah, Ky.) to Y.-S. Chang (Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Ill.), June 24.

LMES (Lockheed Martin Energy Systems, Inc.), 1996a, *Paducah Site Annual Environmental Report for 1994*, ES/ESH-60 (KY/EM-79), prepared by Environmental, Safety, and Health Compliance and Environmental Management staffs, Oak Ridge, Tenn., and Environmental Management Division, Paducah Site, Paducah, Ky., for U.S. Department of Energy, Feb.

LMES 1996b, *Oak Ridge Reservation Annual Site Environmental Report for 1995*, ES/ESH/69, prepared by Oak Ridge National Laboratory and the Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant and Oak Ridge K-25 Site, Oak Ridge, Tenn., for U.S. Department of Energy, Sept.

LMES, 1996c, *Environmental Monitoring and Surveillance on the Oak Ridge Reservation: 1994 Data*, ES/ESH-59, prepared by Environmental, Safety, and Health Compliance and Environmental Management staffs, Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant and Oak Ridge K-25 Site, Oak Ridge, Tenn., for U.S. Department of Energy, April.

LMES, 1997a, *Paducah Site Annual Report for 1995*, KY/EM-176, prepared by Environmental Management Division, Kevil, Ky., for U.S. Department of Energy, Jan.

LMES, 1997b, *Safety Analysis Report, Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant, Paducah, Kentucky*, Revision R0-A, KY/EM-174, Paducah, Ky.

LMES, 1997c, *Paducah Site Annual Environmental Report for 1996*, KY/EM-206, prepared by Environmental Management Division, Kevil, Ky., for U.S. Department of Energy, Dec.

LMES, 1997d, *UF<sub>6</sub> Cylinder Project Management Plan*, K/TSO-30, Rev. 2, prepared by Project Support Organization, East Tennessee Technology Park, Oak Ridge, Tenn., for U.S. Department of Energy.

McGinnis, J., 2002, personal communication from McGinnis (City of Oak Ridge, Tennessee) to L. Nieves (Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Ill.), May 31.

McGuire, S.A., 1991, *Chemical Toxicity of Uranium Hexafluoride Compared to Acute Effects of Radiation*, Final Report, NUREG-1391, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, Washington, D.C., Feb.

MMES (Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc.), 1990, *U-AVLIS Site Data Package, Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant*, KY/A-553, Paducah, Ky., Oct.

MMES, 1994a, *Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant, Annual Site Environmental Report for 1993*, ES/ESH-53 (KY/ERWM-18), prepared by MMES, Oak Ridge Tenn., and Paducah, Ky., for U.S. Department of Energy, and by Martin Marietta Utility Services, Inc., for United States Enrichment Corporation, Oct.

MMES, 1994b, *Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant, Annual Site Data for 1993*, ES/ESH-55 (KY/ERWM-20), prepared by MMES, Oak Ridge, Tenn., and Paducah, Ky., for U.S. Department of Energy, and by Martin Marietta Utility Services, Inc., for United States Enrichment Corporation, Oct.

Moriarty, P., 2002, personal communication from Moriarty (City of Paducah, Ky.) to L. Nieves (Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Ill), May 17.

Morris, M.W., 1998, *K-25 Site Cultural Resources Survey, Archaeological Reconnaissance*, JE/EM-41, prepared by Jacobs Environmental Management Team, Oak Ridge, Tenn., for U.S. Department of Energy, March.

National Climatic Data Center, undated, *Hourly United States Weather Observations, 1990–1995*, Asheville, N.C.

National Safety Council, 2002, *Injury Facts, 2002 Edition*, Itasca, Ill.

NCRP (National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements), 1987, *Ionizing Radiation Exposure of the Population of the United States*, NCRP Report No. 93, Bethesda, Md.

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission), 1977, *Final Environmental Statement on the Transportation of Radioactive Material by Air and Other Modes*, NUREG-0170, Washington, D.C.

NRC, 1988, *Final Generic Environmental Impact Statement on Decommissioning of Nuclear Facilities*, NUREG-0586, Washington, D.C., Aug.

NRC, 1994, *Generic Environmental Impact Statement in Support of Rulemaking on Radiological Criteria for Decommissioning of NRC-Licensed Nuclear Facilities*, NUREG-1496, Washington, D.C., Aug.

NRC, 1995, *Environmental Assessment for Renewal of Source Material License, SUB-526, Docket 40-3392, Allied Signal, Inc., Metropolis, Illinois*, Division of Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards, Washington, D.C.

Nuttli, O.W., 1973, “The Mississippi Valley Earthquakes of 1811 and 1812: Intensities, Ground Motion, and Magnitudes,” *Bulletin of the Seismological Society of America* 63(1):227–248.

Operations Management International, Inc., 2002a, *Overview*. Available at <http://www.ettpreuse.com/overview.html>. Accessed July 26, 2002.

Operations Management International, Inc., 2002b, *Current Tenants*. Available at <http://www.ettpreuse.com/tenants.html>. Accessed July 26, 2002.

ORNL (Oak Ridge National Laboratory), 2002, *Climatic Data for the Oak Ridge Reservation*. Available at [http://www.ornl.gov/Env\\_Rpt/aser01/aser2001.htm](http://www.ornl.gov/Env_Rpt/aser01/aser2001.htm). Accessed Aug. 2003.

Parks, J.W., 1997, *Data for Revised No Action Alternative in the Depleted UF<sub>6</sub> Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement*, memorandum from Parks (U.S. Department of Energy, Enrichment Facilities, EF-20, Oak Ridge Operations Office, Oak Ridge, Tenn.) to C.E. Bradley (U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Facilities, NE-40, Germantown, Md.), April 7.

Parolari, K., 2002, personal communication from Parolari (Knox County, Tenn.) to L. Nieves (Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Ill.), May 31.

Pennington, G.G., 2001, *Data Submittal for Preparation of the Site-Specific Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for the Portsmouth and Paducah Conversion Facility Sites*, personal communication from Pennington (Bechtel Jacobs Company LLC) to L.D. Boggs (U.S. Department of Energy), Feb. 8.

Platts Nuclear Fuel, 2002, "USEC, DOE Reach Agreement on Replacement of Some Contaminated U; HEU Contract Okayed," *Platts Nuclear Fuel* 27(13):1-8.

Policastro, A.J., et al., 1997, *Facility Accident Impact Analyses in Support of the Uranium Hexafluoride Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement*, attachment to intraoffice memorandum from Policastro et al. to H.I. Avci (Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Ill.), June 15.

Ranek, N.L., and F.A. Monette, 2001, *Evaluation of UF<sub>6</sub>-to-UO<sub>2</sub> Conversion Capability at Commercial Nuclear Fuel Fabrication Facilities*, ANL/EAD/TM-110, Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Ill., May.

Rogers, A., 2002, personal communication from Rogers (Knox County, Tenn.) to L. Nieves (Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Ill.), May 31.

Rogers, J.G., et al., 1988, *Environmental Surveillance of the U.S. Department of Energy Paducah Reservation and Surrounding Environs during 1987*, ES/ESH-4/V3, prepared by Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc., Oak Ridge, Tenn., for U.S. Department of Energy, April.

Rothschild, E.R., et al., 1984, *Resource Management Plan, Oak Ridge Reservation, Volume 10, Appendix J: Hydrology*, ORNL-6026/V10, Oak Ridge, Tenn., July.

Sadri, R.J., 1995, letter from Sadri (Regulatory Branch, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Louisville District, Ky.) to J. Hodges (U.S. Department of Energy, Oak Ridge Operations, Paducah Site Office, Paducah, Ky.), Dec. 14.

Saint Louis University Earthquake Center, 2002, *Introduction to the New Madrid Seismic Zone*. Available at [http://www.eas.slu.edu/Earthquake\\_Center/SEISMICITY/NewMadridGeneral.html](http://www.eas.slu.edu/Earthquake_Center/SEISMICITY/NewMadridGeneral.html). Accessed June 2002.

Saricks, C.L., and M.M. Tompkins, 1999, *State-Level Accident Rates of Surface Freight Transportation: A Reexamination*, ANL/ESD/TM-150, Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Ill., April.

Shaw, K., 2001, *Site Selection for Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride Conversion Facility at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant*, e-mail with attachment of white paper from Shaw (DUF<sub>6</sub> Program, Office of Environmental Management, U.S. Department of Energy, Md.) to H.I. Avci and F.A. Monette (Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Ill.), May 1.

Sheppard, J.D., 2002, electronic data transmittal from Sheppard (U.S. Department of Energy, Portsmouth, Ohio) to H. Hartmann (Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Ill.), June.

Shootman, K., 2002, personal communication from Shootman (City of Clinton, Tenn.) to L. Nieves (Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Ill.), May 31.

Souza, P.A., et al., 2001, *Cultural Resources Management Plan, Department of Energy Oak Ridge Operations Office, Anderson and Roane Counties, Tennessee*, DOE/ORO-2085, U.S. Department of Energy, Oak Ridge Operations Office, Oak Ridge, Tenn., July.

Storm Prediction Center, 2002, *Historical Tornado Data Archive*. Available at <http://www.spc.noaa.gov/archive/tornadoes/index.html>. Accessed June 2002.

TDEC (Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation), 1999, "Tennessee's Ambient Air Quality Standards," Chapter 1200-3-3 in *Rules of Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation*, Nashville, Tenn., April.

Tennessee Department of Education, 2001, *Annual Report 2001*, State of Tennessee, Nashville, Nov.

Tetra Tech, Inc., 2000, *DUF<sub>6</sub> Conversion Facility Site Characterization Report, Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant, Paducah, Kentucky*, BJC/PAD-207, prepared by Tetra Tech, Inc., Oak Ridge, Tenn., for U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Environmental Management, Sept. Available at [http://www.oakridge.doe.gov/duf6disposition/PADUCAH\\_REPORT.pdf](http://www.oakridge.doe.gov/duf6disposition/PADUCAH_REPORT.pdf).

UDS (Uranium Disposition Services, LLC), 2003a, *DUF<sub>6</sub> — General Facility Description*, personal communication from S. Gertz (Burns and ROE Enterprises, Mt. Laurel, N.J.) to H. Avci (Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Ill.), Feb. 3.

UDS, 2003b, *Updated NEPA Data*, DUF<sub>6</sub>-UDS-NEP-002, Rev. 0, Oak Ridge, Tenn, Aug. 27.

U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1992, *County Business Patterns, 1990*, Washington, D.C. Available at <http://www.census.gov/ftp/pub/epcd/cbp/view/cbpview.html>.

U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2000, *Poverty in the United States: 1999*, P-60-210, U.S. Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C.

U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2001, *Census 2000 Redistricting Data (Public Law 94-171), 2000 Census of Population and Housing, Technical Documentation*, PL/00-1, Washington, D.C., Feb.

U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2002a, *U.S. Census American FactFinder*. Available at <http://factfinder.census.gov>.

U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2002b, *County Business Patterns, 2000*, Washington, D.C. Available at <http://www.census.gov/ftp/pub/epcd/cbp/view/cbpview.html>.

U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2002c, *State and County Quickfacts, State of Kentucky and McCracken County, Kentucky*. Washington, D.C. Available at <http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/21/21145.html>. Accessed June 2002.

U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2002d, *State and Local Government Employment and Payroll Data*, Washington, D.C. Available at <http://www.census.gov/ftp/pub/govs/www/apesstl.html>.

U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2002e, *State and County Quickfacts, State of Tennessee and Roane County, Tennessee*. Available at <http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/47/47001.html>. Accessed June 2002.

USDA (U.S. Department of Agriculture), 1994, *Census of Agriculture — County Data, 1992*, National Agricultural Statistics Service, Washington, D.C. Available at <http://www.nass.usda.gov/census/census92/agrimenu.htm>.

USDA, 1999, *Census of Agriculture, Volume 1: Geographic Area Series*, Washington, D.C.

U.S. Department of Commerce, 2002, *Regional Accounts Data, Local Area Personal Income*, Washington, D.C. Available at <http://www.bea.doc.gov/bea/regional/reis>.

U.S. Department of the Army, 1994a, *Environmental Investigations at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant and Surrounding Area, McCracken County, Kentucky; Volume IV, Cultural Resources Investigation; Part A, Results of Field Investigation*, Final Report, Volume 4A, prepared by Waterways Experiment Station, Corps of Engineers Environmental Laboratory, Vicksburg, Miss., and Engineer District Nashville, Nashville, Tenn., for U.S. Department of Energy, Oak Ridge Operations, Paducah Site Office, Paducah, Ky., May.

U.S. Department of the Army, 1994b, *Environmental Investigations at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant and Surrounding Area, McCracken County, Kentucky; Volume IV, Cultural Resources Investigation; Part B, Sensitivity Analysis*, Final Report, Volume 4B, prepared by Waterways Experiment Station, Corps of Engineers Environmental Laboratory, Vicksburg, Miss., and Engineer District Nashville, Nashville, Tenn., for U.S. Department of Energy, Oak Ridge Operations, Paducah Site Office, Paducah, Ky., May.

U.S. Department of the Army, 1994c, *Environmental Investigations at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant and Surrounding Area, McCracken County, Kentucky; Volume II, Wetlands, Investigation*, Final Report, Volume 2, prepared by Waterways Experiment Station, Corps of Engineers Environmental Laboratory, Vicksburg, Miss., and Engineer District Nashville, Nashville, Tenn., for U.S. Department of Energy, Oak Ridge Operations, Paducah Site Office, Paducah, Ky., May.

U.S. Department of the Army, 1994d, *Environmental Investigations at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant and Surrounding Area, McCracken County, Kentucky; Volume III, Threatened and Endangered Species Investigation*, Final Report, Volume 3 prepared by Waterways Experiment Station, Corps of Engineers Environmental Laboratory, Vicksburg, Miss., and Engineer District Nashville, Nashville, Tenn., for U.S. Department of Energy, Oak Ridge Operations, Paducah Site Office, Paducah, Ky., May.

USFWS (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service), 2002, *Biological Opinion on the Application for an Incidental Take Permit for the Federally Endangered Indiana Bat (*Myotis sodalis*) for the Six Points Road Interchange and Associated Development, Hendricks and Marion Counties, Indiana*, Bloomington Field Office, Bloomington, Ind.

USGS (U.S. Geological Survey), 2002, *National Land Cover Data*. Available at <http://edc2.usgs.gov/scripts/mapserv.exe?map=d%3A%5Cinetpub%5Cwwwroot%5Cllccp%5Cnlcd%5Cnlcd.map&zoomsize=2>. Accessed July 2002.

U.S. President, 1977a, "Protection of Wetlands," Executive Order 11990, *Federal Register*, 42:26961, May 24.

U.S. President, 1977b, "Floodplain Management," Executive Order 11988, *Federal Register*, 42:26951, May 24.

U.S. President, 1993, "Federal Compliance with Right-to-Know Laws and Pollution Prevention Requirements," Executive Order 12856, *Federal Register* 58(150):41981–41987, Aug. 6.

U.S. President, 2000, "Greening the Government through Leadership in Environmental Management," Executive Order 13148, *Federal Register*, 65(81):24593–24606, April 26.

Van Lonkhuyzen, R., 2004, "Biological Assessment and Floodplain/Wetland Assessment for the Proposed DUF<sub>6</sub> Conversion Facility at the Paducah Site, Biological Assessment and Wetland Assessment for the Proposed DUF<sub>6</sub> Conversion Facility at the Portsmouth Site," intraoffice memorandum with attached files from R. Van Lonkhuyzen to H. Avci (Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Ill.), April 16.

Waynick, J., 2002, personal communication from Waynick (Tennessee Division of Air Pollution Control, Nashville, Tenn.) to Y.-S. Chang (Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Ill.), July 17.

Wood, R.A. (editor), 1996, *Weather of U.S. Cities*, 5th ed., Gales Research, Detroit, Mich.

Yuan, Y.C., et al., 1995, *RISKIND — A Computer Program for Calculating Radiological Consequences and Health Risks from Transportation of Spent Nuclear Fuel*, ANL/EAD-1, Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Ill., Nov.

## 8 LIST OF PREPARERS

Name	Education/Expertise	Contribution
<i>U.S. Department of Energy</i>		
Gary S. Hartman	B.A., Geology; 23 years of experience in NEPA compliance and environmental compliance and regulation	DOE Document Manager
<i>Argonne National Laboratory<sup>1</sup></i>		
Timothy Allison	M.S., Mineral and Energy Resource Economics; M.A., Geography; 16 years of experience in regional analysis and economic impact analysis	Socioeconomic analysis
Halil I. Avci	Ph.D., Nuclear Engineering; 19 years of experience in environmental assessment, waste management, accident analysis, and project management	Project Leader
Bruce M. Biwer	Ph.D., Chemistry; 13 years of experience in radiological pathway analysis, dose calculations, and radiological transportation risk analysis	Radiological transportation risk analysis
James P. Butler	Ph.D., Environmental Health Sciences; 22 years of experience in health risk assessment and exposure analysis	Chemical human health impacts — normal operations
Young-Soo Chang	Ph.D., Chemical Engineering; 17 years of experience in air quality impact analysis	Air quality, noise
Jing-Jy Cheng	Ph.D., Polymer Science and Engineering; 13 years of experience in radiological risk assessment and computer model development	Radiological impacts — normal operations
Stephen M. Folga	Ph.D., Gas Engineering; 9 years of experience in technology assessment and waste management	Technology assessment, accident assessment, resources/materials

<sup>1</sup> The contractor disclosure statement appears in Appendix H.

Name	Education/Expertise	Contribution
John R. Gasper	M.S., M.P.H., Environmental Health Science; 28 years of experience in environmental and energy assessment and program management	Program Coordinator/Liaison
Jerry L. Gillette	M.S., Nuclear Engineering; 34 years of experience in energy and environmental technologies and accident analysis	Technology assessment, accident analysis
Larry J. Gorenflo	Ph.D., Geography, M.A., Anthropology; 18 years of experience in environmental impact assessment and anthropological and geographical research	Land use, environmental justice, cumulative impacts
Heidi M. Hartmann	M.S., Environmental Toxicology and Epidemiology; 15 years of experience in exposure and risk analysis and public health assessment	Assistant Project Leader/Technical Coordinator; chemical human health impacts, cylinder management
Patricia Hollopeter	A.M., Philosophy; 22 years of experience in editing and writing	Technical Editor
Michael Lazaro	M.S., Environmental Science (Atmospheric Physics), M.S., Nuclear Engineering; 30 years of experience in atmospheric modeling, environmental engineering, policy analysis, and environmental assessment	Chemical accidents
David J. LePoire	M.S., Computer Science, B.S., Physics; 13 years of experience in computer models development for radiological human health risk assessments	Radiological accidents
Frederick A. Monette	M.S., Health Physics; 13 years of experience in radiological risk assessment, environmental impact assessment, and document management	Assistant Project Leader/ Document Manager
Marita Moniger	B.A., English; 24 years of experience in editing and writing	Technical Editor
Dan O'Rourke	M.S., Industrial Archaeology; 11 years of experience in cultural resource management; 6 years of experience in historical property issues	Cultural resources

---

Name	Education/Expertise	Contribution
Mary H. Picel	M.S., Environmental Health Sciences; 17 years of experience in environmental assessment, risk assessment, and waste management	Waste management
Nancy L. Ranek	J.D., M.S., Nuclear Engineering, B.S., Physics; 19 years of experience in environmental permitting, management, and assessment	Environmental, occupational safety, and health permits and compliance requirements
Elisabeth A. Stull	Ph.D., Ecology; 34 years of experience in ecological research and environmental assessment	Cumulative impacts, affected environment, summary
David Tomasko	Ph.D., Civil Engineering; 24 years of experience in hydrogeology and fluid mechanics	Water and soil
Robert A. VanLonkhuyzen	B.A., Biology; 13 years of experience in ecological research and environmental assessment	Ecological resources
Bruce T. Verhaaren	Ph.D., Archaeology; 16 years of experience in archaeological analysis; 13 years of experience in environmental assessments and records management	Cultural resources, references
Konnie L. Wescott	B.A., Mathematics and Sociology/Anthropology, M.A., Anthropology; 15 years of experience in archaeological research; 13 years of experience in environmental assessment	Cultural resources

---

## 9 GLOSSARY

**Accident:** An unplanned sequence of events resulting in undesirable consequences, such as the release of radioactive or hazardous material to the environment.

**Accident consequence assessment:** An assessment of the impacts following the occurrence of an accident, independent of the probability of that accident. The environmental impact statement (EIS) provides estimates of the consequences of a number of possible accidents, ranging from those with low probability (rare) to those with relatively high probability (frequent).

**Accident frequency:** The likelihood that a specific accident will occur, that is, the probability of occurrence. If an accident is estimated to happen once every 50 years, the accident frequency is generally reported as 0.02 per year (1 occurrence divided by 50 years = 0.02 occurrence per year). For the EIS, accident frequencies were grouped as follows:

- I, likely (L) — The average frequency of occurrence is estimated to be greater than or equal to 1 in 100 years.
- II, unlikely (U) — The average frequency of occurrence is estimated to be 1 in 100 to 1 in 10,000 years.
- III, extremely unlikely (EU) — The average frequency of occurrence is estimated to be 1 in 10,000 to 1 in 1 million years.
- IV, incredible (I) — The average frequency of occurrence is estimated to be less than 1 in 1 million years.

**Accident risk:** Risk based on both the severity of an accident (consequence) and the probability that the accident will occur. High-consequence accidents that are unlikely to occur (low probability) may pose a low overall risk. For purposes of comparison, accident risk is typically calculated by multiplying the accident consequence (e.g., dose or expected fatalities) by the accident probability.

**Accident risk assessment:** An assessment that considers the probabilities and consequences of a range of possible accidents, including low-probability accidents that have high consequences and high-probability accidents that have low consequences. The overall risk associated with an accident is generally estimated by multiplying the accident consequence by the probability of occurrence.

**Accident source term:** The amount of radioactive or hazardous material released to the environment in dispersible form following an accident.

**Adsorption:** Process in which solid surfaces attract and retain a layer of ions from a water solution.

**Advection:** The process by which material is transported by the bulk motion of flowing water.

**Air quality:** Measure of the health-related and visual characteristics of the air, often derived from quantitative measurements of the concentrations of specific injurious or contaminating substances. Air quality standards are the prescribed level of constituents in the outside air that cannot be exceeded during a specific time in a specified area.

***Air Quality Control Region (AQCR):*** An interstate or intrastate area designated by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for the attainment and maintenance of National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS).

***Alpha particle ( $\alpha$ ):*** A positively charged particle consisting of two protons and two neutrons that is emitted during radioactive decay from the nucleus of certain nuclides. It is the least penetrating of the three common types of radiation (alpha, beta, and gamma).

***Ambient air:*** The surrounding atmosphere as it exists around people, plants, and structures.

***American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978:*** The Act that established national policy to protect and preserve for Native Americans their inherent right of freedom to believe, express, and exercise their traditional religions, including the rights of access to religious sites, use and possession of sacred objects, and freedom to worship through traditional ceremonies and rites.

***Aquifer:*** A saturated subsurface geologic formation that can transmit significant quantities of water.

***Archaeological and Historic Preservation Act:*** Act directed at the preservation of historic and archaeological data that would otherwise be lost as a result of federal construction. It authorizes the U.S. Department of the Interior to undertake recovery, protection, and preservation of archaeological and historic data.

***As low as reasonably achievable (ALARA):*** An approach to control or manage radiation exposures (both individual and collective to the workforce and the public) and releases of radioactive material to the environment as low as social, technical, economic, practical,

and public policy considerations permit. ALARA is not a dose limit; it is a practice that has as its objective the attainment of dose levels as far below applicable limits as possible.

***Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (AEA):*** The Act that, along with other related legislation, provided the Atomic Energy Commission (a predecessor of the U.S. Department of Energy) with authority to develop generally applicable standards for protecting the environment from radioactive materials.

***Attainment area:*** An area considered to have air quality as good as or better than the National Ambient Air Quality standards as defined in the Clean Air Act (CAA). An area may be an attainment area for one pollutant and a nonattainment area for others (see also *nonattainment area*).

***Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act, as amended:*** The Act making it unlawful to take, pursue, molest, or disturb bald (American) and golden eagles, their nests, or their eggs anywhere in the United States.

***Beta particle ( $\beta$ ):*** An elementary particle emitted from a nucleus during radioactive decay; it is negatively or positively charged, identical in mass to an electron, and in most cases easily stopped, as by a thin sheet of metal or plastic.

***Biota:*** The plant and animal life of a region.

***Bounding:*** In the case of accident analysis, bounding is a condition, consequence, or risk that provides an upper limit that is not exceeded by other conditions, consequences, or risks. This term is also used to identify conservative assumptions that will likely overestimate actual risks or consequences.

**Breach:** A general term referring to a hole in a cylinder or container. A breach may be caused by corrosion or by mechanical forces, such as those caused by a drop or contact with handling equipment.

**Cancer:** A group of diseases characterized by uncontrolled cellular growth. Increased incidence of cancer can be caused by exposure to radiation.

**Candidate species:** Plant or animal species that are not yet officially listed as threatened or endangered but are undergoing status review by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS). These species are candidates for possible addition to the list of threatened and endangered species.

**Carbon monoxide (CO):** A colorless, odorless gas that is toxic if breathed in high concentration over a period of time. Carbon monoxide is one of six criteria air pollutants specified under Title I of the CAA.

**Cascade:** The process system that is used to separate the isotopic streams of uranium-235 and uranium-238 in gaseous diffusion plants.

**Cask:** A heavily shielded, typically robust container for shipping or storing spent nuclear fuel. Spent nuclear fuel casks are usually cylindrical containers with radiation shielding provided by steel, lead, concrete, or depleted uranium.

**Census tract:** An area usually containing between 2,500 and 8,000 persons that is used for organizing and monitoring census data. The geographic dimensions of census tracts vary widely, depending on population settlement density. Census tracts do not cross county borders.

**Clean Air Act (CAA):** The Act that mandates the issuance and enforcement of air pollution

control standards for stationary sources and motor vehicles.

**Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990:** An Act that expanded the enforcement powers of the EPA and added restrictions on air toxins, ozone-depleting chemicals, stationary and mobile emissions sources, and emissions implicated in acid rain and global warming.

**Clean Water Act of 1972, 1987:** The Act that regulates the discharge of pollutants from a point source into navigable waters of the United States in compliance with a National Pollution Discharge Elimination System permit. Also regulates discharges to or dredging of wetlands.

**Code of Federal Regulations (CFR):** The codified form in which all federal regulations in force are published.

**Collective dose:** Summation of individual radiation doses received by all those exposed to the source or event being considered. The collective radiation dose received by a population group is usually measured in units of person-rem.

**Collective population risk:** A measure of possible loss in a group of people that takes into account the probability that the hazard will cause harm and the consequences of that event. The collective population risk does not express the risk to specific individual members of the population.

**Committed effective dose equivalent:** The sum of the committed dose equivalents to various tissues of the body, each multiplied by its weighting factor. It does not include contributions from external doses. Committed effective dose equivalent is expressed in units of rem and provides an estimate of the lifetime radiation dose to an individual from

radioactive material taken into the body through either inhalation or ingestion.

**Convection:** Process by which heat is transferred between a surface and a moving fluid when they are at different temperatures.

**Criteria pollutants:** Six air pollutants for which national ambient air quality standards are established by the EPA under Title I of the CAA. The six pollutants are sulfur dioxide (SO<sub>2</sub>), nitrogen oxides (NO<sub>x</sub>), carbon monoxide (CO), ozone (O<sub>3</sub>), particulate matter (PM<sub>10</sub>, particles with a mean diameter of 10 micrometers [ $\mu\text{m}$ ] or less), and lead (Pb).

**Critical habitat:** Air, land, or water area and constituent elements, the loss of which would appreciably decrease the likelihood of survival and recovery of a species listed as threatened or endangered or a distinct segment of the population of that species.

**Cultural resources:** Archaeological sites, architectural structures or features, traditional use areas, and Native American sacred sites or special use areas.

**Cumulative impacts:** The impacts assessed in an environmental impact statement that could potentially result from the incremental impact of the action when added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions regardless of what agency (federal or nonfederal), private industry, or individual undertakes such other actions. Cumulative impacts can result from individually minor but collectively significant actions taking place over a period of time.

**Curie (Ci):** A measure of the radioactivity of a material, equal to  $3.7 \times 10^{10}$  disintegrations per second.

**Cylinder:** As defined for this EIS, a large steel container used to store depleted uranium hexafluoride (DUF<sub>6</sub>). Cylinders are typically about 12 ft long by 4 ft in diameter and weigh about 9 to 13 t (10 to 14 tons) when full of DUF<sub>6</sub>.

**Cylinder preparation:** The activities required to prepare DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders for transportation. Cylinder preparation would be required if cylinders were transported to a conversion facility.

**Decay:** see also *radioactive decay*.

**Decay products:** see also *radioactive decay products*.

**Decommissioning:** The process of removing a facility from operation, followed by decontamination, entombment, dismantlement, or conversion to another use.

**Defluorination:** The conversion of uranium hexafluoride to triuranium octaoxide (U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> [uranyl uranate]) accomplished by using steam. UF<sub>6</sub> is chemically decomposed with steam and heat to produce U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> and HF, with concentrated HF as the direct by-product.

**Depleted uranium hexafluoride (DUF<sub>6</sub>):** A compound of uranium and fluorine from which most of the uranium-235 isotope has been removed. Isotope separation results in two product “streams.” The stream containing the additional uranium-235 is said to be “enriched” and is collected for further processing into other forms of enriched uranium. The remaining UF<sub>6</sub> stream is said to be “depleted” and is now stored at the Paducah, Portsmouth, and ETTP sites.

**Disposal:** The emplacement of material in a manner designed to ensure isolation for the foreseeable future. Disposal is considered to

be permanent, with no intent to retrieve the material for future use.

***Disposal facility:*** A facility or part of a facility into which hazardous, radioactive, or solid waste is intentionally placed and at which waste is intended to permanently remain after closure of the facility.

***Disproportionately high and adverse environmental impact:*** An adverse environmental impact determined to be unacceptable or above generally accepted norms. A disproportionately high impact refers to an environmental hazard with a risk or rate of exposure for a low-income or minority population that exceeds the risk or rate of exposure for the general population.

***Disproportionately high and adverse human health effect:*** Any effect on human health from exposure to environmental hazards that exceeds generally accepted levels of risk and affects low-income and minority populations at a rate that appreciably exceeds the rate for the general population. Adverse health effects are measured in risks and rates that could result in latent cancer fatalities, as well as other fatal or nonfatal adverse impacts to human health.

***Dose:*** The amount of energy deposited in body tissue due to radiation exposure. Various technical terms — such as dose equivalent, effective dose equivalent, and collective dose — are used to evaluate the amount of radiation received by an exposed individual or population.

***Dose rate:*** Radiation dose delivered per unit of time and measured in rem per hour.

***Drain:*** A device (e.g., a channel or pipe) used to carry away or to empty liquid from a liquid source.

***Effective dose equivalent:*** The sum of the products of the dose equivalent to various organs or tissues and the weighting factors applicable to each of the body organs or tissues that are irradiated. The effective dose equivalent includes the dose from radiation sources internal and/or external to the body and is expressed in units of rem.

***Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986:*** The Act that established programs to provide the public with important information on the hazardous and toxic chemicals in their communities and established emergency planning and notification requirements to protect the public in the event of a release of hazardous substances.

***Emergency Response Planning Guideline (ERPG):*** A hazardous-material personnel exposure level or range which, when exceeded by a short-term or acute exposure, will cause adverse reproductive, developmental, or carcinogenic effects in humans. ERPGs are approved by a committee of the American Industrial Hygiene Association.

***Endangered species:*** Any species that is in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its geographic range.

***Endangered Species Act, as amended:*** The Act intended to prevent the further decline of endangered and threatened species and to restore these species and their habitats. Consultation with the USFWS is necessary to determine whether endangered and threatened species or their critical habitats are known to be in the vicinity of the proposed action.

***Engineering analysis:*** A comprehensive technical analysis of DUF<sub>6</sub> technology options, including conversion, use, transportation, storage, and disposal.

**Enrichment:** An isotopic separation process that increases the portion of the uranium-235 isotope in relation to uranium-238 in natural uranium. In addition to the enriched uranium, this process also produces uranium depleted in uranium-235. Enrichment is accomplished in the United States through a process called gaseous diffusion.

**Environmental impact statement (EIS):** A document prepared in accordance with the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).

**Environmental justice:** The fair treatment of people of all races, cultures, incomes, and educational levels with respect to the development, implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws, regulations, and policies. Fair treatment implies that no population of people should be forced to shoulder a disproportionate share of the negative environmental impacts of pollution or environmental hazards as a result of their lack of political or economic strength.

**Evapotranspiration:** Loss of water from the soil by both evaporation and transpiration from plants growing in the soil.

**Exposure:** The condition of being made subject to the action of radiation, chemicals, or physical hazards. Exposure is sometimes used as a generic term to refer to the dose of radiation or chemicals absorbed by an individual or population.

**External exposure:** Exposure to radiation, principally gamma radiation, that originates from sources outside of the body.

**Farmland Protection Policy Act of 1981:** An Act that requires federal agencies to take steps to ensure that federal actions do not contribute to the unnecessary and irreversible conversion

of farmland to nonagricultural uses in cases in which other national interests do not override the importance of protecting the farmland resources.

**Fault:** A fracture in the earth's crust accompanied by displacement of one side of the fracture with respect to the other and in a direction parallel to the fracture.

**Federal Facilities Compliance Act of 1992:** An Act that amended the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) with the objectives of bringing all federal facilities into compliance with applicable federal and state hazardous waste laws, of waiving federal sovereign immunity under those laws, and of allowing the imposition of fines and penalties. The law also requires the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) to submit an inventory of all its mixed waste and to develop a treatment plan for mixed waste.

**Federal listed species:** see also *threatened*, *endangered*, and *candidate species*.

**Fission:** The splitting of a heavy atomic nucleus into two nuclei of lighter elements, accompanied by the release of energy and generally one or more neutrons. Fission can occur spontaneously or be induced by neutron bombardment.

**Floodplain:** The lowlands adjoining inland and coastal waters and relatively flat areas, including at a minimum that area inundated by a 1% or greater chance flood in any given year. The base floodplain is defined as the 100-year (1%) floodplain. The critical action floodplain is defined as the 500-year (0.2%) floodplain.

**Food chain:** The scheme of feeding relationships between trophic levels that unites the member species of a biological community.

**Fugitive dust:** The dust released from activities associated with construction, manufacturing, or transportation.

**Fugitive emissions:** Uncontrolled emissions to the atmosphere from pumps, valves, flanges, seals, and other process points not vented through a stack. Also includes emissions from area sources such as ponds, lagoons, landfills, and piles of stored material.

**Gamma radiation ( $\gamma$ ):** High-energy, short-wavelength electromagnetic radiation (a packet of energy) emitted from a radioactive nucleus during decay. Gamma radiation frequently accompanies alpha and beta emissions and always accompanies fission. Gamma rays are very penetrating and are best stopped or shielded against by dense materials such as lead or uranium. Gamma rays are similar to X-rays, but are usually more energetic.

**Gaseous diffusion:** The uranium enrichment process first developed in the 1940s as part of the Manhattan Project. In gaseous diffusion, gaseous UF<sub>6</sub> is allowed to flow irreversibly through a membrane or diffusion barrier. With holes just large enough to allow the passage of individual molecules without passage of the bulk gas through the membrane or diffusion barrier, more of the lighter molecules (i.e., those containing uranium-235 atoms) will flow through the barrier than the heavier molecules (i.e., those containing uranium-238 atoms), thus effecting partial separation. Gaseous diffusion results in two streams of UF<sub>6</sub>: one enriched in the uranium-235 isotope and one depleted in the uranium-235 isotope.

**General public:** For purposes of analyses in this EIS, anyone outside the boundary of a site at the time of an accident or during normal facility operations, as well as people

along transportation routes used to ship hazardous chemicals or radioactive materials.

**Glove box:** An airtight box used to work with hazardous material, vented to a closed filtering system, having gloves attached inside the box to protect the worker.

**Greater-than-Class-C waste:** Low-level radioactive waste generated by the commercial sector that exceeds U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) concentration limits for Class-C low-level waste, as specified in Title 10, Part 61, *Code of Federal Regulations* (10 CFR Part 61).

**Green salt:** see *uranium tetrafluoride*.

**Groundshine:** Gamma radiation emitted from radioactive materials deposited on the ground.

**Groundwater:** Generally, all water contained in the ground; water held below the water table available to freely enter wells.

**Grout:** A cementing or sealing mixture of cement and water to which sand, sawdust, or other fillers (additives — e.g., waste) may be added.

**Grouted waste:** Refers to the solid material obtained by mixing waste material with cement and repackaging it in drums. Grouting is intended to reduce the mobility of the waste material.

**Habitat:** Area where a plant or animal lives.

**Hazard index:** A summation of the hazard quotients for all chemicals to which an individual is exposed. A hazard index value of 1.0 or less than 1.0 indicates that no adverse human health effects (noncancer) are expected to occur.

**Hazard quotient:** A comparison of an estimated chemical intake (dose) with a reference dose level below which adverse health effects are unlikely. The hazard quotient is expressed as the ratio of the estimated intake to the reference dose. The value is used to evaluate the potential for noncancer health effects, such as organ damage, from chemical exposures.

**Hazardous air pollutants:** The 189 chemicals and chemical classes — such as asbestos, beryllium, mercury, benzene, and radionuclides — whose emissions are specially regulated by the CAA.

**Hazardous material:** A material that poses a potential risk to health, safety, and property when transported or handled.

**Hazardous waste:** Under RCRA, a solid waste, or combination of solid waste, which — because of its quantity, concentration, or physical, chemical, or infectious characteristics — may (a) cause or significantly contribute to an increase in mortality or an increase in serious irreversible, or incapacitating reversible, illness or (b) pose a substantial present or potential hazard to human health or the environment when improperly treated, stored, transported, or disposed of, or otherwise managed. Source material (including UF<sub>6</sub>), special nuclear material, and by-product material, as defined by the AEA, are specifically excluded from the definition of solid waste.

**Health risk conversion factors:** Estimates of the expected number of health effects (i.e., cancer cases, cancer fatalities, or genetic effects) caused by exposure to a given amount of radiation. Health risk conversion factors are multiplied by the estimated radiation dose received by a given population (such as workers or members of the public) in order to

estimate the number of health effects expected to occur as a result of the exposure. Health risk conversion factors are derived from data collected from Japanese atomic bomb survivors, historical medical and industrial exposures, and animal experimentation.

**Heels:** Residual amounts of nonvolatile material left in a cylinder following the removal of DUF<sub>6</sub>.

**High-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter:** A filter with an efficiency of at least 99.95% used to separate particles from air exhaust streams prior to releasing that air into the atmosphere.

**Hydrocarbons (HC):** Chemical compounds containing carbon and hydrogen as the principal elements.

**Hydrogen fluoride (HF):** A colorless, toxic, fuming, corrosive liquid or gas miscible with cold water and very soluble in hot water. HF is produced when UF<sub>6</sub> comes in contact with water, such as humidity in the air, and is often a by-product produced when UF<sub>6</sub> is converted to another chemical form.

**Hygroscopic:** A chemical substance with an affinity for water; one that will absorb moisture, usually from the air.

**Inconel:** A metal alloy containing nickel, chromium, and iron, which exhibits good resistance to corrosion in aqueous environments.

**Internal exposure:** The ingestion or inhalation of radioactive contaminants in air, water, food, or soil, and the subsequent radiation dose to internal organs and tissues of the body.

**Involved worker:** A worker directly involved in the handling or processing of radioactive or hazardous materials.

**Ion:** An atom, molecule, or molecular fragment carrying a positive or negative electrical charge.

**Ionizing radiation:** Radiation that has enough energy to remove electrons from substances that it passes through, forming ions.

**Isotope:** One of two or more species of an element that have the same atomic number but different masses. The difference in mass is due to the presence of one or more extra neutrons in the nucleus. The number of protons for different isotopes of the same element is the same. Uranium-235 and uranium-238 are examples of isotopes of the element uranium.

**Land disposal restrictions:** Restrictions on the disposal of waste that is hazardous under RCRA. The land disposal restrictions include technology-based or performance-based treatment standards that must be met before hazardous waste can be disposed of on land.

**Latent cancer fatality (LCF):** Term used to indicate the estimated number of cancer fatalities that may result from exposure to a cancer-causing element. Latent cancer fatalities are similar to naturally occurring cancers and may be expressed at any time after the initial exposure.

**Lead (Pb):** A toxic metal in air, food, water, and soil. Overexposure to this metal can cause damage to the circulatory, digestive, and central nervous systems. Lead is one of six criteria air pollutants specified under Title I of the CAA.

**Long-term storage:** The containment of material on a temporary basis or for a period

of years, in such a manner as not to constitute disposal of such material. Long-term storage would preserve access to the material until a future use is identified or until a decision is made to dispose of the material.

**Low-income population:** Persons of low-income status. This status is based on U.S. Bureau of the Census definitions of individuals living below the poverty line, as defined by a statistical threshold that considers family size and income. For 1990, the poverty line threshold for a family unit of four individuals was \$12,674 (based on 1989 income). In this EIS, low-income population was defined as consisting of any census tract located within a 50-mi (80-km) radius of a storage site that has a proportion of low-income population that is greater than the respective state average.

**Low-level mixed waste (LLMW):** Waste that contains both hazardous waste under RCRA and radioactive material, including source, special nuclear, or by-product material subject to the AEA. Such waste has to be handled, processed, and disposed of in a manner that considers its chemical as well as its radioactive components.

**Low-level radioactive waste (LLW):** Waste that contains radioactivity but is not classified as high-level waste, transuranic waste, spent nuclear fuel, or "11e(2) by-product material" as defined by DOE Order 5820.2A. Low-level waste is typically disposed of using shallow land burial.

**Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act:** The Act, as amended, that established procedures for the implementation of compacts providing for the establishment and operation of regional disposal facilities for LLW that made the federal government responsible for ultimate disposal of commercially generated waste with a

classification of greater-than-Class-C (see also *greater-than-Class-C waste*).

**Maximally exposed individual (MEI):** A hypothetical individual who — because of proximity, activities, or living habits — could potentially receive the maximum possible dose of radiation or of a hazardous chemical from a given event or process.

**Migratory Bird Treaty Act, as amended:** Act intended to protect birds that have common migration patterns between the United States and Canada, Mexico, Japan, and Russia.

**Millirem:** A unit of radiation exposure equal to one-thousandth of a rem.

**Minority population:** Persons classified by the U.S. Bureau of the Census as Negro/Black/African-American, Hispanic, Asian and Pacific Islander, American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut, or other nonwhite; based on self-classification by individuals according to the race with which they most closely identify. For this EIS, a minority population was defined as any census tract located within a 50-mi (80-km) radius of a storage site that has a proportion of minority population that is greater than the respective state average.

**Mixed waste:** see also *low-level mixed waste*.

**Model:** A conceptual, mathematical, or physical system obeying certain specified conditions, whose behavior is used to understand the physical system to which it is analogous. Models are often used to predict the behavior or outcome of future events.

**Modified Mercalli Intensity:** A level on the Modified Mercalli scale. A measure of the perceived intensity of earthquake ground-shaking with 12 divisions, from I (not felt by people) to XII (damage nearly total).

**Monel:** Trade name for a white copper-nickel alloy that is acid- and corrosion-resistant.

**National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS):** Air quality standards established by the CAA, as amended. The primary NAAQS are intended to protect the public health with an adequate margin of safety; the secondary NAAQS are intended to protect the public welfare from any known or anticipated adverse effects of a pollutant.

**National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAPs):** A set of national emission standards for listed hazardous pollutants emitted from specific classes or categories of new and existing sources. These standards were implemented in the CAA Amendments of 1977.

**National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969:** The Act that established the national policy to protect humans and the environment, requiring environmental reviews of federal actions that have the potential for significant impact on the environment. It also established the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ).

**National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, as amended:** The Act directing federal agencies to consider the effects of their programs and projects on properties listed on or eligible for the National Register of Historic Places. It does not require any permits, but pursuant to federal code, if a proposed action might impact any archaeological, historical, or architectural resource, this Act mandates consultation with the proper agencies.

**National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES):** Federal permitting system required for hazardous effluents regulated through the CWA, as amended.

**National Register of Historic Places:** A list maintained by the Secretary of the Interior as the official list of historic properties (districts, sites, buildings, structures, and objects) deserving preservation because of their local, state, or national significance in American history, architecture, archaeology, engineering, and culture. Properties listed on or eligible for the National Register are protected by the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, as amended.

**NEPA document:** A document prepared pursuant to requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act or CEQ regulations, including the following: environmental assessment, environmental impact statement, Notice of Intent, Record of Decision, and Finding of No Significant Impact.

**Nitrogen oxides (NO<sub>x</sub>):** The oxides of nitrogen, primarily nitrogen oxide (NO) and nitrogen dioxide (NO<sub>2</sub>), that are produced in the combustion of fossil fuels and can constitute an air pollution problem. When NO<sub>2</sub> combines with volatile organic compounds in sunlight, ozone is produced. Nitrogen oxides are one of six criteria air pollutants specified under Title I of the CAA.

**Nonattainment area:** An AQCR (or a portion thereof) for which the EPA has determined that ambient air concentrations exceed NAAQS for one or more criteria pollutants (see also *attainment area* and *criteria pollutants*).

**Nonhazardous waste:** Routinely generated waste, including general facility refuse such as paper, cardboard, glass, wood, plastics, scrap, metal containers, dirt, and rubble. Nonhazardous waste is segregated and recycled whenever possible.

**Noninvolved worker:** A worker employed at a site who is not directly involved in the handling of radioactive or hazardous materials.

**Normal operations:** Conditions during which facilities and processes operate as expected or designed. In general, the evaluation of normal operations includes the occurrence of some infrequent events that, although not considered routine, are not classified as accidents. For example, the identification and repair of breached cylinders, expected to occur infrequently, was considered to be normal operations.

**Nuclear weapon:** The general name given to any weapon in which the explosion results from energy released by reactions involving atomic nuclei — either fission or fusion, or both.

**Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA):** The agency that oversees and regulates workplace health and safety, created by the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970.

**Overpack:** Container used for transporting cylinders not meeting U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) requirements. An overpack is a container into which a cylinder would be placed for shipment. The overpack would be designed, tested, and certified to meet all DOT shipping requirements and would be suitable to contain, transport, and store the cylinder contents regardless of cylinder condition.

**Ozone (O<sub>3</sub>):** The triatomic form of oxygen. In the stratosphere, ozone protects the earth from the sun's ultraviolet rays, but in lower levels of the atmosphere, ozone is considered an air pollutant and can cause irritation of the eyes

and respiratory tract. Ozone is one of six criteria air pollutants specified under Title I of the CAA.

***Palustrine:*** Nontidal wetlands dominated by trees, shrubs, or persistent emergent vegetation or small shallow wetlands.

***Particulate matter, particulates:*** Particles in an aerosol stream, the larger of which usually can be removed by filtration.

***Pasquill stability categories:*** Classification scheme that describes the degree of atmospheric turbulence. Categories range from extremely unstable (A) to extremely stable (F). Unstable conditions promote the rapid dispersion of atmospheric contaminants and result in lower air concentrations compared with stable conditions.

***Pathway:*** A route or sequence of processes by which radioactive or hazardous material may move through the environment to humans or other organisms. For example, one potential exposure pathway involves the contamination and subsequent use of surface water or groundwater.

***Permeability:*** In hydrology, the capacity of a medium (rock, sediment, or soil) to transmit groundwater. Permeability depends on the size and shape of the pores in the medium and how they are interconnected.

***Permissible exposure limits (PELs):*** Occupational exposure limits established for worker exposures to various chemicals, endorsed by the OSHA. Permissible exposure limits are defined so as to protect worker health and may be for short-term or 8-hour duration exposure.

***Plume:*** The spatial distribution of a release of airborne or waterborne material as it disperses in the environment.

***Plutonium (Pu):*** A heavy, radioactive, metallic element with the atomic number 94. Plutonium is produced artificially in a reactor by bombardment of uranium with neutrons and is used primarily in the production of nuclear weapons.

***PM<sub>10</sub>:*** Particulate matter with a mean aerodynamic diameter of 10 micrometers (µm) or less. PM<sub>10</sub> is one of six criteria air pollutants specified under Title I of the CAA.

***Pollution Prevention Act of 1990:*** The Act establishing the national policy that pollution should be prevented or reduced at the source or recycled in an environmentally safe manner and that pollution that cannot be prevented or recycled should be, as a last resort, treated and disposed of in an environmentally safe manner.

***Polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs):*** A class of chemical substances formerly manufactured as an insulating fluid in electrical equipment. PCBs are highly toxic to aquatic life and, in the environment, exhibit many of the characteristics of dichloro diphenyl trichloroethane (DDT). PCBs persist in the environment for a long time and accumulate in animals.

***Polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs):*** A group of organic compounds, some of which are known to be potent human carcinogens.

***Population dose:*** see also *collective dose*.

***Programmatic environmental impact statement (PEIS):*** A type of EIS that deals with broad strategies and decisions, such as those that are regional or national in scope.

***Proposed action:*** The term used in an EIS to refer to the activity planned by a federal

agency that generates the need to prepare an EIS.

**Public:** see also *general public*.

**Radiation:** The particles (alpha and beta particles) or photons (gamma rays) emitted from the nuclei of radioactive atoms. Some elements are naturally radioactive; others are induced to become radioactive by bombardment in a reactor. Naturally occurring radiation, such as that from uranium, is indistinguishable from induced radiation.

**Radiation absorbed dose (rad):** The basic unit of absorbed dose equal to the absorption of 0.01 joule per kilogram (J/kg) of absorbing material.

**Radioactivity:** The spontaneous decay or disintegration of unstable atomic nuclei, accompanied by the emission of radiation.

**Radioactive decay:** Natural process by which a radioactive atom is physically transformed into another form by the release of energy in the form of subatomic particles such as alpha or beta particles, or electromagnetic radiation such as gamma rays.

**Radioactive decay products:** The isotopes produced when another isotope undergoes radioactive decay. The decay products are also typically radioactive.

**Radionuclide:** An atom that exhibits radioactive properties. Standard practice for naming a radionuclide is to use the name or atomic symbol of the element followed by its atomic weight (e.g., cobalt-60 [Co-60], a radionuclide of cobalt with an atomic weight of 60).

**Recharge:** Replenishment of water to an aquifer.

**Record of Decision (ROD):** A document prepared in accordance with the requirements of 40 CFR 1505.2 that provides a concise public record of the DOE's decision on a proposed action for which an EIS was prepared. A ROD identifies the alternatives considered in reaching the decision, the environmentally preferable alternative(s), and the factors balanced by the DOE in making the decision. The ROD also identifies whether all practicable means of avoiding or minimizing environmental harm have been adopted and, if not, why they were not.

**Region of influence (ROI):** The physical area that bounds the environmental, sociological, economic, or cultural feature of interest for the purpose of analysis.

**Rem:** The dosage of an ionizing radiation that will cause the same biological effect as one roentgen of X-ray or gamma-ray exposure.

**Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), as amended:** An act that provides a "cradle-to-grave" regulatory program for hazardous waste that established, among other things, a system for managing hazardous waste from its generation until its ultimate disposal.

**Retardation:** The process by which dissolved material moves more slowly through the soil than the velocity of the bulk fluid (i.e., water).

**Risk:** A quantitative or qualitative expression of possible loss that considers both the probability that a hazard will cause harm and the consequences of that event.

**Safe Drinking Water Act, as amended:** An act that protects the quality of public water supplies and all sources of drinking water.

**Sanitary waste:** Waste generated by normal housekeeping activities, liquid or solid (includes sludge), that is not hazardous or radioactive.

**Scope:** The range of actions, alternatives, and impacts to be considered in a document prepared pursuant to NEPA of 1969.

**Scoping:** The process of inviting public comment on what should be considered prior to preparation of an EIS.

**Severe accident:** An accident with a frequency of less than 1 in 1 million ( $10^{-6}$ ) per year that would have more severe consequences than a design-basis accident in terms of damage to the facility, off-site consequences, or both.

**Shielding:** Any material that is placed between a source of radiation and people, equipment, or other objects, in order to absorb the radiation and thereby reduce radiation exposure. Common shielding materials include concrete, steel, water, and lead. In general, for shielding gamma radiation sources, the denser a material is, the more effective it is as a shield.

**Sinter:** To form a homogenous mass by heating without melting.

**Socioeconomic analysis:** Analysis of those parts of the human environment in a particular location that are related to existing and potential future economic and social conditions.

**Socioeconomic impacts:** For this EIS, impacts expressed in terms of regional economic impacts (notably changes in local employment, income, and economic output [sales]), impacts to public services and finance in local jurisdictions, and impacts to local housing markets.

**Soil and Water Conservation Act of 1977:** An Act to establish a program administered by the Secretary of Agriculture to further the conservation of soil, water, and related resources consistent with the roles and responsibilities of other federal agencies and state and local governments.

**Solid Waste Disposal Act:** An Act that regulates the treatment, storage, or disposal of solid, both nonhazardous and hazardous, waste, as amended by RCRA and the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984.

**Source:** Any physical entity that may cause radiation exposure, for example, by emitting ionizing radiation or releasing radioactive material. Examples of radiation sources include X-ray machines and radionuclides such as uranium.

**Source term:** The amount of radioactive or hazardous material released to the environment following an accident.

**Stability class:** see *Pasquill stability categories*.

**Stakeholder:** Any person or organization interested in or potentially affected by activities and decisions of the DOE.

**Storage:** The temporary holding of material in a controlled and monitored facility.

**Sulfur dioxide (SO<sub>2</sub>):** A compound of sulfur produced by the burning of sulfur-containing compounds and considered to be a major air pollutant. Sulfur dioxide is one of six criteria air pollutants specified under Title I of the CAA.

**Sulfur oxides (SO<sub>x</sub>):** A general term used to describe the oxides of sulfur — pungent, colorless gases formed primarily by the

combustion of fossil fuels. Sulfur oxides, which are considered major air pollutants, may damage the respiratory tract as well as vegetation.

***Technetium:*** A radioactive element with the atomic number 43. It is derived from uranium and plutonium fission products. Its isotope Tc-99 is used to absorb slow neutrons in reactor technology.

***Terrestrial:*** Pertaining to plants or animals living on land rather than in the water.

***Threatened species:*** Any species that is likely to become an endangered species within the foreseeable future throughout all or a significant portion of its range.

***Throughput:*** A general term that refers to the amount of material handled or processed by a facility in a year.

***Tiering:*** The process of first addressing general (programmatic) matters in a broad PEIS, followed by more narrowly focused (project-level) environmental documentation that incorporates by reference the more general document.

***Topography:*** Physical shape of the ground surface.

***Total effective dose equivalent:*** The sum of the effective dose equivalent from external exposure and the 50-year committed effective dose equivalent from internal exposure.

***Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976 (TSCA):*** The act authorizing the EPA to secure information on all new and existing chemical substances and to control any of these substances determined to cause an unreasonable risk to public health or the environment. This law requires that the health and environmental effects of all new

chemicals be reviewed by the EPA before they are manufactured for commercial purposes.

***Transuranic (TRU) waste:*** Waste contaminated by alpha-emitting transuranic radionuclides (i.e., radionuclides with atomic numbers greater than 92) with half-lives of more than 20 years and concentrations higher than 100 nanocuries per gram (nCi/g) at the time of assay.

***Triuranium octaoxide (U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub>):*** An oxide form of uranium that is the most common chemical form found in nature. U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> is very stable and has a low solubility in water.

***Uranium:*** A heavy, silvery-white, naturally radioactive, metallic element (atomic number 92). Its two principally occurring isotopes are uranium-235 and uranium-238. Uranium-235 is indispensable to the nuclear industry because it is the only isotope existing in nature to any appreciable extent that is fissionable by thermal neutrons. Uranium-238 is also important because it absorbs neutrons to produce a radioactive isotope that subsequently decays to plutonium-239, an isotope that also is fissionable by thermal neutrons.

***Uranium dioxide (UO<sub>2</sub>):*** A black crystalline powder that is widely used in the manufacture of fuel pellets for nuclear reactors. Pressed and sintered, it is stable when exposed to water or air below 300°C (572°F).

***Uranium hexafluoride (UF<sub>6</sub>):*** A chemical composed of one atom of uranium combined with 6 atoms of fluorine. UF<sub>6</sub> is a volatile white crystalline solid at ambient conditions. This form of uranium is used as feed for gaseous diffusion enrichment plants.

***Uranium metal:*** A heavy, silvery-white, malleable, ductile, softer-than-steel metallic

element. One of the densest materials known, it is 1.6 times more dense than lead and slightly less toxic. Uranium metal is not as stable as U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> or UF<sub>4</sub> because it is subject to surface oxidation. It tarnishes in air, with the oxide film preventing further oxidation of massive metal at room temperature.

**Uranium tetrafluoride (UF<sub>4</sub>):** A green crystalline solid that melts at about 960°C (1,652°F) and has an insignificant vapor pressure. It is very slightly soluble in water; generally an intermediate in the conversion of UF<sub>6</sub> to either uranium oxide (U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> or UO<sub>2</sub>) or uranium metal. Also known as green salt.

**Uranyl fluoride (UO<sub>2</sub>F<sub>2</sub>):** A yellow hygroscopic (i.e., moisture-retaining) solid that is very soluble in water. In accidental releases of UF<sub>6</sub>, UO<sub>2</sub>F<sub>2</sub> is a solid particulate compound that may deposit on the ground over a large area.

**Vacuum:** A pressure less than atmospheric. Depleted uranium hexafluoride (DUF<sub>6</sub>) is stored in a vacuum in cylinders.

**Volatile organic compounds (VOCs):** A broad range of organic compounds (such as benzene, chloroform, and methyl alcohol), often halogenated, that vaporize at ambient or relatively low temperatures.

**Waste management:** The planning, coordination, and direction of those functions related to generation, handling, treatment, storage, transportation, and disposal of waste, as well

as associated pollution prevention and surveillance and maintenance activities.

**Waste minimization:** An action that economically avoids or reduces the generation of waste by source reduction, reducing the toxicity of hazardous waste, improving energy usage, or recycling.

**Wastewater:** Water that typically contains less than a 1% concentration of organic hazardous waste materials.

**Water Quality Act of 1987:** An act amending the Federal Water Pollution Control Act to make NPDES requirements applicable to storm water discharges.

**Web site:** A collection of information — possibly including text, figures, pictures, audio, and video — that can be accessed by computer through the Internet computer network. These sites are intended to communicate and distribute information to anyone having access to the Internet.

**Wetlands:** Lands or areas exhibiting hydric soils, saturated or inundated soil during some portion of the plant growing season, and plant species tolerant of such conditions (includes swamps, marshes, and bogs).

**Wild and Scenic Rivers Act:** An Act providing for protection of the free-flowing, scenic, and natural values of rivers designated as components or potential components of the National Wild and Scenic Rivers System.

**10 INDEX****Affected Environment**

1-28, 3-1, 3-15, 3-53, 7-3, 8-3, B-16, (Appendix C Report, 11), F-36, F-37

**Air Quality**

2-4, 2-27, 2-35, 2-36, 2-53, 3-5, 3-7 through 10, 3-44, 3-47 through 50, 5-4, 5-6, 5-15, 5-16, 5-23 through 26, 5-59 through 63, 5-95, 5-107, 5-108, 5-111, 5-113, 5-123, 6-4, 6-5, 7-7, 7-9, 7-13, 8-1, 9-1, 9-2, 9-4, 9-10, (Appendix C Report, 3, 22), (Appendix D Report, 7, 12, 16), F-33, F-34, F-39, F-43, F-48

**Air Quality and Noise**

2-35, 2-53, 5-15, 5-23, 5-59, (Appendix D Report, 7, 12), F-33

**Alternatives**

1-6, 1-7, 1-15, 1-16, 1-18, 1-21, 1-30, 2-1, 2-2, 2-4, 2-5, 2-23, 2-24, 2-26 through 2-29, 2-31, 2-32, 2-34, 2-36 through 2-40, 2-42, 2-43, 2-45, 2-66, 3-74, 4-1 through 3, 4-5, 4-11, 4-13, 5-1, 5-21, 5-43, 5-72, 5-73, 5-106 through 113, 5-116 through 120, 6-12, 9-13, 9-14, B-17, B-18, (Appendix C Report, iii, 1, 2, 3, 9, 20, 21, 23), (Appendix D Report, 2, 9), E-9, F-3, F-7, F-14, F-35, F-40, F-42 through 45

**Background Information**

1-2, 1-30, 4-1, 4-2, 5-42, (Appendix C Report, 2), (Appendix D Report, 2)

**Biotic Resources**

3-17, 3-57, 6-10

**Breached Cylinders**

2-3, 2-4, 2-26, 2-28, 3-14, 3-53, 5-5, 5-6, 5-8, 5-9, 5-15, 5-18, 5-19, 9-11

**Chemical Environment**

3-26, 3-61

**Comparison of Alternatives**

2-1, 2-26

**Contractor Disclosure Statement**

1-31, 8-1, H-1, H-3

**Cultural Resources**

1-21, 2-27, 2-40, 2-43, 2-61, 3-37, 3-72, 5-5, 5-20, 5-40, 5-71, 5-72, 5-96, 5-108, 5-112, 5-114, 6-11, 6-12, 7-9, 7-10, 7-13, 7-14, 8-2, 8-3, 9-4, (Appendix C Report, 15), (Appendix D Report, 7, 12, 15), F-42, F-43

**Cumulative Impacts**

1-24, 1-27, 1-30, 2-42 through 44, 5-1, 5-63, 5-104 through 112, 8-2, 8-3, 9-4, (Appendix C Report, 3, 13, 22), F-45, F-48

**Cylinder Inventory**

1-2, 1-10, 1-16, 2-3, 2-15, 2-20, 2-28, 3-1, 4-3, 5-1, 5-104, B-3, B-5, B-15, (Appendix C Report, iii, 11), F-13

**Cylinder Preparation**

1-23, 1-28, 2-20, 2-40, 2-62, 5-91, 5-93 through 95, 5-111, 7-8, 9-4, (Appendix D Report, 22), F-7, F-8, F-48, F-49

**Cylinder Yards**

1-4, 1-5, 2-2, 2-6, 2-26, 2-28, 2-45, 3-2, 3-4, 3-14, 3-17, 3-42, 3-53, 3-61, 5-7, 5-15, 5-16, 5-20, 5-44, 5-45, 5-92, 5-113, B-17, (Appendix C Report, 14, 19), (Appendix D Report, 4)

**Decontamination and Decommissioning (D&D)**

1-1, 1-13, 1-17, 1-30, 2-2, 2-5, 2-27, 2-42, 2-64, 2-65, 3-42, 5-1, 5-109, 5-110, 5-117, 5-119 through 125, (Appendix C Report, 1, 3, 8, 14, 15, 18, 21), (Appendix D Report, 7, 10)

**Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride Management Program**

1-28, 7-6, 7-8, B-19, (Appendix D Report, 22), F-48, F-49

**Ecology**

2-4, 2-27, 2-37, 2-58, 5-6, 5-19, 5-30, 5-67, 5-107, 5-112, 8-3, (Appendix D Report, 7, 12), F-39

**Environmental Impacts of Alternatives**

5-1

**Environmental Justice**

1-21, 2-27, 2-40, 2-43, 2-62, 3-38, 3-39, 3-74, 3-75, 5-20, 5-41, 5-42, 5-72, 5-108, 5-112, 7-2, 8-2, 9-6, (Appendix C Report, 4, 14, 22), F-43, F-44, F-45, F-47

**Housing**

2-37, 3-30, 3-31, 3-67, 5-19, 5-29, 5-66, 5-113, 7-13, 9-14, (Appendix C Report, 4, 22), (Appendix D Report, 14), F-36, F-38, F-44, F-51

**Human Health and Safety**

1-21, 1-22, 2-4, 2-27, 2-28, 2-32, 2-45, 2-47, 2-50, 2-64, 5-6 through 8, 5-20, 5-22, 5-42, 5-46, 5-47, 5-110, 5-121, 5-122, (Appendix C Report, 13), (Appendix D Report, 7, 12, 13, 17, 19), F-3, F-12, F-21

**Irreversible and Irrecoverable Commitment of Resources**

5-1, 5-116

**Land Use**

2-27, 2-40, 2-43, 2-61, 3-1, 3-35, 3-72, 4-2, 5-20, 5-39, 5-40, 5-71, 5-107, 5-112, 5-117, 8-2, (Appendix D Report, 7, 9, 12, 14), F-42, F-43

**List of Preparers**

8-1

**Low-Level Mixed Waste**

9-9, 9-10, B-14

**Low-Level Waste**

9-7, 9-9, (Appendix C Report, 3, 22), (Appendix D Report, 6)

**Minority and Low-Income Populations**

2-40, 5-41, 5-42, 5-72, 5-112, F-44, F-45

**Mitigation**

1-30, 2-38, 2-40, 5-1, 5-15, 5-32, 5-41, 5-66, 5-96, 5-112 through 115, (Appendix D Report, iii, 9, 10, 15, 16), F-46

**No Action Alternative**

1-2, 1-8, 1-11, 1-14, 1-17, 1-18, 2-1, 2-3, 2-4, 2-26 through 28, 2-30, 2-32, 2-35 through 38, 2-40 through 43, 2-66, 3-38, 4-1, 4-3, 5-1 through 8, 5-10, 5-11, 5-13, 5-15 through 20, 5-94, 5-109, 5-111, 5-112, 7-8, 7-11, (Appendix C Report, 3), F-3, F-7, F-8, F-12, F-14, F-35, F-36, F-42 through 44

**Nonradioactive Hazardous and Toxic Waste**

3-35, 3-71

**Normal Operations**

2-16, 2-27, 2-28, 2-50, 2-62, 2-66, 4-1, 4-10, 5-7, 5-8, 5-42, 5-44, 5-46, 5-65, 5-66, 5-94, 5-95, 5-110, 5-111, 8-1, 9-11, B-7, (Appendix D Report, 7, 12, 13, 17), F-5, F-9, F-10, F-26, F-35

**Pollution Prevention and Waste Minimization**

1-30, 5-1, 5-120

**Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCBs)**

1-13, 1-31, 2-15, 2-16, 2-39, 5-114, B-3, B-15 through 19

**Portsmouth Site**

1-1, 1-7, 1-8, 1-10, 1-13, 1-14, 1-17, 1-23 through 25, 2-1, 2-22, 5-1, 5-108, B-3, B-7, B-14, B-17, B-18, C-3, (Appendix C Report, 8, 9), (Appendix D Report, 12, 14, 22), F-49

**Preferred Alternative**

1-22, 2-6, 2-7, 2-44, 5-109, (Appendix C Report, 2, 9, 21)

**Proposed Action**

1-1, 1-7, 1-11, 1-13 through 15, 1-18, 1-22, 1-26, 2-1, 2-2, 2-4, 2-16, 2-26, 2-27, 2-39, 2-42, 2-45, 2-46, 2-61, 3-1, 3-38, 3-74, 4-1, 5-1, 5-21, 5-42, 5-70, 5-71, 5-108 through 111, 6-12, 9-5, 9-10, 9-12, 9-13, B-3, B-6, B-7, B-11, B-14, B-17, B-18, (Appendix C Report, 22), F-45

**Public and Occupational Safety and Health**

3-24, 3-58

**Public Finances**

2-37, 5-19, 5-29, 5-66, (Appendix D Report, 14)

**Purpose and Need**

1-13, (Appendix C Report, 20)

**Radiation Environment**

3-24, 3-58, 5-7

**References**

1-30, 7-1, 8-3, B-3, B-18, (Appendix D Report, iii, 22), E-17, F-46

**Regional Economic Activity**

F-36

**Relationship between Short-Term Use of the Environment and Long-Term Productivity**

1-30, 5-1, 5-119

**Relationship to Other NEPA Reviews**

1-24

**Resource Requirements**

1-21, 2-27, 2-39, 2-61, 5-20, 5-39, 5-70, (Appendix D Report, 7, 12, 14), F-41, F-42

**Seismic Risk**

3-11, 3-52

**Site Infrastructure**

3-2, 3-44

**Socioeconomics**

1-21, 2-27, 2-37, 2-57, 3-26, 3-61, 5-4, 5-19, 5-29, 5-66, 5-113, 5-123, (Appendix C Report, 14), (Appendix D Report, 7, 12, 14), F-35, F-43, F-45

**Solid Nonhazardous, Nonradioactive Waste**

3-34, 3-71

**Surface Water**

2-4, 2-16, 2-36, 2-37, 2-55, 2-66, 3-2, 3-15, 3-16, 3-19, 3-21, 3-24, 3-27, 3-53 through 57, 3-62, 5-6, 5-8, 5-9, 5-17, 5-19, 5-27, 5-28, 5-32, 5-33, 5-46, 5-65 through 68, 5-107, 5-111, 5-113, 6-5, 9-12, B-16, B-17, (Appendix C Report, 3, 22), (Appendix D Report, 13), F-4, F-6, F-7, F-35, F-39

**Threatened and Endangered Species**

2-37, 3-22, 3-58, 5-30, 5-35, 5-68, 6-10, 7-14, 9-3, (Appendix C Report, 4, 22), (Appendix D Report, 10), F-39, F-40

**Transportation**

1-1, 1-8, 1-14, 1-16, 1-17, 1-19, 1-22, 1-23, 1-25 through 29, 2-2, 2-5, 2-16 through 20, 2-24, 2-25, 2-27, 2-31 through 35, 2-40, 2-43, 2-50, 3-2, 3-29, 3-30, 3-43, 3-44, 3-64, 3-65, 4-1, 4-2, 4-5, 4-6, 4-10, 5-15, 5-21, 5-35, 5-43, 5-71, 5-73 through 76, 5-78, 5-80 through 89, 5-91, 5-93, 5-96, 5-97, 5-99 through 103, 5-105 through 108, 5-110, 5-115, 5-116, 5-118, 5-119, 5-121, 6-1, 6-2, 6-10, 7-1, 7-2, 7-5, 7-6, 7-9, 7-11, 7-12, 7-15, 8-1, 9-4, 9-5, 9-7, 9-11, 9-16, A-3, B-7, B-9, B-11, B-14, B-16, B-17, (Appendix C Report, iii, 3, 9, 12, 15, 20, 21, 22), (Appendix D Report, 6, 7, 9, 12, 15, 19, 20), E-11, E-16, F-3, F-8, F-21 through 32, F-36, F-41, F-46, F-47, F-49 through 51

**Transuranic Contamination**

B-3, (Appendix C Report, 11)

**Unavoidable Adverse Impacts**

5-1, 5-116

**Uncertainty in Estimated Impacts**

4-13

**Vegetation**

2-37, 2-38, 2-58, 3-17 through 19, 3-21, 3-24, 3-57, 3-58, 5-27, 5-30, 5-31, 5-67, 5-113, 9-12, 9-15, F-39

**Waste Management**

1-21, 1-26, 1-27, 2-27, 2-37 through 39, 2-42, 2-56, 2-59, 3-1, 3-32, 3-39, 3-68, 5-4, 5-20, 5-37, 5-39, 5-69, 5-70, 5-109, 5-116, 5-119, 5-123, 6-8, 7-3, 7-5, 8-1, 8-3, 9-16, B-3, B-11, (Appendix C Report, 4, 9, 15, 22, 23), (Appendix D Report, 7, 12, 17), F-40, F-42, F-47, F-48

**Wastewater**

2-37, 3-15, 3-32, 3-34, 3-35, 3-55, 3-68, 5-17, 5-28, 5-65, 5-95, 6-6, 9-16, (Appendix D Report, 14, 17), F-4, F-40, F-41

**Water and Soil**

2-36, 2-55, 5-17, 5-27, 5-65, 5-107, 5-111, 8-3, (Appendix D Report, 7, 12, 13), F-35, F-51

**Water Resources**

3-15, 3-53, 6-5 through 7

**Wetlands**

2-37, 2-38, 2-43, 2-58, 3-15, 3-19 through 21, 3-24, 3-58, 5-19, 5-30, 5-32 through 37, 5-68, 5-114, 6-7, 7-14, 7-15, 9-3, 9-12, 9-16, (Appendix C Report, 4, 22), (Appendix D Report, 7, 12, 16), F-39, F-40

**Wildlife**

2-37, 2-38, 2-58, 3-1, 3-10, 3-17 through 19, 3-25, 3-37, 3-57, 3-60, 5-30 through 32, 5-37, 5-63, 5-67, 5-68, 5-116, 5-119, 6-10, 7-1, 7-15, 9-3, (Appendix C Report, 13), F-39, F-40

DOE/EIS-0359

**FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT  
STATEMENT FOR CONSTRUCTION  
AND OPERATION OF A DEPLETED URANIUM  
HEXAFLUORIDE CONVERSION FACILITY  
AT THE PADUCAH, KENTUCKY, SITE**

Volume 2: Comment and Response Document

June 2004



U.S. Department of Energy  
Office of Environmental Management

## COVER SHEET

**RESPONSIBLE FEDERAL AGENCY:** U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)

**TITLE:** Final Environmental Impact Statement for Construction and Operation of a Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride Conversion Facility at the Paducah, Kentucky, Site (DOE/EIS-0359)

**CONTACT:** For further information on this environmental impact statement (EIS), contact:

Gary S. Hartman  
DOE-ORO Cultural Resources Management Coordinator  
U.S. Department of Energy-Oak Ridge Operations  
P.O. Box 2001  
Oak Ridge, TN 37831  
e-mail: Pad\_DUF6@anl.gov  
phone: 1-866-530-0944  
fax: 1-866-530-0943

For general information on the DOE National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) process, contact:

Carol Borgstrom, Director  
Office of NEPA Policy and Compliance (EH-42)  
U.S. Department of Energy  
1000 Independence Avenue, SW  
Washington, DC 20585  
202-586-4600, or leave message at 1-800-472-2756

**ABSTRACT:** The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) proposes, via a contract awarded at the direction of Congress (Public Law 107-206), to design, construct, and operate two conversion facilities for converting depleted uranium hexafluoride (commonly referred to as DUF<sub>6</sub>): one at Portsmouth, Ohio, and one at Paducah, Kentucky. DOE intends to use the proposed facilities to convert its inventory of DUF<sub>6</sub> to a more stable chemical form suitable for beneficial use or disposal. This site-specific EIS considers the construction, operation, maintenance, and decontamination and decommissioning (D&D) of the proposed DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion facility at three locations within the Paducah site; transportation of depleted uranium conversion products and waste materials to a disposal facility; transportation and sale of the hydrogen fluoride (HF) produced as a conversion co-product; and neutralization of HF to calcium fluoride (CaF<sub>2</sub>) and its sale or disposal in the event that the HF product is not sold. This EIS also considers a no action alternative that assumes continued storage of DUF<sub>6</sub> at the Paducah site. A separate EIS has been prepared for the proposed facility at Portsmouth (DOE/EIS-0360). DOE's preferred alternative is to construct and operate the conversion facility at Location A within the Paducah site. DOE plans to decide where to dispose of depleted U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> conversion product after additional appropriate NEPA review.

## NOTATION

The following is a list of acronyms and abbreviations, chemical names, and units of measure used in this document.

### GENERAL ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ACEP	American Centrifuge uranium enrichment plant
ALARA	as low as reasonably achievable
ANL	Argonne National Laboratory
ANP	Advanced Nuclear Power, Inc.
ATSDR	Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry
BAT	best available technologies
CAP	Citizen's Advisory Panel
CEQ	Council on Environmental Quality
CERCLA	Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
D&D	decontamination and decommissioning
DCG	derived concentration guide
DEIS	Draft Environmental Impact Statement
DNFSB	Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board
DOE	U.S. Department of Energy
DOT	U.S. Department of Transportation
EA	Environmental Assessment
EIS	Environmental Impact Statement
EPA	U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
ERDA	U.S. Energy Research and Development Administration
ETTP	East Tennessee Technology Park (formerly K-25 site)
FOCI	Foreign Ownership, Control and Influence
FR	<i>Federal Register</i>
GDP	gaseous diffusion plant
HP	health physics
ICRP	International Commission on Radiological Protection
KDWM	Kentucky Division of Waste Management
KPDES	Kentucky Pollutant Discharge Elimination System

LEU	low enriched uranium
LLW	low-level waste
LOC	Local Oversight Committee
MEI	maximally exposed individual
NAAQS	National Ambient Air Quality Standard(s)
NEPA	National Environmental Policy Act
NESHAPs	National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants
NIOSH	National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health
NRC	U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NTS	Nevada Test Site
ODNR	Ohio Department of Natural Resources
ORC	Ohio Revised Code
ORNL	Oak Ridge National Laboratory
ORO	Oak Ridge Operations
ORSSAB	Oak Ridge Site Specific Advisory Board
PACE	Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical and Energy International Union
PEIS	Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement
PGDP	Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant
P.L.	Public Law
PM <sub>10</sub>	particulate matter with a mean aerodynamic diameter of 10 μm or less
PM <sub>2.5</sub>	particulate matter with a mean aerodynamic diameter of 2.5 μm or less
PORTS	Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant
PRESS	Portsmouth/Pikeon Residents for Environmental Safety and Security
RCRA	Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
ROD	Record of Decision
SMR	steam methane reforming
SODI	Southern Ohio Diversification Initiative
TDEC	Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation
TDS	total dissolved solids
TEPP	Transportation Emergency Preparedness Program
UDS	Uranium Disposition Services, LLC
USEC	United States Enrichment Corporation
WAC	waste acceptance criteria

## CHEMICALS

CaF <sub>2</sub>	calcium fluoride
DU	depleted uranium
DUF <sub>6</sub>	depleted uranium hexafluoride
HF	hydrogen fluoride
NH <sub>3</sub>	ammonia
NO <sub>x</sub>	nitrogen oxides
Np	neptunium
Pu	plutonium
TCE	trichloroethylene
TRU	transuranic(s)
U <sub>3</sub> O <sub>8</sub>	triuranium octaoxide
UF <sub>4</sub>	uranium tetrafluoride

## UNITS OF MEASURE

°C	degree(s) Celsius	kg	kilogram(s)
Ci	curie(s)	km	kilometer(s)
cm	centimeter(s)	km <sup>2</sup>	square kilometer(s)
		kPa	kilopascal(s)
d	day(s)		
dB	decibel(s)	L	liter(s)
dB(A)	A-weighted decibel(s)	lb	pound(s)
°F	degree(s) Fahrenheit	m	meter(s)
ft	foot (feet)	m <sup>2</sup>	square meter(s)
ft <sup>2</sup>	square foot (feet)	m <sup>3</sup>	cubic meter(s)
ft <sup>3</sup>	cubic foot (feet)	MeV	million electron volts
		mg	milligram(s)
g	gram(s)	mi	mile(s)
gal	gallon(s)	mi <sup>2</sup>	square mile(s)
		min	minute(s)
h	hour(s)	mL	milliliter(s)
ha	hectare(s)	mph	mile(s) per hour
		mR	milliroentgen(s)
in.	inch(es)	mrem	millirem(s)
in. <sup>2</sup>	square inch(es)	mSv	millisievert(s)

MVA	megavolt-ampere(s)	rem	roentgen equivalent man
MW	megawatt(s)		
MWh	megawatt-hour(s)	s	second(s)
		Sv	sievert(s)
nCi	nanocurie(s)		
		t	metric ton(s)
oz	ounce(s)	ton(s)	short ton(s)
		wt%	percent by weight
pCi	picocurie(s)	yd <sup>3</sup>	cubic yard(s)
ppb	part(s) per billion	yr	year(s)
ppm	part(s) per million		
psia	pound(s) per square inch absolute	μg	microgram(s)
psig	pound(s) per square inch gauge	μm	micrometer(s)

**CONTENTS**

COVER SHEET ..... iii

NOTATION ..... vii

1 PUBLIC REVIEW OF THE DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS ..... 1-1

    1.1 Overview of the Public Review Process ..... 1-1

    1.2 Comments on the Draft EIS Reports..... 1-2

    1.3 Common Issues Raised by Reviewers ..... 1-2

    1.4 Revisions to the Draft EIS Reports ..... 1-6

2 COMMENT DOCUMENTS..... 2-1

3 RESPONSES TO COMMENTS..... 3-1

4 REFERENCES ..... 4-1

**TABLES**

2.1 Index of Commentors by Document Number ..... 2-1

2.2 Index of Commentors by Last Name..... 2-3

2.3 Index of Commentors by Company/Organization ..... 2-4

3.1 Index of DOE Responses to Comments by Document Number ..... 3-1

3.2 Index of DOE Responses to Comments by Last Name..... 3-3

3.3 Index of DOE Responses to Comments by Company/Organization..... 3-4

3.4 Index of Commentors by EIS ..... 3-5

3.5 List of Commentors on Only the Portsmouth EIS..... 3-6

3.6 List of Commentors on Only the Paducah EIS ..... 3-6

3.7 List of Commentors on both the Portsmouth and Paducah EISs..... 3-7

## **1 PUBLIC REVIEW OF THE DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS**

On November 28, 2003, a Notice of Availability was published by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in the *Federal Register* (68 FR 66824) for two draft environmental impact statements (EISs) evaluating the construction and operation of depleted uranium hexafluoride (DUF<sub>6</sub>) conversion facilities at the Portsmouth, Ohio, site (DOE EIS/0360), and the Paducah, Kentucky, site (DOE/EIS-0359). In accordance with Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) and U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) regulations, the two site-specific conversion facility EISs were distributed to interested agencies, organizations, and the general public to allow them to provide oral and written comments.

This volume contains the comments received during the review period and DOE's responses to those comments. Because of the similarities in the proposed actions and the applicability of many of the comments to both sites, all comments received on the Portsmouth and Paducah EISs are included in this volume. Consequently, this comment response volume is the same for both the Paducah and Portsmouth conversion facility EISs. All comments received were considered in the preparation of both final EISs, regardless of whether they were submitted in response to one or both of the conversion facility EISs.

The remainder of this chapter contains an overview of the public review process and summarizes the most common concerns raised by reviewers. Chapter 2 contains an index of the reviewers, as well as copies of the actual letters or other documents containing public comments on the draft EISs that were submitted to DOE (including comments extracted from the transcripts of the public hearings). Chapter 3 contains the DOE responses to each of the comments received.

### **1.1 OVERVIEW OF THE PUBLIC REVIEW PROCESS**

Details concerning the public review process are described in a Communications Plan prepared for each EIS (Avci 2003). The communications plans outline the general approach that was followed, delineate the roles and responsibilities of the organizations involved in the preparation and distribution of the EISs, and include the draft EIS distribution lists for Congressmen, governors, tribal leaders, Federal agencies, environmental groups, and other stakeholders.

The two draft site-specific conversion facility EISs were mailed to stakeholders in late November 2003, with the Notice of Availability published on November 28, 2003. In addition, each EIS was made available in its entirety on the Internet at the same time, and e-mail notification was sent to those on the project Web site mailing list. Stakeholders were encouraged to provide comments on the draft EISs during a 67-day review period, from November 28, 2003, until February 2, 2004.

To facilitate public involvement, there were a variety of ways to submit comments on the draft EISs. Comments could be submitted by calling a toll-free telephone number, by toll-free fax, by letter, by e-mail, or through the project Web site (<http://web.ead.anl.gov/uranium/eis/>).

Three public hearings were also held during the review period. The public hearings were held near Portsmouth, Ohio, on January 7, 2004; Paducah, Kentucky, on January 13, 2004; and Oak Ridge, Tennessee, on January 15, 2004. The public hearings were announced on the project Web site and in local newspapers prior to the meetings. The hearings on the draft EISs were an important component in DOE's continuing efforts to provide the public with opportunities to participate in the decision-making process. An independent facilitator conducted the hearings, which included a presentation by the DOE document manager, a question and answer period, and an oral comment session where reviewers were invited to formally enter their comments into the public record. Transcripts of the public hearing proceedings were recorded by a court reporter and are available on the project Web site (<http://web.ead.anl.gov/uranium/eis/>).

## **1.2 COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT EIS REPORTS**

A total of about 210 comments contained in 34 submissions were received during the comment period (including both EISs). As noted above, because of the similarities in the proposed actions and the applicability of many of the comments to both sites, all comments received on the Portsmouth and Paducah EISs are included in this volume and were considered in the preparation of both final EISs. Comments were received from individuals, Federal and State agencies, local governments, and nongovernmental organizations such as businesses and environmental groups.

Chapter 2 of this volume provides copies of the actual letters or other documents containing public comments on the draft EISs that were submitted to DOE (including comments extracted from the transcripts of the public hearings). Each submission was assigned a document number. For those documents containing comments, each individual comment was delineated and assigned a unique identification number. This ensured that the comment tracking system tracked each comment, not just the document itself. It also provided DOE with greater detail regarding the number of comments submitted and the number of documents received.

Chapter 3 of this volume contains the DOE responses to each of the comments received. Where applicable, the responses identify specific chapters, sections, or appendices in the Final EISs that address the issue(s) raised in the comments. The most common issues raised are summarized in Section 1.3.

## **1.3 COMMON ISSUES RAISED BY REVIEWERS**

Specific responses to each comment received on the draft EISs are presented in Chapter 3 of this volume; a summary of the most common issues raised by the reviewers and the general DOE responses to these issues are listed below:

- *Comments related to the proposed action and preferred alternative.* Numerous reviewers expressed support for the DOE conversion project in general and agreement with the preferred alternatives identified in the draft EISs. Reviewers stressed the importance of meeting the requirements of Public Law (P.L.) 107-206, as well as the consent orders that DOE has signed with each of the affected states.

DOE appreciates support for the conversion project, and is committed to complying with all applicable regulations, agreements, and orders.

- *Comments related to transportation of cylinders.* Several reviewers raised concerns over the safe transportation of cylinders from the East Tennessee Technology Park (ETTP) (formerly K-25) site. Common themes included a preference for the use of overpacks, opposition to transporting noncompliant cylinders “as-is” under a U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) exemption, a general desire that shipments be made in a manner protective of health and safety, and questions concerning the potential use of barge transportation.

DOE is committed to conducting all transportation activities in a manner protective of human health and safety and in compliance with all applicable regulations. A Transportation Plan will be developed for each shipping program related to the DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion facility project. Each Plan will be developed to address specific issues associated with the commodity being shipped, the origin and destination points, and the concerns of jurisdictions transited by the shipments. In all cases, DOE-sponsored shipments will comply with all applicable State and Federal regulations, and these regulations will be reflected in many of the operational decisions that will be made and presented in the Plan. The transportation regulations are designed to be protective of public health and safety during both accident and routine transportation conditions.

To allow flexibility in planning and future operations, the transportation analysis in each EIS evaluates a range of options for cylinder preparation and transport modes. For example, all three options for shipping noncompliant cylinders, including obtaining a DOT exemption, using overpacks, and transferring the contents from noncompliant to compliant cylinders, are evaluated in the EISs, as are both truck and rail modes. Because barge transport has not been proposed as part of the current conversion facility project and for the reasons discussed in Section 2.3.5 of each EIS, a detailed evaluation has not been included in the Final EISs. If barge transportation was proposed in the future, additional NEPA review would be conducted.

- *Comments related to removal of cylinders from the ETTP site.* Several reviewers stressed the importance of DOE compliance with the 1999 consent order with the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation that

requires the removal of the DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders from the ETTP site or the conversion of the material by December 31, 2009.

DOE is committed to complying with the 1999 consent order. Toward that end, the DOE contract for accelerated cleanup of the ETTP site, including removal of the DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders, calls for completion of this activity by the end of Fiscal Year (FY) 2008.

- *Comments related to the potential for DOE to receive additional DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders from other sources.* Several reviewers noted that DOE may receive additional DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders from other sources, including continued United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) operations, the proposed American Centrifuge Facility at the Portsmouth site, or a new commercial enrichment facility. Some reviewers requested that DOE design the conversion facilities to accommodate such an increase.

At the present time, there are no plans or proposals for DOE to accept DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders for conversion beyond the current inventory for which it has responsibility. However, Section 2.2.7 of the Portsmouth EIS and Section 2.2.5 of the Paducah EIS discuss a number of possible future sources of additional DUF<sub>6</sub> that could require conversion. The potential environmental impacts associated with expanding plant operations (either by extending operations or increasing the throughput) to accommodate processing of additional cylinders are discussed in Section 5.2.8 of the Portsmouth EIS and Section 5.2.6 of the Paducah EIS. Because of the uncertainty associated with possible future sources of DUF<sub>6</sub> for which DOE could assume responsibility, there is no current proposal to increase the throughputs of the conversion facilities. As part of the potential impacts associated with expanded plant operations, Section 5.2.8 of the Portsmouth EIS also discusses potential impacts that would be associated with a conversion facility consisting of four process lines rather than three. If a decision is made in the future to increase the number of parallel process lines beyond four at either site, additional NEPA review would be conducted.

- *Comments related to USEC's American Centrifuge Facility.* Several reviewers noted the January 2004 announcement by USEC that the American Centrifuge Facility would be sited at Portsmouth, and stated that the EISs should be revised accordingly, including consideration of the facility under Portsmouth cumulative impacts.

The two site-specific conversion facility EISs have been revised to reflect that USEC announced that Portsmouth has been selected as the site for its American Centrifuge Facility. Although Location B is the likely site for construction of the centrifuge facility, it has been retained in the final Portsmouth conversion EIS as a siting alternative. The cumulative impacts analysis included in both the draft and final Portsmouth conversion facility

EIS assumed that a new USEC centrifuge enrichment facility would be constructed and operated at the Portsmouth site (see Sections S.5.16 and 5.3.2). As stated in Sections S.5.16 and 5.3.2, the analysis assumed that such a plant would be sited at Portsmouth, that the existing DOE gas centrifuge technology would be used, and that the environmental impacts of such a facility would be similar to those outlined in a 1977 EIS for Expansion of the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant that considered a similar action that was never completed (Energy Research and Development Administration [ERDA] 1977). It should be noted that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensing activities for the proposed centrifuge enrichment plant will include preparation of an environmental impact statement that must also evaluate cumulative impacts at the Portsmouth site. The centrifuge enrichment facility cumulative impacts analysis will be based on the anticipated USEC enrichment facility design, which does not currently exist, and will benefit from the detailed evaluation of conversion facility impacts presented in this EIS.

- *Comments related to current cylinder management.* Several reviewers raised questions and concerns about the current management of the cylinders at the three DOE storage sites.

In response to these concerns, DOE emphasizes that its current cylinder management program provides for safe storage of the depleted UF<sub>6</sub> cylinders. DOE is committed to the safe storage of the cylinders at each site through the implementation of the decision made in the Record of Decision to be issued following this EIS. DOE has an active cylinder management program designed to ensure the continued safety of cylinders until conversion is accomplished.

- *Comments related to the health and safety of workers and the general public during construction and operation of the conversion facilities.*

The construction and operation of the conversion facilities will be conducted with a commitment to keeping workers, the public, and the environment safe. First, DOE will maintain compliance with all applicable health and safety regulations to keep worker exposures to radiation, chemicals, and physical hazards at low levels. Wherever possible, the conversion process will be automated and enclosed so that no worker exposures occur (this will particularly limit exposures to dusts). Workers who may come in contact with radioactive materials will wear radiation dosimeters so that individual exposures can be monitored and controlled to remain at low, health-protective levels.

The EISs include detailed evaluations of the potential impacts to human health and safety, including impacts to workers directly involved in conversion facility operations, other workers located at the sites, as well as members of

the public living around the sites. The EISs consider exposures to not only depleted uranium compounds but also other chemicals used in the conversion process and by-products of conversion. In the Paducah EIS, potential health and safety impacts during operations are discussed in Sections 5.2.2.1 and 5.2.2.2 for routine conditions and accidents, respectively. In the Portsmouth EIS, potential health and safety impacts during operations are discussed in Sections 5.2.3.1 and 5.2.3.2 for routine conditions and accidents, respectively. The results of the analyses indicate that the risks to human health and safety are expected to be low and well within applicable limits and regulations.

#### **1.4 REVISIONS TO THE DRAFT EIS REPORTS**

Several revisions were made to the two site-specific conversion facility draft EISs on the basis of the comments received (changes are indicated by vertical lines in the right margins of the documents). The vast majority of the changes were made to provide clarification and additional detail. The changes made in response to public comments did not affect the assessment scope or type, or the overall significance of the environmental impacts presented in the draft EISs.

Document D0020



Many Voices Working for the Community

# Oak Ridge Site Specific Advisory Board

January 15, 2004

Gary S. Hartman  
DOE-Oak Ridge Operations  
P.O. Box 2001  
Oak Ridge, TN 37831

Dear Mr. Hartman:

**Comments on the Draft Environmental Impact Statements for Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride (UF<sub>6</sub>) Conversion Facilities**

The Oak Ridge Site Specific Advisory Board (ORSSAB) has considered the Draft Environmental Impact Statements for Depleted UF<sub>6</sub> Conversion Facilities.<sup>1,2</sup> ORSSAB provided a recent recommendation to the U.S. Department of Energy—Oak Ridge Operations concerning the Depleted UF<sub>6</sub> Disposition Program at the Department of Energy's East Tennessee Technology Park.<sup>3</sup> At this time, ORSSAB would like to affirm that recommendation and submit it as comments on the proposed activities described in these documents. A copy of that recommendation is enclosed. ORSSAB would also like to take this opportunity to clarify that the overall intent of the recommendation is to accelerate the removal of all UF<sub>6</sub> cylinders in inventory at the East Tennessee Technology Park.

D0020-1

Sincerely,

David N. Mosby, Chair

OFFICIAL FILE COPY

AMESQ

Enclosure

Log No.

139886

cc/enc: Dave Adler, DOE-ORO  
Pat Halsey, DOE-ORO  
Connie Jones, EPA Region 4  
John Owsley, TDEC  
Sandra Waisley, DOE-HQ

Date

JAN 20 2004

File Cl.

<sup>1</sup> U.S. Department of Energy, *Draft Environmental Impact Statement for Construction and Operation of a Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride Conversion Facility at the Paducah, Kentucky, Site*, DOE/EIS-0359, December 2003.

<sup>2</sup> U.S. Department of Energy, *Draft Environmental Impact Statement for Construction and Operation of a Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride Conversion Facility at the Portsmouth, Ohio, Site*, DOE/EIS-0360, December 2003.

<sup>3</sup> Oak Ridge Site Specific Advisory Board, "Recommendation Concerning the Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride Disposition Program at the DOE East Tennessee Technology Park," Letter to Mr. Steve McCracken, July 10, 2003.



*Many Voices Working for the Community*

## **Oak Ridge Site Specific Advisory Board**

---

July 10, 2003

Mr. Steve McCracken  
Assistant Manager for Environmental Management  
DOE-Oak Ridge Operations  
P.O. Box 2001, EM-90  
Oak Ridge, TN 37831

Dear Mr. McCracken:

**Recommendation Concerning the Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride Disposition Program  
at the DOE East Tennessee Technology Park, Oak Ridge, Tennessee**

At our July 9, 2003, meeting, the Oak Ridge Site Specific Advisory Board approved the enclosed recommendation.

We appreciate your consideration of our recommendation and look forward to receiving your written response.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "D. Mosby".

David N. Mosby, Chair

Enclosure

cc/enc: Dave Adler, DOE-ORO  
Pat Halsey, DOE-ORO  
Dave Hutchins, DOE-ORO  
Connie Jones, EPA Region 4  
John Owsley, TDEC  
Sandra Waisley, DOE-HQ



**Oak Ridge Site Specific Advisory Board  
Recommendation Concerning the Depleted Uranium  
Hexafluoride Disposition Program at the DOE  
East Tennessee Technology Park, Oak Ridge, Tennessee**

---

## **BACKGROUND**

A uranium enrichment process called gaseous diffusion was used at the Oak Ridge Gaseous Diffusion Plant, now called the East Tennessee Technology Park (ETTP), from 1945 until 1985. The process physically separated naturally occurring uranium, fed as a uranium hexafluoride (UF<sub>6</sub>) gas that solidifies at ambient temperatures, into a product enriched in uranium-235 and a depleted stream that was withdrawn and stored in cylinders allowed to accumulate on site. Most cylinders contain either 10 or 14 tons of UF<sub>6</sub>, but there are a number of cylinders of smaller sizes and ones that are empty or contain heels.

Overall, there are approximately 57,000 storage cylinders containing over 500,000 metric tons of UF<sub>6</sub> at the ETTP, Paducah, Kentucky, and Portsmouth, Ohio, gaseous diffusion plants. Since there are more cylinders at Paducah (about 38,000), transporting the 6,364 ETTP cylinders to Portsmouth would bring the inventories into balance and facilitate the design and operation of two similarly sized conversion plants. The Tennessee Department of Conservation (TDEC) and DOE signed a Commissioner's Order in 1999 requiring DOE to submit a plan to remove the depleted UF<sub>6</sub> (DUF<sub>6</sub>) cylinders and their contents no later than December 31, 2009. The Oak Ridge Comprehensive Closure and Performance Management Plans accelerate this schedule to the end of fiscal year 2007 to accomplish closure of ETTP. In 2002, DOE awarded a conversion contract to Uranium Disposition Services for two plants and also decided that Bechtel Jacobs Corporation (BJC) and Uranium Disposition Services (UDS) will share responsibility for shipment of the ETTP cylinders to Portsmouth. Requirements for shipping UF<sub>6</sub> cylinders are contained in the U.S. Department of Transportation Hazardous Materials Regulations, 49 CFR Parts 100-185 and ANSI N14.1, *Uranium Hexafluoride - Packaging for Transport*. BJC will be responsible for shipping ANSI N14.1-compliant cylinders in 2003 through 2005, and UDS will be responsible for shipping ANSI N14.1-noncompliant cylinders in 2005 through 2007.

## **DISCUSSION**

On May 14, 2003, Mr. David Hutchins, Manager of the DUF<sub>6</sub> Cylinder Program at ETTP, gave a review to the Oak Ridge Site Specific Advisory Board (ORSSAB) on plans for shipping cylinders at ETTP to Portsmouth. The presentation focused on the ANSI N14.1-compliant cylinders. DOE notes that these shipments do not involve "Highway Route-Controlled Quantities," and are not subject to any laws that require specific routing, notifications, or escorts, but they are taking some additional steps. The questions asked by members of the Board and the public related to emergency response and preparedness training, communications with local communities, shipping logistics, and hazards inherent to the material. The Board was told that some consideration was given to disguising the cylinders for security purposes but that ability to identify the material in any incident was decided to be more important. Shipment by barge and air were discounted. DOE prefers highway shipments by truck, claiming they're more cost

effective than rail. Truck shipments were said to have higher probability of accident occurrence than rail, but rail accidents would have higher consequences due to more cylinders potentially being involved. Truck shipments allow greater potential selection of routes. DOE has worked primarily through state authorities rather than directly with every local community along the way to develop the transportation plan and to train emergency response personnel. The Department of Transportation has set an initial evacuation distance for UF<sub>6</sub> from a large spill at 100 meters (1/16 mile) and then 300 meters (3/16 mile) in event of a major fire. By comparison, evacuation distances, in event of a fire, are 800 meters (1/2 mile) for gasoline and chlorine and 1,600 meters (1 mile) for propane.

Historical research indicates that DOE and its predecessor agencies have been involved in efforts to make the handling of uranium hexafluoride safer for a long time. In 1966, fire tests of bare, UF<sub>6</sub>-filled cylinders were conducted at the Oak Ridge Gaseous Diffusion Plant Rifle Range to determine if cylinders would hydrostatically or explosively rupture and the time available for fire fighting before either incident occurred.<sup>1</sup> The tests confirmed that a UF<sub>6</sub> cylinder rupture of explosive force is possible and that it can occur within a time sufficiently short as to preclude fire fighting unless initiated very promptly. It was also concluded that a type of foam insulation provided a high degree of fire protection for shipments.

Safety issues related to the storage of DUF<sub>6</sub> have continued to be investigated up through preparation and maintenance of current safety basis documents for the cylinder storage yards.

On April 30, 2002, the Department of Transportation issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to bring about compatibility of its regulations with those of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). One area that has the greatest potential for substantially increased costs to shippers of radioactive materials concerns large stocks of DUF<sub>6</sub> stored in currently authorized packagings at three different locations. If this material should be moved off-site to one or more conversion facilities, then it is likely that the current packagings will not meet the standards proposed in this NPRM. In that case the existing packages likely will be required to be overpacked in order to meet the standard for a hypothetical fire test. The ramification of differences between U.S. and IAEA regulations is something that needs to be better understood.

#### RECOMMENDATION

ORSSAB fully supports the accelerated shipping schedule for DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders from ETTP. Additionally, we recommend that DOE keep open and not preclude transportation options other than highway. Finally, we recommend that DOE manage the safety aspects of the program consistent with the entire knowledge base of the hazards associated with handling UF<sub>6</sub> and inform the public about any plans to seek exemptions from more stringent requirements that may be evolving.

D0020-1 (cont.)

D0020-2

D0020-3

<sup>1</sup> Mallett, A.J., *ORGDP Container Test and Development Program – Fire Tests of UF<sub>6</sub>-Filled Cylinders*, K-D-1894, Union Carbide Nuclear Division, ORGDP, January 12, 1966.

**Document D0021****Comments on the UF6 Environmental Impact Statement**

**Paul D. Kalb, Division Head  
Environmental Research & Technology Division  
Brookhaven National Laboratory  
Upton, NY 11973**

As a researcher at Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) I have been involved with the issue of depleted uranium for a number of years. As you are probably aware, BNL developed, tested and patented a process for the encapsulation of various forms of DU in polyethylene. The secondary end-use product (sometimes referred to as DUPoly) is a dense solid that can be used for shielding or ballast applications. It provides the same benefits as DUCrete but has advantages in that it can be easily formed to complex shapes, re-worked at a later date, and has good ability to shield both high energy gamma and neutron radiation. We recently completed fabrication of a full-scale prototype DUPoly transport/disposal cask and then successfully used it to transport a highly radioactive RaBe source and dispose the material and cask at Hanford without additional handling and radiation exposures to workers. We have discussed the use of this material for dry-cask storage of spent nuclear fuel with NAS Corp. and its use as a shielding/construction material at the Yucca Mountain repository with Argonne National Laboratory.

I was disappointed to find that the EIS did not take the potential for re-use of the DU into account, but rather focused on issues of disposal. Turning our waste into useful, commercially viable products is a tremendous economic and sociological benefit. While the UF6 website does include several references to secondary end-use of DU, including its use in DUPoly, the EIS itself does not consider this alternative. In my view, the additional benefits associated with this alternative make the treatment of DUF<sub>6</sub> a much more cost-effective and attractive solution.

D0021-1

Document D0022



State of Ohio Environmental Protection Agency  
Southwest District

401 East Fifth Street  
Dayton, Ohio 45402-2911

TELE: (937) 285-6357  
FAX: (937) 285-6249

January 29, 2004

Mr. Gary S. Hartman  
USDOE ORO  
P.O. Box 2001  
Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37831

Mr. Hartman:

Ohio EPA has reviewed the Draft Environmental Impact Statement for Construction and Operation of a Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride (DUF<sub>6</sub>) Conversion Facility and comments on this draft are listed below. As you are aware, Kentucky, Tennessee and Ohio have been working with DOE for many years to address the multiple challenges associated with management and conversion of DUF<sub>6</sub>. We expect that collaboration to continue throughout the construction, operation and cylinder management and transportation portions of this project.

Ohio EPA concurs with the preferred alternative of constructing a DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion facility at the Portsmouth site. We also concur with transporting DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders from the ETTP at Oak Ridge to the Portsmouth site for conversion. We are currently negotiating administrative orders with DOE to allow this to happen. Please contact me if you have any questions about these comments.

Sincerely,

Graham E. Mitchell  
Chief, Office of Federal Facilities Oversight

D0022-1



**Ohio EPA Comments on the Draft Environmental Impact Statement for Construction and Operation of a Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride Conversion Facility at the Portsmouth, Ohio Site.**

**General Comments**

- |    |   |         |
|----|---|---------|
| 1) | A closed RCRA unit (The X-616 Chromium sludge Lagoon) which is in post-closure care is located in the area of Alternative Location A. A deed notice was submitted to the Pike County Planning Commission on July 7, 1992. There are also monitoring wells associated with this unit which are used to evaluate the status of the groundwater contamination in that area. Please provide a description of how the restricted land and these wells will be avoided during the construction and operation of the facility.   | D0022-2 |
| 2) | The EIS should be expanded to discuss the potential to accept the DUF <sub>6</sub> cylinders from USEC should the Centrifuge Facility be constructed and operated at Portsmouth. The EIS should discuss the impact of longer operation and the potential need to increase the size of the Portsmouth Facility to deal with the additional DUF <sub>6</sub> cylinders.   | D0022-3 |
| 3) | The EIS should recognize that the current clean-up at the facility is governed by three Administrative Consent Orders; the 1989 Ohio Consent Decree, the 1997 Three Party Administrative Order on Consent and the 1999 Administrative Order for Integration. The document should also recognize that the DUF <sub>6</sub> is considered a hazardous waste by the State of Ohio and that there is an Administrative Order governing how the DUF <sub>6</sub> cylinders are to be managed at the site.                      | D0022-4 |
| 4) | Please provide a discussion of how the cylinders will be prioritized for conversion. Will the older cylinders be processed first? Will the cylinders from ETTP be processed first? What is the current strategy for determining which cylinders will be addressed first during the conversion process?  | D0022-5 |
| 5) | Please provide a description of the type of inspections that will be conducted of the cylinders during the four month aging period to determine if the cylinder wall has been breached or damaged during the conversion process.  | D0022-6 |
| 6) | You may wish to consider decommissioning and decontaminating the X-616 SWMU and the old fire training area to make additional room for cylinders to be stored and managed before and after conversion.  | D0022-7 |
| 7) | The EIS fails to describe in Section 5.9 what is expected during decommissioning and decontamination (D& D) of the facility. The EIS should provide some detail regarding what will happen to the waste from the D&D facility and where the waste is likely to go. For instance, some of the material may be construction debris and is likely to be interred in a facility that accepts construction debris waste, other waste would be considered mixed waste and shall be shipped off site to an appropriate facility. | D0022-8 |

**Specific Comments**

- |    |  |          |
|----|--|----------|
| 1) | Table S-2 page S-13: The table should also include a bulleted item under Proposed Action describing how the DUF <sub>6</sub> cylinders created by USEC during the centrifuge operation ( should the facility be constructed in Portsmouth) would be maintained at the facility and converted at the UDS Facility.  | D0022-9  |
| 2) | Page S-21, Section S.2.2.5: Will the noncompliant cylinders remain in the over packs? If not, how will these cylinders be moved around the facility once received at Portsmouth?   | D0022-10 |
| 1) | Page S-39, S.5.5 Water and Soil: The text should indicate that best available practices (BAT) will be implemented at the site during construction to eliminate or reduce the risk of potential soil, surface water, and groundwater contamination from construction of the facility. The text indicates that good construction practices will be implemented during construction but does not provide any detail. It is common for a construction project as described in the text to implement a BAT policy during construction to minimize impact on the soils, surface water and ground water at the construction site. | D0022-11 |
| 4) | Page S-39, S.5.6 Socioeconomics: The text indicates that construction of the facility would create 310 jobs and the operation of the conversion facility would create 320 jobs. The information provided to Ohio EPA indicates that approximately 100-150 construction jobs would be created and approximately 140-150 jobs would be needed to operate the facility. Please provide the correct reference to the number of jobs created for construction and operation of the facility.  | D0022-12 |
| 5) | Page S-41, section S.5.8: This section states that a stabilizer will be added to the heels in the emptied cylinders. What type of stabilizer will be used and will this stabilizer produce any gases which will need to be captured?   | D0022-13 |
| 6) | Page S-41, section S.5.8: Will the U <sub>3</sub> O <sub>8</sub> generated be considered a LLW or a LLMW? How will this be determined?   | D0022-14 |
| 1) | Page S-47, S.5.18 Unavoidable Adverse Impacts: Please provide an explanation as to why it may be necessary to disturb up to 65 acres of land during construction. Please provide an area map showing the extent of the area which may be disturbed.  | D0022-15 |
| 2) | Page S-47, S.5.18 Unavoidable Adverse Impacts: Please provide a detailed list of the possible loss of terrestrial and aquatic habitats from construction and disturbance of wildlife during operations. Include a description of the type of wildlife which may be impacted due to construction. Also, describe which areas may be irrevocably harmed due to the presence of the facility.   | D0022-16 |
| 3) | Page S-54, S.7 Preferred Alternative, Table S-6: – Under Environmental Consequence, the Bounding radiological accident for the proposed action is given as an earthquake damaging the U <sub>3</sub> O <sub>8</sub> storage building and releasing 145 lb. of depleted U <sub>3</sub> O <sub>8</sub> . For no action, a cylinder ruptures-fire is given as the bounding accident with 24,000 lb of UF <sub>6</sub> released. On Pg. S-12, the cylinder accident is stated  | D0022-17 |

- |  |                             |
|--|-----------------------------|
| <p>to be one involving several cylinders in a fire. On Pg. S-68, under the earthquake scenario, 10% of the stored containers are assumed to be breached. More definitive data needs to be presented to support the quantities released.</p>  | <p>D0022-17<br/>(cont.)</p> |
| <p>4) Page 2-23, Section 2.2.7: The EIS discusses the possibility of accepting cylinders from the Paducah facility. Currently, there is no mechanism in place that allows for the transfer of cylinders from the Paducah facility to Portsmouth. As you are aware the State of Ohio and US DOE are currently negotiating a Director's Administrative Order, including a management plan for the shipment and management for the cylinders from ETTP. Please provide a description of the regulatory requirements which would be required in order for the State of Ohio to accept the DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders from Paducah. Furthermore, it is likely that Portsmouth may be required to accept cylinders from an enrichment facility in New Mexico or a new USEC centrifuge facility. It would make more sense to increase the size of the facilities being built so that a greater number of cylinders can be addressed in a shorter period of time. Both facilities should be sized to have the capability to address all the DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders currently on site as well as others which may be shipped from other facilities in the future.</p> | <p>D0022-18</p>             |
| <p>5) Page 2-25, Section 2.3.5 Other Transportation Modes: Due to the difficulties cited by the document with air and barge transportation, it appears that these modes of transportation are not being seriously considered. If this situation changes, the state would expect adequate NEPA review in order to assess risks associated with those methods.</p>   | <p>D0022-19</p>             |
| <p>6) Page 2-27, Section 2.4.2: Please refer to General Comment #7 above in regard to D&amp;D.</p>   | <p>D0022-20</p>             |
| <p>7) Page 2-29, Section 2.4.2.2.2: Please make reference to the approved DUF<sub>6</sub> management plan that is currently in place and agreed to by US DOE. The DUF<sub>6</sub> management plan outlines the steps US DOE must take should a breach in the DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders occur.</p>  | <p>D0022-21</p>             |
| <p>8) Section 5.2.2.3.1 Based on the information provided in this section. It appears that fugitive dust emissions (PM<sub>10</sub>, and PM<sub>2.5</sub>) concentrations (ug/m<sup>3</sup>) from construction activities may exceed the National Ambient Air Quality Standards NAAQS for PM<sub>10</sub> and PM<sub>2.5</sub>. Additional emission control methods, operational restrictions, or monitoring need to be implemented to assure that the NAAQS are not exceeded.</p>   | <p>D0022-22</p>             |

**Document D0023**

Ernie Fletcher  
Governor



LaJuana S. Wilcher  
Secretary

**Commonwealth of Kentucky**  
**Environmental & Public Protection Cabinet**  
**Department for Environmental Protection**  
Division of Waste Management  
14 Reilly Road  
Frankfort KY 40601-1190  
February 2, 2004

Mr. William E. Murphie, Manager  
U.S. Department of Energy  
Portsmouth Paducah Project Office  
1017 Majestic Place Drive  
Suite 200  
Lexington KY 40513

Mr. Glenn E. VanSickle, Paducah Manager of Projects  
Bechtel Jacobs Company LLC  
761 Veterans Avenue  
Kevil, Kentucky 42053

RE: Draft Environmental Impact Statement for Construction and Operation of a  
Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride Conversion Facility at the  
Paducah, Kentucky, Site  
DOE/EIS-0359

Dear Mr. Murphie and Mr. VanSickle:

The Division of Waste Management (Division) has completed its review of the DUF<sub>6</sub> Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) received on November 24, 2003. Several concerns were identified during the review. The Division's comments are outlined in the attached pages. Also attached separately are comments from the Cabinet for Health Safety (CHS). Please edit the draft EIS consistent with the enclosed comments.

Mr. Murphie,  
Mr. VanSickle  
Page 2  
January 30, 2004

We look forward to the submittal of a revised EIS. Please contact Lori Veal at (502) 564-6716 if you have any questions or need additional information.

Sincerely,



Michael V. Welch, P.E., Manager  
Hazardous Waste Branch

MVW/lmv

Attachment

c: Randy McDowell, OLS-Frankfort  
Mike Welch, DWM-Frankfort  
Lori Veal, DWM-Frankfort  
Tuss Taylor, DWM-Frankfort  
DWM Reading file # 1190  
DOE Reading file

*Draft Environmental Impact Statement for Construction and Operation of a Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride Conversion Facility at the Paducah, Kentucky Site, Paducah, Kentucky*

**Specific Comments:**

- 1. Summary, Section S.1.1.2, Page S-5 and S-6:** This section outlines the development of concern over DOE's DUF<sub>6</sub> inventory beginning in 1995. The 3rd paragraph describes an agreement reached in 1998 between DOE and Ohio EPA (OEPA) that resulted in the implementation of a DUF<sub>6</sub> management plan governing the storage of DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders at Portsmouth. The 4th paragraph discusses a consent order entered into in 1999 by DOE and the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation (TDEC) regarding the implementation of a UF<sub>6</sub> management plan for cylinders stored at ETTP, as well as removal or conversion of DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders at ETTP. An addition must be included in this section to discuss the Agreed Order signed by DOE and Kentucky Department for Environmental Protection in October 2003 regarding the implementation of a DUF<sub>6</sub> management plan for cylinders stored at PGDP, as well as other issues associated with the proposed DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion facility at Paducah.

D0023-1
- 2. Section 1.1.2, Page 1-4 and 1-5:** See Specific Comment #1 above.

D0023-2
- 3. Summary, Section S.5.2.2, Page S-30:** Impacts from a certain type of accident were investigated by DOE but not included in the draft EIS due to security concerns. The document states that a classified appendix will be provided to proper state and local officials for review and comment. Please identify which "proper state and local officials" will review the classified appendix.

D0023-3
- 4. Summary, Section S.5.2.2, Page S-31:** Current UDS facility design includes the storage and use of anhydrous NH<sub>3</sub> for production of hydrogen for the conversion process. Conversion facility scenarios involving the accidental release of NH<sub>3</sub> were evaluated. However, the document states that the use of natural gas for hydrogen production is being investigated, which would eliminate the need for NH<sub>3</sub>. DOE must define in the EIS the specific process and products that will be utilized in the conversion facility in order to complete a relevant evaluation of environmental impacts.

D0023-4
- 5. Summary, Section S.5.19, Page S-45:** Please clarify the statement that the land used to dispose of conversion products would be an "irreversible and irretrievable" commitment of resources. The Kentucky Division of Waste Management (KDWM) does not agree with the designation of this land as an "irreversible and irretrievable resource" or the limitations implied regarding any natural resources damages that could occur due to construction and operation of the conversion facility.

D0023-5

6. **Section 1.1.1, Page 1-4:** The first paragraph describes the agreement between DOE and USEC signed in June 2002 to transfer ownership of up to 23,300 tons DUF<sub>6</sub> from USEC to DOE between 2002 and 2006. A clear determination must be made with regards to who will be responsible for management of these cylinders. The EIS must be revised to indicate if DOE plans to manage these cylinders under the 2003 DUF<sub>6</sub> Agreed Order between Kentucky and DOE. D0023-6
7. **Section 2.4.2.3, Page 2-30:** This section outlines safety considerations related to cylinder transportation. The highest risk is shown to be associated with accidents involving NH<sub>3</sub> or HF shipments. Please include consideration of risks associated with shipping UF<sub>6</sub> cylinders from ETTP to the selected conversion sites. D0023-7
8. **Section 3.1.5.1, Page 3-15:** The sixth paragraph states “In 2000, the maximum uranium concentration from DOE outfalls was 0.09 mg/L. This value is below the derived concentration guide of 600 pCi/L.” Please state these values in common units in order to provide a clear comparison between the contamination level and the regulatory limit. D0023-8
9. **Section 5.1.1.1, Page 5-3:** Table 5.1-1 lists frequency of inspections, monitoring, and maintenance for cylinders for 2003-2007. This section must provide clarification that inspection and maintenance activity schedules will be consistent with requirements of the 2003 DUF<sub>6</sub> Agreed Order between Kentucky and DOE. D0023-9
10. **Section 5.2.1.4, Page 5-28:** This section discusses wastewater that will be produced during construction, treated prior to release, and discharged to a KPDES permitted outfall or to an existing sewer. It is further stated that dilution will occur once the discharge reaches Bayou Creek and the Ohio River, and therefore contamination of surface water from the discharge will be negligible. This section must be edited to state that the discharge will meet KPDES limits **at the outfall**, regardless of how much dilution is expected to occur downstream. D0023-10
11. **Section 5.2.2.3.1, Page 59:** This section indicates that fugitive dust emission concentrations from conversion will approach the National Ambient Air Quality Standards NAAQS for PM<sub>2.5</sub>. Elaborate on emission control methods, operational restrictions, or monitoring that will be implemented to assure that the NAAQS are not exceeded. D0023-11
12. **Section 5.2.2.4.1, Page 5-65:** The EIS maintains there will be no process wastewater discharge from the facility during conversion and that all blowdown water would be circulated back into the process with no planned discharges. Thus impacts on surface water are assumed to be negligible. The EIS must address the possibility and impacts of an accidental or emergency discharge of process water or blowdown water that could affect surface water. Please specify the distance to potential receiving waters and possible contaminants of concern. D0023-12

13. **Section 5.2.2.4.1, Page 5-65:** The third paragraph describes an accident scenario in which an earthquake would cause the rupture of an aboveground pipeline carrying liquid HF from the conversion building to the storage building. The scenario assumes that “because response and cleanup would occur within a relatively short time after the release (i.e. days or weeks), the HF would have little time to migrate into the soil. Removal of the contaminated soil would prevent any problems of contamination of either surface or groundwater resources. Therefore, there would be no impacts to surface water or groundwater from this type of accident.” If cleanup was impeded by adverse weather conditions, then stormwater runoff and/or infiltration could transport contaminants to surface water or groundwater within a short time. This section must be edited to consider the possibility that such an accident could endanger surface water and groundwater quality. D0023-13
14. **Section 5.2.2.4.1, Page 5-65:** Define the origin and expected constituents of the “sanitary wastewater” that is proposed to be treated in the wastewater treatment plant and discharged to Bayou Creek. D0023-14
15. **Section 5.2.4, Page 5-89:** This section discusses the impacts associated with the use and potential sale of conversion byproducts. However, the discussion fails to consider time periods for storage of the byproducts before disposal or reuse. Estimates of storage times must be given along with consideration of how storage of the conversion products may impact human health and the environment. D0023-15
16. **Section 5.2.4, Page 5-90:** This section does not provide an adequate description of cylinders that might be transported from ETTP to Paducah for conversion. DOE must provide more information regarding contents and contaminants of cylinders compared to the cylinders currently stored at PGDP along with assessment of potential environmental impacts. D0023-16
17. **Section 5.9, Page 5-118:** This section fails to adequately address impacts from future decommissioning and decontamination (D&D) of the facility. Further details must be provided regarding disposal of waste from D&D of the facility, since portions of the waste would likely be classified as hazardous or mixed waste. D0023-17

**General Comments:**

1. The EIS states that no hazardous wastes will be disposed of or treated on site at the conversion facility, nor will any hazardous wastes that are generated during conversion be stored on site for more than 90 days. Therefore, UDS assumes that no hazardous waste permit will be required. Since DOE does not treat DUF<sub>6</sub> as a hazardous waste, the EIS does not evaluate the need to have a hazardous waste permit for converting/treating the DUF<sub>6</sub>. In addition, the no action alternative considers only LLW and LLMW that would be generated during construction from maintenance of cylinder yards and cylinder painting and scraping operations. It does not consider management of the DUF<sub>6</sub> itself as a mixed waste. The Division disagrees with these assumptions, based on Condition 7 in the 2003 DUF<sub>6</sub> Agreed Order which states: "The Cabinet (Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet) alleges that the DUF<sub>6</sub> generated by DOE and USEC is a "Waste" as defined by KRS 224.010(31) and is subject to the waste determination requirement in KRS 224.46-510".  
D0023-18<sup>2</sup>
2. The EIS proposes that if the HF conversion by-product cannot be sold to the chemical industry, it will be converted to CaF<sub>2</sub> for sale or disposal. Generation of large volumes of CaF<sub>2</sub> would have significant impacts on transportation and waste management plans. DOE has not determined whether CaF<sub>2</sub> would need to be disposed of as a non-hazardous solid waste, or a LLW. Additionally, DOE has not determined whether CaF<sub>2</sub> would be considered DOE waste if the conversion was performed by a private commercial enterprise. DOE must edit the EIS to adequately address these issues.  
D0023-19
3. Comments previously issued by KDWM for the PEIS should be considered applicable to this EIS. KDWM requests that DOE respond to these comments as relevant to the EIS.  
D0023-20
4. The EIS should be expanded to discuss the potential to accept DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders from USEC due to continued conversion operations at PGDP, and due to cylinder transport from ETTP. The EIS should discuss the impacts of longer operation and the potential need to increase the size of the Paducah Facility to deal with the additional DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders. In addition, specify where additional cylinders would be stored in the event that cylinders are transported from ETTP to Paducah for conversion.  
D0023-21

<sup>2</sup>Comment withdrawn by the Kentucky Division of Waste Management on March 12, 2004 (Hatton 2004).



ERNIE FLETCHER  
GOVERNOR

**CABINET FOR HEALTH AND FAMILY SERVICES**  
**RADIATION HEALTH & TOXIC AGENTS BRANCH**  
275 EAST MAIN STREET, HS 1 C-A  
FRANKFORT, KENTUCKY 40621-0001  
(502) 564-3700 (502) 564-1492 FAX  
[HTTP://CHS.KY.GOV/PUBLICHEALTH/RADIATION.HTM](http://chs.ky.gov/publichealth/radiation.htm)

JAMES W. HOLSINGER, JR., M.D.  
SECRETARY

**MEMORANDUM**

**To:** Lori Veal,  
Kentucky Division of Waste Management

**From:** Robert L. Johnson, Manager  
Radiation Health & Toxic Agents Branch

**Date:** January 29, 2004

**Subject:** REVIEW PADUCAH DUF6 DRAFT ENVIRONEMNTAL IMPACT  
STATEMENT

The Radiation Health and Toxic Agents Branch (RHTAB) has completed a preliminary review of the Paducah Draft DUF6 Environment Impact Statement for the HF and CaF<sub>2</sub> separation process. The RHTAB's comments are attached and will be further clarified with comment from UK .

Cc: Eric Scott, REMS  
Steve Hampson, UK  
Tuss Taylor, NREPC

PADUCAH DEIS Comments  
January 29, 2003  
Page One

1. **Verification of Compliance with the DOE Public Dose Limit, page E-10, second paragraph.** Please provide a copy of the basis for presumption of compliance decision and how the DOE demonstrated compliance with the a public dose limit of 100 mrem TEDE in a year by limiting the maximally exposed member of the public to 25 mrem.. I have not had the opportunity to review any position determination related to this method of compliance verification and would be interested in reviewing the document before agreeing to the general process identified in the Draft environmental Impact Statement.
2. **Characterization of HF and CaF<sub>2</sub> Produced during conversion, Page E-5, third paragraph, and Page E.4.1, first paragraph.** Both references indicate Framatome Advanced Nuclear Power, Inc. (ANP) is licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). I question DOE's capability to commercially market HF and CaF<sub>2</sub> developed during conversion without licensing due to the amount of Uranium present in bulk, even though depleted Uranium. Further research will be required.

D0023-22

D0023-23

Document D0024



January 29, 2004

OFFICIAL FILE COPY

AMESQ

Log No. 142098

Date Received FEB 3 2004

File Code \_\_\_\_\_

Gary S. Hartman  
Oak Ridge Operations  
P.O. Box 2001  
Oak Ridge, TN 37831

Re: The U.S. Department of Energy's Draft Environmental Impact Statements for the Construction and Operation of Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride Conversion Facilities at the Paducah, KY and Portsmouth, OH Sites

Dear Mr. Hartman:

The Central Midwest Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Commission is concerned about the safe management of low-level radioactive waste within the borders of the two-state compact region of Illinois and Kentucky. While the Commission acknowledges that the DUF<sub>6</sub> addressed in these Draft Environmental Impact Statements (DEIS's) is federal waste not subject to the Commission's jurisdiction, it is concerned for its safe management nonetheless and offers these comments on the two DEIS's. Unless specifically noted, the comments contained in this letter apply to both DEIS's.

Section 2.2.4 of the DEIS's states "It is unknown how many DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders do not meet DOT transportation requirements." This section should reference the LLNL report *Depleted Uranium Management Program; the Engineering Analysis Report for the Long-Term Management of Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride* which estimates that half to all of the DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders at the ETTP do not meet Department of Transportation (DOT) requirements. Failure to do so might indicate that DOE is trying to understate the magnitude of the effort

D0024-1

Dr. Edward S. Ford  
Chairman



Gary N. Wright  
Secretary-Treasurer



Philip J. Rock  
Commissioner



Marcia S. Marr  
Executive Director

Gary S. Hartman  
 Page 2  
 January 29, 2004

required to render the East Tennessee Technical Park (ETTP) cylinders roadworthy or the need to seek a variance from DOT. | D0024-1 (cont.)

As part of the transportation analysis, the DEIS's do not address the impacts to local first-responders who would respond to any transportation accident. Both DEIS's indicate that there will be a significant number of DUF<sub>6</sub> and UF<sub>6</sub> shipments from the ETTP to either Portsmouth or Paducah, possible DUF<sub>6</sub> shipments from Paducah to Portsmouth, and possible DUF<sub>6</sub> shipments from a yet to be developed enrichment facility to one or both of the conversion facilities. | D0024-2

The analysis presented exposure scenarios for both low and high consequence accident events. Various assumptions must have been made regarding the nature of these events and the amount of material released to the environment. However, the DEIS's are silent with regard to how these events are managed from a practical perspective. Police, emergency medical personnel and firefighters respond to traffic accidents. What were the assumptions of their ability in terms of training, experience and available resources to deal with these potential accidents? | D0024-3

The DEIS's are silent with respect to the need for providing assistance to these first responders. DOE should commit to provide assistance in the form of training and equipment for local first responders along the transportation routes selected for DUF<sub>6</sub> and UF<sub>6</sub> shipments. Without this assistance, some of the low-consequence events could become high-consequence with significant impact to public health and the environment. | D0024-4

DOE has provided "training the trainer" assistance to the Commonwealth of Kentucky, which had the net effect of training over 500 first responders in Kentucky. However, these responders are not physically equipped to respond to a potential transportation accident. DOE needs to provide direct financial assistance to local governments so they may purchase the equipment necessary to respond in case of an accident. Since these shipments would be "campaigned", the specific transportation routes would be defined such that the appropriate governmental entities can be easily identified. In addition, DOE should consider providing this assistance to local governments and first responders located along designated routes for the shipment of hazardous conversion products. | D0024-4

Gary S. Hartman  
Page 3  
January 29, 2004

The DOE should also schedule the DUF<sub>6</sub> and UF<sub>6</sub> shipments such that they would travel in convoys of approximately 10 trucks. This would allow Kentucky to more effectively manage its resources and escort these shipments through the state. With DOE acknowledging that half to all of the canisters at the ETTP do not meet DOT standards, it is incumbent on the state to ensure that these shipments are properly inspected prior to traveling on Kentucky roadways.

D0024-5

D0024-6

The Commission thanks the DOE for the opportunity to provide comment on these DEIS's. Any question you may have pertaining to these comments may be directed to Michael Klebe, Illinois Emergency Management Agency, at 217-785-9986.

Sincerely,

Edward S. Ford  
Chairman

Document D0025

JAN. 30. 2004 42AM ORDER SERVICE

NO. 883 P. 2

MITCH McCONNELL  
KENTUCKY

351-A RUSSELL SENATE OFFICE BUILDING  
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-1702  
(202) 224-2641

United States Senate

January 30, 2004

MAJORITY WHIP  
COMMITTEES:  
AGRICULTURE  
APPROPRIATIONS  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON FOREIGN OPERATIONS  
CHAIRMAN  
RULES AND ADMINISTRATION

Mr. Gary Hartman  
DOE-ORO Cultural Resources Management Coordinator  
DOE Oak Ridge Operations  
P.O. Box 2001  
Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37831-2001

RE: DOE/EIS-0359  
Draft Environmental Impact Statement for Construction of a Depleted Uranium  
Hexafluoride Conversion Facility in Paducah, Kentucky

Dear Mr. Hartman:

I understand that DOE is in the process of collecting comments on the Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DOE/EIS-0359) for the construction of the congressionally mandated depleted uranium hexafluoride (DUF<sub>6</sub>) conversion facility in Paducah, Kentucky. This is an important step in the process of issuing a Record of Decision to finalize the EIS, which is critical to ensure that the construction of this important facility can begin on time.

D0025-1

You may be aware that I sponsored Public Law 105-204 and provisions in Public Law 107-206 that require DOE to construct and operate DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion facilities in Paducah, Kentucky and Portsmouth, Ohio. More specifically, P.L. 107-206 expressly requires that construction of these facilities begin by July 31, 2004, and continue expeditiously thereafter. In recognition of the "two plant" mandate, DOE has completed Draft Environmental Impact Statements for both locations. The Draft EIS for Paducah assesses environmental risks associated with the construction and operation of the facility, related maintenance, and D&D, as well as materials and waste transportation issues.

Each of the sites under consideration for the Paducah conversion plant lie within the confines of the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant reservation, where DOE currently maintains nearly 40,000 aging cylinders of DUF<sub>6</sub>. Congress has directed DOE to process this DUF<sub>6</sub> into materials more suitable for long-term storage, use, or disposal. This will remove from Paducah the existing DUF<sub>6</sub> inventory, which currently poses significant inspection, maintenance, and security challenges.

D0025-2

It is long past time to remove the environmental and public health threats this waste poses to our citizens. I respectfully urge the DOE to finalize the EIS and issue a Record of Decision so that construction can begin on the Paducah DUF<sub>6</sub> Conversion Facility by the deadline mandated by Congress.

D0025-3

Sincerely,

  
MITCH McCONNELL  
UNITED STATES SENATOR

MM/bdb

FEDERAL BUILDING  
241 EAST MAIN STREET  
ROOM 102  
BOWLING GREEN, KY 42101  
(270) 781-1878

1885 DIXIE HIGHWAY  
SUITE 345  
FORT WRIGHT, KY 41011  
(859) 578-0168

771 CORPORATE DRIVE  
SUITE 530  
LEXINGTON, KY 40503  
(859) 224-8286

300 SOUTH MAIN  
SUITE 310  
LONDON, KY 40341  
(606) 884-2028

601 WEST BROADWAY  
SUITE 630  
LOUISVILLE, KY 40202  
(502) 582-6304

PROFESSIONAL ARTS BUILDING  
3320 BROADWAY  
SUITE 100  
PADUCAH, KY 42001  
(270) 443-4554

FEB-02-2004 16:42 FROM:US EPA REGION 5

312 353 5374

TO:630 252 4611

P.2

## Document D0026



UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY  
REGION 5  
77 WEST JACKSON BOULEVARD  
CHICAGO, IL 60604-3590

FEB 02 2004

REPLY TO THE ATTENTION OF

B-19J

Mr. Gary Hartman  
DOE-ORO Cultural Resources Management Coordinator  
U.S. Department of Energy- Oak Ridge Operations  
P.O. Box 2001  
Oak Ridge, TN 37831

**Subject: Comments on the Draft Environmental Impact Statement for the Construction and Operation of a Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride Conversion Facility.**

Dear Mr. Hartman:

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Region 5 (U.S. EPA) has reviewed the Department of Energy Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) for the Construction and Operation of a Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride Conversion Facility at the Portsmouth, Ohio site. Our review is pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) regulations (40 CFR Parts 1500-1508), and Section 309 of the Clean Air Act. The CEQ's number for this DEIS is 030540.

The proposed action is to convert the Department of Energy's Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride (DUF<sub>6</sub>) inventory at the Portsmouth site to Triuranium Octaoxide (U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub>). The EIS assessed the potential environmental impacts from the following construction activities: 1) Construction, operation, maintenance, and decontamination and decommissioning (D&D) of the proposed conversion facility; 2) Transportation of uranium conversion products and waste materials to a disposal facility; 3) Transportation and sale of the hydrogen fluoride (HF) conversion co-product; and 4) Neutralization of HF and Calcium Fluoride (CaF<sub>2</sub>) and its sale or disposal in the event that the HF co-product is not sold.

Potential environmental impacts were assessed by examining all of the activities required to implement each alternative. Potential long-term impacts from cylinder breaches occurring at Portsmouth and East Tennessee Technology Park (ETTP) were also estimated. For each alternative, potential impacts to workers, members of the general public, and the environment were estimated for both normal operations and potential accidents.

Because of the chemical and radioactive nature of the materials processed and produced and the fact that the conversion facility would be built on a previously disturbed industrialized site, the potential impact to the health of workers and the public is one of the areas of primary

FEB-02-2004 16:42 FROM:US EPA REGION 5

312 353 5374

TO:630 252 4611

P.3

concern.

The No Action alternative is the storage of DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders indefinitely in the yards at the Portsmouth and ETTP sites with the continued cylinder surveillance and maintenance activity. Impacts were evaluated through the year 2039 and potential long-term (beyond 2039) impacts were also evaluated.

Three action alternatives, besides the No Action Alternative, were evaluated. The only difference in alternatives was the location of the plant within the Portsmouth site.

Alternative A, the preferred alternative, has three existing structures that were formerly used to store chemicals. The site has already been environmentally disturbed; therefore no new impacts will be likely to occur.

Alternative location B was considered, but a gas centrifuge plant is now going to be constructed at the site, so that location is not a viable alternative anymore.

Alternative location C consists of a gently rolling grass field and would cause more environmental disturbances than the preferred alternative.

Our comments about the project as described in the DEIS include:

- The three Administrative Consent Orders governing environmental restoration at the Portsmouth plants should be discussed in the FEIS;
- The cumulative impacts of constructing and operating the newly announced centrifuge facility for uranium enrichment should be discussed in the context of the DUF<sub>6</sub> facility;
- The FEIS should describe DOE's confidence that adequate off-site disposal capacity will exist to accept wastes from the DUF<sub>6</sub> process;
- Transportation of wastes should be more thoroughly discussed;
- The FEIS should be explicit that the Radionuclide National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAPS) for DOE facilities will apply to the DUF<sub>6</sub> facility;
- Calculations provided and models cited should use consistent units.

U.S. EPA rates "A," the preferred alternative, **EC-2, Environmental Concerns - Insufficient Information**. Please see the enclosure for a description of U.S. EPA's ratings. An EC-2 rating indicates that our review has identified potential environmental impacts of the proposal that should be avoided to fully protect the environment, and that more information should be provided to fully assess the impacts of the proposal. Our detailed comments are included in an additional enclosure.

D0026-8

We appreciate the opportunity to review the DEIS. Please send only three copies of the final EIS to this office at the same time it is officially filed with our Washington, D.C. Office. If

FEB-02-2004 16:42 FROM:US EPA REGION 5


312 353 5374

TO:630 252 4611

P.4

you have any questions, please call Joana Bezerra at (312) 886-6004, or send email to bezerra.joana@epa.gov.

Sincerely,



Kenneth A. Westlake  
Chief, Environmental Planning and Evaluation Branch  
Office of Strategic Environmental Analysis

Enclosures (2):      Summary of Rating Definitions and Followup Action  
                                 Detailed Comments

## SUMMARY OF RATING DEFINITIONS AND FOLLOW UP ACTION\*

### Environmental Impact of the Action

#### LO-Lack of Objections

The EPA review has not identified any potential environmental impacts requiring substantive changes to the proposal. The review may have disclosed opportunities for application of mitigation measures that could be accomplished with no more than minor changes to the proposal.

#### EC-Environmental Concerns

The EPA review has identified environmental impacts that should be avoided in order to fully protect the environment. Corrective measures may require changes to the preferred alternative or application of mitigation measures that can reduce the environmental impacts. EPA would like to work with the lead agency to reduce these impacts.

#### EO-Environmental Objections

The EPA review has identified significant environmental impacts that must be avoided in order to provide adequate protection for the environment. Corrective measures may require substantial changes to the preferred alternative or consideration of some other project alternative (including the no action alternative or a new alternative). EPA intends to work with the lead agency to reduce these impacts.

#### EU-Environmentally Unsatisfactory

The EPA review has identified adverse environmental impacts that are of sufficient magnitude that they are unsatisfactory from the standpoint of public health or welfare or environmental quality. EPA intends to work with the lead agency to reduce these impacts. If the potential unsatisfactory impacts are not corrected at the final EIS state, this proposal will be recommended for referral to the CEQ.

### Adequacy of the Impact Statement

#### Category 1-Adequate

The EPA believes the draft EIS adequately sets forth the environmental impact(s) of the preferred alternative and those of the alternatives reasonably available to the project or action. No further analysis or data collecting is necessary, but the reviewer may suggest the addition of clarifying language or information.

#### Category 2-Insufficient Information

The draft EIS does not contain sufficient information for the EPA to fully assess the environmental impacts that should be avoided in order to fully protect the environment, or the EPA reviewer has identified new reasonably available alternatives that are within the spectrum of alternatives analyzed in the draft EIS, which could reduce the environmental impacts of the action. The identified additional information, data, analyses, or discussion should be included in the final EIS.

#### Category 3-Inadequate

EPA does not believe that the draft EIS adequately assesses potentially significant environmental impacts of the action, or the EPA reviewer has identified new, reasonably available alternatives that are outside of the spectrum of alternatives analyzed in the draft EIS, which should be analyzed in order to reduce the potentially significant environmental impacts. EPA believes that the identified additional information, data analyses, or discussions are of such a magnitude that they should have full public review at a draft stage. EPA does not believe that the draft EIS is adequate for the purposes of the NEPA and/or Section 309 review, and thus should be formally revised and made available for public comment in a supplemental or revised draft EIS. On the basis of the potential significant impacts involved, this proposal could be a candidate for referral to the CEQ.

**USEPA Comments on the Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride Conversion Facility DEIS in  
Portsmouth, Ohio.**

February 2, , 2004

The Final EIS should indicate that environmental restoration activities at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plants (PORTs) are governed by three Administrative Consent Orders: 1) the 1989 Ohio EPA Consent Decree; 2) the 1997 Three Party Administrative Order on Consent (U.S. EPA, Ohio EPA and DOE); and 3) the 1999 Ohio EPA Administrative Order for Integration. A summary and overview of these and other legal orders relevant to PORTs should be provided.

D0026-1

On January 12, 2004, USEC, Inc., announced that a new American Centrifuge uranium enrichment plant (ACEP) will be constructed and operated at Portsmouth. The summary section of the Final EIS should address the potential cumulative effects of that new plant will have on the overall environmental impacts of the DUF<sub>6</sub> facility.

D0026-2

If the conversion facility will have a role beyond processing the current inventory of DUF<sub>6</sub> and non-DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders, the Final EIS should address the conversion facility's potentially longer operation period and processing capacity. The EIS should also address the potential for facility upgrades that would accommodate increased processing capacity should the need arise. The concern is whether the EIS is comprehensive enough to accommodate future upgrades to the conversion facility, without having to revisit the NEPA process again.

D0026-3

Disposal facilities each have unique waste acceptance criteria (WAC) that dictate what can be accepted for disposal. For what is currently known about the two representative disposal facilities (Envirocare and NTS - Nevada Test Site), and the anticipated profiles of the conversion products (depleted U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub>, CaF<sub>2</sub>, emptied cylinders), the Final EIS should describe the level to which DOE is confident that the representative disposal facilities have both the WAC limits and the physical capacity to accept what will be an enormous quantity of conversion product waste.

D0026-4

The Draft EIS suggested that 2,200 railcar shipments could be sent to NTS. Rail access to NTS and its existing disposal areas currently does not exist. The Final EIS should offer additional discussion of the transportation process and related impacts.

D0026-5

When regulatory compliance assurances are provided throughout this document, the Radionuclide National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAPs) for Radionuclide Emissions for United States Department of Energy (USDOE) Owned or Operated Facilities, found at 40 CFR 61, Subpart H, are not always adequately identified. This outside oversight and compliance demonstration helps to provide the public with the knowledge they are adequately protected under this regulation as long as compliance can be clearly demonstrated.

D0026-6

Measurement of parameters in calculations and models cited must be in consistent units to avoid confusion and to better assess the conservatism and adequacy of the methodologies used for evaluating the relative risks for this project.

D0026-7

FROM : USEC

TO :

630 252 4611

2004,02-02

15:38

#391 P.02/05

## Document D0027



February 2, 2004

Gary S. Hartman  
DOE-ORO Cultural Resources Management Coordinator  
U.S. Department of Energy - Oak Ridge Operations  
P.O. Box 2001  
Oak Ridge, TN 37831

RE: DEIS for Construction and Operation of a Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride  
Conversion Facility at the Portsmouth, Ohio Site (DOE/EIS - 0360)

Dear Mr. Hartman:

Attached please find specific comments on the referenced DEIS.

As a general comment, United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) and the DOE-PORTS office have worked together to address issues at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant (PORTS) for more than 10 years. They coordinate many of their activities to assure appropriate site reporting and response to the various environmental authorities. This close coordination has benefited both DOE and USEC and has assured compliance with applicable environmental requirements. We would be glad to arrange for a meeting at PORTS to discuss the impacts the UDS Conversion Facility may have upon other activities at PORTS and to include those facilities in our coordination of activities affecting the site.

Thank you for the opportunity to make these comments.

Sincerely,

T. Michael Taimi  
Director, Environmental Affairs

Attachment

D0027-1

FROM : USEC

TO :

630 252 4611

2004.02-02

15:39

#391 P.04/05



February 2, 2004

Gary S. Hartman  
DOE-ORO Cultural Resources Management Coordinator  
U.S. Department of Energy - Oak Ridge Operations  
P.O. Box 2001  
Oak Ridge, TN 37831

RE: DEIS for Construction and Operation of a Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride  
Conversion Facility at the Paducah, Kentucky Site (DOE/EIS - 0359)

Dear Mr. Hartman:

Attached please find specific comments on the referenced DEIS.

As a general comment, United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) and the DOE-GDP office have worked together to address issues at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant (PGDP) for more than 10 years. They coordinate many of their activities to assure appropriate site reporting and response to the various environmental authorities. This close coordination has benefited both DOE and USEC and has assured compliance with applicable environmental requirements. We would be glad to arrange for a meeting at PGDP to discuss the impacts the UDS Conversion Facility may have upon other activities at PGDP and to include those facilities in our coordination of activities affecting the site.

Thank you for the opportunity to make these comments.

Sincerely,

T. Michael Taimi  
Director, Environmental Affairs

Attachment

D0027-1  
(cont.)

FROM : USEC

TO :

530 252 4611

2004.02-02

15:39

#391 P.03/05

**Draft Environmental Impact Statement comments for Construction and Operation of a Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride Conversion Facility at the Portsmouth, Ohio, Site**

- |  |                |
|--|----------------|
| <p>1. Section 2.5 - USEC concurs with the DOE's preferred location (Location A) to construct and operate the proposed DUF6 conversion facility.</p>  | <p>D0027-2</p> |
| <p>2. General Comment - Reference to any USEC Advanced Technology siting decisions for the American Centrifuge need to reflect that the siting decision has been made and that PORTS has been selected.</p>  | <p>D0027-3</p> |
| <p>3. Section 3.1.3.2 - The Title V air permit for USEC operations has been issued and was effective August 21, 2003.</p>  | <p>D0027-4</p> |
| <p>4. Table 6.1 States: "The DUF6 conversion facility would not discharge industrial process wastewater. Therefore, an NPDES Permit for Process Water Discharge would not be required." It is possible that a facility with a wet scrubber, water-cooled heat exchangers, and water spray cooling may have a process wastewater stream. Sanitary water use from daily activity and shower rooms will require discharge through a NPDES permitted treatment process such as the onsite USEC operated process. It is likely that UDS will be required to obtain a NPDES permit that will require an internal monitored outfall before discharging into the USEC X-6619 permitted sewage treatment plant.</p>                                 | <p>D0027-5</p> |
| <p>5. Section 3.1.6.2 states "greater biological diversity exists upstream of the plant discharges than downstream." This is not consistent with the following Ohio EPA reports that state: "aquatic habitat quality in Little Beaver Creek declines upstream of PORTS discharges due to low and/or intermittent water flow."</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Biological, Fish Tissue and Sediment Quality in Little Beaver Creek, Big Beaver Creek, Big Run Creek and West Ditch, Piketon Ohio.</i> May 24, 1993, OEPA Technical Report EAS/1993-5-2</li> <li>• <i>Biological and Water Quality Study of Little Beaver Creek and Big Beaver Creek - 1997,</i> June 4, 1998, OEPA Technical Report MAS/1998-5-1</li> </ul> | <p>D0027-6</p> |
| <p>6. General Comment: There is no specific reference as to how waste material with radionuclides other than uranium will be addressed. In particular, heels material is likely to contain TRU, and long-lived thorium isotopes (<sup>228</sup>Th, <sup>230</sup>Th, <sup>232</sup>Th). The EIS needs to address containment and contamination control of this material.</p>   | <p>D0027-7</p> |
| <p>7. General Comment: There is no specific reference to how Radionuclide NESHAPs will be implemented. UDS needs to consider how they will quantify their radionuclide emissions and how they will coordinate their annual reporting with other site residents. Currently the Radionuclide NESHAPs dose limit applies to the site as a whole. If UDS pursues a "go it alone" approach, then USEC and DOE will be UDS's public and UDS will be USEC and DOE's public for whom dose needs to be determined.</p>  | <p>D0027-8</p> |
| <p>8. Table 6.1 States: "UDS will prepare and submit an Annual Hazardous Chemical Inventory Report each year, if hazardous chemicals have been stored at the DUF6 conversion facility site in amounts that exceed threshold quantities during the preceding year." Chemical threshold quantities are derived from the aggregate of all Reservation residents. Currently DOE provides USEC a monthly chemical inventory list of materials managed by various DOE Sub-Contractors resident on site. USEC compiles the lists monthly to determine if a threshold quantity has been exceeded. USEC then files the Annual Hazardous Chemical Inventory Report for the site.</p>   | <p>D0027-9</p> |

FROM : USEC TO : 630 252 4611 2004.02-02 15:40 #391 P.05/05

DOE/EIS 359 Comments

Section	Comment/Recommendation	
General Comments	HF production is discussed in several areas but emissions are not addressed. USEC's current air pollution permit contains limits on HF emissions that utilize the full allocation for the site. The EIS should address how HF emissions are to be treated or include a zero emission plant design.	D0027-10
	There is no specific reference as to how waste material that includes radionuclides and long-lived thorium isotopes other than uranium will be handled. USEC experience indicates transuranics and technetium may remain in the heel material after transfer of UF <sub>6</sub> from the cylinder, especially in cylinders that were previously used for handling of reactor returns. The EIS should address waste material containing transuranics and technetium.	D0027-11
	There is no specific reference to how radionuclide NESHAPs will be implemented. Currently radionuclide NESHAPs dose limit applies to the site as a whole. If UDS pursues a stand-alone approach, then USEC and DOE will be UDS's "public" and UDS will be USEC's and DOE's "public" when calculating and reporting dose to the public. The EIS should address the method of compliance with 40 CFR 61 regulations.	D0027-12
	Reference to any USEC Advanced Technology siting decisions for the American Centrifuge should reflect that the siting decision has been made and that the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant site has been selected.	
S.5.4, Table 5.6, 3.1.3.3	The EIS indicates emissions of particulate matter from construction activities may exceed ambient air quality standards. Control measures will be applied to minimize the particulate emissions. The EIS should address any air or water quality impacts from applying the particulate matter control measures.	D0027-13
Fig. 2.2-2	Process descriptions indicate the addition of nitrogen and ammonia to the systems but do not mention whether NO <sub>x</sub> will be generated in significant quantities. The EIS should discuss the impact of introduction of nitrogen bearing compounds.	D0027-14
S.5.16	The cumulative radiological exposure as compared to the DOE limit is discussed but there is no mention of exposure compared to 40 CFR 61 and 40 CFR 190 limits. The EIS should discuss compliance with EPA limits on radiological exposure.	D0027-15
3.1.3.2	USEC does not have a Title V Permit. Sentence should be revised to so indicate.	D0027-16
3.1.9, 5.3.2	USEC does not manage the DOE DUF <sub>6</sub> cylinders and therefore does not handle waste generated from those processes. Delete these references.	D0027-17
5.2.1.4.1	The EIS indicates water is used during construction and that wastewater will be treated at the wastewater treatment plant. The wastewater treatment plant is not shown in process schematics. The EIS should be specific on where the wastewater will be treated and indicate on process drawings.	D0027-18
Table 5.2-15	This Table mentions 24 hour concentrations of HF associated with operations of the facility. The KDEP standard is base on a 12-hour concentration. The EIS should discuss compliance during normal operation and during accident conditions with the KDEP 12-hour limit.	D0027-19
Table 5.2-19 and Table 5.6-3	The amount of fuel and natural gas listed in these tables are not included in the general process discussions of air emissions and permitting. The EIS should discuss this issue.	D0027-20
Table 6-1	This Table indicates UDS will prepare an Annual Hazardous Chemical Inventory report each year. Chemical threshold quantities are derived from the aggregate of all residents on the DOE Reservation. Currently DOE provides USEC a monthly chemical inventory list of materials managed by various DOE sub-contractors on site. USEC then compiles the list to determine if a threshold quantity has been exceeded. The EIS method should address the current practices and how compliance will be demonstrated for the site.	D0027-21
	This Table indicates the DUF <sub>6</sub> conversion plant will not discharge process wastewater and therefore will not need a NPDES permit. USEC experience has been that a wet scrubber, water-cooled heat exchangers and water spray cooling will have a process waste stream. The EIS should address how these waste streams are to be treated or indicate a discharge permit will be required.	D0027-22

Document D0028



**Oak Ridge Reservation  
Local Oversight Committee**

February 2, 2004

Gary Hartman  
U.S. Department of Energy  
Oak Ridge Operations Office  
P.O. Box 2001  
Oak Ridge, TN 37831

*Subject: Draft Environmental Impact Statements (DEIS) for the construction and Operation of Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride (DUF<sub>6</sub>) Conversion Facilities at the Paducah, KY and Portsmouth, OH sites (DOE/EIS-0359 and -0360)*

Dear Mr. Hartman:

The Citizens' Advisory Panel (CAP) of the Oak Ridge Reservation Local Oversight Committee, Inc. (LOC) concurs with the preferred alternatives presented for the two DEISs.

D0028-1

The CAP's special concern is the removal of the DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders from East Tennessee Technology Park (ETTP). We are pleased that this action is to be completed by 2008 prior to the deadline imposed by the Tennessee Department of Conservation and Environment Commissioner's order and so that the accelerated cleanup of ETTP can be accomplished in a timely manner.

D0028-2

The cumulative impact portion of the Portsmouth DEIS should be updated to reflect the decision to site the centrifuge plant at Site B.

D0028-3

We are pleased to have the opportunity to comment on these documents. If you have any questions, feel free to contact the LOC office at 483-1333.

Sincerely,

Norman A. Mulvenon  
Chair, LOC Citizens' Advisory Panel

- cc: LOC Register
- LOC Board
- LOC CAP
- Steve McCracken, Assistant Manager for EM, DOE ORO
- William Murphie, Manager, Portsmouth Paducah Project Office
- John Owsley, Director, TDEC DOE-O
- Pat Halsey, FFA Coordinator, DOE ORO
- Amy Fitzgerald, City of Oak Ridge
- David Mosby, Chair, ORSSAB

Document D0029

**From:** Vina Colley [vcolley@earthlink.net]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, February 03, 2004 4:50 PM  
**To:** DUF6\_Ports  
**Subject:** Testimony for the record..

Thank you for the opportunity to testify about the DU conversion plant. *Facility Accidents Involving Radiation or Chemical Release* on page 2-29 ( 2.4.2.2.2) DOE/EIS-0360 Construction and Operation of a Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride Conversion Facility dated December 2003.

D0029-1

Under the alternative, it is possible that human-error could cause an accidental release of more deadly radiation and toxic chemicals into the environment affecting both the workers and the general public. For the Piketon, Oak Ridge and any other plant to ship these cylinders off-site and continue moving these cylinders around, whether by train or by truck, not only provides the terrorists with a moving target as well as increases the threat of nuclear terrorism. We shouldn't ship these potential "dirty bombs" of poisonous hazards waste cylinders because there will be unnecessary risks of exposure to the workers and the public. .

D0029-2

Many of these cylinders contain plutonium (PU) and Neptunium NEP in them any many other Transuranic elements. Past history has also revealed shoddy record keeping at the Piketon plant. We find the records on these cylinders often disappear or the government simply fails to follow necessary safety precautions, which can cause even more serious problems once these depleted uranium (DU) cylinders become heated up.

D0029-3

Furthermore, where will we put all the toxic waste? How many more people will ultimately be contaminated with PU and NEP and many other daughter products? Who will want to store such nuclear waste? And how much more waste from these potential "dirty bombs" will be left over, which further increases the threat of nuclear terrorism? The scope of this work is to push forward into unknown territory. Performance at the Piketon plant over the past 50 years has been based solely on government secrecy and lies. Recent statements being made by government contractors vying to build two new plants at Piketon is also base on similar lies that we've all heard before.

Telling local schools teachers, media and all local business owners that these new jobs will be safe and better than before is simply another LIE! The truth is we the people of the United States are engaged in a war on terrorism. The government has even lied to us about why we were going to war against Iraq (there were no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq). We are Americans and we have the right to know the truth about health hazards and other potential threats that the promise of these new jobs will bring with them into Piketon, into each of our communities, even into our very own backyards!

D0029-4

Many of you know what serious harm will come from the DU conversion plant or from the Centrifuge, but some of you don't. If the Piketon community will still be operating a nuclear waste storage facility then everyone in the Piketon community should be told the truth that the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion will be a conversion waste storage plant. In the end you can expect to find little work, but more toxic, hazardous chemicals coming through our area and contaminating our community. We might suggest that as a sign of good faith that the government buys up the homes leading into the plant if they still intend to build these two hazards plants.

D0029-5

It is high time for the DOD/DOE to abandon their Nazi mentality and remember their crimes against humanity. Thousand of American workers that you lied too became made sick as if Piketon was a Nazi concentration camp and we were your holocaust victims. The ghosts of thousands of former plant workers and eventually the ghosts of those who are now dying after deadly exposures from the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion plant will certainly come back to haunt you in the end. Not only here, but at other DOE/DOD site across this country! If you don't believe in God and the Day of Judgment, the Devil and hell, you and your families will have an eternity to think about your crimes against humanity.

D0029-6

Cancer and heart problems around the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion plant are extremely high. Thousands of community residents have not been given any compensation for their cancers or other radiation-induced illnesses, either. Like the Nazis, you shall stand before God Almighty with their blood on your hands too. Additional threats that the Piketon plant poses include several earthquake tremors (at least 5-7 on the scale) that we have had. We live in a flood plain zone. Tornados have also been known to touch down within a couple miles from the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion plant, too. Any of these so-called "acts of God" can certainly cause the Piketon nuclear facility to explode like Chernobyl.

D0029-7

Two aquifers beneath the Piketon nuclear plant supplies our groundwater. One is shallow and the other aquifer is

D0029-8

2/4/2004

deep. DOE reports the shallow aquifer is contaminated, with (TCE) *trichloroethylene* being the main contaminant of concern. The other aquifer is not of sufficient volume to be a source of drinking water. DOE maintains that no groundwater has migrated offsite, which we know to be a bare face lie. Arguments similar to these were used at the Pantex plant in Texas, where a shallow "perched" aquifer was supposedly confined, but has since been found to be leaking into the much larger Ogallala aquifer, despite DOE's earlier false assurances to the American public that all is safe. (TCE) trichloroethylene is contaminating the Ogallala Aquifer, which was outlined in the Radioactive Waste Management Associate groundwater report February 2002 on groundwater movement of the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant.

D0029-8  
(cont.)

Below is a few reason that the Portsmouth Gaseous diffusion should be investigated before we bring more nuclear jobs to Piketon, Ohio. DOE/DOD haven't even address the off site problems from the past 50 years of production yet.

D0029-9

The report of Groundwater Movement at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant by Marilyn del Merced, Beat Hintermann and Marvin Resnikoff for the Uranium Enrichment Project and PRESS February 2002 should be thoroughly investigated before anyone should begin pushing the idea of creating more dirty jobs for the area. We will need to have independent scientists looking at the problems here first in order to hold someone within the U.S. government, within the Piketon nuclear plant accountable before beginning construction of the Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride Conversion Facility at Piketon, Ohio. We will also need to look much closer at the on site and off site contamination problems from the past 50 years of productions at the Piketon plant, too.

D0029-10

POTENTIAL COMMUNITY HEALTH THREAT POSED BY RADIATION IN CREEK FLOWING FROM PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT IN PIKETON, OH. Dr. Paschenko has collected over 100 samples of water and soil around the plant, which will be analyzed in SSGR's laboratory in the coming months. However, in the first stage of analysis, Paschenko discovered levels of beta activity in samples of foam that were at least 100 times higher than normal background radiation levels. This foam was collected in a creek that flows from the plant grounds along border of the community residents. We need more time to bring others into Piketon for additional independent studies in order to hold DOE and other government officials accountable.

D0029-11

Members of (PRESS) Portsmouth/ Piketon Residents for Environmental Safety and Security have asked the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency (OEPA) and the company managing the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion plant many times to please post warning signs along the creeks that surround the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion plant located in Piketon, Ohio. Still to this day THERE ARE NO SIGNS! This alone is hard core evidence that clearly proves the OEPA blatant disregard for the value of human life and raises some serious concerns about their role as protectors of environmental safety.

D0029-12

(PRESS) Portsmouth/Piketon Residents for Environmental Safety and Security have only used documents from the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion plants to publicly present every story about the problems at the Piketon, Ohio plant. Stories about the "Plutonium" which the company managing the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion plant consistently denies having on site, for example. Workers nationally at the DOE/DOD plants now have a compensation bill called EEOICPA. This bill is paying some cancer victims but not all cancer victims nor all illness. PRESS is asking for an audit and investigation of the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant as well. If the recent findings of Sergie Paschenko, a well known Russia physicist, are validated community concern will quickly escalate.

D0029-13

Once again this will provide additional hard-core evidence of the OEPA blatant disregard for the value of human life. Residents of the local community have not been informed that they have problems. Furthermore, the site alert/alarms have not been sounded at the time of negative release of gases. On March 7, 1978 a 14 ton cylinder filled with liquid uranium hexafluoride was being hauled to a cooling site by straddle and lift cylinders. The cylinder lost over 21,00.00 lbs of uranium hexafluoride passing through a hole in the cylinder. The alarm should have sounded, but didn't! Again in August of 1980 the Cleveland Plain Dealer reported that: 2,500 pounds of uranium was lost down the west drainage ditch, which also collected "essentially all the uranium that precipitated from the plume". About 1,500 pounds of uranium escaped from the ditch into the nearby Scioto River.

D0029-14

The Cleveland Plain Dealer reported that at least 43 workers were known to have become contaminated. Goodyear officials speculated that most of the URANIUM HEX-A-FLUORIDE reacted with moisture in the air (FORMING HYDROGEN FLUORIDE - A POTENT ACID CAPABLE OF EATING THROUGH GLASS AND URANYL FLUORIDE) another uranium compound. In 1992 while moving and painting the Deplete Uranium cylinders a valve was broken. This cause more material to become airborne. Again there were NO ALARMS for community awareness.

Below are a few reports of the many off-site problems. The Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion in Piketon, Ohio scored 54.6 for the NPL superfund. A minimum score of 28.5 score suggests it should have be placed on the Superfund. Portsmouth has never been placed on the NPL listing.

D0029-15

Columbus Dispatch Feb 7, 1993

Michael B. Lafferty reported that the fish in streams surrounding the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant in Piketon, Ohio have elevated levels of radiation according to an Ohio Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). The report was written in April of 1992 but was not released until the Dispatch asked for a copy for his story in 1993. The report stated the most comprehensive state evaluation of radiation and chemical pollution surround the nuclear fuels plant. Further example suggests the Plant's uranium hexafluoride is concentrated into a more radioactive form for use as fuel in reactors like those on submarines. Bomb grade uranium was process from 1954 until at least 1991 or 92.

The dispatch further reported that tissue from fish around the plant have elevated levels of radiation. Stream sediments also displayed radiation levels FIVE TIMES above the acceptable levels. There were also increased levels of arsenic, cadmium, chromium and mercury.

At one measured site on Little Beaver Creek in Southern Ohio. The total uranium levels were twice the level at which normally corrective action are required.

In total, the test samples were collected at 18 sites in the Scioto River , Big Beaver and Little Beaver Creeks, Big Run and at the water course referred to in the report as Nursing home road.

D0029-16

The EPA representative said in the 90's that there was a strong indication that radioactive and chemical pollutants would cause future problems. Biologists have been concerned about the uranium and heavy metals found in Little Beaver Creek. Most of the year, particularly during summer, wastewater from the plant supplies almost all flow into the streams. The EPA report also said they found radioactivity may be the results of the radioactive isotope potassium 40, which is considered an abnormally RADIOACTIVE substance that accumulates in bones like Strontium-90. Radiation could be the result of widespread technetium 99 contamination at the Portsmouth Plant, too. Bernie Counts speculated the heavy metals may be suppressing some insect populations as well.

Finally, the EPA report says heavy metals in the sediments were also at high concentration levels. The highly elevated concentrations of chromium, (about 72 parts per million) and also mercury (0.24 parts per million) were found where BiG Beaver Creek empties into the Scioto River and then into the OHIO RIVER, which is a primary source of drinking water for millions of unwitting Americans residing in cities further downstream, from Cincinnati all the way to New Orleans!

Vina Colley former worker and president of PRESS and National Advocate co-chair for National Nuclear Workers For Justice..

**Document D0030**

February 2, 2004

Gary Hartman  
 U.S. Department of Energy  
 Oak Ridge Operations  
 P.O. Box 2001  
 Oak Ridge, TN 37831


Public Comment in the matter of:  
 Draft Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride (DUF-6) Conversion Facility EISs

Comment Period Ends:  
 February 2, 2004

Please include the following questions and comments as part of the permanent file.

Charles Jurka  
 RT 3, Box 265A  
 Golconda, IL 62938

Vicki Jurka  
 RT 3, Box 265A  
 Golconda, IL 62938

Questions and Comments:

1. Pages 2-19 & 20: A proposed enrichment facility in New Mexico is attempting to broker a deal giving DOE responsibility for conversion of their DUF-6; for services similiar to those DOE provides USEC. This DEIS (Paducah) bases its assumptions on a 25 year operational period with a maximum 20,000 tons/yr (DUF-6) throughput. Should USEC and the New Mexico company divide future conversion needs between Paducah and Portsmouth, many of the already marginal assumptions, regarding human health and the environment, would become invalid either in terms of time, throughput, or both. Rumors persist that plans are already underway to increase the capacity of the Paducah conversion plant beyond the four parallel conversion lines.
2. Page 4-11 (last para.): Many hypersensitive individuals were "created" due to an initiating dose that changed their normal immune response.
3. Page 4-11 (last para.): A pregnant woman exposed during an "accidental" release may show no adverse response herself; inatead passing the toxic effect to the fetus.
4. Page F9 (F.1.2): When addressing the chemical impacts of hydrogen fluoride, on human health, one important aspect, not considered in this DEIS (Paducah), is the propensity of inhaled HF to damage the heart and arteries once absorbed into the blood stream. For instance, the latent effects, for the general public, from the action of HF (fluoride) on the heart and vascular system could be considerable when calculating a dose of 0.02mg/kg-d (168 hours per week) over a 25 year period. Low doses of fluoride entering

D0030-1

D0030-2

D0030-3

D0030-4

the body, over a long period of time, might also produce arthritic conditions from the calcifying action on joints.

Also unclear is whether total regionally-emitted "fluoride" was considered when determining potential dose to the general public. One might expect that the coal burning plants, identified in Table 3.1-2 (page 3-7), would be additional regional-sources of fluoride emissions as well as PGDP and the Honeywell plant in Metropolis, Illinois. Further, in this instance, an important consideration should be the extent and duration of past fluoride exposure, for general public, living within 10 miles of PGDP. It is also unclear as to whether the HF dose-rate of 0.02mg/kg-d applies to all of the general public residing within the targeted 50 mile radius or to public in an unidentified radius. One would expect the impact to be greater the closer one lives to the plant.

D0030-4  
(cont.)

Low doses of fluoride entering the body over a long period of time might also produce generational effects.

5. Page 5-63: "Total maximum estimated concentrations for PM 2.5 would approach NAAQS and SAAQS..." What is the anticipated composition (metal, chemical, radiological) of that PM 2.5 (microns), expected to be released to air during normal plant operations? The character of the respirably sized particle is important when considering its potential to adversely impact human health. For instance, respirably sized particles of U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> could represent a significant pathway for radiation exposure if inhaled into the lungs or absorbed into the gastrointestinal tract, through contaminated foodstuff. The health risk for PM 2.5 does not alone lie in the airborne levels but also in the duration that particle remains in the body and the effect it has on cell structure and activity. Also, due to the size of the particle and the anticipated high-release levels this DEIS (Paducah) should have assessed a terrain dispersion model that included cumulative levels of particulates and their re-entrainment.

D0030-5

6. Page B-7 (B.5): "...potential impacts of any TRU and Tc contamination would be the greatest in cases involving accidents during...handling of the cylinders and during the management of wastes associated with the cleaning and disposition of empty cylinders." (B-9) "...doses...attributed to TRU and Tc-99 found in the heels...can be relative high compared to uranium doses." Page 2-36 (2.4.2.8) "Current USD plans are to leave the heels in the emptied cylinders...and either (1) crush the cylinders..." Page 2-14 (2.2.2.6) This section presents an option for compacting and sectioning emptied cylinders still containing heels.

The option to crush and section cylinders in the manner presented on page 2-36 provides no explanation as to whether protective measures were incorporated into that process ; that would protect workers from exposure to "free" TRU or grouted TRU. This DEIS (Paducah), in general, fails to consider worker health with respect to handling cylinders.

D0030-6

Page B-6 (B.4) "...UDS is now planning to fill the emptied cylinders with the depleted U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> product..." We agree this would be the preferred option and suggest the heels be stabilized with grout prior to refilling. We do disagree however that the U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> is "product": it is waste. Also, if the crush and cut option is still valid, this DEIS needs to present a clearer

- |   |                            |
|---|----------------------------|
| <p>view as to how the TRU in the heels will be contained during processing.</p>   | <p>D0030-6<br/>(cont.)</p> |
| <p>7. Page E-7 (E 3.1): Does the figure of 70% include all the aqueous hydrogen F produced at both conversion plants?</p>   | <p>D0030-7</p>             |
| <p>8. The nominal wall thickness for DUF-6 cylinders is 312 mils.. Ultrasonic measurements for the thickness of cylinders in storage at ETT and Paducah have shown that corrosive actions have reduced that thickness, in many instances, to less than half. DOE guidance recommends that a minimum cylinder wall thickness of 250 mils is "required" for safe handling and transporting cylinders. Studies have determined 3mils per year would be a normal rate of corrosive reduction in cylinders. At that rate, cylinders over 25 years old would already have wall thicknesses below the "safe level" of 250 mils, thus presenting a hazard when handling and shipping. Further, previous inspections of cylinders stored on the ground have found that areas in contact with the ground experienced greater corrosion rates. Other cylinders have not been inspected to assess wall thickness due to the storage configuration. It is our opinion that this DEIS (Paducah) has not adequately considered the conditions of the cylinders and the associated risk(s).</p> | <p>D0030-8</p>             |
| <p>9. Page F-21 (F.3.1): In the past river transportation was explored as an economical option for transporting cylinders from ETT. This DEIS did not analyze the risks associated with that mode of transportation.</p>  | <p>D0030-9</p>             |
| <p>10. Will the calcium fluoride produced at the conversion plant be a granular form or a fine powder?</p>  | <p>D0030-10</p>            |
| <p>11. The Depleted UF-6 Final PEIS expresses Hydrogen Fluoride in terms of anhydrous while this DEIS (Paducah) expresses it as aqueous. Please explain the reason for this change.</p>   | <p>D0030-11</p>            |
| <p>12. Perhaps we overlooked it, but we do not recall any information in this DEIS (Paducah) detailing annual use, storage, or transportation of anhydrous ammonia. It is apparent that anhydrous ammonia (page 2-12, 2.2.2.3) is an important component of the conversion process that will pose its own set of hazards.</p> <p>Page 5-117 (Table 5.6-2): 10,000 tons of nitrogen gas (N<sub>2</sub>) will be consumed annually during the conversion facility operations" (Paducah).<br/>Page 2-12 (2.2.2.3): "Nitrogen...a purging gas and is released to the atmosphere...the clean off-gas stream."</p> <p>Pages 5-59 through 61 (5.2.2.3.1): We are unsure as to whether all nitrogen referenced as an off-gas is a by-product of hydrogen generation from anhydrous ammonia. We are also unsure as to whether all 10,000 tons are expected to be released to air. Another uncertainty is whether this excess nitrogen, free for oxidation, was included in total NO<sub>x</sub> emissions from conversion facility operations.</p>                                       | <p>D0030-12</p>            |
| <p>13. Page 5-65 (5.2.2.4.1): Water withdrawn from the Ohio River would approximate 57 million gallons per year. 4,000 gal/d would be released to surface water with the remainder of the withdrawn-water recirculated back</p>   | <p>D0030-13</p>            |

into the process. Assuming this were true, there would be an enormous net water gain somewhere in the system or a lot of potentially contaminated water would be vented as steam from the cooling towers and other plant processes. This DEIS (Paducah) needs to better account for water usage/disposal.

D0030-13  
(cont.)

14. Page 5-69 (line 11): incorectly references Table 5.2-18 for Table 5.2-17

D0030-14

15. Page 3-15 (3.1.5.1): This sets the current water use at "approximately 15 million gal/d." However, a January 9, 2004 report entitled Paducah Water Balance Analysis (PGDP,CAB-Water Task Force) sets the total average water flow in at 11.9 million gal/d.

Page 3-15 (3.1.5.1): This states that"during most of the year, most of the flow in both streams (Bayou & Little Bayou) is derived from plant effluents" and that the average discharge to the Ohio River...is about 4.1 million gal/d. However, the Paducah Water Balance Analysis puts the water flow out (accounted for) at 10.54 million gal/d.

D0030-15

In this draft DEIS (Paducah) the difference in the ratio of water in to water out is significant. Since the Water Balance-water flow in figure is reflective of the unaccounted for (DEIS) water out this DEIS needs to reconcile water in/water out with water use/ water disposal.

16. The ATSDR Public Health Assessment for Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant... May 2002 (pg. 52), identifies thallium as "the contaminant of concern" found in surface water at PGDP. While this DEIS (Paducah) discusses PCB and Uranium as surface water/sediment contaminants, it fails to consider thallium; a significant pollutant, injurious to human health.

D0030-16

17. The combined effect of pollutants is frequently understated in documents such as this (DEIS). One of the reasons often provided is the lack of studies regarding additive, synergistic, or cummulative actions. However, the synergistic interaction of airborne hydrogen fluoride with sulfur dioxide has been well researched. This DEIS (Paducah) anticipates the release of HF to air from the DUF-6 conversion facility (page 5-61, Table 5.2-15) and describes fairly high sulfur dioxide emission levels from major sources around the Paducah site (page 3-7, Table 3.1-2).This DEIS has not considered the greater adverse-effects expected from the synergistic action of these two pollutants.

D0030-17

18. Page 5-69 (re: on site disposal): The permitted life of the on-site C-746-U landfill is less that the expected 25 years of conversion operations. The Acclerated Clean-up Plan waste volumes for PGDP also exceed the permitted capacity of that landfill. The C-746-U landfill is owned by DOE. If Uranium Disposition Services, LLC is a private/stand alone company, ultimately responsible for products produced as well as waste generated, disposal in the C-746-U landfill should be fee based, identical to any similiar landfill. THE C-746-U LANDFILL IS A VERY CONTENUOUS COMMUNITY ISSUE.

D0030-18

19. Past "self regulation" of PGDP, by DOE, has ultimately created an extreme example of a Superfund site that will remain a toxic legacy for generations to come. Uranium Disposition Services, LLC (Paducah) should be the owner/operator of the conversion facility; responsible for all air, water, and land permits.

D0030-19

Thank you

Document D0031



STATE OF TENNESSEE  
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND CONSERVATION  
NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE 37243-0435

BETSY L. CHILD  
COMMISSIONER

PHIL BREDESEN  
GOVERNOR

January 30, 2004

Gary S. Hartman  
U.S. Department of Energy  
Oak Ridge Operations  
PO Box 2001  
Oak Ridge, TN 37831

RE: Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride EIS

Dear Mr. Hartman:

Please find enclosed the comments on the Draft Environmental Impact Statements concerning the facilities at Paducah and Portsmouth. I am writing to emphasize two points. The Department of Energy is under a final Order regarding the depleted uranium hexafluoride (DUF<sub>6</sub>) cylinders at the East Tennessee Technology Park in Oak Ridge. That Order requires that all of the cylinders be removed by December 31, 2009. All actions of the Department of Energy, in regard to the cylinders, should be consistent with that deadline, including the statements in the Environmental Impact Statement. The other issue is that at this time we support the option of over-packing any cylinders that do not meet DOT transportation requirements. We do not view any other option as having been adequately studied or evaluated in a NEPA process.

D0031-1  
D0031-2

Sincerely,

Karen Stachowski  
Deputy Commissioner

Encls.

Cc: John Owsley

OFFICIAL FILE COPY  
AWESQ  
Log No. 142 094  
FEB 3 2004

Document D0032



STATE OF TENNESSEE  
 DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND CONSERVATION  
 DOE OVERSIGHT DIVISION  
 761 EMORY VALLEY ROAD  
 OAK RIDGE, TENNESSEE 37830-7072

January 23, 2004

Gary S. Hartman  
 U.S. Department of Energy  
 Oak Ridge Operations  
 PO Box 2001  
 Oak Ridge, TN 37831

Dear Mr. Hartman

**Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) for a proposal to Construct, Operate, Maintain, and Decontaminate and Decommission a Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride (DUF<sub>6</sub>) Conversion Facility at Portsmouth, Ohio and another at Paducah, Kentucky, DOE/EIS 0359 and DOE/EIS 0360, respectively**

The Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation, DOE Oversight Division (TDEC/DOE-O), has reviewed the above subject documents in accordance with the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and associated regulations of 40 CFR 1500-1508 and 10CFR 1021 as implemented. The Tennessee Emergency Management Agency also concurs in these comments.

**General Comments:**

The state of Tennessee concurs with the proposed action for managing the ETPP cylinder inventory. We defer comments on siting and operational alternatives at DOE Paducah and DOE Portsmouth to the commonwealth of Kentucky and the state of Ohio respectively.

D0032-1

We do not expect to compromise environmental quality in another state in order to benefit our own. We will continue to talk about UF<sub>6</sub> with Ohio and Kentucky like we have for the past several years.

D0032-2

The DEIS documents were reviewed with the Tennessee Consent Order No.97-0378-H0023 Part IX of the Uranium Hexafluoride Management Plan in focus, which states "By (July 31, 1999), DOE shall issue its record of decision (ROD) for the final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Alternative Strategies for the long-term management and Use of Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride (PEIS). Unless DOE selects the no action alternative in the ROD, DOE

D0032-3

*shall either remove all known DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders and their contents from ETTP or complete the conversion of the contents of the cylinders by (December 31,2009). In this event, DOE may undertake additional National Environmental Policy Act reviews (EAs/EISs) in order to implement the alternative selected in the ROD. Within 60 days of completing any such further NEPA reviews as may be necessary to implement the selected long-term management strategy, DOE shall submit a plan containing schedules for activities that will ensure removal of all known DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders and their contents from ETTP or conversion of the contents of such cylinders will be completed by December 31, 2009. The schedule contained in the plan shall be considered an enforceable provision of this Agreement.” These documents should state that DOE shall submit this schedule within 60 days of completing this EIS. Any associated references (summaries, etc) should be changed accordingly.*

D0032-3  
(cont.)

**Specific Comments:**

**Section 1, Introduction, 2.1 No Action Alternative, 2.4.1 General:** Both EIS’s evaluate a no action alternative that assumes continued storage of cylinders at Portsmouth, Paducah, and ETTP. These documents should state that the Tennessee Consent Order requires conversion or removal of UF<sub>6</sub> cylinders from ETTP by the end of 2009 because DOE did not select the no action alternative in the PEIS ROD of April 1999.

D0032-4

**Section 1.2.1, Table 1.1-1 Inventory of DOE UF<sub>6</sub> Cylinders Considered in This [sic] EIS:** The tables list the proposed action for shipment of all ETTP cylinders to Portsmouth. According to the table this includes 584 empty cylinders. Most of these empty cylinders have already been shipped to NTS. Some empty 48-inch cylinders remaining at ETTP will probably be shipped to Portsmouth. The table is footnoted to show that the numbers are as of April 30, 2003. Updated data should be used in the final Portsmouth and Paducah documents.

D0032-5

**Section 2.2.4 Preparation and Transportation of ETTP Cylinders, Pg. 2-18; Section 5.2.4 Cylinder Preparation Impacts at ETTP.** The statement is made in 2.2.4 that “It is unknown exactly how many DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders do not meet DOT transportation requirements.” In 5.2.4, the evaluation referenced in the DUF<sub>6</sub> PEIS (DOE 1999a) indicates that 50% to 100% of the ETTP inventory would not meet DOT requirements. The current documents should be updated to show the number of DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders that will be shipped initially without extra preparation such as overpacks or transfer of contents.

D0032-6

**Section 2.2.5, Preparation and Transportation of ETTP Cylinders to Portsmouth, Page S-21, Second Paragraph, Line 8:** There are “no current plans” for a new cylinder transfer facility at ETTP. If such a facility was to be further considered, the state of Tennessee would expect to be notified through the NEPA process of such plans as soon as they reach the stage of serious consideration. Due to the nature of the operation (purging of deteriorating cylinders, and subsequent refilling of more substantial cylinders) the environmental risk posed by this type of facility to the environment of the state of Tennessee and the East Tennessee Technology Park has the potential to be substantial. The state of Tennessee requires that the cylinders be shipped in a DOT-compliant manner using over-pack containers, if necessary. This applies even if the cylinders are shipped by a different mode of transportation to Paducah.

D0032-7

**Section 2.3.5, Other Transportation Modes, Page 2-25:** Due to the difficulties cited by the document with air and barge transportation, it appears that these modes of transportation are not being seriously considered. If this situation changes, the state would expect adequate NEPA review in order to assess risks associated with those methods. D0032-8


**Section 2.4.2.3, Human Health and Safety – Transportation:** – This section shows the two highest potential accidents to involve either NH<sub>3</sub> or HF shipments. It should be expanded to show that there is also transportation risk connected with shipping UF<sub>6</sub> cylinders from ETPP to the selected conversion sites. D0032-9

**Section 3.2.7.1 Radiation Environment, Page 3-56, Line 3:** states that “radiation exposure of the general public MEI (Maximally Exposed Individual) is estimated to be 6.7 mrem/yr. This dose is about 7% of the maximum dose limit of 100 mrem/yr set for the general public (DOE 1990) and much smaller than the average dose from natural background radiation in the state of Tennessee. The actual radiation exposure of the general public would be much lower than the estimated maximum value.” The state would like to point out that these dose estimates to the general public provided by the document are very scenario-dependent. The state’s UF<sub>6</sub> Cylinder Yard Monitoring Project recorded a 2002 direct gamma dose of 9,539 mrem/yr at the fence line of the K-1066-L yard. While the state’s dose measurement in this instance is the result of continuous monitoring (twenty four hours per day, 365 days) and reflects direct gamma dose only, the relative openness of the ETPP site to co-located workers from private companies, and the plans to further open the ETPP site to the public leave many previous assumptions about dose estimates in question. D0032-10

**Section 5.2.3.1.1 Radiological Impacts, Page 5-61, Fourth Paragraph, Line 2** states that “for the first 2 years, because of receiving, inspecting and putting the ETPP cylinders into storage position, the potential radiation exposures are expected to be greater than in following years.” This should be changed to reflect the fact that only ANSI-N14.1 compliant cylinders will be shipped during the first 2 years and the total shipping campaign will take approximately twice that long resulting in higher potential radiation exposures for a longer time period. D0032-11

If you have any questions concerning these comments, please contact me at (865) 481-0995.

Sincerely



John A. Owsley  
Director

FEB-04 10:31 FROM: ENGLISH

12704883265

TO: 18665300943

P. 1/2

Document D0033

**Ruby English**  
6715 Metropolis Lake Road  
West Paducah, KY 42086  
Phone: (270) 488-3225  
E-Mail: [renglish@brtc.net](mailto:renglish@brtc.net)

February 3, 2004

Gary S. Hartman  
U. S. Department of Energy  
Oak Ridge Operations  
PO Box 2001  
Oak Ridge, TN 37831

**Public Comment in the Matter of: Draft Environmental Impact Statement  
Construction and Operation of a Depleted Uranium  
Hexafluoride Conversion Facility**

**Comment Period was Extended to: February 4, 2004 by Department of Energy**

D0033-1

Please include the following comments as part of the permanent record.

*Thank you for allowing me the opportunity to comment on such an important topic, The construction of a DUF6 Conversion Facility to be located at Paducah, KY. As you know, I am a neighbor of the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant and have always tried to comment on topics you have let me know about and I always try to do it in a civilized manner.*

D0033-2

*I understand about the conversion plant being built here and employing some of the workers that will be laid off when USEC closes. Since this is a rural community and the high paying jobs are not around here this plant would be good for the few people that will be successful in securing those positions. But, I also understand that when all or most of the current and former workers begin developing health problems then that will be another story.*

D0033-3

*The continued storage of the current DUF6 cylinders indefinitely will eventually cause you more of a problem if these are not moved and disposed of due to continued exposure. There are more accidents at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant each year than is reported. One day this plant will cause an accident that will affect this whole area if these cylinders are not cleaned up. Then, I look at the health aspect for the neighborhood and wonder how much more The Department of Energy is going to put on us.*

D0033-4

FEB-4-2004 19:32 FROM: ENGLISH

12704883265

TO: 18665300943

P. 2/2

~~So money wise this plant will be a good thing. Health wise this plant addition will only cause more health problems for the neighborhood and the community.~~

D0033-5

Transportation will be another problem, because, you will not only clean-up the cylinders at the Paducah site, but, you will be shipping in cylinders from other locations. These cylinders will be traveling on our roads and rails and possibly down our rivers. There could be accidents and then this would endanger the public. Hexafluoride is dangerous to our health. I also want to know about the disposal of the cylinders as to where they will go. My concern is in the landfill behind my house. Is that the plan?

D0033-6

I also want to know about the waste from the DUF<sub>6</sub> plant being built in New Mexico by Louisiana Energy Systems. Is the Department of Energy going to be responsible for waste that is produced from this plant. If so will they be shipped to Paducah? From everything that I am reading it seems the plan is for the EPA to lower the standards for the landfills and then DOE will dispose of material in these landfills that should never be put there. This has already happened at the Paducah Site and I am sure it could and will happen again. I don't really know what else to say, because, I think decisions and agreements have already been made and any thing else I could say would not make much difference. I hope that you will seriously consider and think about the decisions you make that at least take the thought of what is good for the neighborhood and the worker's. I know you have to make money, but please don't do it at the expense of human life. There has already been more than enough lives taken due to health problems caused by the misguided management that has been at this plant in the past. Please do something good for the community and build and operate a clean plant. The imaginary fences are not there and the contaminants don't stop at the fence either. The landfills are already leaking, so any additional dumping will only endanger us that much more.

D0033-7

D0033-8

D0033-9

This Paducah Site will become a dumping ground for all waste good or bad that other locations will want to ship to Paducah if you let them. So, let me know what your decision will be and May God Bless.

D0033-10

Sincerely,  
  
 Ruby English  
 PGDP Neighbor and  
 ACT Chairperson

## Document D0034



UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY  
REGION 4  
ATLANTA FEDERAL CENTER  
61 FORSYTH STREET  
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303-8960

February 2, 2004

OFFICIAL FILE COPY  
AMESQLog No. 142607Date Received FEB 5 2004

File Code \_\_\_\_\_

Mr. Gary S. Hartman  
DOB-ORO Cultural Resources Management Coordinator  
U.S. Department of Energy-Oak Ridge Operations  
P.O. Box 2001  
Oak Ridge, TN 37831

**RE: EPA Review and Comments on  
Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS)  
Construction and Operation of a Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride  
Conversion Facility at the Paducah, KY site  
CEQ No. 030541**

Dear Mr. Hartman:

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (U.S. EPA) Region 4 reviewed the subject Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) pursuant to Section 309 of the Clean Air Act and Section 102 (2)(C) of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). The purpose of this letter is to provide the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) with EPA's comments regarding potential impacts of the proposed construction and operation of a depleted uranium hexafluoride conversion facility at the Paducah, Kentucky site.

DOE's proposed action is to design, construct, and operate a conversion facility for converting depleted uranium hexafluoride (DUF<sub>6</sub>) to a more stable chemical form (depleted triuranium octoxide, U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub>) at the Paducah, KY site. The resulting conversion products would be suitable for beneficial use or for disposal.

The DEIS assesses the potential environmental impacts of the following activities: 1) construction, operation, maintenance, and decontamination and decommissioning (D&D) of the proposed conversion facility; 2) conversion to depleted U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> based on the proposed Uranium Disposition Services, LLC (UDS) technology; 3) transportation of uranium conversion products and waste to a disposal facility; 4) transportation and sale of the hydrogen fluoride (HF) conversion co-product and 5) neutralization of HF to CaF<sub>2</sub> and its sale or disposal in the event that the HF product is not sold.

Potential environmental impacts were assessed by examining all of the activities required to implement each alternative. For each alternative, potential impacts to workers, the public, and the environment were estimated for both normal operations and potential accidents. The No Action alternative is the storage of DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders indefinitely, with continued cylinder surveillance and maintenance. The action alternatives included three potential locations for siting the proposed conversion facility. Location A was identified as the preferred location.

When regulatory compliance is discussed in this document, the radionuclide National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAPs) for Radionuclide Emissions for United States Department of Energy (USDOE) Owned or Operated Facilities, in 40, CFR 61, Subpart H, is not always adequately referenced. Please include this information in the FEIS.

D0034-1

The EIS should include information regarding the capability and capacity for the two disposal facilities mentioned in the DEIS, namely Envirocare and the Nevada Test Site (NTS), to accept the proposed waste products from the Paducah conversion facility. The disposal facilities must meet both the Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC) limits, as well as have the physical capacity to accept the proposed quantity of conversion product waste.

D0034-2

Based on the review of the DEIS, the project received a rating of "EC-1," meaning that some environmental concerns exist regarding aspects of the proposed project. Because of the chemical and radioactive nature of the materials processed and produced, safety measures and prevention of potential impacts to on-site workers and public health are areas of primary concern. Specifically, protecting the environment and human health involves the need for appropriate operation and safety measures, monitoring, short-term storage, packaging, and transportation and sale or disposal of conversion products.

D0034-3

Ongoing radiological monitoring will be required during operation of this facility. Also, appropriate short-term storage of radioactive wastes on-site is required in order to prevent impacts to workers, the public, and the environment. With regard to LLW disposal, the DEIS covers the impacts from the transporting of conversion products to both the Envirocare of Utah, Inc. facility, and Nevada Test Site (NTS) from the proposed conversion facility in Paducah. Construction of the facility could potentially result in minor impacts to wetlands. Overall, the impacts as defined in the DEIS appear to be within acceptable limits.

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on this document. We look forward to reviewing the Final EIS. If we can be of further assistance, please contact Ramona McConney of my staff at (404) 562-9615.

Sincerely,



Heinz J. Mueller, Chief  
NEPA Program Office

Enclosure: Summary of Rating Definitions and Follow up Action

## SUMMARY OF RATING DEFINITIONS AND FOLLOW UP ACTION\*

### Environmental Impact of the Action

#### LO-Lack of Objections

The EPA review has not identified any potential environmental impacts requiring substantive changes to the proposal. The review may have disclosed opportunities for application of mitigation measures that could be accomplished with no more than minor changes to the proposal.

#### EC-Environmental Concerns

The EPA review has identified environmental impacts that should be avoided in order to fully protect the environment. Corrective measures may require changes to the preferred alternative or application of mitigation measures that can reduce the environmental impacts. EPA would like to work with the lead agency to reduce these impacts.

#### EO-Environmental Objections

The EPA review has identified significant environmental impacts that must be avoided in order to provide adequate protection for the environment. Corrective measures may require substantial changes to the preferred alternative or consideration of some other project alternative (including the no action alternative or a new alternative). EPA intends to work with the lead agency to reduce these impacts.

#### EU-Environmentally Unsatisfactory

The EPA review has identified adverse environmental impacts that are of sufficient magnitude that they are unsatisfactory from the standpoint of public health or welfare or environmental quality. EPA intends to work with the lead agency to reduce these impacts. If the potential unsatisfactory impacts are not corrected at the final EIS state, this proposal will be recommended for referral to the CEQ.

### Adequacy of the Impact Statement

#### Category 1-Adequate

The EPA believes the draft EIS adequately sets forth the environmental impact(s) of the preferred alternative and those of the alternatives reasonably available to the project or action. No further analysis or data collecting is necessary, but the reviewer may suggest the addition of clarifying language or information.

#### Category 2-Insufficient Information

The draft EIS does not contain sufficient information for the EPA to fully assess the environmental impacts that should be avoided in order to fully protect the environment, or the EPA reviewer has identified new reasonably available alternatives that are within the spectrum of alternatives analyzed in the draft EIS, which could reduce the environmental impacts of the action. The identified additional information, data, analyses, or discussion should be included in the final EIS.

#### Category 3-Inadequate

EPA does not believe that the draft EIS adequately assesses potentially significant environmental impacts of the action, or the EPA reviewer has identified new, reasonably available alternatives that are outside of the spectrum of alternatives analyzed in the draft EIS, which should be analyzed in order to reduce the potentially significant environmental impacts. EPA believes that the identified additional information, data analyses, or discussions are of such a magnitude that they should have full public review at a draft stage. EPA does not believe that the draft EIS is adequate for the purposes of the NEPA and/or Section 309 review, and thus should be formally revised and made available for public comment in a supplemental or revised draft EIS. On the basis of the potential significant impacts involved, this proposal could be a candidate for referral to the CEQ.

\*From EPA Mammal 1640 Policy and Procedures for the Review of the Federal Actions Impacting the Environment

### 3 RESPONSES TO COMMENTS

This section provides DOE's responses to comments received during the public comment period. Indices of the DOE responses are provided by document number (Table 3.1), by commentors' last name (Table 3.2), and by commentors' company/organization (Table 3.3). Most of the comments received apply to both the Portsmouth and the Paducah conversion facility EISs. However, there are some comment documents that apply specifically to one EIS or the other. An index of comment documents indicating their applicability to each EIS is given in Table 3.4. Table 3.5 lists only those comment documents that apply to the Portsmouth EIS, and Table 3.6 lists those comment documents that apply to the Paducah EIS. Table 3.7 lists the documents that apply to both EISs.

**TABLE 3.1 Index of DOE Responses to Comments by Document Number**

Document Number	Name	Company/Organization	Page
D0001	Driver, Charles M.	Individual	3-9
D0002	Kilrod, John	Individual	3-12
D0003	Colley, Vina	Portsmouth/Piketon Residents for Environmental Safety and Security	3-13
D0004	Howell, Linda	Individual	3-21
D0005	Minter, Dan	Southern Ohio Diversification Initiative	3-24
D0006	Justice, T.J.	Ohio Governor's Office	3-25
D0007	Orazine, Danny	Individual	3-25
D0008	Jurka, Vickie	Active Citizens for Truth	3-26
D0009	Donham, Mark	Individual	3-27
D0010	Klebe, Michael	Central Midwest Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Commission	3-30
D0011	Walton, Barbara	Individual	3-32
D0012	Mulvenon, Norman A.	Individual	3-35
D0013	Gawarecki, Susan	Oak Ridge Reservation Local Oversight Committee	3-36
D0014	Forsberg, Charles	Individual	3-37
D0015	Minter, Dan	Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical and Energy International Union	3-37
D0016	Simonton, Gregory L.	Southern Ohio Diversification Initiative	3-40
D0017	Meiners, Steve	Safety and Ecology Corporation	3-42
D0018	Baldrige, Paul R.	Ohio Department of Natural Resources	3-43
D0019	Haire, M. Jonathan	Individual	3-43
D0020	Mosby, David N.	Oak Ridge Site-Specific Advisory Board	3-45
D0021	Kalb, Paul D.	Individual	3-46
D0022	Mitchell, Graham E.	State of Ohio Environmental Protection Agency	3-47
D0023	Welch, Michael V.	Kentucky Division of Waste Management	3-59
D0024	Ford, Edward S.	Central Midwest Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Commission	3-72
D0025	McConnell, Mitch	United States Senator, Kentucky	3-76

**TABLE 3.1 (Cont.)**

---

Document Number	Name	Company/Organization	Page
D0026	Westlake, Kenneth A.	U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region 5	3-77
D0027	Taimi, T. Michael	United States Enrichment Corporation Inc.	3-82
D0028	Mulvenon, Norman A.	Oak Ridge Reservation Local Oversight Committee	3-90
D0029	Colley, Vina	Portsmouth/Piketown Residents for Environmental Safety and Security	3-92
D0030	Jurka, Charles and Vicki	Individuals	3-103
D0031	Stachowski, Karen	Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation	3-116
D0032	Owsley, John	Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation	3-117
D0033	English, Ruby	Individual	3-123
D0034	Mueller, Heinz J.	U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region 4	3-128

---

**TABLE 3.2 Index of DOE Responses to Comments by Last Name**

Name	Company/Organization	Document Number	Page
Baldrige, Paul R.	Ohio Department of Natural Resources	D0018	3-43
Colley, Vina	Portsmouth/Piketon Residents for Environmental Safety and Security	D0003 & D0029	3-13, 3-92
Donham, Mark	Individual	D0009	3-27
Driver, Charles M.	Individual	D0001	3-9
English, Ruby	Individual	D0033	3-123
Ford, Edward S.	Central Midwest Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Commission	D0024	3-72
Forsberg, Charles	Individual	D0014	3-37
Gawarecki, Susan	Oak Ridge Reservation Local Oversight Committee	D0013	3-36
Haire, M. Jonathan	Individual	D0019	3-43
Howell, Linda	Individual	D0004	3-21
Jurka, Charles and Vicki	Individuals	D0030	3-103
Jurka, Vickie	Active Citizens for Truth	D0008	3-26
Justice, T.J.	Ohio Governor's Office	D0006	3-25
Kalb, Paul D.	Individual	D0021	3-46
Kilrod, John	Individual	D0002	3-12
Klebe, Michael	Central Midwest Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Commission	D0010	3-30
McConnell, Mitch	United States Senator, Kentucky	D0025	3-76
Meiners, Steve	Safety and Ecology Corporation	D0017	3-42
Minter, Dan	Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical and Energy International Union & Southern Ohio Diversification Initiative	D0005 & D0015	3-24, 3-37
Mitchell, Graham E.	State of Ohio Environmental Protection Agency	D0022	3-47
Mosby, David N.	Oak Ridge Site-Specific Advisory Board	D0020	3-45
Mueller, Heinz J.	U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region 4	D0034	3-128
Mulvenon, Norman A.	Individual & Oak Ridge Reservation Local Oversight Committee	D0012 & D0028	3-35, 3-90
Orazine, Danny	Individual	D0007	3-25
Owsley, John	Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation	D0032	3-117
Simonton, Gregory L.	Southern Ohio Diversification Initiative	D0016	3-40
Stachowski, Karen	Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation	D0031	3-116
Taimi, T. Michael	United States Enrichment Corporation Inc.	D0027	3-82
Walton, Barbara	Individual	D0011	3-32
Welch, Michael V.	Kentucky Division of Waste Management	D0023	3-59
Westlake, Kenneth A.	U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region 5	D0026	3-77

**TABLE 3.3 Index of DOE Responses to Comments by Company/Organization**

Company/Organization	Document Number	Name	Page
Active Citizens for Truth	D0008	Jurka, Vickie	3-26
Central Midwest Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Commission	D0010	Klebe, Michael	3-30
Central Midwest Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Commission	D0024	Ford, Edward S.	3-72
Kentucky Division of Waste Management	D0023	Welch, Michael V.	3-59
Oak Ridge Reservation Local Oversight Committee	D0013	Gawarecki, Susan	3-36
Oak Ridge Reservation Local Oversight Committee	D0028	Mulvenon, Norman A.	3-90
Oak Ridge Site-Specific Advisory Board	D0020	Mosby, David N.	3-45
Ohio Department of Natural Resources	D0018	Baldrige, Paul R.	3-43
Ohio Governor's Office	D0006	Justice, T.J.	3-25
Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical and Energy International Union	D0015	Minter, Dan	3-37
Portsmouth/Piketon Residents for Environmental Safety and Security	D0003 & D0029	Colley, Vina	3-13, 3-92
Safety and Ecology Corporation	D0017	Meiners, Steve	3-42
Southern Ohio Diversification Initiative	D0005	Minter, Dan	3-24
Southern Ohio Diversification Initiative	D0016	Simonton, Gregory L.	3-40
State of Ohio Environmental Protection Agency	D0022	Mitchell, Graham E.	3-47
Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation	D0032	Owsley, John	3-117
Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation	D0031	Stachowski, Karen	3-116
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region 4	D0034	Mueller, Heinz J.	3-128
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region 5	D0026	Westlake, Kenneth A.	3-77
United States Enrichment Corporation, Inc.	D0027	Taimi, T. Michael	3-82
United States Senator, Kentucky	D0025	McConnell, Mitch	3-76

**TABLE 3.4 Index of Commentors by EIS**

Document Number	Name	Company/Organization	Ports. EIS	Paducah EIS
D0001	Driver, Charles M.	Individual	×	×
D0002	Kilrod, John	Individual	×	×
D0003	Colley, Vina	Portsmouth/Piketon Residents for Environmental Safety and Security	×	
D0004	Howell, Linda	Individual	×	×
D0005	Minter, Dan	Southern Ohio Diversification Initiative	×	
D0006	Justice, T.J.	Ohio Governor's Office	×	×
D0007	Orazine, Danny	Individual		×
D0008	Jurka, Vickie	Active Citizens for Truth		×
D0009	Donham, Mark	Individual	×	×
D0010	Klebe, Michael	Central Midwest Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Commission	×	×
D0011	Walton, Barbara	Individual	×	×
D0012	Mulvenon, Norman	Individual	×	×
D0013	Gawarecki, Susan	Oak Ridge Reservation Local Oversight Committee	×	×
D0014	Forsberg, Charles	Individual	×	×
D0015	Minter, Dan	Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical and Energy International Union	×	×
D0016	Simonton, Gregory L.	Southern Ohio Diversification Initiative	×	
D0017	Meiners, Steve	Safety and Ecology Corporation	×	×
D0018	Baldrige, Paul R.	Ohio Department of Natural Resources	×	
D0019	Haire, M. Jonathan	Individual	×	×
D0020	Mosby, David N.	Oak Ridge Site Specific Advisory Board	×	×
D0021	Kalb, Paul D.	Individual	×	×
D0022	Mitchell, Graham E.	State of Ohio Environmental Protection Agency	×	
D0023	Welch, Michael V.	Kentucky Division of Waste Management		×
D0024	Ford, Edward S.	Central Midwest Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Commission	×	×
D0025	McConnell, Mitch	United States Senator, Kentucky		×
D0026	Westlake, Kenneth A.	U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region 5	×	
D0027	Taimi, T. Michael	United States Enrichment Corporation Inc.	×	×
D0028	Mulvenon, Norman A.	Oak Ridge Reservation Local Oversight Committee	×	×
D0029	Colley, Vina	Portsmouth Piketon Residents for Environmental Safety and Security	×	
D0030	Jurka, Charles and Vicki	Individual		×
D0031	Stachowski, Karen	Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation	×	×
D0032	Owsley, John	Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation	×	×
D0033	English, Ruby	Individual		×
D0034	Mueller, Heinz J.	U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region 4		×

**TABLE 3.5 List of Commentors on Only the Portsmouth EIS**

Document Number	Name	Company/Organization
D0003	Colley, Vina	Portsmouth/Piketon Residents for Environmental Safety and Security
D0005	Minter, Dan	Southern Ohio Diversification Initiative
D0016	Simonton, Gregory L.	Southern Ohio Diversification Initiative
D0018	Baldridge, Paul R.	Ohio Department of Natural Resources
D0022	Mitchell, Graham E.	State of Ohio Environmental Protection Agency
D0026	Westlake, Kenneth A.	U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region 5
D0029	Colley, Vina	Portsmouth/Piketon Residents for Environmental Safety and Security

**TABLE 3.6 List of Commentors on Only the Paducah EIS**

Document Number	Name	Company/Organization
D0007	Orazine, Danny	Individual
D0008	Jurka, Vickie	Active Citizens for Truth
D0023	Welch, Michael V.	Kentucky Division of Waste Management
D0025	McConnell, Mitch	United States Senator, Kentucky
D0030	Jurka, Charles and Vicki	Individual
D0033	English, Ruby	Individual
D0034	Mueller, Heinz J.	U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region 4

**TABLE 3.7 List of Commentors on Both the Portsmouth and Paducah EISs**

Document Number	Name	Company/Organization
D0001	Driver, Charles M.	Individual
D0002	Kilrod, John	Individual
D0004	Howell, Linda	Individual
D0006	Justice, T.J.	Ohio Governor's Office
D0009	Donham, Mark	Individual
D0010	Klebe, Michael	Central Midwest Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Commission
D0011	Walton, Barbara	Individual
D0012	Mulvenon, Norman	Individual
D0013	Gawarecki, Susan	Oak Ridge Reservation Local Oversight Committee
D0014	Forsberg, Charles	Individual
D0015	Minter, Dan	Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical and Energy International Union
D0017	Meiners, Steve	Safety and Ecology Corporation
D0019	Haire, Jonathan	Individual
D0020	Mosby, David N.	Oak Ridge Site-Specific Advisory Board
D0021	Kalb, Paul D.	Individual
D0024	Ford, Edward S.	Central Midwest Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Commission
D0027	Taimi, T. Michael	United States Enrichment Corporation Inc.
D0028	Mulvenon, Norman A.	Oak Ridge Reservation Local Oversight Committee
D0031	Stachowski, Karen	Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation
D0032	Owsley, John	Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation



**COMMENTOR D0001: Charles M. Driver****Comment D0001-001**

If there is anyone qualified to discuss the handling of DUF<sub>6</sub> and DU<sub>4</sub>, it would be the persons who have handled it before and are now suffering from the effects of that handling.

**Response D0001-001**

As with all controlled materials at the DOE sites, the handling of DUF<sub>6</sub> and any other depleted uranium-containing material is subject to established procedures and guidelines that are based on many years of experience by the workers who have worked with such materials. For example, the manual "Uranium Hexafluoride: A Manual of Good Handling Practices, ORO-651," (DOE 1991) was first issued by the Atomic Energy Commission in 1957 to provide information on how UF<sub>6</sub> is handled in U.S. gaseous diffusion plants. The manual has gone through many iterations and has since been adopted by USEC as "The UF<sub>6</sub> Manual: Good Handling Practices for Uranium Hexafluoride, USEC-651," (available from USEC Inc., Production Department, 6903 Rockledge Drive, Bethesda, MD 20817) to provide guidance to workers handling the UF<sub>6</sub>. The manual is based on years of experience by the workers who have been handling the material.

With respect to health effects from past operations, DOE has established an office to address worker compensation. Although worker compensation issues are outside the scope of this EIS, the following information is provided to help any individual locate appropriate resources. DOE has established the Office of Worker Advocacy to oversee workers' claims. Workers may submit an application for any illness that may have been caused by exposure to toxic substances, radiation, or biological agents while they were working at a covered DOE facility. Information about the program is available on the Web at <http://www.eh.doe.gov/advocacy/index.html>. Application forms may be downloaded from this Web site, or they can be requested by calling or visiting one of the DOE Resource Centers. Listing of the Resource Centers is also available from the above Web site. The telephone numbers of the resource center at Portsmouth are 740-353-6993, and Toll Free: 866-363-6993; at Paducah 270-534-0599, Toll Free: 866-534-0599; and at Oak Ridge 865-481-0411, Toll Free: 866-481-0411.

**Comment D0001-002**

My concern centers around the continued claim of upper management, distributed through middle management and on down the line to Front Line Managers who still tell employees that, "This is a clean plant. The dust out in the buildings is just DUST and there is nothing in it that will hurt you. Radiation is the only concern here and it is monitored. If there was any other danger, they would tell us about it."

I'm sorry, but that is an outright lie. DOE and its managing subcontractors have known for generations that the dust in Process Buildings, storage buildings and the ground surrounding

these buildings contains deadly elements such as Arsenic, Lead, Nickel, Silver and a long list of other deadly substances. Many of these elements are “laced” with secondary substances, such as Mercury, Zinc, Chromium and others, compounds that do not break down in the natural environment, pollution so intense that it is overwhelming.

What I don’t understand and remain confused about is the continued denial that these deadly elements, byproducts from the processing of nuclear material and the substances used in cleaning and maintaining the facilities, are the root cause of the cancers and other poisonings that both workers and other downwind victims suffer from.

### **Response D0001-002**

DOE conducts a comprehensive monitoring program at both on-site and off-site locations measuring the ambient concentrations of radionuclides and hazardous substances in environmental media, including air, water, soil, building surfaces, vegetation and wildlife. Any occurrences of higher than acceptable concentrations are reported and appropriate actions are taken. All the findings from the monitoring program are documented in the annual site environmental reports. The most recent site environmental reports that were available at the time were used in the preparation of the Portsmouth and Paducah EISs. The environmental conditions at and around the Portsmouth, Paducah, and ETTP sites are summarized in Section 3 of the EISs.

With respect to health effects from past operations, see response to Comment D0001-001 above for information about the DOE Office of Worker Advocacy.

### **Comment D0001-003**

DOE is long overdue to stop crying about potential “free-loaders” possibly getting compensation and using that excuse for not providing health care, nor paying the thousands of true victims the Congressionally appointed compensation they are supposed to be receiving. The claimed “lack of information” on applicants, lost employment and medical records is absolutely false. We, that worked in certain departments, know that the DOE and the subcontractors have stacks of records and computer files on every employee and individual that ever entered the plant.

I have personally seen files up to a quarter-inch thick, just on a “delivery person”. On employees, with the security background checks, interviews, updates and annual physical exams, each employee has a mountain of historical records. DOE, for some reason, wants to slow the process down, thus allowing more victims to die in despair, never knowing if they could have been saved by alternative medical treatments, nor if their families received any compensation for the pain, severe loss of income and suffering.

### **Response D0001-003**

Comment noted. See the response to Comment D0001-001 above for information about the DOE Office of Worker Advocacy.

**Comment D0001-004**

There are thousands of innocent victims all across this nation that are being systematically ignored and allowed to suffer needlessly. I implore you to take caution as you explore the methods of safe handling of these Depleted Radioactive Elements, the containers they are stored in, and remember that the byproducts, the dust and cleaning agents can be as deadly as the DU itself.

**Response D0001-004**

The conversion facility project will be conducted with a commitment to keeping workers, the public, and the environment safe. First, all applicable health and safety regulations will be complied with; this results in keeping worker exposures to radiation, chemicals, and physical hazards at low levels. Wherever possible, reactions in the conversion process will be automated and contained within closed vessels so that workers are not exposed (this will particularly limit exposures to dusts). Workers with the possibility of contacting radioactive materials will wear radiation dosimeters so that individual exposures can be monitored and controlled to remain at low, health-protective levels.

The EISs include detailed evaluations of the potential impacts to human health and safety, including workers directly involved in conversion facility operations, other workers located at the sites, as well as members of the public living around the sites. The EISs consider exposures to not only depleted uranium compounds but also to other chemicals used in the conversion process and by-products of conversion. In the Paducah EIS, potential health and safety impacts during operations are discussed in Sections 5.2.2.1 and 5.2.2.2 for routine conditions and accidents, respectively. In the Portsmouth EIS, potential health and safety impacts during operations are discussed in Sections 5.2.3.1 and 5.2.3.2 for routine conditions and accidents, respectively. The results of the analyses indicate that the risks to human health and safety are expected to be low and well within applicable limits and regulations.

**COMMENTOR D0002: John Kilrod****Comment D0002-001**

I understand that there is a public meeting and public comments on the UF<sub>6</sub> cylinder project (and that is the transferring of UF<sub>6</sub> cylinders from K25 to Portsmouth or Paducah). I understand that Bechtel-Jacobs has offered up a barge remedy to barge those cylinders from K25 to Paducah and/or Portsmouth or vice versa. The one thing that concerns me is if you load barges at K25 facilities or any facilities upstream of Kingston, you will have to do some dredging to do that. If that dredging interferes or some way mucks up the residues in the bottom of the Clinch River in which there is known contaminants and it reaches the water tables and water systems in Kingston and downstream users, how is the Department of Energy prepared to reimburse or give us clean water?

This has been thought of before and has been tried before. And I think the only thing that Bechtel-Jacobs wants is a quick fix under Incentive C, not looking out for downstream users and downstream people. 1) So one of the things that I'd like to see is some definitive data, not comments or professional judgments, definitive data, that there is no residue disturbance that will occur in a barge transfer. 2) Even if there is no dredging needed, wouldn't that disturb the sediment in the water and wouldn't that make it intrusive into the downstream users' water table? 3) I would like to know what happens if a cylinder falls off the barge, and 4) How would you remediate that? 5) How are going to protect it and provide adequate security down through the Tennessee River into Alabama and back up through Tennessee and Kentucky? I'd like answers to those questions before I would be willing to support any kind of action that Bechtel-Jacobs would suggest. I assume they have a conflict of interest because they are going to propose the least cost alternative in order to maximize their incentive fee under incentive contract. I would like to know about this and DOE's views.

**Response D0002-001**

The transportation of cylinders by barge was considered, but not analyzed in detail in the two site-specific conversion draft EISs. As discussed in Section 2.3.5 of each EIS, barge transport was not considered in detail primarily because the nearest functioning barge facilities to Portsmouth and Paducah are located between 20 and 30 miles from the sites. Consequently, overland transportation would be required at each end of the route, as would additional cylinder loading and unloading steps. In addition, truck and rail were identified as the likely cylinder transport modes in conversion facility design documents.

As with any transportation mode, barge transport has associated advantages and disadvantages. For example, during barge transport there is no onboard fuel available and the shipment is not in close proximity to other transport vehicles, factors which could reduce, but not eliminate, potential accident risks. However, barge transport would require overland transportation by truck on each end of the route, as well as additional handling of cylinders during the loading and unloading of the barge. These activities have associated accident risks and would contribute to the radiation exposure of workers during normal cylinder handling. In addition, shipment by barge could require dredging

of the river bottoms at the barge facilities, an activity with potential adverse environmental impacts, as noted by the commentor.

It should be noted that, regardless of the transport mode, all cylinder shipments must comply with the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations for the shipment of radioactive materials, as specified in Title 49 of the *Code of Federal Regulations*. These regulations are designed to be protective of public health and safety during both accident and routine transportation conditions.

Because barge transport was considered to be an unreasonable option and has not been proposed as part of the current conversion facility project, a detailed evaluation has not been included in the Final site-specific conversion EISs. If barge transportation was proposed in the future, additional NEPA review would be conducted. Such a review would address all issues associated with the proposed activity, including issues associated with dredging, accidents, and security.

**COMMENTOR D0003:**           **Vina Colley, President**  
  Portsmouth/Piketon Residents for Environmental Safety  
  and Security

**D0003-001**

We feel that the oxide conversion facility was here from '57 to '78 and it was one of most hazardous radiological chemical operations at Portsmouth. There were high levels of transuranium problems there, and the report explains that the oxide conversion process was originally established as a waste recovery process. We feel that the depleted uranium hexafluoride plant is another process in establishing waste. It will put workers and the community at risk.

**Response D0003-001**

The oxide conversion facility that operated from 1957 to 1978 at the Portsmouth site to which the commentor has referred was a different type of a conversion facility than the one being considered in this EIS. The earlier facility was used to convert UO<sub>3</sub> to UF<sub>6</sub>, which was later fed into the gaseous diffusion plant at the site to be enriched and used. Some of the UO<sub>3</sub> was derived from the reprocessing of used nuclear fuel and contained transuranic elements. In 2000, the DOE Office of Oversight, within the Office of Environment, Safety and Health conducted an investigation into the activities that took place at the Portsmouth site prior to 2000, and documented its findings in a report entitled "Independent Investigation of the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant, Volume 1: Past Environment, Safety, and Health Practices" (DOE 2000). The conversion facility referenced by the commentor as well as the conditions under which the facility operated and potential impacts to the workers at the facility are described in Section 3.2.2 of that report.

The conversion facility that is discussed in this EIS is intended to convert the depleted uranium hexafluoride (DUF<sub>6</sub>) contained in the cylinders to depleted U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub>. Under the proposed action, the depleted U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> product would subsequently be packaged and transported to a disposal facility off site and disposed of there. The amount of product in temporary storage on site at any one time would not exceed the quantity generated over a six-month period. The conversion facility would be constructed and operated under strict guidelines and would be protective of the workers, residents who live in the vicinity of the site, and the environment.

Impacts associated with potential transuranic contamination of DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders at the three storage sites are discussed in detail in Appendix B of both the Portsmouth and Paducah EISs. The impacts are also summarized in Sections 5.1.2.1, 5.2.3.1, and 5.2.3.2 of the Portsmouth EIS, and Sections 5.1.2.1, 5.2.2.1, and 5.2.2.2 of the Paducah EIS. As indicated in those sections, the impacts associated with transuranic contamination of cylinders are relatively small compared with the impacts associated with the DUF<sub>6</sub> stored in the same cylinders. Impacts associated with activities other than DUF<sub>6</sub> management are addressed under the cumulative impacts discussion in Section 5.3 of both EISs.

#### **Comment D0003-002**

Mounting evidence of health effects of the depleted uranium on humans and the environment is showing up in the Gulf War, and now lawsuits have started. So this is going to be another big issue here if we have this conversion plant.

#### **Response D0003-002**

To the extent that the commentor is concerned about the health effects of depleted uranium, the EISs include detailed evaluations of the potential impacts to human health and safety, including workers directly involved in conversion facility operations, other workers located at the sites, as well as members of the public living around the sites. The EISs consider exposures to depleted uranium compounds as well as other chemicals used in the conversion process and by-products of conversion. The most recently available toxicological data from established regulatory sources were used in the evaluations. In the Paducah EIS, potential health and safety impacts during operations are discussed in Sections 5.2.2.1 and 5.2.2.2 for routine conditions and accidents, respectively. In the Portsmouth EIS, potential health and safety impacts during operations are discussed in Sections 5.2.3.1 and 5.2.3.2 for routine conditions and accidents, respectively. The results of the analyses indicate that the risks to human health and safety are expected to be low and well within applicable limits and regulations.

The conversion facility project will be conducted with a commitment to keeping workers, the public, and the environment safe. All applicable health and safety regulations will be complied with, keeping worker exposures to radiation, chemicals, and physical hazards at low levels. Wherever possible, reactions in the conversion process will be automated and contained within closed vessels so that workers will not be exposed (this will particularly limit exposures to dusts). Workers with the possibility of contacting radioactive materials

will wear radiation dosimeters so that individual exposures can be monitored and controlled to remain at low, health-protective levels.

### **Comment D0003-003**

In 1997 the National Institution of Occupational Safety and Health, NIOSH, evaluated the cylinder yard and they found that there was neutron exposures there. They concluded that there was potential and chronic neutron exposures in the area where uranium was stored, and the cylinder yard was just one of the areas that neutron exposures occurred.

### **Response D0003-003**

As described in Section 1.2 of each site-specific conversion facility EIS, uranium and its decay products in DUF<sub>6</sub> emit low levels of alpha, beta, gamma, and neutron radiation. The average external dose rate at the outside surface of the cylinders, based on actual measurements in the cylinder yards, is typically about 2 to 3 mrem per hour (about 1 mrem/h at 1 ft). Estimates of radiation exposures resulting from cylinder handling and transportation activities were made either on the basis of external radiation measurement data or computer modeling results, which are in good agreement with measurement data. Most of the exposure is due to gamma radiation. Beta and neutron radiation contribute significantly less to worker exposures and diminish quickly as one moves away from the cylinder. The contribution of alphas to exposure is essentially zero. Potential lifetime latent cancer risks resulting from radiation exposures are presented in Section 5.1.2.1.1 of each EIS for maintenance activities needed for continued cylinder storage (the no action alternative).

### **Comment D0003-004**

Documents indicated that there's various slips associated with the valves on the HF cylinders deactivation and the coupling welds. So we're concerned that this could be a huge problem when they start moving these cylinders around. We've also been told that they really don't have any expertise that knows how to get these cylinders moved from place to place.

### **Response D0003-004**

The Paducah, Portsmouth, and ETTP sites have extensive experience with moving the cylinders, and excellent safety records for those cylinder movements. Since the mid-1990s, most of the cylinders at the sites have been safely moved to achieve readily monitored locations on well-drained yards.

The valves of each cylinder are inspected for signs of leakage during the scheduled inspection of each cylinder (either once every 4 years or once every year for those cylinders previously stored in substandard conditions or showing areas of heavy pitting or corrosion). If discoloration is noted around a valve, radiological monitoring of the cylinder surface is conducted to determine whether leakage has occurred. If necessary,

leaking valves are replaced. These procedures are discussed in Section 5.1.1.1 of each of the EISs.

A 2003 Agreed Order between the Commonwealth of Kentucky and DOE stipulates that a detailed inspection procedure be followed prior to cylinder relocations within the Paducah site; the Portsmouth site follows similar procedures. Prior to movement or feeding into the conversion facility autoclaves, the cylinders would be visually inspected to ensure that no damage had occurred since the last scheduled inspection. No cylinder would be moved or fed into the process unless there was a high degree of confidence in its ability to withstand the handling.

#### **Comment D0003-005**

In 1992 there was a valve that was knocked off of one of these cylinders in the yard and there was an airborne plume that left the site. The workers were told to stay in the building, and I monitored it on my own radio at home but no one in the community was even notified. At no time have we ever had a release in this community that the alarm went off to warn the community.

#### **Response D0003-005**

All past release incidents at the three DUF<sub>6</sub> storage sites are reported as required under law. If the releases are small and do not reach off-site locations at health-threatening levels, immediate public notification in the form of alarms is not required. However, if an emergency situation were ever to develop that threatened the off-site population near any of these sites, immediate activation of the emergency response system, including alarms, would be implemented. Additionally, emergency procedures and training are provided for site employees in the event of accidental releases of DUF<sub>6</sub>.

#### **Comment D0003-006**

We lack stakeholder involvement here. At Piketon they made a mockery of the real public involvement. I'm a stakeholder, and I've not been invited to one stakeholder meeting for probably a couple years.

#### **Response D0003-006**

Public and stakeholder involvement has been an important component of the DOE Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride Management Program's National Environmental Policy Act activities. For example, during preparation of the *Programmatic EIS (PEIS) for Alternative Strategies for the Long-Term Management and Use of Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride* (DOE 1999), stakeholders were invited to participate in public scoping meetings held near Portsmouth, Ohio, Paducah, Kentucky, and Oak Ridge, Tennessee, in February 1996 to solicit input into the PEIS process. Public hearings on the draft PEIS were held at the same sites in February and March of 1998. Similarly, during preparation of the two site-specific conversion facility EISs, public scoping meetings were held near

the three storage sites in November and December 2001, and public hearings on the draft EISs were held in January 2004. Alternative means of stakeholder involvement were also provided, such as toll free telephone and fax lines, e-mail addresses, and a program Web site. In all cases, the public was invited and encouraged to provide input into the process and all comments were considered in preparation of the final EISs.

### **Comment D0003-007**

I know that they're going to keep accumulating more and more waste. We had a Russian scientist that came here and we did soil samples off-site, and some of the community residents want their land and water and things cleaned up. We found radiation levels a hundred times the background level and we sent some of these samples to Russia to get them analyzed further.

There's a foam that's coming down through Mr. West's property where his cows are grazing and drinking out of these creeks and the foam has little brown particles that has radiation and uranium in it.

### **Response D0003-007**

Cylinders containing depleted UF<sub>6</sub> are no longer accumulating at the Portsmouth or ETTP sites, where the gaseous diffusion plants have ceased operations. The DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders that are being generated at the Paducah site from operation of USEC's gaseous diffusion plant are subject to regulation by federal and state agencies and are being stored in a safe manner.

There are no plans for the long-term storage of conversion products at the Portsmouth or Paducah conversion facilities. As discussed in each site-specific EIS, all wastes generated under the proposed action would be stored, treated, and disposed of in accordance with all applicable regulations, as appropriate. The depleted uranium conversion product, emptied cylinders, and radioactively contaminated waste will be disposed of in off-site low-level waste disposal facilities, such as Envirocare of Utah and the Nevada Test Site. DOE plans to decide the specific disposal location(s) for the depleted U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> conversion product after additional appropriate NEPA review. Accordingly, DOE will continue to evaluate its disposal options and will consider any further information or comments relevant to that decision. DOE will give a minimum 45-day notice before making the specific disposal decision and will provide any supplemental NEPA analysis for public review and comment.

The DOE has conducted soil and water sampling at on-site and off-site locations. Results of these sampling efforts are summarized in Sections 3.1.4 and 3.1.5 of the Portsmouth EIS. When soil contamination has been identified, it has been addressed and has been or will be remediated under site remediation programs. DOE is not aware of any significantly elevated levels of contamination at any off-site locations associated with these facilities (i.e., levels that could cause elevated risks of adverse health impacts).

**Comment D0003-008**

We scored – double scored the superfund list here at this site, and we're asking that we do an environmental impact statement on the property and the air and the releases and the community health that's been affected from here.

**Response D0003-008**

The Portsmouth site is not listed on the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) National Priorities List (i.e., the Superfund list). Investigation and cleanup of hazardous substances and hazardous wastes that have been released to air, surface water, groundwater, soils, and solid waste management units as a result of past operational activities at the Portsmouth site are being conducted under the provisions of the various edicts that have been issued pursuant to Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), CERCLA, and/or Ohio state law.

It appears that the commentor is requesting a sitewide EIS for the Portsmouth site. If so, the issue of the need for a sitewide EIS for the Portsmouth site is beyond the scope of this EIS. However, it is worth noting that Section 5.3 of the EIS discusses the cumulative impacts at the site, which include the impacts on the environment resulting from incremental impacts of the proposed action when added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions. As discussed in Section 5.3.2, other activities considered at the Portsmouth site include all major activities that are currently occurring or projected to occur at the site. For example, the proposed construction of a new uranium enrichment facility by USEC is included in the analysis.

In addition, both the Portsmouth and the Paducah conversion facility EISs include detailed evaluations of the potential impacts to human health and safety, including workers directly involved in the operation of a conversion facility, other workers located at the sites, as well as members of the public living around the sites. The EISs consider exposures to depleted uranium compounds as well as other chemicals used in the conversion process and by-products of conversion. In the Portsmouth EIS, potential health and safety impacts during operations are discussed in Sections 5.2.3.1 and 5.2.3.2 for routine conditions and accidents, respectively. In the Paducah EIS, potential health and safety impacts during operations are discussed in Sections 5.2.2.1 and 5.2.2.2 for routine conditions and accidents, respectively. The results of the analyses indicate that the risks to human health and safety are expected to be low and well within applicable limits and regulations.

**Comment D0003-009**

And I looked in the book and it says something about mines underground where they might think about doing some storage of this waste and we're concerned about that.

**Response D0003-009**

The potential use of mines for storage or disposal of depleted uranium conversion products is mentioned in the two site-specific conversion EISs, but only in relation to alternatives that were considered in the *Programmatic EIS for Alternative Strategies for the Long-Term Management and Use of Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride* (DOE 1999). The use of mines for storage or disposal of depleted uranium conversion products is not considered in the two site-specific conversion facility EISs. Also see response to Comment D0003-007.

**Comment D0003-010**

We're also concerned about maybe burning this – heating up these cylinders again because, like I said, in 1979 we lost a cylinder here and we lost 24,000 pounds of uranium hexafluoride to the air, to the creeks, and to this day there's never been an impact statement on the health effects of this cylinder. And according to the lawsuit and the community residents, it's been compared to Three Mile Island.

**Response D0003-010**

On March 7, 1978, there was an incident that resulted in a liquid uranium hexafluoride release at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant. At approximately 4:36 p.m., in the X-745B cylinder storage lot, a 14-ton cylinder with 5/16 in. wall thickness, containing liquid natural uranium hexafluoride, was dropped 8 to 10 in. and ruptured. The result was the release of 21,125 lb (9,600 kg) of feed material in less than 5 minutes. Emergency notifications and responses were rapid; there were no injuries to personnel or the off-site public, and all exposures to radioactive materials were within allowable DOE limits.

Precipitation in the form of snow, coupled with cold temperatures, minimized the off-site impact. There was a reported fish kill as a result of runoff from the incident area caused by treating the runoff with lime and causing a pH change in the water. This lime treatment aided in the prevention of off-site uranium contamination.

A Public Health Assessment for the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant site was conducted by the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR), a federal government agency that is separate from and independent of DOE, in November 1996. As part of the Public Health Assessment, ATSDR evaluated the records associated with the accident described above and concluded, "There was no measurable off-site release from the UF<sub>6</sub> cylinder rupture that took place on March 7, 1978. ATSDR received the incident report for the accident and all sample documentation. ATSDR staff have determined that not enough material could have reached off-site areas to cause adverse health effects." (See ATSDR 1996, Section on Environmental Contamination and Other Hazards, and Subsection on Off-site Contamination)

To prevent such an accident from reoccurring, several steps were taken, including modifications of cylinder handling equipment and eliminating the transport of uranium hexafluoride in the liquid state.

The DUF<sub>6</sub> currently stored in the cylinders in yards is in solid state. When the cylinders are emptied into the conversion plant, the DUF<sub>6</sub> in them will be transformed into gas by sublimation (i.e., changing a solid directly to a gas) without going through the liquid state in an autoclave (a completely enclosed structure). Therefore, the chance of occurrence of the type of accident that took place on March 7, 1978, at the conversion facility is essentially nonexistent.

### **Comment D0003-011**

I want to remind you we do have – that there is a citizen lawsuit that's tied up in court. I didn't see it anywhere in that book.

### **Response D0003-011**

DOE assumes that this comment refers to a lawsuit filed in 1990 against several DOE contractors at the Portsmouth site. This lawsuit, which was certified as a class action in 1991, remains pending, awaiting a final opinion from the judge. The future course of the litigation will be determined by the final opinion, which is not expected to influence DOE's decision regarding whether to construct and operate a depleted UF<sub>6</sub> conversion facility at the Portsmouth site.

### **Comment D0003-012**

We would like to know how much authority does the E.P.A. really have because if they don't have authority on transportation problems and releases from this plant, then who does have?

### **Response D0003-012**

In general, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) does not directly regulate radiation protection of the public and environment during construction and operation of individual nuclear facilities. Rather, in the case of DOE-owned facilities that support the U.S. nuclear weapons complex, such as the existing depleted UF<sub>6</sub> storage yards and the proposed depleted UF<sub>6</sub> conversion facilities, the EPA develops radiation protection standards that DOE is required to implement. DOE does this through conditions incorporated into the construction and operating contracts for these facilities. The DOE Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance provides oversight of compliance with these contractual conditions. The EPA also sets concentration criteria applicable to releases of certain types of radioactive material into the air or into current or potential sources of drinking water from nuclear facilities during normal operation. These criteria are enforced through permits issued by the State.

Transportation of radioactive materials, including depleted UF<sub>6</sub>, is regulated by the DOT.

**COMMENTOR D0004: Linda Howell**

**Comment D0004-001**

In 1995, the Defense Nuclear Safety Board gave three recommendations on the cylinders, and the first one was that the coating be renewed, the second one was that there be steps taken to protect the cylinders from the elements, and the third was a study be conducted on more suitable chemical form for storage. My question is: Have these things been done?

**Response D0004-001**

The DOE met all commitments made in response to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) Recommendation 95-1, including the three mentioned by the commentor. The DNFSB closed Recommendation 95-1 in December 1999. Text from the letter from DNFSB Chairman John T. Conway to DOE Secretary Richardson (Conway 1999) closing Recommendation 95-1 is copied below:

“...The Board believes the Department of Energy (DOE) has met all of the commitments in the Implementation Plan for Recommendation 95-1 and considers the recommendation closed.

The Board is particularly impressed by DOE’s use of the systems engineering process to develop a workable and technically justifiable cylinder management program that is now being used to govern the maintenance and surveillance of the cylinders. Although concerned that funding was not available for painting of cylinders during 1999, the Board is pleased that DOE has committed to continuing implementation of the cylinder management program as part of its accelerated conversion program.”

**Comment D0004-002**

Another page in the EIS stated that there have been 11 breaches or holes in the cylinders and nine of those were caused from mishandling. Again, that shows lack of expertise in training the workers to handle the cylinders. Only two were caused from corrosion.

**Response D0004-002**

The EISs discuss past cylinder breaches at the sites in Sections 2.1 and 5.1.1.2. The text states that most of the breaches were determined to be caused by mechanical damage during stacking, and that the damage was not noticed immediately and subsequent corrosion occurred at the point of damage, eventually leading to a breach. DOE believes that the handling that caused the damage to the cylinder surfaces was most likely done in the early years of cylinder generation, prior to DOE’s current extensive cylinder management program. Now that the long-term negative results of such handling damage are known, greater care is taken during cylinder movements that such damage does not occur.

The Paducah, Portsmouth, and ETTP sites now have extensive experience with moving the cylinders, and excellent safety records for those cylinder movements. Since the mid-1990s, most of the cylinders at the sites have been successfully moved to readily monitored locations on well-drained yards.

### **Comment D0004-003**

Again, from the EIS, another question says that many of the containers no longer meet DOT requirements for physical – for transportation because of the physical deterioration or because documentation has been lost and some might also violate more than one requirement of DOT.

### **Response D0004-003**

As stated in Section 2.2.4 of both EISs, at this time it is unknown exactly how many of the DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders at ETTP do not meet DOT transportation requirements. The DUF<sub>6</sub> programmatic EIS (DOE 1999) assessment for cylinder preparation for shipment evaluated from half to all of the DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders at ETTP not meeting DOT shipping requirements, but this was an assumption made for the purposes of analysis. Prior to shipment of any cylinder from ETTP, the cylinder would receive a thorough inspection, including a record review to determine if the cylinder is overfilled, a visual inspection for damage or defects, a pressure check to determine if the cylinder is overpressurized, and an ultrasonic wall thickness measurement (if necessary based on the visual inspection).

The two site-specific conversion EISs identify three possible options for shipping cylinders that do not comply with DOT requirements for the shipment of UF<sub>6</sub>: (1) transferring the contents to compliant cylinders (likely requiring a new facility); (2) obtaining an exemption from DOT to ship the cylinders “as is,” provided that DOE can demonstrate a level of safety that would be at least equal to the level required by the regulations; and (3) transporting the cylinders in a protective overpack. At present, a transportation plan for shipment of noncompliant cylinders has not been finalized and DOE is evaluating the available options. Consequently, the EISs provide an evaluation of these options.

It should be noted that all shipments must be made in compliance with DOT regulations, regardless of the specific approach selected. A Transportation Plan will be developed for each shipping program related to the DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion facility program. Each Plan is developed to address specific issues associated with the commodity being shipped, the origin and destination points, and concerns of jurisdictions transited by the shipments. In all cases, DOE-sponsored shipments will comply with all applicable state and federal regulations and will be reflected in many of the operational decisions to be made and presented in the Plan.

### **Comment D0004-004**

And it said that some of the breaches could go undetected for up to four years because that's the period between planned inspections and, you know, I'm not real familiar with nuclear handling

requirements and so forth, but just as a person using their common sense, one would think that four years between inspections shows a lack of responsibility.

#### **Response D0004-004**

The 4-year inspection interval implemented under the three site's cylinder management program has been shown to be a cost-effective time frame during the 9 years since this schedule was established. The initial cylinder yard improvements and relocations of cylinders as necessary that occurred prior to 1999 led to the identification of eight cylinder breaches (see discussion in Section 5.1.1.2 of each EIS). Since that time, only three additional cylinder breaches have been identified, and none of these were cylinders with advanced deterioration or that involved significant releases of UF<sub>6</sub> to the environment. This indicates that the inspection schedule is effective in identifying new cylinder breaches before they have progressed to result in significant environmental releases.

The text of Section 5.1.1.2 of each EIS states "For all hypothetical cylinder breaches, it was assumed that the breach would go undetected for 4 years, which is the period between planned inspections for most of the cylinders. In practice, cylinders that show evidence of damage or heavy external corrosion are inspected annually, so it is very unlikely that a breach would go undetected for a 4-year period."

Although it is very unlikely that a breach could go undetected for 4 years, the purpose of the EIS analyses was to estimate the upper bound environmental impacts of continued cylinder storage. Therefore, a long time was assumed for detecting cylinder breaches, further leading to a bounding (high) assumption for the amount of DUF<sub>6</sub> released from the breached cylinder.

#### **Comment D0004-005**

And again one further question: If the requirements and the criteria that they're supposed to be meeting have not been done to this point, how can the public be assured that those plans that are being made for the facility now will be carried out to specification?

#### **Response D0004-005**

Soon after the DNFSB, an independent DOE oversight organization within the Executive Branch, issued Recommendation 95-1 in May 1995, DOE instituted a comprehensive systems engineering approach for the management of its DUF<sub>6</sub> inventory. This approach was used to relocate most of the cylinders at the sites and has achieved safe, monitored storage conditions for the three-site cylinder inventory. The DOE met all commitments made in response to DNFSB Recommendation 95-1, as discussed in the response to Comment D0004-001.

DOE is committed to continue to manage its inventory of DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders with the same level of rigor and safety throughout the period they remain in storage until conversion

takes place. UDS, the conversion contractor that DOE has selected, has safely operated a similar conversion plant in Richland, Washington, for a number of years. UDS will use and build on this experience to operate the conversion facilities in a manner that will protect the employees, the general public, and the environment of the sites, and that will follow all applicable regulations.

**COMMENTOR D0005:**           **Dan Minter, Vice Chairman**  
Southern Ohio Diversification Initiative, and Paper,  
Allied-Industrial, Chemical and Energy International Union

**Comment D0005-001**

Regarding the conversion activity, when you consider the options of these cylinders sitting and having no activity, decaying, and the environmental insult that they potentially might cause, there was a reference to how many breaches there may have been, those would continue with the surveillance and maintenance process.

**Response D0005-001**

Both EISs consider the no action alternative, which assumes continued storage of the cylinders at their present locations. As part of the no action alternative assessment, two estimates of the number of cylinder breaches that might occur in the future were made; one based on the number of breaches that have occurred to date, and the second on estimated corrosion rates for cylinders that previously were kept in poor storage conditions (e.g., in ground contact, or with debris left in skirted ends). Estimates of the impacts associated with these hypothetical cylinder breaches are given in Section 5.1.2 of each document, which discusses the no action alternative. However, these estimates were made to bound the potential impact of cylinder breaches. To minimize actual impacts during continued storage of the cylinders or during storage while awaiting conversion, the DOE is committed to cylinder maintenance and inspection such that few, if any, additional breaches should occur. Any breaches that do occur will be remediated quickly to limit impacts.

**Comment D0005-002**

Ultimately the final dispossession of these materials from this site and the conversion process would be the best end state and removing this material once and for all from the site certainly is in the best interest. It must be done in a safe manner both for the workforce, the public, the safety and health of the community as well as the environment at the site. That is clearly something that has to be done.

**Response D0005-002**

DOE is committed to accomplishing the conversion and disposition of its depleted uranium hexafluoride inventory in a manner protective of the workforce, the public, and the environment.

**COMMENTOR D0006:**           **T.J. Justice**  
Ohio Governor's Office

**Comment D0006-001**

I have no specific comments on the EIS. Those are, I believe, the responsibility of the Ohio E.P.A. as well as possibly the Ohio Department of Health. But I did want to enter as a matter of record our support for both DUF<sub>6</sub> facilities.

We have worked very hard with the administration in Washington to secure funding for the construction of these facilities, as Dan said, to responsibly dispose of the material in question here as well as look at the tremendous economic impact it's going to have with regard to job creation.

I just want the record to reflect, as is evidenced by many letters which have been sent to the department of the administration, our support for the project, and I believe there will be a separate submission coming from the Ohio E.P.A. relative to the specific EIS.

**Response D0006-001**

Comment noted.

**COMMENTOR D0007:**           **Danny Orazine**

**Comment D0007-001**

...the local civic leaders and elected leaders here have long worked with DOE and our other elected representatives in Washington – Senators McConnell and Bunning and Representative Whitfield – on this project. And we very much view this as a positive project for our community, and we'd very much like to see and hope that you can stick to the schedule that you showed on the board, and construction starts in July of '04.

**Response D0007-001**

Comment noted.

**Comment D0007-002**

We view this as good for the community in a couple of ways. It's going to clean up the environment, but we also look at the economic impact of building the plant and the jobs that will operate the DUF<sub>6</sub> plant.

I'm not going to belabor this. I don't need five minutes. But we, the elected people and what people we speak for in this county and also the region, very much would like to see this project happen.

**Response D0007-002**

Comment noted.

**COMMENTOR D0008:**       **Vickie Jurka**  
Active Citizens for Truth

**Comment D0008-001**

It is my opinion that this Draft Environmental Impact Statement does not adequately address the health effects on an already exposed population, those living closest to the plant. This is of special concern, because expected emissions are known to target the lungs and kidneys, what was already of concern to this community.

**Response D0008-001**

The EISs include detailed evaluations of the potential impacts to human health and safety, including workers directly involved in conversion facility operations, other workers located at the sites, as well as members of the public living around the sites. The EISs consider exposures to depleted uranium compounds as well as other chemicals used in the conversion process and by-products of conversion. The potential for lung damage and kidney damage are among the health effects looked at when assessing the risks of uranium and hydrogen fluoride exposures (see Section 4.3.3 of the EISs for a discussion of the methods used to estimate impacts from both chronic exposures and from short-term, high-level accidental exposures).

In the Paducah EIS, potential health and safety impacts during operations are discussed in Sections 5.2.2.1 and 5.2.2.2 for routine conditions and accidents, respectively. In the Portsmouth EIS, potential health and safety impacts during operations are discussed in Sections 5.2.3.1 and 5.2.3.2 for routine conditions and accidents, respectively. The results of the analyses indicate that the risks to human health and safety are expected to be low and well within applicable limits and regulations.

The impacts from past activities at the site are considered in the cumulative impacts analyses that are discussed in Section 5.3 of both the Paducah conversion facility EIS and the Portsmouth conversion facility EIS. As described in Section 5.3, cumulative effects are defined as the impacts on the environment (including human health) resulting from the incremental impacts of an action when added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions (40 CFR 1508.7). Therefore, the activities considered in the cumulative analysis in each conversion facility EIS include those that might affect environmental conditions at or near the sites, including those that occurred in the past. The results of the cumulative impacts analyses indicate that the risks to human health and safety are expected to be low and well within applicable limits and regulations.

**Comment D0008-002**

I would like to say that I'm not opposed to the conversion process, but I do think that the community this time needs to be taken into account.

**Response D0008-002**

Impacts on the community are considered in both EISs for the conversion facilities. The potential for adverse health effects from the conversion facilities and for the no action alternative are summarized in Sections 2.4.2.1 (Human Health and Safety, Construction and Normal Facility Operations), 2.4.2.2 (Human Health and Safety, Facility Accidents), and in 2.4.2.3 (Human Health and Safety–Transportation). These summaries address health impacts for the residents in the off-site populations surrounding the site, as well as for workers on the sites. Section 2.4.2.6 (Socioeconomics) also summarizes economic impacts in the communities around the sites. Details of these analyses are provided in Chapter 5 of each EIS. The results of the analyses indicate that under all alternatives, the risks to human health and safety are expected to be low and well within applicable limits and regulations. The increased cancer risks associated with the no action alternative are slightly higher than those associated with the proposed action alternatives. For socioeconomics, the impacts tend to be positive; the conversion facilities will create jobs and income with only minor impacts on housing, public finances, and employment in local public services.

The preferences and opinion of the community are also taken into account through the public participation process. The public scoping process for the EISs is described in Section 1.6.1 of each EIS, and all comments received from the public during the public comment period on the draft EISs have been considered in the preparation of the Final EISs.

**COMMENTOR D0009: Mark Donham**

**Comment D0009-001**

I just have a few questions I want to put on the record. I know they won't get answered tonight, but they can possibly be addressed through the response to comments.

One has to do with the marketing of the hydrogen fluoride. And it gives a figure in the EIS for the demand, the national demand for this particular product, aqueous hydrogen fluoride. And it says that there's another plant in, I believe, Geismar – is that Louisiana? – that produces the same product, but it doesn't – it gives a total amount of hydrogen fluoride that it produces, but it doesn't divide it up into the two different kinds.

And then it talks about importing hydrogen fluoride from Mexico, but it never does say exactly how much that Louisiana plant produces. And it leaves this whole question about demand and whether something – whether this product can actually be sold or not. And that's a huge – that's a huge gap in knowing what's really going to happen.

**Response D0009-001**

Demand for HF in the United States in 2002 stood at 330,000 tons, of which only about 9% (29,000 tons) was for aqueous HF. Section E.3.1 of the EIS provides more information on the U.S. market for HF and U.S. HF production. At the time the EIS was prepared, there were two plants in the United States capable of producing HF, one in La Porte, Texas, and one in Geismar, Louisiana, with all production of HF coming from the Geismar plant at that time. As U.S. HF production is limited to a single plant, the total quantity of aqueous HF produced and the quantities of the various HF acid concentrations are proprietary.

The maximum amount of HF that could be produced annually by the two facilities combined would be about 6,000 metric tons of 70% solution and 13,500 metric tons of 49% solution (from Table E-2 in the EISs). The amount of HF and CaF<sub>2</sub> produced by the two conversion facilities that might be sold cannot be predicted. The EIS is therefore limited to identifying general market areas for HF and CaF<sub>2</sub>. The impact of the sale and use of HF and CaF<sub>2</sub> are presented in Sections E.6.1 and E.6.2 in the EIS.

**Comment D0009-002**

– there was one paragraph in here about transuranics – if I can find the section here –that I made some notes on. Okay. It says: The transuranic contaminants that are dispersed throughout the depleted uranium hexafluoride might be entrained in the gaseous DUF<sub>6</sub> during the cylinder emptying operation and carried out of the cylinders. These contaminants could be captured in filters between the cylinders and the conversion units.

And then it says: These filters would be monitored and changed out periodically to prevent buildup of transuranics. They would be disposed of as low-level waste.

Well, that seems inconsistent, because if you're going to be capturing all the transuranics, and they're going to be concentrated in a certain place, why would that be that low-level waste then?

**Response D0009-002**

By definition, the transuranic waste contains greater than 100 nanocuries per gram of transuranic radionuclides with half-lives of more than 20 years (see Glossary, Chapter 9 in the EIS). If the concentration of the transuranics is less than that, the waste is not transuranic waste. The filters will be monitored and replaced before the transuranic concentration reaches 100 nanocuries per gram. Therefore, the filters will be classified as low-level radioactive waste and will be disposed of as such.

**Comment D0009-003**

And also, I don't like this, "... might be entrained in the gaseous DUF<sub>6</sub> ..." "... could be captured in filters," that's not the kind of language that I like to hear when I'm talking about – when you're talking about pollution controls.

There's also some assumptions, such as it says: It is also expected that the nonvolatile forms of technetium that exist in the cylinders would remain in the heels -- or be captured in the filters.

And then it goes on, but there's no citations. There's no references to any studies. You've got a bibliography that gives your references, but it's extremely hard to pin what reference comes from what place, because there doesn't seem to be a citation after the particular sentences.

### **Response D0009-003**

The discussion provided in Section B.4 of both the Paducah and Portsmouth DUF<sub>6</sub> Conversion Facility EISs regarding the behavior of potential transuranic and technetium contaminants in some cylinders is abstracted primarily from two references listed at the end of Appendix B, namely Brumburgh et al. (2000) and Hightower et al. (2000). To clarify this point, these references have been inserted into the section. The discussion given in this section regarding the fate of these contaminants is based on a series of experimental and field work described in these two references as well as the understanding and opinion of the experts in the field of transuranic element chemistry. However, because of the scarcity of data and the lack of complete understanding of the chemistry and level of contamination in the cylinders, the discussion is presented qualitatively in terms of the expected behavior of the contaminants under the conditions that would be encountered during the conversion process. However, to overcome this uncertainty, the analyses and results presented in Sections B.5 and B.6 of Appendix B are based on conservative assumptions, that is, assumptions are made in such a way that the results obtained are overestimates of the impacts that would actually be encountered in the proposed conversion facility.

### **Comment D0009-004**

And also, you know, I've got an ongoing concern about a cumulative impact analysis, similar to the previous commentor, that NEPA requires a cumulative impact look of past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future action. And that would include everything that's been going on in the past and the things that you think in the future, which would be all of the cleanup activities that you would expect, all the decontamination. And I've never seen all of that in one document as far as cumulative impact.

### **Response D0009-004**

Cumulative impacts are discussed in Section 5.3 of both the Paducah conversion facility EIS and the Portsmouth conversion facility EIS. As described in Section 5.3, cumulative effects are defined as the impacts on the environment resulting from the incremental impacts of an action when added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions (40 CFR 1508.7). Cumulative effects include other actions regardless of what agency (federal or nonfederal), organization, or person undertakes them. Noteworthy cumulative impacts can result from individually minor, but collectively significant, effects of all actions. Therefore, the activities considered in the cumulative analysis in

each conversion facility EIS include those that might affect environmental conditions at or near the sites.

In the Paducah EIS, the cumulative impacts include the impacts associated with the proposed action and alternatives; waste management activities at the Paducah site; continued enrichment of uranium and storage of DUF<sub>6</sub> by USEC and DOE (management, only); conversion of DUF<sub>6</sub> without or with cylinders from ETTP (proposed action alternatives in this EIS); continued conversion of uranium ore into UF<sub>6</sub> at the Honeywell International, Inc., plant at Metropolis, Illinois; electrical power generation at the TVA's Shawnee power plant and at the Joppa Electric Energy, Inc., power plant; and environmental restoration activities at the Paducah site that have proceeded to a point that their consequences can be defined. Future actions included construction, operation, and D&D of a uranium enrichment facility at the Paducah site, even though Portsmouth has been identified by USEC as the site for a new centrifuge facility.

In the Portsmouth EIS, the cumulative impacts include the impacts associated with the proposed action and alternatives, including the impacts of constructing an additional storage pad; waste management activities at the Portsmouth site; conversion of the Portsmouth GDP to standby; construction, operation, and D&D of the Lead Cascade test uranium enrichment facility at Portsmouth; construction, operation and D&D of a uranium enrichment facility at the Portsmouth site; consolidation of reusable uranium in the DOE complex at the Portsmouth site; and environmental restoration activities that have proceeded to the point that their consequences can be defined.

**COMMENTOR D0010:**            **Michael Klebe**  
Central Midwest Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste  
Commission

**Comment D0010-001**

I'm an engineer with the Illinois Emergency Management Agency, Division of Nuclear Safety. However, here, I am representing this evening the Central Midwest Interstate Low Level Radioactive Waste Commission. The commission, who recently met this past December, is very concerned about the transportation of low-level radioactive waste within its region. Clearly, the commission acknowledges that this radioactive material that would be shipped from the ETTP to either Portsmouth or Paducah is federal waste and is not, clearly, under the commission's jurisdiction. The commission is concerned about its safe transport nonetheless.

**Response D0010-001**

A Transportation Plan will be developed for each shipping program related to the DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion facility program. Each Plan is developed to address specific issues associated with the commodity being shipped, the origin and destination points, and concerns of jurisdictions transited by the shipments. In all cases, DOE-sponsored shipments will comply with all applicable state and federal regulations and will be reflected in many of the operational decisions to be made and presented in the Plan. The transportation

regulations are designed to be protective of public health and safety during both accident and routine transportation conditions.

As a matter of record, DOE considers DUF<sub>6</sub> a source material within the meaning of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and not as a “Federal waste.”

### **Comment D0010-002**

Now, I admit that I have not made it through the entire Draft Environmental Impact Statement for both of the facilities to know whether or not these issues that I’d like to address this evening are included. But as part of the – as part of the Environmental Impact Statement, I would hope that it would include the potential impacts for transportation hazards, transportation accidents, and the impacts that this would represent to local first responders, whether or not these first responders are adequately trained, adequately supplied, adequately funded to respond to a transportation accident of the 4,000-plus casks that would be shipped from the ETTP to either Portsmouth or Paducah.

### **Response D0010-002**

The two site-specific conversion facility EISs include evaluation of the risks associated with the transportation of radioactive and hazardous materials, including depleted uranium hexafluoride, depleted uranium oxide, hydrogen fluoride, and anhydrous ammonia. In the Portsmouth EIS, potential transportation impacts are discussed in Sections 5.2.5 and 5.2.7. In the Paducah EIS, transportation impacts are discussed in Sections 5.2.3 and 5.2.5. The transportation assessment includes evaluation of risks incurred during normal operations, as well as risks from accidents. The assessment considers both vehicle-related risks (i.e., risks related to vehicle operation, such as the potential for accidents causing injuries and fatalities) and cargo-related risks.

With respect to the potential impacts to first responders, the transportation accident assessment includes the evaluation of impacts to both the population living within 50 mi (80 km) of an accident site as well as to a maximally exposed individual (MEI) assumed to be exposed in the immediate vicinity of an accident. These receptors are assumed to be exposed to the passing plume of released material and to be unshielded and without protective equipment. Consequently, the impacts presented for the MEI represent an upper bound estimate of the risk posed to a first responder.

### **Comment D0010-003**

I would hope that the Department of Energy would make some very specific commitments, time frames, in terms of providing the necessary support for the first responders along the path as it travels through Kentucky, not only in terms of transportation, not only in terms of training, but also in terms of funding for equipment and necessary materials that would be needed to respond to any sort of transportation accident.

Obviously, along the path, the path is both rural, the path is urban. Certain districts, fire departments, are more technically capable than others, but certainly they all should be – they all should be on a relatively equal footing in terms of funding and ability and training.

### **Response D0010-003**

DOE maintains and operates an active training program dealing with first response to a transportation accident involving radioactive materials. This program, the Transportation Emergency Preparedness Program (TEPP), has conducted or provided technical support to numerous training programs in the three states hosting DOE facilities handling UF<sub>6</sub> — Kentucky, Tennessee, and Ohio. TEPP works actively with the Kentucky Division of Emergency Management, the Radiation Health and Toxic Agents Branch of the Kentucky Department for Public Health, the Tennessee Emergency Management Agency, and the Ohio Emergency Management Agency within the Ohio Department of Public Safety to ensure that first responder training concerns are met within this three-state area.

Because there is an extensive shipping history and significant ongoing shipping activities among these three facilities, the state agencies have a high level of awareness regarding the hazards associated with UF<sub>6</sub>. TEPP staff members are committed participants in the emergency management and response community and plan to continue to support first responder readiness throughout these three states.

**COMMENTOR D0011: Barbara Walton**

### **Comment D0011-001**

I think they did a good job of preparing these documents and I agree with the preferred alternatives.

### **Response D0011-001**

Comment noted.

### **Comment D0011-002**

...we have somewhat been overtaken by events and the decision has been made to build the centrifuge base enrichment plant at Portsmouth. And partly as a result of that, and partly for other reasons, the cumulative impacts section of the Portsmouth document, I feel, has some inadequacies, which I would like to see remedied in the final EIS. They refer to a 1977 document, a 1977 Analysis of Environmental Consequences for such an action that was done by U.S. Energy Research and Development Administration. This is on page 5-117 of the Portsmouth document. I would like to see that updated. I'm assuming that there will be an EIS done for the enrichment facility that will be built at Portsmouth. This document does state that it will be located in area B that was considered here, so there is no conflict there.

**Response D0011-002**

The cumulative impacts analysis included in both the draft and final Portsmouth conversion facility EIS assumed that a new USEC centrifuge enrichment facility would be constructed and operated at the Portsmouth site (see Sections S.5.16 and 5.3.2). As stated in Section S.5.16, the analysis assumed that such a plant would be sited at Portsmouth, that the existing DOE gas centrifuge technology would be used, and that the environmental impacts of such a facility would be similar to those outlined in a 1977 EIS for Expansion of the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant that considered a similar action (ERDA 1977).

The 1977 EIS was used because it evaluated construction and operation of an 8.8 million separative work unit gas centrifuge enrichment facility at Location B of the Portsmouth site, compared to the currently proposed 3.5 million separative work unit USEC facility. The 1977 report was judged to be the best available information with respect to the potential impacts of a centrifuge facility at the Portsmouth site. Note that the centrifuge facility proposed in 1977 was never completed, so operational data are not available for estimating environmental impacts. It should be noted that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensing activities for the proposed centrifuge enrichment plant will include preparation of an environmental impact statement that must also evaluate cumulative impacts at the Portsmouth site. The centrifuge enrichment facility cumulative impacts analysis will be based on the anticipated USEC enrichment facility design, which does not currently exist, and will benefit from the detailed evaluation of conversion facility impacts presented in this EIS.

The text of Sections S.5.16 and 5.3.2 has been revised to indicate that the final USEC centrifuge enrichment facility siting decision identified Portsmouth as the facility site.

**Comment D0011-003**

Also, there were, in the worker dose on page 5-115 there were two footnotes. Note i said that there was no worker dose given for the lead cascade and the information just was not available. And I hope that that can be remedied to where a better estimate than a 1977 document could be given for the final.

**Response D0011-003**

As described in Response D0011-002, the 1977 EIS was used because it was the best available information. The facility proposed in 1977 was never completed, thus data on actual environmental impacts are not available. With respect to footnote "i" and doses from the proposed lead cascade, the NRC published the final Environmental Assessment for the facility in January 2004 and no worker dose estimates were provided (NRC 2004).

**Comment D0011-004**

...there is a section on historical safety for Anhydrous Ammonia and Hydrogen Fluoride, which goes up through 2002, but the table of impacts on page 5-104 analyzes forty-nine percent and seventy percent Aqueous Hydrogen Fluoride. I suspect that was done because it is a bounding, but I would like a clear statement about that.

**Response D0011-004**

As noted by the commentor, the proposed conversion facility will produce aqueous HF. The transportation accident history for shipment of anhydrous HF was included in Section 5.2.3.4 of the Paducah EIS (Section 5.2.5.4 of the Portsmouth EIS) because it is the form of HF most commonly shipped in the United States and it is more hazardous than aqueous HF, thus representing a bounding case. Text has been added to this section to clearly state that the conversion facilities will produce aqueous HF and that the accident record for anhydrous HF was included for purposes of conservatism.

**Comment D0011-005**

I note that there was a recent derailment of fuming Sulfuric Acid in Knoxville and a lot of people were evacuated away from their homes for three or four days and that is a similar order of magnitude.

**Response D0011-005**

Anhydrous ammonia and aqueous hydrogen fluoride are chemicals that would be used or produced at the conversion facilities. Accidental releases of these chemicals could also cause injuries and might make evacuations necessary, similar to the situation discussed in the comment in which fuming sulfuric acid was released in a train derailment near Farragut, Tennessee, on September 15, 2002. Injuries and deaths from spills of anhydrous ammonia or aqueous HF are also possible. Section 5.2.5.3 of the Portsmouth EIS and Section 5.2.3.3 of the Paducah EIS discuss the possible consequences of a transportation accident involving the release of hydrogen fluoride or ammonia. Section 5.2.5.4 of the Portsmouth EIS and Section 5.2.3.4 of the Paducah EIS discuss the historical safety record of anhydrous ammonia and HF transportation in the United States.

**Comment D0011-006**

...in the Paducah Environmental Impact Statement on page 320 is figure 3.1-4 on the wetlands...this figure is titled Paducah, but it is the identical figure that is in the Portsmouth document on page 3-19. In other words, they have shown the Portsmouth wetlands in the Paducah document. And I assume that could be corrected for the final.

**Response D0011-006**

The figure showing wetlands at the Portsmouth site was inadvertently included in the Paducah draft EIS instead of the figure showing the wetlands at the Paducah site. The final EIS for the Paducah site includes the correct wetlands figure.

**Comment D0011-007**

...they say in the document that use of an overpack is most likely to ship the noncompliant cylinders, but they also analyze the building of a facility in Oak Ridge. I would like a more definitive statement on that. They don't analyze it as an alternative or give a preference, it's just a general statement and I would like a definite statement that that is what they plan to do. It's fine that they analyze more than one thing, which is what you are supposed to do in an EIS.

**Response D0011-007**

The two site-specific conversion EISs identify three possible options for shipping cylinders that do not comply with DOT requirements for the shipment of UF<sub>6</sub>: (1) transferring the contents to compliant cylinders (likely requiring a new facility); (2) obtaining an exemption from DOT to ship the cylinders "as is," provided that DOE can demonstrate a level of safety that would be at least equal to the level required by the regulations; and (3) transporting the cylinders in a protective overpack. At present, a transportation plan for shipment of noncompliant cylinders has not been finalized and DOE is evaluating the available options. Consequently, the EISs provide an evaluation of these options. It should be noted that all shipments must be made in a manner that achieves the level of safety required by DOT regulations, regardless of the specific approach selected. Thus, in terms of potential environmental impacts, no option is clearly preferable.

**COMMENTOR D0012: Norman A. Mulvenon**

**Comment D0012-001**

My main theme is to thank the Department of Energy finally for issuing these environmental impact statements. And the second thing is that I concur with everything that Ms. Walton said. Barbara is very meticulous in reading these documents and is one of our resources in making sure that the Department of Energy follows all the rules. Our main theme here in Oak Ridge is that we ship those cylinders out of here. We don't particularly care whether they go to Portsmouth or Paducah, but they are scheduled to go to Portsmouth. There are some empties that have been recently sent to the Nevada test site and there are some partially filled cylinders that are ready to go to Ohio right now. And then the bulk of them are the cylinders which are going to be shipped out. Our main theme is that they should leave the City of Oak Ridge. They present an issue with us about being able to use the K-25 or ETTP site as a reindustrialization site. If you were a person who wanted to lease or build a building out there and all you see is thousands of these cylinders stacked around it, I don't think it is very conducive to people wanting to actually use the site. Our main theme; ship them out of here.

**Response D0012-001**

DOE is committed to complying with the 1999 consent order with the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation that requires the removal of the DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders from the ETTP site or the conversion of the material by December 31, 2009. Toward that end, the DOE contract for accelerated cleanup of the ETTP site, including removal of the DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders, calls for completion of this activity by the end of Fiscal Year (FY) 2008.

**COMMENTOR D0013:**            **Susan Gawarecki, Executive Director**  
Oak Ridge Reservation Local Oversight Committee

**Comment D0013-001**

I wanted to say that I concur with Barbara Walton and Norman Mulvenon and especially emphasize that safe and rapid shipment of the cylinders out is a high priority in this community. We would hope that UDS would look at this for their part of the shipping very early on, involve the stakeholders. Do consider the option of rail transportation instead of by truck. And understand that you are going to have to be working with a number of states and emergency management organizations as well. And there are good organizations already built up and a lot of planning done already. And certainly, we are eager to work with the company and make sure that they understand what the needs of the communities are. But again, we are very interested in seeing those cylinders shipped out in a timely and safe manner.

**Response D0013-001**

DOE is committed to complying with the 1999 consent order with the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation that requires the removal of the DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders from the ETTP site or the conversion of the material by December 31, 2009. Toward that end, the DOE contract for accelerated cleanup of the ETTP site, including removal of the DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders, calls for completion of this activity by the end of FY 2008.

In addition, all transportation operations will be conducted in accordance with applicable DOT regulations for the shipment of radioactive materials as specified in Title 49 of the *Code of Federal Regulations*. At present, a transportation plan for shipment of all the ETTP cylinders has not been finalized and DOE is evaluating the available options in the two conversion facility EISs, including both truck and rail transport modes. DOE is committed to working with state and local agencies, as appropriate.

**COMMENTOR D0014: Charles Fosberg****Comment D0014-001**

...the facilities should include expandable long-term storage facilities for the stable Depleted Uranium Dioxide waste product. The historical record of the United States and other Western countries is that disposal always takes longer than planned. Plan ahead.

**Response D0014-001**

As described in Section 1.6.2.4, the conversion facilities are being designed with short-term storage capacity for 6 months worth of depleted uranium oxide production. This storage capacity is provided in order to accommodate potential delays in disposal activities without affecting conversion operations. There are no current plans to expand oxide storage at the conversion facilities. DOE plans to decide the specific disposal location(s) for the depleted U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> conversion product after additional appropriate NEPA review. Accordingly, DOE will continue to evaluate its disposal options and will consider any further information or comments relevant to that decision. DOE will give a minimum 45-day notice before making the specific disposal decision and will provide any supplemental NEPA analysis for public review and comment.

**COMMENTOR D0015: Dan Minter**  
President, Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical and Energy (PACE)  
International Union  
Vice Chairman, Southern Ohio Diversification Initiative (SODI)

**Comment D0015-001**

1) PL 107-206 - Assurance that construction of both plants will be started on schedule on July 31, 2004. Further, both sites' construction must proceed expeditiously thereafter. (Section 502(c) of the Act) Meeting schedule is an environmental compliance issue.

**Response D0015-001**

DOE plans to start construction of the conversion facilities at both Paducah and Portsmouth by July 31, 2004. In compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the schedule is dependent upon issuance of the Record of Decision (ROD) before construction begins. Compliance with P.L. 107-206 and the start of construction by July 31, 2004, involves many project and engineering activities. The DOE is working these activities in parallel to the extent it can to meet its commitment. DOE fully appreciates the importance of ensuring both that construction of the conversion facilities be started on schedule and that construction proceed in the most expedient manner possible. Compliance with NEPA must also be ensured and the engineering design must meet the contract requirements.

**Comment D0015-002**

2) Has DOE provided sufficient funds for construction of both plants for FY 05? This speaks to the question of whether statutory intent will be honored fully, or whether it will be constrained by allocation of funds in the President's budget request. Failure to meet schedule is an environmental issue.

**Response D0015-002**

Sufficient funds for completion of design and start of construction activities at both Paducah and Portsmouth have been allocated for FY04. Funding levels for FY05 will be contingent on Congressional approval of the FY05 Presidential budget request.

**Comment D0015-003**

3) PL 107-206 provides access to the \$373 million by the Secretary without need for further appropriation, by virtue of removing the fence on the expenditures of funds. This money is in account number 95X4054 in the U.S. Treasury. The GAO's Letter Report January 19, 2000 to Chairman Billy Tauzin of the House Energy & Commerce Committee regarding the use of funds for the Portsmouth Cold Standby Plan (B-286661), states that the USEC fund is available to meet the authorized purposes of the McConnell Act (P.L. 105-204). Please explain whether and how DOE is using these funds? If not, please explain why?

**Response D0015-003**

DOE is not using the subject funds. To date, funding for the design and construction project has been requested for appropriation from the general fund. The Congress has raised no objection to this approach, and it is the Department's intent to continue the practice until completion. The funds reserved in the USEC Fund (95X4054) may be authorized for project use; however, authorization does not imply that they are available without need for Congressional appropriation. In fact, they are not available for the DUF<sub>6</sub> Conversion Project outside of the appropriation process. Therefore, there is no advantage to requesting funds from the reserved account.

**Comment D0015-004**

4) Are there foreign ownership and control issues that are impairing the ability of the contractor and DOE to meet the statutory schedule? If so, what are the plans for resolving this potential delay?

**Response D0015-004**

DOE initially expected that the contractor would not need facility clearance during the design and construction periods of the contract, but may need security clearances during cylinder management and conversion operations. This allowed the Department to move forward with contract award consistent with P.L. 107-206. Since contract award and as a

result of post-September 11, 2001, heightened security requirements, the Department has been evaluating the need for facility clearance and the potential impacts to the project. In an effort to reduce capital and operating costs that would be incurred if work had to be accomplished in a classified manner, the Department is considering alternatives involving a favorable Foreign Ownership, Control and Influence (FOCI) determination, mitigation measures, and contract modification. Resolving this matter is expected to be lengthy and involve discussions with the contractor and DOE experts on national security. In the interim, the contractor must move forward in accordance with contract requirements and provide engineering, construction, and operations plans that allow work to proceed without the need for classified access and avoid schedule impacts.

**Comment D0015-005**

5) Socioeconomic Impact - Will DOE direct Bechtel Jacobs to admit UDS to the Multiple Employer Pension Plan? If not, please advise how DOE will assure that UDS will provide pension continuity?

**Response D0015-005**

DOE is currently investigating options for pension continuity; however, this comment is beyond the scope of issues addressed in this EIS.

**Comment D0015-006**

6) It appears from the supplied data that impacts no action would in fact pose greater risk to environment and public safety? This is based on decay of the containment vessels and surveillance painting potential impacts and other required up-keep activities. Is this what the EIS is stating based on a no action plan?

**Response D0015-006**

Yes, in general the EISs show greater impacts for the no action alternative than for the proposed action of constructing and operating the conversion facilities. For normal operations, the EISs estimate a risk of developing cancer for workers at the cylinder yards and the conversion facilities that is slightly higher than the background risk. However, over the life of the project, the increased cancer risk for workers is greatest under the no action alternative (i.e., continued storage of the cylinders). For the Paducah site, for example, the risk is a 1 in 7 chance of one additional latent cancer fatality for the proposed action alternatives, whereas the risk is a 1 in 2 chance of one additional latent cancer fatality for the no action alternative (see Tables S-6 and 2.4-1). Increased cancer risks for noninvolved workers and the general public are similarly higher for the no action alternative than for the proposed action alternatives (this also applies to the Portsmouth EIS). Additionally, the no action alternative has the potential for groundwater contamination with uranium over the long-term; this adverse impact is not anticipated under the proposed action alternatives.

Risks associated with accidents are somewhat higher for the proposed action alternatives than for the no action alternative. The highest risks are associated with transport of anhydrous NH<sub>3</sub> and aqueous HF. However, these chemicals are transported routinely in the United States with a good safety record that has improved in recent years due to closer manufacturer supervision of container inspections, installation of protective devices on railcars, and participation of shippers in the Chemical Transportation Emergency Center. Similar though slightly lower risks are also associated with potential accidental releases from DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders during continued storage. Although the probability of large accidental releases is very low under both the proposed action alternatives and the no action alternatives, risks can only be completely eliminated when the conversion of the DUF<sub>6</sub> inventory has been completed.

**Comment D0015-007**

7) How, given the risks of a no action option and the fact that time is not an element conducive to the current method of vessel storage, provisions of Public law 105-204 and 107 -206, clear Congressional intent and 1/3 billion in available funding; why is a no action option even a proposed option under consideration?

**Response D0015-007**

In its NEPA regulations, the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) requires that the alternatives analysis in EISs “include the alternative of no action” [Section 1502.14(d)]. Accordingly, the regulations require the analysis of the no action alternative even if the agency is under a court order or legislative command to act. This analysis provides a benchmark, enabling decision makers to compare the magnitude of environmental effects of the action alternatives. It is also an example of a reasonable alternative outside the jurisdiction of the agency which must be analyzed. Inclusion of such an analysis in the EIS is necessary to inform the Congress, the public, and the President as intended by NEPA.

**COMMENTOR D0016:**            **Gregory Simonton, Executive Director**  
Southern Ohio Diversification Initiative

**Comment D0016-001**

We believe that the best alternative to dealing with the DUF<sub>6</sub> waste at the US DOE Piketon site is to build the DUF<sub>6</sub> Conversion Plant, as directed by Public Laws 105-204 and 107-206, at Piketon, Ohio, to convert the material into a more stable form for use and/or disposal. We also agree that location A (former lithium hydroxide monohydrate storage area) is the best location for the facility.

We oppose the no action alternative and long-term storage of the cylinders and conversion products at the US DOE Piketon site...We also oppose the construction of one conversion plant for two sites.

**Response D0016-001**

The support for the proposed action and for Preferred Location A at the Portsmouth site is noted.

With respect to the no action alternative, as explained in Response D0015-007 above, in its NEPA regulations, the CEQ requires that the alternatives analysis in an EIS “include the alternative of no action” [Section 1502.14(d)].

Long-term storage and/or construction and operation of one-plant are not being proposed or considered as alternatives in the two site-specific conversion facility EISs. Such alternatives were previously analyzed in the *Programmatic EIS for Alternative Strategies for the Long-Term Management and Use of Depleted UF<sub>6</sub>* (DOE 1999).

**Comment D0016-002**

As the designated community reuse organization, SODI expects to be involved in the sale of conversion products so that revenues will be used to benefit the community and local governments that are hosting and supporting the conversion plant operations.

**Response D0016-002**

DOE expects that any revenues generated from the sale of conversion products would be used to off-set the operational costs of the conversion facilities. This approach helps to lessen project dependence on federal allocations and reduce future funding uncertainties, indirectly benefiting the local community by promoting project continuity. In addition, it is expected that sales tax generated from the sale of conversion products would directly benefit the local communities hosting the conversion facilities.

**Comment D0016-003**

Because the DUF<sub>6</sub> material is chemically toxic to humans if released into the atmosphere, it is imperative that safety and health issues are given top priority to protect the workers, the community, and the environment.

**Response D0016-003**

The conversion facility project will be conducted with a commitment to keeping workers, the public, and the environment safe. The EISs include detailed evaluations of the potential impacts to human health and safety, including workers directly involved in conversion facility operations, other workers located at the sites, as well as members of the public living around the sites. In the Paducah EIS, potential health and safety impacts during operations are discussed in Sections 5.2.2.1 and 5.2.2.2 for routine conditions and accidents, respectively. In the Portsmouth EIS, potential health and safety impacts during operations are discussed in Sections 5.2.3.1 and 5.2.3.2 for routine conditions and

accidents, respectively. The results of the analyses indicate that the risks to human health and safety are expected to be low and well within applicable limits and regulations.

#### **Comment D0016-004**

We do not support the transport of “repaired” or “as is” non-compliant cylinders from ETTP to Piketon. We strongly urge US DOT not to grant exemptions, but to require DUF<sub>6</sub> contents to be transferred from non-compliant cylinders to new or compliant cylinders prior to shipment to Piketon. Shipping and then storing non-compliant cylinders from ETTP at Piketon increases the risk of exposure to toxic chemicals to workers, the community, and the environment. We also believe that DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders from ETTP should be shipped only as the Piketon inventory of DUF<sub>6</sub> material is safely converted and space becomes available.

#### **Response D0016-004**

Comments noted. At present, a transportation plan for shipment of noncompliant cylinders has not been finalized and DOE is evaluating the available options. Consequently, the EISs provide an evaluation of the possible options. It should be noted that all shipments must be made in compliance with DOT regulations, regardless of the specific approach selected. Thus, in terms of potential environmental impacts, no option is clearly preferable.

**COMMENTOR D0017:**            **Steve Meiners, Regional Manager**  
Safety and Ecology Corporation

#### **Comment D0017-001**

Please consider barge transport in a second draft EIS for public comment. Barge is more economical and safer than truck or rail transport. It is safer for the public because it involves no onboard fuel and does not place the cylinders in harms way in proximity to fuel trucks and other fuel-laden conveyances moving at high speed in opposing and cross-traversing traffic.

#### **Response D0017-001**

The transportation of cylinders by barge was considered, but not analyzed in detail in the two conversion facility EISs. As discussed in Section 2.3.5 of each EIS, barge transport was not considered in detail primarily because the nearest functioning barge facilities to Portsmouth and Paducah are located between 20 and 30 miles from the sites. Consequently, overland transportation would be required at each end of the route, as would additional cylinder loading and unloading steps. In addition, truck and rail were identified as the likely cylinder transport modes in conversion facility design documents.

As with any transportation mode, barge transport has associated advantages and disadvantages. As noted by the commentor, during barge transport there is no onboard fuel available and the shipment is not in close proximity to other transport vehicles, factors which could reduce, but not eliminate, potential accident risks. However, barge

transport would require overland transportation by truck on each end of the route, as well as additional handling of cylinders during the loading and unloading of the barge. These activities have associated accident risks and would contribute to the radiation exposure of workers during normal cylinder handling. In addition, shipment by barge could require dredging of the river bottoms at the barge facilities, an activity with potential environmental impacts.

It should be noted that, regardless of the transport mode, all cylinder shipments must comply with the DOT regulations for the shipment of radioactive materials, as specified in Title 49 of the *Code of Federal Regulations*. These regulations are designed to be protective of public health and safety during both accident and routine transportation conditions.

Because barge transport was not considered to be a reasonable option and has not been proposed as part of the current conversion facility project, a detailed evaluation has not been included in the Final conversion facility EISs. If barge transportation was proposed in the future and considered reasonable, additional NEPA review would be conducted. Such a review would address all issues associated with the proposed activity.

**COMMENTOR D0018:**           **Paul R. Baldrige**  
Ohio Department of Natural Resources

**Comment D0018-001**

The Ohio Department of Natural Resources (ODNR) has no concerns with this proposed project. No rare or endangered species, unique natural features, state nature preserves or scenic rivers were identified within or adjacent to the project site. Additionally, ODNR does not think the proposed project will negatively impact any rare or endangered species, ODNR properties, or rare geological features outside of the project area.

**Response D0018-001**

Comment noted.

**COMMENTOR D0019:**           **M. Jonathan Haire**

**Comment D0019-001**

The EIS does not describe the role of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, especially in licensing the product for disposal. Clarifying the role of various licensing agencies would be beneficial to the reader.

**Response D0019-001**

Section 1.6.2.4 discusses the scope of the EIS with respect to the disposition of the conversion products (HF, CaF<sub>2</sub>, and depleted U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub>). As that section indicates, studies

conducted by Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) for DOE have shown that both the NTS and Envirocare of Utah, Inc. could be acceptable disposal facilities for depleted U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub>, and UDS provided evidence in its proposal that both sites could accept the depleted U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub>. The NTS is a DOE facility that operates and is authorized to receive wastes in conformance with DOE directives. The Envirocare of Utah, Inc. facility is a commercial facility that is licensed to operate and receive wastes by the Utah Department of Health, Bureau of Radiation Protection, which is an NRC Agreement State agency. This means that the NRC has evaluated Utah laws and regulations implemented by the Bureau of Radiation Protection and determined them to provide a program of administration, licensure, and enforcement for certain radioactive materials that is equivalent to the NRC program. Thus, the NRC itself has no direct role in licensing either of the facilities currently being considered for disposal of the depleted U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> product. Notwithstanding, other facilities licensed by the NRC may be considered in the future for depleted U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> disposal. Therefore, as Section 1.6.2.4 of the EIS indicates, any depleted U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> destined for disposal will be transported from the conversion facility to disposal sites that would be (1) selected in a manner consistent with DOE policies and orders and (2) authorized or licensed to receive the conversion products by DOE (in conformance with DOE directives), the NRC (in conformance with NRC regulations), or an NRC Agreement State agency (in conformance with state laws and regulations determined to be equivalent to NRC regulations). DOE plans to decide the specific disposal location(s) for the depleted U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> conversion product after additional appropriate NEPA review. Accordingly, DOE will continue to evaluate its disposal options and will consider any further information or comments relevant to that decision. DOE will give a minimum 45-day notice before making the specific disposal decision and will provide any supplemental NEPA analysis for public review and comment.

### **Comment D0019-002**

The product of the conversion facilities is said to be U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub>. In fact it is a complex mixture of uranium oxides, urania. Most of the beneficial uses of depleted uranium use uranium dioxide, UO<sub>2</sub>. I urge the project to include provisions to fabricate UO<sub>2</sub>.

### **Response D0019-002**

DOE agrees that the conversion product is a mixture. The two site-specific EISs have been revised to clearly indicate that the conversion product is indeed a mixture of uranium oxides, with U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> being the predominant chemical form (estimated to be more than 80% of the product). The terms “depleted uranium oxide” and “depleted U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub>” are used interchangeably throughout the EISs in reference to the conversion product.

Currently, there are no plans or proposals to convert the depleted UF<sub>6</sub> inventory to UO<sub>2</sub>. The two site-specific EISs address the potential environmental impacts of the proposed conversion facilities as currently envisioned. Alternative uranium conversion products, including UO<sub>2</sub>, were evaluated in the *Programmatic EIS for Alternative Strategies for the Long-Term Management and Use of Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride* (DOE 1999). In addition, several alternative conversion products were evaluated during the conversion

services procurement process, as summarized in the environmental synopsis included in Appendix D of each site-specific conversion EIS. If conversion to UO<sub>2</sub> were proposed in the future, additional NEPA review would be conducted.

**COMMENTOR D0020:**           **David N. Mosby, Chair**  
Oak Ridge Site-Specific Advisory Board

**Comment D0020-001**

The Oak Ridge Site-Specific Advisory Board (ORSSAB) would like to clarify that the overall intent of the recommendation is to accelerate the removal of all UF<sub>6</sub> cylinders in inventory at the East Tennessee Technology Park...ORSSAB fully supports the accelerated shipping schedule for DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders from ETPP.

**Response D0020-001**

Comment noted.

**Comment D0020-002**

Additionally, we recommend that DOE keep open and not preclude transportation options other than highway.

**Response D0020-002**

The two site-specific conversion facility EISs evaluate transportation by both highway and rail modes in detail. Transportation by air and barge were considered, but not evaluated in detail for the reasons provided in Section 2.3.5 of each EIS (see also the response to Comment D0017-001 with respect to barge shipments). The detailed evaluation of only truck and rail modes in the Final EISs does not preclude the use of other modes in the future. However, if an alternative transportation mode was proposed and considered reasonable, additional NEPA review would be conducted. Such a review would address all issues associated with the proposed activity. It should be noted that, regardless of the transport mode, all cylinder shipments must comply with DOT regulations for the shipment of radioactive materials, as specified in Title 49 of the *Code of Federal Regulations*. These regulations are designed to be protective of public health and safety during both accident and routine transportation conditions.

**Comment D0020-003**

Finally, we recommend that DOE manage the safety aspects of the program consistent with the entire knowledge base of the hazards associated with handling UF<sub>6</sub> and inform the public about any plans to seek exemptions from more stringent requirements that may be evolving.

**Response D0020-003**

DOE is committed to continuing for as long as necessary the safe management of its depleted UF<sub>6</sub> cylinder inventory, consistent with inherent hazards of the material and all applicable regulatory requirements. Continued public and community involvement is an important component of that commitment.

**COMMENTOR D0021: Paul D. Kalb**

**Comment D0021-001**

I was disappointed to find that the EIS did not take the potential for re-use of the DU into account, but rather focused on issues of disposal. Turning our waste into useful, commercially viable products is a tremendous economic and sociological benefit. While the UF<sub>6</sub> website does include several references to secondary end-use of DU, including its use in DUPoly, the EIS itself does not consider this alternative. In my view, the additional benefits associated with this alternative make the treatment of DUF<sub>6</sub> a much more cost-effective and attractive solution.

**Response D0021-001**

As discussed in Section 2.2.3 of each site-specific conversion facility EIS, DOE requested in its Request for Proposals that the bidders for conversion services investigate and propose viable uses for the products of conversion. The conversion process would generate four conversion products that have a potential use or reuse: depleted uranium oxide, HF, CaF<sub>2</sub>, and steel from emptied DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders (if not used as disposal containers). According to the selected contractor (UDS), of the four conversion products, only HF has a viable commercial market currently interested in the product. Therefore, UDS expects that the HF would be sold to a commercial vendor pending DOE approval of the residual contamination limits and the sale. Although the depleted uranium oxide and emptied cylinders have the potential for use or reuse, currently none of the uses have been shown to be viable because of cost, perception, feasibility, or the need for additional study. Thus, UDS expects most, if not all, of the uranium oxide and emptied cylinders to be disposed of. If a viable use for the depleted uranium product is identified in the future, further NEPA review may be required. In addition, appropriate authorization limits or licenses would be obtained depending on the proposed use.

**COMMENTOR D0022:**           **Graham Mitchell**  
State of Ohio Environmental Protection Agency

**Comment D0022-001**

Ohio EPA has reviewed the Draft Environmental Impact Statement for Construction and Operation of a Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride (DUF<sub>6</sub>) Conversion Facility and comments on this draft are listed below. As you are aware, Kentucky, Tennessee and Ohio have been working with DOE for many years to address the multiple challenges associated with management and conversion of DUF<sub>6</sub>. We expect that collaboration to continue throughout the construction, operation and cylinder management and transportation portions of this project.

Ohio EPA concurs with the preferred alternative of constructing a DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion facility at the Portsmouth site. We also concur with transporting DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders from the ETTP at Oak Ridge to the Portsmouth site for conversion. We are currently negotiating administrative orders with DOE to allow this to happen.

**Response D0022-001**

Comment noted.

**Comment D0022-002**

A closed RCRA unit (The X-616 Chromium sludge Lagoon) which is in post-closure care is located in the area of Alternative Location A. A deed notice was submitted to the Pike County Planning Commission on July 7, 1992. There are also monitoring wells associated with this unit which are used to evaluate the status of the groundwater contamination in that area. Please provide a description of how the restricted land and these wells will be avoided during the construction and operation of the facility.

**Response D0022-002**

DOE and Uranium Disposition Services (UDS), DOE's construction and operations contractor, are aware of the deed notice and the restrictions contained therein. The X-616 Chromium Sludge Lagoon and its associated monitoring wells are, at their nearest point, located approximately 100 feet from the DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion facility site boundary. To prevent direct impacts and ensure the integrity of these areas, they will be clearly marked and identified, suitable buffer zones established around them, and entry of conversion facility personnel or equipment into these areas prohibited.

To prevent indirect impacts, best available technologies (BAT) will be identified and implemented to prevent the transport of air particulates and liquid effluents or discharges originating at the facility site from trespassing or impacting upon the RCRA unit. Technologies to prevent air particulate transport could include using water sprays on dirt roadways and on bare, excavated, and staged or bunkered soils; covering open bodied trucks transporting materials likely to become airborne; covering staged or bunkered

soils; maintaining paved roadways in good repair and in a clean condition; mulching or covering bare soils until they are paved or vegetation has been established; prohibiting open burning; and using barriers and windbreaks around construction areas.

Technologies to prevent trespass or impact by liquid discharges or effluents could include storm water and sediment controls such as temporary and permanent seeding, mulching and matting, sediment barriers, traps, and basins, silt fences, and runoff and diversion banks; prohibiting the discharge of liquid effluents to the facility site environment; properly maintaining and repairing vehicles and equipment; storing and managing materials in appropriate areas and containers; providing secondary containment around liquid storage areas; and promptly cleaning up and containerizing any inadvertent leaks and spills.

### **Comment D0022-003**

The EIS should be expanded to discuss the potential to accept the DUF cylinders from USEC should the Centrifuge Facility be constructed and operated at Portsmouth. The EIS should discuss the impact of longer operation and the potential need to increase the size of the Portsmouth Facility to deal with the additional DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders.

### **Response D0022-003**

At the present time, there are no plans or proposals for DOE to accept DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders for conversion beyond the current inventory for which it has responsibility. However, Section 2.2.7 of the Portsmouth site-specific conversion facility EIS (Section 2.2.5 of the Paducah EIS) discusses a number of possible future sources of additional DUF<sub>6</sub> that could require conversion, including the operation of a new USEC centrifuge facility. The section has been revised to indicate that USEC has announced that Portsmouth is the preferred site for such a facility. In addition, potential environmental impacts associated with expanded plant operations (including extending plant operations and increasing plant throughput) are discussed in Section 5.2.8 of the Portsmouth EIS (Section 5.2.6 of the Paducah EIS).

Because of the uncertainty associated with possible future sources of DUF<sub>6</sub> for which DOE could assume responsibility, there is no current proposal to increase the throughput of the Portsmouth facility or extend operations. On the basis of its experience with other projects, DOE believes that the assumed process availabilities in the proposed DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion facilities can be improved by making process changes during operations, and thus the throughput of DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders can be increased. However, for purposes of the EIS, it was assumed that the Portsmouth conversion process building would be designed and built with sufficient space to accommodate an increased plant throughput sometime in the future. The modular design of the dry conversion process — the Portsmouth and Paducah facilities are being designed with three and four parallel conversion lines, respectively — facilitates process expansion. In addition to the potential impacts associated with expanded plant operations, Section 5.2.8 of the Portsmouth EIS also discusses potential impacts that would be associated with a conversion facility consisting

of four process lines rather than three. If a decision is made in the future to increase the number of parallel process lines beyond four at either site, additional NEPA review would be conducted.

**Comment D0022-004**

The EIS should recognize that the current clean-up at the facility is governed by three Administrative Consent Orders; the 1989 Ohio Consent Decree, the 1997 Three Party Administrative Order on Consent and the 1999 Administrative Order for Integration. The document should also recognize that the DUF is considered a hazardous waste by the State of Ohio and that there is an Administrative Order governing how the DUF cylinders are to be managed at the site.

**Response D0022-004**

Section 1.1.2 in the Portsmouth Final EIS discusses the concerns of the State of Ohio regarding the characterization of depleted UF<sub>6</sub> pursuant to RCRA. Also, Table 6.1 in the EIS lists the OEPA Director's Final Findings and Orders (issued February 24, 1998) among the licenses, permits, and other consents that would apply during construction and operation of the depleted UF<sub>6</sub> conversion facility.

With regard to the three Consent Orders identified in the comment, the Portsmouth affected environment section (Chapter 3) has been modified to reflect the fact that the monitoring results reported therein are the product of the ongoing cleanup program, as defined by the Consent Orders.

**Comment D0022-005**

Please provide a discussion of how the cylinders will be prioritized for conversion. Will the older cylinders be processed first? Will the cylinders from ETTP be processed first? What is the current strategy for determining which cylinders will be addressed first during the conversion process?

**Response D0022-005**

The older cylinders will not be processed preferentially because age alone is not necessarily an indicator of the cylinder condition. UDS will develop a processing strategy based on the cylinder condition, location, and characteristics. UDS is required by contract to process the cylinders in a systematic manner and is prohibited from purposefully setting aside degraded cylinders. These issues will be addressed in cylinder storage, maintenance, and operations plans and procedures.

**Comment D0022-006**

Please provide a description of the type of inspections that will be conducted of the cylinders during the four month aging period, to determine if the cylinder wall has been breached or damaged during the conversion process.

**Response D0022-006**

The emptied cylinders will be visually inspected prior to and immediately after being placed in the aging yard. Since the residues remaining in the cylinders after emptying will be stabilized, there will be no reactive products that would be released. The yard itself will be subjected to routine monitoring for contamination (approximately monthly) in accordance with operational facility plans and procedures. Please note that a breach in the conversion process is highly unlikely; but if it were to occur, it would be known immediately, because the autoclaves are equipped with sensors that can detect HF present in the airspace outside of the cylinder.

**Comment D0022-007**

You may wish to consider decommissioning and decontaminating the X-616 SWMU and the old fire training area to make additional room for cylinders to be stored and managed before and after conversion.

**Response D0022-007**

The suggestion to decommission and decontaminate the X-616 solid waste management unit (SWMU) and the old fire training area is noted; however, two additional cylinder yard storage areas have been identified that are adjacent to the current cylinder storage yards should additional storage be needed. These yard locations are described in Section 2.2.5 of the EIS, and the environmental impacts from constructing a new storage yard are discussed in detail in Section 5.2.1.

Decommissioning and decontamination of site locations impacted by past activities is being addressed by ongoing remediation programs at the site that are outside the scope of the conversion facility EIS.

**Comment D0022-008**

The EIS fails to describe in Section 5.9 what is expected during decommissioning and decontamination (D&D) of the facility. The EIS should provide some detail regarding what will happen to the waste from the D&D facility and where the waste is likely to go. For instance, some of the material may be construction debris and is likely to be interred in a facility that accepts construction debris waste, other waste would be considered mixed waste and shall be shipped off site to an appropriate facility.

**Response D0022-008**

Additional information has been added to Section 5.9.5, Waste Management, of the Decommissioning and Decontamination section (Section 5.9) of each EIS that elaborates on the waste disposal process.

**Comment D0022-009**

Table S-2 page S-13: The table should also include a bulleted item under Proposed Action describing how the DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders created by USEC during the centrifuge operation (should the facility be constructed in Portsmouth) would be maintained at the facility and converted at the UDS Facility.

**Response D0022-009**

At the present time, there are no plans or proposals for DOE to accept DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders for conversion beyond the current inventory for which it has responsibility. However, Section 2.2.7 of the Portsmouth site-specific conversion facility EIS (Section 2.2.5 of the Paducah EIS) discusses a number of possible future sources of additional DUF<sub>6</sub> that could require conversion, including the operation of a new USEC centrifuge facility. Because of the uncertainty associated with these possible future sources of DUF<sub>6</sub>, there is no current proposal for DOE to maintain or convert such material. Consequently, activities related to these possible sources have not been included as part of the proposed actions considered in the two site-specific conversion facility EISs. However, to account for the possible processing of additional material in the future, potential environmental impacts associated with expanding conversion facility operations, either by extending the operational period or by increasing throughput, are included in Section 5.2.8. Management of the cylinders generated by USEC would be USEC's responsibility and would be addressed in future NEPA documentation prepared specifically for the centrifuge facility. The cumulative impacts discussion in Section 5.3 of the EISs includes the consideration of building the centrifuge facility at Portsmouth or Paducah in general terms.

**Comment D0022-010**

Page S-21, Section S.2.2.5: Will the noncompliant cylinders remain in the over packs? If not, how will these cylinders be moved around the facility once received at Portsmouth?

**Response D0022-010**

No, the overpacks are assumed to be reusable. Note that the overpacks may be necessary for off-site cylinder transport, but not storage. The cylinders will be moved in accordance with the current cylinder movement procedures in place at Portsmouth. These procedures are similar to the procedures in place at ETTP and Paducah. The cylinders arriving from ETTP will be handled and managed similarly to the cylinders already at Portsmouth. A 2003 Agreed Order between the Commonwealth of Kentucky and DOE stipulates that a

detailed inspection procedure be followed prior to cylinder relocations within the Paducah site; the Portsmouth site follows similar procedures. Prior to movement or feeding into the conversion facility autoclaves, the cylinders would be visually inspected to ensure that no damage had occurred since the last scheduled inspection. No cylinder would be moved or fed into the process unless there was a high degree of confidence in its ability to withstand the handling.

#### **Comment D0022-011**

Page S-39, S.5.5 Water and Soil: The text should indicate that best available practices will be implemented at the site during construction to eliminate or reduce the risk of potential soil, surface water, and groundwater contamination from construction of the facility. The text indicates that good construction practices will be implemented during construction but does not provide any detail. It is common for a construction project as described in the text to implement a BAT policy during construction to minimize impact on the soils, surface water and ground water at the construction site.

#### **Response D0022-011**

Following good engineering practices during construction has the same intent as following BAT protocol. Text has been added to Sections S.5.5 and 5.2.2.4 giving examples of good construction practices that might be implemented (e.g., covering chemicals with tarps to prevent interaction with rain, promptly cleaning up any spills). Additional practices that might be implemented include sediment and erosion controls such as temporary and permanent seeding; mulching and matting; sediment barriers, traps, and basins; silt fences; and runoff and earth diversion dikes.

#### **Comment D0022-012**

Page S-39, S.5.6 Socioeconomics: The text indicates that construction of the facility would create 310 jobs and the operation of the conversion facility would create 320 jobs. The information provided to Ohio EPA indicates that approximately 100-150 construction jobs would be created and approximately 140-150 jobs would be needed to operate the facility. Please provide the correct reference to the number of jobs created for construction and operation of the facility.

#### **Response D0022-012**

The employment ranges provided to Ohio and referred to in the comment are likely the direct employment impacts of construction and operation of the conversion facility. Indirect impacts also occur at each site as wages and salary spending and the local procurement of materials and services produce additional impacts. The socioeconomic impacts in the Final EISs have been revised based on more recent cost data provided by the conversion facility contractor (UDS 2003). Based on the revised data, the peak year total (direct and indirect) employment impacts of a conversion facility during construction would be 290 jobs at Paducah and 280 jobs at Portsmouth. Operations

impacts would be 330 jobs at Paducah and 320 jobs at Portsmouth. Data on employment impacts can be found in Sections 5.2.1.5 and 5.2.2.5 for Paducah and Sections 5.2.2.5 and 5.2.3.5 for Portsmouth.

### **Comment D0022-013**

Page S-41, section S.5.8: This section states that a stabilizer will be added to the heels in the emptied cylinders. What type of stabilizer will be used and will this stabilizer produce any gases which will need to be captured?

### **Response D0022-013**

The current stabilization media proposed is a 45% potassium hydroxide solution, but other media, such as magnesium oxide has been shown to be equally effective. The stabilization process is designed to neutralize the HF vapor that might be emitted from the small amount of residual DUF<sub>6</sub> in the cylinder heel. Any HF that might escape when the cylinder is opened to inject the stabilization media will be trapped locally. No other gases are expected from the stabilization process. Note also, that when the cylinder is removed from the autoclave it is at a negative pressure and thus the stabilizing media will be drawn into the cylinder.

### **Comment D0022-014**

Page S-41, section S.5.8: Will the U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> generated be considered a LLW or a LLMW? How will this be determined?

### **Response D0022-014**

In accordance with Section 3734.01 in the Ohio Revised Code (ORC 3734.01), Section 2014 in Title 42 in the *United States Code* (42 USC 2014), and directives DOE O 435.1 and DOE M 435.1-1, U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> that is destined for disposal will be managed as low-level waste (LLW). DOE plans to decide the specific disposal location(s) for the depleted U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> conversion product after additional appropriate NEPA review. Accordingly, DOE will continue to evaluate its disposal options and will consider any further information or comments relevant to that decision. DOE will give a minimum 45-day notice before making the specific disposal decision and will provide any supplemental NEPA analysis for public review and comment.

### **Comment D0022-015**

Page S-47, S.5.18 Unavoidable Adverse Impacts: Please provide an explanation as to why it may be necessary to disturb up to 65 acres of land during construction. Please provide an area map showing the extent of the area which may be disturbed.

**Response D0022-015**

The actual area disturbed during construction would be expected to be less than the values given in the EISs (65 acres at Portsmouth and 45 acres at Paducah). In fact, UDS, the contractor charged with designing and operating the conversion facilities at Paducah and Portsmouth for the first 5 years, has reduced the estimates for areas disturbed to 21 acres at Portsmouth and 24 acres at Paducah. However, to bound the impacts associated with disturbed areas during construction activities, the EISs used the larger areas identified above for impact analyses. Because the exact locations of all the disturbed areas, except for the area where the buildings would be constructed, are not known, no drawings or figures are provided in the EISs.

UDS will employ best management practices to minimize the area disturbed during construction. Also, the impacts associated with disturbed areas will be mitigated to the extent possible. Technologies that will be used to mitigate air quality impacts during construction include using water sprays on dirt roadways and on bare soils in work areas for dust control; covering open-bodied trucks transporting materials likely to become airborne when full and at all times when in motion; water spraying and covering bunkered or staged excavated and replacement soils; maintaining paved roadways in good repair and in a clean condition; using barriers and windbreaks around construction areas such as soil banks, temporary screening, and/or vegetative cover; mulching or covering exposed bare soil areas until vegetation has time to recover or paving has been installed; and prohibiting any open burning. Impacts to water quality and soil will be minimized through implementing storm water management, sediment, and erosion controls (e.g., temporary and permanent seeding; mulching and matting; sediment barriers, traps, and basins; silt fences; runoff and earth diversion dikes), and good construction practices (e.g., covering chemicals with tarps to prevent interaction with rain, promptly cleaning up any spills).

**Comment D0022-016**

Page S-47, S.5.18 Unavoidable Adverse Impacts: Please provide a detailed list of the possible loss of terrestrial and aquatic habitats from construction and disturbance of wildlife during operations. Include a description of the type of wildlife which may be impacted due to construction. Also, describe which areas may be irrevocably harmed due to the presence of the facility.

**Response D0022-016**

A detailed discussion of the terrestrial and aquatic habitats that would potentially be lost as a result of facility construction can be found in Section 5.2.2.6 of the Portsmouth EIS. Approximately 10 acres of previously disturbed managed grassland vegetation would be expected to be lost due to facility construction at any of the candidate locations. Railway construction at Location A would impact small previously disturbed wooded areas and areas of previously disturbed managed grassland. Much of a wetland approximately 0.08 acre in size would be impacted by the construction of a facility entrance road at

Location A. However, the impact may potentially be avoided by an alternative routing of the entrance road, or mitigation may be developed in coordination with appropriate regulatory agencies. Impacts to wetlands at Locations B and C could likely be avoided. The types of ecological impacts resulting from the presence of the facility during operations are described in Section 5.2.3.6. A description of the habitats and wildlife on and near the proposed facility location can be found in Section 3.1.6.

#### **Comment D0022-017**

Page S-54, S.7 Preferred Alternative, Table S-6: Under Environmental Consequence, the bounding radiological accident for the proposed action is given as an earthquake damaging the U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> storage building and releasing 145 lb. of depleted U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub>. For no action, a cylinder ruptures-fire is given as the bounding accident with 24,000 lb of UF<sub>6</sub> released. On Pg. S-12, the cylinder accident is stated to be one involving several cylinders in a fire. On Pg. S-68, under the earthquake scenario, 10% of the stored containers are assumed to be breached. More definitive data needs to be presented to support the quantities released.

#### **Response D0022-017**

More details on the accidents analyzed in the EISs and the estimated impacts are given in Sections 5.2.3.2 (Portsmouth EIS) and 5.2.2.2 (Paducah EIS) for facility accidents and Sections 5.2.5 (Portsmouth EIS) and 5.2.3 (Paducah EIS) for transportation accidents. Supporting documents referenced from within the above cited sections, in particular (Policastro et al. 1997 and UDS 2003) provide further details on both the accidents considered and the estimated consequences from them.

#### **Comment D0022-018**

Page 2-23, Section 2.2.7: The EIS discusses the possibility of accepting cylinders from the Paducah facility. Currently, there is no mechanism in place that allows for the transfer of cylinders from the Paducah facility to Portsmouth. As you are aware the State of Ohio and US DOE are currently negotiating a Director's Administrative Order, including a management plan for the shipment and management for the cylinders from ETTP. Please provide a description of the regulatory requirements which would be required in order for the State of Ohio to accept the DUF cylinders from Paducah. Furthermore, it is likely that Portsmouth may be required to accept cylinders from an enrichment facility in New Mexico or a new USEC centrifuge facility. It would make more sense to increase the size of the facilities being built so that a greater number of cylinders can be addressed in a shorter period of time. Both facilities should be sized to have the capability to address all the DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders currently on site as well as others which may be shipped from other facilities in the future.

#### **Response D0022-018**

At the present time, there are no plans or proposals for DOE to accept DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders for conversion beyond the current inventory for which it has responsibility, or to transfer cylinders from Paducah to Portsmouth. However, Section 2.2.7 of the Portsmouth site-

specific conversion facility EIS (Section 2.2.5 of the Paducah EIS) discusses a number of possible future sources of additional DUF<sub>6</sub> that could require conversion. In addition, the section points out that, under some circumstances, it could be beneficial to transfer cylinders from Paducah to Portsmouth at some time in the future. The potential environmental impacts associated with expanded plant operations (including extending plant operations and increasing plant throughput) are discussed in Section 5.2.8 of the Portsmouth EIS and Section 5.2.6 of the Paducah EIS.

Because of the uncertainty associated with possible future sources of DUF<sub>6</sub> for which DOE could assume responsibility, there is no current proposal to increase the throughput of the conversion facilities or extend operations. However, for purposes of the EIS, it was assumed that the Portsmouth conversion process building would be designed and built with sufficient space to accommodate an increased plant throughput sometime in the future. The modular design of the dry conversion process — the Portsmouth and Paducah facilities are being designed with three and four parallel conversion lines, respectively — facilitates process expansion. In addition to the potential impacts associated with expanded plant operations, Section 5.2.8 of the Portsmouth EIS also discusses potential impacts that would be associated with a conversion facility consisting of four process lines rather than three. If a decision is made in the future to increase the number of parallel process lines beyond four at either site, additional NEPA review would be conducted.

The permitting and compliance requirements applicable to transportation and conversion of DUF<sub>6</sub> are discussed in Chapter 6 of each site-specific EIS. These are the requirements that would apply to DUF<sub>6</sub>, if any cylinders were shipped from Paducah to Portsmouth for conversion. It is expected that DOE would confer with the State of Ohio regarding any future decisions to accept DUF<sub>6</sub> at the Portsmouth DUF<sub>6</sub> facility from off-site locations, as was done for the referenced ETTP cylinder shipments. It should be noted that UF<sub>6</sub> cylinders were routinely transported from Paducah to Portsmouth during operation of the Portsmouth gaseous diffusion plant.

#### **Comment D0022-019**

Page 2-25, Section 2.3.5 Other Transportation Modes: Due to the difficulties cited by the document with air and barge transportation, it appears that these modes of transportation are not being seriously considered. If this situation changes, the state would expect adequate NEPA review in order to assess risks associated with those methods.

#### **Response D0022-019**

The two site-specific conversion facility EISs evaluate transportation by both highway and rail modes in detail. Transportation by air and barge were considered, but not evaluated in detail for the reasons provided in Section 2.3.5 of each EIS (see also the response to Comment D0017-001 with respect to barge shipments). The detailed evaluation of only truck and rail modes in the Final EISs does not preclude the use of other modes in the future. However, if an alternative transportation mode was proposed

in the future and considered reasonable, additional NEPA review would be conducted. Such a review would address all issues associated with the proposed activity.

**Comment D0022-020**

Page 2-27, Section 2.4.2: Please refer to General Comment #7 above in regard to D&D.

**Response D0022-020**

In response to the referenced Comment 7 (Comment D0022-008), additional information concerning waste management has been added to Section 5.9, Decontamination and Decommissioning, of each EIS (see response to Comment D0022-008).

**Comment D0022-021**

Page 2-29, Section 2.4.2.2.2: Please make reference to the approved DUF<sub>6</sub> management plan that is currently in place and agreed to by US DOE. The DUF<sub>6</sub> management plan outlines the steps US DOE must take should a breach in the DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders occur.

**Response D0022-021**

The text in Section 2.4.2.2 of the Portsmouth EIS (Facility Accidents Involving Radiation or Chemical Releases) and the corresponding section of the Paducah EIS have been revised to reference the cylinder management plans, stating that these plans describe the steps that must be taken should a breach in the DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders occur.

**Comment D0022-022**

Section 5.2.2.3.1 Based on the information provided in this section. It appears that fugitive dust emissions (PM<sub>10</sub>, and PM<sub>2.5</sub>) concentrations ( $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$ ) from construction activities may exceed the National Ambient Air Quality Standards NAAQS for PM<sub>10</sub> and PM<sub>2.5</sub>. Additional emission control methods, operational restrictions, or monitoring need to be implemented to assure that the NAAQS are not exceeded.

**Response D0022-022**

The draft Portsmouth EIS showed that the 24-hour PM<sub>10</sub> increment from construction at Location A would be 64% of the standard; with background included, the total ambient concentration could exceed the standard of  $150 \mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$  by  $10 \mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$ . The annual PM<sub>10</sub> (particulate matter with a mean aerodynamic diameter of  $10 \mu\text{m}$  or less) standard would not be exceeded. Similarly, the 24-hour and annual PM<sub>2.5</sub> (particulate matter with a mean aerodynamic diameter of  $2.5 \mu\text{m}$  or less) increments from construction at Location A would be about 30% of the standards, but with background included; the standards would be exceeded (the annual average could be as high as  $29 \mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$ , in comparison with the standard of  $15 \mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$ ).

The background data used are the maximum values from the last 5 years of monitoring at the nearest monitoring location (operated by the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency [OEPA]) to the site, located about 20 miles away in the town of Portsmouth. Using these values, exceedance of the annual PM<sub>2.5</sub> standard would be unavoidable, because the background concentration already exceeds the standard (background is 24.1 µg/m<sup>3</sup>, in comparison with the standard of 15 µg/m<sup>3</sup>). The 24-hour PM<sub>2.5</sub> background concentration is also quite high in comparison with the standard (i.e., background of 57.5 µg/m<sup>3</sup>, 88% of the standard of 65 µg/m<sup>3</sup>). For 24-hour PM<sub>10</sub>, the background concentration is 64 µg/m<sup>3</sup>, which is 43% of the standard of 150 µg/m<sup>3</sup>. Actual particulate matter background levels closer to the site may be lower (particularly for PM<sub>10</sub>) due to lower population density and vehicle traffic. However, no data are currently available for background PM levels closer to the Portsmouth site.

The assessment of construction impacts incorporated EPA's AP-42 emission factors (EPA 2002), which are based on experimental observations of a "typical" construction site and are reported as tons/acre/month. The EIS assessment used these factors assuming that at Portsmouth, 8.5 acres would be actively disturbed at one time during construction activities. This is consistent with the recommended application of the AP-42 emission factors (8.5 acres is an upper estimate of the portion of the 10-acre facility footprint expected to require grading and disturbance during construction). The total estimated emissions are given in Table 5.2-5 of the Portsmouth EIS.

The air quality approach used in the EIS employed standard EPA methodologies for estimating air quality impacts, using conservative assumptions for the purposes of NEPA. The intent was to bound potential air quality impacts given the uncertainties associated with the assessment. For example, maximum background concentrations for the last 5 years of monitoring from the nearest monitoring location were used in the assessment, as opposed to average or median values. Had average or median values been used, the 24-hour PM<sub>10</sub> would probably not exceed the standard. In addition, the entire construction area of approximately 8.5 acres within the 10-acre facility footprint was assumed to be disturbed during the construction period, and it was assumed that water spraying would only occur once or twice per day. Finally, the nearest location of public access was assumed to be 100 m from the construction site. However, since September 11, 2001, public access to the site has been restricted to the DOE property boundary located about three quarters of a mile from the construction site. Assuming that this access limitation remains in place during construction of the conversion facility, PM concentration increments at locations of potential exposure for the general public would be less than 10% of those given in Table 5.2-6 of the EIS (i.e., at 100 m from the construction site). The analyses presented in the EISs are intended to fulfill the requirements of NEPA for presenting to the public impacts that are realistic and yet conservative in nature and bounding. It may be more appropriate to employ less conservative assumptions in other types of analyses, for example, for permitting purposes. As stated above, the methodology used in the EISs is consistent with the methodology used in other NEPA documents.

Although the EIS analysis indicates that there is potential for exceedance of the PM standards during construction of the Portsmouth conversion facility, mitigation measures exist to avoid this adverse impact. For example, PM emissions in the construction area could be decreased by aggressive water spraying (3 to 4 times/day), and this would lower the emissions by an additional approximate 30%, resulting in the PM<sub>10</sub> 24-hour standard not being exceeded. Additional controls could include covering when full and at all times when in motion, open-bodied trucks transporting materials likely to become airborne; water spraying and covering bunkered or staged excavated and replacement soils; maintaining paved roads in good repair and in a clean condition; using barriers and windbreaks around construction areas; and mulching or covering exposed bare soil areas until vegetation has been established or paving has been installed. The effectiveness of controls could be demonstrated by perimeter monitoring of the construction site. With these or similar mitigation controls, and given the temporary nature of the activity, impacts would be minimized and the 24-hour PM<sub>10</sub> standard would probably not be exceeded.

**COMMENTOR D0023:**            **Michael V. Welch, Manager, Hazardous Waste Branch**  
Kentucky Division of Waste Management

**Comment D0023-001**

Summary, Section S.1.1.2, Page S-5 and S-6: This section outlines the development of concern over DOE's DUF<sub>6</sub> inventory beginning in 1995. The 3rd paragraph describes an agreement reached in 1998 between DOE and OEPA that resulted in the implementation of a DUF<sub>6</sub> management plan governing the storage of DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders at Portsmouth. The 4th paragraph discusses a consent order entered into in 1999 by DOE and the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation (TDEC) regarding the implementation of a UF<sub>6</sub> management plan for cylinders stored at ETTP, as well as removal or conversion of DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders at ETTP. An addition must be included in this section to discuss the Agreed Order signed by DOE and Kentucky Department for Environmental Protection in October 2003 regarding the implementation of a DUF<sub>6</sub> management plan for cylinders stored at PGDP, as well as other issues associated with the proposed DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion facility at Paducah.

**Response D0023-001**

Sections S.1.1.2 and 1.1.2 of the Draft EISs have both been modified by adding the following paragraph:

“In Kentucky, a final Agreed Order between DOE and the Kentucky Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet concerning DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinder management was entered on October 2, 2003. This Agreed Order requires that DOE provide the Kentucky Department of Environmental Protection an inventory of all DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders for which DOE has management responsibility at the Paducah site and, with regard to that inventory, that DOE will implement the DUF<sub>6</sub> Cylinder Management Plan which is Attachment 1 to the Agreed Order. Performance of the Cylinder Management Plan

satisfies DOE's obligations regarding alleged violations and potential violations of hazardous waste laws and regulations that are enforceable by Kentucky."

### **Comment D0023-002**

Section 1.1.2, Page 1-4 and 1-5: See Specific Comment #1 above. (Summary, Section S.1.1.2, Page S-S and S-6: This section outlines the development of concern over DOE's DUF<sub>6</sub> inventory beginning in 1995. The 3rd paragraph describes an agreement reached in 1998 between DOE and OEPA that resulted in the implementation of a DUF<sub>6</sub> management plan governing the storage of DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders at Portsmouth. The 4th paragraph discusses a consent order entered into in 1999 by DOE and TDEC regarding the implementation of a UF<sub>6</sub> management plan for cylinders stored at ETTP, as well as removal or conversion of DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders at ETTP. An addition must be included in this section to discuss the Agreed Order signed by DOE and Kentucky Department for Environmental Protection in October 2003 regarding the implementation of a DUF<sub>6</sub> management plan for cylinders stored at PGDP, as well as other issues associated with the proposed DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion facility at Paducah.)

### **Response D0023-002**

See previous Response D0023-001.

### **Comment D0023-003**

Summary, Section S.5.2.2, Page S-30: Impacts from a certain type of accident were investigated by DOE but not included in the draft EIS due to security concerns. The document states that a classified appendix will be provided to proper state and local officials for review and comment. Please identify which "proper state and local officials" will review the classified appendix.

### **Response D0023-003**

The classified appendix was provided for review to all federal, state, and local officials who requested access to the document, had a demonstrable need-to-know, and had the proper security clearance. During the draft EIS public comment period, the classified appendix was requested and reviewed by the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation.

### **Comment D0023-004**

Summary, Section S.5.2.2, Page S-31: Current UDS facility design includes the storage and use of anhydrous NH<sub>3</sub> for production of hydrogen for the conversion process. Conversion facility scenarios involving the accidental release of NH<sub>3</sub> were evaluated. However, the document states that the use of natural gas for hydrogen production is being investigated, which would eliminate the need for NH<sub>3</sub>. DOE must define in the EIS the specific process and products that will be utilized in the conversion facility in order to complete a relevant evaluation of environmental impacts.

**Response D0023-004**

The EISs have assessments of the impacts for several reasonable alternative approaches for some of the operations at the conversion plants. The reason for this is because the specific option to be implemented is currently unknown; these assessments are included to provide operational flexibility.

In the case of the hydrogen generation for use in the conversion process, the bounding impacts in each technical area from using either anhydrous ammonia or steam methane reforming (SMR) of natural gas were analyzed in the EIS. For example, the impacts from an accidental release of anhydrous ammonia are greater than from an accidental release of natural gas, so the anhydrous ammonia release was modeled. For air quality, emissions from the use of natural gas would be greater, so estimated emissions included those from natural gas use. The land area proposed by UDS for the two EISs is large enough to accommodate either hydrogen production process. Noise levels would be similar since both processes employ rotating equipment. Socioeconomic impacts would also be very similar. This method of assessing potential impacts allows flexibility for the contractor in the event that a change from the planned use of anhydrous ammonia is needed in the future.

**Comment D0023-005**

Summary, Section S.5.19, Page S-45: Please clarify the statement that the land used to dispose of conversion products would be an “irreversible and irretrievable” commitment of resources. The Kentucky Division of Waste Management (KDWM) does not agree with the designation of this land as an “irreversible and irretrievable resource” or the limitations implied regarding any natural resources damages that could occur due to construction and operation of the conversion facility.

**Response D0023-005**

As discussed in each site-specific EIS, DOE expects most, if not all, of the depleted uranium oxide conversion product to be shipped to a disposal facility. DOE considers disposal to be the emplacement of material in a manner to ensure its isolation for the foreseeable future. As opposed to long-term storage, disposal is generally considered permanent, with considerable and deliberate effort required to regain access to the material. Thus, the land used for a disposal facility would not be available for later use by future generations, or its use would be very limited.

DOE recognizes that it is possible that in the future the disposal facility land could be put to some alternate use, and that the disposed material could be removed from the facility and the land restored to its previous condition. However, given the nature of the material and the fact that disposal is intended to be permanent, DOE has identified the land used for a disposal facility as an irreversible and irretrievable commitment of that resource. The KDWM objection to this designation is noted.

DOE does not regard, nor intend to imply, that the designation of disposal land as an irreversible and irretrievable commitment of a resource is a limitation concerning the construction and operation of the conversion facilities.

### **Comment D0023-006**

Section 1.1.1, Page 1-4: The first paragraph describes the agreement between DOE and USEC signed in June 2002 to transfer ownership of up to 23,300 tons DUF<sub>6</sub> from USEC to DOE between 2002 and 2006. A clear determination must be made with regards to who will be responsible for management of these cylinders. The EIS must be revised to indicate if DOE plans to manage these cylinders under the 2003 DUF<sub>6</sub> Agreed Order between Kentucky and DOE.

### **Response D0023-006**

Article 4.B(a) of the June 17, 2002, Agreement (the Agreement) between USEC and DOE provides for the transfer of “title, but not custody (until processing)” of DUF<sub>6</sub> generated by USEC at Paducah. While DOE will take title to this inventory, under the Agreement, USEC’s “custody” includes continued sole responsibility for cylinder management of this inventory at USEC’s sole expense and liability and under the regulatory oversight of the NRC. This custody will continue until at DOE’s sole discretion, USEC delivers the cylinders to DOE for processing in the DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion facility. Because these cylinders are the management responsibility of USEC, they are not included in the inventory of cylinders to which the October 2003 Agreed Order between Kentucky and DOE applies. The following has been added to the text in Section 1.1.1: “While title to the DUF<sub>6</sub> is transferred to DOE under this agreement, custody and cylinder management responsibility remains with USEC until DOE requests that USEC deliver the cylinders for processing in the conversion facility.”

### **Comment D0023-007**

Section 2.4.2.3, Page 2-30: This section outlines safety considerations related to cylinder transportation. The highest risk is shown to be associated with accidents involving NH<sub>3</sub> or HF shipments. Please include consideration of risks associated with shipping UF<sub>6</sub> cylinders from ETTP to the selected conversion sites.

### **Response D0023-007**

The risks associated with shipping UF<sub>6</sub> cylinders from ETTP to the selected conversion sites are included in each EIS. The risks from transportation of UF<sub>6</sub> cylinders, including routine conditions and accidents, are presented in detail in Section 5.2.5 of each document. The assessment shows that the potential consequences of an accident involving DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders during transport from ETTP are lower than the consequences of an accidental release of NH<sub>3</sub> or aqueous hydrogen fluoride during shipment. Text has been added to Section 2.4.2.3 to indicate where in each document UF<sub>6</sub> cylinder accidents are discussed in detail.

**Comment D0023-008**

Section 3.1.5.1, Page 3-15: The sixth paragraph states “In 2000, the maximum uranium concentration from DOE outfalls was 0.09 mg/L. This value is below the derived concentration guide of 600 pCi/L.” Please state these values in common units in order to provide a clear comparison between the contamination level and the regulatory limit.

**Response D0023-008**

The text has been revised to state “In 2000, the maximum uranium concentration was 0.09 mg/L (about 62 pCi/L) (DOE 2001b). This value is below the derived concentration guide (DCG) of 600 pCi/L.”

**Comment D0023-009**

Section 5.1.1.1, Page 5-3: Table 5.1-1 lists frequency of inspections, monitoring, and maintenance for cylinders for 2003-2007. This section must provide clarification that inspection and maintenance activity schedules will be consistent with requirements of the 2003 DUF<sub>6</sub> Agreed Order between Kentucky and DOE.

**Response D0023-009**

A footnote has been added to Table 5.1-1 of the Paducah EIS, stating that the presented planned average annual frequencies of activities for 2003–2007 are consistent with the requirements of the Agreed Order, except that the Agreed Order does not include requirements for painting.

**Comment D0023-010**

Section 5.2.1.4, Page 5-28: This section discusses wastewater that will be produced during construction, treated prior to release, and discharged to a KPDES permitted outfall or to an existing sewer. It is further stated that dilution will occur once the discharge reaches Bayou Creek and the Ohio River, and therefore contamination of surface water from the discharge will be negligible. This section must be edited to state that the discharge will meet KPDES limits at the outfall, regardless of how much dilution is expected to occur downstream.

**Response D0023-010**

Section 5.2.1.4.1 of the Paducah EIS and Section 5.2.2.4 of the Portsmouth EIS have been revised to indicate that there would not be any water releases to any surface water bodies during the construction of the conversion facilities. Therefore, there would be no potential impacts to surface waters.

**Comment D0023-011**

Section 5.2.2.3.1, Page 59: This section indicates that fugitive dust emission concentrations from conversion will approach the National Ambient Air Quality Standards NAAQS for PM<sub>2.5</sub>. Elaborate on emission control methods, operational restrictions, or monitoring that will be implemented to assure that the NAAQS are not exceeded.

**Response D0023-011**

Although the EIS analysis indicates that there is potential for exceedance of the PM standards during construction of the Paducah conversion facility, mitigation measures exist to avoid this adverse impact. For example, PM emissions in the construction area could be decreased by aggressive water spraying (3 to 4 times/day). Additional controls could include covering when full and at all times when in motion, open-bodied trucks transporting materials likely to become airborne; water spraying and covering bunkered or staged excavated and replacement soils; maintaining paved roads in good repair and in a clean condition; using barriers and windbreaks around construction areas; and mulching or covering exposed bare soil areas until vegetation has been established or paving has been installed. The effectiveness of controls could be demonstrated by perimeter monitoring of the construction site. With these or similar mitigation controls, and given the temporary nature of the activity, impacts would be minimized and the PM standards would probably not be exceeded.

**Comment D0023-012**

Section 5.2.2.4.1, Page 5-65: The EIS maintains there will be no process wastewater discharge from the facility during conversion and that all blowdown water would be circulated back into the process with no planned discharges. Thus impacts on surface water are assumed to be negligible. The EIS must address the possibility and impacts of an accidental or emergency discharge of process water or blowdown water that could affect surface water. Please specify the distance to potential receiving waters and possible contaminants of concern.

**Response D0023-012**

On the basis of updated data from the conversion contractor (UDS 2003), the text in Section 5.2.2.4.1 of the Paducah EIS has been changed to indicate that 4,000 gal/d of process wastewater and 31,000 gal/d of cooling tower blowdown would be produced during operations. These wastewaters would not contain radionuclides and could be disposed of to the existing process wastewater treatment system, or discharged under a KPDES permit, or treated and reused at the conversion facility. Impacts to surface waters from wastewater discharge would be negligible.

The Paducah site is located about 3.5 mi from the Ohio River. The nearest surface water to sites A, B, and C is about 1/4 to 1/2 mi (Bayou or Little Bayou Creek). If the entire volume of process wastewater and cooling tower blowdown generated during 1 day (35,000 gal) was lost at one time, it would be equivalent to 0.11 ac-ft (an acre-foot is the

amount of water that would cover an acre to a depth of 1 foot). Such a release would produce no measurable impacts to groundwater resources, from either a hydrological perspective or a water quality perspective, and would be very unlikely to flow overland to either creek. Because of the small associated volume of water that would be released and its composition, it was not included as one of the accidents analyzed for the EIS.

More water could potentially be released from an accident to the cooling tower. This water could contain chlorine for reducing biofilms during the cooling process and increased total dissolved solids (TDS) due to 3 cycles of concentration being used in the cooling process (UDS 2003). Cooling tower blowdown for an entire year is described as 11.3 million gal. In the event of an earthquake that ruptures the cooling towers, a total of about 20,000 gal of water would be released to the environment. This quantity of water is equivalent to approximately one-half ac-ft. As with the process water accident discussed above, the volume of water released and its composition would not produce significant impacts to the groundwater system or nearby surface water bodies. The accident was, therefore, not included in the suite of accidents analyzed in the EIS.

### **Comment D0023-013**

Section 5.2.2.4.1, Page 5-65: The third paragraph describes an accident scenario in which an earthquake would cause the rupture of an aboveground pipeline carrying liquid HF from the conversion building to the storage building. The scenario assumes that “because response and cleanup would occur within a relatively short time after the release (i.e. days or weeks), the HF would have little time to migrate into the soil. Removal of the contaminated soil would prevent any problems of contamination of either surface or groundwater resources. Therefore, there would be no impacts to surface water or groundwater from this type of accident.” If cleanup was impeded by adverse weather conditions, then stormwater runoff and/or infiltration could transport contaminants to surface water or groundwater within a short time. This section must be edited to consider the possibility that such an accident could endanger surface water and groundwater quality.

### **Response D0023-013**

As discussed in Sections 1.5.2 and 3.1.4.2, the uppermost aquifer at the site is perched and consists of a discontinuous mixture of sands and clays. A fragipan frequently occurs at a depth of about 4 ft that impedes the vertical flow of infiltrating water and leads to the formation of perched water. The lower aquifer, which is a good yield aquifer, lies at a depth of about 39 ft. Flow in the upper, perched water aquifer is primarily vertically downward; no reliable horizontal gradient has been found. Vertical flow in the perched-water zone recharges the underlying lower aquifer. The permeability of the soil above the perched water ranges from about 0.2 to 2.0 in./h (Section 3.1.4.2). Once in water, the HF would disassociate into hydrogen and fluoride, forming a weak acid. The travel time for the fluoride to reach the location of the perched water would range from about 1 to 10 days for the soil conditions at Paducah. In the absence of very adverse conditions, the contaminated soil in the zone above the perched aquifer could be cleaned up before the fluoride reached the perched water, as stated in the EIS.

If cleanup was not completed in about 10 days, the fluoride could reach the zone of perched water. Assuming that all of the annual precipitation acts as recharge to the lower aquifer (approximately 49 in./yr; Section 3.1.3.1), the travel time to the lower aquifer would be about 10 years. Actual travel times for water contaminated with fluoride would be expected to be longer because of the following conservative assumptions: the fluoride infiltrates at a velocity equal to the maximum infiltration possible (a more realistic estimate would assume that recharge is approximately 10% of the annual precipitation), the fluoride is not retarded by sorption processes during transport through the perched water zone (i.e., it has a distribution coefficient of 0.0 mL/g), and it does not degrade chemically or physically during transport (e.g., the HF does not volatilize on the surface or react after disassociation with the soil matrix or dissolved chemicals in the groundwater). For more realistic conditions, the actual time for fluoride to reach the lower aquifer would likely exceed 10 years. Because cleanup of the contaminated soil and perched water could be accomplished before the fluoride reached the location of the lower aquifer, a detailed discussion of this type of accident is not warranted for the EIS.

An alternative impact of an aboveground break of the HF pipe due to an earthquake would be potential contamination of nearby surface water features. In the EIS, an earthquake was assumed to occur, and HF would be spilled onto the ground. Because the distance to the nearest surface water feature (Bayou or Little Bayou Creek) is on the order of a 1/4 mi and the site is not located in the 100-year floodplain, an analysis of impacts to surface water was not performed, assuming that cleanup would be performed of the contaminated soil near the pipe break.

The comment suggests that adverse weather could facilitate transport to nearby surface waters. Because of the physical location of the facility on the Paducah site, a significant rainfall event would be required to mobilize and transport HF from the location of the spill to either Bayou or Little Bayou Creek. Assuming that the 100-year rainfall event was sufficient to mobilize and transport the HF to the creeks, the probability of the joint event (i.e., an earthquake breaking the pipe during a 100-year rainfall event) would be very small (probability of an earthquake occurring that broke the pipe times the probability of a 100-year rainfall event). This product makes the accident scenario nearly incredible for the Paducah site. DOE believes that the risk (i.e., product of the probability of occurrence times consequence) associated with such an accident becomes very small and not warranted for analysis in the EIS.

#### **Comment D0023-014**

Section 5.2.2.4.1, Page 5-65: Define the origin and expected constituents of the “sanitary wastewater” that is proposed to be treated in the wastewater treatment plant and discharged to Bayou Creek.

**Response D0023-014**

Sanitary wastewater is wastewater derived from use by operations personnel (e.g., bathrooms, showers, drinking fountains, etc.). It can also be called domestic wastewater. The composition of this wastewater is expected to be the same as municipal sanitary wastewater.

**Comment D0023-015**

Section 5.2.4, Page 5-89: This section discusses the impacts associated with the use and potential sale of conversion byproducts. However, the discussion fails to consider time periods for storage of the byproducts before disposal or reuse. Estimates of storage times must be given along with consideration of how storage of the conversion products may impact human health and the environment.

**Response D0023-015**

The HF will be stored on site at each conversion facility for approximately 2 weeks or less under normal conditions and then shipped to a vendor. The storage capacity at each site is limited for HF and if the material cannot be moved, it will be converted to CaF<sub>2</sub> or processing will stop. The uranium oxide will also be shipped off site for reuse or disposal in a similar time frame. However, each plant has the capacity to store CaF<sub>2</sub> and uranium oxide for up to 6 months of production if necessary due to the interruption of transport or some other unforeseen circumstance. DOE plans to decide the specific disposal location(s) for the depleted U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> conversion product after additional appropriate NEPA review. Accordingly, DOE will continue to evaluate its disposal options and will consider any further information or comments relevant to that decision. DOE will give a minimum 45-day notice before making the specific disposal decision and will provide any supplemental NEPA analysis for public review and comment.

CaF<sub>2</sub> has low toxicity and reactivity, and thus presents low risks during storage. The potential risks from accidental releases of HF and U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> in storage at the conversion facilities are presented in Section 5.2.2.2 of the Paducah EIS and in Section 5.2.3.2 of the Portsmouth EIS. Risks from HF storage are minimized by keeping quantities in storage to a minimum and by using best available practices for HF storage and loading of HF for transport.

**Comment D0023-016**

Section 5.2.4, Page 5-90: This section does not provide an adequate description of cylinders that might be transported from ETTP to Paducah for conversion. DOE must provide more information regarding contents and contaminants of cylinders compared to the cylinders currently stored at PGDP along with assessment of potential environmental impacts.

**Response D0023-016**

Cylinders at all three storage sites (Paducah, Portsmouth, ETTP) are similar in content. All DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders were originally filled (some cylinders are only partially full) with pure DUF<sub>6</sub> in liquid form, which then solidified under ambient conditions. Over time, some of the uranium in the DUF<sub>6</sub> has decayed and daughter products have built up in the cylinders. In addition, as explained in Appendix B of both EISs, a small, but unknown number of cylinders contain a small amount of transuranics and technetium in them. Such cylinders are likely to be found at all three sites. The impacts associated with such contamination were analyzed in detail in Appendix B of the EISs. The impacts are also summarized in Sections 5.1.2.1, 5.2.3.1, and 5.2.3.2 of the Portsmouth EIS and Sections 5.1.2.1, 5.2.2.1, and 5.2.2.2 of the Paducah EIS. As indicated in those sections, the impacts associated with transuranic contamination of cylinders are relatively small compared to the impacts associated with the DUF<sub>6</sub> stored in the same cylinders.

**Comment D0023-017**

Section 5.9, Page 5-118: This section fails to adequately address impacts from future decommissioning and decontamination (D&D) of the facility. Further details must be provided regarding disposal of waste from D&D of the facility, since portions of the waste would likely be classified as hazardous or mixed waste.

**Response D0023-017**

To the extent known, additional information has been added to Section 5.9.5, Waste Management, of the Decontamination and Decommissioning section (Section 5.9) of each EIS that elaborates on the waste disposal process. Additional NEPA review would be required when the facilities are proposed for D&D.

**Comment D0023-018**

*Comment withdrawn by Kentucky Division of Waste Management (Hatton 2004).*

**Response D0023-018**

*Comment withdrawn.*

**Comment D0023-019**

The EIS proposes that if the HF conversion by-product cannot be sold to the chemical industry, it will be converted to CaF<sub>2</sub> for sale or disposal. Generation of large volumes of CaF<sub>2</sub> would have significant impacts on transportation and waste management plans. DOE has not determined whether CaF<sub>2</sub> would need to be disposed of as a non-hazardous solid waste, or a LLW. Additionally, DOE has not determined whether CaF<sub>2</sub> would be considered DOE waste if the conversion was performed by a private commercial enterprise. DOE must edit the EIS to adequately address these issues.

**Response D0023-019**

DOE believes that the EIS adequately addresses the issues associated with converting HF to CaF<sub>2</sub> in Sections 5.2.2.7, 5.2.4, and Appendix E. As indicated therein, neutralization of HF to CaF<sub>2</sub> would produce approximately 4,900 yd<sup>3</sup>/yr (3,780 m<sup>3</sup>/yr) of CaF<sub>2</sub>. Section 5.2.2.7 states that, if this CaF<sub>2</sub> cannot be sold, it would be managed as either nonhazardous solid waste (provided that authorized limits have been established in accordance with DOE Order 5400.5) or LLW. As nonhazardous solid waste, this volume of CaF<sub>2</sub> would represent an increase of approximately 20% in the projected annual Paducah site generation rate. It could be disposed of in a commercial nonhazardous waste landfill, or if it is considered to be DOE waste, in either a commercial or a DOE-owned nonhazardous waste landfill. The final choice of disposal location in any case would be based on applicable DOE directives and policies, available landfill capacities, cost effectiveness, and protection of public health and the environment. As LLW, the increase in projected annual Paducah site generation rate caused by this volume would be approximately 53%. These increases would have a moderate to large impact relative to site annual waste generation volumes and on-site waste management capacities. It could be disposed of in a commercial LLW landfill, or if it is considered to be DOE waste, in either a commercial or a DOE-owned LLW landfill. The final choice of disposal location in any case would be based on applicable DOE directives and policies, available landfill capacities, cost-effectiveness, and protection of public health and the environment. Impacts associated with transportation of CaF<sub>2</sub> product to either the Envirocare of Utah (a commercial facility) or NTS (a DOE facility) are presented in Section 5.2.3 of the Paducah EIS and Section 5.2.5 of Portsmouth EIS.

**Comment D0023-020**

Comments previously issued by KDWM for the PEIS should be considered applicable to this EIS. KDWM requests that DOE respond to these comments as relevant to the EIS.

**Response D0023-020**

The DOE responses to all comments received on the “Programmatic EIS for Alternative Strategies for the Long-Term Management and Use of Depleted UF<sub>6</sub>” are publicly available in Volume 3, Responses to Public Comments, of the PEIS (DOE 1999). The comments submitted by the KDWM are listed under Commentor No. 75 in Volume 3 (page 2-101).

The KDWM comments (Commentor 75) and DOE responses provided in Volume 3 of the PEIS were reviewed with respect to relevance to the current proposed action. Based upon this review, it was determined that either (1) the comment was not applicable to the current proposed action (e.g., comments referring to PEIS assumptions) or (2) the comment was applicable to the current proposed action and that the DOE response was still appropriate. Consequently, the KDWM comments and DOE responses were not repeated in this Comment Response Document.

**Comment D0023-021**

The EIS should be expanded to discuss the potential to accept DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders from USEC due to continued conversion operations at PGDP, and due to cylinder transport from ETTP. The EIS should discuss the impacts of longer operation and the potential need to increase the size of the Paducah Facility to deal with the additional DUF cylinders. In addition, specify where additional cylinders would be stored in the event that cylinders are transported from ETTP to Paducah for conversion.

**Response D0023-021**

At the present time, there are no plans or proposals for DOE to accept DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders for conversion beyond the current inventory for which it has responsibility. However, Section 2.2.7 of the Portsmouth EIS and Section 2.2.5 of the Paducah EIS discuss a number of possible future sources of additional DUF<sub>6</sub> that could require conversion, including receiving additional cylinders from USEC. The potential environmental impacts associated with expanding plant operations (including extending plant operations and increasing plant throughput) to accommodate processing of additional cylinders are discussed in Section 5.2.8 of the Portsmouth EIS and Section 5.2.6 of the Paducah EIS.

Because of the uncertainty associated with possible future sources of DUF<sub>6</sub> for which DOE could assume responsibility, there is no current proposal to increase the throughput of the conversion facilities or extend operations. However, for purposes of the EIS, it was assumed that the Portsmouth conversion process building would be designed and built with sufficient space to accommodate an increased plant throughput sometime in the future. The modular design of the dry conversion process — the Portsmouth and Paducah facilities are being designed with three and four parallel conversion lines, respectively — facilitates process expansion. In addition to the potential impacts associated with expanded plant operations, Section 5.2.8 of the Portsmouth EIS also discusses potential impacts that would be associated with a conversion facility consisting of four process lines rather than three. If a decision is made in the future to increase the number of parallel process lines beyond four at either site, additional NEPA review would be conducted.

With respect to the possible conversion of the ETTP cylinders at the Paducah site, potential transportation impacts and impacts associated with extended Paducah conversion plant operations are presented in Section 5.2.5 of the Paducah EIS. The impacts discussed in this section include impacts associated with the receipt, surveillance, and maintenance of the ETTP cylinders at the Paducah site, transfer of the ETTP cylinders to the conversion plant, and extending conversion plant operations for the necessary 3 years. However, because the proposed action and current DOE plans call for the shipment of the ETTP cylinders to the Portsmouth site, no specific location at Paducah has been identified for storage of the ETTP cylinders. As noted in Section 5.2.5, if it was decided to transport the ETTP cylinders to Paducah and it was determined that a new cylinder yard was required, additional NEPA review would be conducted.

**Comment D0023-022**

Verification of Compliance with the DOE Public Dose Limit, page E-10 second paragraph. Please provide a copy of the basis for presumption of compliance decision and how the DOE demonstrated compliance with the a public dose limit of 100 mrem TEDE in a year by limiting the maximally exposed member of the public to 25 mrem. I have not had the opportunity to review any position determination related to this method of compliance verification and would be interested in reviewing the document before agreeing to the general process identified in the Draft Environmental Impact Statement.

**Response D0023-022**

DOE indicates its use of a 25-mrem/yr dose constraint for controlling anticipated exposures to members of the public from each DOE source or practice in Section 3.1.2, "Implementation Guide, Control and Release of Property with Residual Radioactive Material for Use with DOE 5400.5, Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment," DOE G 441.1-XX (draft), which is available on the Internet at the following URL address: <http://www.directives.doe.gov/pdfs/doe/doetext/draftord/441/g4411-xx.pdf>.

The International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) developed the concept of dose constraints for circumstances in which people may be exposed to radiation from several different sources. In such cases, the ICRP recommends that regulatory agencies establish an upper restriction on the anticipated dose that an average individual member of the public may receive from a single source in order to ensure that the actual dose to any individual member of the public would not exceed the legal dose limit from all sources (e.g., 100 mrem/yr from all sources and pathways in the case of dose to a member of the public in the United States). Such an upper restriction is referred to as a dose constraint. For a discussion of the conceptual framework for radiological protection recommended by the ICRP, the following URL address may be consulted: [http://www.nrp.org/publications/documents\\_of\\_nrp/abstracts/absd4-1.htm](http://www.nrp.org/publications/documents_of_nrp/abstracts/absd4-1.htm).

Please note that, in the case of HF or CaF<sub>2</sub> releases from the proposed DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion facility, even if an alternative set of release limits were to be demonstrated to comply with the dose constraint of 25 mrem/yr, that demonstration alone would not qualify the alternative set of release limits to be authorized limits. Instead, several alternative sets of release limits that have been demonstrated to comply with the dose constraint would need to be evaluated using the ALARA (as low as reasonably achievable) process. The purpose of the evaluation would be to identify the one alternative set of release limits that would yield exposures to members of the public as far below 25 mrem/yr as practicable, taking into account technological, economic, safety, environmental, social, and public policy factors. This set of release limits would then qualify for possible approval by DOE as authorized limits.

**Comment D0023-023**

Characterization of HF and CaF<sub>2</sub> Produced during conversion, Page E-5 third paragraph and Page E.4.1 first paragraph: Both references indicate Framatome Advanced Nuclear Power, Inc. (ANP) is licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). I question DOE's capability to commercially market HF and CaF<sub>2</sub> developed during conversion without licensing due to the amount of Uranium present in bulk, even though depleted Uranium. Further research will be required.

**Response D0023-023**

Comment noted. The Framatome ANP facility mentioned in Section E.4.1 generates HF and sells it commercially for unrestricted use. The amount of residual radioactive material allowed in the HF released from the Framatome ANP facility is governed by the facility's NRC license. If UDS decides to release HF and/or CaF<sub>2</sub> from the proposed DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion facilities for unrestricted use, DOE (rather than NRC) must establish authorized limits for the maximum concentrations of residual radioactive material allowed to remain volumetrically distributed within the released HF and CaF<sub>2</sub>. The process by which DOE will establish such authorized limits is described in Section E.4 of each EIS.

**COMMENTOR D0024:****Edward S. Ford, Chairman**Central Midwest Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste  
Commission**Comment D0024-001**

The Central Midwest Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Commission is concerned about the safe management of low-level radioactive waste within the borders of the two-state compact region of Illinois and Kentucky. While the Commission acknowledges that the DUF<sub>6</sub> addressed in these Draft Environmental Impact Statements (DEIS's) is federal waste not subject to the Commission's jurisdiction, it is concerned for its safe management nonetheless and offers these comments on the two DEIS's. Unless specifically noted, the comments contained in this letter apply to both DEIS's.

Section 2.2.4 of the DEIS's states "It is unknown how many DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders do not meet DOT transportation requirements." This section should reference the LLNL report Depleted Uranium Management Program; the Engineering Analysis Report for the Long-Term Management of Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride which estimates that half to all of the DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders at the ETTP do not meet Department of Transportation (DOT) requirements. Failure to do so might indicate that DOE is trying to understate the magnitude of the effort required to render the East Tennessee Technical Park (ETTP) cylinders roadworthy or the need to seek a variance from DOT.

**Response D0024-001**

In its ROD for the Programmatic EIS, DOE stated that it would use depleted uranium oxide generated by the conversion facilities to the extent possible, and store or dispose of the remainder (see Section S.1.1.3 of the EISs). Therefore, the U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> is considered to have a potential for use and is not necessarily a waste.

Text to indicate that the PEIS cylinder preparation assessment evaluated from half to all of the DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders not meeting DOT shipping requirements has been added to Section 2.2.4 of each of the EISs.

**Comment D0024-002**

As part of the transportation analysis, the DEIS's do not address the impacts to local first-responders who would respond to any transportation accident. Both DEIS's indicate that there will be a significant number of DUF<sub>6</sub> and UF<sub>6</sub> shipments from the ETPP to either Portsmouth or Paducah, possible DUF<sub>6</sub> shipments from Paducah to Portsmouth, and possible DUF<sub>6</sub> shipments from a yet to be developed enrichment facility to one or both of the conversion facilities.

**Response D0024-002**

The two site-specific conversion facility EISs include evaluation of the risks associated with the transportation of radioactive and hazardous materials, including depleted uranium hexafluoride, depleted uranium oxide, hydrogen fluoride, and anhydrous ammonia. In the Portsmouth EIS, potential transportation impacts are discussed in Sections 5.2.5 and 5.2.7. In the Paducah EIS, transportation impacts are discussed in Sections 5.2.3 and 5.2.5. The transportation assessment includes evaluation of risks incurred during normal operations, as well as risks from accidents. The assessment considers both vehicle-related risks (i.e., risks related to vehicle operation, such as the potential for accidents causing injuries and fatalities) and cargo-related risks.

With respect to the potential impacts to first responders, the transportation accident assessment includes the evaluation of impacts to both the population living within 50 mi (80 km) of an accident site as well as to a MEI assumed to be exposed in the immediate vicinity of an accident. These receptors are assumed to be exposed to the passing plume of released material and to be unshielded and without protective equipment. Consequently, the impacts presented for the MEI represent an upper bound estimate of the risk posed to a first responder.

**Comment D0024-003**

The analysis presented exposure scenarios for both low and high consequence accident events. Various assumptions must have been made regarding the nature of these events and the amount of material released to the environment. However, the DEIS's are silent with regard to how these events are managed from a practical perspective. Police, emergency medical personnel and

firefighters respond to traffic accidents. What were the assumptions of their ability in terms of training, experience and available resources to deal with these potential accidents?

### **Response D0024-003**

In order to not underestimate the impacts from chemical and radiological release scenarios considered in these EISs, it was assumed that minimal available emergency response measures would be used to mitigate the impacts from the postulated releases. With respect to the potential impacts to first responders, the transportation accident assessment includes the evaluation of impacts to both the population living within 50 mi (80 km) of an accident site as well as to an MEI assumed to be exposed in the immediate vicinity of an accident. These receptors are assumed to be exposed to the passing plume of released material and to be unshielded and without protective equipment. Consequently, the impacts presented for the MEI represent an upper bound estimate of the risk posed to a first responder.

DOE maintains and operates an active training program dealing with first response to a transportation accident involving radioactive materials. This program, the TEPP, has conducted or provided technical support to numerous training programs in the three states hosting DOE facilities handling UF<sub>6</sub> — Kentucky, Tennessee, and Ohio. TEPP works actively with the Kentucky Division of Emergency Management, the Radiation Health and Toxic Agents Branch of the Kentucky Department for Public Health, the Tennessee Emergency Management Agency, and the Ohio Emergency Management Agency within the Ohio Department of Public Safety to ensure that first responder training concerns are met within this three-state area.

Because there is an extensive shipping history and significant ongoing shipping activities among these three facilities, the state agencies have a high level of awareness regarding the hazards associated with UF<sub>6</sub>. TEPP staff members are committed participants in the emergency management and response community and plan to continue to support first responder readiness throughout these three states.

### **Comment D0024-004**

The DEIS's are silent with respect to the need for providing assistance to these first responders. DOE should commit to provide assistance in the form of training and equipment for local first responders along the transportation routes selected for DUF and UF shipments. Without this assistance, some of the low- consequence events could become high-consequence with significant impact to public health and the environment.

DOE has provided “training the trainer” assistance to the Commonwealth of Kentucky, which had the net effect of training over 500 first responders in Kentucky. However, these responders are not physically equipped to respond to a potential transportation accident. DOE needs to provide direct financial assistance to local governments so they may purchase the equipment necessary to respond in case of an accident. Since these shipments would be “campaigned”, the specific transportation routes would be defined such that the appropriate governmental entities

can be easily identified. In addition, DOE should consider providing this assistance to local governments and first responders located along designated routes for the shipment of hazardous conversion products.

#### **Response D0024-004**

See Response to Comment D0024-003.

#### **Comment D0024-005**

The DOE should also schedule the DUF<sub>6</sub> and UF<sub>6</sub> shipments such that they would travel in convoys of approximately 10 trucks. This would allow Kentucky to more effectively manage its resources and escort these shipments through the state.

#### **Response D0024-005**

A Transportation Plan is developed for each shipping program related to the DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion facility program. Each Plan is developed to address specific issues associated with the commodity being shipped, the origin and destination points, and concerns of jurisdictions transited by the shipments. Decisions on matters such as convoys are developed with comment and input from all affected agencies and take into consideration factors such as safety, security, efficiency, and regulatory requirements. Security issues associated with hazardous materials transportation have recently been accorded a higher priority, and DOT has enacted specific requirements to enhance the security of hazardous materials in commerce. These enhanced measures are addressed, to the extent appropriate in a public document, in the applicable Transportation Plan. In all cases, DOE-sponsored shipments will comply with all applicable state and federal regulations and will be reflected in many of the operational decisions to be made and presented in the Plan.

#### **Comment D0024-006**

With DOE acknowledging that half to all of the canisters at the ETTP do not meet DOT standards, it is incumbent on the state to ensure that these shipments are properly inspected prior to traveling on Kentucky roadways.

#### **Response D0024-006**

As stated in Section 2.2.4 of both EISs, at this time it is unknown exactly how many of the DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders at ETTP do not meet DOT transportation requirements. The DUF<sub>6</sub> programmatic EIS assessment for cylinder preparation for shipment evaluated from half to all of the DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders at ETTP not meeting DOT shipping requirements, but this was an assumption made for the purposes of analysis. Prior to shipment of any cylinder from ETTP, the cylinder would receive a thorough inspection, including a record review to determine if the cylinder is overfilled, a visual inspection for damage or defects, a pressure check to determine if the cylinder is overpressurized, and an ultrasonic wall thickness measurement (if necessary based on the visual inspection).

The two site-specific conversion EISs identify three possible options for shipping cylinders that do not comply with DOT requirements for the shipment of UF<sub>6</sub>: (1) transferring the contents to compliant cylinders (likely requiring a new facility); (2) obtaining an exemption from DOT to ship the cylinders “as is,” provided that DOE can demonstrate a level of safety that would be at least equal to the level required by the regulations; and (3) transporting the cylinders in a protective overpack. At present, a transportation plan for shipment of noncompliant cylinders has not been finalized and DOE is evaluating the available options. Consequently, the EISs provide an evaluation of these options.

It should be noted that all shipments must be made in compliance with DOT regulations, regardless of the specific approach selected. A Transportation Plan will be developed for each shipping program related to the DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion facility program. Each Plan will be developed to address specific issues associated with the commodity being shipped, the origin and destination points, and concerns of jurisdictions transited by the shipments. In all cases, DOE sponsored shipments will comply with all applicable state and federal regulations and will be reflected in many of the operational decisions to be made and presented in the Plan.

**COMMENTOR D0025:**           **Mitch McConnell**  
United States Senator, Kentucky

**Comment D0025-001**

I understand that DOE is in the process of collecting comments on the Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DOE/EIS-0359) for the construction of the congressionally mandated depleted uranium hexafluoride (DUF<sub>6</sub>) conversion facility in Paducah, Kentucky. This is an important step in the process of issuing a Record of Decision to finalize the EIS, which is critical to ensure that the construction of this important facility can begin on time.

**Response D0025-001**

Comment noted.

**Comment D0025-002**

Each of the sites under consideration for the Paducah conversion plant lie within the confines of the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant reservation, where DOE currently maintains nearly 40,000 aging cylinders of DUF<sub>6</sub>. Congress has directed DOE to process this DUF<sub>6</sub> into material more suitable for long-term storage, use, or disposal. This will remove from Paducah the existing DUF<sub>6</sub> inventory, which currently poses significant inspection, maintenance, and security challenges.

**Response D0025-002**

Comment noted.

**Comment D0025-003**

It is long past time to remove the environmental and public health threats this waste poses to our citizens. I respectfully urge the DOE to finalize the EIS and issue a Record of Decision so that construction can begin on the Paducah DUF<sub>6</sub> Conversion Facility by the deadline mandated by Congress.

**Response D0025-003**

DOE is committed to finalizing the two site-specific EISs and issuing the RODs in order to begin construction by the Congressionally mandated date of July 31, 2004.

**COMMENTOR D0026:**           **Kenneth A. Westlake**  
  U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region 5

**Comment D0026-001**

The Final EIS should indicate that environmental restoration activities at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plants (PORTs) are governed by three Administrative Consent Orders: 1) the 1989 Ohio EPA Consent Decree; 2) the 1997 Three Party Administrative Order on Consent (U.S. EPA, Ohio EPA and DOE); and 3) the 1999 Ohio EPA Administrative Order for Integration. A summary and overview of these and other legal orders relevant to PORTs should be provided.

**Response D0026-001**

Section 3.1 in the Portsmouth DEIS has been modified by adding the following paragraphs: "The Portsmouth site is not listed on the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) National Priorities List. Investigation and cleanup of hazardous substances (as defined in CERCLA) and hazardous wastes (as defined in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act [RCRA]) that have been released to air, surface water, groundwater, soils, and solid waste management units as a result of past operational activities at the Portsmouth site are being conducted under the provisions of the following administrative edicts, which have been issued pursuant to RCRA, CERCLA, and/or Ohio state law:

- State of Ohio v. U.S. Department of Energy, Divested Atomic Corporation, et al., Consent Decree. Civil Action C2-89-732. August 31, 1989 (referred to as the 1989 Ohio Consent Decree). The 1989 Ohio Consent Decree addresses certain hazardous waste compliance issues at the Portsmouth site and requires the performance of corrective actions in addition to other requirements.

- In the Matter of United States Department of Energy: Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant, Administrative Consent Order. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Administrative Docket No. OH7 890 008 983. August 12, 1997 (agreement between DOE, EPA, and Ohio EPA) (referred to as the 1997 Three-Party Administrative Consent Order). The 1997 Three-Party Administrative Consent Order replaced a prior EPA Administrative Consent Order, which was issued during 1989 and amended in 1994, and defines oversight roles at the Portsmouth site for the Ohio EPA and EPA with respect to corrective action/response action activities. It also defines certain cleanup performance obligations for DOE.
- In the Matter of United States Department of Energy and Bechtel Jacobs Company LLC, Director's Final Findings and Orders. March 17, 1999 (referred to as the 1999 Ohio Integration Order). The 1999 Ohio Integration Order integrates the closure requirements for specified units at the Portsmouth site as established under the 1989 Ohio Consent Decree, the Ohio Administrative Code, and the 1997 Three Party Administrative Consent Order. The purpose of this integration is to avoid duplication of effort, and efficiently perform site-wide groundwater monitoring and surveillance and maintenance activities at the Portsmouth site.”

#### **Comment D0026-002**

On January 12, 2004, USEC, Inc., announced that a new American Centrifuge uranium enrichment plant (ACEP) will be constructed and operated at Portsmouth. The summary section of the Final EIS should address the potential cumulative effects of that new plant will have on the overall environmental impacts of the DUF<sub>6</sub> facility.

#### **Response D0026-002**

The cumulative impacts analysis included in both the draft and final Portsmouth conversion facility EIS assumed that a new USEC centrifuge enrichment facility would be constructed and operated at the Portsmouth site (see Sections S.5.16 and 5.3.2). As stated in Section S.5.16, the analysis assumed that such a plant would be sited at Portsmouth, that the existing DOE gas centrifuge technology would be used, and that the environmental impacts of such a facility would be similar to those outlined in a 1977 EIS for Expansion of the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant that considered a similar action (ERDA 1977).

The 1977 EIS was used because it evaluated construction and operation of an 8.8 million separative work unit gas centrifuge enrichment facility at Location B of the Portsmouth site, compared to the currently proposed 3.5 million separative work unit USEC facility. Note that the centrifuge facility proposed in 1977 was never completed, so operational data are not available for estimating environmental impacts. It should be noted that the NRC licensing activities for the proposed centrifuge enrichment plant will include preparation of an environmental impact statement that must also evaluate cumulative

impacts at the Portsmouth site. The centrifuge enrichment facility cumulative impacts analysis will be based on the anticipated USEC enrichment facility design, which does not currently exist, and benefit from the detailed evaluation of conversion facility impacts presented in this EIS.

The text of Section S.5.16 has been revised to indicate that USEC announced in January 2004 that it had selected Portsmouth as the site for its centrifuge enrichment facility.

### **Comment D0026-003**

If the conversion facility will have a role beyond processing the current inventory of DUF<sub>6</sub> and non-DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders, the final EIS should address the conversion facility's potentially longer operation period and processing capacity. The EIS should also address the potential for facility upgrades that would accommodate increased processing capacity should the need arise. The concern is whether the EIS is comprehensive enough to accommodate future upgrades to the conversion facility, without having to revisit the NEPA process again.

### **Response D0026-003**

At the present time, there are no plans or proposals for DOE to accept DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders for conversion beyond the current inventory for which it has responsibility. However, Section 2.2.7 of the Portsmouth site-specific conversion facility EIS (Section 2.2.5 of the Paducah EIS) discusses a number of possible future sources of additional DUF<sub>6</sub> that could require conversion. The potential environmental impacts associated with expanding plant operations (including extending plant operations and increasing plant throughput) to accommodate processing of additional cylinders are discussed in Section 5.2.8 of the Portsmouth EIS and Section 5.2.6 of the Paducah EIS.

Because of the uncertainty associated with possible future sources of DUF<sub>6</sub> for which DOE could assume responsibility, there is no current proposal to increase the throughput of the conversion facilities or extend operations. However, for purposes of the EIS, it was assumed that the Portsmouth conversion process building would be designed and built with sufficient space to accommodate an increased plant throughput sometime in the future. The modular design of the dry conversion process — the Portsmouth and Paducah facilities are being designed with three and four parallel conversion lines, respectively — facilitates process expansion. In addition to the potential impacts associated with expanded plant operations, Section 5.2.8 of the Portsmouth EIS also discusses potential impacts that would be associated with a conversion facility consisting of four process lines rather than three. If a decision is made in the future to increase the number of parallel process lines beyond four at either site, additional NEPA review would be conducted.

**Comment D0026-004**

Disposal facilities each have unique waste acceptance criteria (WAC) that dictate what can be accepted for disposal. For what is currently known about the two representative disposal facilities (Envirocare and NTS - Nevada Test Site), and the anticipated profiles of the conversion products (depleted U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub>, CaF<sub>2</sub>, emptied cylinders), the Final EIS should describe the level to which DOE is confident that the representative disposal facilities have both the WAC limits and the physical capacity to accept what will be an enormous quantity of conversion product waste.

**Response D0026-004**

As Section 1.6.2.4 in the EIS states, studies conducted by ORNL for DOE have shown that both NTS (a DOE facility) and Envirocare of Utah, Inc. (a commercial facility) would be acceptable disposal facilities for depleted uranium (Croff et al. 2000a,b). These studies included reviews of the LLW acceptance programs and disposal capacities of both the NTS and Envirocare of Utah, Inc. and concluded that either facility would have the capacity needed to dispose of all the products from the proposed DOE DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion program, and that the materials sent to these facilities would be able to meet each site's waste acceptance criteria. Additionally, in its proposal to design, construct, and operate the DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion facilities, UDS provided evidence that both sites could accept the U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> and identified the Envirocare facility as the primary and NTS as the secondary disposal site. DOE plans to decide the specific disposal location(s) for the depleted U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> conversion product after additional appropriate NEPA review. Accordingly, DOE will continue to evaluate its disposal options and will consider any further information or comments relevant to that decision. DOE will give a minimum 45-day notice before making the specific disposal decision and will provide any supplemental NEPA analysis for public review and comment.

**Comment D0026-005**

The Draft EIS suggested that 2,200 railcar shipments could be sent to NTS. Rail access to NTS and its existing disposal areas currently does not exist. The Final EIS should offer additional discussion of the transportation process and related impacts.

**Response D0026-005**

The transportation assessment for the shipment of depleted uranium conversion products for disposal considers several options. The proposed disposal site is the Envirocare facility (a small number of empty cylinders may require disposal at NTS). For shipments to Envirocare, rail is evaluated as the proposed mode and truck is evaluated as an alternative. In addition, the NTS is considered as an alternative disposal site. For this alternative, both truck and rail modes are evaluated, although neither is currently proposed.

For assessment of the rail option to NTS, it has been assumed that a rail spur is built in the future providing rail access to the NTS. Currently, the nearest rail terminal is about

70 miles from NTS. If a rail spur is not available in the future and NTS was selected as the disposal site, shipments could be made by truck, or rail could be used with an intermodal transfer to trucks at some place near the NTS (transportation impacts for the intermodal option would be slightly greater than those presented for rail assuming NTS rail access, but less than those presented for the truck alternative). If a rail spur were built to the NTS, additional NEPA review would be required.

Additional information has been added to the transportation section to clarify the assumption concerning NTS rail access.

#### **Comment D0026-006**

When regulatory compliance assurances are provided throughout this document, the Radionuclide National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAPs) for Radionuclide Emissions for United States Department of Energy (USDOE) Owned or Operated Facilities, found at 40 CFR 61, Subpart H, are not always adequately identified. This outside oversight and compliance demonstration helps to provide the public with the knowledge they are adequately protected under this regulation as long as compliance can be clearly demonstrated.

#### **Response D0026-006**

In Chapter 6 of the EISs (regulatory requirements), Table 6.1 identifies that the conversion facility is subject to the requirements of 40 CFR 61, Subpart H. Similarly, compliance with 10 CFR 61 requirements is explicitly identified in the EIS human health and safety sections for the no action alternative (Section 5.1.2.1.1) and for the action alternatives (Section 5.2.3.1.1).

In the final EIS, text has been added to the human health and safety sections of the summary (Section S.5.1) and the comparison of alternatives (Section 2.4.2.1) to clearly identify that the assessment results were in compliance with regulatory requirements, including those of 40 CFR 61, Subpart H.

#### **Comment D0026-007**

Measurement of parameters in calculations and models cited must be in consistent units to avoid confusion and to better assess the conservatism and adequacy of the methodologies used for evaluating the relative risks for this project.

#### **Response D0026-007**

DOE attempted to use consistent units throughout the EISs, although some errors may exist. For example, environmental measurements of radionuclide and chemical concentrations in air, water, and soil are given in the same units as the regulatory or guideline values. Where errors (or inconsistencies) were identified in the draft EISs, these have been corrected for the final EISs.

**Comment D0026-008**

U.S. EPA rates “A,” the preferred alternative, EC-2, Environmental Concerns - Insufficient Information. Please see the enclosure for a description of the U.S. EPA’s ratings. An EC-2 rating indicates that our review has identified potential impacts of the proposal that should be avoided to fully protect the environment, and that more information should be provided to fully assess the impacts of the proposal. Our detailed comments are included in an additional enclosure.

**Response D0026-008**

The U.S. EPA concerns are noted. DOE has addressed the detailed comments with the intent of providing the U.S. EPA with sufficient information to fully assess the impacts of the proposal.

**COMMENTOR D0027:**           **T. Michael Taimi, Director, Environmental Affairs**  
United States Enrichment Corporation Inc.

**Comment D0027-001**

As a general comment, United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) and the DOE-PORTS office have worked together to address issues at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant (PORTS) for more than 10 years. They coordinate many of their activities to assure appropriate site reporting and response to the various environmental authorities. This close coordination has benefited both DOE and USEC and has assured compliance with applicable environmental requirements. We would be glad to arrange for a meeting at PORTS to discuss the impacts the UDS Conversion Facility may have upon other activities at PORTS and to include those facilities in our coordination of activities affecting the site.

As a general comment, United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) and the DOE-GDP office have worked together to address issues at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant (PGDP) for more than 10 years. They coordinate many of their activities to assure appropriate site reporting and response to the various environmental authorities. This close coordination has benefited both DOE and USEC and has assured compliance with applicable environmental requirements. We would be glad to arrange for a meeting at PGDP to discuss the impacts the UDS Conversion Facility may have upon other activities at PGDP and to include those facilities in our coordination of activities affecting the site.

**Response D0027-001**

DOE appreciates the close coordination with USEC concerning compliance with applicable environmental requirements at the Portsmouth and Paducah sites and looks forward to continued cooperation in the future.

**Comment D0027-002**

Section 2.5 - USEC concurs with the DOE's preferred location (Location A) to construct and operate the proposed DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion facility.

**Response D0027-002**

Comment noted.

**Comment D0027-003**

General Comment - Reference to any USEC Advanced Technology siting decisions for the American Centrifuge need to reflect that the siting decision has been made and that PORTS has been selected.

**Response D0027-003**

The two site-specific conversion facility EISs have been revised to reflect that USEC announced in January 2004 that it had selected Portsmouth as the site for its centrifuge enrichment facility.

**Comment D0027-004**

Section 3.1.3.2 - The Title V air permit for USEC operations has been issued and was effective August 21, 2003.

**Response D0027-004**

The text of Section 3.1.3.2 of the Portsmouth EIS has been revised to reflect that the Title V air permit has been issued.

**Comment D0027-005**

Table 6.1 States: "The DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion facility would not discharge industrial process wastewater. Therefore, an NPDES Permit for Process Water Discharge would not be required." It is possible that a facility with a wet scrubber, water-cooled heat exchangers, and water spray cooling may have a process wastewater stream. Sanitary water use from daily activity and shower rooms will require discharge through a NPDES permitted treatment process such as the onsite USEC operated process. It is likely that UDS will be required to obtain a NPDES permit that will require an internal monitored outfall before discharging into the USEC X-6619 permitted sewage treatment plant.

**Response D0027-005**

The quoted item in Table 6.1 has been modified to read as follows: UDS is studying options for management of process water/blowdown discharges. The need for an NPDES

permit for such discharges will be determined based on the outcome of the study. If it is determined that an NPDES permit is required, UDS will apply for the permit at the appropriate time.

#### **Comment D0027-006**

Section 3.1.6.2 states “greater biological diversity exists upstream of the plant discharges than downstream.’ This is not consistent with the following Ohio EPA reports that state: “aquatic habitat quality in Little Beaver Creek declines upstream of PORTS discharges due to low and/or intermittent water flow.”

- Biological, Fish Tissue and Sediment Quality in Little Beaver creek Big Beaver Creek. Big Run Creek and West Ditch, Piketon Ohio. May 24, 1993, OEPA Technical Report EAS/1993-5-2
- Biological and Water Quality Study of Little Beaver Creek and Big Beaver Creek— 1997, June 4, 1998, OEPA Technical Report MAS/1998-5-1

#### **Response D0027-006**

The text of Section 3.1.6.2 of the Portsmouth EIS has been changed to include the updated EPA data.

#### **Comment D0027-007**

General Comment: There is no specific reference as to how waste material with radionuclides other than uranium will be addressed. In particular, heels material is likely to contain TRU, and long-lived thorium isotopes (Th-228, Th-230, and Th-232). The EIS needs to address containment and contamination control of this material.

#### **Response D0027-007**

Impacts associated with potential transuranic and technetium contamination of DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders, both in bulk and in heels, at the three storage sites are discussed in detail in Appendix B of both the Portsmouth and Paducah EISs. The impacts are also summarized in Sections 5.1.2.1, 5.2.3.1, and 5.2.3.2 of the Portsmouth EIS and Sections 5.1.2.1, 5.2.2.1 and 5.2.2.2, of the Paducah EIS. The discussion includes potential generation and management of transuranic waste at the conversion facilities. As indicated in those sections, the impacts associated with transuranic and technetium contamination of cylinders are relatively small compared with the impacts associated with the DUF<sub>6</sub> stored in the same cylinders. Short-lived thorium isotopes that are produced from the decay of uranium isotopes are included in the assessment of impacts. There are not enough long-lived thorium isotopes in the cylinders to warrant special consideration. In addition, on a per unit mass basis, their impacts should be comparable to the impacts from U-238.

**Comment D0027-008**

General Comment: There is no specific reference to how Radionuclide NESHAPS will be implemented. UDS needs to consider how they will quantify their radionuclide emissions and how they will coordinate their annual reporting with other site residents. Currently the Radionuclide NESHAPS dose limit applies to the site as a whole. If UDS pursues a “go it alone” approach, then USEC and DOE will be UDS’s public and UDS will be USEC and DOE’s public for whom dose needs to be determined.

**Response D0027-008**

UDS will quantify their radionuclide emissions through sampling and monitoring of the stack effluents and will cooperate with other DOE tenants on the site regarding submission of a site-wide Radionuclide NESHAPS report. The quantities of radioactive materials released from the depleted UF<sub>6</sub> conversion facility will be incorporated into the site-wide report.

**Comment D0027-009**

Table 6.1 States: “UDS will prepare and submit an Annual Hazardous Chemical Inventory Report each year, if hazardous chemicals have been stored at the DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion facility site in amounts that exceed threshold quantities during the preceding year.” Chemical threshold quantities are derived from the aggregate of all Reservation residents. Currently DOE provides USEC a monthly chemical inventory list of materials managed by various DOE Sub-Contractors resident on site. USEC compiles the lists monthly to determine if a threshold quantity has been exceeded. USEC then files the Annual Hazardous Chemical Inventory Report for the site.

**Response D0027-009**

The quoted item in Table 6.1 has been modified to read as follows: “UDS will cooperate with other DOE tenants on the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant (PORTS) site regarding submission of a site-wide Annual Hazardous Chemical Inventory Report each year. The quantities of hazardous chemicals stored at the depleted UF<sub>6</sub> conversion facility will be incorporated into the site-wide report.”

**Comment D0027-010**

HF production is discussed in several areas but emissions are not addressed. USEC’s current air pollution permit contains limits on HF emissions that utilize the full allocation for the site. The EIS should address how HF emissions are to be treated or include a zero emission plant design.

**Response D0027-010**

Because HF monitoring at the Paducah gaseous diffusion plant (GDP) was discontinued in the early 1990s, the most current available background level was from around that time, and was used for the EIS analysis (Argonne National Laboratory [ANL] 1991).

Therefore, the background level did include operation of the USEC gaseous diffusion plant, although throughput levels may have changed since that time. Background values were available for one week and annual averaging periods. For the revised EIS analysis, the highest available weekly and annual background levels were used to estimate the background values for other averaging times. The information on the source of the HF background values has been added to the final EIS.

Emissions of HF from the Paducah conversion facility were described in Section 5.2.2.3 of the DEIS. Based on updated facility design information provided by the conversion facility contractor, emissions and estimated ambient levels have been revised for the FEIS. A comparison of HF levels with secondary HF standards has also been added. The emissions result in ambient HF levels much lower than both primary and secondary air quality standards. For example, conversion facility HF emissions would result in 24-hour ambient HF concentrations of up to 0.09  $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$ , which corresponds to about 3.1% of the Commonwealth of Kentucky's secondary ambient air quality standard. For other secondary standards (e.g., 12-hour, 1-week, and 1-month), predicted maximum concentration increments would be less than 4% of their respective standards. Predicted annual maximum concentration increments and total concentrations would be several orders of magnitude lower than the primary standards.

With background included, all the total maximum concentrations would still be well below their corresponding standards. For example, the total 24-hour maximum concentration would be less than 35% of the secondary standard, whereas the total maximum concentrations for the 12-hour, 1-week, and 1-month averaging times would be less than 43% of their secondary standards.

Emissions of HF from USEC operations are considered in the air permit application that has been submitted for the conversion facility. It is anticipated that the fence line HF concentrations will be below all applicable air quality criteria, even when considering emissions from both the conversion facility and USEC.

#### **Comment D0027-011**

There is no specific reference as to how waste material that includes radionuclides and long-lived thorium isotopes other than uranium will be handled, USEC experience indicates transuranics and technetium may remain in the heel material after transfer of UF from the cylinder, especially in cylinders that were previously used for handling of reactor returns. The EIS should address waste material containing transuranics and technetium.

#### **Response D0027-011**

Please see Response D0027-007.

**Comment D0027-012**

There is no specific reference to how radionuclide NESHAPs will be implemented. Currently radionuclide NESHAPs dose limit applies to the site as a whole. If UDS pursues a stand-alone approach, then USEC and DOE will be UDS “public” and UDS will be USEC and DOE’s “public” when calculating and reporting dose to the public. The EIS should address the method of compliance with 40 CFR 61 regulations.

Reference to any USEC Advanced Technology siting decisions for the American Centrifuge should reflect that the siting decision has been made and that the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant site has been selected.

**Response D0027-012**

Please see Response D0027-008.

The two site-specific conversion facility EISs have been revised to reflect that USEC announced in January 2004 that it had selected Portsmouth as the site for its centrifuge enrichment facility.

**Comment D0027-013**

S.5.4, Table 5.6, 3.1.3.3: The EIS indicates emissions of particulate matter from construction activities may exceed ambient air quality standards. Control measures will be applied to minimize the particulate emissions. The EIS should address any air or water quality impacts from applying the particulate matter control measures.

**Response D0027-013**

The amount of water that would be applied to limit dust generation during construction activities would be less than 3,000 gal/day, which would be readily available at the site. An adverse impact from water applications that could occur would be runoff from the construction site. Control measures that might be applied to limit this impact include sediment and erosion controls such as temporary and permanent seeding; mulching and matting; sediment barriers, traps, and basins; silt fences; and runoff and earth diversion dikes.

No adverse air quality impacts would be associated with the water spraying to limit particulate matter generation.

**Comment D0027-014**

Fig. 2.2-2: Process descriptions indicate the addition of nitrogen and ammonia to the systems but do not mention whether NO<sub>x</sub> will be generated in significant quantities. The EIS should discuss the impact of introduction of nitrogen bearing compounds.

**Response D0027-014**

The use, storage, and transportation of anhydrous ammonia as part of the conversion process have been addressed throughout both the Paducah and Portsmouth EISs. In the Paducah EIS, the annual use of anhydrous ammonia is stated in Section 5.2.2.8 (Resource Requirements). The nitrogen oxide (NO<sub>x</sub>) emissions given in Section 5.2.2.3.1 of the Paducah EIS and Section 5.2.3.3.1 of the Portsmouth EIS are conservative estimates that include NO<sub>x</sub> that might be generated from use of either ammonia or natural gas as the hydrogen source in the process. (If ammonia were used, NO<sub>x</sub> emissions would be negligible; if natural gas were used, emissions would be somewhat higher, so the NO<sub>x</sub> emissions given in the air quality sections include amounts that could be generated from use of natural gas).

The nitrogen in the process is used as a purge gas to control air in-leakage into the conversion processes. It would be released to the air without any substantial conversion to nitrogen oxides or other potential pollutants. It was not included in the total NO<sub>x</sub> emissions from conversion facility operations because the absence of oxygen in contact with the nitrogen stream at high temperatures would severely limit the potential for NO<sub>x</sub> formation.

In the comparison of alternatives sections of the EISs, which include Figure 2.2-2 mentioned in the comment, only summary information on the process is included. Additional description of nitrogen oxide formation from use of ammonia and nitrogen in the process has been added to the “air quality during operations” sections of each EIS.

**Comment D0027-015**

S.5.16: The cumulative radiological exposure as compared to the DOE limit is discussed but there is no mention of exposure compared to 40 CFR 61 and 40 CFR 190 limits. The EIS should discuss compliance with EPA limits on radiological exposure.

**Response D0027-015**

The text in Section S.5.16 and in Section 5.3.2 of the EIS has been revised to state that cumulative exposures for the off-site population will be well below the limits specified in both 40 CFR Part 61 and 40 CFR Part 190.

**Comment D0027-016**

3.1.3.2: USEC does not have a Title V Permit. Sentence should be revised to so indicate.

**Response D0027-016**

The text has been revised to indicate that the Paducah site does not have a Title V Permit.

**Comment D0027-017**

3.1.9, 5.3.2: USEC does not manage the DOE DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders and therefore does not handle waste generated from those processes. Delete these references.

**Response D0027-017**

The text has been changed to indicate that DOE manages the wastes associated with cylinder management.

**Comment D0027-018**

5.2.1.4.1: The EIS indicates water is used during construction and that wastewater will be treated at the wastewater treatment plant. The wastewater treatment plant is not shown in process schematics. The EIS should be specific on where the wastewater will be treated and indicate on process drawing.

**Response D0027-018**

The text has been changed to indicate that portable toilets would be used to accommodate sanitary wastewater during construction. Therefore, no wastewater would be sent to the wastewater treatment plant.

During normal operations, wastewater might be sent to the wastewater treatment plant. However, at this time, a final plan for dealing with normal operations wastewater has not been finalized. Wastewater may be treated and sent to the wastewater treatment plant, not treated and sent to the wastewater treatment plant, or treated and recycled for use in the conversion facility. Any discharges would occur under appropriate KPDES permits. Because the plans for disposition of this wastewater are not complete, the process schematics are not available.

**Comment D0027-019**

Table 5.2-15: This Table mentions 24-hour concentrations of HF associated with operations of the facility. The KDEP standard is base on a 12-hour concentration. The EIS should discuss compliance during normal operation and during accident conditions with the KDEP 12-hour limit.

**Response D0027-019**

The HF concentrations for other KDEP secondary standards, including for averaging times of 12-hour, 1-week, and 1-month have been calculated. The referenced table and corresponding text for normal operation and during accident conditions have been revised as suggested. It is shown that during normal facility operations, the maximum short-term (less than or equal to 1-month) HF concentration increments and total (project increment plus background) concentrations would be about 3.8% and 42.8% of the KDEP

standards, respectively. The annual HF concentrations would be several orders of magnitude lower than the KDEP primary standard.

**Comment D0027-020**

Table 5.2-19 and Table 5.6-3: The amount of fuel and natural gas listed in these tables are not included in the general process discussions of air emissions and permitting. The EIS should discuss this issue.

**Response D0027-020**

Although the conversion facility contractor is proposing to use electrical heating for the facilities, emissions from natural gas use were analyzed as a bounding case because the emissions would be higher than those from furnaces or electric heat. The boiler emission numbers given in Table 5.2-17 of the Portsmouth EIS and Table 5.2-14 of the Paducah EIS were derived on the basis of the natural gas usage numbers given in Table 5.2-22 of the Portsmouth EIS and in Table 5.2-19 of the Paducah EIS; footnotes have been added to the emissions tables to clarify that the boiler emissions are based on natural gas use.

Liquid fuel will be used at the facilities by the vehicles used for cylinder transport from the cylinder yards to the conversion facilities. Potential emissions resulting from liquid fuel use are small compared with point sources, and the resulting ambient levels are low due to dispersion along the length of the haul roads. The impacts from these emissions were assumed to be negligible and were not quantified in the EISs.

**Comment D0027-021**

Table 6-1: This Table indicates UDS will prepare an Annual Hazardous Chemical Inventory report each year. Chemical threshold quantities are derived from the aggregate of all residents on the DOE Reservation. Currently DOE provides USEC a monthly chemical inventory list of materials managed by various DOE sub-contractors on site. USEC then compiles the list to determine if a threshold quantity has been exceeded. The EIS method should address the current practices and how compliance will be demonstrated for the site.

**Response D0027-021**

See Response D0027-009.

**Comment D0027-022**

Table 6-1: This Table indicates the DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion plant will not discharge process wastewater and therefore will not need a NPDES permit. USEC experience has been that a wet scrubber, water-cooled heat exchangers and water spray cooling will have a process waste stream. The EIS should address how these waste streams are to be treated or indicate a discharge permit will be required.

**Response D0027-022**

The quoted item in Table 6.1 has been modified to read as follows: “UDS is studying options for management of process water/blowdown discharges. The need for a KPDES permit for such discharges will be determined based on the outcome of the study. If it is determined that a KPDES permit is required, UDS will apply for the permit at the appropriate time.”

**COMMENTOR D0028:**            **Norman A. Mulvenon, Chair**  
Oak Ridge Reservation Local Oversight Committee

**Comment D0028-001**

The Citizens’ Advisory Panel (CAP) of the Oak Ridge Reservation Local Oversight Committee, Inc. (LOC) concurs with the preferred alternatives presented for the two DEISs.

**Response D0028-001**

Comment noted.

**Comment D0028-002**

CAP’s special concern is the removal of the DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders from East Tennessee Technology Park (ETTP). We are pleased that this action is to be completed by 2008 prior to the deadline imposed by the Tennessee Department of Conservation and Environment Commissioner’s order and so that the accelerated cleanup of ETTP can be accomplished in a timely manner.

**Response D0028-002**

DOE is committed to complying with the 1999 consent order with the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation that requires the removal of the DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders from the ETTP site or the conversion of the material by December 31, 2009. Toward that end, the DOE contract for accelerated cleanup of the ETTP site, including removal of the DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders, calls for completion of this activity by the end of FY 2008. The CAP’s preference for accelerating the removal of the cylinders from the ETTP site is noted.

**Comment D0028-003**

The cumulative impact portion of the Portsmouth EIS should be updated to reflect the decision to site the centrifuge plant at Site B.

**Response D0028-003**

The cumulative impacts analysis included in both the draft and final Portsmouth conversion facility EIS assumed that a new USEC centrifuge enrichment facility would

be constructed and operated at the Portsmouth site (see Sections S.5.16 and 5.3.2). As stated in Section S.5.16, the analysis assumed that such a plant would be sited at Portsmouth, that the existing DOE gas centrifuge technology would be used, and that the environmental impacts of such a facility would be similar to those outlined in a 1977 EIS for Expansion of the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant that considered a similar action (ERDA 1977).

The 1977 EIS was used because it evaluated construction and operation of an 8.8 million separative work unit gas centrifuge enrichment facility at Location B of the Portsmouth site, compared to the currently proposed 3.5 million separative work unit USEC facility. It should be noted that NRC licensing activities for the proposed centrifuge enrichment plant will include preparation of an environmental impact statement that must also evaluate cumulative impacts at the Portsmouth site. The centrifuge enrichment facility cumulative impacts analysis will be based on the anticipated USEC enrichment facility design, which does not currently exist, and benefit from the detailed evaluation of conversion facility impacts presented in this EIS.

The text of Sections S.5.16 and 5.3.2 has been revised to indicate that USEC announced in January 2004 that it had selected Portsmouth as the site for its centrifuge enrichment facility.

**COMMENTOR D0029:**            **Vina Colley, President**  
Portsmouth/Piketon Residents for Environmental Safety and  
Security

**Comment D0029-001**

Thank you for the opportunity to testify about the DU conversion plant. Facility Accidents Involving Radiation or Chemical Release on page 2-29 (2.4.2.2.2) DOE/EIS-0360 Construction and Operation of a Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride Conversion Facility dated December 2003. Under the alternative, it is possible that human-error could cause an accidental release of more deadly radiation and toxic chemicals into the environment affecting both the workers and the general public.

**Response D0029-001**

As discussed in Section 4.3.4 of both the Portsmouth and Paducah EIS, a range of accidents belonging to four frequency categories were considered. In each frequency category, the accidents with the maximum consequences were selected for presentation in the EISs. The frequency category designated as incredible encompassed a range from once in a million years at the high end to about once in 10 million years at the low end. All reasonable accident initiators, including human error, were considered in the development of accident scenarios.

**Comment D0029-002**

For the Piketon, Oak Ridge and any other plant to ship these cylinders off-site and continue moving these cylinders around, whether by train or by truck, not only provides the terrorists with a moving target as well as increases the threat of nuclear terrorism. We shouldn't ship these potential "dirty bombs" of poisonous hazardous waste cylinders because there will be unnecessary risks of exposure to the workers and the public.

**Response D0029-002**

The commentor's preference for not shipping the DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders off site is noted. However, with two conversion facilities planned and three sites with DUF<sub>6</sub> inventories, cylinders at one of the sites have to be shipped off site. The proposed action is to ship the cylinders at ETTP to Portsmouth. The impacts associated with the transportation of cylinders are addressed in Section 5.2.5 of the Portsmouth EIS.

The security of cylinder shipments while en route is a recognized and important consideration and will be taken into account in the transportation planning process. All cylinder shipments, regardless of the transport mode, will comply with DOT regulations for the shipment of radioactive materials, as specified in Title 49 of the *Code of Federal Regulations*. These regulations are designed to be protective of public health and safety during both accident and routine transportation conditions.

**Comment D0029-003**

Many of these cylinders contain plutonium (PU) and Neptunium NEP in them and many other Transuranic elements. Past history has also revealed shoddy record keeping at the Piketon plant. We find the records on these cylinders often disappear or the government simply fails to follow necessary safety precautions, which can cause even more serious problems once these depleted uranium (DU) cylinders become heated up.

Furthermore, where will we put all the toxic waste? How many more people will ultimately be contaminated with PU and NEP and many other daughter products? Who will want to store such nuclear waste? And how much more waste from these potential "dirty bombs" will be left over, which further increases the threat of nuclear terrorism? The scope of this work is to push forward into unknown territory.

**Response D0029-003**

Impacts associated with potential transuranic contamination (including Pu and Np) of DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders at the three storage sites are discussed in detail in Appendix B of both the Portsmouth and Paducah EISs. The impacts are also summarized in Sections 5.1.2.1, 5.2.3.1, and 5.2.3.2 of the Portsmouth EIS and Sections 5.1.2.1, 5.2.2.1, and 5.2.2.2 of the Paducah EIS. As indicated in those sections, the impacts associated with transuranic contamination of cylinders are relatively small compared with the impacts associated with the DUF<sub>6</sub> stored in the same cylinders.

The sites maintain a database called the Cylinder Inventory Database which contains all pertinent records and information about the history and current condition of the cylinders. Workers follow approved and documented procedures when they inspect, move, or otherwise handle the cylinders. The conversion contractor will develop and implement safe handling procedures when emptying the cylinders into the conversion plant. Management of wastes to be generated during the conversion operations is discussed in Section 5.2.3.7 of the Portsmouth EIS and in Section 5.2.2.7 of the Paducah EIS. The conversion contractor plans to dispose of the depleted U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> product or other products for which no use is found at an approved disposal facility in Utah or Nevada. There are no plans to leave any hazardous or radioactive wastes from the conversion process at the sites. The process proposed by the conversion contractor for converting the DUF<sub>6</sub> to U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> utilizes a known, proven technology. DOE plans to decide the specific disposal location(s) for the depleted U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> conversion product after additional appropriate NEPA review. Accordingly, DOE will continue to evaluate its disposal options and will consider any further information or comments relevant to that decision. DOE will give a minimum 45-day notice before making the specific disposal decision and will provide any supplemental NEPA analysis for public review and comment.

#### **Comment D0029-004**

Performance at the Piketon plant over the past 50 years has been based solely on government secrecy and lies. Recent statements being made by government contractors vying to build two new plants at Piketon is also based on similar lies that we've all heard before.

Telling local schools teachers, media and all local business owners that these new jobs will be safe and better than before is simply another LIE! The truth is we the people of the United States are engaged in a war on terrorism. The government has even lied to us about why we were going to war against Iraq (there were no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq). We are Americans and we have the right to know the truth about health hazards and other potential threats that the promise of these new jobs will bring with them into Piketon, into each of our communities, even into our very own backyards!

#### **Response D0029-004**

The NEPA process used to review federal projects, including the construction and operation of these conversion facilities, is intended to incorporate public input and to answer the questions and concerns of the public to the greatest extent possible in an open and honest manner. The EISs have addressed potential health impacts from the proposed facilities in a very thorough and truthful manner. In the Paducah EIS, potential health and safety impacts during operations are discussed in Sections 5.2.2.1 and 5.2.2.2 for routine conditions and accidents, respectively. In the Portsmouth EIS, potential health and safety impacts during operations are discussed in Sections 5.2.3.1 and 5.2.3.2 for routine conditions and accidents, respectively. The results of the analyses indicate that the risks to human health and safety are expected to be low and well within applicable limits and regulations. Additionally, the preferences and opinion of the community are also taken into account through the public participation process. The public scoping process for the

EISs is described in Section 1.6.1 of each EIS, and all comments received from the public during the public comment period on the draft EISs have been considered in the preparation of the final EISs.

**Comment D0029-005**

Many of you know what serious harm will come from the DU conversion plant or from the Centrifuge, but some of you don't. If the Piketon community will still be operating a nuclear waste storage facility then everyone in the Piketon community should be told the truth that the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion will be a conversion waste storage plant. In the end you can expect to find little work, but more toxic, hazardous chemicals coming through our area and contaminating our community. We might suggest that as a sign of good faith that the government buys up the homes leading into the plant if they still intend to build these two hazards plants.

**Response D0029-005**

There are no plans for the long-term storage of conversion products at the Portsmouth or Paducah conversion facilities. As discussed in each site-specific EIS, all wastes generated under the proposed action would be stored, treated, and disposed of in accordance with all applicable regulations, as appropriate. The depleted uranium conversion product, emptied cylinders, and radioactively contaminated waste will be disposed of in off-site LLW disposal facilities, such as Envirocare of Utah and the NTS. See also response to Comment D0029-003.

DOE is committed to accomplishing the conversion and disposition of its depleted uranium hexafluoride inventory in a manner protective of the workforce, the public, and the environment.

The commentor's suggestion that DOE buy homes near the plant is outside the scope of this EIS.

**Comment D0029-006**

It is high time for the DOD/DOE to abandon their Nazi mentality and remember their crimes against humanity. Thousands of American workers that you lied too became made sick as if Piketon was a Nazi concentration camp and we were your holocaust victims. The ghosts of thousands of former plant workers and eventually the ghosts of those who are now dying after deadly exposures from the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion plant will certainly come back to haunt you in the end. Not only here, but at other DOE/DOD site across this country! If you don't believe in God and the Day of Judgment, the Devil and hell, you and your families will have an eternity to think about your crimes against humanity.

Cancer and heart problems around the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion plant are extremely high. Thousands of community residents have not been given any compensation for their cancers or other radiation-induced illnesses, either. Like the Nazis, you shall stand before God Almighty with their blood on your hands too.

**Response D0029-006**

DOE has established the Office of Worker Advocacy to oversee workers' claims. Workers may submit an application for any illness that may have been caused by exposure to toxic substances, radiation, or biological agents while they were working at a covered DOE facility. Information about the program is available on the Web at <http://www.eh.doe.gov/advocacy/index.html>. Application forms may be downloaded from this Web site or they can be requested by calling or visiting one of the DOE Resource Centers. Listing of the Resource Centers is also available from the above Web site. The telephone numbers of the resource center at Portsmouth are 740-353-6993, and Toll Free: 866-363-6993, at Paducah 270-534-0599, Toll Free: 866-534-0599, and at Oak Ridge 865-481-0411, Toll Free: 866-481-0411.

In November 1996, the ATSDR, a federal government agency that is separate from and independent of DOE, issued a Public Health Assessment of the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant site (ATSDR 1996; available at [http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/HAC/PHA/portsmouthgas/pgd\\_toc.html#lot](http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/HAC/PHA/portsmouthgas/pgd_toc.html#lot)). The study was conducted in response to a petition by the Pike County and Scioto County residents in 1992. The study concluded that there did not appear to be any off-site threat to public health from any site activity or release. ATSDR found off-site contamination was not at levels that could cause adverse health effects. Radiation measurements off site did not exceed normal variations in background for the region.

The ATSDR study also indicated that residents had raised questions about excessive cancer rates in Scioto County, excessive birth defects, and other adverse health effects believed to be related to environmental releases from the site. ATSDR concluded that available information about health outcomes did not suggest any adverse health impact from site operations.

Since the publication of the ATSDR study in 1996, the gaseous diffusion plant at Portsmouth has been shut down and certain operations have been discontinued. During the same period, no major releases have taken place from the site that would cause an increase in off-site public health impacts.

Portsmouth is not a Department of Defense (DOD) site, and activities at DOD facilities are outside the scope of these conversion facility EISs.

**Comment D0029-007**

Additional threats that the Piketon plant poses include several earthquake tremors (at least 5-7 on the scale) that we have had. We live in a flood plain zone. Tornadoes have also been known to touch down within a couple miles from the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion plant, too. Any of these so-called "acts of God" can certainly cause the Piketon nuclear facility to explode like Chernobyl.

**Response D0029-007**

The accident assessments included in Sections 5.1.2.1 and 5.2.3.2 of the Portsmouth EIS include consideration of a range of natural phenomena as accident initiators, including earthquakes, floods, and tornadoes. The specific accidents discussed in detail in the EIS are those expected to have the greatest potential consequences. Given the nuclear properties of depleted uranium, a conversion facility accident similar to that at Chernobyl is physically not possible.

**Comment D0029-008**

Two aquifers beneath the Piketon nuclear plant supplies our groundwater. One is shallow and the other aquifer is deep. DOE reports the shallow aquifer is contaminated, with (TCE) trichloroethylene being the main contaminant of concern. The other aquifer is not of sufficient volume to be a source of drinking water. DOE maintains that no groundwater has migrated offsite, which we know to be a bare face lie. Arguments similar to these were used at the Pantex plant in Texas, where a shallow “perched” aquifer was supposedly confined, but has since been found to be leaking into the much larger Ogallala aquifer, despite DOE’s earlier false assurances to the American public that all is safe. (TCE) trichloroethylene is contaminating the Ogallala Aquifer, which was outlined in the Radioactive Waste Management Associate groundwater report February 2002 on groundwater movement of the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant.

**Response D0029-008**

On-site contamination of groundwater at the Portsmouth site is discussed in Section 3.1.5.2 of the Portsmouth EIS. As described in that section, five on-site monitoring wells have shown contamination with volatile organic compounds, including TCE and radionuclides. Two remediation projects are under way to clean up TCE-contaminated groundwater at the site. Monitoring results from wells in the vicinity of the site indicate that groundwater contamination is limited to the shallow aquifer, within the DOE site property.

Contamination of groundwater related to the Pantex plant is outside the scope of this EIS.

**Comment D0029-009**

Below is a few reason that the Portsmouth Gaseous diffusion should be investigated before we bring more nuclear jobs to Piketon, Ohio. DOE/DOD haven’t even address the off site problems from the past 50 years of production yet.

**Response D0029-009**

DOE has actively addressed contamination from past operations at the Portsmouth facility. Investigation and cleanup of hazardous substances (as defined in CERCLA) and hazardous wastes (as defined in the RCRA) that have been released to air, surface water, groundwater, soils, and solid waste management units as a result of past operational

activities at the Portsmouth site are being conducted under the provisions of three administrative edicts issued pursuant to RCRA, CERCLA, and/or Ohio state law.

Portsmouth is not a DOD facility, and activities at DOD facilities are outside the scope of these conversion facility EISs.

### **Comment D0029-010**

The report of Groundwater Movement at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant by Marilyn dela Merced, Beat Hintermann and Marvin Resnikoff for the Uranium Enrichment Project and PRESS February 2002 should be thoroughly investigated before anyone should begin pushing the idea of creating more dirty jobs for the area. We will need to have independent scientists looking at the problems here first in order to hold someone within the U.S. government, within the Piketon nuclear plant accountable before beginning construction of the Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride Conversion Facility at Piketon, Ohio.

We will also need to look much closer at the on site and off site contamination problems from the past 50 years of productions at the Piketon plant, too

### **Response D0029-010**

On-site contamination of groundwater at the Portsmouth site is discussed in Section 3.1.5.2 of the Portsmouth EIS. As described in that section, five on-site monitoring wells have shown contamination with volatile organic compounds, including TCE, and radionuclides. Two remediation projects are underway to clean up TCE-contaminated groundwater at the site. Monitoring results from wells in the vicinity of the site indicate that groundwater contamination is limited to within the DOE site property.

See also the responses to Comment No. D0029-006 and D0029-009.

### **Comment D0029-011**

POTENTIAL COMMUNITY HEALTH THREAT POSED BY RADIATION IN CREEK FLOWING FROM PORTSMOUTH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT IN PIKETON, OH. Dr. Paschenko has collected over 100 samples of water and soil around the plant, which will be analyzed in SSGR's laboratory in the coming months. However, in the first stage of analysis, Paschenko discovered levels of beta activity in samples of foam that were at least 100 times higher than normal background radiation levels. This foam was collected in a creek that flows from the plant grounds along borders of the community residents. We need more time to bring others into Piketon for additional independent studies in order to hold DOE and other government officials accountable.

**Response D0029-011**

The DOE has conducted soil and water sampling at on-site and off-site locations. Results of these sampling efforts are summarized in Sections 3.1.4 and 3.1.5 of the Portsmouth EIS. When soil contamination has been identified, it has been addressed and has been or will be remediated under site remediation programs. DOE is not aware of any elevated levels of contamination at any off-site locations associated with these facilities (i.e., levels that could cause elevated risks of adverse health impacts).

**Comment D0029-012**

Members of (PRESS) Portsmouth/ Piketon Residents for Environmental Safety and Security have asked the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency (OEPA) and the company managing the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion plant many times to please post warning signs along the creeks that surround the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion plant located in Piketon, Ohio. Still to this day THERE ARE NO SIGNS! This alone is hard core evidence that clearly proves the OEPA's blatant disregard for the value of human life and raises some serious concerns about their role as protectors of environmental safety.

**Response D0029-012**

Activities of the OEPA are outside the control of DOE and outside the scope of this EIS. DOE is not aware of any significantly elevated levels of contamination at any off-site locations that would warrant posting signs.

**Comment D0029-013**

(PRESS) Portsmouth/Piketon Residents for Environmental Safety and Security have only used documents from the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion plants to publicly present every story about the problems at the Piketon, Ohio plant. Stories about the "Plutonium" which the company managing the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion plant consistently denies having on site, for example. Workers nationally at the DOE/DOD plants now have a compensation bill called EEOICPA. This bill is paying some cancer victims but not all cancer victims nor all illness. PRESS is asking for an audit and investigation of the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant as well. If the recent findings of Sergie Paschenko, a well known Russian physicist, are validated community concern will quickly escalate.

Once again, this will provide additional hard-core evidence of the OEPA's blatant disregard for the value of human life. Residents of the local community have not been informed that they have problems.

**Response D0029-013**

In 2000, the DOE Office of Oversight, within the Office of Environment, Safety and Health conducted an investigation into the activities that took place at the Portsmouth site prior to 2000, and documented their findings in a report entitled *Independent*

*Investigation of the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant, Volume 1: Past Environment, Safety, and Health, Practices* (DOE 2000). Questions related to handling of materials with transuranic elements in them at the Portsmouth site are addressed in the study. The question of potential transuranic contamination of DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders was addressed in two separate studies (Hightower et al. 2000; Brumburgh et al. 2000). It is also discussed in detail in Appendix B of both EISs. Also see Response to Comment No. D0029-003.

The EISs used data that were published or publicly available. Any samples that Mr. Pashenko may have taken and analyzed as mentioned by the commentor would not have been considered in the EISs unless they were publicly available.

#### **Comment D0029-014**

Furthermore, the site alert/alarms have not been sounded at the time of negative release of gases. On March 7, 1978 a 14 ton cylinder filled with liquid uranium hexafluoride was being hauled to a cooling site by straddle and lift cylinders. The cylinder lost over 21,00.00 lbs of uranium hexafluoride passing through a hole in the cylinder. The alarm should have sounded, but didn't! Again in August of 1980 the Cleveland Plain Dealer reported that: 2,500 pounds of uranium was lost down the west drainage ditch, which also collected "essentially all the uranium that precipitated from the plume". About 1,500 pounds of uranium escaped from the ditch into the nearby Scioto River.

The Cleveland Plain Dealer reported that at least 43 workers were known to have become contaminated. Goodyear officials speculated that most of the URANIUM HEX-A-FLUORIDE reacted with moisture in the air (FORMING HYDROGEN FLUORIDE - A POTENT ACID CAPABLE OF EATING THROUGH GLASS AND URANYL FLUORIDE) another uranium compound. In 1992 while moving and painting the Deplete Uranium cylinders a valve was broken. This caused more material to become airborne. Again there were NO ALARMS for community awareness.

#### **Response D0029-014**

The large release of DUF<sub>6</sub> in 1978 identified in the comment is discussed in the response to Comment No. D0003-010. The result of the accident was the release of 21,125 pounds (9,600 kg) of feed material in less than 5 minutes. Emergency notifications and responses were rapid; there were no injuries to personnel or the off-site public. A Public Health Assessment for the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant site was conducted by the ATSDR, a federal government agency that is separate from and independent of DOE, in November 1996. As part of the Public Health Assessment, ATSDR evaluated the records associated with this accident and concluded that "There was no measurable off-site release from the UF<sub>6</sub> cylinder rupture that took place on March 7, 1978. ATSDR received the incident report for the accident and all sample documentation. ATSDR staff have determined that not enough material could have reached off-site areas to cause adverse health effects." (See ATSDR 1996, Section on Environmental Contamination and Other Hazards, and Subsection on Off-site Contamination). To prevent such an accident from

reoccurring, several steps were taken, including modifications of cylinder handling equipment and eliminating the transport of uranium hexafluoride in the liquid state.

The DUF<sub>6</sub> currently stored in the cylinders in yards is in solid state. When the cylinders are emptied into the conversion plant, the DUF<sub>6</sub> in them will be transformed into gas by sublimation without going through the liquid state in an autoclave (a completely enclosed structure). Therefore, the chance of occurrence of the type of accident that took place on March 7, 1978, at the conversion facility is essentially nonexistent.

The Portsmouth Site has an Emergency Plan in effect and conducts periodic emergency drills and exercises to prepare for any emergency situation. There are two levels of emergencies at the Site: (1) Alert — An alert is declared if emergency hazards could affect plant personnel, but not the general public outside the plant boundaries. Local government officials are advised so that their resources and emergency responders are ready to assist on site if needed. (2) Site Area Emergency — A Site Area Emergency is declared if the hazards could affect the general public within a 2-mile radius of the plant boundaries. This is the most serious emergency situation and means that a significant release of hazardous materials may occur. All individuals within this notification area would be notified immediately by audible voice alert from the plant. Additionally, messages can be directed immediately to local radio and television stations which provide protective actions that are recommended. These recommendations could be to evacuate or to shelter in place. Local government officials are also notified immediately so that their resources, which may include deputies and offices as well as volunteer fire personnel, may quickly focus on protecting the general public. Experts from the Site, federal agencies, and state and local officials coordinate emergency actions. Warning sirens are in place to source for public alert should a Site Area Emergency be declared. There have been no such emergencies requiring warning sirens since the warning system was placed in operation in 1988. Periodically, the sirens are sounded for routine testing or during drills.

DOE conducts a comprehensive monitoring program at both on-site and off-site locations that measure the ambient concentrations of radionuclides and hazardous substances in environmental media, including air, water, soil, building surfaces, vegetation, and wildlife. Any occurrences of higher than acceptable concentrations are reported, and necessary actions are taken. All the findings from the monitoring program are documented in the annual site environmental reports. The most recent site environmental reports that were available at the time were used in the preparation of the Portsmouth and Paducah EISs. The environmental conditions at and around the Portsmouth, Paducah, and ETTP sites are summarized in Section 3 of the EISs.

#### **Comment D0029-015**

The Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion in Piketon, Ohio scored 54.6 for the NPL superfund. A minimum score of 28.5 score suggests it should have been placed on the Superfund. Portsmouth has never been placed on the NPL listing.

**Response D0029-015**

Investigation and cleanup of hazardous substances and hazardous wastes that have been released to air, surface water, groundwater, soils, and SWMUs as a result of past operational activities at the Portsmouth site are being conducted under the provisions of the various edicts that have been issued pursuant to RCRA, CERCLA, and/or Ohio state law. See Chapter 6 of the EIS for a complete discussion of laws and regulations applicable for a conversion facility at Portsmouth. Discussion of releases and potential health impacts associated with past operations at the Portsmouth site would be provided in documentation for site investigations and remediation actions, which are obtainable through the site public affairs office, at (740) 897-2457.

The question of whether the Portsmouth site should be on the National Priorities List is beyond the scope of the EIS.

**Comment D0029-016**

Below are a few reports of the many off-site problems:

Columbus Dispatch Feb 7, 1993, Michael B. Lafferty reported that the fish in streams surrounding the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant in Piketon, Ohio have elevated levels of radiation according to an Ohio Environmental Protection Agency (OEPA). The report was written in April of 1992 but was not released until the Dispatch asked for a copy for his story in 1993. The report stated the most comprehensive state evaluation of radiation and chemical pollution surround the nuclear fuels plant. Further example suggests the Plant's uranium hexafluoride is concentrated into a more radioactive form for use as fuel in reactors like those on submarines. Bomb grade uranium was process from 1954 until at least 1991 or 92.

The dispatch further reported that tissue from fish around the plant have elevated levels of radiation. Stream sediments also displayed radiation levels FIVE TIMES above the acceptable levels. There were also increased levels of arsenic, cadmium, chromium and mercury.

At one measured site on Little Beaver Creek in Southern Ohio. The total uranium levels were twice the level at which normally corrective action are required.

In total, the test samples were collected at 18 sites in the Scioto River , Big Beaver and Little Beaver Creeks, Big Run and at the water course referred to in the report as Nursing home road.

The EPA representative said in the 90's that there was a strong indication that radioactive and chemical pollutants would cause future problems. Biologists have been concerned about the uranium and heavy metals found in Little Beaver Creek. Most of the year, particularly during summer, wastewater from the plant supplies almost all flow into the streams. The EPA report also said they found radioactivity may be the results of the radioactive isotope potassium 40, which is considered an abnormally RADIOACTIVE substance that accumulates in bones like Strontium-90. Radiation could be the result of widespread technetium 99 contamination at the

Portsmouth Plant, too. Bernie Counts speculated the heavy metals may be suppressing some insect populations as well.

Finally, the EPA report says heavy metals in the sediments were also at high concentration levels. The highly elevated concentrations of chromium, (about 72 parts per million) and also mercury (0.24 parts per million) were found where Big Beaver Creek empties into the Scioto River and then into the OHIO RIVER, which is a primary source of drinking water for millions of unwitting Americans residing in cities further downstream, from Cincinnati all the way to New Orleans!

### **Response D0029-016**

The environmental conditions at and around the Portsmouth site that may be affected by the proposed action and environmental data that are used in the analysis of the impacts associated with the alternatives considered in the EIS are described in Section 3.1 of the Portsmouth EIS. The data were obtained from the site annual environmental reports and other public documents. Site environmental reports are prepared based on data obtained from a comprehensive monitoring of the environment at and around the site and a detailed evaluation of the impacts associated with actual or projected releases to the environment from the site. Any reports issued by other federal agencies, including the EPA, and private organizations are reviewed and factored into the site environmental reports. The latest site environmental report available at the time was used in the preparation of the EIS. The data that go into the site environmental reports have to meet a high level of quality control and are obtained following strict procedures. Therefore, DOE has made every reasonable effort to obtain the most comprehensive and defensible data in preparing the EIS. Although not specifically addressed individually, all the data that the commentor has mentioned would either have been obtained by the site staff or reviewed and incorporated into the site reports and consequently the EIS.

**COMMENTOR D0030: Charles and Vicki Jurka**

### **Comment D0030-001**

Pages 2-19 & 20: A proposed enrichment facility in New Mexico is attempting to broker a deal giving DOE responsibility for conversion of their DUF<sub>6</sub>; for services similar to those DOE provides USEC. This DEIS (Paducah) bases its assumptions on a 25 year operational period with a maximum 20,000 tons/yr (DUF<sub>6</sub>) throughput. Should USEC and the New Mexico company divide future conversion needs between Paducah and Portsmouth, many of the already marginal assumptions, regarding human health and the environment, would become invalid either in terms of time, throughput, or both. Rumors persist that plans are already underway to increase the capacity of the Paducah conversion plant beyond the four parallel conversion lines.

### **Response D0030-001**

At the present time, there are no plans or proposals for DOE to accept DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders for conversion beyond the current inventory for which it has responsibility. However,

Section 2.2.7 of the Portsmouth site-specific conversion facility EIS and Section 2.2.5 of the Paducah EIS discuss a number of possible future sources of additional DUF<sub>6</sub> that could require conversion, including a new commercially operated enrichment facility in New Mexico. The potential environmental impacts associated with expanding plant operations (including extending operations and increasing throughput) to accommodate processing of additional cylinders are discussed in Section 5.2.8 of the Portsmouth EIS and Section 5.2.6 of the Paducah EIS.

Because of the uncertainty associated with possible future sources of DUF<sub>6</sub> for which DOE could assume responsibility, there is no current proposal to increase the throughput of the conversion facilities or extend operations. However, for purposes of the EIS, it was assumed that the Portsmouth conversion process building would be designed and built with sufficient space to accommodate an increased plant throughput sometime in the future. The modular design of the dry conversion process — the Portsmouth and Paducah facilities are being designed with three and four parallel conversion lines, respectively — facilitates process expansion. In addition to the potential impacts associated with expanded plant operations, Section 5.2.8 of the Portsmouth EIS also discusses potential impacts that would be associated with a conversion facility consisting of four process lines rather than three. If a decision is made in the future to increase the number of parallel process lines beyond four at either site, additional NEPA review would be conducted.

#### **Comment D0030-002**

Page 4-11 (last para.): Many hypersensitive individuals were “created” due to an initiating dose that changed their normal immune response.

#### **Response D0030-002**

DOE is committed to conducting the conversion facility project in a manner that will keep workers, the public, and the environment safe. All exposures to process chemicals and radioactivity will be kept as low as reasonably achievable, and within health-protective standards and guidelines. The chemicals associated with the facility, mainly uranium hexafluoride, uranium oxide, hydrogen fluoride, and ammonia, have not generally been associated with hypersensitive reactions (see ATSDR’s toxicological profiles for Uranium; Fluoride, Hydrogen Fluoride, and Fluorine; and Ammonia; under “Immunological Effects.” The toxicological profiles are available at <http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/toxpro2.html>).

#### **Comment D0030-003**

Page 4-11 (last para.): A pregnant woman exposed during an “accidental” release may show no adverse response herself; instead passing the toxic effect to the fetus.

**Response D0030-003**

Information on the reproductive effects of the chemicals associated with the facility, mainly uranium hexafluoride, uranium oxide, hydrogen fluoride, and ammonia, can be found at the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registries Web site (see ATSDR's toxicological profiles for Uranium; Fluoride, Hydrogen Fluoride, and Fluorine; and Ammonia; under "Reproductive Effects" and "Developmental Effects." The toxicological profiles are available at <http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/toxpro2.html>). The toxicological profiles summarize various studies in which the chemicals of concern caused adverse reproductive effects, generally at high doses. Under normal operations at the conversion facilities, exposures would be lower than levels that have been observed to cause adverse reproductive and developmental effects. As discussed in Section 5.1.2.1 for the no action alternative and Section 5.2.2.2 for the proposed action alternatives in the Paducah EIS; and in Section 5.1.2.1 for the no action alternative and Section 5.2.3.2 for the proposed action alternatives in the Portsmouth EIS, if some of the postulated accidents were to occur, it is possible that some exposed workers or members of the general public may be injured or die. If there were pregnant women among the exposed population, the developing fetus' could also be exposed and injured. However, as explained in the above cited sections of the two EISs, the probability of occurrence for these high consequence accidents is very low. As a result, the risk of any fatalities, including death or severe injury to a fetus, would be much less than one, indicating that no fatalities or severe injury would be expected.

Even though the risks are low, the consequences for a few of the accidents analyzed in the EISs, mainly those associated with the storage of anhydrous NH<sub>3</sub> and aqueous HF on site, are considered to be high. As stated in Section 5.2.2.2 of the Paducah EIS, and in Section 5.2.3.2 of the Portsmouth EIS, the consequences can be reduced or mitigated through design (e.g., by limiting tank capacity), operational procedures (e.g., by controlling accessibility to the tanks), and emergency response actions (e.g., by sheltering, evacuation, and interdiction of contaminated food materials following an accident).

**Comment D0030-004**

Page F9 (F.1.2): When addressing the chemical impacts of hydrogen fluoride, on human health, one important aspect, not considered in this DEIS (Paducah), is the propensity of inhaled HF to damage the heart and arteries once absorbed into the blood stream. For instance, the latent effects, for the general public, from the action of HF (fluoride) on the heart and vascular system could be considerable when calculating a dose of 0.02mg/kg-d (168 hours per week) over a 25 year period. Low doses of fluoride entering the body, over a long period of time, might also produce arthritic conditions from the calcifying action on joints.

Also unclear is whether total regionally-emitted "fluoride" was considered when determining potential dose to the general public. One might expect that the coal burning plants, identified in Table 3.1-2 (page 3-7), would be additional regional-sources of fluoride emissions as well as PGDP and the Honeywell plant in Metropolis, Illinois. Further, in this instance, an important

consideration should be the extent and duration of past fluoride exposure, for general public, living within 10 miles of PGDP. It is also unclear as to whether the HF dose-rate of 0.02 mg/kg-d applies to all of the general public residing within the targeted 50 mile radius or to public in an unidentified radius. One would expect the impact to be greater the closer one lives to the plant. Low doses of fluoride entering the body over a long period of time might also produce generational effects.

#### **Response D0030-004**

In the EISs, the hydrogen fluoride (HF) reference levels for worker and general public exposures were 0.71 and 0.02 mg/kg-d, respectively (see Section F.1.2.2 for background). These exposure levels were based on the OSHA standard; the general public level was modified to account for possible continuous exposures and to be protective of sensitive subpopulations in the human population. The reference level used for the general public is more conservative than the minimal risk level of 0.06 mg/kg-d developed by the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR); (see the Toxicological Profile for Fluorine, Hydrogen Fluoride, and Fluoride available at <http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/toxpro2.html> for more information on the minimal risk levels and information on toxicity of fluoride compounds on different human biological systems, including the vascular system and genetic effects).

Adverse effects on the thyroid and skeletal system from drinking water fluoride exposures have been observed at 0.5 to 0.8 mg/kg-d in rats and mice (see ATSDR Toxicological Profile for Fluorine, Hydrogen Fluoride, and Fluoride). These were the effects occurring at the lowest doses, meaning that any vascular system effects (i.e., damage to the heart or arteries) or generational (genetic) effects would occur at higher doses. The estimated maximum doses estimated from conversion plant normal operations were much lower than these doses. A maximum daily intake of less than 0.000002 mg/kg/d (10,000 times less than the reference level) was estimated for the general public around both conversion facility sites; this dose included both inhalation and ingestion pathways. The hazard indices given in Sections 5.2.2.1.2 of the Paducah EIS and 5.2.3.1.2 of the Portsmouth EIS include consideration of these hydrogen fluoride and fluoride exposures as well as potential uranium exposures; all hazard indices were several orders of magnitude below 1, the level of concern. The doses were estimated for hypothetical MEIs; the actual doses for the general population within a 50-mile radius of the facilities would be much lower than these doses.

DOE has not been able to find any evidence that the current emissions of HF from the Paducah gaseous diffusion plant and other facilities in the vicinity of Paducah gaseous diffusion plant are of any health concern. Given that the exposures from the proposed conversion facility were estimated to be so much lower than the adverse effect levels (see previous paragraph), there would not be any expected adverse cumulative impacts in the population around the site due to HF emissions.

**Comment D0030-005**

Page 5-63: “Total maximum estimated concentrations for PM<sub>2.5</sub> would approach NAAQS and SAAQS...” What is the anticipated composition (metal, chemical, radiological) of that PM<sub>2.5</sub> (microns), expected to be released to air during normal plant operations? The character of the respirably sized particle is important when considering its potential to adversely impact human health. For instance, respirably sized particles of U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> could represent a significant pathway for radiation exposure if inhaled into the lungs or absorbed into the gastrointestinal tract, through contaminated foodstuff. The health risk for PM<sub>2.5</sub> does not alone lie in the airborne levels but also in the duration that particle remains in the body and the effect it has on cell structure and activity. Also, due to the size of the particle and the anticipated high-release levels this DEIS (Paducah) should have assessed a terrain dispersion model that included cumulative levels of particulates and their re-entrainment.

**Response D0030-005**

The PM<sub>2.5</sub> concentrations that would approach or exceed the NAAQS and SAAQS would occur mainly during construction activities. The major portion of the PM<sub>2.5</sub> in the air would be contributed from background levels already present and a regional problem along the Ohio River Valley; the conversion facilities would contribute about one-third of the total concentration level over the limited duration of construction activities. During construction, these particulates would have a composition similar to that of the uncontaminated soil at the construction sites. The particulates might also be the combustion products produced from the fuel used for the construction vehicles. At this time, the standard method used to evaluate the toxicity of such particulates that are less than 2.5 microns in diameter is comparison of ambient levels with the 24-hr and annual NAAQS of 65 and 15 µg/m<sup>3</sup>, respectively. This standard is based on extensive toxicity data that take into account the duration that the particles remain in the body and the internal cellular effect.

The model used to estimate the airborne concentration of PM<sub>2.5</sub> was ISCST3, the EPA-recommended model. PM<sub>2.5</sub> particles are so small and light that they act as a gaseous pollutant, do not readily deposit on surfaces, and are transported over long distances (EPA 1995). To estimate the maximum airborne PM<sub>2.5</sub> concentrations, it was assumed that no deposition occurs, which makes consideration of re-entrainment unnecessary.

During operations, the PM<sub>2.5</sub> levels are estimated to be much lower than during construction (see Section 5.2.3.3 of the Portsmouth EIS and Section 5.2.2.3 of the Paducah EIS). In addition, more than 99.9 % of the PM<sub>2.5</sub> released to air during operations is from the boiler and the backup generator. The composition of that PM<sub>2.5</sub> would not be any different from a standard industrial boiler or backup generator. The small amount of uranium released from the conversion building stack (< 0.25 g/yr) is assessed separately from the PM<sub>2.5</sub> emissions. It is estimated that no adverse health impacts would be associated with the uranium emissions (see the hazard indices given in Section 5.2.2.1.2 of the Paducah EIS and Section 5.2.3.1.2 of the Portsmouth EIS).

**Comment D0030-006**

Page B-7 (B.5): "...potential impacts of any TRU and Tc contamination would be the greatest in cases involving accidents during handling of the cylinders and during the management of wastes associated with the cleaning and disposition of empty cylinders." (B-9) "...doses...attributed to TRU and Tc-99 found in the heels...can be relatively high compared to uranium doses." Page 2-36 (2.4.2.8) "Current USD plans are to leave the heels in the emptied cylinders...and either (1) crush the cylinders..." Page 2-4 (2.2.2.6). This section presents an option for compacting and sectioning emptied cylinders still containing heels.

The option to crush and section cylinders in the manner presented on page 2-36 provides no explanation as to whether protective measures were incorporated into that process that would protect workers from exposure to "free" TRU or grouted TRU. This DEIS (Paducah), in general, fails to consider worker health with respect to handling cylinders.

Page B-6 (B.4) "...UDS is now planning to fill the emptied cylinders with the depleted U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> product..." We agree this would be the preferred option and suggest the heels be stabilized with grout prior to refilling. We do disagree however that the U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> is "product": it is waste. Also, if the crush and cut option is still valid, this DEIS needs to present a clearer view as to how the TRU in the heels will be contained during processing.

**Response D0030-006**

With respect to cylinder yard worker risks, in the Paducah EIS potential health and safety impacts to cylinder yard workers during operations are discussed in Sections 5.2.2.1 (see Table 5.2-7) and 5.2.2.2 for routine conditions and accidents, respectively. In the Portsmouth EIS, potential health and safety impacts to cylinder yard workers during operations are discussed in Sections 5.2.3.1 and 5.2.3.2 for routine conditions and accidents, respectively. For routine conditions, the health and safety risks for cylinder yard workers are expected to be low and well within applicable limits and regulations. Under accident conditions, the cylinder yard workers might be the involved workers who could be injured if an accident took place in a cylinder yard. Each site has detailed documented emergency plans and trains its workers regarding procedures to follow in the event of an accidental release. These procedures, including evacuation and use of respirators and personal protective clothing, will lessen the chance of severe injury for involved workers in the event of an accident, although the risk cannot be eliminated altogether.

Section 2.2.2.6 of the EIS discusses the process to be used for either crushing the cylinders or reusing the emptied cylinders as disposal containers. If crushed, the process would be enclosed, and the debris from the operations would be collected by a vacuum system, thus greatly reducing the potential for worker exposures to the heels materials (including any TRU). Text similar to that in Section B.4 has been added to Section 2.2.2.6, stating that the current plan calls for stabilizing the heels in the emptied cylinders, and then after a storage period, using the emptied cylinders as U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> disposal containers.

In its ROD for the Programmatic EIS, DOE stated that it would use depleted uranium oxide generated by the conversion facilities to the extent possible, and store or dispose of the remainder (see Section S.1.1.3 of the EISs). Therefore, the U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> is considered to have a potential for use and is not necessarily a waste.

**Comment D0030-007**

Page E-7 (E 3.1): Does the figure of 70% include all the aqueous hydrogen F produced at both conversion plants?

**Response D0030-007**

The production totals in Section E.3.1 refer to production of aqueous HF from both facilities combined.

**Comment D0030-008**

The nominal wall thickness for DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders is 312 mils. Ultrasonic measurements for the thickness of cylinders in storage at ETT and Paducah have shown that corrosive actions have reduced that thickness, in many instances, to less than half. DOE guidance recommends that a minimum cylinder wall thickness of 250 mils is “required” for safe handling and transporting cylinders. Studies have determined 3mils per year would be a normal rate of corrosive reduction in cylinders. At that rate, cylinders over 25 years old would already have wall thicknesses below the “safe level” of 250 mils, thus presenting a hazard when handling and shipping. Further, previous inspections of cylinders stored on the ground have found that areas in contact with the ground experienced greater corrosion rates. Other cylinders have not been inspected to assess wall thickness due to the storage configuration. It is our opinion that this DEIS (Paducah) has not adequately considered the conditions of the cylinders and the associated risk(s).

**Response D0030-008**

The Paducah and Portsmouth sites have extensive experience with moving the cylinders, and excellent safety records for those cylinder movements. Since the mid-1990s, most of the cylinders at the sites have been safely relocated to achieve safe, monitored storage conditions.

A 2003 Agreed Order between the Commonwealth of Kentucky and DOE stipulates that a detailed inspection procedure be followed prior to cylinder relocations within the Paducah site; the Portsmouth site follows similar procedures. Prior to movement or feeding into the conversion facility autoclaves, the cylinders would be visually inspected to ensure that no damage had occurred since the last scheduled inspection. (All cylinders undergo scheduled inspections at least once every 4 years; some are inspected annually). Ultrasonic wall thickness measurements would be conducted if the visual inspection indicated this was needed. No cylinder would be moved or fed into the process unless there was a high degree of confidence in its ability to withstand the handling.

With respect to transportation of ETTP cylinders to either the Portsmouth site or the Paducah site, all cylinder shipments would be in compliance with DOT safety regulations for the transportation of radioactive material, as specified in Title 49 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* requirements.

Both EISs consider the condition of the cylinders in the assessment of the no action alternative, which made estimates of the number of cylinder breaches that might occur in the future based on the number of breaches that have occurred to date, and on estimated corrosion rates for cylinders that previously were kept in poor storage conditions (e.g., in ground contact, or with debris left in skirted ends). Estimates of the impacts associated with possible additional cylinder breaches are given in Section 5.1.2 of each document, which discusses the no action alternative.

### **Comment D0030-009**

Page F-21 (F.3.1): In the past river transportation was explored as an economical option for transporting cylinders from ETT. This DEIS did not analyze the risks associated with that mode of transportation.

### **Response D0030-009**

The transportation of cylinders by barge was considered, but not analyzed in detail in the two conversion facility EISs. As discussed in Section 2.3.5 of each EIS, barge transport was not considered in detail (i.e., not considered to be a reasonable option) primarily because the nearest functioning barge facilities to Portsmouth and Paducah are located between 20 and 30 miles from the sites. Consequently, overland transportation would be required at each end of the route, as would additional cylinder loading and unloading steps. In addition, truck and rail were identified as the likely cylinder transport modes in conversion facility design documents.

As with any transportation mode, barge transport has associated advantages and disadvantages. For example, during barge transport there is no onboard fuel available and the shipment is not in close proximity to other transport vehicles, factors which could reduce, but not eliminate, potential accident risks. However, barge transport would require overland transportation by truck on each end of the route, as well as additional handling of cylinders during the loading and unloading of the barge. These activities have associated accident risks and would contribute to the radiation exposure of workers during normal cylinder handling. In addition, shipment by barge could require dredging of the river bottoms at the barge facilities, an activity with potential environmental impacts.

It should be noted that, regardless of the transport mode, all cylinder shipments must comply with the DOT regulations for the shipment of radioactive materials, as specified in Title 49 of the *Code of Federal Regulations*. These regulations are designed to be protective of public health and safety during both accident and routine transportation conditions.

For the reasons discussed above, a detailed evaluation of barge transport has not been included in the Final conversion facility EISs. If barge transportation was proposed in the future and determined to be a reasonable option, additional NEPA review would be conducted. Such a review would address all issues associated with the proposed activity.

**Comment D0030-010**

Will the calcium fluoride produced at the conversion plant be a granular form or a fine powder?

**Response D0030-010**

It is anticipated that the calcium fluoride produced at the conversion facility would be a mixture of particle sizes ranging from granules to fine powder, since no attempt to standardize the particle size is planned.

**Comment D0030-011**

The Depleted UF<sub>6</sub> Final PEIS expresses Hydrogen Fluoride in terms of anhydrous while this DEIS (Paducah) expresses it as aqueous. Please explain the reason for this change.

**Response D0030-011**

The Programmatic EIS for the Long-Term Management and Use of Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride (DOE 1999) evaluated a range of representative technologies in the areas of conversion, long-term storage, use, and disposal. At the time that the PEIS was prepared, no decision on long-term management had been made and no specific technologies had been proposed. For the conversion options considered in the PEIS, it was assumed that anhydrous HF would be produced and sold because (1) it was believed to be the chemical form most easily marketed, and (2) it represented an upper bound estimate of potential hazards due to its chemical nature.

Following the ROD for the PEIS, DOE released a Request for Proposals for specific conversion technologies and awarded a contract to UDS for construction and operation of conversion facilities at the Paducah and Portsmouth sites. This action is the subject of the two site-specific EISs. The proposed UDS conversion process produces aqueous HF as a product of DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion. Based on the experience of Framatome ANP, Inc. (a UDS partner), there is a commercially viable market for aqueous HF. Therefore, the production, handling, transportation, and sale of aqueous HF are considered in each conversion facility EIS.

**Comment D0030-012**

Perhaps we overlooked it, but we do not recall any information in this DEIS (Paducah) detailing annual use, storage, or transportation of anhydrous ammonia. It is apparent that anhydrous ammonia (page 2-12, 2.2.2.3) is an important component of the conversion process that will pose its own set of hazards.

Page 5-117 (Table 5.6-2): 10,000 tons of nitrogen gas (N<sub>2</sub>) will be consumed annually during the conversion facility operations” (Paducah). Page 2-12 (2.2.2.3): “Nitrogen....a purging gas and is released to the atmosphere...the clean off-gas stream.”

Pages 5-59 through 61 (5.2.2.3.1): We are unsure as to whether all nitrogen referenced as an off-gas is a by-product of hydrogen generation from anhydrous ammonia. We are also unsure as to whether all 10,000 tons are expected to be released to air. Another uncertainty is whether this excess nitrogen, free for oxidation, was included in total NO<sub>x</sub> emissions from conversion facility operations.

### **Response D0030-012**

The use, storage, and transportation of anhydrous ammonia as part of the conversion process have been addressed throughout both the Paducah and Portsmouth EISs. In the Paducah EIS, the annual use of anhydrous ammonia is stated in Section 5.2.2.8 (Resource Requirements). Potential impacts from accidental release of anhydrous ammonia during storage are assessed in Section 5.2.2.2, and impacts from transportation accidents are assessed in Section 5.2.3.3. In the Portsmouth EIS, similar discussions are provided in Sections 5.2.3.8, 5.2.3.2, and 5.2.5.3, respectively for use, storage, and transportation.

The nitrogen in the process is used as a purge gas to control air in-leakage into the conversion processes. It would be released to the air without any substantial conversion to nitrogen oxides or other potential pollutants. It was not included in the total NO<sub>x</sub> emissions from conversion facility operations because the absence of oxygen in contact with the nitrogen stream at high temperatures would severely limit the potential for NO<sub>x</sub> formation.

### **Comment D0030-013**

Page 5-65 (5.2.2.4. 1): water withdrawn from the Ohio River would approximate 57 million gallons per year. 4,000 gal/d would be released to surface water with the remainder of the withdrawn—water recirculated back into the process. Assuming this were true, there would be an enormous net water gain somewhere in the system or a lot of potentially contaminated water would be vented as steam from the cooling towers and other plant processes. This DEIS (Paducah) needs to better account for water usage/ disposal.

### **Response D0030-013**

The text in Section 5.2.2.4.1 was revised for more current water use values (3 million gal/yr potable water and 37 million gal/yr for nonpotable uses, rather than 1.9 million and 55 million gal/yr). The text was further revised to indicate that 11.3 million gal/yr of wastewater would be generated by the cooling towers. Differences in the water budget between the input and output reflect consumptive use. This wastewater could be disposed of to the existing wastewater treatment system at Paducah, discharged under a KPDES permit, or treated and reused at the conversion facility.

**Comment D0030-014**

Page 5-69 (line 11): incorrectly references Table 5.2-18 for Table 5.2-17

**Response D0030-014**

In the Paducah EIS, the reference to Table 5.2-18 has been changed to 5.2-17.

**Comment D0030-015**

Page 3-15 (3.1.5.1): This sets the current water use at “approximately 15 million gal/d.” However, a January 9, 2004 report entitled Paducah Water Balance Analysis (PGDP, CAB-Water Task Force) sets the total average water flow in at 11.9 million gal/d.

Page 3-15 (3.1.5.1): This states that “during most of the year, most of the flow in both streams (Bayou & Little Bayou) is derived from plant effluents” and that the average discharge to the Ohio River is about 4.1 million gal/d. However, the Paducah Water Balance Analysis puts the water flow out (accounted for) at 10.54 million gal/d.

In this draft DEIS (Paducah) the difference in the ratio of water in to water out is significant. Since the Water Balance-water flow in figure is reflective of the unaccounted for (DEIS) water out this DEIS needs to reconcile water in/water out with water use/water disposal.

**Response D0030-015**

The results provided in the EISs were based on the most recent qualified data that were available at the time the EISs were prepared. The water balance data that were used were somewhat different from the data mentioned by the commentor. However, even if the data supplied by the commentor were used, the conclusions in the EIS concerning water resources and quality would not change.

**Comment D0030-016**

The ATSDR Public Health Assessment for Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant... May 2002 (pg. 52), identifies thallium as “the contaminant of concern” found in surface water at PGDP. While this DEIS (Paducah) discusses PCB and Uranium as surface water/sediment contaminants, it fails to consider thallium; a significant pollutant, injurious to human health.

**Response D0030-016**

The May 2002 ATSDR Public Health Assessment for Paducah (ATSDR 2002; available at [http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/HAC/PHA/paducah2/pgd\\_toc.html](http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/HAC/PHA/paducah2/pgd_toc.html)) does identify thallium as a contaminant of concern for surface water with the following text: “Thallium is one of the seventeen chemical surface water contaminants and is the only one that has estimated exposure doses that exceed health guidelines. Therefore, thallium is a contaminant of

concern for the surface water pathway and will be discussed further in the following pathway analysis section and in the public health implications section of this report.”

In the subsequent sections of the ATSDR Health Assessment, it is concluded that thallium is NOT a public health hazard at the Paducah site. Thallium is not associated with the conversion facility process and is not addressed in the conversion facility EIS for Paducah.

The following text regarding the public health hazard of thallium is excerpted verbatim from the ATSDR Public Health Assessment for Paducah, May 21, 2002: “Exposure to thallium in off-site surface water and groundwater is not a public health hazard... Thallium was detected in surface water near PGDP. The maximum thallium concentration in surface water was 5,260 µg/L in Bayou Creek near the inactive southwest landfill [45]. Using this maximum concentration, we estimated that incidental ingestion of water from Bayou Creek would result in an exposure dose of 0.001 mg/kg/day for adults and 0.002 mg/kg/day for children 1 to 6 years old. Thallium was not found in drinking water wells, but the lowest level of analytical detection was 10 µg/L--higher than EPA’s drinking water standard of 2 µg/L [155]. Therefore, we used the detection limit of 10 µg/L to estimate exposure doses. This gave us doses of 0.0003 mg/kg/day for an adult and 0.001 mg/kg/day for a child, assuming that these residential wells were the sole source of drinking water. . .The thallium dose that did not cause toxicity to rats (i.e., 0.25 mg/kg/day) was 200 times higher than the maximum exposure dose that ATSDR estimated for surface water or groundwater ingestion, despite the fact that we used very conservative assumptions to estimate dose. . .

Therefore, ATSDR scientists conclude that ingestion of thallium in surface water from Bayou Creek or from drinking water wells located near PGDP is not expected to result in adverse human health effects.”

#### **Comment D0030-017**

The combined effect of pollutants is frequently understated in documents such as this (DEIS). One of the reasons often provided is the lack of studies regarding additive, synergistic, or cumulative actions. However, the synergistic interaction of airborne hydrogen fluoride with sulfur dioxide has been well researched. This DEIS (Paducah) anticipates the release of HF to air from the DUF-<sub>6</sub> conversion facility (page 5-61, Table 5.2-15) and describes fairly high sulfur dioxide emission levels from major sources around the Paducah site (page 3-7, Table 3.1-2). This DEIS has not considered the greater adverse-effects expected from the synergistic action of these two pollutants.

#### **Response D0030-017**

Both hydrogen fluoride and sulfur dioxide are respiratory irritants and can cause difficulty breathing and damage the respiratory system at higher exposure levels. However, the estimated maximum air concentrations of both HF and sulfur dioxide associated with operation of the conversion facilities are well below their health-based

primary standard levels, even when including background concentrations. (The sulfur dioxide standards are National Ambient Air Quality Standards, the HF primary and secondary standards are Commonwealth of Kentucky Ambient Air Quality Standards. HF levels would also be well below the secondary standards, which are lower but are not based on health considerations). The highest estimated HF ambient level (including background concentrations) would be well below 34% of its associated primary standard level for both conversion facilities. The highest estimated sulfur dioxide ambient levels would be between 17 and 46% of the primary standard level, including background concentrations. No scientific literature was located, indicating that these pollutants would have synergistic health effects at these levels. Based on data reviewed for EIS preparation, the levels that would be associated with facility operations would not cause adverse health effects.

### **Comment D0030-018**

Page 5-69 (re: on site disposal): The permitted life of the on-site C-746-U landfill is less than the expected 25 years of conversion operations. The Accelerated Clean-up Plan waste volumes for PGDP also exceed the permitted capacity of that landfill. The C-746-U landfill is owned by DOE. If Uranium Disposition Services, LLC is a private/stand alone company, ultimately responsible for products produced as well as waste generated, disposal in the C-746-U landfill should be fee based, identical to any similar landfill. THE C-746-U LANDFILL IS A VERY CONTINUOUS COMMUNITY ISSUE.

### **Response D0030-018**

UDS will use the on-site disposal facilities for construction debris and soils. After construction, UDS has no plans to use on-site disposal facilities. Financial arrangements between DOE and UDS are outside the scope of the EIS.

### **Comment D0030-019**

Past “self regulation” of PGDP, by DOE, has ultimately created an extreme example of a Superfund site that will remain a toxic legacy for generations to come. Uranium Disposition Services, LLC (Paducah) should be the owner/ operator of the conversion facility; responsible for all air, water, and land permits.

### **Response D0030-019**

Pursuant to the DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion contract between DOE and UDS, UDS is required to obtain all permits and other regulatory approvals needed to construct and operate the DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion facilities. UDS is also required to comply with all applicable laws, which typically require the operator of a facility to sign applicable permit applications. To the extent DOE is also required to sign permit applications as the owner of the facility, DOE will do so and comply with the law. The commentor’s preference to designate UDS as the owner/operator of the conversion facility at Paducah is noted, but

the issue of which entity should sign permit applications is dictated by state and federal regulations.

**COMMENTOR D0031:**           **Karen Stachowski, Deputy Commissioner**  
Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation

**Comment D0031-001**

The Department of Energy is under a final Order regarding the depleted uranium hexafluoride (DUF<sub>6</sub>) cylinders at the East Tennessee Technology Park in Oak Ridge. That Order requires that all of the cylinders be removed by December 31, 2009. All actions of the Department of Energy, in regard to the cylinders, should be consistent with that deadline, including the statements in the Environmental Impact Statement.

**Response D0031-001**

DOE acknowledges the consent order with the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation and its requirements in each site-specific conversion EIS (see Sections S.1.1.2 and 1.1.2). DOE is committed to complying with the 1999 consent order requiring the removal of the DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders from the ETTP site or the conversion of the material by December 31, 2009.

**Comment D0031-002**

...at this time we support the option of over-packing any cylinders that do not meet DOT transportation requirements. We do not view any other option as having been adequately studied or evaluated in a NEPA process.

**Response D0031-002**

Comment noted. The two conversion facility EISs identify three possible options for shipping cylinders that do not comply with DOT requirements for the shipment of UF<sub>6</sub>: (1) transferring the contents to compliant cylinders (likely requiring a new facility); (2) obtaining an exemption from DOT to ship the cylinders "as is," provided that DOE can demonstrate a level of safety that would be at least equal to the level required by the regulations; and (3) transporting the cylinders in a protective overpack.

At present, a Transportation Plan for shipment of noncompliant cylinders has not been finalized and DOE is evaluating the available options. Consequently, the EISs provide an evaluation of these options. It should be noted that all shipments must be made in compliance with DOT regulations, regardless of the specific approach selected. Thus, in terms of potential environmental impacts during transportation, no option is clearly preferable.

DOE recognizes that if a decision is made to transfer the contents of noncompliant cylinders to compliant cylinders and a new facility is required at ETTP, then additional NEPA review would be conducted.

**COMMENTOR D0032:**           **John Owsley, Director**  
Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation

**Comment D0032-001**

The state of Tennessee concurs with the proposed action for managing the ETTP cylinder inventory. We defer comments on siting and operational alternatives at DOE Paducah and DOE Portsmouth to the commonwealth of Kentucky and the state of Ohio respectively.

**Response D0032-001**

Comment noted.

**Comment D0032-002**

We do not expect to compromise environmental quality in another state in order to benefit our own. We will continue to talk about UF<sub>6</sub> with Ohio and Kentucky like we have for the past several years.

**Response D0032-002**

Comment noted. DOE is committed to continued cooperation with the States of Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee, and to complying with the requirements specified in the applicable consent orders.

**Comment D0032-003**

The DEIS documents were reviewed with the Tennessee Consent Order No.97-0378-H0023 Part IX of the Uranium Hexafluoride Management Plan in focus, which states “By (July 31, 1999), DOE shall issue its record of decision (ROD) for the final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Alternative Strategies for the long-term management and Use of Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride (PEIS). Unless DOE selects the no action alternative in the ROD, DOE shall either remove all known DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders and their contents from ETTP or complete the conversion of the contents of the cylinders by (December 31, 2009). In this event, DOE may undertake additional National Environmental Policy Act reviews (EAs/EISs) in order to implement the alternative selected in the ROD. Within 60 days of completing any such further NEPA reviews as may be necessary to implement the selected long-term management strategy, DOE shall submit a plan containing schedules for activities that will ensure removal of all known DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders and their contents from ETTP or conversion of the contents of such cylinders will be completed by December 31, 2009. The schedule contained in the plan shall be considered an enforceable provision of this Agreement.”

These documents should state that DOE shall submit this schedule within 60 days of completing this EIS. Any associated references (summaries, etc) should be changed accordingly.

### **Response D0032-003**

For information purposes, text has been added to Section 1.1.2 of both the Paducah and Portsmouth EISs to indicate the requirement in the Consent Order for DOE to submit the schedule within 60 days of completion of the NEPA process.

### **Comment D0032-004**

Section 1, Introduction, 2.1, No Action Alternative, 2.4.1 General: Both EIS's evaluate a no action alternative that assumes continued storage of cylinders at Portsmouth, Paducah, and ETTP. These documents should state that the Tennessee Consent Order requires conversion or removal of UF<sub>6</sub> cylinders from ETTP by the end of 2009 because DOE did not select the no action alternative in the PEIS ROD of April 1999.

### **Response D0032-004**

In its NEPA regulations, the CEQ requires that the alternatives analysis in an EIS "include the alternative of no action" [Section 1502.14(d)]. Accordingly, the regulations require the analysis of the no action alternative even if the agency is under a court order or legislative command to act. In guidance, the CEQ explains that this analysis provides a benchmark, enabling decision makers to compare the magnitude of environmental effects of the action alternatives. Also, according to the CEQ guidance, no action is an example of a reasonable alternative outside the jurisdiction of the agency that must be analyzed. Inclusion of such an analysis in the EIS is necessary to inform the Congress, the public, and the President as intended by NEPA. Hence, the CEQ requires that DOE include analyses of a no action alternative in the EISs for the conversion facilities at both Portsmouth and Paducah, and DOE's compliance with this requirement should not be viewed as inconsistent with its April 1999 ROD regarding long-term management of DUF<sub>6</sub>.

Furthermore, DOE is committed to honoring the 1999 Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation consent order, which requires either the removal of the DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders from the ETTP site or the conversion of the material by December 31, 2009. Toward that end, the DOE contract for accelerated cleanup of the ETTP site, including removal of the DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders, calls for completion of this activity by the end of FY 2008.

### **Comment D0032-005**

Section 1.2.1. Table 1.1-1 Inventory of DOE UF<sub>6</sub> Cylinders Considered in This[sic] EIS: The tables list the proposed action for shipment of all ETTP cylinders to Portsmouth. According to the table this includes 584 empty cylinders. Most of these empty cylinders have already been shipped to NTS. Some empty 48-inch cylinders remaining at ETTP will probably be shipped to

Portsmouth. The table is footnoted to show that the numbers are as of April 30, 2003. Updated data should be used in the final Portsmouth and Paducah documents.

### **Response D0032-005**

The cylinder inventory numbers have been updated in the Final EISs to reflect the most current information from the Cylinder Information Databases to account for changes that occurred after release of the draft EISs. The updated inventories are provided in Table 1.1-1 of each site-specific document. Potential areas of impact have been updated accordingly.

### **Comment D0032-006**

Section 2.2.4 Preparation and Transportation of ETTP Cylinders, Pg. 2-18; Section 5.2.4 Cylinder Preparation Impacts at ETTP:

The statement is made in 2.2.4 that “It is unknown exactly how many DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders do not meet DOT transportation requirements.” In 5.2.4, the evaluation referenced in the DUF<sub>6</sub> PEIS (DOE 1999a) indicates that 50% to 100% of the ETTP inventory would not meet DOT requirements. The current documents should be updated to show the number of DUF cylinders that will be shipped initially without extra preparation such as overpacks or transfer of contents.

### **Response D0032-006**

As stated in Section 2.2.4 of both EISs, at this time it is unknown exactly how many of the DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders at ETTP do not meet DOT transportation requirements. The DUF<sub>6</sub> Programmatic EIS assessment for cylinder preparation for shipment evaluated from half to all of the DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders at ETTP not meeting DOT shipping requirements, but this was an assumption made for the purposes of analysis. More recently, a supplement analysis for transport of compliant DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders from ETTP evaluated the impacts of transporting up to 1,700 DOT-compliant cylinders (see Section 1.7 of either EIS).

Prior to shipment of any cylinder from ETTP, the cylinder would receive a thorough inspection, including a record review to determine if the cylinder is overfilled, a visual inspection for damage or defects, a pressure check to determine if the cylinder is overpressurized, and an ultrasonic wall thickness measurement (if necessary based on the visual inspection).

These two conversion facility EISs identify three possible options for shipping cylinders that do not comply with DOT for the shipment of UF<sub>6</sub>: (1) transferring the contents to compliant cylinders (likely requiring a new facility); (2) obtaining an exemption from DOT to ship the cylinders “as is,” provided that DOE can demonstrate a level of safety that would be at least equal to the level required by the regulations; and (3) transporting the cylinders in a protective overpack. A Transportation Plan will be developed for each shipping program related to the DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion facility program. Each Plan is developed to address specific issues associated with the commodity being shipped, the

origin and destination points, and concerns of jurisdictions transited by the shipments. In all cases, DOE-sponsored shipments comply with all applicable state and federal regulations and are reflected in many of the operational decisions made and presented in the Plan. The transportation regulations are designed to be protective of public health and safety during both accident and routine transportation conditions.

### **Comment D0032-007**

Section 2.2.5, Preparation and Transportation of ETPP Containers to Portsmouth, Page S-21, Second Paragraph, Line 8: There are “no current plans” for a new container transfer facility at ETPP. If such a facility was to be further considered, the state of Tennessee would expect to be notified through the NEPA process of such plans as soon as they reach the stage of serious consideration. Due to the nature of the operation (purging of deteriorating containers, and subsequent refilling of more substantial containers) the environmental risk posed by this type of facility to the environment of the state of Tennessee and the East Tennessee Technology Park has the potential to be substantial. The state of Tennessee requires that the containers be shipped in a DOT-compliant manner using over-pack containers, if necessary. This applies even if the containers are shipped by a different mode of transportation to Paducah.

### **Response D0032-007**

Comment noted. The two conversion facility EISs identify three possible options for shipping containers that do not comply with DOT requirements for the shipment of UF<sub>6</sub>: (1) transferring the contents to compliant containers (likely requiring a new facility); (2) obtaining an exemption from DOT to ship the containers “as is,” provided that DOE can demonstrate a level of safety that would be at least equal to the level required by the regulations; and (3) transporting the containers in a protective overpack.

At present, a Transportation Plan for shipment of noncompliant containers has not been finalized and DOE is evaluating the available options. Consequently, the EISs provide an evaluation of these options. It should be noted that all shipments must be made in compliance with the DOT regulations, regardless of the specific approach selected.

DOE recognizes that if a decision were made to transfer the contents of noncompliant containers to compliant containers and a new facility is required at ETPP, then additional NEPA review would be conducted. The State would be notified of any such plans, if they were to reach the stage of serious consideration.

### **Comment D0032-008**

Section 2.3.5., Other Transportation Modes, Page 2-25: Due to the difficulties cited by the document with air and barge transportation, it appears that these modes of transportation are not being seriously considered. If this situation changes, the state would expect adequate NEPA review in order to assess risks associated with those methods.

**Response D0032-008**

The two conversion facility EISs evaluate transportation by both highway and rail modes in detail. Transportation by air and barge were considered, but not evaluated in detail for the reasons provided in Section 2.3.5 of each EIS (see also the response to Comment D0017-001 with respect to barge shipments). The detailed evaluation of only truck and rail modes in the Final EISs does not preclude the use of other modes in the future. However, if an alternative transportation mode was proposed in the future, additional NEPA review would be conducted. Such a review would address all issues associated with the proposed activity.

**Comment D0032-009**

Section 2.4.2.3, Human Health and Safety – Transportation: This section shows the two highest potential accidents to involve either NH<sub>3</sub> or HF shipments. It should be expanded to show that there is also transportation risk connected with shipping UF<sub>6</sub> cylinders from ETTP to the selected conversion sites.

**Response D0032-009**

The risks associated with shipping UF<sub>6</sub> cylinders from ETTP to the selected conversion sites are included in the EISs. The risks from UF<sub>6</sub> transportation, during routine conditions and accidents, are presented in detail in Section 5.2.5 of each EIS. The analysis shows that the potential consequences of an accident involving DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders during transport from ETTP are lower than the consequences of an accidental release of NH<sub>3</sub> or aqueous hydrogen fluoride during shipment. Text has been added to Section 2.4.2.3 to indicate where in each document the accident risks from UF<sub>6</sub> cylinder shipments are discussed.

**Comment D0032-010**

Section 3.2.7.1 Radiation Environment, Page 3-56, Line 3: states that “*radiation exposure of the general public MEI (Maximally Exposed Individual) is estimated to be 6.7 mrem/yr. This dose is about 7% of the maximum dose limit of 100 mrem/yr set for the general public (DOE 1990) and much smaller than the average dose from natural background radiation in the state of Tennessee. The actual radiation exposure of the general public would be much lower than the estimated maximum value.*” The state would like to point out that these dose estimates to the general public provided by the document are very scenario-dependent. The state’s UF<sub>6</sub> Cylinder Yard Monitoring Project recorded a 2002 direct gamma dose of 9,539 mrem/yr at the fence line of the K-1066-L yard. While the state’s dose measurement in this instance is the result of continuous monitoring (twenty four hours per day, 365 days) and reflects direct gamma dose only, the relative openness of the ETTP site to co-located workers from private companies, and the plans to further open the ETTP site to the public leave many previous assumptions about dose estimates in question.

**Response D0032-010**

To address the potential radiation exposures resulting from the cylinder yards, the following text has been added to Section 3.2.7.1, 1st paragraph - “The estimated dose of 6.7 mrem/yr for the MEI was based on the assumption that the off-site public would not be in the immediate vicinity of the cylinder yards for any appreciable time, which is the case under normal conditions. However, potential external exposure could occur and reach 100 mrem/yr if an off-site individual spends more than 90 hours a year immediately at the cylinder yard fence line.”

**Comment D0032-011**

Section 5.2.3.1.1 Radiological Impacts, Page 5-61, Fourth Paragraph, Line 2 states that “*for the first 2 years, because of receiving, inspecting and putting the ETTP cylinders into storage position, the potential radiation exposures are expected to be greater than in following years.*” This should be changed to reflect the fact that only ANSI-N14.1 compliant cylinders will be shipped during the first 2 years and the total shipping campaign will take approximately twice that long resulting in higher potential radiation exposures for a longer time period.

**Response D0032-011**

The estimated total collective worker doses from handling the ETTP cylinders at the receiving site would be the same regardless of the duration of the shipment campaign. However, the annual collective dose depends on the duration of the campaign. As stated in Section 5.2.3.1.1, all cylinders must be removed from the ETTP site by December 31, 2009; however, for the purpose of providing conservative estimates of annual impacts, the shipment of all ETTP cylinders was assumed to occur over 2 years. The dose results presented in Section 5.2.3.1.1 for cylinder yard workers reflect this assumption. Assuming a longer shipment campaign would result in a smaller estimated annual dose to cylinder yard workers, although the total dose over the duration of the activity would be the same.

In estimating the radiation exposures from handling the ETTP cylinders at the receiving sites, steps involved in retrieving the cylinders from the transport vehicle and placing them in temporary storage on site were considered. It was assumed that if the cylinders were transported in protective overpacks, they would be removed from the overpack before being put into storage. As a result, the worker doses would be expected to be slightly higher when the cylinders are shipped in overpacks. However, in the analyses conservative assumptions were employed to bound the worker doses under either transportation option and no distinctions were made between the two options.

The text in Section 5.2.3.1.1 has been modified to clearly indicate that the ETTP cylinders must be removed from the site by December 31, 2009, and that a 2-year shipping campaign was assumed to bound the estimated annual impacts to cylinder yard workers. It should be noted that the DOE contract for accelerated cleanup of the ETTP

site, including removal of the DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders, calls for completion of this activity by the end of FY 2008.

**COMMENTOR D0033: Ruby English**

**Comment D0033-001**

Comment Period was Extended to: February 4, 2004 by Department of Energy

**Response D0033-001**

As a matter of record, the comment period officially ended on February 2, 2004, as originally announced in the Notice of Availability published in the *Federal Register* (November 28, 2003) and as presented at the three public hearings held in January 2004. The comment period was not officially extended to February 4 by the Department of Energy. However, comments received after February 2 were considered to the extent practicable in preparation of the final EISs.

**Comment D0033-002**

Thank you for allowing me the opportunity to comment on such an important topic, the construction of a DUF<sub>6</sub> Conversion Facility to be located at Paducah, KY. As you know, I am a neighbor of the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant and have always tried to comment on topics you have let me know about and I always try to do it in a civilized manner.

**Response D0033-002**

Comment noted. DOE appreciates public and stakeholder involvement and is committed to addressing local community concerns in a constructive manner.

**Comment D0033-003**

I understand about the conversion plant being built here and employing some of the workers that will be laid off when USEC closes. Since this is a rural community and the high paying jobs are not around here this plant would be good for the few people that will be successful in securing those positions. But, I also understand that when all or most of the current and former workers begin developing health problems then that will be another story.

**Response D0033-003**

The conversion facility project will be conducted with a commitment to keeping workers and the public healthy and safe as well as minimizing impacts to the environment. All applicable health and safety regulations will be complied with; this results in keeping worker exposures to radiation, chemicals, and physical hazards at low levels. Wherever possible, reactions in the conversion process will be automated and contained in closed vessels so that workers will not be exposed (this will particularly limit exposures to

dusts). Workers with the possibility of contacting radioactive materials will wear radiation dosimeters so that individual exposures can be monitored and controlled to remain at low, health-protective levels.

The EISs include detailed evaluations of the potential impacts to human health and safety, including workers directly involved in conversion facility operations, other workers located at the sites, as well as members of the public living around the sites. The EISs consider exposures to not only depleted uranium compounds but also other chemicals used in the conversion process and by-products of conversion. In the Paducah EIS, potential health and safety impacts during operations are discussed in Sections 5.2.2.1 and 5.2.2.2 for routine conditions and accidents, respectively. In the Portsmouth EIS, potential health and safety impacts during operations are discussed in Sections 5.2.3.1 and 5.2.3.2 for routine conditions and accidents, respectively. The results of the analyses indicate that the risks to human health and safety are expected to be low and well within applicable limits and regulations.

#### **Comment D0033-004**

The continued storage of the current DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders indefinitely will eventually cause you more of a problem if these are not moved and disposed of due to continued exposure. There are more accidents at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant each year than is reported. One day this plant will cause an accident that will affect this whole area if these cylinders are not cleaned up. Then, I look at the health aspect for the neighborhood and wonder how much more The Department of Energy is going to put on us.

#### **Response D0033-004**

The proposed action considered in the two site-specific conversion EISs is to construct and operate plants to convert the DOE's inventory of DUF<sub>6</sub> to a more stable chemical form for use or disposal, thereby eliminating the need to continue to store cylinders indefinitely. Problems associated with continued long-term storage are evaluated under the no action alternative, as required by NEPA. The no action alternative includes evaluation of accidents involving cylinders during long-term storage. Conversion of the DUF<sub>6</sub> inventory will decrease the probability of cylinder accidents by decreasing the number of cylinders in storage.

All accidents and incidents at the plants are reported as required to appropriate federal and state agencies.

#### **Comment D0033-005**

So money wise this plant will be a good thing. Health-wise this plant addition will only cause more health problems for the neighborhood and the community.

**Response D0033-005**

DOE is committed to accomplishing the conversion and disposition of its depleted uranium hexafluoride inventory in a manner protective of the workforce, the public, and the environment. The EISs provide a comprehensive evaluation of the potential impacts to human health in the vicinity of the plant in Chapter 5. The results of the human health evaluation indicate that potential impacts from plant operations will be low and well within applicable regulations designed to be protective of human health and the environment.

**Comment D0033-006**

Transportation will be another problem, because you will not only clean-up cylinders at the Paducah site, but, you will be shipping in cylinders from other locations. These cylinders will be traveling on our roads and rails, possibly down our rivers. There could be accidents and then this would endanger the public. Hexafluoride is dangerous to our health. I also want to know about the disposal of the cylinders as to where they will go. My concern is in the landfill behind my house. Is that the plan?

**Response D0033-006**

The proposed action considered in the two site-specific conversion EISs is to ship the DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders at the ETTP site near Oak Ridge, Tennessee, to the Portsmouth site. Thus, there is no current proposal to ship cylinders to the Paducah site. However, as a reasonable alternative under NEPA, the EISs evaluate the shipment of ETTP cylinders to Paducah as well. The transportation analysis for the alternative of shipping ETTP cylinders to the Paducah site is provided in Section 5.2.5 of the Paducah EIS.

The transportation of DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders and conversion products is an important component of the proposed action and does pose potential risks during routine transportation operations and from accidents, as noted by the commentor. Consequently, the two conversion facility EISs include evaluation of the risks associated with the transportation of radioactive and hazardous materials, including depleted uranium hexafluoride, depleted uranium oxide, hydrogen fluoride, and anhydrous ammonia. In the Portsmouth EIS, potential transportation impacts are discussed in Sections 5.2.5 and 5.2.7. In the Paducah EIS, transportation impacts are discussed in Sections 5.2.3 and 5.2.5. The transportation analysis includes evaluation of risks caused by normal operations, as well as risks from accidents. The analysis considers both vehicle-related risks (i.e., risks related to vehicle operation, such as the potential for accidents causing injuries and fatalities) and cargo-related risks.

It should be noted that, regardless of the transport mode, all shipments must comply with DOT regulations, as specified in Title 49 of the *Code of Federal Regulations*. These regulations are designed to be protective of public health and safety during both accident and routine transportation conditions.

With respect to the disposal of cylinders, the emptied cylinders would not be disposed of in landfills at the Paducah or Portsmouth sites. As described in the EISs (Section 2.2.2 in the Portsmouth and Paducah EISs), current plans call for the emptied cylinders to be reused as disposal containers for the depleted uranium conversion product. As such, they would be disposed of with the depleted uranium at a LLW disposal facility, such as Envirocare of Utah or the NTS. The EISs also consider the alternative of using bags for disposal of the depleted uranium product. Under this alternative, the emptied cylinders would be crushed and shipped off site to a LLW disposal site.

**Comment D0033-007**

I also want to know about the waste from the DUF<sub>6</sub> plant being built in New Mexico by Louisiana Energy Systems. Is the Department of Energy going to be responsible for waste that is produced from this plant. If so they be shipped to Paducah?

**Response D0033-007**

At the present time, there are no plans or proposals for DOE to accept DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders for conversion beyond the current inventory for which it has responsibility. However, Section 2.2.7 of the Portsmouth site-specific conversion facility EIS and Section 2.2.5 of the Paducah EIS discuss a number of possible future sources of additional DUF<sub>6</sub> that could require conversion, including a new commercially operated enrichment facility in New Mexico. The potential environmental impacts associated with expanding plant operations (including extending operations and increasing throughput) to accommodate processing of additional cylinders are discussed in Section 5.2.8 of the Portsmouth EIS and Section 5.2.6 of the Paducah EIS. Because of the uncertainty associated with possible future sources of DUF<sub>6</sub> for which DOE could assume responsibility, there is no current proposal to ship cylinders from a new commercial enrichment plant to Paducah. If such a decision was made in the future, additional NEPA review would be conducted.

**Comment D0033-008**

From everything that I am reading it seems the plan is for the EPA to lower the standards for the landfills and then DOE will dispose or material in these landfills that should never be put there. This has already happened at the Paducah site and I am sure it could and will happen again.

**Response D0033-008**

As discussed in each site-specific EIS, all wastes generated under the proposed action would be stored, treated, and disposed of in accordance with all applicable regulations, as appropriate. These regulations are intended to be protective of human health and the environment. The depleted uranium conversion product, emptied cylinders, and radioactively contaminated waste will be disposed of in off-site LLW disposal facilities, such as Envirocare of Utah and the NTS. Also see Response to Comment No. D0033-006.

With reference to the changes in the Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC) for the C-746-U Landfill, the commentor is correct that there has been a change in the WAC for placement of solid waste in that landfill, but the standards have not been “lowered.” The change in the WAC involved application of DOE's authorized limits criteria pertaining to management of radionuclides. The original permit for Paducah's C-745-U landfill operation allowed placement of solid waste with up to 35 pCi/g of uranium on a case-by-case basis. No other radionuclides were addressed in the permit. The current WAC require analysis of all exposure pathways for all known radionuclides and require that disposal of solid waste will not result in additional exposure to the public greater than 1 mrem/yr. This criterion is significantly less than (i.e., more protective than) the EPA administrative standard of 15 mrem/yr additional exposure to the public and the 10 CFR Part 835 Rule that requires additional exposure to the public be less than 100 mrem/yr.

#### **Comment D0033-009**

I don't really know what else to say, because, I think, decisions and agreements have already been made and any thing else I could say would not make much difference. I hope that you will seriously consider and think about the decisions you make that at least take the thought of what is good for the neighborhood and the worker's. I know you have to make money, but please don't do it at the expense of human life. There has already been more than enough lives taken due to health problems caused by the misguided management that has been at this plant in the past. Please do something good for the community and build and operate a clean plant. The imaginary fences are not there and the contaminants don't stop at the fence either. The landfills are already leaking, so any additional dumping will only endanger us that much more.

#### **Response D0033-009**

There are no definitive data supporting an assertion that the landfills are leaking. Groundwater contaminants have been detected in some samples from wells in the vicinity of the C-746-S and -T landfills. Some contaminant concentrations from these wells have exceeded the maximum concentration level (MCL) for drinking water standards of 5 µg/L of TCE. Because the data are from wells both upgradient and downgradient from the landfills, it is not clear whether the source of contaminants is from the plant or from the landfills. The October 2003 Agreed Order between the Commonwealth of Kentucky and DOE requires that DOE pursue a field investigation to determine whether the C-746-S and -T landfills are a source of the groundwater contamination.

Public and stakeholder involvement is an important component of the DOE Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride Management Program's NEPA activities. DOE takes all public input into the process seriously, and all comments received on the draft EISs were considered in preparation of the final EISs. The program NEPA activities are an important and necessary component of the DOE decision-making process.

DOE is committed to constructing and operating the conversion facilities in a manner protective of the workers, the public, and the environment. The EISs include detailed

evaluations of the potential impacts to human health and safety, including workers directly involved in conversion facility operations, other workers located at the sites, as well as members of the public living around the sites. In the Paducah EIS, potential health and safety impacts during operations are discussed in Sections 5.2.2.1 and 5.2.2.2 for routine conditions and accidents, respectively. In the Portsmouth EIS, potential health and safety impacts during operations are discussed in Sections 5.2.3.1 and 5.2.3.2 for routine conditions and accidents, respectively. The results of the analyses indicate that the risks to human health and safety are expected to be low and well within applicable limits and regulations.

As discussed in the response to Comment Nos. D0033-06 and D0033-008, all wastes generated under the proposed action would be stored, treated, and disposed of in accordance with all applicable regulations, and radioactively contaminated waste would be disposed of in off-site LLW disposal facilities, such as Envirocare of Utah and the NTS.

### **Comment D0033-010**

This Paducah Site will become a dumping ground for all waste good or bad that other locations will want to ship to Paducah if you let them. So let me know what your decision will be and May God Bless.

### **Response D0033-010**

There are no plans to ship wastes from other sites to Paducah for disposal. In fact, the Paducah Part B permit for interim storage of RCRA waste does not permit receipt of waste from any other site.

With respect to the potential construction and operation of a Paducah conversion facility, the depleted uranium conversion product, emptied cylinders, and radioactively contaminated waste would be disposed of off site at a LLW disposal facility. DOE will announce the decision on construction and operation of DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion plants at the Paducah and Portsmouth sites in RODs to be published no sooner than 30 days after publication of the final EISs. Availability of the RODs will be announced in the *Federal Register* and posted on the project Web site at <http://web.ead.anl.gov/uranium/>.

**COMMENTOR D0034:**           **Mueller, Heinz J.**  
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region 4

### **Comment D0034-001**

When regulatory compliance is discussed in this document, the radionuclide National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAPs) for Radionuclide Emissions for United States Department of Energy (USDOE) Owned or Operated Facilities, in 40, CFR 61, Subpart H, is not always adequately referenced. Please include this information in the FEIS.

**Response D0034-001**

In the final EIS, text has been added to the human health and safety sections of the summary (Section S.5.1) and the comparison of alternatives (Section 2.4.2.1) to clearly identify that the assessment results were in compliance with regulatory requirements, including those of 40 CFR 61, Subpart H.

In Chapter 6 of the draft and final EIS (regulatory requirements), Table 6.1 identifies that the conversion facility is subject to the requirements of 40 CFR 61, Subpart H. Similarly, compliance with 10 CFR 61 requirements is explicitly identified in the draft and final EIS human health and safety sections for the no action alternative (Sections 5.1.2.1.1 and 5.1.3.1.1) and for the action alternatives (Sections 5.2.3.1.1).

**Comment D0034-002**

The EIS should include information regarding the capability and capacity for the two disposal facilities mentioned in the DEIS, namely Envirocare and the Nevada Test Site (NTS), to accept the proposed waste products from the Paducah conversion facility. The disposal facilities must meet both the Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC) limits, as well as have the physical capacity to accept the proposed quantity of conversion product waste.

**Response D0034-002**

As Section 1.6.2.4 in the EIS states, studies conducted by ORNL for DOE have shown that both NTS (a DOE facility) and Envirocare of Utah, Inc. (a commercial facility) would be acceptable disposal facilities for depleted uranium (Croff et al. 2000a,b). These studies included reviews of the LLW acceptance programs and disposal capacities of both the NTS and Envirocare of Utah, Inc. and concluded that either facility would have the capacity needed to dispose of all the products from the proposed DOE DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion program, and that the materials sent to these facilities would be able to meet each site's waste acceptance criteria. Additionally, in its proposal to design, construct, and operate the DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion facilities, UDS provided evidence that both sites could accept the U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> and identified the Envirocare facility as the primary and NTS as the secondary disposal site. DOE plans to decide the specific disposal location(s) for the depleted U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> conversion product after additional appropriate NEPA review. Accordingly, DOE will continue to evaluate its disposal options and will consider any further information or comments relevant to that decision. DOE will give a minimum 45-day notice before making the specific disposal decision and will provide any supplemental NEPA analysis for public review and comment.

**Comment D0034-003**

Based on the review of the DEIS, the project received a rating of "EC-1," meaning that some environmental concerns exist regarding aspects of the proposed project. Because of the chemical and radioactive nature of the materials processed and produced, safety measures and prevention of potential impacts to on-site workers and public health are areas of primary concern.

Specifically, protecting the environment and human health involves the need for appropriate operation and safety measures, monitoring, short-term storage, packaging, and transportation and sale or disposal of conversion products.

Ongoing radiological monitoring will be required during operation of this facility. Also, appropriate short-term storage of radioactive wastes on-site is required in order to prevent impacts to workers, the public, and the environment. With regard to LLW disposal, the DEIS covers the impacts from the transporting of conversion products to both the Envirocare of Utah, Inc. facility, and Nevada Test Site (NTS) from the proposed conversion facility in Paducah. Construction of the facility could potentially result in minor impacts to wetlands. Overall, the impacts as defined in the DEIS appear to be within acceptable limits.

**Response D0034-003**

The EPA concerns are noted. Because of the chemical and radioactive nature of the material, DOE is committed to accomplishing the conversion and disposition of its depleted uranium hexafluoride inventory in a manner protective of the workforce, the public, and the environment. DOE is further committed to complying with all applicable regulatory requirements concerning processing, storage, and disposal. DOE concurs with the assessment that overall impacts will be within acceptable limits.

#### 4 REFERENCES

ANL (Argonne National Laboratory), 1991, *Environmental Site Description for a Uranium Atomic Vapor Laser Isotope Separation (U-AVLIS) Production Plant at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant Site*, ANL/EAIS/TM-59, Argonne, Ill., Sept.

ATSDR (Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry), 1996, *Public Health Assessment for the U.S. DOE Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant, Piketon, Pike County, Ohio*, Nov. 20.

ATSDR, 2002, *Public Health Assessment for the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant (U.S. DOE), Paducah, McCracken County, Kentucky*, May 21.

Avci, H.I., 2003, "Final Communications Plans," e-mail with attachments entitled *Communications Plan for Publication of the Draft Environmental Impact Statement for Construction and Operation of a Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride Conversion Facility at the Paducah Site, Revision 4, December 1, 2003*, and *Communications Plan for Publication of the Draft Environmental Impact Statement for Construction and Operation of a Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride Conversion Facility at the Portsmouth Site, Revision 4, December 1, 2003*, from Avci (Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Ill.) to G. Hartman (DOE, Oak Ridge Operations, Oak Ridge, Tenn.), Dec. 1, 2003.

Brumburgh, G.P., et al., 2000, *A Peer Review of the Strategy for Characterizing Transuranics and Technetium in Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride Tails Cylinders*, UCRL-ID-140343, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, Calif., Sept. 1.

Conway, J.T., 1999, letter from Conway (Chairman, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, Washington, D.C.) to W. Richardson (Secretary of Energy, U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, D.C.), Dec. 16.

Croff, A.G., et al., 2000a, *Assessment of Preferred Depleted Uranium Disposal Forms*, ORNL/TM-2000/161, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tenn., June.

Croff, A.G., et al., 2000b, *Evaluation of the Acceptability of Potential Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride Conversion Products at the Envirocare Disposal Site*, ORNL/TM-2000/355, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tenn., Dec.

DOE (U.S. Department of Energy), 1991, *Uranium Hexafluoride: A Manual of Good Handling Practices*, ORO-651 (Rev. 6), DE91015811, DOE Field Office, Oak Ridge, U.S. Department of Energy, Oak Ridge, Tenn.

DOE, 1999, *Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Alternative Strategies for the Long-Term Management and Use of Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride*, DOE/EIS-0269, Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology, Germantown, Md., April.

DOE, 2000, *Independent Investigation of the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant, Volume 1: Past Environment, Safety, and Health Practices*, Office of Oversight, Office of Environment, Safety and Health, U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, D.C., May.

EPA (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency), 1995, *User's Guide for the Industrial Source Complex (ISC3) Dispersion Models, Volume I — User Instructions*, EPA-454/B-95-003a, Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards, Research Triangle Park, N.C., Sept.

EPA, 2002, *Compilation of Air Pollutant Emission Factors*, AP-42, 5th ed. Volume 1: Stationary Point and Area Sources, Research Triangle Park, N.C., Jan. Available at <http://www.epa.gov/ttn/chief/ap42/index.html>. Accessed June and July 2002.

ERDA (U.S. Energy Research and Development Administration), 1977, *Final Environmental Statement, Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant Expansion, Piketon, Ohio*, ERDA-1549.


Hatton, A.R., 2004, letter from Hatton (Acting Director, Kentucky Division of Waste Management) to William Murphie (U.S. DOE) and Glenn Van Sickle (Bechtel Jacobs Company LLC), March 12.

Hightower, J.R., et al., 2000, *Strategy for Characterizing Transuranics and Technetium Contamination in Depleted UF<sub>6</sub> Cylinders*, ORNL/TM-2000/242, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tenn., Oct.

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission), 2004, *Environmental Assessment of the USEC American Centrifuge Lead Cascade Facility*, Jan. 15.

Policastro, A.J., et al., 1997, *Facility Accident Impact Analyses in Support of the Uranium Hexafluoride Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement*, attachment to intraoffice memorandum from Policastro et al. to H.I. Avci (Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Ill.), June 15.

UDS (Uranium Disposition Services, LLC), 2003, *Updated NEPA Data*, DUF<sub>6</sub>-UDS-NEP-002, Rev. 0, Oak Ridge, Tenn., Aug. 27.



**FIGURE 2.2-1 Three Alternative Conversion Facility Locations within the Paducah Site, with Location A Being the Preferred Alternative (A representative conversion facility footprint is shown within each location.)**




FIGURE 2.2-2 Conceptual Overall Material Flow Diagram for the Paducah Conversion Facility (Source: UDS 2003b)







FIGURE 2.2-3 Conceptual Conversion Facility Site Layout for Paducah



**FIGURE 3.1-1 Regional Map of the Paducah Site Vicinity (Source: Adapted from LMES 1996a)**



**FIGURE 3.1-2 Locations of Cylinder Yards at the Paducah Site That Are Used to Store DOE-Managed Cylinders (Source: Adapted from DOE 1999a)**



**FIGURE 3.1-4 Wetlands in the Vicinity of the Three Candidate Locations for the Paducah Conversion Facility**




FIGURE 3.1-5 Areas of Potential Indiana Bat Habitat at the Paducah Site






FIGURE 3.1-6 Land Cover in McCracken County, Kentucky (Data Source: USGS 2002)



**FIGURE 3.1-7 Census Tracts within 50 mi (80 km) of the Conversion Facility at the Paducah Site with Minority Populations in Excess of State-Specific Thresholds (Source: Based on data from U.S. Bureau of the Census 2002c)**



**FIGURE 3.1-8 Census Tracts within 50 mi (80 km) of the Conversion Facility at the Paducah Site with Low-Income Populations in Excess of State-Specific Thresholds (Source: Based on data from U.S. Bureau of the Census 2002c)**








FIGURE 3.2-5 Land Cover in Roane County, Tennessee (Data Source: USGS 2002)



**FIGURE 3.2-6 Census Tracts within 50 mi (80 km) of the Storage Facility at ETTP with Minority Populations in Excess of State-Specific Thresholds (Source: Based on data from U.S. Bureau of the Census 2002e)**



**FIGURE 3.2-7 Census Tracts within 50 mi (80 km) of the Storage Facility at ETTP with Low-Income Populations in Excess of State-Specific Thresholds (Source: Based on data from U.S. Bureau of the Census 2002e)**





FIGURE S-1 Regional Map of the Paducah, Kentucky, Site Vicinity



**FIGURE S-3 Three Alternative Conversion Facility Locations within the Paducah Site, with Location A Being the Preferred Alternative (A representative conversion facility footprint is shown within each location.)**




FIGURE S-4 Conceptual Overall Material Flow Diagram for the Paducah Conversion Facility





FIGURE S-5 Conceptual Conversion Facility Site Layout for Paducah

FM50301



GMA7659

**FIGURE S-6 Areas of Potential Impact Evaluated for Each Alternative**

**TABLE 2.4-1 Summary Comparison of Potential Environmental Consequences of the Alternatives<sup>a</sup>**

Environmental Consequence	Proposed Action			
	Location A (Preferred)	Location B	Location C	No Action
<i>Human Health and Safety — Normal Facility Operations</i>				
<b>Radiation exposure</b>				
Construction				
Involved workers	Potential external radiation exposures (above background) because of proximity to cylinder storage yards. Estimated maximum annual individual worker dose of 35 mrem/yr over a 2-year construction period.	Background	Potential external radiation exposures (above background) because of proximity to cylinder storage yards. Estimated maximum annual individual worker dose of 40 mrem/yr over a 2-year construction period.	Potential external radiation exposures (above background) to construction workers for yard reconstruction because of proximity to cylinder storage yards. Estimated maximum total individual worker dose is 230 mrem/yr.
Operations				
Involved workers				
Average dose to individual involved workers	Conversion facility: 75 mrem/yr Cylinder yards: 430–690 mrem/yr	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	740 mrem/yr
Collective dose to involved workers	Conversion facility: 10.7 person-rem/yr Cylinder yards: 3–6 person-rem/yr	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	33 person-rem/yr

**TABLE 2.4-1 (Cont.)**

Environmental Consequence	Proposed Action			
	Location A (Preferred)	Location B	Location C	No Action
Total health effects among involved workers for the life of the project (through 2039 for no action)	1 in 7 chance of 1 latent cancer fatality (LCF)	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	1 in 2 chance of 1 LCF
Noninvolved workers				
Maximum dose to noninvolved worker maximally exposed individual (MEI)	$1 \times 10^{-5}$ mrem/yr	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	0.15 mrem/yr
Collective dose to noninvolved workers	$<1.9 \times 10^{-5}$ person-rem/yr	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	0.003 person-rem/yr
Total health effects among noninvolved workers for the life of the project (through 2039 for no action)	<1 in 1 million chance of 1 LCF	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	<1 in 100,000 chance of 1 LCF
General public				
Maximum dose to the general public MEI	$<3.9 \times 10^{-5}$ mrem/yr	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	<0.1 mrem/yr (during storage) <0.5 mrem/yr (long-term)
Collective dose to the general public within 50 mi (80 km)	$4.7 \times 10^{-5}$ person-rem/yr	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	0.008 person-rem/yr
Total health effects among members of the public over the life of the project (through 2039 for no action)	<1 chance in 1 million of 1 LCF	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	1 chance in 7,000 of 1 LCF

**TABLE 2.4-1 (Cont.)**

Environmental Consequence	Proposed Action			
	Location A (Preferred)	Location B	Location C	No Action
<b>Chemical exposure of concern<sup>b</sup> (concern = hazard index &gt;1)</b>				
Noninvolved worker MEI	Well below levels expected to cause health effects (hazard index <0.1).	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	Well below levels expected to cause health effects (hazard index <0.1).
General public MEI	Well below levels expected to cause health effects (hazard index <0.1).	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	Well below levels expected to cause health effects (hazard index <0.1).
<i>Human Health and Safety — Facility Accidents<sup>c</sup></i>				
<b>Physical hazards (involved and noninvolved workers)</b>				
Construction: on-the-job fatalities and injuries	0 fatalities; 11 injuries	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	0 fatalities; 2 injuries
Operations: on-the-job fatalities and injuries	0 fatalities/yr; 8 injuries/yr	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	0 fatalities/yr; 2 injuries/yr

**TABLE 2.4-1 (Cont.)**

Environmental Consequence	Proposed Action			
	Location A (Preferred)	Location B	Location C	No Action
<b>Accidents involving chemical or radiation releases, low frequency-high consequence accidents</b>				
Bounding chemical accident	Anhydrous ammonia (NH <sub>3</sub> ) tank rupture	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	Cylinder ruptures – fire (high for adverse effects); corroded cylinder spill, wet conditions (high for irreversible adverse effects).
Release amount	29,500 lb (13,400 kg) of NH <sub>3</sub>	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	24,000 lb (11,000 kg) of DUF <sub>6</sub> (fire); 96 lb (44 kg) of HF (spill, wet conditions)
Estimated frequency	<1 time in 1,000,000 years	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	≈1 time in 100,000 years (both accidents)
Probability – life of the project (through 2039 for no action)	<1 chance in 40,000	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	≈1 chance in 2,500
Consequences (per accident) <sup>d</sup>				
Chemical exposure – public				
Adverse effects	26–4,800 persons	14–4,900 persons	17–6,700 persons	0–2,000 persons
Irreversible adverse effects	2–370 persons	0–320 persons	1–220 persons	0–1 person
Fatalities	0–7 persons	0–6 persons	0–4 persons	0 persons

**TABLE 2.4-1 (Cont.)**

Environmental Consequence	Proposed Action			
	Location A (Preferred)	Location B	Location C	No Action
Chemical exposure – noninvolved workers <sup>e</sup>				
Adverse effects	1,100–1,600 persons	1,100–1,400 persons	1,400–1,600 persons	4–910 persons
Irreversible adverse effects	600–1,600 persons	730–1,400 persons	130–1,600 persons	1–300 persons
Fatalities	0–30 persons	0–30 persons	0–30 persons	0–3 persons
Accident risk (consequence × probability)				
General public	0 fatalities	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	0 fatalities
Noninvolved workers <sup>e</sup>	0 fatalities	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	0 fatalities
Bounding radiological accident	Earthquake accident damages U <sub>3</sub> O <sub>8</sub> storage building containing 6 months’ of product.	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	Cylinder ruptures – fire
Release amount	180 lb (82 kg) of depleted U <sub>3</sub> O <sub>8</sub>	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	24,000 lb (11,000 kg) of UF <sub>6</sub>
Estimated frequency	≈1 time in 100,000 years	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	≈1 time in 100,000 years
Probability – life of the project (through 2039 for no action)	≈1 chance in 4000	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	≈1 chance in 2,500
Consequences (per accident)				
Radiation exposure – public				
Dose to MEI	2–40 rem	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	15 mrem
Risk of LCF	1 chance in 50	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	7 in 1 million
Total dose to population	13–73 person-rem	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	29 person-rem
Total LCFs	1 chance in 40 of 1 LCF	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	1 chance in 70 of 1 LCF

**TABLE 2.4-1 (Cont.)**

Environmental Consequence	Proposed Action			
	Location A (Preferred)	Location B	Location C	No Action
Radiation exposure – noninvolved workers <sup>e</sup>				
Dose to MEI	2–40 rem	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	20 mrem
Risk of LCF	1 chance in 50	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	8 in 1 million
Total dose to workers	0.2–530 person-rem	0.5–1,300 person-rem	0.1–300 person-rem	15 person-rem
Total LCFs	1 chance in 5 of 1 LCF	1 chance in 2 of 1 LCF	1 chance in 8 of 1 LCF	1 chance in 170 of 1 LCF
Accident risk (consequence × probability)				
General public	0 LCFs	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	0 LCFs
Noninvolved workers <sup>e</sup>	0 LCFs	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	0 LCFs
<i>Human Health and Safety — Transportation</i>				
<b>Transportation impacts during normal operations</b>				Negligible impacts due to small number of shipments (1 shipment/yr) and low concentration of expected contamination.
Total fatalities from exposure to vehicle exhaust emissions				
Maximum use of truck	20 (30 if hydrogen fluoride [HF] is neutralized to calcium fluoride [CaF <sub>2</sub> ] for disposal)	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	Negligible
Maximum use of rail	<1 (1 if HF is neutralized to CaF <sub>2</sub> )	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	Negligible

**TABLE 2.4-1 (Cont.)**

Environmental Consequence	Proposed Action			
	Location A (Preferred)	Location B	Location C	No Action
Total fatalities from exposure to external radiation				
Maximum use of truck	<1	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	Negligible
Maximum use of rail	<1	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	Negligible
Maximum radiation exposure to a person along a route (MEI)	Negligible (<0.045 mrem)	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	Negligible
Traffic accident fatalities (life of the project); (physical hazards, unrelated to cargo)				
Maximum use of truck	2 (4 if CaF <sub>2</sub> shipped for disposal)	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	Negligible
Maximum use of rail	1 (including CaF <sub>2</sub> )	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	Negligible
<b>Traffic accidents involving radiation or chemical releases</b>				
Low frequency-high consequence cylinder accidents				NA <sup>f</sup>
Bounding accident scenario	Urban rail accident involving DUF <sub>6</sub> cylinders (only if East Tennessee Technology Park [ETTP] cylinders are shipped to Paducah by rail).	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	NA
Release	Uranium, HF	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	NA

**TABLE 2.4-1 (Cont.)**

Environmental Consequence	Proposed Action			
	Location A (Preferred)	Location B	Location C	No Action
Probability – life of the project	≈1 chance in 120,000	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	NA
Consequences (per accident)				
Chemical exposure – all workers and members of general public				
Irreversible adverse effects	4	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	NA
Fatalities	0	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	NA
Radiation exposure – all workers and members of the general public				
Total LCFs	60	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	NA
Accident risk (consequence × probability)				
Workers and the general public	0 fatalities	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	NA
Low frequency-high consequence accidents with all other materials				NA
Bounding accident scenario	Urban rail accident involving anhydrous NH <sub>3</sub>	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	NA
Release	Anhydrous NH <sub>3</sub>	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	NA
Probability – life of project	≈1 chance in 200,000	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	NA
Consequences (per accident)				
Chemical exposure – all workers and members of the general public				
Irreversible adverse effects	5,000	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	NA

**TABLE 2.4-1 (Cont.)**

Environmental Consequence	Proposed Action			
	Location A (Preferred)	Location B	Location C	No Action
Fatalities	100	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	NA
Accident risk (consequence × probability)				
Irreversible adverse effects	0	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	NA
Fatalities	0	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	NA
<i>Air Quality and Noise</i>				
Pollutant emissions during conversion facility construction	Total (modeled plus background) concentrations for particulate matter (PM) with an aerodynamic diameter of less than or equal to 10 and 2.5 μm, respectively (PM <sub>10</sub> and PM <sub>2.5</sub> ), would exceed standards at the construction site boundary because of the high background concentrations; construction-related concentrations would be negligible at the nearest residence. Other criteria pollutants are well within standards.	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	For yard reconstruction, the maximum 24-hour PM <sub>10</sub> concentration is up to 90% of the standard; other criteria pollutants are well within standards.

**TABLE 2.4-1 (Cont.)**

Environmental Consequence	Proposed Action			
	Location A (Preferred)	Location B	Location C	No Action
Pollutant emissions during conversion facility operations	<p>Average-annual PM<sub>2.5</sub> concentrations close to standards because of high background concentrations; operations-related concentrations would be negligible at the nearest residence. Other criteria pollutants would be well within standards.</p> <p>No concentration increment would exceed applicable prevention of significant deterioration (PSD) increments at the site boundary (for Class II area), and all increments would well below the PSD increment for the nearest Class I area.</p>	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	<p>Under the controlled cylinder corrosion scenario, the maximum 24-hour HF concentration would be less than 3% of the Commonwealth of Kentucky secondary standard; criteria pollutants would be well within standards.</p> <p>Under the uncontrolled cylinder corrosion scenario, the maximum 24-hour HF concentration at the site boundary could be up to 69% of the Commonwealth of Kentucky secondary standard.</p>

**TABLE 2.4-1 (Cont.)**

Environmental Consequence	Proposed Action			
	Location A (Preferred)	Location B	Location C	No Action
Estimated noise levels at the nearest residence	Below the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) guideline of 55 dB(A) as day-night average sound level (DNL) during construction and operation.	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	Below the EPA guideline of 55 dB(A) as DNL during construction and operation.
<i>Water and Soil</i>				
Surface water Construction	Negligible impacts from changes to runoff, from floodplains, or from water use and discharge.	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	Negligible impacts from changes to runoff, from floodplains, or from water use and discharge.
Operations	Negligible impacts from water use and discharge.	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	Negligible impacts from water use and discharge.
Groundwater Construction	No direct impacts to groundwater recharge, depth, or flow direction; impacts to groundwater quality unlikely.	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	No direct impacts to groundwater recharge, depth, or flow direction; impacts to groundwater quality unlikely.

**TABLE 2.4-1 (Cont.)**

Environmental Consequence	Proposed Action			
	Location A (Preferred)	Location B	Location C	No Action
Operations	No direct impacts to groundwater recharge, depth, or flow direction; impacts to groundwater quality unlikely.	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	<p>Under the controlled corrosion case, maximum uranium groundwater concentration (occurring in around 2070) of 6 µg/L, below the guideline of 20 µg/L.<sup>g</sup></p> <p>Under the uncontrolled corrosion case, cylinder breaches occurring before 2020 could result in groundwater concentrations exceeding the guideline sometime after 2100.</p>
Soils Construction	Local and temporary increase in erosion; impacts to soil quality unlikely. Potentially contaminated soil associated with solid waste management unit (SWMU) 194 could be excavated.	Same as Location A	Local and temporary increase in erosion; impacts to soil quality unlikely.	Local and temporary increase in erosion; impacts to soil quality unlikely.
Operations	No direct impacts to soil.	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	Negligible impacts to soils.

**TABLE 2.4-1 (Cont.)**

Environmental Consequence	Proposed Action			
	Location A (Preferred)	Location B	Location C	No Action
<i>Socioeconomics</i>				
Construction	Direct employment of 190 people in peak year; 290 total jobs in the region of influence (ROI); total personal income of \$9.5 million in peak year; marginal impacts on public services. Two-year duration of impacts.	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	Direct employment of 30 people; 110 total jobs in ROI; total personal income of \$3.2 million; no significant impacts on public services.
Operations	Direct employment of 160 people; 330 total jobs in ROI; total personal income of \$13 million per year; no significant impacts on public services.	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	Direct employment of 90 people; 130 total jobs in ROI; total personal income of \$3.8 million per year through 2039; no significant impacts on public services.

**TABLE 2.4-1 (Cont.)**

Environmental Consequence	Proposed Action			
	Location A (Preferred)	Location B	Location C	No Action
<i>Ecology</i>				
Ecological resources (habitat loss, vegetation, wildlife)	Total area disturbed during construction: 45 acres (18 ha).  Vegetation and wildlife communities impacted and potential loss of habitat; impacts could be minimized by facility placement.	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	Negligible impact to ecological resources; all activities would occur in previously developed areas; however, there is a potential for impacts to aquatic biota from cylinder yard runoff during painting activities.
Concentrations of chemical or radioactive materials	Well below harmful levels; negligible impacts on vegetation and wildlife.	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	Potential for adverse impacts to aquatic biota associated with cylinder painting.
Wetlands	Potential direct and indirect impacts to wetlands from facility construction; impacts could be minimized by facility placement.	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	Negligible impacts

**TABLE 2.4-1 (Cont.)**

Environmental Consequence	Proposed Action			
	Location A (Preferred)	Location B	Location C	No Action
Threatened or endangered species	No direct impacts from construction or operations; destruction of trees with exfoliating bark could indirectly impact the Indiana bat by destroying roosting habitat.	Same as Location A	Same as Location A; in addition; construction in the eastern portion of Location C could impact potential habitat for wild indigo and compass plant.	Negligible impacts
<i>Waste Management</i>				
Construction	Minimal impacts to site waste management capabilities from construction-generated waste.  Potentially contaminated soil associated with SWMU 194 could be excavated and require management and disposal.	Same as Location A	Same as Location A, except contaminated soil unlikely.	Negligible impacts from yard reconstruction.

**TABLE 2.4-1 (Cont.)**

Environmental Consequence	Proposed Action			
	Location A (Preferred)	Location B	Location C	No Action
Operations	<p>Negligible impacts to site management capabilities from low-level radioactive waste (LLW) and hazardous waste generation.</p> <p>The triuranium octaoxide (U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub>) produced would generate about 7,850 yd<sup>3</sup> (6,000 m<sup>3</sup>)/yr of LLW. This is 83% of Paducah's annual projected volume; potentially large impact on site LLW management.</p> <p>If HF is neutralized to CaF<sub>2</sub>, generation of about 4,900 yd<sup>3</sup>/yr (3,800 m<sup>3</sup>/yr) of CaF<sub>2</sub>.</p> <p>Generation of transuranic (TRU) waste unlikely under current proposals.</p>	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	<p>No impacts from LLW generation; less than 1% of annual site totals for each.</p> <p>Low-level radioactive mixed waste (LLMW) generated from cylinder stripping and painting operations could generate less than a 1% increase in site LLMW, resulting in a negligible impact to on-site waste operations.</p>

**TABLE 2.4-1 (Cont.)**

Environmental Consequence	Proposed Action			
	Location A (Preferred)	Location B	Location C	No Action
<b><i>Resource Requirements<sup>h</sup></i></b>				
Construction and operations	No effects on local, regional, or national availability of materials required are expected.	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	No effects on local, regional, or national availability of materials required are expected.
<b><i>Land Use</i></b>				
Construction and operations	Up to 45 acres (18 ha) would be disturbed, with 10 acres (4 ha) permanently altered, representing about 1% of available land already developed for industrial purposes, resulting in negligible impacts to land use.	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	Reconstruction of one existing cylinder storage yard within the boundaries of existing yards is planned; negligible impacts to land use.
<b><i>Cultural Resources</i></b>				
Construction and operations	Impacts to cultural resources are possible; archaeological and architectural surveys have not been completed and must be initiated prior to initiation of the proposed action.	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	Impacts would be unlikely because the storage yards are located in previously disturbed areas already dedicated to cylinder storage.

**TABLE 2.4-1 (Cont.)**

Environmental Consequence	Proposed Action			
	Location A (Preferred)	Location B	Location C	No Action
<i>Environmental Justice</i>				
Construction and operations	No disproportionately high and adverse impacts to minority or low-income populations in the general public during normal operations or from accidents.	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	No disproportionately high and adverse impacts to minority or low-income populations in the general public during normal operations or from accidents.
<i>Conversion of ETTP Cylinders at Paducah (option)</i>				
Cylinder preparation				
Location of cylinder preparation activities	ETTP: approximately 5,900 ETTP cylinders prepared for shipment to Paducah.	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	NA
Impacts from using cylinder overpacks	No facility construction required; operational impacts limited to external radiation exposure of involved workers; total collective dose to the worker population of 69 to 85 person-rem at ETTP, with no LCFs expected.	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	NA

**TABLE 2.4-1 (Cont.)**

Environmental Consequence	Proposed Action			
	Location A (Preferred)	Location B	Location C	No Action
Impacts from using cylinder transfer facility	<p>Construction of a transfer facility would be required at ETPP.</p> <p>Operational impacts would generally be small and limited primarily to external radiation exposure of involved workers; total collective dose to the worker population of 440 to 480 person-rem at ETPP, with no LCFs expected.</p>	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	NA
Impact of extended conversion operations	<p>If ETPP cylinders were transported to Paducah, the operational period would extend to 28 years. Annual impacts would be the same as discussed for each technical discipline. No significant increase in overall impacts is expected.</p>	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	NA



**TABLE 2.4-1 (Cont.)**

Environmental Consequence	Proposed Action			
	Location A (Preferred)	Location B	Location C	No Action
<b><i>Decontamination and Decommissioning</i></b>				
Activities involved	Disassembly and removal of all radioactive and hazardous components, equipment, and structures, with the objective of completely dismantling the various buildings and achieving greenfield (unrestricted use) conditions.	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	NA
Human health and safety impacts	Decontamination and decommissioning (D&D) impacts primarily limited to external radiation exposure of involved workers; expected exposures would be a small fraction of operational doses; no LCFs expected.  No fatalities from occupational accidents expected; up to 5 injuries.	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	NA

**TABLE 2.4-1 (Cont.)**

Environmental Consequence	Proposed Action			
	Location A (Preferred)	Location B	Location C	No Action
Other impacts	Generation of LLW, LLMW, and hazardous waste; approximately 90% of D&D materials generated are expected to be clean.	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	NA
<i>Impacts Associated with Conversion Product Sale</i>				
Products potentially marketed	HF and/or CaF <sub>2</sub>	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	NA
Annual Paducah production	55% HF solution: 11,000 t/yr (12,000 tons/yr)	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	NA
	CaF <sub>2</sub> : 24 t/yr (26 tons/yr)	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	NA
CaF <sub>2</sub> produced if HF is neutralized	11,800 t/yr (13,000 tons/yr)	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	NA
Maximum estimated radiation dose to a worker from HF or CaF <sub>2</sub> use	<1 mrem/yr	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	NA
Potential socioeconomic impacts from use	Negligible socioeconomic impacts	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	NA

**Footnotes on next page.**

**TABLE 2.4-1 (Cont.)**

- 
- <sup>a</sup> Potential environmental impacts are summarized and compared in this table for the no action alternative and the action alternatives. For the action alternatives, impacts are presented for the three alternative locations within the site; annual impacts are based on the assumption of a 25-year operational period. For the no action alternative, annual impacts are based on the assumption of a 40-year operational period. Potential impacts associated with expanding throughput through process improvements and with extending the operational period would be similar to those presented for the base design.
  - <sup>b</sup> Chemical exposures for involved workers during normal operations were not estimated; the workplace environment would be monitored to ensure that airborne chemical concentrations were below applicable exposure limits.
  - <sup>c</sup> On the basis of calculations performed for this EIS, the accidents that are listed in this table have been found to have the highest consequences of all the accidents analyzed. In general, accidents that have lower probabilities have higher consequences.
  - <sup>d</sup> The ranges in accident impacts reflect differences in possible atmospheric conditions at the time of the accident.
  - <sup>e</sup> In addition to noninvolved worker impacts, chemical and radiological exposures for involved workers under accident conditions (workers within 100 m [328 ft] of a release) would depend in part on specific circumstances of the accident. Involved worker fatalities and injuries resulting from the accident initiator or the accident itself are possible.
  - <sup>f</sup> NA = not applicable.
  - <sup>g</sup> The guideline concentration used for comparison with estimated surface water and groundwater uranium concentrations is the former proposed EPA maximum concentration limit (MCL) of 20 µg/L; a revised value of 30 µg/L became effective in December 2003. These values are applicable for water “at the tap” of the user and are not directly applicable for surface water or groundwater (no such standard exists). The guideline concentration used for comparison with estimated soil uranium concentrations is a health-based guideline value for residential settings of 230 µg/g.
  - <sup>h</sup> Resources evaluated include construction materials (e.g., concrete, steel, special coatings), fuel, electricity, process chemicals, and containers (e.g., drums and cylinders).

**TABLE 3.1-3 National Ambient Air Quality Standards, Kentucky State Ambient Air Quality Standards, Maximum Allowable Increments for Prevention of Significant Deterioration, and Highest Background Levels Representative of the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant**

Pollutant <sup>a</sup>	Averaging Time	NAAQS/SAAQS <sup>b</sup>		PSD Increment <sup>d</sup> ( $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$ )		Highest Background Level	
		Value	Type <sup>c</sup>	Class I	Class II	Concentration <sup>e</sup>	Location (Year)
SO <sub>2</sub>	3 hours	0.50 ppm (1,300 $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$ )	S	25	512	0.065 ppm (13%)	Grahamville (1999)
	24 hours	0.14 ppm (365 $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$ )	P	5	91	0.033 ppm (24%)	Grahamville (1997)
	Annual	0.03 ppm (80 $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$ )	P	2	20	0.005 ppm (17%)	Grahamville (1999)
NO <sub>2</sub>	Annual	0.053 ppm (100 $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$ )	P, S	2.5	25	0.012 ppm (23%)	Paducah (1998)
CO <sup>f</sup>	1 hour	35 ppm (40 mg/m <sup>3</sup> )	P, S	– <sup>g</sup>	–	6.1 ppm (17%)	Paducah (1997)
	8 hours	9 ppm (10 mg/m <sup>3</sup> )	P, S	–	–	2.9 ppm (32%)	Paducah (1997)
O <sub>3</sub>	1 hour	0.12 ppm (235 $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$ )	P, S	–	–	0.110 ppm (92%) <sup>h</sup>	Paducah (1999)
	8 hours	0.08 ppm (157 $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$ )	P, S	–	–	0.093 ppm (116%) <sup>i</sup>	Paducah (1999)
PM <sub>10</sub>	24 hours	150 $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$	P, S	8	30	79 $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$ (53%) <sup>h</sup>	Paducah (2002)
	Annual	50 $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$	P, S	4	17	25 $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$ (50%)	Paducah (1999)
PM <sub>2.5</sub>	24 hours	65 $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$	P, S	–	–	31.1 $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$ (48%) <sup>h</sup>	Paducah (2002)
	Annual	15 $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$	P, S	–	–	14.7 $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$ (98%)	Paducah (2000)
Pb	Calendar quarter	1.5 $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$	P, S	–	–	0.02 $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$ (3%)	Louisville (1997)

Footnotes on next page.

**TABLE 3.1-3 (Cont.)**

- 
- <sup>a</sup> CO = carbon monoxide; NO<sub>2</sub> = nitrogen dioxide; O<sub>3</sub> = ozone; Pb = lead; PM<sub>2.5</sub> = particulate matter ≤2.5 μm; PM<sub>10</sub> = particulate matter ≤10 μm; and SO<sub>2</sub> = sulfur dioxide.
- <sup>b</sup> The SO<sub>2</sub> (3-hour and 24-hour) and CO standards are attained when the stated value is not exceeded more than once per year. The SO<sub>2</sub> (annual), NO<sub>2</sub>, and Pb standards are attained when the stated value is not exceeded. The O<sub>3</sub> (1-hour) standard is attained when the stated value is not exceeded more than three times in 3 years. The O<sub>3</sub> (8-hour) standard is attained when the 3-year average of the annual fourth-highest daily maximum 8-hour average concentration does not exceed the stated value. The PM<sub>10</sub> (annual) and PM<sub>2.5</sub> (annual) standards are attained when the 3-year average of the annual arithmetic means does not exceed the stated value. The PM<sub>10</sub> (24-hour) standard is attained when the 3-year average of the 99th percentile values does not exceed the stated value. The PM<sub>2.5</sub> (24-hour) standard is attained when the 3-year average of the annual 98th percentile values does not exceed the stated value.
- <sup>c</sup> P = primary standard whose limits were set to protect public health; S = secondary standard whose limits were set to protect public welfare.
- <sup>d</sup> Class I areas are specifically designated areas in which degradation of air quality is severely restricted under the Clean Air Act; Class II areas have a somewhat less stringent set of allowable emissions.
- <sup>e</sup> Values in parentheses are monitored concentrations as a percentage of NAAQS or SAAQS.
- <sup>f</sup> The NAAQS have a primary standard only; the Kentucky SAAQS, however, have a secondary standard as well.
- <sup>g</sup> A dash indicates that no standard exists.
- <sup>h</sup> Second-highest value.
- <sup>i</sup> Fourth-highest value.

Sources: 40 CFR Part 50; Kentucky Division for Air Quality (2002); 40 CFR 52.21; EPA (2003a).

**TABLE 3.1-6 Estimated Radiation Doses to Members of the General Public and Cylinder Yard Workers at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant**

Receptor	Radiation Source	Dose to Individual (mrem/yr)
Member of the general public (MEI) <sup>a</sup>	Routine site operations	
	Airborne radionuclides	0.0088 <sup>b</sup>
	Waterborne radionuclides	0.032 <sup>c</sup>
	Direct gamma radiation	0.17 <sup>d</sup>
	Ingestion of drinking water	0.00055 <sup>e</sup>
	Ingestion of wildlife	1.7 <sup>f</sup>
Cylinder yard worker	External radiation	170–427 <sup>g</sup>
Member of the public or worker	Natural background radiation around the Paducah site	95 <sup>h</sup>
DOE worker limit		2,000 <sup>i</sup>

<sup>a</sup> The MEI is assumed to reside at an off-site location that would yield the largest dose. An average person would receive a radiation dose much less than the values shown in this table.

<sup>b</sup> Radiation doses from airborne releases were estimated by using an air dispersion model and took into account exposure from external radiation, inhalation, and ingestion of foodstuffs. The MEI was assumed to be located approximately 4,003 ft (1,220 m) north of the plant site (DOE 2001b).

<sup>c</sup> Radiation doses would result from incidental ingestion of contaminated sediment in Little Bayou Creek every other day during the hunting season (DOE 2001b).

<sup>d</sup> Radiation exposure would result from frequently traveling along Dykes Road in the vicinity of the cylinder storage yards (DOE 2001b).

<sup>e</sup> The radiation dose was estimated on the basis of the assumption that the MEI consumes water supplied by the public water system at Cairo, Illinois, the closest water supply system that uses water downstream of Paducah GDP effluents (DOE 2001b).

<sup>f</sup> Radiation doses could result from ingestion of the edible portion of two average-weight deer containing the maximum detected concentrations of radionuclides (DOE 2001b).

<sup>g</sup> Range of annual dose in 2001 (Hicks 2002a).

<sup>h</sup> Average dose from natural background radiation is 105 mR/yr (DOE 2001b), which can be converted to 95 mrem/yr.

<sup>i</sup> DOE administrative procedures limit DOE workers to 2,000 mrem/yr (DOE 1992), whereas the regulatory dose limit for radiation workers is 5,000 mrem/yr (10 CFR Part 835).

**TABLE 3.1-7 Estimated Hazard Quotients for Members of the General Public near the Paducah Site under Existing Environmental Conditions<sup>a</sup>**

Environmental Medium	Parameter	Assumed Exposure Concentration	Estimated Chronic Intake (mg/kg-d)	Reference Level <sup>b</sup> (mg/kg-d)	Hazard Quotient <sup>c</sup>
Air <sup>d,e</sup>	Uranium	0.02 µg/m <sup>3</sup>	$5.7 \times 10^{-6}$	0.0003	0.019
	HF	0.096 µg/m <sup>3</sup>	$2.7 \times 10^{-5}$	0.02	0.0014
Soil <sup>f</sup>	Uranium	5.8 µg/g	$7.7 \times 10^{-5}$	0.003	0.026
Surface water <sup>e,g</sup>	Uranium	17 µg/L	$9.3 \times 10^{-6}$	0.003	0.003
	Fluoride	< 224 µg/L	$1.2 \times 10^{-4}$	0.06	0.002
Sediment <sup>e,h</sup>	Uranium	360 µg/g	$6.2 \times 10^{-6}$	0.003	0.033
	Aroclor <sup>®</sup> 1254	1.4 µg/g	$3.8 \times 10^{-7}$	0.00002	0.019
	Aroclor 1254 <sup>i</sup>	1.4 µg/g	$5.5 \times 10^{-8}$	2 (slope factor)	$1.1 \times 10^{-7}$ (cancer risk)
Groundwater <sup>j</sup>	Uranium	600 µg/L	$1.7 \times 10^{-2}$	0.003	5.7
	Fluoride	520 µg/L	$1.5 \times 10^{-2}$	0.06	0.25

- <sup>a</sup> The receptor is assumed to be a long-term resident near the site boundary or another off-site monitoring location that would have the highest concentration of the contaminant being addressed; reasonable maximum exposure conditions were assumed. Only the exposure pathway contributing the most to intake levels was considered (i.e., inhalation for air and ingestion for soil, sediment, surface water, and groundwater). Residential exposure scenarios were assumed for air, soil, and groundwater analyses; recreational exposure scenarios were assumed for surface water and sediment analyses.
- <sup>b</sup> The reference level is an estimate of the daily human exposure level that is likely to be without an appreciable risk of deleterious effects. The reference levels used in this assessment are defined in Appendix F. For the carcinogen Aroclor 1254, the slope factor is also given. Slope factors in units of (mg/kg-d)<sup>-1</sup> are multiplied by lifetime average intake to estimate excess cancer risk.
- <sup>c</sup> The hazard quotient is the ratio of the intake of the human receptor to the reference level. A hazard quotient of less than 1 indicates that adverse health effects resulting from exposure to that chemical alone are unlikely. For carcinogens, the cancer risk (intake × slope factor) is also given. Increased cancer risks of between 10<sup>-6</sup> and 10<sup>-4</sup> are considered tolerable at hazardous waste sites; risks of less than 10<sup>-6</sup> are considered negligible.
- <sup>d</sup> For the uranium air concentration, the reported concentration for uranium-238 and thorium-234 combined was used (DOE 2001b). No new HF air concentration data were available; the concentration reported in MMES (1994a,b) was used.
- <sup>e</sup> Exposure concentrations are the maximum annual averages for all monitoring locations.
- <sup>f</sup> Maximum uranium concentration from 10 facility boundary and off-site soil monitoring locations (LMES 1996a).
- <sup>g</sup> The uranium value is the maximum average surface water concentration from 20 sampling locations (DOE 2001b). No new fluoride concentration data were available; the concentration reported in MMES (1994a,b) was used.
- <sup>h</sup> Uranium sediment concentration is from LMES (1997a); PCB data are from LMES (1996a). Values reported in the 2000 environmental report are lower.
- <sup>i</sup> Parameter analyzed for carcinogenic effects; all other parameters were analyzed for noncarcinogenic effects.
- <sup>j</sup> Data are maximum detected values for monitoring and residential wells located on or near DOE property at the Paducah site (none of the wells are currently used for drinking water). The maximum uranium concentration was observed in the upper continental recharge system; the maximum fluoride concentration was from the northwest plume, MW 237 (DOE 2001b). Several additional substances (most notably TCE and Tc-99) exceeded reference levels between 1993 and 1996; listed here are only substances of particular interest for this EIS.

**TABLE 3.2-11 Employment in Anderson County by Industry in 1990 and 2000**

Sector	No. of People Employed in 1990 <sup>a</sup>	Percentage of County Total	No. of People Employed in 2000 <sup>b</sup>	Percentage of County Total	Growth Rate (%), 1990–2000
Agriculture	577 <sup>c</sup>	1.7	243 <sup>d</sup>	0.6	-8.3 <sup>e</sup>
Mining	293	0.9	60	0.2	-14.7
Construction	857	2.6	1,175	3.0	3.2
Manufacturing	11,634	34.9	10,523	26.4	-1.0
Transportation and public utilities	801	2.4	218	0.5	-12.2
Trade	5,236	15.7	4,200	10.6	-2.2
Finance, insurance, and real estate	829	2.5	1,058	2.7	2.5
Services	13,016	39.1	22,273	56.0	5.5
Total	33,299		39,797		1.8

<sup>a</sup> U.S. Bureau of the Census (1992).

<sup>b</sup> U.S. Bureau of the Census (2002b).

<sup>c</sup> These agricultural data are for 1992 and are taken from USDA (1994).

<sup>d</sup> These agricultural data are for 1997 and are taken from USDA (1999).

<sup>e</sup> Agricultural data are for 1992 and 1997.

**TABLE 3.2-12 Employment in the ETTP Region of Influence by Industry in 1990 and 2000**

Sector	No. of People Employed in 1990 <sup>a</sup>	Percentage of ROI Total	No. of People Employed in 2000 <sup>b</sup>	Percentage of ROI Total	Growth Rate (%), 1990–2000
Agriculture	4,528 <sup>c</sup>	2.2	2,545 <sup>d</sup>	1.0	-5.6 <sup>e</sup>
Mining	1,138	0.6	407	0.2	-9.8
Construction	11,185	5.5	14,416	5.8	2.6
Manufacturing	39,633	19.3	32,706	13.2	-1.9
Transportation and public utilities	11,322	5.5	6,682	2.7	-5.1
Trade	61,583	30.1	50,387	20.3	-2.0
Finance, insurance, and real estate	8,851	4.3	12,357	5.0	3.4
Services	66,279	32.3	128,299	51.7	6.8
Total	204,922		248,003		1.9

<sup>a</sup> U.S. Bureau of the Census (1992).

<sup>b</sup> U.S. Bureau of the Census (2002b).

<sup>c</sup> These agricultural data are for 1992 and are taken from USDA (1994).

<sup>d</sup> These agricultural data are for 1997 and are taken from USDA (1999).

<sup>e</sup> Agricultural data are for 1992 and 1997.

**TABLE 3.2-11 Employment in Anderson County by Industry in 1990 and 2000**

Sector	No. of People Employed in 1990 <sup>a</sup>	Percentage of County Total	No. of People Employed in 2000 <sup>b</sup>	Percentage of County Total	Growth Rate (%), 1990–2000
Agriculture	577 <sup>c</sup>	1.7	243 <sup>d</sup>	0.6	-8.3 <sup>e</sup>
Mining	293	0.9	60	0.2	-14.7
Construction	857	2.6	1,175	3.0	3.2
Manufacturing	11,634	34.9	10,523	26.4	-1.0
Transportation and public utilities	801	2.4	218	0.5	-12.2
Trade	5,236	15.7	4,200	10.6	-2.2
Finance, insurance, and real estate	829	2.5	1,058	2.7	2.5
Services	13,016	39.1	22,273	56.0	5.5
Total	33,299		39,797		1.8

<sup>a</sup> U.S. Bureau of the Census (1992).

<sup>b</sup> U.S. Bureau of the Census (2002b).

<sup>c</sup> These agricultural data are for 1992 and are taken from USDA (1994).

<sup>d</sup> These agricultural data are for 1997 and are taken from USDA (1999).

<sup>e</sup> Agricultural data are for 1992 and 1997.

**TABLE 3.2-12 Employment in the ETTP Region of Influence by Industry in 1990 and 2000**

Sector	No. of People Employed in 1990 <sup>a</sup>	Percentage of ROI Total	No. of People Employed in 2000 <sup>b</sup>	Percentage of ROI Total	Growth Rate (%), 1990–2000
Agriculture	4,528 <sup>c</sup>	2.2	2,545 <sup>d</sup>	1.0	-5.6 <sup>e</sup>
Mining	1,138	0.6	407	0.2	-9.8
Construction	11,185	5.5	14,416	5.8	2.6
Manufacturing	39,633	19.3	32,706	13.2	-1.9
Transportation and public utilities	11,322	5.5	6,682	2.7	-5.1
Trade	61,583	30.1	50,387	20.3	-2.0
Finance, insurance, and real estate	8,851	4.3	12,357	5.0	3.4
Services	66,279	32.3	128,299	51.7	6.8
Total	204,922		248,003		1.9

<sup>a</sup> U.S. Bureau of the Census (1992).

<sup>b</sup> U.S. Bureau of the Census (2002b).

<sup>c</sup> These agricultural data are for 1992 and are taken from USDA (1994).

<sup>d</sup> These agricultural data are for 1997 and are taken from USDA (1999).

<sup>e</sup> Agricultural data are for 1992 and 1997.

**TABLE 3.2-16 Public Service Employment in the City of Knoxville, ETTP Region-of-Influence Counties, and Tennessee in 2001**

Employment Category	City of Knoxville		Knox County		Clinton			
	No. of Workers	Level of Service <sup>a</sup>	No. of Workers	Level of Service <sup>a</sup>	No. of Workers	Level of Service <sup>a</sup>		
Police	429	2.5	495	2.3	24	2.5		
Fire <sup>b</sup>	334	1.91.91	0	0.0	18	1.9		
General	907	5.2	2,505	11.8	58	6.1		
Total	1,670	9.6	3,000	14.1	100	10.6		

Employment Category	Lake City		City of Oak Ridge		Anderson County		Tennessee <sup>c</sup>
	No. of Workers	Level of Service <sup>a</sup>	No. of Workers	Level of Service <sup>a</sup>	No. of Workers	Level of Service	Level of Service
Police	7	3.8	56	2.0	93	2.8	2.4
Fire <sup>b</sup>	3	1.6	42	1.5	0	0.0	1.1
General	19	10.2	256	9.3	336	10.2	39.1
Total	29	15.6	354	12.9	429	13.0	52.6

<sup>a</sup> Level of service represents the number of employees per 1,000 persons in each jurisdiction (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2002a).

<sup>b</sup> Volunteers not included.

<sup>c</sup> 2000 data.

Sources: City of Knoxville: Hatfield (2002); Knox County: Rodgers (2002), Parolari (2002); Clinton: Shootman (2002); Lake City: Hayden (2002); City of Oak Ridge: McGinnis (2002); Anderson County: Worthington (2002); Tennessee: U.S. Bureau of the Census (2002d).

**TABLE 3.2-17 Number of Physicians in Knox and Anderson Counties and Tennessee in 1997**

Employment Category	Knox County		Anderson County		Tennessee
	No.	Level of Service <sup>a</sup>	No.	Level of Service <sup>a</sup>	Level of Service <sup>a</sup>
Physicians	1,519	4.1	209	3.0	2.6

<sup>a</sup> Level of service represents the number of physicians per 1,000 persons in each jurisdiction.

Source: American Medical Association (1999).

**TABLE 3.2-16 Public Service Employment in the City of Knoxville, ETTP Region-of-Influence Counties, and Tennessee in 2001**

Employment Category	City of Knoxville		Knox County		Clinton			
	No. of Workers	Level of Service <sup>a</sup>	No. of Workers	Level of Service <sup>a</sup>	No. of Workers	Level of Service <sup>a</sup>		
Police	429	2.5	495	2.3	24	2.5		
Fire <sup>b</sup>	334	1.91.91	0	0.0	18	1.9		
General	907	5.2	2,505	11.8	58	6.1		
Total	1,670	9.6	3,000	14.1	100	10.6		
Employment Category	Lake City		City of Oak Ridge		Anderson County		Tennessee <sup>c</sup>	
	No. of Workers	Level of Service <sup>a</sup>	No. of Workers	Level of Service <sup>a</sup>	No. of Workers	Level of Service	Level of Service	
Police	7	3.8	56	2.0	93	2.8	2.4	
Fire <sup>b</sup>	3	1.6	42	1.5	0	0.0	1.1	
General	19	10.2	256	9.3	336	10.2	39.1	
Total	29	15.6	354	12.9	429	13.0	52.6	

<sup>a</sup> Level of service represents the number of employees per 1,000 persons in each jurisdiction (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2002a).

<sup>b</sup> Volunteers not included.

<sup>c</sup> 2000 data.

Sources: City of Knoxville: Hatfield (2002); Knox County: Rodgers (2002), Parolari (2002); Clinton: Shootman (2002); Lake City: Hayden (2002); City of Oak Ridge: McGinnis (2002); Anderson County: Worthington (2002); Tennessee: U.S. Bureau of the Census (2002d).

**TABLE 3.2-17 Number of Physicians in Knox and Anderson Counties and Tennessee in 1997**

Employment Category	Knox County		Anderson County		Tennessee
	No.	Level of Service <sup>a</sup>	No.	Level of Service <sup>a</sup>	Level of Service <sup>a</sup>
Physicians	1,519	4.1	209	3.0	2.6

<sup>a</sup> Level of service represents the number of physicians per 1,000 persons in each jurisdiction.

Source: American Medical Association (1999).

**TABLE 3.2-18 School District Data for Knox and Anderson Counties and Tennessee in 2001**

Employment Category	Knox County		Anderson County		Tennessee
	No.	Student-to-Teacher Ratio <sup>a</sup>	No.	Student-to-Teacher Ratio <sup>a</sup>	Student-to-Teacher Ratio <sup>a</sup>
Teachers	3,380	15.4	488	12.5	15.8

<sup>a</sup> The number of students per teacher in each school district.

Source: Tennessee Department of Education (2001).

**TABLE 3.2-19 Medical Facility Data for Knox and Anderson Counties in 1998**

Hospital	No. of Staffed Beds	Occupancy Rate (%) <sup>a</sup>
<b><i>Knox County</i></b>		
Baptist Hospital of East Tennessee	316	66
East Tennessee Children's Hospital	103	67
County total	319	NA <sup>b</sup>
<b><i>Anderson County</i></b>		
Methodist Medical Center of Oak Ridge	250	72
Ridgeview Psychiatric Hospital and Center	20	35
County total	270	NA

<sup>a</sup> Percent of staffed beds occupied.

<sup>b</sup> NA = not available.

Source: Healthcare InfoSource, Inc. (1998).

**TABLE 3.2-18 School District Data for Knox and Anderson Counties and Tennessee in 2001**

Employment Category	Knox County		Anderson County		Tennessee
	No.	Student-to-Teacher Ratio <sup>a</sup>	No.	Student-to-Teacher Ratio <sup>a</sup>	Student-to-Teacher Ratio <sup>a</sup>
Teachers	3,380	15.4	488	12.5	15.8

<sup>a</sup> The number of students per teacher in each school district.

Source: Tennessee Department of Education (2001).

**TABLE 3.2-19 Medical Facility Data for Knox and Anderson Counties in 1998**

Hospital	No. of Staffed Beds	Occupancy Rate (%) <sup>a</sup>
<b><i>Knox County</i></b>		
Baptist Hospital of East Tennessee	316	66
East Tennessee Children's Hospital	103	67
County total	319	NA <sup>b</sup>
<b><i>Anderson County</i></b>		
Methodist Medical Center of Oak Ridge	250	72
Ridgeview Psychiatric Hospital and Center	20	35
County total	270	NA

<sup>a</sup> Percent of staffed beds occupied.

<sup>b</sup> NA = not available.

Source: Healthcare InfoSource, Inc. (1998).

**TABLE 3.2-3 National Ambient Air Quality Standards, Tennessee State Ambient Air Quality Standards, Maximum Allowable Increments for Prevention of Significant Deterioration, and Highest Background Levels Representative of the ETTP Site**

Pollutant <sup>a</sup>	Averaging Time	NAAQS/SAAQS <sup>b</sup>		PSD Increments <sup>d</sup> ( $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$ )		Highest Background Level	
		Value	Type <sup>c</sup>	Class I	Class II	Concentration <sup>e</sup>	Location (Year)
SO <sub>2</sub>	3 hours	0.50 ppm (1,300 $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$ )	S	25	512	0.109 ppm (22%)	Rockwood (1998)
	24 hours	0.14 ppm (365 $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$ )	P	5	91	0.031 ppm (22%)	Rockwood (2001)
	Annual	0.03 ppm (80 $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$ )	P	2	20	0.003 ppm (10%)	Oak Ridge (2000)
NO <sub>2</sub>	Annual	0.053 ppm (100 $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$ )	P, S	2.5	25	0.008 ppm (15%)	Oak Ridge (2000)
CO <sup>f</sup>	1 hour	35 ppm (40 $\text{mg}/\text{m}^3$ )	P, S	— <sup>g</sup>	—	11.1 ppm (32%)	Knoxville (1999)
	8 hours	9 ppm (10 $\text{mg}/\text{m}^3$ )	P, S	—	—	4.9 ppm (54%)	Knoxville (1997)
O <sub>3</sub>	1 hour	0.12 ppm (235 $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$ )	P, S	—	—	0.116 ppm (97%) <sup>h</sup>	Oak Ridge (1999)
	8 hours	0.08 ppm (157 $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$ )	P, S	—	—	0.099 ppm (124%) <sup>i</sup>	Anderson County (2002)
PM <sub>10</sub>	24 hours	150 $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$	P, S	8	30	69.9 $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$ (47%)	ETTP (2000)
	Annual	50 $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$	P, S	4	17	23.2 $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$ (46%)	ETTP (2000)
PM <sub>2.5</sub>	24 hours	65 $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$	P, S	—	—	50.4 $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$ (78%) <sup>h</sup>	Harriman (2000)
	Annual	15 $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$	P, S	—	—	18.4 $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$ (123%)	Harriman (2000)
Pb	Calendar quarter	1.5 $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$	P, S	—	—	0.0063 $\mu\text{g}/\text{m}^3$ (0.4%)	ETTP (2000)

Footnotes on next page.

**TABLE 3.2-3 (Cont.)**

- 
- <sup>a</sup> CO = carbon monoxide; NO<sub>2</sub> = nitrogen dioxide; O<sub>3</sub> = ozone; Pb = lead; PM<sub>2.5</sub> = particulate matter ≤2.5 μm; PM<sub>10</sub> = particulate matter ≤10 μm; and SO<sub>2</sub> = sulfur dioxide.
- <sup>b</sup> The SO<sub>2</sub> (3-hour and 24-hour) and CO standards are attained when the stated value is not exceeded more than once per year. The SO<sub>2</sub> (annual), NO<sub>2</sub>, and Pb standards are attained when the stated value is not exceeded. The O<sub>3</sub> (1-hour) standard is attained when the stated value is not exceeded more than three times in three years. The O<sub>3</sub> (8-hour) standard is attained when the 3-year average of the annual fourth-highest daily maximum 8-hour average concentration does not exceed the stated value. The PM<sub>10</sub> (annual) and PM<sub>2.5</sub> (annual) standards are attained when the 3-year average of the annual arithmetic means does not exceed the stated value. The PM<sub>10</sub> (24-hour) standard is attained when the 3-year average of the 99th percentile values does not exceed the stated value. The PM<sub>2.5</sub> (24-hour) standard is attained when the 3-year average of the annual 98th percentile values does not exceed the stated value.
- <sup>c</sup> P = primary standard whose limits were set to protect public health; S = secondary standard whose limits were set to protect public welfare.
- <sup>d</sup> Class I areas are specifically designated areas in which the degradation of air quality is severely restricted under the Clean Air Act; Class II areas have a somewhat less stringent set of allowable emissions.
- <sup>e</sup> Values in parentheses are monitored concentrations as a percentage of NAAQS or SAAQS.
- <sup>f</sup> The NAAQS have a primary standard only; the Tennessee SAAQS, however, have a secondary standard as well.
- <sup>g</sup> A dash indicates that no standard exists.
- <sup>h</sup> Second-highest value.
- <sup>i</sup> Fourth-highest value.

Sources: 40 CFR 50; TDEC (1999); 40 CFR 52.21; DOE (2002c); EPA (2003a).

**TABLE 3.2-6 Federal- and State-Listed Endangered, Threatened, and Special Concern Species on ORR**

Scientific Name	Common Name	Federal Status	State Status
<b>Mammals</b>			
<i>Myotis grisescens</i>	Gray bat	E	E
<i>Sorex longirostris</i>	Southeastern shrew		NM
<b>Birds</b>			
<i>Accipiter striatus</i>	Sharp-shinned hawk		NM
<i>Aimophila aestivalis</i>	Bachman's sparrow		E
<i>Anhinga anhinga</i>	Anhinga		NM
<i>Casmerodius alba</i>	Great egret		NM
<i>Circus cyaneus</i>	Northern harrier		NM
<i>Contopus borealis</i>	Olive-sided flycatcher		NM
<i>Dendroica cerulea</i>	Cerulean warbler		NM
<i>Egretta caerulea</i>	Little blue heron		NM
<i>Egretta thula</i>	Snowy egret		NM
<i>Falco peregrinus</i>	Peregrine falcon		E
<i>Heliaeetus leucocephalus</i>	Bald eagle	T	NM
<i>Lanius ludovicianus</i>	Loggerhead shrike		NM
<i>Pandion haliaetus</i>	Osprey		E
<i>Sphyrapicus varius</i>	Yellow-bellied sapsucker		NM
<b>Amphibians</b>			
<i>Hemidactylium scutatum</i>	Four-toed salamander		NM
<b>Fish</b>			
<i>Phoxinus tennesseensis</i>	Tennessee dace		NM
<b>Plants</b>			
<i>Aureolaria patula</i>	Spreading false-foxglove		T
<i>Carex gravida</i>	Heavy sedge		S
<i>Carex oxylepis pubescens</i>	Hairy sharp-scaled sedge		S
<i>Cimicifuga rubifolia</i>	Appalachian bugbane		T
<i>Cypripedium acaule</i>	Pink lady's slipper		E
<i>Delphinium exaltatum</i>	Tall larkspur		E
<i>Diervilla lonicera</i>	Northern bush-honeysuckle		T
<i>Draba ramosissima</i>	Branching whitlow-grass		S
<i>Elodea nuttallii</i>	Nuttall waterweed		S
<i>Fothergilla major</i>	Mountain witch-alder		T
<i>Hydrastis canadensis</i>	Golden seal		S
<i>Juglans cinerea</i>	Butternut		T
<i>Juncus brachycephalus</i>	Small-head rush		S
<i>Lilium canadense</i>	Canada lily		T
<i>Lilium michiganense</i>	Michigan lily		T
<i>Liparis loeselii</i>	Fen orchid		E
<i>Panax quinquefolius</i>	Ginseng		S
<i>Platanthera flava herbiola</i>	Tuberculed rein-orchid		T
<i>Ruellia purshiana</i>	Pursh's wild petunia		S
<i>Scirpus fluviatilis</i>	River bulrush		S
<i>Spiranthes lucida</i>	Shining ladies-tresses		T
<i>Thuja occidentalis</i>	Northern white cedar		S
<i>Viola tripartita</i>	Three-parted violet		S

<sup>a</sup> Status codes: E = endangered; T = threatened; NM = in need of management; S = special concern.

Source: DOE (2001c).

**TABLE 3.2-8 Estimated Hazard Quotients for Members of the Public near ETTP under Existing Environmental Conditions<sup>a</sup>**

Environmental Medium	Parameter	Assumed Exposure Concentration	Estimated Chronic Intake (mg/kg-d)	Reference Level <sup>b</sup> (mg/kg-d)	Hazard Quotient <sup>c</sup>
Air <sup>d</sup>	Uranium	0.0014 µg/m <sup>3</sup>	$3.9 \times 10^{-7}$	0.0003	0.0013
Soil <sup>e</sup>	Uranium	6.7 µg/g	$8.9 \times 10^{-5}$	0.003	0.03
Surface water <sup>f</sup>	Uranium	13 µg/L	$7.1 \times 10^{-6}$	0.003	0.0024
	Fluoride	180 µg/L	$9.9 \times 10^{-5}$	0.06	0.0016
Sediment <sup>g</sup>	Uranium	43 µg/g	$1.2 \times 10^{-5}$	0.003	0.0039
Groundwater <sup>h</sup>	Uranium	25 µg/L	$1.8 \times 10^{-4}$	0.003	0.24
	Fluoride	4,000 µg/L	$1.1 \times 10^{-2}$	0.06	1.9

<sup>a</sup> The receptor was assumed to be a long-term resident near the site boundary or another off-site monitoring location that would have the highest concentration of the contaminant being addressed; reasonable maximum exposure conditions were assumed. Only the exposure pathway contributing the most to intake levels was considered (i.e., inhalation for air and ingestion for soil, sediment, surface water, and groundwater). Residential exposure scenarios were assumed for air, soil, and groundwater analyses; recreational exposure scenarios were assumed for surface water and sediment analyses. For all environmental media, only uranium and fluoride data (of particular interest for this EIS) are presented, although other substances are also measured.

<sup>b</sup> The reference level is an estimate of the daily human exposure level that is likely to be without an appreciable risk of deleterious effects. The reference levels used in this assessment are defined in Appendix F.

<sup>c</sup> The hazard quotient is the ratio of the intake of the human receptor to the reference level. A hazard quotient of less than 1 indicates that adverse health effects resulting from exposure to that chemical alone are unlikely.

<sup>d</sup> For the uranium air concentration, the maximum average from six monitoring locations was used (DOE 2002d). HF was not measured.

<sup>e</sup> Current soil sampling data were unavailable; data presented are from LMES (LMES 1996c). No data were available for fluoride.

<sup>f</sup> For uranium, the value is the maximum average for downstream locations (DOE 2002d). Current surface water sampling data for fluoride were unavailable; data presented are from LMES (1996c).

<sup>g</sup> Current sediment sampling data were unavailable; data presented are from LMES (1996c).

<sup>h</sup> Groundwater data are not provided in the current annual site environmental report (DOE 2002c). The concentration presented for uranium is from LMES (1996c). The value is the maximum annual average for all exit pathway monitoring locations because these are the locations where the general public could most likely be exposed in the future. Alpha activity was used as a surrogate measure of the uranium concentration. The well-specific concentration for fluoride was not available; the exposure concentration given is the drinking water standard. Several wells were stated to have fluoride levels in excess of the standard (LMES 1996b). The hazard index for fluoride could therefore exceed that presented. Several additional substances exceeded drinking water standards or guidelines in 1994 and 1995 monitoring; only substances of particular interest for this EIS are listed here.

**TABLE S-2 Summary of Alternatives Considered for the Paducah Conversion Facility EIS**

Alternative	Description	Options Considered
No Action	Continued storage of the DUF <sub>6</sub> cylinders indefinitely at the Paducah site, with continued cylinder surveillance and maintenance.	None.
Proposed Action	<p>Construction and operation of a conversion facility at the Paducah site for conversion of the Paducah DUF<sub>6</sub> inventory into depleted uranium oxide (primarily U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub>) and other conversion products. This EIS assesses the potential environmental impacts from the following proposed activities:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Construction, operation, maintenance, and D&amp;D of the proposed DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion facility at the Paducah site;</li> <li>• Conversion to depleted U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> based on the proposed UDS technology;</li> <li>• Transportation of uranium conversion products and waste materials to a disposal facility;</li> <li>• Transportation and sale of the HF conversion product; and</li> <li>• Neutralization of HF to CaF<sub>2</sub> and its sale or disposal in the event that the HF product is not sold.</li> </ul>	<p><i>ETTP Cylinders:</i> This EIS considers an option of shipping DUF<sub>6</sub> and non-DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders at ETTP to Paducah.</p> <p><i>Transportation:</i> This EIS evaluates the shipment of cylinders and conversion products by both truck and rail.</p> <p><i>Expanded Operations:</i> This EIS discusses the impacts associated with potential expansion of plant operations by extending the operational period and by increasing throughput through efficiency improvements.</p>
Alternative Location A (Preferred)	Construction of the conversion facility at Location A, an area that encompasses 35 acres (14 ha) located south of the administration building and its parking lot, immediately west of and next to the primary location of the DOE cylinder yards and east of the main plant access road.	
Alternative Location B	Construction of the conversion facility at Location B, an area that encompasses 59 acres (23 ha) directly south of the Paducah maintenance building and west of the main plant access road.	
Alternative Location C	Construction of the conversion facility at Location C, an area that encompasses 53 acres (21 ha) east of the Paducah pump house and cooling towers.	

**TABLE S-3 Summary of Paducah Conversion Facility Parameters**

Parameter/Characteristic	Value
Construction start	2004
Construction period	2 years
Start of operations	2006
Operational period	25 years
Facility footprint	10 acres (4 ha)
Facility throughput	18,000 t/yr (20,000 tons/yr) DUF <sub>6</sub> (≈1,400 cylinders/yr)
Conversion products	
Depleted U <sub>3</sub> O <sub>8</sub>	14,300 t/yr (15,800 tons/yr)
CaF <sub>2</sub>	24 t/yr (26 tons/yr)
70% HF acid	3,300 t/yr (3,600 tons/yr)
49% HF acid	7,700 t/yr (8,500 tons/yr)
Steel (emptied cylinders, if not used as disposal containers)	1,980 t/yr (2,200 tons/yr)

**TABLE S-4 Summary of Proposed Conversion Product Treatment and Disposition**

Conversion Product	Packaging/Storage	Proposed Disposition	Optional Disposition
Depleted U <sub>3</sub> O <sub>8</sub>	Packaged in emptied cylinders for disposal (bulk bags are an option).	Disposal at Envirocare of Utah, Inc. <sup>a</sup>	Disposal at Nevada Test Site (NTS). <sup>a</sup>
CaF <sub>2</sub>	Packaged for sale or disposal.	Commercial sale pending DOE approval of authorized release limits, as appropriate.	Disposal at Envirocare of Utah, Inc. <sup>a</sup>
HF acid (70% and 49%)	HF would be commercial grade and stored on site until loaded into rail tank cars.	Sale to commercial HF acid supplier pending DOE approval of authorized release limits, as appropriate.	Neutralization of HF to CaF <sub>2</sub> for use or disposal.
Steel (emptied cylinders)	If bulk bags were used for U <sub>3</sub> O <sub>8</sub> disposal, emptied cylinders would be processed for disposal; otherwise used for disposal of U <sub>3</sub> O <sub>8</sub> .	Disposal at Envirocare of Utah, Inc. <sup>a</sup>	Disposal at NTS. <sup>a</sup>

<sup>a</sup> DOE plans to decide the specific disposal location(s) for the depleted U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> conversion product after additional appropriate NEPA review. Accordingly, DOE will continue to evaluate its disposal options and will consider any further information or comments relevant to that decision. DOE will give a minimum 45-day notice before making the specific disposal decision and will provide any supplemental NEPA analysis for public review and comment.

**TABLE S-3 Summary of Paducah Conversion Facility Parameters**

Parameter/Characteristic	Value
Construction start	2004
Construction period	2 years
Start of operations	2006
Operational period	25 years
Facility footprint	10 acres (4 ha)
Facility throughput	18,000 t/yr (20,000 tons/yr) DUF <sub>6</sub> (≈1,400 cylinders/yr)
Conversion products	
Depleted U <sub>3</sub> O <sub>8</sub>	14,300 t/yr (15,800 tons/yr)
CaF <sub>2</sub>	24 t/yr (26 tons/yr)
70% HF acid	3,300 t/yr (3,600 tons/yr)
49% HF acid	7,700 t/yr (8,500 tons/yr)
Steel (emptied cylinders, if not used as disposal containers)	1,980 t/yr (2,200 tons/yr)

**TABLE S-4 Summary of Proposed Conversion Product Treatment and Disposition**

Conversion Product	Packaging/Storage	Proposed Disposition	Optional Disposition
Depleted U <sub>3</sub> O <sub>8</sub>	Packaged in emptied cylinders for disposal (bulk bags are an option).	Disposal at Envirocare of Utah, Inc. <sup>a</sup>	Disposal at Nevada Test Site (NTS). <sup>a</sup>
CaF <sub>2</sub>	Packaged for sale or disposal.	Commercial sale pending DOE approval of authorized release limits, as appropriate.	Disposal at Envirocare of Utah, Inc. <sup>a</sup>
HF acid (70% and 49%)	HF would be commercial grade and stored on site until loaded into rail tank cars.	Sale to commercial HF acid supplier pending DOE approval of authorized release limits, as appropriate.	Neutralization of HF to CaF <sub>2</sub> for use or disposal.
Steel (emptied cylinders)	If bulk bags were used for U <sub>3</sub> O <sub>8</sub> disposal, emptied cylinders would be processed for disposal; otherwise used for disposal of U <sub>3</sub> O <sub>8</sub> .	Disposal at Envirocare of Utah, Inc. <sup>a</sup>	Disposal at NTS. <sup>a</sup>

<sup>a</sup> DOE plans to decide the specific disposal location(s) for the depleted U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> conversion product after additional appropriate NEPA review. Accordingly, DOE will continue to evaluate its disposal options and will consider any further information or comments relevant to that decision. DOE will give a minimum 45-day notice before making the specific disposal decision and will provide any supplemental NEPA analysis for public review and comment.

**TABLE S-5 Summary of Major EIS Data and Assumptions**

Parameter/Characteristic	Data/Assumption
<b>General</b>	
Paducah DUF <sub>6</sub> inventory	36,191 cylinders; 436,400 t (484,000 tons)
Paducah non-DUF <sub>6</sub> inventory	1,667 cylinders; 17,600 t (19,400 tons)
ETTP DUF <sub>6</sub> inventory	4,822 cylinders; 54,300 t (60,000 tons)
ETTP non-DUF <sub>6</sub> cylinder inventory	1,102 cylinders; 26 t (27 tons)
<b>No Action Alternative</b>	
	No conversion facility constructed; continued long-term storage of DUF <sub>6</sub> and non-DUF <sub>6</sub> in cylinders at Paducah.
Assessment period	Through 2039, plus long-term impacts
Construction	3 storage yards reconstructed
Cylinder management	Continued surveillance and maintenance activities consistent with current plans and procedures.
Assumed total number of future cylinder breaches:	
Controlled-corrosion case	36
Uncontrolled-corrosion case	444
<b>Action Alternatives</b>	
	Build and operate a conversion facility at the Paducah site for conversion of the Paducah DUF <sub>6</sub> inventory.
Construction start	2004
Construction period	≈2 years
Start of operations	2006
Operational period	25 years (28 years if ETTP cylinders are converted at Paducah)
Facility footprint	10 acres (4 ha)
Facility throughput	18,000 t/yr (20,000 tons/yr) DUF <sub>6</sub>
Conversion products	
Depleted U <sub>3</sub> O <sub>8</sub>	14,300 t/yr (15,800 tons/yr)
CaF <sub>2</sub>	24 t/yr (26 tons/yr)
70% HF acid	3,300 t/yr (3,600 tons/yr)
49% HF acid	7,700 t/yr (8,500 tons/yr)
Steel (empty cylinders, if not used as disposal containers)	1,980 t/yr (2,200 tons/yr)

**TABLE S-6 Summary Comparison of Potential Environmental Consequences of the Alternatives<sup>a</sup>**

Environmental Consequence	Proposed Action			
	Location A (Preferred)	Location B	Location C	No Action
<i>Human Health and Safety — Normal Facility Operations</i>				
<b>Radiation exposure</b>				
Construction				
Involved workers	Potential external radiation exposures (above background) because of proximity to cylinder storage yards. Estimated maximum annual individual worker dose of 35 mrem/yr over a 2-year construction period.	Background	Potential external radiation exposures (above background) because of proximity to cylinder storage yards. Estimated maximum annual individual worker dose of 40 mrem/yr over a 2-year construction period.	Potential external radiation exposures (above background) to construction workers for yard reconstruction because of proximity to cylinder storage yards. Estimated maximum total individual worker dose is 230 mrem/yr.
Operations				
Involved workers				
Average dose to individual involved workers	Conversion facility: 75 mrem/yr Cylinder yards: 430–690 mrem/yr	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	740 mrem/yr
Collective dose to involved workers	Conversion facility: 10.7 person-rem/yr Cylinder yards: 3–6 person-rem/yr	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	33 person-rem/yr

**TABLE S-6 (Cont.)**

Environmental Consequence	Proposed Action			
	Location A (Preferred)	Location B	Location C	No Action
Total health effects among involved workers for the life of the project (through 2039 for no action)	1 in 7 chance of 1 latent cancer fatality (LCF)	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	1 in 2 chance of 1 LCF
Noninvolved workers				
Maximum dose to noninvolved worker maximally exposed individual (MEI)	$1 \times 10^{-5}$ mrem/yr	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	0.15 mrem/yr
Collective dose to noninvolved workers	$<1.9 \times 10^{-5}$ person-rem/yr	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	0.003 person-rem/yr
Total health effects among noninvolved workers for the life of the project (through 2039 for no action)	<1 in 1 million chance of 1 LCF	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	<1 in 100,000 chance of 1 LCF
General public				
Maximum dose to the general public MEI	$<3.9 \times 10^{-5}$ mrem/yr	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	<0.1 mrem/yr (during storage) <0.5 mrem/yr (long-term)
Collective dose to the general public within 50 mi (80 km)	$4.7 \times 10^{-5}$ person-rem/yr	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	0.008 person-rem/yr
Total health effects among members of the public over the life of the project (through 2039 for no action)	<1 chance in 1 million of 1 LCF	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	1 chance in 7,000 of 1 LCF

**TABLE S-6 (Cont.)**

Environmental Consequence	Proposed Action			
	Location A (Preferred)	Location B	Location C	No Action
<b>Chemical exposure of concern<sup>b</sup> (concern = hazard index &gt;1)</b>				
Noninvolved worker MEI	Well below levels expected to cause health effects (hazard index <0.1).	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	Well below levels expected to cause health effects (hazard index <0.1).
General public MEI	Well below levels expected to cause health effects (hazard index <0.1).	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	Well below levels expected to cause health effects (hazard index <0.1).
<i>Human Health and Safety — Facility Accidents<sup>c</sup></i>				
<b>Physical hazards (involved and noninvolved workers)</b>				
Construction: on-the-job fatalities and injuries	0 fatalities; 11 injuries	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	0 fatalities; 2 injuries
Operations: on-the-job fatalities and injuries	0 fatalities/yr; 8 injuries/yr	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	0 fatalities/yr; 2 injuries/yr

**TABLE S-6 (Cont.)**

Environmental Consequence	Proposed Action			
	Location A (Preferred)	Location B	Location C	No Action
<b>Accidents involving chemical or radiation releases, low frequency-high consequence accidents</b>				
Bounding chemical accident	Anhydrous ammonia (NH <sub>3</sub> ) tank rupture	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	Cylinder ruptures – fire (high for adverse effects); corroded cylinder spill, wet conditions (high for irreversible adverse effects).
Release amount	29,500 lb (13,400 kg) of NH <sub>3</sub>	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	24,000 lb (11,000 kg) of DUF <sub>6</sub> (fire); 96 lb (44 kg) of HF (spill, wet conditions)
Estimated frequency	<1 time in 1,000,000 years	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	≈1 time in 100,000 years (both accidents)
Probability – life of the project (through 2039 for no action)	<1 chance in 40,000	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	≈1 chance in 2,500
Consequences (per accident) <sup>d</sup>				
Chemical exposure – public				
Adverse effects	26–4,800 persons	14–4,900 persons	17–6,700 persons	0–2,000 persons
Irreversible adverse effects	2–370 persons	0–320 persons	1–220 persons	0–1 person
Fatalities	0–7 persons	0–6 persons	0–4 persons	0 persons

**TABLE S-6 (Cont.)**

Environmental Consequence	Proposed Action			
	Location A (Preferred)	Location B	Location C	No Action
Chemical exposure – noninvolved workers <sup>e</sup>				
Adverse effects	1,100–1,600 persons	1,100–1,400 persons	1,400–1,600 persons	4–910 persons
Irreversible adverse effects	600–1,600 persons	730–1,400 persons	130–1,600 persons	1–300 persons
Fatalities	0–30 persons	0–30 persons	0–30 persons	0–3 persons
Accident risk (consequence × probability)				
General public	0 fatalities	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	0 fatalities
Noninvolved workers <sup>e</sup>	0 fatalities	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	0 fatalities
Bounding radiological accident	Earthquake accident damages U <sub>3</sub> O <sub>8</sub> storage building containing 6 months’ of product.	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	Cylinder ruptures – fire
Release amount	180 lb (82 kg) of depleted U <sub>3</sub> O <sub>8</sub>	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	24,000 lb (11,000 kg) of UF <sub>6</sub>
Estimated frequency	≈1 time in 100,000 years	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	≈1 time in 100,000 years
Probability – life of the project (through 2039 for no action)	≈1 chance in 4000	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	≈1 chance in 2,500
Consequences (per accident)				
Radiation exposure – public				
Dose to MEI	2–40 rem	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	15 mrem
Risk of LCF	1 chance in 50	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	7 in 1 million
Total dose to population	13–73 person-rem	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	29 person-rem
Total LCFs	1 chance in 40 of 1 LCF	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	1 chance in 70 of 1 LCF

**TABLE S-6 (Cont.)**

Environmental Consequence	Proposed Action			
	Location A (Preferred)	Location B	Location C	No Action
Radiation exposure – noninvolved workers <sup>e</sup>				
Dose to MEI	2–40 rem	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	20 mrem
Risk of LCF	1 chance in 50	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	8 in 1 million
Total dose to workers	0.2–530 person-rem	0.5–1,300 person-rem	0.1–300 person-rem	15 person-rem
Total LCFs	1 chance in 5 of 1 LCF	1 chance in 2 of 1 LCF	1 chance in 8 of 1 LCF	1 chance in 170 of 1 LCF
Accident risk (consequence × probability)				
General public	0 LCFs	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	0 LCFs
Noninvolved workers <sup>e</sup>	0 LCFs	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	0 LCFs
<b>Human Health and Safety — Transportation</b>				
<b>Transportation impacts during normal operations</b>				Negligible impacts due to small number of shipments (1 shipment/yr) and low concentration of expected contamination.
Total fatalities from exposure to vehicle exhaust emissions				
Maximum use of truck	20 (30 if hydrogen fluoride [HF] is neutralized to calcium fluoride [CaF <sub>2</sub> ] for disposal)	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	Negligible
Maximum use of rail	<1 (1 if HF is neutralized to CaF <sub>2</sub> )	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	Negligible

**TABLE S-6 (Cont.)**

Environmental Consequence	Proposed Action			
	Location A (Preferred)	Location B	Location C	No Action
Total fatalities from exposure to external radiation				
Maximum use of truck	<1	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	Negligible
Maximum use of rail	<1	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	Negligible
Maximum radiation exposure to a person along a route (MEI)	Negligible (<0.045 mrem)	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	Negligible
Traffic accident fatalities (life of the project); (physical hazards, unrelated to cargo)				
Maximum use of truck	2 (4 if CaF <sub>2</sub> shipped for disposal)	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	Negligible
Maximum use of rail	1 (including CaF <sub>2</sub> )	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	Negligible
<b>Traffic accidents involving radiation or chemical releases</b>				
Low frequency-high consequence cylinder accidents				NA <sup>f</sup>
Bounding accident scenario	Urban rail accident involving DUF <sub>6</sub> cylinders (only if East Tennessee Technology Park [ETTP] cylinders are shipped to Paducah by rail).	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	NA
Release	Uranium, HF	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	NA

**TABLE S-6 (Cont.)**

Environmental Consequence	Proposed Action			
	Location A (Preferred)	Location B	Location C	No Action
Probability – life of the project	≈1 chance in 120,000	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	NA
Consequences (per accident)				
Chemical exposure – all workers and members of general public				
Irreversible adverse effects	4	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	NA
Fatalities	0	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	NA
Radiation exposure – all workers and members of the general public				
Total LCFs	60	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	NA
Accident risk (consequence × probability)				
Workers and the general public	0 fatalities	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	NA
Low frequency-high consequence accidents with all other materials				NA
Bounding accident scenario	Urban rail accident involving anhydrous NH <sub>3</sub>	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	NA
Release	Anhydrous NH <sub>3</sub>	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	NA
Probability – life of project	≈1 chance in 200,000	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	NA
Consequences (per accident)				
Chemical exposure – all workers and members of the general public				
Irreversible adverse effects	5,000	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	NA

**TABLE S-6 (Cont.)**

Environmental Consequence	Proposed Action			
	Location A (Preferred)	Location B	Location C	No Action
Fatalities	100	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	NA
Accident risk (consequence × probability)				
Irreversible adverse effects	0	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	NA
Fatalities	0	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	NA
<i>Air Quality and Noise</i>				
Pollutant emissions during conversion facility construction	Total (modeled plus background) concentrations for particulate matter (PM) with an aerodynamic diameter of less than or equal to 10 and 2.5 μm, respectively (PM <sub>10</sub> and PM <sub>2.5</sub> ), would exceed standards at the construction site boundary because of the high background concentrations; construction-related concentrations would be negligible at the nearest residence. Other criteria pollutants are well within standards.	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	For yard reconstruction, the maximum 24-hour PM <sub>10</sub> concentration is up to 90% of the standard; other criteria pollutants are well within standards.

**TABLE S-6 (Cont.)**

Environmental Consequence	Proposed Action			
	Location A (Preferred)	Location B	Location C	No Action
Pollutant emissions during conversion facility operations	<p>Average-annual PM<sub>2.5</sub> concentrations close to standards because of high background concentrations; operations-related concentrations would be negligible at the nearest residence. Other criteria pollutants would be well within standards.</p> <p>No concentration increment would exceed applicable prevention of significant deterioration (PSD) increments at the site boundary (for Class II area), and all increments would well below the PSD increment for the nearest Class I area.</p>	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	<p>Under the controlled cylinder corrosion scenario, the maximum 24-hour HF concentration would be less than 3% of the Commonwealth of Kentucky secondary standard; criteria pollutants would be well within standards.</p> <p>Under the uncontrolled cylinder corrosion scenario, the maximum 24-hour HF concentration at the site boundary could be up to 69% of the Commonwealth of Kentucky secondary standard.</p>

**TABLE S-6 (Cont.)**

Environmental Consequence	Proposed Action			
	Location A (Preferred)	Location B	Location C	No Action
Estimated noise levels at the nearest residence	Below the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) guideline of 55 dB(A) as day-night average sound level (DNL) during construction and operation.	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	Below the EPA guideline of 55 dB(A) as DNL during construction and operation.
<i>Water and Soil</i>				
Surface water Construction	Negligible impacts from changes to runoff, from floodplains, or from water use and discharge.	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	Negligible impacts from changes to runoff, from floodplains, or from water use and discharge.
Operations	Negligible impacts from water use and discharge.	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	Negligible impacts from water use and discharge.
Groundwater Construction	No direct impacts to groundwater recharge, depth, or flow direction; impacts to groundwater quality unlikely.	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	No direct impacts to groundwater recharge, depth, or flow direction; impacts to groundwater quality unlikely.

**TABLE S-6 (Cont.)**

Environmental Consequence	Proposed Action			
	Location A (Preferred)	Location B	Location C	No Action
Operations	No direct impacts to groundwater recharge, depth, or flow direction; impacts to groundwater quality unlikely.	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	<p>Under the controlled corrosion case, maximum uranium groundwater concentration (occurring in around 2070) of 6 µg/L, below the guideline of 20 µg/L.<sup>g</sup></p> <p>Under the uncontrolled corrosion case, cylinder breaches occurring before 2020 could result in groundwater concentrations exceeding the guideline sometime after 2100.</p>
Soils Construction	Local and temporary increase in erosion; impacts to soil quality unlikely. Potentially contaminated soil associated with solid waste management unit (SWMU) 194 could be excavated.	Same as Location A	Local and temporary increase in erosion; impacts to soil quality unlikely.	Local and temporary increase in erosion; impacts to soil quality unlikely.
Operations	No direct impacts to soil.	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	Negligible impacts to soils.

-----

**TABLE S-6 (Cont.)**

Environmental Consequence	Proposed Action			
	Location A (Preferred)	Location B	Location C	No Action
<i>Socioeconomics</i>				
Construction	Direct employment of 190 people in peak year; 290 total jobs in the region of influence (ROI); total personal income of \$9.5 million in peak year; marginal impacts on public services. Two-year duration of impacts.	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	Direct employment of 30 people; 110 total jobs in ROI; total personal income of \$3.2 million; no significant impacts on public services.
Operations	Direct employment of 160 people; 330 total jobs in ROI; total personal income of \$13 million per year; no significant impacts on public services.	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	Direct employment of 90 people; 130 total jobs in ROI; total personal income of \$3.8 million per year through 2039; no significant impacts on public services.

**TABLE S-6 (Cont.)**

Environmental Consequence	Proposed Action			
	Location A (Preferred)	Location B	Location C	No Action
<i>Ecology</i>				
Ecological resources (habitat loss, vegetation, wildlife)	Total area disturbed during construction: 45 acres (18 ha).  Vegetation and wildlife communities impacted and potential loss of habitat; impacts could be minimized by facility placement.	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	Negligible impact to ecological resources; all activities would occur in previously developed areas; however, there is a potential for impacts to aquatic biota from cylinder yard runoff during painting activities.
Concentrations of chemical or radioactive materials	Well below harmful levels; negligible impacts on vegetation and wildlife.	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	Potential for adverse impacts to aquatic biota associated with cylinder painting.
Wetlands	Potential direct and indirect impacts to wetlands from facility construction; impacts could be minimized by facility placement.	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	Negligible impacts

**TABLE S-6 (Cont.)**

Environmental Consequence	Proposed Action			
	Location A (Preferred)	Location B	Location C	No Action
Threatened or endangered species	No direct impacts from construction or operations; destruction of trees with exfoliating bark could indirectly impact the Indiana bat by destroying roosting habitat.	Same as Location A	Same as Location A; in addition; construction in the eastern portion of Location C could impact potential habitat for wild indigo and compass plant.	Negligible impacts
<i>Waste Management</i>				
Construction	Minimal impacts to site waste management capabilities from construction-generated waste.  Potentially contaminated soil associated with SWMU 194 could be excavated and require management and disposal.	Same as Location A	Same as Location A, except contaminated soil unlikely.	Negligible impacts from yard reconstruction.

**TABLE S-6 (Cont.)**

Environmental Consequence	Proposed Action			
	Location A (Preferred)	Location B	Location C	No Action
Operations	<p>Negligible impacts to site management capabilities from low-level radioactive waste (LLW) and hazardous waste generation.</p> <p>The triuranium octaoxide (U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub>) produced would generate about 7,850 yd<sup>3</sup> (6,000 m<sup>3</sup>)/yr of LLW. This is 83% of Paducah's annual projected volume; potentially large impact on site LLW management.</p> <p>If HF is neutralized to CaF<sub>2</sub>, generation of about 4,900 yd<sup>3</sup>/yr (3,800 m<sup>3</sup>/yr) of CaF<sub>2</sub>.</p> <p>Generation of transuranic (TRU) waste unlikely under current proposals.</p>	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	<p>No impacts from LLW generation; less than 1% of annual site totals for each.</p> <p>Low-level radioactive mixed waste (LLMW) generated from cylinder stripping and painting operations could generate less than a 1% increase in site LLMW, resulting in a negligible impact to on-site waste operations.</p>

**TABLE S-6 (Cont.)**

Environmental Consequence	Proposed Action			
	Location A (Preferred)	Location B	Location C	No Action
<b><i>Resource Requirements<sup>h</sup></i></b>				
Construction and operations	No effects on local, regional, or national availability of materials required are expected.	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	No effects on local, regional, or national availability of materials required are expected.
<b><i>Land Use</i></b>				
Construction and operations	Up to 45 acres (18 ha) would be disturbed, with 10 acres (4 ha) permanently altered, representing about 1% of available land already developed for industrial purposes, resulting in negligible impacts to land use.	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	Reconstruction of one existing cylinder storage yard within the boundaries of existing yards is planned; negligible impacts to land use.
<b><i>Cultural Resources</i></b>				
Construction and operations	Impacts to cultural resources are possible; archaeological and architectural surveys have not been completed and must be initiated prior to initiation of the proposed action.	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	Impacts would be unlikely because the storage yards are located in previously disturbed areas already dedicated to cylinder storage.

**TABLE S-6 (Cont.)**

Environmental Consequence	Proposed Action			
	Location A (Preferred)	Location B	Location C	No Action
<i>Environmental Justice</i>				
Construction and operations	No disproportionately high and adverse impacts to minority or low-income populations in the general public during normal operations or from accidents.	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	No disproportionately high and adverse impacts to minority or low-income populations in the general public during normal operations or from accidents.
<i>Conversion of ETTP Cylinders at Paducah (option)</i>				
Cylinder preparation				
Location of cylinder preparation activities	ETTP: approximately 5,900 ETTP cylinders prepared for shipment to Paducah.	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	NA
Impacts from using cylinder overpacks	No facility construction required; operational impacts limited to external radiation exposure of involved workers; total collective dose to the worker population of 69 to 85 person-rem at ETTP, with no LCFs expected.	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	NA

**TABLE S-6 (Cont.)**

Environmental Consequence	Proposed Action			
	Location A (Preferred)	Location B	Location C	No Action
Impacts from using cylinder transfer facility	<p>Construction of a transfer facility would be required at ETPP.</p> <p>Operational impacts would generally be small and limited primarily to external radiation exposure of involved workers; total collective dose to the worker population of 440 to 480 person-rem at ETPP, with no LCFs expected.</p>	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	NA
Impact of extended conversion operations	<p>If ETPP cylinders were transported to Paducah, the operational period would extend to 28 years. Annual impacts would be the same as discussed for each technical discipline. No significant increase in overall impacts is expected.</p>	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	NA

-----

**TABLE S-6 (Cont.)**

Environmental Consequence	Proposed Action			No Action
	Location A (Preferred)	Location B	Location C	
<b><i>Decontamination and Decommissioning</i></b>				
Activities involved	Disassembly and removal of all radioactive and hazardous components, equipment, and structures, with the objective of completely dismantling the various buildings and achieving greenfield (unrestricted use) conditions.	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	NA
Human health and safety impacts	Decontamination and decommissioning (D&D) impacts primarily limited to external radiation exposure of involved workers; expected exposures would be a small fraction of operational doses; no LCFs expected.  No fatalities from occupational accidents expected; up to 5 injuries.	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	NA

**TABLE S-6 (Cont.)**

Environmental Consequence	Proposed Action			
	Location A (Preferred)	Location B	Location C	No Action
Other impacts	Generation of LLW, LLMW, and hazardous waste; approximately 90% of D&D materials generated are expected to be clean.	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	NA
<i>Impacts Associated with Conversion Product Sale</i>				
Products potentially marketed	HF and/or CaF <sub>2</sub>	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	NA
Annual Paducah production	55% HF solution: 11,000 t/yr (12,000 tons/yr)	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	NA
	CaF <sub>2</sub> : 24 t/yr (26 tons/yr)	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	NA
CaF <sub>2</sub> produced if HF is neutralized	11,800 t/yr (13,000 tons/yr)	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	NA
Maximum estimated radiation dose to a worker from HF or CaF <sub>2</sub> use	<1mrem/yr	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	NA
Potential socioeconomic impacts from use	Negligible socioeconomic impacts	Same as Location A	Same as Location A	NA

**Footnotes on next page.**

**TABLE S-6 (Cont.)**

- 
- <sup>a</sup> Potential environmental impacts are summarized and compared in this table for the no action alternative and the action alternatives. For the action alternatives, impacts are presented for the three alternative locations within the site; annual impacts are based on the assumption of a 25-year operational period. For the no action alternative, annual impacts are based on the assumption of a 40-year operational period. Potential impacts associated with expanding throughput through process improvements and with extending the operational period would be similar to those presented for the base design.
- <sup>b</sup> Chemical exposures for involved workers during normal operations were not estimated; the workplace environment would be monitored to ensure that airborne chemical concentrations were below applicable exposure limits.
- <sup>c</sup> On the basis of calculations performed for this EIS, the accidents that are listed in this table have been found to have the highest consequences of all the accidents analyzed. In general, accidents that have lower probabilities have higher consequences.
- <sup>d</sup> The ranges in accident impacts reflect differences in possible atmospheric conditions at the time of the accident.
- <sup>e</sup> In addition to noninvolved worker impacts, chemical and radiological exposures for involved workers under accident conditions (workers within 100 m [328 ft] of a release) would depend in part on specific circumstances of the accident. Involved worker fatalities and injuries resulting from the accident initiator or the accident itself are possible.
- <sup>f</sup> NA = not applicable.
- <sup>g</sup> The guideline concentration used for comparison with estimated surface water and groundwater uranium concentrations is the former proposed EPA maximum concentration limit (MCL) of 20 µg/L; a revised value of 30 µg/L became effective in December 2003. These values are applicable for water “at the tap” of the user and are not directly applicable for surface water or groundwater (no such standard exists). The guideline concentration used for comparison with estimated soil uranium concentrations is a health-based guideline value for residential settings of 230 µg/g.
- <sup>h</sup> Resources evaluated include construction materials (e.g., concrete, steel, special coatings), fuel, electricity, process chemicals, and containers (e.g., drums and cylinders).

**APPENDIX A:**

**TEXT OF PUBLIC LAW 107-206 PERTINENT  
TO THE MANAGEMENT OF DUF<sub>6</sub>**



**APPENDIX A:****TEXT OF PUBLIC LAW 107-206 PERTINENT  
TO THE MANAGEMENT OF DUF<sub>6</sub>****Section 502 of Public Law 107-206, “2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act for Further Recovery from and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States” (signed by the President 08/02/2002)**

SEC. 502. Section 1 of Public Law 105-204 (112 Stat. 681) is amended —

(1) in subsection (b), by striking “until the date” and all that follows and inserting “until the date that is 30 days after the date on which the Secretary of Energy awards a contract under subsection (c), and no such amounts shall be available for any purpose except to implement the contract.”; and

(2) by striking subsection (c) and inserting the following:

“(c) **CONTRACTING REQUIREMENTS** —

(1) **IN GENERAL** — Notwithstanding any other provision of law (except section 1341 of title 31, United States Code), the Secretary of Energy shall —

(A) not later than 10 days after the date of enactment of this paragraph, request offerors whose proposals in response to Request for Proposals No. DE-RP05-010R22717 (‘Acquisition of Facilities and Services for Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride (DUF<sub>6</sub>) Conversion Project’) were included in the competitive range as of January 15, 2002, to confirm or reinstate the offers in accordance with this paragraph, with a deadline for offerors to deliver reinstatement or confirmation to the Secretary of Energy not later than 20 days after the date of enactment of this paragraph; and

(B) not later than 30 days after the date of enactment of this paragraph, select for award of a contract the best value of proposals confirmed or reinstated under subparagraph (A), and award a contract for the scope of work stated in the Request for Proposals, including the design, construction, and operation of —

(i) a facility described in subsection (a) on the site of the gaseous diffusion plant at Paducah, Kentucky; and

(ii) a facility described in subsection (a) on the site of the gaseous diffusion plant at Portsmouth, Ohio.

(2) **CONTRACT TERMS** — Notwithstanding any other provision of law (except section 1341 of title 31, United States Code) the Secretary of Energy shall negotiate with the awardee to modify the contract awarded under paragraph (1) to —

(A) require, as a mandatory item, that groundbreaking for construction occur not later than July 31, 2004, and that construction proceed expeditiously thereafter;

(B) include as an item of performance the transportation, conversion, and disposition of depleted uranium contained in cylinders located at the Oak Ridge K-25 uranium enrichment facility located in the East Tennessee Technology Park

at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, consistent with environmental agreements between the State of Tennessee and the Secretary of Energy; and

(C) specify that the contractor shall not proceed to perform any part of the contract unless sufficient funds have been appropriated, in advance, specifically to pay for that part of the contract.

(3) **CERTIFICATION OF GROUNDBREAKING** — Not later than 5 days after the date of groundbreaking for each facility, the Secretary of Energy shall submit to Congress a certification that groundbreaking has occurred.

(d) **FUNDING** —

(1) **IN GENERAL** — For purposes of carrying out this section, the Secretary of Energy may use any available appropriations (including transferred unobligated balances).

(2) **AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS** — There are authorized to be appropriated, in addition to any funds made available under paragraph (1), such sums as are necessary to carry out this section.”

**APPENDIX B:**

**ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH DUF<sub>6</sub> CYLINDER CONTAMINATION** |



## APPENDIX B:

### ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH DUF<sub>6</sub> CYLINDER CONTAMINATION

This appendix discusses issues associated with possible contamination of the depleted uranium hexafluoride (DUF<sub>6</sub>) within the cylinders and on the cylinders themselves. Section B.1 addresses possible contamination of the DUF<sub>6</sub> with transuranic (TRU) isotopes and technetium-99 (Tc-99). Section B.2 addresses the existence of polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) used in the paint on some portion of the cylinder inventory. References are provided in Section B.3.

#### B.1 POSSIBLE TRANSURANIC CONTAMINATION

##### B.1.1 Summary

This section addresses the concerns and impacts associated with potential contamination of DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders with TRU isotopes (these isotopes have an atomic number greater than that of uranium-92 [U-92]) and Tc-99. The extent of contamination is discussed, and potential radiological, chemical, and waste management impacts are evaluated. The results indicate that a small but unknown number of DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders in the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) inventory are likely to contain relatively high concentrations of TRU and Tc-99 in a small volume inside the cylinders. The TRU and Tc-99 concentrations in a great majority of the cylinders and in the bulk of the small number of contaminated cylinders are expected to be relatively low. The impacts associated with such low concentrations are also expected to be negligibly low (less than 10%) compared with the impacts that would be associated with DUF<sub>6</sub> in the cylinders. In addition, both the concentrations and impacts associated with TRU and Tc-99 in the conversion facility at either the Paducah, Kentucky, or Portsmouth, Ohio, site and in the conversion products are estimated to be negligibly small. However, under certain circumstances, the doses resulting from the high concentrations of TRU and Tc-99 in a small number of emptied cylinders could be relatively high. In addition, depending on how the emptied cylinders are processed and dispositioned, there may be some transuranic waste (TRUW) issues at either conversion site. However, under the proposed action and by using the cylinder disposition strategy proposed by the conversion contractor, Uranium Disposition Services, LLC (UDS), no TRUW is expected to be generated at either the Paducah or Portsmouth site.

##### B.1.2 Background

At about the time the final programmatic environmental impact statement (PEIS) for DUF<sub>6</sub> was published in April 1999 (DOE 1999), and while DOE was preparing a request for proposals (RFP) to acquire the services of a private firm to design, construct, and operate two plants at Paducah and Portsmouth to convert DOE's inventory of DUF<sub>6</sub> to a more stable

chemical form (DOE 2000a), concern was raised that some portion of DOE's DUF<sub>6</sub> inventory might be contaminated with TRU and Tc. This concern arose because in the period before 1985, some reprocessed uranium from defense production sites was fed into the diffusion cascades in the form of UF<sub>6</sub>. The reprocessed uranium was obtained from the fuel that had been irradiated in the production reactors (reactors used by the government to produce nuclear materials for weapons). This irradiation produced a large number of radionuclides that initially had not been present in the fresh fuel. These radionuclides were either TRU or fission products (radionuclides created from the fissioning of uranium atoms). When the used fuel was reprocessed to separate the wanted nuclear materials and the uranium to be used again, a small fraction of the TRU elements and a fission product, Tc-99, ended up in the uranium stream. It was thought that when the reprocessed uranium was converted to UF<sub>6</sub> and fed to the diffusion cascades for reenrichment, part of the contaminants in the uranium might have transferred into the tails cylinders (cylinders containing the DUF<sub>6</sub>). The principal isotopes of concern were two TRU isotopes, plutonium-239 (Pu-239) and neptunium-237 (Np-237), and Tc-99.

DOE wanted to determine the extent of contamination in the cylinders so that potential responders to the RFP could properly factor it into their proposals. To resolve this uncertainty, DOE commissioned Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) to develop a strategy for characterizing TRU and Tc contamination in the tails cylinders (Hightower et al. 2000). The draft strategy developed by ORNL was peer reviewed by a team of scientists and engineers from Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and Argonne National Laboratory (Brumburgh et al. 2000). The peer review team found that available data and process knowledge was sufficient to establish bounding concentrations of contaminants in the tails cylinders and that additional sampling of the cylinders would not be cost-effective. The ORNL team also concluded that additional characterization of the cylinders would not be likely to result in lower bids by prospective vendors, and that direct sampling of many older cylinders might not be practical. However, during the period December 1999 through August 2000, additional measurements were taken on 14 selected full DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders and heels cylinders (i.e., empty cylinders containing about 10 to 23 kg (22 to 50 lb) of residual DUF<sub>6</sub>, uranium decay products, and, in some cases, TRU and Tc) stored at the Paducah and Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plants. The results of these measurements were included in the final ORNL strategy document (Hightower et al. 2000).

### **B.1.3 Extent of Transuranic and Technetium Contamination in the DUF<sub>6</sub> Cylinders**

Both the ORNL team and the peer review team reviewed the previous characterization studies conducted on the tails cylinders. The ORNL team also interviewed some staff members who worked at the Portsmouth and Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant sites when the recycled uranium was being fed to the cascades. On the basis of those reviews and the characterization performed in the period December 1999 to August 2000, it was concluded that the level of contamination in the tails cylinders is very limited. The peer review team stated that the only plausible pathway for the TRU and Tc to get into the DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders was by way of the heels from prior use of the cylinders to store reactor return feed. It was discovered during the investigations that some cylinders that were used to store reprocessed UF<sub>6</sub> were emptied into the cascades for reenriching the UF<sub>6</sub>. The same cylinders were later filled with DUF<sub>6</sub> without first

being cleaned. The TRU contamination in the feed cylinders consisted mainly of nonvolatile fluorides. Therefore, they were concentrated in the heels of the feed cylinders. Any TRU isotopes that were carried into the cascades were thought to have plated out and been captured in the cascades; thus, they never made it into the tails cylinders. Similarly, nonvolatile compounds of Tc stayed in the heels, while the volatile components, because of their low molecular weight compared with UF<sub>6</sub>, moved up the cascades and either were released in the purge stream or stayed with the enriched product.

The number of reprocessed uranium feed cylinders that were later used to store DUF<sub>6</sub> was not known, but it was estimated to be in the hundreds (Hightower et al. 2000). This number represents only a portion of the total of approximately 60,000 DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders that are used to store DOE's inventory of DUF<sub>6</sub> at the three storage sites — Portsmouth, Paducah, and East Tennessee Technology Park.

It is believed that when the cylinders with contaminated heels were filled with DUF<sub>6</sub>, the liquid DUF<sub>6</sub> entering the cylinder stirred the heels and caused some fraction of the contamination to be mixed with the DUF<sub>6</sub>. It is also possible that a small fraction of the TRU that had been captured in the cascades may have revolatilized during the cascade improvement projects and was carried into some DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders. Therefore, TRU and Tc could be found both in the heels and in the bulk of a small, but unknown, number of DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders in the DOE inventory. To provide guidance to prospective responders to the RFP, the ORNL study listed bounding concentrations of TRU and Tc in the cylinders in the bulk DUF<sub>6</sub> and in the heels. It also gave an estimated maximum quantity that could exist in the entire cylinder inventory. This information was included in the final RFP issued in October 2000 (DOE 2000a) and is reproduced here in Tables B-1 and B-2. The quantities listed were used in this environmental impact statement (EIS) to estimate the impacts associated with TRU and Tc contamination.

**TABLE B-1 Bounding Concentrations of Dispersed Transuranic and Tc-99 Contamination in the DUF<sub>6</sub> Full and Heels Cylinders**

Contaminant <sup>a</sup>	Concentration in Full Cylinders (ppb) <sup>b</sup>	Concentration in Heels Cylinders (ppb) <sup>b</sup>
Pu-238	0.00012	5
Pu-239	0.043	1,600
Np-237	5.2	54,000
Tc-99	15.9	5,700,000
Am-241	0.0013	0.57

<sup>a</sup> Am = americium, Np = neptunium, Pu = plutonium, and Tc = technetium.

<sup>b</sup> Equivalent to grams of contaminant per billion grams of uranium.

#### **B.1.4 Extent of Transuranic and Technetium Contamination in the Conversion Facility**

It is expected that when cylinders with TRU and Tc contamination would be fed into the conversion facility, the TRU and the Tc contamination, which would principally exist in the form of nonvolatile fluorides, would remain in the heels of the emptied cylinders (Brumburgh et al.

2000; Hightower et al. 2000). Although a small fraction of TRU might be carried out of the cylinders with the gaseous UF<sub>6</sub> as particulates, it is expected that it would instead be captured in the filters through which the UF<sub>6</sub> would pass before it entered the conversion equipment. Therefore, the only places at the entire conversion facility where TRU contamination could be of concern would be in some full cylinders before they were emptied, in some heels cylinders after they were emptied, and in the filters at the front end of the facility.

**TABLE B-2 Maximum Total Quantities of Transuranics and Technetium in the DUF<sub>6</sub> Inventory**

Radionuclide	Maximum Quantity (g)
Pu	24
Np	17,800
Tc	804,000

It is also expected that most of the Tc that existed in the cylinders would remain in the heels or be captured in the filters. However, because of the existence of some volatile technetium fluoride compounds, and for the purposes of analyses in this EIS, it was assumed that all of the Tc would volatilize with UF<sub>6</sub> and be carried into the conversion process equipment. Any Tc compounds transferred into the reaction chambers would be oxidized in the reaction chambers along with the DUF<sub>6</sub>. For this EIS, it was also assumed that the Tc in the form of oxides would partition into the triuranium octaoxide (U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub>) and hydrogen fluoride (HF) products in the same ratio as the uranium.

Under the proposed action, it is assumed that after the emptied cylinders were removed from the autoclaves, a stabilizing agent would be introduced in the cylinders to neutralize residual fluoride in the heels. The cylinders would then be moved out to the aging yard and stored for at least 4 months to allow short-lived daughter products of uranium to decay. Then the cylinders would be transported to the cylinder disposition facility on site, where they would be compacted and dissected. Finally, the sectioned cylinder parts with heels in them would be transported to the Envirocare of Utah, Inc., facility for disposal. The emptied cylinders would be surveyed by using nondestructive assay (NDA) techniques to determine the presence of a significant quantity of TRU isotopes. If TRU isotopes were detected, samples would be taken and analyzed. Cylinders that exceeded the disposal site limits at the Envirocare of Utah facility would be treated to immobilize the heel (e.g., with grout) within the cylinder, compacted, and sectioned; then the cylinder/heel waste stream would be sent to the Nevada Test Site (NTS) and disposed of as low-level radioactive waste (LLW).

Because of a recent design change, UDS is now planning to fill the emptied cylinders with the depleted U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> product, transport the filled cylinders to the Envirocare of Utah disposal facility, and dispose of them there. Previously, the depleted U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> product was to have been poured into 11,340-kg (25,000-lb) capacity bulk bags, transported to the same disposal facility, and disposed of there. The cylinders were to be treated and disposed of as a separate waste stream, as discussed above. This EIS considers both options.

A small quantity of nonvolatile TRU contamination, which might be entrained in the gaseous DUF<sub>6</sub> during the cylinder emptying operations and carried out of the cylinders, would be captured in the filters that would be used between the cylinders and the conversion equipment.

These filters would be monitored and changed out periodically to prevent buildup of TRU, and they would be disposed of as LLW.

Under the proposed action, there would not be any TRUW (radioactive waste that contains transuranic radionuclides with half-lives greater than 20 years and in concentrations greater than 100 nCi/g) generated at the conversion plant at either the Paducah or Portsmouth site. However, to provide a conservative estimate of the impacts associated with the management of TRU- and Tc-contaminated heels materials, this EIS also considers the option of washing the emptied cylinders, removing the heels from the emptied cylinders, and disposing of the solids from the washing solution as waste. Under this option, it is shown that some of the waste thus generated might possibly be classified as TRUW.

### **B.1.5 Impact Areas**

TRU contamination of DUF<sub>6</sub> is of concern with regard to its potential impact on the health and safety of the workers and the public primarily because the radiological toxicity of TRU radionuclides is higher than that of uranium isotopes. If the TRU was concentrated in waste materials generated during the conversion process, potential generation of TRUW would also be of concern.

As discussed above, TRU and Tc could occur in some full and heels cylinders. They could also be collected in the filters used in the front end of the conversion plant process. TRU and Tc would be health and safety concerns primarily if they were released to the environment in forms that could be taken internally by workers and the general public through inhalation, ingestion, or dermal absorption. The primary pathway of exposure is inhalation of particulates in air. The chemical toxicity of both the TRU and Tc is not much different than that of uranium, but because the concentrations of TRU and Tc are much less than that of uranium, their chemical impacts compared with those of uranium would be negligibly small.

During normal operations, the DUF<sub>6</sub> and any contaminants in it would be contained in the cylinders or the process equipment to prevent any measurable internal contamination of the workers or the public. However, if an accident caused the DUF<sub>6</sub> to be released to the atmosphere, the potential would arise for internal exposures. As discussed above, the TRU contaminants would be present in some of the cylinders and in the filters, but they would not enter the conversion process areas. Tc-99 could also be present in the same locations and could transfer into the process areas and conversion products. The highest concentration of the contaminants would be in the heels of some of the emptied cylinders. Therefore, potential impacts of any TRU and Tc contamination would be the greatest in cases involving accidents during storage, transportation, or handling of the cylinders, and during the management of wastes associated with the cleaning and disposition of empty cylinders.

Relative contributions of TRU and Tc to radiological doses under accident conditions are discussed below and in the main text of this EIS. Also discussed is the potential quantity of TRUW that could be generated at a conversion plant if the empty cylinders were to be washed and the heels separated.

In 1999 and 2000, a team of experts from DOE conducted a study on the historical generation and flow of recycled uranium (through reprocessing and reusing) in the DOE complex. The team report provided evaluation guidelines for the health and safety impacts associated with the contaminants found in the recycled uranium (DOE 2000b). In particular, Appendix A of the report provided the technical basis for identifying the relative radiological health hazards of the constituents. For each constituent and for a range of uranium enrichments, the appendix listed the concentrations of TRU radionuclides in the reprocessed uranium that would result in a 10% increase in the dose received by an individual over and above the dose the individual would receive from the uranium alone. The concentrations that corresponded to the depleted uranium (0.2% U-235) are reproduced in Table B-3 for three different clearance classes, D, W, and Y. The clearance class indicates the speed by which the radionuclides taken internally by an individual would leave the body through biological mechanisms. Depending on the chemical form of the radionuclide, it could be on the order of days (D class), weeks (W class), or years (Y class). Among the chemical forms of uranium that are of concern in this EIS, UF<sub>6</sub> and uranyl fluoride (UO<sub>2</sub>F<sub>2</sub>) are considered to be D class, whereas the oxides and uranium tetrafluoride (UF<sub>4</sub>) are considered to be W class.

A comparison of the concentrations given in Tables B-1 and B-3 shows that the concentrations of all the constituents in full cylinders (Column 2 in Table B-1) are less than the concentrations given in Table B-3. This indicates that each constituent would contribute less than 10% to dose. By applying the sum of fractions rule, it can be shown that the contribution to dose

**TABLE B-3 Concentrations of Transuranic Constituents and Tc-99 in Depleted Uranium That Would Result in 10% Contribution to Dose**

Contaminant	ppb U <sup>a</sup>			pCi/g <sup>b</sup>		
	Clearance Class			Clearance Class		
	D	W	Y	D	W	Y
Pu-238	0.0115	0.0227	0.804	201	395	14,000
Pu-239	2.17	4.34	193	133	266	11,900
Np-237	189	379	5,630	133	266	3,950
Am-241	0.0387	0.0775	1.15	133	266	3,950
Tc-99	NL <sup>c</sup>	NL	NL	NL	NL	NL

<sup>a</sup> ppb U = parts per billion of uranium.

<sup>b</sup> pCi/g = picocuries of constituent per gram of total uranium.

<sup>c</sup> NL = no limit.

Source: DOE (2000b).

by all the constituents combined would also be less than 10% even under the most restrictive clearance class (D class). According to this rule, if the sum of the concentration of each constituent from Table B-1 divided by the concentration of the same constituent from Table B-3 is less than 1, then the sum of contributions to dose from all the constituents would be expected to be less than 10%. Under the D class, this sum would be  $0.00012/0.0115$  (Pu-238) +  $0.043/2.17$  (Pu-239) +  $5.2/189$  (Np-237) +  $0.0013/0.0387$  (Am-241) + 0 (Tc-99) = 0.091. For the W and Y classes, the same sum of ratios would be 0.046 and 0.0024, respectively.

Thus, on the basis of the above analysis, it can be concluded that as long as the TRU and Tc-99 existed in uranium streams at concentrations equal to or less than those shown in Column 2 of Table B-1, their contribution to dose would be less than 10% of the dose due to uranium alone. In fact, because the sum of ratios is considerably below 1.0, the contribution would be much less than 10%. Given the uncertainties associated with the estimation of doses, this type of contribution to dose would be considered negligible. The analyses performed for this EIS (see Section B.1.6.1 below) also demonstrate the fact that when the TRU and Tc-99 concentrations are at or below the levels shown in Table B-1, Column 2, for full cylinders, their contribution to dose is negligibly small. However, as discussed below, doses that can be attributed to TRU and Tc-99 found in the heels of some of the cylinders under accident conditions can be relatively high compared to uranium doses.

## **B.1.6 Conservative Estimates of Impacts**

### **B.1.6.1 Cylinder Accidents**

The TRU and Tc contaminants in the cylinders could become available for human uptake as a result of accidents involving the release of some portion of the contents of a cylinder. Such accidents could occur during storage, handling, or transportation of cylinders. A spectrum of cylinder accidents was analyzed for the DUF<sub>6</sub> PEIS (Policastro et al. 1997). The resulting impacts were estimated on the basis of projected release quantities of DUF<sub>6</sub>. For purposes of this analysis, it is assumed that in accidents involving full cylinders, TRU and Tc would exist at their maximum concentrations, as listed in Table B-1. It is also assumed that these contaminants would be released and transported through environmental media at the same relative concentration as that present in the cylinder (i.e., it is assumed that the mass concentration of TRU divided by the mass concentration of total uranium isotopes would remain constant). When DUF<sub>6</sub> is released to the environment, it interacts with moisture in the air and converts to depleted UO<sub>2</sub>F<sub>2</sub>, which is solid at atmospheric conditions. Therefore, the assumption that depleted UO<sub>2</sub>F<sub>2</sub> particles and particulate forms of TRU and Tc travel in tandem is considered to be reasonable.

The possibility of an accident involving heels cylinders with the highest TRU concentrations as shown in Table B-1 is also considered. Table B-4 shows the pertinent radiological data for the radionuclides under consideration. Table B-5 shows the relative doses (relative to uranium, assuming that the uranium is 0.25% U-235, with the remaining being U-238) for the TRU isotopes and Tc-99. The data show that when TRU isotopes are present at

**TABLE B-4 Radiological Parameters for Uranium, Transuranic, and Technetium Isotopes**

Radionuclide	Dose Conversion Factor			Nuclide Constants	
	Inhalation (mrem/pCi)	Ingestion (mrem/pCi)	External Surface ([mrem/yr]/[pCi/cm <sup>2</sup> ])	Half-Life (yr)	Atomic Mass
U-238	0.118	$2.69 \times 10^{-4}$	$3.25 \times 10^{-2}$	$4.47 \times 10^9$	238
U-235	0.123	$2.67 \times 10^{-4}$	0.194	$7.04 \times 10^8$	235
Pu-238	0.392	$3.2 \times 10^{-3}$	$9.79 \times 10^{-4}$	87.74	238
Pu-239	0.429	$3.54 \times 10^{-3}$	$4.29 \times 10^{-4}$	$2.41 \times 10^4$	239
Np-237	0.54	$4.44 \times 10^{-3}$	0.261	$2.14 \times 10^6$	237
Tc-99	$8.33 \times 10^{-6}$	$1.46 \times 10^{-6}$	$9.11 \times 10^{-5}$	$2.13 \times 10^5$	99
Am-241	0.444	$3.64 \times 10^{-3}$	$3.21 \times 10^{-2}$	432.2	241

**TABLE B-5 Relative Contributions of Transuranic and Technetium Isotopes to Dose**

Radionuclide	Bounding Concentration in ppb (U) <sup>a</sup>		TRU Contribution <sup>b</sup>	
	Tails	Heels	Inhalation Dose (conservative heels concentration)	Inhalation Dose (realistic tails concentration)
Pu-238	$1.2 \times 10^{-4}$	5	0.835	$2.00 \times 10^{-5}$
Pu-239	$4.3 \times 10^{-2}$	$1.6 \times 10^3$	1.06	$2.85 \times 10^{-5}$
Np-237	5.2	$5.4 \times 10^4$	0.511	$4.92 \times 10^{-5}$
Tc-99	15.9	$5.7 \times 10^6$	$2.00 \times 10^{-2}$	$5.59 \times 10^{-8}$
Am-241	$1.3 \times 10^{-3}$	0.57	$2.16 \times 10^{-2}$	$4.93 \times 10^{-5}$
Total			2.45	$1.47 \times 10^{-4}$

<sup>a</sup> Equivalent to grams of contaminant per billion grams of uranium.

<sup>b</sup> Relative to uranium; e.g., the dose from Pu-238 would be 0.835 times the dose from uranium for a conservative heels concentration.

the maximum bulk concentrations, the TRU and Tc add only about 0.015% to the dose calculated on the basis of DUF<sub>6</sub> alone. However, when they are present in maximum heels concentrations, the dose can be increased by about a factor of 4 (2.45 + 1 for uranium) over what it would be for DUF<sub>6</sub> alone.

In the accident analyses performed for the DUF<sub>6</sub> PEIS, accidents involving both full cylinders and heels were considered. However, it was found that the releases and, consequently, the impacts from the accidents involving full cylinders were considerably higher than those

involving only the heels cylinders. In fact, in the source document for the PEIS, the Engineering Analysis Report (Dubrin et al. 1997, Section 7, p. 7-5), an accident involving two heels cylinders was described. The estimated amount of DUF<sub>6</sub> leaving each cylinder was 7 kg (15 lb), for a total release of about 14 kg (31 lb) of DUF<sub>6</sub>. A similar accident was also postulated for full cylinders. In that case, it was estimated that about 1,500 kg (3,306 lb) of DUF<sub>6</sub> would be released from the cylinders. As expected, the estimated impacts from the accident involving the full cylinders were considerably greater than the estimated impacts from the heels cylinder accident; therefore, only the impacts for the full cylinder accident were discussed in the PEIS.

Dose contributions from potential TRU and Tc contaminants were not considered in the PEIS. If such contributions were added, the dose from a heels cylinder accident would increase by a factor of about 4, which would be equivalent to about 60 kg (132 lb) of DUF<sub>6</sub> being released (the dose is directly proportional to the quantity of DUF<sub>6</sub> released from the cylinders), whereas the dose from the full cylinder accident would remain the same, with about 1,500 kg (3,307 lb) of DUF<sub>6</sub> being released. Because the doses from the full cylinder accident were much greater and because the frequencies of the two accidents were considered to be about the same (they were both considered to belong to the extremely unlikely category, with a frequency range of 10<sup>-4</sup> to 10<sup>-6</sup> per year), the full cylinder accident was discussed in the PEIS, but the heels cylinder accident was not. As the analyses above show, even after including the contributions from TRU and Tc, the full cylinder accident would still produce a much greater dose than the heels cylinder accident and, therefore, would still be bounding for the group of accidents belonging to the extremely unlikely frequency category.

The relative contributions of Tc-99 to dose from exposure to bulk DUF<sub>6</sub> in the cylinders and to heels material with maximum contaminant concentrations (Table B-1) are 0.000006% and 0.2%, respectively (Table B-5). Similar to TRU contaminants, most of Tc-99 would be expected to remain in the heels or be captured in the filters when the cylinders were emptied. However, if it did transfer into the conversion equipment, there it would be expected to (a) convert to technetium oxide during the conversion of DUF<sub>6</sub> to U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> and (b) partition into the uranium and HF products at about the same ratio as the uranium. As a result, the relative concentration of Tc-99 in both products (relative to uranium) would be about the same as in the bulk DUF<sub>6</sub>; namely, 15.9 ppb. Its relative contribution to dose (relative to uranium) would be about 0.000006%. Given such a low contribution and the low doses that would result from exposure to U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> (see Section 5.2.3) and HF product (see Section 5.2.6), the radiological impacts of Tc-99 in the conversion products can be considered to be negligible.

### **B.1.6.2 Waste Management**

As mentioned previously, no TRUW would be generated at either conversion facility in Paducah or Portsmouth under the proposed action. The empty cylinders would be refilled with the depleted U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> product and disposed of. The impacts associated with management of LLW, including transportation to a disposal facility, are discussed in Sections 5.2.3 and 5.2.5 of this EIS. The option of disposing of the emptied cylinders as a separate LLW stream is also discussed. This section provides a conservative estimate of waste management impacts associated with the heels material in emptied cylinders, under the assumption that they are

cleansed by washing the cylinders with water and treating the wash solution to generate solid U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> and a small quantity of solid CaF<sub>2</sub>. Such an option was discussed in the Engineering Analysis Report (Dubrin et al. 1997, Section 6.3) and in the PEIS. Under the approach considered, no liquid radioactive waste would be generated.

Table B-6 shows that if the heels in the emptied cylinders contained TRU and Tc at the maximum concentrations shown in Table B-1, and if the heels material was separated and declared waste, it would be classified as TRUW because the concentration of TRU radionuclides would exceed 100 nCi/g. If the heels were left in the form of DUF<sub>6</sub>, the calculated TRU activity concentration would be about 150 nCi/g. If the heels were converted to U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> and dried and the TRU were also converted to oxides, the TRU activity concentration would be about 190 nCi/g (Table B-7).

Table B-2 indicates that there is a maximum of 24 g (0.85 oz.) of Pu and 17.8 kg (3.97 lb) of Np in the DUF<sub>6</sub> inventory. If this amount of TRU was distributed uniformly in the heels of as many cylinders as possible and if the concentration of TRU in the converted U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> heels material was 100 nCi/g, there would be approximately 240 drums of converted U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> (each drum containing 627 kg [1,382 lb] of U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub>) that could be classified as TRUW (see Table B-8). The total number of drums of converted U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> heels material would be about 820 (61,422 cylinders × 8 kg [18 lb] heels U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> per cylinder/627 kg [1,382 lb] per drum × 1.023, where the factor 1.023 accounts for the presence of granulating binder, water, etc., in the final product). That would mean that about 30% of the heels-generated U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> would be classified as TRUW; the remainder (about 580 drums) would be classified as LLW. In actuality, the amount of waste that would fall under the definition of TRUW would be considerably less than 30%. The assumptions made in deriving the above TRUW quantities are highly conservative. These assumptions include the following:

1. The quantity of heels material in an emptied cylinder was assumed to be 10 kg (22 lb). This amount is actually likely to be greater than 10 kg (22 lb). In fact, it could be greater than 20 kg (44 lb) per cylinder, in which case none of the heels material would be classified as TRUW.
2. It is very unlikely that TRU would be distributed uniformly at a concentration just high enough to make the waste TRUW. Some might be present at concentrations greater than 100 nCi/g, with the result that the volume and the number of drums of TRUW would be less.

Filters used to process the DUF<sub>6</sub> leaving the cylinders would be monitored and replaced before the concentration of TRU reached the stage where the filters would have to be managed as TRUW. Therefore, no TRUW is assumed to be generated from the filters. However, an estimate was made of the amount of LLW that could be generated. The following assumptions were used in the estimation:

1. The filters are metallic, cylindrical in shape (6-in. [5-cm] diameter and 15-in. [38-cm] height), and weigh about 38 kg (84 lb);

**TABLE B-6 Estimated Maximum Transuranic Radioactivity Concentration in Heels**

Contaminant	Concentration (ppb) (U) <sup>a</sup>	Quantity of DUF <sub>6</sub> in Heel (kg)	Quantity of U in Heel (kg)	Quantity of Contaminant in Heel (g)	Specific Activity (Ci/g)	Radioactivity in Heel	
						in Ci	in nCi
Pu-238	5	10	6.8	$3.38 \times 10^{-5}$	$1.71 \times 10^1$	$5.79 \times 10^{-4}$	$5.79 \times 10^5$
Pu-239	1,600	10	6.8	$1.08 \times 10^{-2}$	$6.22 \times 10^{-2}$	$6.72 \times 10^{-4}$	$6.72 \times 10^5$
Np-237	54,000	10	6.8	$3.65 \times 10^{-1}$	$7.05 \times 10^{-4}$	$2.57 \times 10^{-4}$	$2.57 \times 10^5$
Am-241	0.57	10	6.8	$3.85 \times 10^{-6}$	3.43	$1.32 \times 10^{-5}$	$1.32 \times 10^4$
Total				$3.76 \times 10^{-1}$		$1.52 \times 10^{-3}$	$1.52 \times 10^6$

<sup>a</sup> Equivalent to grams of contaminant per billion grams of uranium.

**TABLE B-7 Estimated Maximum Transuranic Activity Concentration in Converted Heels Material**

Final Form	Quantity in Heel (g)	Total TRU Activity Concentration (nCi/g)
<sup>238</sup> PuO <sub>2</sub>	$3.8 \times 10^{-5}$	72.6
<sup>239</sup> PuO <sub>2</sub>	$1.2 \times 10^{-2}$	84.3
<sup>237</sup> NpO <sub>2</sub>	$4.1 \times 10^{-1}$	32.3
<sup>241</sup> AmO <sub>2</sub>	$4.4 \times 10^{-6}$	1.66
U <sub>3</sub> O <sub>8</sub>	$8.0 \times 10^3$	0
Total	$8.0 \times 10^3$	191

**TABLE B-8 Estimated Maximum Number of Drums Containing Potential Transuranic Waste**

Contaminant	Maximum Quantity (g)	Isotope-Averaged Specific Activity (Ci/g)	Maximum Activity (Ci)	Total Quantity in One Drum (g)	TRUW Concentration Limit (nCi/g)	Radioactivity in One Drum (nCi)	No. of Drums
Pu	24	$1.15 \times 10^{-1}$	2.77	627,273	100	62,727,273	44
Np	17,800	$7.05 \times 10^{-4}$	12.5	627,273	100	62,727,273	200
Total			15.3	627,273	100	62,727,273	244

2. About 10% of the TRU in the cylinders is entrained during emptying of the cylinders by sublimation and captured in the filters;
3. Filters are replaced when the activity concentration reaches 50 nCi/g; and
4. Filters are macroencapsulated and placed in 55-gal drums for disposal.

On the basis of the above assumptions, it is estimated that on average, 1 drum of LLW would be generated per year of operation, and overall there would be about 26 drums generated over the lifetime of the conversion campaign at both plants combined (Folga 2002).

### **B.1.6.3 Transportation**

Transportation impacts estimated for the PEIS and this EIS include the impacts of transporting all wastes and all products of the conversion process as LLW, low-level mixed waste (LLMW), or nonradioactive/nonhazardous waste (see Section 5.2.5). Under the proposed action, no TRUW would be generated at either the Paducah or Portsmouth site. However, as discussed in Section B.1.6.2, there could be up to 244 drums of TRUW generated over the lifetime of the conversion campaign at both conversion facilities combined, if the heels cylinders were to be washed and the heels materials disposed of as waste. Under these conditions, the TRUW would need to be shipped from the conversion facilities to a disposal site authorized to receive such waste. The total number of truck shipments required would be 6 (assuming 14 drums per TRUPACT-II container and 3 containers per truck) from both conversion plants combined. This number is much less than the approximately 6,000 to 36,000 truck shipments of LLW from the two facilities.

On a single-shipment basis, the impacts associated with incident-free transportation of a TRUW shipment and with a LLW shipment of U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> drums would be comparable, because the external exposure rate in the vicinity of the truck would be about the same. However, the accident risks would be larger for the TRU shipments if the same amount of material spilled to the environment. The factor of increase in doses would be similar to what was estimated for heels cylinder accidents, namely a factor of 4. However, the TRUW would be shipped in drums placed in TRUPACT-II containers. TRUPACT-II containers are much stronger than the drums themselves. As a result, the probability of material being released to the environment from TRUW shipments as a result of an accident is much smaller than the probability associated with LLW shipments. (LLW drums are generally shipped “as is,” without additional protection.) The overall relative risk of shipping the U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> generated during cylinder washing in the cylinder treatment facility (if one is constructed) to a disposal facility would be about the same, irrespective of whether it was classified as TRUW or LLW.

## **B.2 ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH POLYCHLORINATED BIPHENYLS IN CYLINDER PAINT**

### **B.2.1 Background**

#### **B.2.1.1 PCBs in Cylinder Paint**

The three-site cylinder inventory contains cylinders of diverse ages, with cylinders having been generated from the early 1950s to the present time. The paints applied to the cylinders had various compositions and included some PCBs. Up until 1977, when the manufacture and use of PCBs in the United States was generally discontinued, certain paints contained up to 10% by weight PCBs. The PCBs were added to the paints to act as a fungicide and to increase durability and flexibility.

Records of the PCB concentrations in the paints used were not kept, so it is currently unknown how many cylinders are coated with paint containing PCBs. However, paint chips from a representative sample of cylinders at the ETTP site have been analyzed for PCBs. The results indicate that up to 50% of the cylinders at ETTP may have coatings on them containing PCBs. Because the Portsmouth and Paducah inventories contain a large number of cylinders produced before 1978, it is reasonable to assume that a significant number of cylinders at those sites also contain PCBs.

The PCBs in dried paint generally have a low environmental mobility, but as the paint ages and chips off the cylinders, there is a potential for transport and subsequent exposure to the PCBs. There is also a potential for the volatilization of the PCBs if the cylinders are heated enough during processing.

#### **B.2.1.2 PCB Use, Contamination, and Distribution at ETTP, Portsmouth, and Paducah**

PCB use was very prevalent and widespread in the United States prior to 1978. As a result, PCBs are often detected in locations with no known source of contamination. Because of their tendency to bioaccumulate, PCBs are also widespread in fish and other biota.

For each of the three storage sites, the PCBs in cylinder paints constitute an extremely small proportion of the PCBs that were previously and are currently at the sites. For example, although the Paducah site has been working for several years to dispose of PCB-containing equipment, the site still had about 870 liquid PCB-containing items (mostly capacitors) in service at the end of 2001 (DOE 2002a). The Portsmouth and ETTP sites also still have a large number of liquid PCB-containing items in service.

The three current DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinder storage sites are suspected to have had spills of PCB liquids during past operations, prior to the identification of the health and environmental hazards

of PCBs. Each of the three sites has an existing program for managing PCB-contaminated waste under the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA). In addition, the environmental monitoring program at each site includes monitoring of PCB concentrations in soil, sediment, groundwater, surface water, and biota on and in the vicinity of the sites (results are presented in Sections 3.1 and 3.2). Soil, water, sediment, and biota samples obtained from on and near each of the sites since the early 1990s have periodically contained detectable levels of PCBs. Background samples have also had detectable levels of PCBs.

### **B.2.1.3 Regulation of PCBs**

Processing, use, storage, transportation, and disposal of cylinders with applied dried paint that contains PCBs are subject to the federal TSCA regulations applicable to PCBs and PCB items. These federal regulations are located in Title 40, Part 761 of the *Code of Federal Regulations* (40 CFR Part 761), “Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCBs) Manufacturing, Processing, Distribution in Commerce, and Use Prohibitions,” and are implemented by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 40 CFR Part 761 requires that after PCB items have been designated for disposal, they be packaged and marked in compliance with applicable U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) hazardous materials regulations (HMRs), which are located in 49 CFR Parts 171 through 180. If DOT HMRs do not apply to a PCB waste, then 40 CFR Part 761 identifies applicable packaging and marking requirements.

## **B.2.2 Potential Impacts from PCBs in Cylinder Paint**

The remainder of this appendix discusses the potential impacts associated with PCBs in cylinder paint during storage, transport, processing, and disposal of the cylinders. The presence of PCBs in the coatings of some cylinders is not expected to result in health and safety risks to workers or the public, as detailed in the sections that follow.

### **B.2.2.1 Storage**

During cylinder storage, the risk to cylinder handlers from dermal contact with the PCBs on cylinders is negligible. The PCBs are bound in a matrix from which dermal absorption is insignificant (Fowler 1999). Because the PCBs are bound in the paint, the potential for them to volatilize under ambient conditions and be inhaled by the workers or the general public would be negligible. In addition, in the case of a cylinder accident involving a fire, the impacts associated with PCBs released from the paint on the cylinders would be negligibly small when compared with the impacts associated with the DUF<sub>6</sub> released from the cylinders.

Cylinder paint chips deposited on the cylinder yard soils can be carried to surface water via runoff. All three sites monitor their surface water discharges for PCBs and also conduct some downstream surface water and sediment monitoring. In general, PCBs have been below detection limits. However, PCBs have occasionally been detected (see Affected Environment in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 of the EIS).

At the Paducah site, effluent at Kentucky Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (KPDES) outfall 017 (which receives runoff from the cylinder yards) contained a maximum of 0.415 µg/L PCBs in 2001 samples; this was not a KPDES permit violation (DOE 2002a). PCBs were not detected in 2002 samples (DOE 2003b). At the Portsmouth site in 2001, seven samples from five different sampling locations that receive runoff from the cylinder yards were obtained throughout the year (DOE 2002b); no PCBs were detected in these samples. PCBs are also monitored in outfalls, sediment, and surface water at and near the ETTP site. Several outfalls at the site (S14, S20, and 113) have contained PCBs at levels of up to 6 µg/L (DOE 2000c, 2001, 2003a). The PCBs in samples from ETTP outfalls are likely attributable to past releases of liquid PCB oils at the plant. The primary source of PCBs in environmental samples is past releases of liquid PCBs. Movement of nonliquid PCBs from the cylinder yards via paint chips in runoff is likely a very minor contributor to environmental releases of PCBs from the sites.

### **B.2.2.2 Transportation**

Transport of cylinders from the ETTP site to either Portsmouth or Paducah would occur under the action alternatives addressed in this EIS. Under the proposed action, to the extent practicable, emptied cylinders at the conversion facilities would be refilled with uranium oxide product, welded shut, and shipped to the designated disposal facility. As a precautionary measure, cylinders with loose paint chips may be bagged for transport to avoid loss of potentially PCB-containing material.

### **B.2.2.3 Cylinder Processing**

Potential impacts during cylinder processing might occur if PCBs volatilized during autoclaving to remove the DUF<sub>6</sub> from the cylinders or if PCBs were released and/or transformed during the cutting and welding process.

During autoclaving, desorption of pure-phase PCBs from the paint matrix would be unlikely, given that the PCBs are bound into the paint structure. PCBs by their very nature are not highly volatile, and losses from PCBs bound in the paint matrix would also be unlikely. However, initial experiments conducted at the University of British Columbia have indicated that some lower chlorinated PCBs may volatilize from PCB-containing paints at 70°C (Gill et al. 1997). Because the DUF<sub>6</sub> autoclaves would operate at approximately 95°C, testing should be conducted either prior to or during the conversion facility startup operations to determine if the air vented from the autoclaves should be monitored or if any alternative measures would need to be taken to ensure that worker exposures to PCBs above allowable Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) limits do not occur.

Before the emptied cylinders were refilled with depleted uranium oxide product, a solvent would be applied to a small area on each cylinder to remove the paint before cut/weld operations occurred (McCoy 2004). Any paint removed from the surface would be managed as Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) hazardous waste, TSCA hazardous waste, or LLMW, as appropriate. Removing the paint before welding would reduce or eliminate the

potential for the volatilization of PCBs or for the generation of other toxic chemicals during welding operations. The quantity of waste generated by this operation would be negligibly small when compared with the quantities generated by other operations at either the Paducah or Portsmouth sites.

#### **B.2.2.4 Disposal**

The proposed action alternatives of this EIS assume that the cylinders (either filled with depleted uranium oxide or empty) would be disposed of at Envirocare of Utah, located in Utah, or at NTS, located in Nevada. The waste acceptance criteria for both facilities indicate that they have units permitted to receive LLW containing PCBs.

### **B.3 REFERENCES**

Brumburgh, G.P., et al., 2000, *A Peer Review of the Strategy for Characterizing Transuranics and Technetium in Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride Tails Cylinders*, UCRL-ID-140343, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, Calif., Sept. 1.

DOE (U.S. Department of Energy), 1999, *Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Alternative Strategies for the Long-Term Management and Use of Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride*, DOE/EIS-0269, Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology, Germantown, Md., April.

DOE, 2000a, *Request for Proposals (No. DE-RP05-01OR22717) Design, Construction, and Operation of DUF<sub>6</sub> Conversion Facilities*, Oak Ridge Operations Office, Oak Ridge, Tenn., Oct. 31.

DOE, 2000b, *Historical Generation and Flow of Recycled Uranium in the DOE Complex, Project Plan*, U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, D.C., Feb.

DOE, 2000c, *Environmental Monitoring on the Oak Ridge Reservation: 1999 Results*, DOE/ORO/2102, compiled by S.D. Thompson. Available at [http://www.ornl.gov/sci/env\\_rpt/aser99/data99.pdf](http://www.ornl.gov/sci/env_rpt/aser99/data99.pdf).

DOE, 2001, *Environmental Monitoring on the Oak Ridge Reservation: 2000 Results*, DOE/ORO/2117, compiled by S.D. Thompson. Available at [http://www.ornl.gov/sci/env\\_rpt/aser2000/data00.pdf](http://www.ornl.gov/sci/env_rpt/aser2000/data00.pdf).

DOE, 2002a, *Paducah Site, Annual Site Environmental Report for Calendar Year 2001*, BJC/PAD-219, prepared by CDM Federal Services, Inc., Kevil, Ky., for Bechtel Jacobs Company LLC and U.S. Department of Energy, Sept. Available at [http://www.bechteljacobs.com/pad\\_reports\\_aser-01.shtml](http://www.bechteljacobs.com/pad_reports_aser-01.shtml).

DOE, 2002b, *U.S. Department of Energy, Portsmouth Annual Environmental Data for 2001, Piketon, Ohio*, DOE/OR/11-3107&D1, prepared by EQ Midwest, Inc., Cincinnati, Ohio, for U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Environmental Management, Nov. Available at <http://www.bechteljacobs.com/pdf/port/aser/2001/2001Report.pdf>.

DOE, 2003a, *Environmental Monitoring on the Oak Ridge Reservation: 2002 Results*, DOE/ORO/2161, compiled by S.D. Thompson. Available at [http://www.ornl.gov/sci/env\\_rpt/aser2002/data.pdf](http://www.ornl.gov/sci/env_rpt/aser2002/data.pdf).

DOE, 2003b, *Paducah Site, Annual Site Environmental Report for Calendar Year 2002*, BJC/PAD-543/V1, prepared by CDM Federal Services, Inc., Kevil, Ky., for Bechtel Jacobs Company LLC and U.S. Department of Energy, Sept. Available at [http://www.bechteljacobs.com/pad\\_reports\\_aser-02.shtml](http://www.bechteljacobs.com/pad_reports_aser-02.shtml).

Dubrin, J.W., et al., 1997, *Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride Management Program; The Engineering Analysis Report for the Long-Term Management of Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride*, UCRL-AR-12408, Volumes I and II, prepared by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Science Applications International Corporation, Bechtel, and Lockheed Martin Energy Systems for U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, D.C., May.

Folga, S.M., 2002, *Estimates of Waste Generation Rates Associated with Transuranic Filters*, intraoffice memorandum from Folga to H.I. Avci (Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Ill.), June 17.

Fowler, M., 1999, *Polychlorinated Biphenyls, The Technical Feasibility of Landfilling PCB-Amended Painted Materials, Appendix G: PCB in Paint Options Analysis*, Environment Canada, Cat. No. En40-569/1999. Available at [http://www.ec.gc.ca/pcb/feasibility\\_june99/eng/xg\\_e.htm](http://www.ec.gc.ca/pcb/feasibility_june99/eng/xg_e.htm).

Gill, C.G., et al., 1997, "PCBs from Old Paint?," *Environmental Science and Technology* 31(8):343A.

Hightower, J.R., et al., 2000, *Strategy for Characterizing Transuranics and Technetium Contamination in Depleted UF<sub>6</sub> Cylinders*, ORNL/TM-2000/242, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tenn., Oct.

McCoy, J., 2004, personal communication from McCoy (Uranium Disposition Services, LLC, Oak Ridge, Tenn.) to H. Hartmann (Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Ill.), May 7.

Policastro, A.J., et al., 1997, *Facility Accident Impact Analyses in Support of the Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement*, attachment to intraoffice memorandum from Policastro to H.I. Avci (Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Ill.), June 15.



**APPENDIX C:**

**SCOPING SUMMARY REPORT FOR DEPLETED URANIUM  
HEXAFLUORIDE CONVERSION FACILITIES**

**ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT SCOPING PROCESS**



## APPENDIX C

This appendix contains the summary report prepared after the initial public scoping period for the depleted uranium hexafluoride conversion facilities environmental impact statement (EIS) project. The scoping period for the EIS began with the September 18, 2001, publication of a Notice of Intent (NOI) in the *Federal Register* (66 FR 23213) and was extended to January 11, 2002. The report summarizes the different types of public involvement opportunities provided and the content of the comments received.

While the EIS preparation was underway, the U.S. Congress passed and the President signed Public Law No. 107-206, which directed the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) to award a contract for conversion facilities to be built at the Paducah and Portsmouth sites. Accordingly, DOE awarded a contract to Uranium Disposition Services, LLC (UDS), on August 29, 2002. In light of Public Law 107-206, DOE reevaluated its approach for conducting the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) process and decided to prepare two separate site-specific EISs in parallel: one EIS for the plant proposed for the Paducah site and a second EIS for the Portsmouth site. This change was announced in a *Federal Register* Notice of Change in NEPA Compliance Approach published on April 28, 2003 (the Notice is included as Attachment B). One set of comments in response to the Change in NEPA Compliance Approach was received from the Oak Ridge Reservation Local Oversight Committee. These comments were similar to those received during public scoping and were considered in the preparation of this EIS.



**SCOPING SUMMARY REPORT FOR DEPLETED URANIUM  
HEXAFLUORIDE CONVERSION FACILITIES**

**ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT SCOPING PROCESS**

**Prepared by**

**Environmental Assessment Division  
Argonne National Laboratory  
Argonne, Illinois**

**for**

**Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride Conversion Project Team  
Oak Ridge Operations (EM-961)  
U.S. Department of Energy  
Oak Ridge, Tennessee**

**June 17, 2002**



**CONTENTS**

1	INTRODUCTION.....	1
1.1	Preliminary Alternatives Identified in the NOI.....	2
1.2	Preliminary Environmental and Other Issues Identified in the NOI.....	3
1.3	Scoping Process .....	4
2	SUMMARY OF SCOPING COMMENTS .....	7
2.1	Policy Comments and Issues.....	7
2.2	Alternatives .....	9
2.3	Cylinder Inventory Comments and Issues .....	11
2.4	Transportation Issues.....	12
2.5	Scope of Environmental Impact Analysis.....	13
	Attachment A: Notice of Intent to Prepare an Environmental Impact Statement for Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride Conversion Facilities .....	17



## SCOPING SUMMARY REPORT

### Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride Conversion Facilities Project

#### 1 INTRODUCTION

On September 18, 2001, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) published a notice of intent (NOI) in the *Federal Register* (66 FR 23213) announcing its intention to prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) for a proposal to construct, operate, maintain, and decontaminate and decommission two depleted uranium hexafluoride (DUF<sub>6</sub>) conversion facilities, one at Portsmouth, Ohio, and one at Paducah, Kentucky. DOE would use the proposed facilities to convert its inventory of DUF<sub>6</sub> to a more stable chemical form suitable for storage, beneficial use, or disposal. Approximately 730,000 metric tons of DUF<sub>6</sub> in about 60,000 cylinders are stored at Portsmouth and Paducah, and at an Oak Ridge, Tennessee, site.<sup>1</sup> The EIS would address potential environmental impacts of the construction, operation, maintenance, and decontamination and decommissioning (D&D) of the conversion facilities. A copy of the NOI is included in Attachment A.

The purpose of the NOI was to encourage early public involvement in the EIS process and to solicit public comments on the proposed scope of the EIS, including the issues and alternatives it would analyze. To facilitate public comments, the NOI included a detailed discussion of the project's background, listings of the preliminary alternatives and environmental impacts DOE proposed to evaluate in the EIS, and a project schedule. The NOI announced that the scoping period for the EIS would be open until November 26, 2001. The scoping period was later extended to January 11, 2002, for reasons discussed in Section 1.3.

This report presents a summary of the scoping process for the DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion facilities project. The first section of the report includes a short summary of the preliminary alternatives and environmental issues described in the NOI and a discussion of how the scoping process was conducted. The second section summarizes the comments submitted to DOE for its consideration in preparing the EIS; the comments are categorized and summarized to capture their substance.

---

<sup>1</sup> At the time the NOI was issued and the scoping meetings were held, DOE's inventory of DUF<sub>6</sub> consisted of approximately 700,000 metric tons of the material in about 57,700 cylinders. The inventory increased with the signing of an agreement between DOE and the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) on June 17, 2002, which could result in the transfer of up to 23,300 metric tons of DUF<sub>6</sub> from USEC to DOE.

## 1.1 PRELIMINARY ALTERNATIVES IDENTIFIED IN THE NOI

The preliminary alternatives were identified in the NOI; they are described here to provide the background information necessary to understand the substance of comments summarized in Section 2.

### *Preferred Alternative*

Under the preferred alternative, two conversion facilities would be built: one at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant (GDP) site in Kentucky and another at the Portsmouth GDP site in Ohio. The cylinders currently stored at the East Tennessee Technology Park (ETTP) site near Oak Ridge, Tennessee, would be transported to Portsmouth for conversion. The conversion products (i.e., depleted uranium as well as fluorine components produced during the conversion process) would be stored, put to beneficial uses, or disposed of at an appropriate disposal facility. This alternative is consistent with the Conversion Plan, which DOE submitted to Congress in July 1999 in response to Public Law 105–204. Several subalternatives would be considered for the preferred alternative:

- Conversion technology processes identified in response to the final Request for Proposals (RFP) for conversion services, plus any other technologies that DOE believes must be considered;
- Local siting alternatives for building and operating conversion facilities within the Paducah and Portsmouth plant boundaries; and
- Timing options, such as staggering the start of the construction and operation of the two conversion facilities.

### *One Conversion Plant Alternative*

An alternative of building and operating only one conversion facility at either the Portsmouth or the Paducah site was proposed in the NOI. This plant could differ in size or production capacity from the two proposed for Portsmouth and Paducah. Technology and local siting subalternatives would be considered as with the preferred alternative.

### *Use of Existing UF<sub>6</sub> Conversion Capacity Alternative*

DOE proposed the possibility of using existing UF<sub>6</sub> conversion capacity at commercial nuclear fuel fabrication facilities in lieu of constructing one or two new conversion plants. DOE is evaluating the feasibility of using existing conversion capacity, although no expression of interest has been received from such facilities.

### *No Action Alternative*

As required by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the EIS would include a “no action” alternative. Under the no action alternative, cylinder management activities (e.g., handling, inspection, monitoring, and maintenance) would continue the “status quo” at the three current storage sites indefinitely, consistent with the DUF<sub>6</sub> Cylinder Project Management Plan and the consent orders, which include actions needed to meet safety and environmental requirements.

Where applicable under the alternatives listed above, transportation options, such as truck, rail, and barge, would be considered for shipping DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders to a conversion facility and conversion products to a storage or disposal facility. For each technology alternative, alternatives for conversion products, including storage, use, and disposal at one or more disposal sites, would also be considered.

## **1.2 PRELIMINARY ENVIRONMENTAL AND OTHER ISSUES IDENTIFIED IN THE NOI**

In the NOI, DOE announced its intent to address the following preliminary environmental issues when assessing the potential environmental impacts of the alternatives in the EIS:

- Potential impacts on health from DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion activities, including those to workers and the public from exposure to radiation and chemicals during routine and accident conditions for the construction, operation, maintenance, and D&D of DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion facilities;
- Potential impacts to workers and the public from exposure to radiation and chemicals during routine and accident conditions for the transport of DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders from ETTP to one of the conversion sites;
- Potential impacts to workers and the public from exposure to radiation and chemicals during routine and accident conditions for the transport of conversion products that are not beneficially used to a low-level waste disposal facility;
- Potential impacts to surface water, groundwater, and soil during construction activities and from emissions and water use during facility operations;
- Potential impacts on air quality from emissions and noise during facility construction and operations;
- Potential cumulative impacts of the past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions, including impacts from activities of the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC);

- Potential impacts from facility construction on historically significant properties, if present, and on access to traditional use areas;
- Potential impacts from land requirements, potential incompatibilities, and disturbances;
- Potential impacts on local, regional, or national resources from materials and utilities required for construction and operation;
- Potential impacts on ecological resources, including threatened and endangered species, floodplains, and wetlands;
- Potential impacts on local and DOE-wide waste management capabilities;
- Potential impacts on local employment, income, population, housing, and public services from facility construction and operations, and environmental justice issues; and
- Pollution prevention, waste minimization, and energy and water use reduction technologies to decrease the use of energy, water, and hazardous substances and to mitigate environmental impacts.

### 1.3 SCOPING PROCESS

During the scoping process, the public was provided with six options for submitting comments to DOE on the DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion project proposal:

- Public scoping meetings held in Piketon, Ohio; Paducah, Kentucky; and Oak Ridge, Tennessee;
- Traditional mail delivery;
- Toll-free facsimile transmission;
- Toll-free voice message;
- Electronic mail; and
- Directly through the Depleted UF<sub>6</sub> Management Information Network web site on the Internet (<http://web.ead.anl.gov/uranium>).

The reason for providing such a variety of ways to communicate issues and submit comments was to encourage maximum participation. All comments, regardless of how they were submitted, received equal consideration.

The scoping period commenced with the publication of the NOI on September 18, 2001, and was originally scheduled to close November 26, 2001. Following publication of the NOI, the scoping period was extended 46 days through January 11, 2002, for the reasons discussed below.

As announced in the NOI, the three public scoping meetings were originally scheduled for the first week of November 2001. However, the meetings were postponed to allow review of DOE's approach for complying with NEPA for the DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion project. The review was not completed in time to hold the scoping meetings as originally scheduled. Consequently, the meetings were postponed, and the scoping period was extended from November 26, 2001, to January 11, 2002. The public was notified of the postponement through a press release, ads in local newspapers, an announcement posted on the Depleted UF<sub>6</sub> Management Information Network web site (<http://web.ead.anl.gov/uranium>), and by e-mail for those on the DUF<sub>6</sub> program distribution mailing list.

The three public scoping meetings were rescheduled and held in Piketon on November 28, in Oak Ridge on December 4, and in Paducah on December 6, 2001. Announcements of the rescheduled meetings were made on the web site, through a press release, by mailing a postcard directly to individuals on the program mailing list, by e-mail to individuals on the mailing list, and through public service radio advertisements. In addition, advertisements appeared in the local newspapers listed in Table 1.

Each public scoping meeting was presided over by an independent facilitator responsible for conducting the meetings. Background materials, including four fact sheets, the NOI, a video describing characteristics of DUF<sub>6</sub>, and a laptop-based demonstration of the web site, were made available at the meetings (all materials distributed at the scoping meetings are available on the Web site at <http://web.ead.anl.gov/uranium/eis/eisscoping/>).

**TABLE 1 Newspapers in Which Rescheduled Scoping Meetings Were Advertised**

Meeting	Newspaper	Ad Run Dates
<b>Piketon Wednesday, November 28</b>	<i>Pike County News</i>	Sunday, Nov. 25 Wednesday, Nov. 28
	<i>Portsmouth Daily Times</i>	Sunday, Nov. 25 Tuesday, Nov. 27
	<i>Chillicothe Gazette</i>	Sunday, Nov. 25 Tuesday, Nov. 27
<b>Oak Ridge Tuesday, December 4</b>	<i>The Oak Ridger</i>	Friday, Nov. 30 Monday, Dec. 3
	<i>Roane County News</i>	Friday, Nov. 30 Monday, Dec. 3
	<i>Knoxville News-Sentinel</i>	Sunday, Dec. 2 Monday, Dec. 3
<b>Paducah Thursday, December 6</b>	<i>Paducah Sun</i>	Sunday, Dec. 2 Wednesday, Dec. 5

Each public scoping meeting consisted of an introduction by the facilitator and a 20-minute overview by the DOE DUF<sub>6</sub> Management Program manager, which described DOE's approach to meeting its obligations under NEPA. The presentation was followed by (1) a question and answer session in which the DOE manager responded to questions from the attendees and (2) a comment period where attendees were invited to formally make comments on the record. A court reporter recorded an official transcript of each meeting in its entirety. Transcripts, as well as the presentation slides, can be viewed on the web site at the address given above.

A total of approximately 100 individuals attended the three scoping meetings, and 20 individuals provided oral comments. Persons attending included representatives of federal officials, state regulators, local officials, site oversight committee members, representatives of interested companies, local media, and private individuals. In addition, about 20 individuals and organizations commented through the other means available (i.e., fax, telephone, mail, e-mail, and the web site). Some of the comments received through these means were duplicates of some of the comments made at the scoping meetings. During the scoping period (September 18–January 11), the Depleted UF<sub>6</sub> Management Information Network web site received significant use. A total of 64,366 pages viewed (an average of 554 per day) during 9,983 user sessions (an average of 85 per day) by 4,784 unique visitors.

## 2 SUMMARY OF SCOPING COMMENTS

Approximately 140 comments were received from about 30 individuals and organizations during the scoping period. The comments were evaluated and grouped into several general categories for this summary. The following sections summarize the substance of the comments received. The wording is intended to capture the substance of the comments, rather than reproduce the exact wording of individual comments. The order in which the issues are presented is not intended to reflect their relative importance. Because of the wide range of interests and opinions about the proposed DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion project, many of the comments in each category illustrate the varied, and perhaps contradictory, issues, concerns, and desired future conditions expressed by individuals, organizations, and public agencies.

### 2.1 POLICY COMMENTS AND ISSUES

#### 2.1.1 Support for Project

Several commentors expressed general support for DOE's DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion project. Several noted that the project was the culmination of a long process involving DOE and state regulatory agencies, and many stated that the project should be done as quickly as possible. Several commentors noted that the removal of cylinders from ETTP is vital for site reindustrialization efforts.

#### 2.1.2 Importance of Safety

Many commentors stressed that the project should be conducted in a safe and environmentally sound manner. One commentor expressed the opinion that too many past DOE decisions regarding the cylinders have been driven by cost and budget considerations, such as the use of thin-walled cylinders and stacking the cylinders two high, and that these decisions have caused enormous problems.

#### 2.1.3 Impacts of Past Site Operations

Several commentors expressed concern and fear as residents living near the existing diffusion plant sites, citing health problems from past site operations. One individual stated that he feels hostage to the Paducah plant and that residents near the plant do not feel safe and secure. The commentor believed that an alternative should be provided so they do not have to live close to the plant. Another commentor stated that it should be recognized that health problems and contamination are present around the Paducah site.

#### **2.1.4 Need for an EIS**

One commentator stressed that the conversion project requires a detailed, site-specific study typical of an EIS, and not an environmental assessment.

#### **2.1.5 NEPA Process**

One commentator stated the belief that the NEPA process was being prejudiced by the contracting chronology, specifically stating that the contract award should be made only after the EIS is completed. Another commentator felt that DOE had already made decisions, and that input from the public should have been requested earlier in the process.

#### **2.1.6 Use**

One organization expressed its opposition to the use of depleted uranium in weaponry. Several commentators recommended banning the use of depleted uranium in commercial facilities, consumer products, and building and industrial production. In addition, they stated that all mining and processing of uranium should be stopped. The Kentucky Radiation Health and Toxic Agents Branch stated that release of any material from a conversion facility to the public domain must be evaluated by them and the public sector. One commentator noted that depleted uranium is a very important national energy resource and can be used in breeder reactors to provide 200 to 300 years of electrical energy, stressing that the United States needs to think of its energy policy not in the short term, but in terms of hundreds of years. The State of Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation noted that consideration should be given to the possibility that conversion products should not be free-released because of radiological contamination.

#### **2.1.7 USEC**

One individual requested that DOE address the contracts entered into with USEC, whereby DOE continues to take possession of USEC-owned cylinders. The commentator claimed that DOE is using taxpayer dollars to subsidize USEC and that the money paid to DOE by USEC is pathetically low.

#### **2.1.8 Portsmouth Cleanup**

One commentator stated that DOE should clean up the Portsmouth site, put the plant in cold storage, restore the quality of air and water, end pollution at the source, and perform D&D of the site before building another facility.

### **2.1.9 Interaction with State Agencies**

The Kentucky Radiation Health and Toxic Agents Branch stated that DOE has not interacted with the responsible radiation agency in Kentucky to provide sufficient information for assessment of the impacts of construction of a conversion facility on public health. In addition, they requested that DOE provide the Radiation Health and Toxic Agents Branch access to the facility to ensure protection of worker and public health. They also stated that handling and disposing of radioactive material and scrap metal must be properly addressed by DOE and evaluated by the Radiation Health and Toxic Agents Branch.

### **2.1.10 Self-Regulation**

The Kentucky Radiation Health and Toxic Agents Branch stated that it is opposed to self-regulation of the facility by the DOE.

### **2.1.11 DUF<sub>6</sub> as Hazardous Waste**

Representatives of the Kentucky Division of Waste Management stated that they believe DUF<sub>6</sub> is a hazardous waste because of its corrosivity and reactivity.

## **2.2 ALTERNATIVES**

### **2.2.1 Support for DOE's Preferred Alternative**

Several individuals and organizations expressed support for DOE's preferred alternative of building two conversion plants, one at Portsmouth and one at Paducah. Supportive organizations included the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency (OEPA), the Kentucky Division of Waste Management, McCracken County administrators, Paducah area business associations, labor representatives, and local Oak Ridge stakeholder groups. The OEPA expressed support for the shipment of cylinders from ETTP to the Portsmouth site, but only after construction of the conversion facility.

### **2.2.2 Opposition to Proposed Alternatives**

One commentator opposed the consideration of a one conversion plant alternative in the EIS. The commentator stated that such an option is not consistent with the intent of Public Law 105-204 and is not a reasonable alternative because no funds have been provided for this option. Another commentator stated that it is a mistake to consider the use of existing U.S. conversion facilities because of transportation issues and potential local opposition.

### **2.2.3 Recommended Conversion Technologies**

Commentors recommended two conversion technology options: (1) building a conversion plant in parallel with a new centrifuge enrichment plant, which would allow the depleted uranium to be used for reenrichment prior to conversion, and (2) not building a conversion plant but directly disposing of the  $\text{DUF}_6$  in a vitreous melt within a disposal area (this recommendation was accompanied by a technical proposal). One commentor recommended a specific laser technology to monitor for and alarm against dangerous levels of hydrogen fluoride (HF).

### **2.2.4 Preferred Chemical Form of Uranium for Disposal**

Several commentors expressed the opinion that  $\text{U}_3\text{O}_8$  is the preferable and prudent chemical form of uranium for disposal based on stability and solubility. They noted that  $\text{U}_3\text{O}_8$  is the most stable form of uranium and is found in nature. Also, foreign countries store this form of depleted uranium. Several commentors stated that disposal of  $\text{DUF}_4$  will pose disposal problems and consideration of  $\text{UF}_4$  is a mistake, identifying generation of HF, expansion of disposal containers, and U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission concerns as some potential problems. One commentor expressed opposition to converting to depleted uranium metal and provided qualified support for converting to  $\text{UO}_2$ .

### **2.2.5 Use of Hydrogen Fluoride**

Several commentors stated that there is no credible market for aqueous HF and that anhydrous HF is clearly a better choice in terms of marketable fluoride products. It was stated that aqueous HF is a low value product that would be sold into a saturated market. These commentors strongly recommended the production of anhydrous HF and its subsequent use within the nuclear fuel cycle to avoid problems with the stigma from potential uranium contamination. One commentor noted that anhydrous HF production technology was previously demonstrated at a DOE pilot facility in 1998. One commentor stated that the specifications for allowable uranium in the HF produced must be made clear because HF will always contain some uranium. The commentor noted that the final use of the HF will affect the allowable uranium content and will need to be considered (the commentor stressed the possible accumulation of uranium if HF evaporation processes are used).

### **2.2.6 Disposition Options**

One commentor stated that  $\text{DUF}_6$  should be disposed of immediately as high-level waste due to the variety of unknown contaminants and decay products, and further, it should be disposed of in deep, dry areas. The commentor also noted that DOE should address disposal of all forms of converted depleted uranium. Another commentor stated a preference for a disposal process that binds the radionuclides, rendering them benign and immobile before final

disposition. One commentor stated that the depleted uranium should be assigned to safe storage facilities with constant monitoring.

## **2.3 CYLINDER INVENTORY COMMENTS AND ISSUES**

### **2.3.1 ETTP Cylinder Inventory**

A number of commentors stated that DOE needs to specifically state the number of UF<sub>6</sub> cylinders stored at the ETTP site, including test and in-line process cylinders that are not the typical 10- and 14-ton cylinders, and rectify inconsistencies between the number of full cylinders reported by DOE Headquarters personnel compared with that of Oak Ridge operations personnel. They claimed that DOE has continued to provide an inaccurate count of the cylinders at the ETTP site. In addition, several commentors stated that all cylinders should be removed from ETTP and that it would make sense to move them all to Portsmouth because handling would be similar. They recommended that the EIS consider removing all the ETTP cylinders.

### **2.3.2 Cylinder Condition, Surveillance, and Maintenance**

Several commentors expressed their concern over the deteriorated condition of cylinders and continued inadequacies of current inspection programs and procedures. They claimed that DOE does not assure the public the cylinders currently stored will not breach due to external corrosion and that there is a high likelihood of future breaches. One commentor stated that a response team is needed at each site to manage potential breaches. One commentor stated that thousands of cylinders no longer have identification tags, which are necessary to determine the amount of DUF<sub>6</sub> in the cylinder, and that DOE must address that issue.

### **2.3.3 Transuranic Contamination**

A number of commentors noted the presence of transuranic (TRU) contaminants in the DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinder inventory. It was stated that the EIS should specifically address the plutonium or TRU present in the stockpile and that DOE should make it a priority to assess the types and amounts of TRU contaminants in the inventory. One commentor stated that the affected environment section of the EIS should describe the contents of cylinders, including possible TRU and decay product elements, specifically americium-241, cadmium-109, cerium-141, curium-42, curium-244, neptunium-239, promethium-149, technetium, thorium-234, uranium-234, uranium-236, xenon-131m, and xenon-133m.

### **2.3.4 Disposition of Emptied Cylinders**

Several commentors requested that DOE consider the possibility that the free release of emptied cylinders may not be an option because of residual contamination. One commentor expressed opposition to the idea of filling the emptied cylinders with conversion products or wastes for on-site storage or disposal.

## **2.4 TRANSPORTATION ISSUES**

### **2.4.1 Importance of Transportation Safety**

A number of commentors stressed the importance of transportation safety, noting that it will be challenging and expensive. One commentor suggested that traveling Hazmat teams should accompany each shipment. The Kentucky Radiation Health and Toxic Agents Branch expressed serious concerns regarding the transport of DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders from Oak Ridge to Portsmouth, stating that without the proper risk assessments, evaluation of accident scenarios, and other DOE actions, they cannot support the movement of cylinders and are opposed to DOE obtaining any exemption from the U.S. Department of Transportation for the shipment of cylinders. One individual opposed shipping ETTP cylinders to Portsmouth and Paducah and sending conversion products to western sites, stating that the sites should deal with their own wastes.

### **2.4.2 Shipment Options**

One organization stated that if DUF<sub>6</sub> is to be transported via truck, routes should be designated and appropriate risk analysis performed, taking into consideration road conditions. One commentor noted that rail transportation and the minimization of trans-loading can reduce project risks and improve safety. Two commentors stressed that the 11-mile ETTP rail right-of-way is in bad shape, and DOE should consider providing funding for and upgrading of the rail line. One organization stated that the EIS must include a comprehensive analysis of shipments by barge, including assessment of the condition of the barge terminal at ETTP, necessary upgrades, and the impact of possible dredging.

### **2.4.3 Schedule**

With respect to the removal of ETTP cylinders, several commentors stated that the proposed time schedule should be adhered to or bettered. Commentors stated that the current time line is too long, and consideration should be given in the EIS to the removal of ETTP cylinders sooner than 2009.

## **2.5 SCOPE OF ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ANALYSIS**

### **2.5.1 Human Health and Safety**

One commenter stated that the EIS must consider the health and safety of construction and demolition workers if the Portsmouth GDP is demolished to build the conversion plant. The Kentucky Radiation Health and Toxic Agents Branch requested that DOE develop monitoring systems that ensure compliance with as low as reasonably achievable requirements. Another commenter requested that the assessment consider all site releases, not just separate sources. Several commentors requested that all actions and exposure pathways that are likely to affect the health and safety of the workers and the general public be considered. The activities mentioned included storage and movement of cylinders, washing of emptied cylinders, and conversion operations.

### **2.5.2 Air, Water, and Ecological Impacts**

Several commentors stated that the EIS should consider off-site contamination of air, water, and soil, and effects from past practices, in particular, HF gas being transported off site. Similarly, water quality analyses should include effects on streams, the watershed, river basin, aquifers, and resident wildlife (in particular, deformed fish and mammals in the vicinity of the site). One commentator was concerned that different pollutants are bioaccumulating in the environment around the Paducah plant and that the long-term impacts are not well understood.

### **2.5.3 Cumulative Impacts**

Commentors requested that the cumulative impact assessment consider the risk of handling old containers and the buildup of contaminants in infrastructures with repeated exposures and breaches; delayed effects of radiation exposures; long-term health monitoring; inventory of plants and wildlife to monitor migration of DNA defects up the food chain; additive effects of multiple contaminants in the environment; indirect and secondary effects; and other activities ongoing at the sites (including non-federal activities). One commentator noted that data already being used by the health care and insurance industries (i.e., mortality and morbidity rates in the communities and areas surrounding these sites) can more accurately predict exposures and resulting illnesses and should be collected and made available for public and independent analysis. According to the commentator, these data can prove a link between people's illnesses and the DOE site. One commentator specifically requested that the effects of uranium-235 be included under the cumulative impacts.

#### **2.5.4 Environmental Justice**

One commentator stated that the EIS should consider the cost of retraining workers and noted that pollution-based jobs are offered in areas where workers are “depressed for work.” The commentator expressed environmental justice concerns.

#### **2.5.5 Socioeconomics**

One commentator requested that extensive socioeconomic analysis be included in the EIS, specifically the economic impact of the facility on the region, including conducting a health inventory of current and past workers and civilians within a 36-mile radius of the Portsmouth and Paducah sites to determine the costs to the community when workers become too ill to work or are laid off; the number of jobs from construction and operation of the conversion facility compared with the number of jobs that can be provided with the reclamation and restoration of the environment and final cleanup during shutdown, D&D, and cold storage; an analysis of the cost to handle, transport, and dispose of depleted uranium that is contaminated; the cost to build, maintain, and operate the conversion facility; and the long-term economic impacts on the community, for example, the loss of other industries because of decreases in land values, contaminated air and water, etc. One commentator requested that the social and psychological effects on the community and the effects on property values in the vicinity of the Paducah site be considered.

#### **2.5.6 Accident Analysis**

One commentator stated that the EIS must adequately address the risk from earthquakes at the Paducah site and from large plane crashes into the cylinder yards at all sites, noting that such risks had been inadequately addressed in previous evaluations, including the programmatic environmental impact statement (PEIS). The commentator expressed concern over HF released in an accident and the difficulty site personnel would have in responding to such an accident, noting the proximity of the Barkley Airport to the Paducah site and the crash of a B-1 bomber near the Paducah site during the PEIS public hearings. The commentator requested that serious analysis be conducted to develop approaches to mitigate such events, such as considering building additional yards and stacking cylinders one high to allow better access in the event of an accident. The State of Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation also requested that the chance of a catastrophic event, such as a plane crash into a cylinder yard, be explored and the possibility of a deliberate act be considered.

#### **2.5.7 Disposal Analysis**

One commentator stated that the methods of disposal of this material should be considered for their long- and short-term risks. Another stated that the EIS must address what to do with any metal conversion product if the DUF<sub>6</sub> were converted to metal.

### **2.5.8 Use Analysis**

One commentor stated that if any future production takes place at the Paducah site using the DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion products, it should be included in the EIS; specifically, the EIS should consider any products produced, the actual production techniques, and associated waste production. One commentor requested that DOE evaluate the impacts associated with the use of conversion products. Another commentor stated that making products from converted materials should be considered outside the scope of the EIS and also be considered in other documents when actual conversion products are known.

### **2.5.9 Life-Cycle Impacts**

A number of commentors recommended that the EIS consider the full life cycle of the material, including conversion, packaging, transportation, disposal, and D&D of the facilities. Several commentors stated that the EIS must consider what to do with the empty cylinders. One commentor stated that the maintenance and D&D evaluation should consider the possibility that it may not be possible to ship the conversion products off site immediately.

### **2.5.10 Waste Management**

One commentor requested that the EIS address the disposition of wastes generated from the conversion process. Another commentor stated that the Paducah GDP waste treatment plant may not be adequate to meet the needs of the conversion facility and other facilities at the site.

### **2.5.11 Cultural Resources**

One commentor requested that DOE evaluate the corrosive effects of fluorine compounds released to the environment from the conversion plant at Paducah GDP on buildings and art work in Paducah and other towns in western Kentucky and southern Illinois.



**ATTACHMENT A:**

**NOTICE OF INTENT TO PREPARE AN ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT  
STATEMENT FOR DEPLETED URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE  
CONVERSION FACILITIES**

**AGENCY:** Department of Energy.

**ACTION:** Notice of Intent.

**SUMMARY:** The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) announces its intention to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for a proposal to construct, operate, maintain, and decontaminate and decommission two depleted uranium hexafluoride (DUF<sub>6</sub>) conversion facilities, at Portsmouth, Ohio, and Paducah, Kentucky. DOE would use the proposed facilities to convert its inventory of DUF<sub>6</sub> to a more stable chemical form suitable for storage, beneficial use, or disposal. Approximately 700,000 metric tons of DUF<sub>6</sub> in about 57,700 cylinders are stored at Portsmouth and Paducah, and at an Oak Ridge, Tennessee site. The EIS will address potential environmental impacts of the construction, operation, maintenance, and decontamination and decommissioning of the conversion facilities. DOE will hold public scoping meetings near the three involved sites.

**DATES:** DOE invites public comments on the proposed scope of the DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion facilities EIS. To ensure consideration, comments must be postmarked by November 26, 2001. Late comments will be considered to the extent practicable. Three public scoping meetings will be held near Portsmouth, Ohio; Paducah, Kentucky; and Oak Ridge, Tennessee. The scoping meetings will provide the public with an opportunity to present comments on the scope of the EIS, and to ask questions and discuss concerns with DOE officials regarding the EIS. The location, date, and time for these public scoping meetings are as follows:

Portsmouth, Ohio: Thursday, November 1, 2001, from 6-9 p.m. at the Vern Riffe Pike County Vocational School, 175 Beaver Creek Road - off State Route 32, Piketon, Ohio 45661.

Paducah, Kentucky: Tuesday, November 6, 2001, from 6-9 p.m. at the Information Age Park Resource Center, 2000 McCracken Blvd., Paducah, Kentucky 42001.

Oak Ridge, Tennessee: Thursday, November 8, 2001, from 6-9 p.m. at the Pollard Auditorium, Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education, 210 Badger Avenue, Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37831.

**ADDRESSES:** Please direct comments or suggestions on the scope of the EIS and questions concerning the proposed project to: Kevin Shaw, U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Environmental Management, Office of Site Closure - Oak Ridge Office (EM-32), 19901 Germantown Road, Germantown, Maryland 20874, fax (301) 903-3479, e-mail [DUF6.Comments@em.doe.gov](mailto:DUF6.Comments@em.doe.gov) (please use 'NOI Comments' for the subject).

**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:** For information regarding the proposed project, contact Kevin Shaw, as above. For general information on the DOE NEPA process, please contact Carol M. Borgstrom, Director, Office of NEPA Policy and Compliance (EH-42), U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW, Washington, DC 20585-0119, telephone (202) 586-4600 or leave a message at (800) 472-2756.

## **SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:**

### **Background**

Depleted UF<sub>6</sub> results from the process of making uranium suitable for use as fuel in nuclear reactors or for military applications. The use of uranium in these applications requires increasing the proportion of the uranium-235 isotope found in natural uranium, which is approximately 0.7 percent (by weight), through an isotopic separation process. A U-235 "enrichment" process called gaseous diffusion has historically been used in the United States. The gaseous diffusion process uses uranium in the form of UF<sub>6</sub>, primarily because UF<sub>6</sub> can conveniently be used in the gas form for processing, in the liquid form for filling or emptying containers, and in the solid form for storage. Solid UF<sub>6</sub> is a white, dense, crystalline material that resembles rock salt.

Over the last five decades, large quantities of uranium were enriched using gaseous diffusion. "Depleted" UF<sub>6</sub> (DUF<sub>6</sub>) is a product of the process and was stored at the three uranium enrichment sites located at Paducah, Kentucky; Portsmouth, Ohio; and the East Tennessee Technology Park (ETTP - formerly known as the K-25 Site) in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. Depleted uranium is uranium that, through the enrichment process, has been stripped of a portion of the uranium-235 that it once contained so that it has a lower uranium-235 proportion than the 0.7 weight-percent found in nature. The uranium in most of DOE's DUF<sub>6</sub> has between 0.2 to 0.4 weight-percent uranium-235.

DOE has management responsibility for approximately 700,000 metric tons (MT) of DUF<sub>6</sub> contained in about

57,700 steel cylinders at the Portsmouth, Paducah, and ETTP sites, where it has stored such material since the 1950s. The characteristics of  $UF_6$  pose potential health and environmental risks.  $DUF_6$  in cylinders emits low levels of gamma and neutron radiation. Also, when released to the atmosphere,  $DUF_6$  reacts with water vapor in the air to form hydrogen fluoride (HF) and uranyl fluoride ( $UO_2F_2$ ), both chemically toxic substances. In light of such characteristics, DOE stores  $DUF_6$  in a manner designed to minimize the risk to workers, the public, and the environment.

In October 1992, the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency (OEPA) issued a Notice of Violation (NOV) alleging that  $DUF_6$  stored at the Portsmouth facility is subject to regulation under State hazardous waste laws applicable to the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant. The NOV stated that OEPA had determined  $DUF_6$  to be a solid waste and that DOE had violated Ohio laws and regulations by not evaluating whether such waste was hazardous. DOE disagreed with this assessment, and, in February 1998, DOE and OEPA reached an agreement. This agreement sets aside the issue of whether the  $DUF_6$  is subject to Resource Conservation and Recovery Act regulation and institutes a negotiated management plan governing the storage of the Portsmouth  $DUF_6$ . The agreement also requires DOE to continue its efforts to evaluate potential use or reuse of the material. The agreement expires in 2008. In 1994, DOE began work on the Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Alternative Strategies for the Long-Term Management and Use of

Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride ( $DUF_6$  PEIS). The  $DUF_6$  PEIS was completed in 1999 and identified conversion of  $DUF_6$  to another chemical form for use or long-term storage as part of a preferred management alternative. In the corresponding Record of Decision for the Long-Term Management and Use of Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride (ROD) (64 FR 43358, August 10, 1999), DOE decided to promptly convert the  $DUF_6$  inventory to depleted uranium oxide, depleted uranium metal, or a combination of both. The ROD further explained that depleted uranium oxide will be used as much as possible, and the remaining depleted uranium oxide will be stored for potential future uses or disposal, as necessary. In addition, according to the ROD, conversion to depleted uranium metal will occur only if uses are available.

During the time that DOE was analyzing its long-term strategy for managing the  $DUF_6$  inventory, several other events occurred related to  $DUF_6$  management. In 1995, the Department began an aggressive program to better manage the  $DUF_6$  cylinders, known as the  $DUF_6$  Cylinder Project Management Plan. In part, this program responded to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) Recommendation 95-1, Safety of Cylinders Containing Depleted Uranium. This program included more rigorous and frequent inspections, a multi-year program for painting and refurbishing of cylinders, and construction of concrete-pad cylinder yards. Implementation of the  $DUF_6$  Cylinder Project Management Plan has been successful, and, as a result, on December 16, 1999, the DNFSB closed out Recommendation 95-1.

In February 1999, DOE and the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation entered into a consent order which included a requirement for the performance of two environmentally beneficial projects: the implementation of a negotiated management plan governing the storage of the small inventory (relative to other sites) of all  $UF_6$  (depleted, low enriched, and natural) cylinders stored at the ETTP site, and the removal of the  $DUF_6$  from the ETTP site or the conversion of the material by December 31, 2009.

In July 1998, the President signed Public Law (P.L.) 105-204. This law directed the Secretary of Energy to prepare "a plan to ensure that all amounts accrued on the books" of the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) for the disposition of  $DUF_6$  would be used to commence construction of, not later than January 31, 2004, and to operate, an on-site facility at each of the gaseous diffusion plants at Paducah and Portsmouth, to treat and recycle  $DUF_6$  consistent with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). DOE responded to P.L. 105-204 by issuing the Final Plan for the Conversion of Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride (referred to herein as the "Conversion Plan") in July 1999. The Conversion Plan describes DOE's intent to chemically process the  $DUF_6$  to create products that would present both a lower long-term storage hazard and provide a material that would be suitable for use or disposal.

DOE initiated the Conversion Plan with the announced availability of a draft Request for Proposals (RFP) on July 30, 1999, for a contractor to design, construct, and operate  $DUF_6$  conversion facilities at the

Paducah and Portsmouth uranium enrichment plant sites. Based on comments received on the draft RFP, DOE revisited some of the assumptions about management of the DUF<sub>6</sub> inventory made previously in the PEIS and ROD. For example, as documented in the Oak Ridge National Laboratory study, Assessment of Preferred Depleted Uranium Disposal Forms (ORNL/TM- 2000/161, June 2000), four potential conversion forms (triuranium octoxide (U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub>), uranium dioxide (UO<sub>2</sub>), uranium tetrafluoride (UF<sub>4</sub>), and uranium metal) were evaluated and found to be acceptable for near-surface disposal at low-level radioactive waste disposal sites such as those at DOE's Nevada Test Site and Envirocare of Utah, Inc. Therefore, the RFP was modified to allow for a wide range of potential conversion product forms and process technologies. However, any of the proposed conversion forms must have an assured environmentally acceptable path for final disposition.

On October 31, 2000, DOE issued a final RFP to procure a contractor to design, construct, and operate DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion facilities at the Paducah and Portsmouth plant sites. Any conversion plants that result from this procurement would convert the DUF<sub>6</sub> to a more stable chemical form that is suitable for either beneficial use or disposal. The selected contractor would design the conversion plants using the technology it proposes and construct the plants. The selected contractor also would operate the plants for a five-year period, which would include maintaining depleted uranium and product inventories, transporting all uranium hexafluoride storage cylinders in Tennessee to a conversion plant

at Portsmouth, as appropriate, and transporting converted product for which there is no use to a disposal site. The selected contractor would also prepare excess material for disposal at an appropriate site.

DOE received five proposals in response to the DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion RFP, and DOE anticipates that a contract will be awarded during the first quarter of fiscal year 2002. Since the site-specific NEPA process will not be completed prior to contract award, the contract shall be contingent on completion of the NEPA process and will be structured such that the NEPA process will be completed in advance of a go/no-go decision. (See NEPA Process below.) DOE initiated the NEPA review by issuing an Advance Notice of Intent to prepare an EIS for the DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion facilities on May 7, 2001 (66 FR 23010).

#### **Purpose and Need for Agency Action**

DOE needs to convert its inventory of DUF<sub>6</sub> to a more stable chemical form for storage, use, or disposal. This need follows directly from the decision presented in the August 1999 "Record of Decision for Long-Term Management and Use of Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride," namely to begin conversion of the DUF<sub>6</sub> inventory as soon as possible.

This EIS will assess the potential environmental impacts of constructing, operating, maintaining, and decontaminating and decommissioning DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion facilities at the Portsmouth and Paducah sites, as well as other reasonable alternatives. The EIS will aid decision making on DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion by evaluating the

environmental impacts of the range of reasonable alternatives, as well as providing a means for public input into the decision making process. DOE is committed to ensuring that the public has ample opportunity to participate in this review.

#### **Relation to the DUF<sub>6</sub> PEIS**

This EIS represents the second level of a tiered environmental review process being used to evaluate and implement the DUF<sub>6</sub> management program. Tiering refers to the process of first addressing general (programmatic) matters in a PEIS followed by more narrowly focused (project level) environmental review that incorporates by reference the more general discussions. The DUF<sub>6</sub> PEIS, issued in April 1999, was the first level of this tiered approach.

The DUF<sub>6</sub> PEIS addressed the potential environmental impacts of broad strategy alternatives, including analyses of the impacts of: (1) continued storage of DUF<sub>6</sub> at DOE's current storage sites; (2) technologies for converting the DUF<sub>6</sub> to depleted U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub>, UO<sub>2</sub>, or uranium metal; (3) long-term storage of depleted U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> and UO<sub>2</sub> for subsequent use or disposal; (4) long-term storage of DUF<sub>6</sub> in cylinders at a consolidated site; (5) use of depleted UO<sub>2</sub> and uranium metal conversion products; (6) transportation of materials; and (7) disposal of depleted U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> and UO<sub>2</sub> at generic disposal sites. The results of the PEIS analysis, as well as supporting documentation, will be incorporated into this EIS to the extent appropriate.

The ROD for the DUF<sub>6</sub> PEIS declared DOE's decision to promptly convert the DUF<sub>6</sub> inventory to a more stable

chemical form. This tiered EIS will address specific issues associated with the implementation of the DUF<sub>6</sub> PEIS ROD.

### Preliminary Alternatives

Consistent with NEPA implementation requirements, this EIS will assess the range of reasonable alternatives regarding constructing, operating, maintaining, and decontaminating and decommissioning DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion facilities. The following preliminary list of alternatives is subject to modification in response to comments received during the public scoping process.

*Preferred Alternative.* Under the preferred alternative, two conversion facilities would be built: one at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant site and another at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant site. The cylinders currently stored at the ETTP site near Oak Ridge, Tennessee, would be transported to Portsmouth for conversion. The conversion products (i.e., depleted uranium as well as fluorine components produced during the conversion process) would be stored, put to beneficial uses, or disposed of at an appropriate disposal facility. This alternative is consistent with the Conversion Plan, which DOE submitted to Congress in July 1999, in response to Public Law 105–204. Subalternatives to be considered for the preferred alternative include:

- Conversion technology processes identified in response to the final RFP for DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion services, plus any other technologies that DOE believes must be considered.

- Local siting alternatives for building and operating conversion facilities within the Paducah and Portsmouth plant boundaries.
- Timing options, such as staggering the start of the construction and operation of the two conversion facilities.

*One Conversion Plant Alternative.* An alternative of building and operating only one conversion facility at either the Portsmouth or the Paducah site will be considered. This plant could differ in size or production capacity from the two proposed for Portsmouth and Paducah. Technology and local siting subalternatives will be considered as with the preferred alternative.

*Use of Existing UF<sub>6</sub> Conversion Capacity Alternative.* DOE will consider using already-existing UF<sub>6</sub> conversion capacity at commercial nuclear fuel fabrication facilities in lieu of constructing one or two new conversion plants. DOE is evaluating the feasibility of using existing conversion capacity, although no expression of interest has been received from such facilities.

*No Action Alternative.* Under the “no action” alternative, cylinder management activities (handling, inspection, monitoring, and maintenance) would continue the “status quo” at the three current storage sites indefinitely, consistent with the DUF<sub>6</sub> Cylinder Project Management Plan and the consent orders, which include actions needed to meet safety and environmental requirements.

Where applicable under the alternatives listed above, transportation options, such as truck, rail, and barge, will be

considered for shipping DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders to a conversion facility and conversion products to a storage or disposal facility. Also, for each technology alternative, alternatives for conversion products, including storage, use, and disposal at one or more disposal sites, will be considered. Further, DOE would appreciate comments regarding whether there are additional siting alternatives for one or more new conversion facilities that should be considered.

### Identification of Environmental and Other Issues

DOE intends to address the following environmental issues when assessing the potential environmental impacts of the alternatives in this EIS. Additional issues may be identified as a result of the scoping process. DOE invites comment from the Federal agencies, Native American tribes, state and local governments, and the general public on these and any other issues that should be considered in the EIS:

- Potential impacts on health from DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion activities, including potential impacts to workers and the public from exposure to radiation and chemicals during routine and accident conditions for the construction, operation, maintenance, and decontamination and decommissioning of DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion facilities.
- Potential impacts to workers and the public from exposure to radiation and chemicals during routine and accident conditions for the transportation of DUF<sub>6</sub>

cylinders from ETPP to one of the conversion sites.

- Potential impacts to workers and the public from exposure to radiation and chemicals during routine and accident conditions for the transportation of conversion products that are not beneficially used to a low-level waste disposal facility.
- Potential impacts to surface water, ground water, and soil during construction activities and from emissions and water use during facility operations.
- Potential impacts on air quality from emissions and from noise during facility construction and operations.
- Potential cumulative impacts of the past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions (including impacts resulting from activities of the United States Enrichment Corporation).
- Potential impacts from facility construction on historically significant properties, if present, and on access to traditional use areas.
- Potential impacts from land requirements, potential incompatibilities, and disturbances.
- Potential impacts on local, regional, or national resources from materials and utilities required for construction and operation.
- Potential impacts on ecological resources, including threatened and

endangered species, floodplains, and wetlands.

- Potential impacts on local and DOE-wide waste management capabilities.
- Potential impacts on local employment, income, population, housing, and public services from facility construction and operations, and environmental justice issues.
- Pollution prevention, waste minimization, and energy and water use reduction technologies to reduce the use of energy, water, and hazardous substances and to mitigate environmental impacts.

DOE received comments on the Advance Notice of Intent from the Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation (TDEC) and the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency (OHEPA). TDEC commented that the EIS should provide an adequate platform for coordination of environmental issues between DOE, Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee, without additional agreements if certain specified topics were explored in detail in the EIS. TDEC's comments emphasized issues related to the transportation of the ETPP cylinders to Portsmouth. OHEPA's comment concurred in TDEC's comment that the EIS should coordinate environmental issues between DOE, Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee, especially emergency management issues associated with the transportation of the ETPP cylinders to Portsmouth.

## NEPA Process

The EIS for the proposed project will be prepared pursuant to the NEPA of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.), Council on Environmental Quality NEPA Regulations (40 CFR Parts 1500—1508), and DOE's NEPA Implementing Procedures (10 CFR Part 1021). Following the publication of this Notice of Intent, DOE will hold scoping meetings, prepare and distribute the draft EIS for public review, hold public hearings to solicit public comment on the draft EIS, and publish a final EIS. Not less than 30 days after the publication of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's Notice of Availability of the final EIS, DOE may issue a ROD documenting its decision concerning the proposed action.

In addition to the above steps, DOE is considering environmental factors in selecting a contractor for the conversion services through the procurement process, including preparation of an environmental critique and an environmental synopsis pursuant to 10 CFR 1021.216. The environmental critique evaluates the environmental data and information submitted by each offeror and is subject to the confidentiality requirements of the procurement process. DOE also is preparing a publicly available environmental synopsis, based on the environmental critique, to document the consideration given to environmental factors in the contractor selection process. The environmental synopsis will be filed with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and will be incorporated into the EIS. In accordance with 10 CFR 1021.216(i), since the NEPA process will not be completed prior to contract award, the contract will be

structured to allow the NEPA review process to be completed in advance of a go/no-go decision.

### **Related NEPA Reviews**

Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Alternative Strategies for the Long-Term Management and Use of Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride (DOE/EIS-0269, April 1999);

Final Waste Management Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Managing Treatment, Storage, and Disposal of Radioactive and Hazardous Waste (DOE/EIS-0200- F, May 1997);

Disposition of Surplus Highly Enriched Uranium, Final Environmental Impact Statement (DOE/ EIS-0240, June 1996);

Environmental Assessment for the Refurbishment of Uranium Hexafluoride Cylinder Storage Yards C-745-K, L, M, N, and P and Construction of a New Uranium Hexafluoride Cylinder Storage Yard (C- 745-T) at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant, Paducah, Kentucky (DOE/EA-1118, July 1996);

Environmental Assessment for DOE Sale of Surplus Natural and Low Enriched Uranium (DOE/EA-1172, October 1996); Environmental Assessment for the Lease of Land and Facilities within the East Tennessee Technology Park, Oak Ridge, Tennessee (DOE/EA-1175, 1997);

Notice of Intent for Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Disposition of Scrap Metals (DOE/EIS-0327) (66 FR 36562, July 12, 2001).

### **Scoping Meetings**

The purpose of this Notice is to encourage early public involvement in the EIS process and to solicit public comments on the proposed scope of the EIS, including the issues and alternatives it would analyze. DOE will hold public scoping meetings near Portsmouth, Ohio; Paducah, Kentucky; and Oak Ridge, Tennessee, to solicit both oral and written comments from interested parties. Oral and written comments will be considered equally in the preparation of the EIS. See "DATES" above for the times and locations of these meetings.

DOE will designate a presiding officer for the scoping meetings. The scoping meetings will not be conducted as evidentiary hearings, and there will be no questioning of the commentors. However, DOE personnel may ask for clarifications to ensure that they fully understand the comments and suggestions. The presiding officer will establish the order of speakers. At the opening of each meeting, the presiding officer will announce any additional procedures necessary for the conduct of the meetings. If necessary to ensure that all persons wishing to make a presentation are given the opportunity, a time limit may be applied for each speaker. Comment cards will also be available for those who would prefer to submit written comments.

DOE will make transcripts of the scoping meetings and other environmental and project-related materials available for public review in the following reading rooms: DOE Headquarters, Freedom of Information Reading Room, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW, Room 1 E-190,

Washington, DC 20585.  
Telephone: (202) 586-3142.

Oak Ridge/ DOE, Public Reading Room, 230 Warehouse Road, Suite 300, Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37831. Telephone: (865) 241-4780.

Paducah/DOE, Environmental Information Center, Berkley Centre, 115 Memorial Drive, Paducah, Kentucky 42001, Telephone: (270) 554-6979.

Portsmouth/DOE, Environmental Information Center, 3930 U.S. Route 23, Perimeter Road, Piketon, OH 45661. Telephone: (740) 289-3317.

Information is also available through the project web site at <http://web.ead.anl.gov/uranium> and on the DOE NEPA web site at <http://www.tis.eh.doe.gov/nepa>.

The EIS will also contain a section summarizing the nature of the comments received during the scoping process and describing any modification to the scope of the EIS in response to the scoping process comments.

### **EIS Schedule**

The draft EIS is scheduled to be published by June 2002. A 45-day comment period on the draft EIS is planned, which will include public hearings to receive oral comments. Availability of the draft EIS, the dates of the public comment period, and information about the public hearings will be announced in the Federal Register and in the local news media.

The final EIS for the DUF<sub>6</sub> Conversion Facilities is scheduled for January 2003. A ROD would be issued no sooner than 30 days after the U. S. Environmental Protection Agency notice of availability of the final EIS is published in the Federal Register.

Signed in Washington, DC, this  
10<sup>th</sup> day of September, 2001.

Steven V. Cary  
Acting Assistant Secretary  
Office of Environment, Safety  
and Health

**NOTICE OF CHANGE IN NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL  
POLICY ACT (NEPA) COMPLIANCE APPROACH FOR  
THE DEPLETED URANIUM HEXAFLUORIDE (DUF<sub>6</sub>)  
CONVERSION FACILITIES PROJECT**



22368

Federal Register / Vol. 68, No. 81 / Monday, April 28, 2003 / Notices

"Browse Pending Collections" link and by clicking on link number 2270. When you access the information collection, click on "Download Attachments" to view. Written requests for information should be addressed to Vivian Reese, Department of Education, 400 Maryland Avenue, SW., Room 4050, Regional Office Building 3, Washington, DC 20202-4651 or to the e-mail address [vivan.reese@ed.gov](mailto:vivan.reese@ed.gov). Requests may also be electronically mailed to the internet address [OCIO\\_RIMG@ed.gov](mailto:OCIO_RIMG@ed.gov) or faxed to 202-708-9346. Please specify the complete title of the information collection when making your request.

Comments regarding burden and/or the collection activity requirements should be directed to Joseph Schubart at (202) 708-9266 or to his e-mail address [Joe.Schubart@ed.gov](mailto:Joe.Schubart@ed.gov). Individuals who use a telecommunications device for the deaf (TDD) may call the Federal Information Relay Service (FIRS) at 1-800-877-8339.

[FR Doc. 03-10325 Filed 4-25-03; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4000-01-P

## DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

### Notice of Change in National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) Compliance Approach for the Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride (DUF<sub>6</sub>) Conversion Facilities Project

**AGENCY:** Department of Energy.

**ACTION:** Notice of revised approach.

**SUMMARY:** On September 18, 2001, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) published a Notice of Intent (NOI) in the *Federal Register*, announcing its intention to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for a proposed action to construct, operate, maintain, and decontaminate and decommission two depleted uranium hexafluoride (DUF<sub>6</sub>) conversion facilities at Portsmouth, Ohio, and Paducah, Kentucky. DOE held three scoping meetings to provide the public with an opportunity to present comments on the scope of the EIS, and to ask questions and discuss concerns with DOE officials regarding the EIS. The scoping meetings were held in Piketon, Ohio on November 28, 2001; in Oak Ridge, Tennessee on December 4, 2001, and in Paducah, Kentucky, on December 6, 2001. The purpose of this Notice is to inform the public of the change in the approach for the NEPA review for the DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion projects for Paducah and Portsmouth, and to invite public comments on the revised approach.

**DATES:** Comments received by May 30, 2003, will be considered in the

preparation of the draft EISs. Comments received after that date will be considered to the extent practicable.

**ADDRESSES:** Comments and suggestions can be forwarded to Gary Hartman, U.S. Department of Energy—Oak Ridge Operations Office, Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37831, telephone (865) 576-0273, fax: (865) 576-0746, e-mail: [hartmangs@oro.doe.gov](mailto:hartmangs@oro.doe.gov). Also contact Mr. Hartman with any questions regarding the DOE DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion project.

**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:** For general information on the DOE NEPA process, contact Carol M. Borgstrom, Director, Office of NEPA Policy and Compliance (EH-42), U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20585-0119, telephone (202) 586-4600 or leave a message at (800) 472-2756.

**SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:** On September 18, 2001, the U.S.

Department of Energy (DOE) published a Notice of Intent (NOI) in the *Federal Register* (66 FR 48123), announcing its intention to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for a proposed action to construct, operate, maintain, and decontaminate and decommission two depleted uranium hexafluoride (DUF<sub>6</sub>) conversion facilities at Portsmouth, Ohio, and Paducah, Kentucky. DOE held three scoping meetings to provide the public with an opportunity to present comments on the scope of the EIS, and to ask questions and discuss concerns with DOE officials regarding the EIS. The scoping meetings were held in Piketon, Ohio on November 28, 2001; in Oak Ridge, Tennessee on December 4, 2001, and in Paducah, Kentucky, on December 6, 2001. The alternatives identified in the NOI included a two-plant alternative (two conversion plants would be built, one at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant site and another at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant site), a one-plant alternative (only one plant would be built either at the Paducah or the Portsmouth site), a use of existing UF<sub>6</sub> conversion capacity alternative (DOE would consider using already-existing UF<sub>6</sub> conversion capacity at commercial nuclear fuel fabrication facilities in lieu of constructing one or two new plants), and the no action alternative. For alternatives that involved constructing one or two new plants, DOE planned to consider alternative conversion technologies, local siting alternatives within the Paducah and Portsmouth plant boundaries, and the shipment of DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders stored at the East Tennessee Technology Park (ETTP) near Oak Ridge, Tennessee, to either the

Portsmouth or Paducah sites. The technologies to be considered in the EIS were those submitted in response to a Request for Proposals (RFP) for conversion services that DOE had issued in October 2000, plus any other technologies that DOE believed must be considered.

Then, on August 2, 2002, the U.S. Congress passed the *2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act for Further Recovery From and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States* (Public Law 107-206). In pertinent part, this law required that, within 30 days of enactment, DOE award a contract for the scope of work described in the October 2000 RFP, including design, construction, and operation of a DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion plant at each of the Department's Paducah, Kentucky and Portsmouth, Ohio sites. Accordingly, the DOE awarded a contract to Uranium Disposition Services, LLC, on August 29, 2002.

In light of Public Law 107-206, and DOE's award of the contract to Uranium Disposition Services, DOE reevaluated the appropriate scope of its NEPA review and decided to prepare two separate EIS's, one for the plant proposed for the Paducah site and a second for the Portsmouth site. The proposed alternatives to be considered in each EIS would focus primarily on where the conversion facilities will be sited at the respective sites, and a no action alternative. DOE will also consider impacts arising from shipment of ETTP cylinders for conversion to each site.

### Schedule

Both draft EISs are scheduled to be published in July 2003. A 45-day comment period on the draft EISs is planned, which will include public hearings to receive comments. Availability of the draft EISs, the dates of the public comment period, and information about the public hearings will be announced in the *Federal Register* and in the local news media.

The final EISs are scheduled for publication in January 2004. The Records of Decision would be issued no sooner than 30 days after the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency notices of availability of the final EISs are published in the *Federal Register*. As directed by Pub. L. 107-206, construction of the DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion facilities is scheduled to begin not later than July 31, 2004.

The purpose of this Notice is to inform the public of the change in the approach for the NEPA review for the DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion projects for Paducah

and Portsmouth, and to invite public comments on the revised approach.

**David R. Allen,**

*NEPA Compliance Officer, Oak Ridge Operations Office.*

[FR Doc. 03-10373 Filed 4-25-03; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6450-01-P

## DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

### Environmental Management Site-Specific Advisory Board, Paducah

**AGENCY:** Department of Energy (DOE).

**ACTION:** Notice of open meeting.

**SUMMARY:** This notice announces a meeting of the Environmental Management Site-Specific Advisory Board (EM SSAB), Paducah. The Federal Advisory Committee Act (Pub. L. 92-463, 86 Stat. 770) requires that public notice of these meetings be announced in the **Federal Register**.

**DATES:** Thursday, May 15, 2003, 5:30 p.m.–9 p.m.

**ADDRESSES:** 111 Memorial Drive, Barkley Centre, Paducah, Kentucky.

**FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:** W. Don Seaborg, Deputy Designated Federal Officer, Department of Energy Paducah Site Office, Post Office Box 1410, MS-103, Paducah, Kentucky 42001, (270) 441-6806.

#### SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

*Purpose of the Board:* The purpose of the Board is to make recommendations to DOE and its regulators in the areas of environmental restoration and waste management activities.

#### Tentative Agenda

- 5:30 p.m. Informal Discussion
- 6:00 p.m. Call to Order; Introductions; Approve April Minutes; Review Agenda
- 6:10 p.m. DDFO's Comments
  - Budget Update
  - ES & H Issues
  - EM Project Updates
  - CAB Recommendation Status
  - Other
- 6:30 p.m. Federal Coordinator Comments
- 6:40 p.m. Ex-officio Comments
- 6:50 p.m. Public Comments and Questions
- 7:00 p.m. Review of Action Items
- 7:15 p.m. Break
- 7:25 p.m. Presentation
  - Fiscal Year (FY) 2004 Budget—Judy Penry (Oak Ridge Chief Financial Officer [CFO])
  - Waste Disposition Environmental Assessment (EA) Addendum
- 8:10 p.m. Public Comments and Questions

8:20 p.m. Task Force and Subcommittee Reports

- Water Task Force
- Waste Operations Task Force
- Long Range Strategy/Stewardship
- Community Concerns
- Public Involvement/Membership

8:55 p.m. Administrative Issues

- Preparation for September Chairs' Meeting
- June Dinner Meeting
- Review of Workplan
- Review Next Agenda
- Final Comments

9:10 p.m. Adjourn

Copies of the final agenda will be available at the meeting.

*Public Participation:* The meeting is open to the public. Written statements may be filed with the Committee either before or after the meeting. Individuals who wish to make oral statements pertaining to agenda items should contact David Dollins at the address listed above or by telephone at (270) 441-6819. Requests must be received five days prior to the meeting and reasonable provision will be made to include the presentation in the agenda. The Deputy Designated Federal Officer is empowered to conduct the meeting in a fashion that will facilitate the orderly conduct of business. Each individual wishing to make public comment will be provided a maximum of five minutes to present their comments as the first item of the meeting agenda.

*Minutes:* The minutes of this meeting will be available for public review and copying at the Freedom of Information Public Reading Room, 1E-190, Forrestal Building, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20585 between 9 a.m. and 4 p.m., Monday–Friday, except Federal holidays. Minutes will also be available at the Department of Energy's Environmental Information Center and Reading Room at 115 Memorial Drive, Barkley Centre, Paducah, Kentucky between 8 a.m. and 5 p.m. Monday through Friday or by writing to David Dollins, Department of Energy Paducah Site Office, Post Office Box 1410, MS-103, Paducah, Kentucky 42001 or by calling him at (270) 441-6819.

Issued at Washington, DC, on April 23, 2003.

**Belinda G. Hood,**

*Acting Deputy Advisory Committee Management Officer.*

[FR Doc. 03-10374 Filed 4-25-03; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6450-01-P

## DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

### Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

[Docket Nos. ER03-610-000]

### Allegheny Energy Supply Units 3, 4, & 5, LLC; Notice of Issuance of Order

April 21, 2003.

Allegheny Energy Supply Units 3, 4, & 5, LLC (Allegheny 3, 4 & 5) filed an application for market-based rate authority, with an accompanying tariff. The proposed market-based rate tariff provides for the sale of capacity and energy at market-based rates, as well as sale of ancillary services into PJM Interconnection LLC, New York Independent System Operator, Inc., and ISO New England, Inc. at market-based rates. Allegheny 3, 4, & 5 also requested waiver of various Commission regulations. In particular, Allegheny 3, 4, & 5 requested that the Commission grant blanket approval under 18 CFR part 34 of all future issuances of securities and assumptions of liability by Allegheny 3, 4, & 5.

On April 18, 2003, pursuant to delegated authority, the Director, Division of Tariffs and Market Development—South, granted the request for blanket approval under part 34, subject to the following:

Any person desiring to be heard or to protest the blanket approval of issuances of securities or assumptions of liability by Allegheny 3, 4, & 5 should file a motion to intervene or protest with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426, in accordance with rules 211 and 214 of the Commission's rules of practice and procedure (18 CFR 385.211 and 385.214).

Notice is hereby given that the deadline for filing motions to intervene or protests, as set forth above, is May 19, 2003.

Absent a request to be heard in opposition by the deadline above, Allegheny 3, 4, & 5 is authorized to issue securities and assume obligations or liabilities as a guarantor, indorser, surety, or otherwise in respect of any security of another person; provided that such issuance or assumption is for some lawful object within the corporate purposes of Allegheny 3, 4, & 5 compatible with the public interest, and is reasonably necessary or appropriate for such purposes.

The Commission reserves the right to require a further showing that neither public nor private interests will be adversely affected by continued approval of Allegheny 3, 4, & 5's

**APPENDIX D:**

**ENVIRONMENTAL SYNOPSIS FOR THE  
DEPLETED UF<sub>6</sub> CONVERSION PROJECT**



**ENVIRONMENTAL SYNOPSIS  
FOR THE DEPLETED UF<sub>6</sub> CONVERSION PROJECT**

**(Solicitation No. DE-RP05-01OR22717)**

**October 2002**

**Environmental Assessment Division  
Argonne National Laboratory  
Argonne, Illinois**

**Prepared for**

**Office of Site Closure – Oak Ridge Office (EM-32)  
Office of Environmental Management  
U.S. Department of Energy  
Washington, D.C.**



**CONTENTS**

1 INTRODUCTION..... 1

2 BACKGROUND..... 3

3 DESCRIPTION OF PROPOSALS ..... 6

4 ASSESSMENT APPROACH USED IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL CRITIQUE ..... 7

5 SUMMARY OF POTENTIAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS ..... 12

    5.1 Environmental Impacts Likely to be Negligible to Low, or Well-Within  
        Regulatory Limits..... 13

    5.2 Environmental Impacts Potentially Requiring Mitigation or of Uncertain  
        Magnitude..... 16

    5.3 Environmental Impacts with Potentially High Consequences, but  
        Low Probability..... 17

    5.4 Differences in Potential Environmental Impacts among the Proposals ..... 20

    5.5 Differences in Required Permits, Licenses, and Approvals..... 21

6 REFERENCES..... 22

**TABLE**

4.1 NEPA Information Requested in the RFP..... 8

**FIGURE**

4.1 Areas of Impact Evaluated in the Environmental Critique ..... 11



**ENVIRONMENTAL SYNOPSIS  
FOR THE DEPLETED UF<sub>6</sub> CONVERSION PROJECT  
(Solicitation No. DE-RP05-01OR22717)**

**1 INTRODUCTION**

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) issued a Request for Proposals (RFP) on October 31, 2000, to procure a contractor to design, construct, and operate two depleted uranium hexafluoride (DUF<sub>6</sub>) conversion facilities at Portsmouth, Ohio, and Paducah, Kentucky (Solicitation No. DE-RP05-01OR22717). The Department intends to use the proposed facilities to convert its inventory of DUF<sub>6</sub> to a more stable chemical form suitable for beneficial use or disposal. The contractor selected will design the conversion plants using the technology it proposes; construct the plants; and operate the plants for a 5-year period, which will include maintaining depleted uranium and product inventories, transporting all uranium hexafluoride storage cylinders from Tennessee to the conversion plant at Portsmouth, Ohio, and transporting converted product that is not needed for other uses to a disposal site. The selected contractor will be expected to arrange for the disposal of such excess material at an appropriate site.

As a Federal agency, the DOE must comply with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) (42 USC 4321 et seq.) by considering potential environmental issues associated with its actions prior to undertaking the actions. The NEPA environmental review of the proposed DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion project will be prepared pursuant to Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) Regulations (40 CFR Parts 1500 - 1508), and the Department's NEPA Implementing Procedures (10 CFR Part 1021), which provide directions specific to procurement actions that DOE may undertake or fund before completing the NEPA process. Per these regulations, DOE has prepared an environmental critique and an environmental synopsis to support the procurement selection process.

The environmental critique for the DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion services procurement process, which was completed during 2001, provided an evaluation and comparison of potential environmental impacts for each proposal received in response to the RFP and deemed to be within the competitive range. The critique was used by DOE to evaluate appreciable differences in the potential environmental impacts from the proposals in the competitive range. As delineated in 10 CFR 1021.216(g), the environmental critique focused on environmental issues pertinent to a decision among the proposals within the competitive range, and included a brief discussion of the purpose of the procurement and each offer, a discussion of the salient characteristics of each offer, and a brief comparative evaluation of the environmental impacts of the offers. The critique represents one aspect of the formal process being used to award a contract for conversion services. As such, it is a procurement-sensitive document and subject to all associated restrictions.

This document is the Environmental Synopsis, which is a publicly available document based on the environmental critique. The Environmental Synopsis documents the evaluation of

potential environmental impacts associated with the proposals in the competitive range and does not contain procurement-sensitive information. The specific requirements for an environmental synopsis delineated in 10 CFR 1021.216(h) are as follows:

*(h) DOE shall prepare a publicly available environmental synopsis, based on the environmental critique, to document the consideration given to environmental factors and to record that the relevant environmental consequences of reasonable alternatives have been evaluated in the selection process. The synopsis will not contain business, confidential, trade secret or other information that DOE otherwise would not disclose pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1905, the confidentiality requirements of the competitive procurement process, 5 U.S.C. 552(b) and 41 U.S.C. 423. To assure compliance with this requirement, the synopsis will not contain data or other information that may in any way reveal the identity of offerors. After a selection has been made, the environmental synopsis shall be filed with EPA, shall be made publicly available, and shall be incorporated in any NEPA document prepared under paragraph (i) of this section.*

To address the above requirements, this environmental synopsis includes (1) a brief description of background information related to the DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion project, (2) a general description of the proposals received in response to the RFP and deemed to be within the competitive range, (3) a summary of the assessment approach used in the environmental critique to evaluate the potential environmental impacts associated with the proposals, and (4) a summary of the environmental impacts presented in the critique, focusing on potential differences among the proposals. Because of confidentiality concerns, the proposals and environmental impacts are discussed in general terms.

## 2 BACKGROUND

Depleted  $\text{UF}_6$  results from the process of making uranium suitable for use as fuel in nuclear reactors or for military applications. The use of uranium in these applications requires increasing the proportion of the uranium-235 isotope found in natural uranium, which is approximately 0.7% (by weight), through an isotopic separation process. A uranium-235 “enrichment” process called gaseous diffusion has historically been used in the United States. The gaseous diffusion process uses uranium in the form of  $\text{UF}_6$ , primarily because  $\text{UF}_6$  can conveniently be used in the gas form for processing, in the liquid form for filling or emptying containers, and in the solid form for storage. Solid  $\text{UF}_6$  is a white, dense, crystalline material that resembles rock salt.

Over the last five decades, large quantities of uranium were enriched using gaseous diffusion. “Depleted”  $\text{UF}_6$  ( $\text{DUF}_6$ ) is a product of the process and was stored at the three uranium enrichment sites located at Paducah, Kentucky; Portsmouth, Ohio; and the East Tennessee Technology Park (ETTP—formerly known as the K-25 Site) in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. Depleted uranium is uranium that, through the enrichment process, has had a portion of the uranium-235 that it once contained removed so that it has a lower uranium-235 proportion than the 0.7 weight-percent found in nature. The uranium in most of DOE’s  $\text{DUF}_6$  has between 0.2 to 0.4 weight-percent uranium-235.

At the time the RFP was issued, DOE had management responsibility for approximately 700,000 metric tons (MT) of  $\text{DUF}_6$  contained in about 57,700 steel cylinders at the Portsmouth, Paducah, and ETTP sites, where it has stored such material since the 1950s. On June 17, 2002, an agreement was signed by DOE and USEC to transfer up to 23,300 MT of additional  $\text{DUF}_6$  from USEC to DOE between 2002 and 2006. The exact number of cylinders was not specified. Transfer of ownership of all the material will take place at Paducah.

The characteristics of  $\text{UF}_6$  pose potential health and environmental risks.  $\text{DUF}_6$  in cylinders emits low levels of gamma and neutron radiation. Also, when released to the atmosphere,  $\text{DUF}_6$  reacts with water vapor in the air to form hydrogen fluoride (HF) and uranyl fluoride ( $\text{UO}_2\text{F}_2$ ), both chemically toxic substances. In light of such characteristics, DOE stores  $\text{DUF}_6$  in a manner designed to minimize the risk to workers, the public, and the environment.

DOE has several agreements with the states in which  $\text{DUF}_6$  is stored. In October 1992, the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency (OEPA) issued a Notice of Violation (NOV) alleging that  $\text{DUF}_6$  stored at the Portsmouth facility is subject to regulation under state hazardous waste laws applicable to the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant. The NOV stated that OEPA had determined  $\text{DUF}_6$  to be a solid waste and that DOE had violated Ohio laws and regulations by not evaluating whether such waste was hazardous. DOE disagreed with this assessment, and in February 1998, DOE and OEPA reached an agreement. This agreement sets aside the issue of whether the  $\text{DUF}_6$  is subject to regulation as solid waste and institutes a negotiated management plan governing the storage of the Portsmouth  $\text{DUF}_6$ . The agreement also requires DOE to continue its efforts to evaluate potential use or reuse of the material. The agreement expires in 2008. Similarly, in February 1999, DOE and the Tennessee Department of Environment and

Conservation (TDEC) entered into a consent order which included a requirement for the performance of two environmentally beneficial projects: the implementation of a negotiated management plan governing the storage of the small inventory (relative to other sites) of all UF<sub>6</sub> (depleted, low-enriched, and natural) cylinders stored at the ETTP site, and the removal of the DUF<sub>6</sub> from the ETTP site or the conversion of the material by December 31, 2009.

In 1994, DOE began work on the *Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Alternative Strategies for the Long-Term Management and Use of Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride* (DUF<sub>6</sub> PEIS; DOE 1999). The DUF<sub>6</sub> PEIS was completed in 1999 and identified conversion of DUF<sub>6</sub> to another chemical form for use or long-term storage as part of a preferred management alternative. In the corresponding *Record of Decision for the Long-Term Management and Use of Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride* (ROD) (64 FR 43358, August 10, 1999), DOE decided to promptly convert the DUF<sub>6</sub> inventory to depleted uranium oxide, depleted uranium metal, or a combination of both. The ROD further explained that depleted uranium oxide will be used as much as possible and the remaining depleted uranium oxide will be stored for potential future uses or disposal, as necessary. In addition, according to the ROD, conversion to depleted uranium metal will occur only if uses are available.

During the time that DOE was analyzing its long-term strategy for managing the DUF<sub>6</sub> inventory, several other events occurred related to DUF<sub>6</sub> management. In 1995, the Department began an aggressive program to better manage the DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders, known as the DUF<sub>6</sub> Cylinder Project Management Plan. In part, this program responded to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) Recommendation 95-1, Safety of Cylinders Containing Depleted Uranium. This program included more rigorous and frequent inspections, a multiyear program for painting and refurbishing of cylinders, and construction of concrete-pad cylinder yards. Implementation of the DUF<sub>6</sub> Cylinder Project Management Plan has been successful, and, as a result, on December 16, 1999, the DNFSB closed out Recommendation 95-1.

In July 1998, the President signed Public Law (P.L.) 105-204. This law directed the Secretary of Energy to prepare “a plan to ensure that all amounts accrued on the books” of the United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) for the disposition of DUF<sub>6</sub> would be used to commence construction of, not later than January 31, 2004, and to operate, an on-site facility at each of the gaseous diffusion plants at Paducah and Portsmouth, to treat and recycle DUF<sub>6</sub> consistent with NEPA. DOE responded to P.L. 105-204 by issuing the *Final Plan for the Conversion of Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride* (referred to herein as the “Conversion Plan”) in July 1999. The Conversion Plan describes DOE’s intent to chemically process the DUF<sub>6</sub> to create products that would present both a lower long-term storage hazard and provide a material that would be suitable for use or disposal.

DOE initiated the Conversion Plan with the announced availability of a draft RFP on July 30, 1999, for a contractor to design, construct, and operate DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion facilities at the Paducah and Portsmouth uranium enrichment plant sites. Based on comments received on the draft RFP, DOE revisited some of the assumptions about management of the DUF<sub>6</sub> inventory made previously in the PEIS and ROD. For example, as documented in the Oak Ridge National Laboratory study, Assessment of Preferred Depleted Uranium Disposal Forms (Croff et al. 2000), four potential conversion forms (triuranium octoxide [U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub>], uranium dioxide [UO<sub>2</sub>],

uranium tetrafluoride [UF<sub>4</sub>], and uranium metal) were evaluated and found to be acceptable for near-surface disposal at low-level radioactive waste disposal sites such as those at DOE's Nevada Test Site (NTS) and Envirocare of Utah, Inc. Therefore, the RFP was modified to allow for a wide range of potential conversion product forms and process technologies. However, any of the proposed conversion forms must have an assured, environmentally acceptable path for final disposition.

On October 31, 2000, DOE issued the final RFP to procure a contractor to design, construct, and operate DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion facilities at the Paducah and Portsmouth plant sites, which is the subject of this environmental synopsis. The conversion plants that result from this procurement will convert the DUF<sub>6</sub> to a more stable chemical form that is suitable for either beneficial use or disposal. The selected contractor will design the conversion plants using the technology it proposes and construct the plants. The selected contractor also will operate the plants for a 5-year period, which will include maintaining depleted uranium and product inventories, transporting all uranium hexafluoride storage cylinders at ETTP to a conversion plant at Portsmouth, and transporting converted product for which there is no use to a disposal site. The selected contractor will be expected to prepare excess material for disposal at an appropriate site.

DOE received a total of five proposals in response to the RFP in March 2001. On August 6, 2001, DOE announced that three proposals were within the competitive range.

In August 2002, Congress passed P.L. 107-206, which stipulates in part that, within 30 days of the law's enactment, DOE must award a contract for the scope of work described in the RFP, including design, construction, and operation of a DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion plant at each of the Department's Paducah, Kentucky, and Portsmouth, Ohio, sites. Accordingly, on August 29, 2002, DOE announced selection of Uranium Disposition Services, LLC (UDS) as the conversion contractor after a full and open competition. Consistent with the RFP, UDS will also be responsible for maintaining the depleted uranium and product inventories and for transporting depleted uranium from Oak Ridge, Tennessee, to the Portsmouth, Ohio, site. UDS was formed by Framatome ANP Inc., Duratek Federal Services Inc., and Burns and Roe Enterprises Inc., specifically to bid on the DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion contract.

### 3 DESCRIPTION OF PROPOSALS

A total of five proposals were received on March 1, 2001, with three proposals identified within the competitive range in August 2001. The three proposals within the competitive range were evaluated for the environmental critique and synopsis. The proposals contain confidential information and therefore are not available for review by the public and cannot be fully described in this synopsis. General characteristics of the proposals are described below.

In general, each proposal considered conversion of depleted  $UF_6$  to either  $U_3O_8$  or  $UF_4$  at two stand-alone industrial plants dedicated to the conversion process and located at the DOE facilities in Portsmouth, Ohio, and Paducah, Kentucky. All of the proposals would involve the handling and processing of approximately 700,000 MT of  $DUF_6$  in about 57,700 cylinders stored at the Paducah, Portsmouth, and ETTP sites. Each proposed facility would occupy only a fraction of the candidate site location at the Portsmouth or Paducah facility specified in the RFP. Cylinders at the ETTP would be transported to the conversion facility at Portsmouth, in accordance with U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations. The conversion plants would typically be capable of receiving depleted  $UF_6$  cylinders on trucks or railcars, temporarily storing a small inventory of full cylinders, processing the depleted  $UF_6$  to another chemical form, and temporarily storing the converted uranium product and any other products until shipment off site.

All proposals are based on previously demonstrated technologies, although some would require scale-up to meet the RFP requirements. All proposers identified a disposal pathway for the depleted uranium product in the event the material cannot be used. Two candidate disposal facilities were identified: DOE's NTS and Envirocare of Utah. Each proposal presented information to demonstrate that the proposed conversion product form would be suitable for disposal at one or both of these facilities. In addition, all proposers indicated that the HF product would be sold for reuse and shipped off site, either as anhydrous HF (AHF) or aqueous HF.

All proposals in the competitive range indicated that emptied cylinders would be sold for reuse in the uranium enrichment industry as much as possible. In addition, two of the three proposals in the competitive range indicated that unsold, emptied  $DUF_6$  cylinders would be modified for use as disposal containers for the depleted uranium conversion product. The remaining proposal indicated that the depleted uranium conversion product would be disposed of in large bulk bags, with the cylinders being crushed and disposed of separately as low-level waste (LLW).

#### 4 ASSESSMENT APPROACH USED IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL CRITIQUE

In the RFP, the offerors were required to provide data for DOE's use in preparing appropriate preliminary NEPA documentation per 10 CFR 1021.216. The data request appeared as Attachment L.3 in the RFP and is repeated in Table 4.1. The NEPA data submitted in the proposals in March 2001 and subsequently revised in October 2001 formed the basis of the evaluation of impacts in the critique and this synopsis.

For the critique, potential environmental consequences were evaluated in the areas of human health and safety (normal operations and accidents), air quality and noise, water and soil, socioeconomics, wetlands and ecology, waste management, resource requirements, land use, and cultural resources. These assessment areas are shown in Figure 4.1. In addition, a total of 49 federal, state (Kentucky and Ohio), and local permit, license, or approval requirements (referred to collectively as "consents") were identified and listed in the critique as potentially applicable to activities that are covered by the RFP to design, construct, and operate two depleted UF<sub>6</sub> conversion facilities, and to manage storage and transport of depleted UF<sub>6</sub> cylinders.

As described in the critique, potential environmental impacts from conversion facilities could occur (1) during construction of a conversion facility; (2) during operations of the facility under both normal conditions and during postulated accidents; (3) during transportation of cylinders, depleted uranium, and HF products; (4) during decontamination and decommissioning (D&D) of the facilities; and (5) during disposal of the conversion products. The potential impacts associated with facility construction would result from typical land-clearing and construction activities. Potential impacts during operations and D&D would occur primarily to workers during handling operations and to the public as a result of routine releases of small amounts of contaminants through exhaust stacks and treated liquid effluent discharges. Potential impacts to workers and the public from processing or storage also might occur as a result of accidents that release hazardous materials, during both facility operations and transportation. Potential impacts from disposal could occur primarily from the intrusion of water into the disposal facility and movement of contaminants into the groundwater.

The potential environmental impacts presented in the critique were based primarily on the environmental data and information provided by the offerors and the detailed evaluations conducted for and presented in the DUF<sub>6</sub> PEIS and PEIS supporting documentation. The PEIS analyses included an evaluation of the impacts associated with several conversion technologies, including conversion to uranium oxide and uranium metal (conversion to UF<sub>4</sub> was an intermediate step in the conversion to metal process considered in the PEIS).

In the PEIS, potential impacts were evaluated for a single plant sized to process an inventory of about 740,000 MT over a 26-year period using the Portsmouth, Paducah, and ETTP sites as representative locations (the inventory of DUF<sub>6</sub> considered in the PEIS was an upper bound estimate meant to address uncertainties related to the transfer of cylinders from USEC to DOE that was occurring at the time the PEIS was prepared). The inventory specified in the RFP was about 700,000 MT, with the DOE inventory increasing to about 723,000 MT in June 2002.

**TABLE 4.1 NEPA Information Requested in the RFP (RFP Attachment L.3)**

Category	Requirements
Facility Descriptions	Provide physical and functional descriptions of all proposed facilities and structures, including their dimensions, materials of construction, and intended use. State if the facilities will be constructed new or will be modifications of existing facilities.
Process Descriptions and Material Flows	Describe the proposed chemical and physical processes from receipt of the depleted UF <sub>6</sub> cylinders through the preparation for final shipment off site or for long-term disposition on site of all the products, by-products, and wastes generated. Provide materials flow diagrams that identify all processes and unit operations; all the products, by-products, and wastes; and potential emissions/effluents to the environment. Provide the physical/chemical state of the materials and the input/output rates per metric ton of depleted UF <sub>6</sub> processed. Provide the concentrations of hazardous substances, including radionuclides in each output stream. Specify the quantity of DUF <sub>6</sub> to be processed on an annual basis.
Anticipated Waste Generation	For each type of hazardous, mixed, radioactive, and nonhazardous waste to be shipped off site or disposed of on site, provide the following: annual generation rate by volume and mass following any on-site treatment, physical and chemical characteristics, estimated concentrations of hazardous constituents, polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), asbestos, or radionuclides, as applicable, and a description of final packaging, if any.
Anticipated Air Emissions	Estimated emissions of criteria air pollutants from construction activities during peak construction year. Estimated annual emissions of criteria air pollutants and hazardous air pollutants, including radionuclides during operations.
Anticipated Liquid Effluents	Annual amounts of liquid effluents (including storm water runoff), description of effluents, and expected concentrations of toxic and conventional pollutants and radionuclides in the effluents. Specify how the effluents will be discharged.
Waste Minimization and Pollution Prevention	Describe the waste minimization and pollution prevention activities planned for the proposed facilities.
Anticipated Water Usage	Annual use expected during operations and the peak construction year.
Anticipated Energy Consumption	Quantity of electricity and fuel (e.g., natural gas, diesel fuel) to be used during the peak construction year and annually during operations.
Anticipated Materials Usage	Amounts of materials to be used for construction (e.g., concrete, steel) and annually during operations (e.g., process chemicals). An indication of the availability of the required materials.

**TABLE 4.1 (Cont.)**

Category	Requirements
Anticipated Toxic or Hazardous Chemical Storage	Total amount of each extremely hazardous substance (See 40 CFR 355, Appendix A) expected to be present at any one time at the facility at concentrations greater than one percent by weight, regardless of location, number of containers, or method of storage, and a description of the storage container(s) or vessel(s).
Wastes Generated During Facility Disposition and Disposal	For each type of waste (mixed, hazardous, or radioactive) provide the quantity anticipated by volume.
Floodplain and Wetland Information	If the proposed facilities are located in a floodplain or wetland, provide the proposed mitigation measures and any practicable alternatives to locating in a floodplain or wetland.
Noise	Describe the expected noise levels by source during construction and operation, proximity of the workers and the public to sources of noise, and proposed mitigation measures.
Land Use	Describe the location and amount of land needed for buildings, parking lots, utilities, etc., during construction and operation.
Employment Needs	Expected numbers of employees during construction and operation of the proposed facilities broken down by job category (e.g., managers, professionals, laborers.)
Anticipated Transportation Needs	Annual quantities and the number of shipments to and from the site of the materials used or produced in the proposed facilities on site. Identify the expected mode of transportation (e.g., by truck, train, barge) and describe the packaging to be used, if any.
Safety Analysis Data	Using the available technology specific-information or data based on similar technologies, provide descriptions and expected frequencies for and environmental releases from potential accidents during facility operations. If possible, provide the above data for one or more accidents in each of the following four frequency ranges: greater than 0.01 per year, between 0.01 and 0.0001 per year, between 0.0001 and 0.000001 per year, and less than 0.000001 per year. If this information is not yet available, provide a discussion of the expected safety issues based on current technology concepts or similar technologies.


**TABLE 4.1 (Cont.)**

Category	Requirements
Safety Analysis Data (Cont.)	Describe the approach to be taken to protect worker safety and health. If the project presents a potential safety hazard beyond project boundaries, provide emergency response plans. Discuss hazards and mitigation measures related to construction activities and facility operations.
Biological Resources	To the extent information is readily available in the public domain, <u>briefly</u> describe the types of plants and animals, as well as their habitat, that you believe may be affected by the construction and operation of the conversion facilities. Species of concern, state and federally listed threatened and endangered species, and their critical habitats affected or likely to be affected should be identified.

Thus, the PEIS considered an inventory slightly greater than the inventory for which DOE currently has management responsibility.

The results were presented in the PEIS as ranges encompassing the results calculated for all three sites. Following the publication of the PEIS, the site-specific data and analyses from the PEIS were segregated and compiled in separate reports for each of the three current storage sites (Hartmann 1999a,b,c). Consequently, the PEIS conversion analyses and the data presented in the PEIS and the three data compilation reports formed a framework that closely represented the environmental analyses required for the critique. The environmental impacts in the critique were estimated by comparing the environmental and engineering data provided in the proposals with the data used to support the PEIS, and then scaling the PEIS results as appropriate. Supplemental analyses were conducted as necessary. In instances where the proposals did not provide complete or adequate data to evaluate environmental impacts, the specific data gaps were noted.

The environmental critique did not include a detailed evaluation of impacts from D&D activities or from disposal. The impacts from D&D activities would be expected to be similar to those discussed for conversion facility construction and would not be expected to differ significantly among the proposals. For disposal, the critique explains that the results of the PEIS and subsequent studies indicated that disposal of depleted uranium either as an oxide or UF<sub>4</sub> should be permissible at a dry location. The disposal facility could be a DOE facility (e.g., NTS) or a site licensed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission or an Agreement State (e.g., the Envirocare facility). Either kind of facility would have its own environmental documentation and a set of criteria for acceptance of the waste. Any depleted uranium waste forms would have to meet the applicable site-specific waste acceptance criteria before being allowed to be disposed of. As a result, environmental impacts of disposal were not analyzed as part of the critique.



FMA9001b

**FIGURE 4.1 Areas of Impact Evaluated in the Environmental Critique**

## 5 SUMMARY OF POTENTIAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS

In the critique, for each of the three proposals in the competitive range, potential environmental consequences at the Paducah and Portsmouth sites were evaluated in the areas of human health and safety (normal operations and accidents), air quality and noise, water and soil, socioeconomics, wetlands and ecology, waste management, resource requirements, land use, and cultural resources. Impacts were evaluated for conversion facilities to be located at the Paducah and Portsmouth sites and for cylinder transport from the ETTP site to the Portsmouth site. In general, potential environmental impacts could occur (1) during construction of a conversion facility; (2) during operations of the facility under normal conditions and during postulated accidents; and (3) during transportation of cylinders, depleted uranium, and HF products.

The potential environmental impacts presented in the critique were based on the offerors' data and detailed evaluations conducted for and presented in the DUF<sub>6</sub> PEIS and PEIS supporting documentation. It should be noted that the estimation of potential environmental impacts for any proposal is subject to a great deal of uncertainty at this point. In many cases, the data provided by the offerors for the NEPA evaluation were based on data from a facility with similar, but not identical, design as the proposed facility and with different throughput. In addition, the data provided by the offerors were of varying levels of detail and, in some cases, incomplete (e.g., detailed accident data will not be available until the preparation of safety analysis reports after the contract award, and some proposals did not include estimates of air releases or waste generated during construction).

The uncertainties in input parameters and varying levels of detail in the data were off-set to a degree by several factors. First, the PEIS analysis provided a detailed and thorough evaluation of fundamentally similar technologies located at the same sites at which the conversion facilities would be constructed. The PEIS analysis provided a unique baseline of the type and magnitude of environmental impacts associated with the construction and operation of conversion facilities. Consequently, by comparing the proposals to the PEIS, it was possible to provide general estimates of potential impacts even in cases where the data provided by the bidders were incomplete (such as accident scenarios).

Second, with regard to comparisons among the proposals, several factors tend to minimize the potential for major differences in the anticipated environmental impacts: (1) all of the proposals would involve the handling and processing of the same amount of DUF<sub>6</sub>, approximately 700,000 MT; (2) all of the proposals would require the shipment of the same number of cylinders from ETTP to Portsmouth, which must be made in accordance with DOT regulations, regardless of the particular method proposed; (3) all of the proposals would generate a relatively insoluble uranium product for disposal at a western disposal site and a fluorine product, either aqueous or anhydrous HF, for reuse; (4) all of the proposals would be required to meet the same regulations pertaining to human health and safety and effluent emissions; (5) all of the proposals utilize existing processes and technologies that have been previously demonstrated on an industrial- or pilot-scale; and (6) all of the proposed facilities would be built in essentially the same locations on the Paducah and Portsmouth sites. These factors, coupled

with the preliminary nature (and associated uncertainties) of the proposed designs, contribute to the similarities in estimated impacts discussed below.

## 5.1 ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS LIKELY TO BE NEGLIGIBLE TO LOW, OR WELL-WITHIN REGULATORY LIMITS

The following environmental disciplines were found to most likely have negligible to low impacts, or impacts well-within regulatory limits for all proposals:

- ***Human Health and Safety – Normal Conditions.*** All of the proposals would result in some risk to workers during normal operations, primarily from exposure to external radiation emitted from depleted uranium materials and associated decay products. Although throughputs differ among the proposals and also with the PEIS, all the proposals would require the handling of the same amount of uranium material over the life of the project. Moreover, the types of handling activities required would generally be similar for any conversion facility. Based on the PEIS analyses, estimated population doses to workers over the facility lifetimes could range from about 800 to 1,300 person-rem, below levels expected to cause cancer fatalities among the workers. Impacts to involved and noninvolved workers from ingestion or inhalation of uranium and/or hazardous chemicals during routine conditions would not be expected. Similarly, doses to the off-site members of the public would be expected to be very small, well below regulatory standards.
- ***Noise.*** All the bidder's reported construction noise levels were typical for construction activities (bidder's levels ranged from about 75 to 100 dB(A) at the source). Some intermittent indoor noise levels during operations would be higher (up to 134 dB[A]); these higher levels could require auditory protection devices to protect workers. In general, none of the continuous operations noise levels reported for the facilities would result in adverse impacts from noise at the site boundaries.
- ***Water and Soil.*** Construction and operation of a conversion plant would disturb land, use water, and produce liquid wastes. In the PEIS, it was estimated that the impacts on the surface water, groundwater, and soil at Paducah and Portsmouth would be nonexistent or negligibly small from a conversion facility – no appreciable impacts to surface water, groundwater, or soils were identified; contaminant concentrations in water discharges would be below EPA guidelines and no changes in groundwater quality would be expected. With the exception of water consumption during operations for one proposal, all the water and soil parameters given in the proposals are similar to or less than those used in the PEIS. Therefore, it is expected that the potential impacts to water and soil from any of the proposed facilities at either site would also be nonexistent or negligibly small. Construction activities have the potential to result in surface water, groundwater, or soil contamination

through spills of construction chemicals. By following good engineering practices, concentrations in soil and wastewater (and therefore surface water and groundwater) could be kept well within applicable standards or guidelines.

One exception noted was for the water consumption during operations for one proposal, which, although within the water usage capacity at both sites, was orders of magnitude larger than the other proposals and the PEIS (up to 835 million gallons per year at Paducah, compared with a maximum of 55 million gallons per year estimated in the PEIS and a maximum among the other proposals of 13 million gallons per year). However, the revised proposal indicated that the majority of this water is in a closed-loop chilled water system and would not be required to be supplied each year.

- ***Socioeconomics.*** For all of the bidders, direct employment estimates for construction and operations were comparable to or lower than PEIS estimates. The maximum number of direct jobs created during operations among the proposals was estimated to be approximately 400, compared with a maximum of 500 in the PEIS. Although indirect impacts (e.g., indirect jobs created, income generated, population in-migration, changes in housing demand and public finances) for the regions surrounding the Paducah and Portsmouth sites cannot be estimated with the available data, based on PEIS analyses, such impacts appear unlikely. The PEIS concluded that the conversion options would be likely to have a small impact on socioeconomic conditions in the regions surrounding the sites, because a major proportion of the expenditures associated with procurement for the construction and operation of the facility would flow outside the regions to other locations in the United States, reducing the concentration of local economic effects.
- ***Land Use.*** Although differences exist in the land required for the proposed facilities (ranging from about 10 to 20 acres), all proposed facilities represent very small fractions of the land available at the Paducah and Portsmouth sites. The proposed facilities would require only a fraction of the candidate sites identified within the Paducah and Portsmouth site boundaries in the RFP. Consequently, land use impacts for all the proposals would likely be negligible.
- ***Resource Requirements.*** In general, the utility requirements for all proposals are not expected to be significant. Based on comparison with the appropriate values from the DUF<sub>6</sub> PEIS, it would be expected that the current utility capacities at the two sites (Paducah and Portsmouth) would be adequate to accommodate the proposed service requirements without any major modifications or constructing new service facilities, therefore significant adverse environmental effects would not be incurred.

The total quantities of commonly used construction materials are not expected to be significant and would be comparable to construction of a multistory building or industrial plant. Small quantities of specialty materials (e.g., Monel and Hastelloy) were identified in one proposal, although these materials are not in short supply. These specialty materials may also be necessary for construction of the various reactors to convert depleted  $UF_6$  into another form. The amount of operations materials is not great and is comparable to a small-scale petroleum refinery or similar chemical processing plant. No specialty chemicals were identified in the proposals that are not currently available in the chemical industry.

- **Cultural Resources.** Archaeological and architectural surveys have not been completed or finalized for either site as a whole or for the candidate locations. If archaeological resources are encountered, or historical or traditional cultural properties identified, a mitigation plan would be required. At Portsmouth, the proposed facilities may impact the existing lithium warehouses; prior to demolition, it would need to be determined if these buildings warrant consideration for the *National Register of Historic Places*, and, if so, a mitigation plan, including avoidance or data recovery, would be required. Because all of the proposals would essentially use the same proposed sites and the land areas are roughly the same sizes (<20 acres), it is unlikely that there would be differences in potential impacts to cultural resources among the proposals.
- **Transportation.** All of the proposals would involve the shipment of cylinders from ETTP to Portsmouth, depleted uranium product from Portsmouth and Paducah to a western disposal site, and HF from Portsmouth and Paducah to a commercial user. In addition, operation-related wastes and raw materials would also require shipment, although such shipments would be expected to have negligible impacts. Differences in the transportation impacts among the proposals cannot be determined until detailed transportation plans are developed. However, because all proposals would require shipment of roughly the same amounts of outgoing products and all would have to comply with DOT requirements, it is expected that all proposals would result in roughly the same impacts from transportation operations. Overall, the largest impact from transportation activities would be associated with the potential for injuries and fatalities from typical traffic accidents. Low-probability accidents involving releases of  $DUF_6$  or HF are discussed further below.

## 5.2 ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS POTENTIALLY REQUIRING MITIGATION OR OF UNCERTAIN MAGNITUDE

The following environmental disciplines were found to potentially require mitigative actions to stay within regulatory limits, or the data submitted in the proposal were insufficient to make an accurate determination of the anticipated impacts:

- ***Air Quality – Construction.*** Except for one proposal, none of the bidders provided complete information on emissions of criteria pollutants during construction. However, based on comparison of the structure sizes and types between the proposals and the PEIS, construction air emissions would be expected to be lower than or similar to those estimated in the PEIS. The only criteria pollutant of some concern during construction for each of the proposed facilities is likely to be particulate matter (PM<sub>10</sub>). PM<sub>10</sub> construction emissions are related to the site land area disturbed; all the proposed facilities would be comparable to or smaller in size than those analyzed in the PEIS. The PEIS estimated that the 24-hour average PM<sub>10</sub> level could be as high as 90% of the standard during construction. However, with appropriate mitigation measures (such as spraying the excavation area with water and covering excavated soil), PM<sub>10</sub> levels could be kept in compliance with standards.
- ***Air Quality – Operations.*** Reporting on criteria pollutant emissions during operations was incomplete for two bidders. Where emissions were reported for the third bidder, levels were much higher than levels reported for operations in the PEIS. In this case, the bidder reported that the emissions estimates were expected to be conservative because all the pollutant sources considered were assumed to be operating concurrently, which is unlikely. Although the levels of criteria pollutant emissions during operations will need to be more thoroughly addressed by whichever bidder is chosen, it is expected that the emissions could be controlled to stay within standard levels.
- ***Wetlands.*** It appears from examination of the siting information provided that the potential exists for all proposals to impact wetlands at Paducah and possibly Portsmouth. At this time it is not possible to determine the extent of such impacts because the locations of vehicle entrance roads, pipelines, and utilities have not been clearly identified. Any wetland impacts would be evaluated in the wetlands assessment required by 10 CFR 1022.12, and if unavoidable, would require permitting from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. The permit may require compensatory mitigation. Compensatory mitigation is designed to reduce or mitigate the impacts to a wetland by the construction of a new wetland area. The new wetland is designed to provide specific wetland functions as compensation for the loss of wetland functions at the impacted wetland. The wetlands potentially impacted do not seem to be high-quality wetlands that would be difficult to compensate for or require special protection based on rarity or uniqueness.

- **Waste Management.** Overall, the waste resulting from normal operations would be expected to have a low to moderate impact on waste management.

It should be noted that not all of the proposals provided information on nonhazardous liquid effluents such as cooling tower blowdown, industrial wastewater, and process water expected to be generated during normal operations. In addition, a more exhaustive investigation of the waste stream characteristics for the various proposals is necessary to ensure proper waste classification, as indicated by comparison of the waste volumes of the proposals with those estimated in the DUF<sub>6</sub> PEIS. It should also be noted that a number of waste streams identified in one proposal were not present in another proposal with a similar process.

The total LLW disposal volumes from disposal of depleted uranium were compared with the total estimated disposal volume for LLW for all DOE waste management activities. Disposal volumes were compared as total volume (m<sup>3</sup>) because disposal facilities would typically have no throughput limitations but rather would be limited by the total volume of waste that could be accepted. Overall, disposal of the final uranium product would generate appreciable amounts of waste for disposal in either DOE or commercial facilities. Within the context of the total amount of LLW undergoing disposal in DOE facilities, these wastes would be expected to have a low impact on DOE's total waste management disposal capabilities.

In the event that the HF could not be sold commercially for unrestricted use, the concentrated HF may be converted to calcium fluoride (CaF<sub>2</sub>) for disposal. Based upon the PEIS, the total volume of CaF<sub>2</sub> may range from 190,000 to 570,000 m<sup>3</sup>. It is unknown whether the CaF<sub>2</sub> produced would be disposed of as nonhazardous solid waste or as LLW. If the CaF<sub>2</sub> is classified as LLW, it would be expected to have a moderate impact on DOE's total waste management disposal capabilities.

### **5.3 ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS WITH POTENTIALLY HIGH CONSEQUENCES, BUT LOW PROBABILITY**

For all proposals, there is a potential for low probability events having high consequences, due to the hazardous nature of the materials handled. Although the chance of such events occurring is impossible to eliminate, existing regulations and standard engineering practices and controls will be used to minimize the probability of these events. High-consequence/low-probability events are discussed below.

- **Human Health and Safety – Facility Accidents.** The designs of the buildings presented in the proposals differed significantly from those evaluated in the PEIS. In many cases, the designs in the proposals do not appear to include areas to accommodate hazard categories of chemically high hazard (HH) for

buildings containing  $\text{DUF}_6$  and HF and radiologically moderate hazard (HC2) for buildings containing depleted uranium (the hazard categories are designations used by DOE to specify the types of building designs required based on the hazards posed by the materials to be used within the buildings). This difference would affect the frequency at which external events such as natural phenomena (tornadoes, earthquakes) can negatively affect building containment that could result in significant releases. The difference in building design between the proposals and the PEIS would also affect the source terms of the various accident scenarios. This may result in different bounding accidents within the four frequency categories considered in the PEIS with resulting differences in consequences. A detailed safety analysis and risk assessment that would take into account the performance categories of the various structures in the proposals was not possible at this time and will be conducted by the successful bidder after contract award. Nevertheless, the PEIS results were used to provide a rough estimate of the types of consequences that might be associated with the conversion facilities.

Based on the PEIS results, it would be expected that the radiological health impacts from facility accidents considered in the proposals would be small.

Limited information on chemical accidents was supplied in the proposals. All proposals, however, provided the amount of hazardous materials expected to be in storage at a given time. These amounts were compared with the storage volumes of the same chemicals in the PEIS. The most hazardous chemical to be stored is HF. The range in the volume of HF stored between the proposals was not great (from 63,400 to 114,000 gal) and all were less than those in the PEIS. The chemical-related health impacts estimated in the PEIS may therefore be expected to bound those for all proposals.

Hydrogen is necessary for conversion of depleted  $\text{UF}_6$  to either  $\text{UF}_4$  or  $\text{U}_3\text{O}_8$ . The PEIS did not directly consider the potential risks associated with storage of hydrogen in either gaseous or liquid form. It is not possible at this time to evaluate the potential hazard of hydrogen storage for the proposals. However, a preliminary literature review indicates that the potential risks associated with hydrogen storage are likely low. Because hydrogen is needed for depleted  $\text{UF}_6$  conversion, it would not be expected to be a discriminator among the proposals.

For all of the management strategies considered in the PEIS, low-probability accidents involving chemicals (primarily HF) at a conversion facility were estimated to have the largest potential consequences to noninvolved workers and members of the public. Such accidents could be caused by a large earthquake and are expected to occur with a frequency of less than once in 1 million per year of operations. For the most severe accidents in each frequency category, it was estimated that there could be a large number (up to tens of thousands) of noninvolved workers and the general public suffering

from adverse effects (e.g., minor irritation to the eye, coughing). The number of irreversible adverse health effects (e.g., lung damage) could also be large (a few hundred). However, the risk (defined as consequence multiplied by probability) for these accidents would be zero fatalities and zero irreversible adverse health effects expected for noninvolved workers and the members of the public combined.

Impacts to involved workers under accident conditions would likely be dominated by physical forces from the accident itself, so that quantitative dose/effect estimates would not be meaningful. For this reason, the impacts to involved workers during accidents were not quantified in the PEIS or critique. However, it is recognized that injuries and fatalities among involved workers would be possible for all proposals if an accident did occur.

It should be noted that there may be differences in the accident impacts between releases of AHF and aqueous HF, and that these differences were not fully evaluated in the critique. One proposal stated that AHF would be produced, whereas two would produce aqueous HF. Anhydrous HF has a much higher volatility than aqueous HF, and therefore would result in a larger amount of material being dispersed to the environment if equal amounts were spilled. At this time, it is not clear if production of aqueous HF would result in a significant reduction in accident risk.

- ***Human Health and Safety – Transportation Accidents.*** Similar to the assessment of facility accidents discussed above, in general, there was not sufficiently detailed information provided in the proposals to perform a comprehensive transportation impact assessment. The results of the PEIS and supporting studies were used to estimate potential impacts of transportation, as discussed below.

For shipment of UF<sub>6</sub> cylinders, among all the accidents analyzed in the PEIS, a severe rail accident involving four DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders was estimated to have the highest potential consequences (note that the consequences for a truck accident, which would likely carry only 1 or 2 cylinders, would be less than the bounding rail accident discussed here). The consequences of such an accident were estimated on the basis of the assumption that the accident occurred in an urban area (with a population density of 1,600 people/km<sup>2</sup>) under stable weather conditions (such as at nighttime). The total probability of an urban rail accident involving a release (not taking into account the frequency of weather conditions) was estimated to be very low (on the order of about 1 chance in 100,000). In the unlikely event that such an accident were to occur, it was estimated that approximately four persons might experience irreversible adverse effects (such as lung damage or kidney damage) from chemical exposure to HF and uranyl fluoride generated from released UF<sub>6</sub>, with zero fatalities expected. Over the long term, radiation effects would also be possible from exposure to the uranium released. It was

estimated that approximately 60 latent cancer fatalities could occur in the urban population from such an accident in addition to the approximately 700,000 that would occur from all other causes (approximately 3 million persons were assumed to be exposed to low levels of uranium from the accident as the uranium dispersed in the air). The radiological risk (consequence multiplied by probability) for this accident would be essentially zero.

If a large HF release from a railcar occurred in an urban area under stable weather conditions, persons within a 7 mi<sup>2</sup> (18 km<sup>2</sup>) area downwind of the accident site could potentially experience irreversible adverse effects from chemical exposure to HF, with up to 300 fatalities possible. However, the probability of such an accident occurring would be expected to be quite low. Anhydrous HF is routinely shipped commercially in the United States for industrial applications. To provide perspective, since 1971, the period covered by DOT records, there have been no fatal or serious injuries to the public or to transportation or emergency response personnel as a result of AHF releases during transportation.

As noted above, shipment of aqueous HF may have different risks than shipment of AHF.

#### **5.4 DIFFERENCES IN POTENTIAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS AMONG THE PROPOSALS**

Based upon the assessment of potential environmental impacts presented in the critique, no proposal was found to be clearly environmentally preferable. Although differences in a number of impact areas were identified, none of the differences were considered to result in one proposal being preferable over the others. Nevertheless, the following differences are of note:

- The annual raw water usage during operations for one proposal, which is reported to be approximately 835 million gallons per year, is more than an order of magnitude greater than any other proposal. The bulk of the usage comes from the chilled water use. However, the revised proposal indicates that the majority of this water flows in a closed-loop chilled water system and thus would not be required to be supplied each year.
- Relative to potential storage and transportation accidents, production of aqueous HF, identified in two proposals, may result in a reduction in accident risk compared with AHF, identified in one proposal, although it is not clear if this difference is significant.
- For one proposal, emissions during construction and operations were reported to be much higher than the estimates provided in the PEIS. The primary source of the estimated high levels of criteria pollutant emissions was heavy

equipment operation (e.g., from cylinder haulers, semi-tractor trailers, forklifts, cranes, and locomotive engines). The PEIS and the other bidder's did not give estimates for this source. The bidder's documentation states that the estimates given are conservatively high because all emissions were assumed to occur concurrently. Although the levels of criteria pollutant emissions during operations will need to be more thoroughly addressed by whichever bidder is chosen, it is expected that the emissions could be controlled to stay within standard levels.

- There appear to be no significant differences in overall environmental impacts associated with conversion to  $UF_4$  versus  $U_3O_8$ . In addition, several studies indicate that disposal of depleted uranium either as an oxide or  $UF_4$  should be permissible at a dry location.

## **5.5 DIFFERENCES IN REQUIRED PERMITS, LICENSES, AND APPROVALS**

No proposal stood out as providing a plan that clearly minimizes environmental permitting requirements. Most of the proposals deferred discussion of permitting requirements to the Regulatory and Permitting Management Plan, which the successful bidder must submit to DOE within 90 days after contract award.

## 6 REFERENCES

Croff, A.G., et al., 2000, *Assessment of Preferred Depleted Uranium Disposal Forms*, ORNL/TM-2000/161, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tenn., June.

Hartmann, H. (compiler), 1999a, *Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride Management Program: Data Compilation for the Paducah Site in Support of Site-Specific NEPA Requirements for Continued Cylinder Storage, Cylinder Preparation, Conversion, and Long-term Storage Activities*, ANL/EAD/TM-109, Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Ill., Aug.

Hartmann, H. (compiler), 1999b, *Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride Management Program: Data Compilation for the Portsmouth Site in Support of Site-Specific NEPA Requirements for Continued Cylinder Storage, Cylinder Preparation, Conversion, and Long-Term Storage Activities*, ANL/EAD/TM-108, Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Ill., Aug.

Hartmann, H. (compiler), 1999c, *Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride Management Program: Data Compilation for the K-25 Site in Support of Site-Specific NEPA Requirements for Continued Cylinder Storage and Cylinder Preparation Activities*, ANL/EAD/TM-107, Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Ill., Aug.

U.S. Department of Energy, 1999, *Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Alternative Strategies for the Long-Term Management and Use of Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride*, DOE/EIS-0269, Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology, Washington, D.C.

**APPENDIX E:**

**IMPACTS ASSOCIATED WITH HF AND CaF<sub>2</sub>  
CONVERSION PRODUCT SALE AND USE**



**APPENDIX E:****IMPACTS ASSOCIATED WITH HF AND CaF<sub>2</sub>  
CONVERSION PRODUCT SALE AND USE****E.1 INTRODUCTION**


During the conversion of the depleted uranium hexafluoride (DUF<sub>6</sub>) inventory to depleted uranium oxide, products having some potential for sale to commercial users would be produced. These products would include aqueous hydrogen fluoride (HF) and calcium fluoride (CaF<sub>2</sub>, commonly referred to as fluorspar). These products are routinely used as commercial materials, and an investigation into their potential reuse was done; results are included as part of this environmental impact statement (EIS). Areas examined as part of this investigation were the characteristics of these materials as produced within the conversion process, the current markets for these products, and the potential socioeconomic impacts within the United States if these products should be provided to the commercial sector. Because some low-level radioactivity would be associated with these materials, a description of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) process for authorizing the release of contaminated materials for unrestricted use (referred to as “free release”) and an estimate of the potential human health effects of such free release were also considered in this investigation. The results and conclusions of this investigation are presented in the following sections of this appendix.

**E.2 CHARACTERISTICS OF HF AND CaF<sub>2</sub> PRODUCED DURING CONVERSION**

Conversion of DUF<sub>6</sub> to the solid uranium oxide form appropriate for use or disposal would be accomplished by reacting the UF<sub>6</sub> with steam and hydrogen, as indicated in the following reactions:



and



The HF vapor and excess steam would be condensed, resulting in HF of approximately 55% strength. The predominant markets for HF call for 49% and 70% HF solutions; thus, the product from the conversion condensers could be further processed to yield these strengths.

A small fraction of the HF produced in the above reactions would escape capture in the condensers and remain as a vapor in the off-gas system. This uncondensed HF would be passed through a wet scrubber containing a nominal 20% potassium hydroxide (KOH) solution, where the HF would be converted into potassium fluoride (KF) via the following reaction:




The KOH would then be regenerated by adding lime to the above reaction products:



The approximate quantities of HF and CaF<sub>2</sub> that would be produced annually via the above reactions at each site are shown in Table E-1. These quantities are based on converting the East Tennessee Technology Park (ETTP) cylinders at Portsmouth. As noted above, the 55% HF solution would be further processed into 70% and 49% solutions prior to being sold. The quantities of aqueous HF in these two concentrations are shown in Table E-2.

The quantities noted in Tables E-1 and E-2 are based on the assumption that there would be a viable economic market for the aqueous HF produced during the DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion process. If there were no such market, Uranium Disposition Services, LLC (UDS) proposes to convert all of the HF to CaF<sub>2</sub> and then either sell this product or dispose of it as a solid waste.

Under this scenario, CaF<sub>2</sub> would be produced by the following reactions:



and



Approximate quantities of CaF<sub>2</sub> that would be produced annually if all the HF was converted to CaF<sub>2</sub> would be 8,800 t (9,700 tons) at Portsmouth and 11,800 t (13,000 tons) at Paducah. Under this scenario, the quantities of depleted triuranium octaoxide (U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub>) would remain the same as those shown in Table E-1.

**TABLE E-1 Products from DUF<sub>6</sub> Conversion  
Assuming HF Acid Is Sold (metric tons per year)**

Product	Portsmouth	Paducah	Total
Depleted U <sub>3</sub> O <sub>8</sub>	10,800	14,300	25,100
HF acid (55% solution)	8,300	11,000	19,300
CaF <sub>2</sub>	18	24	42

**TABLE E-2 Aqueous HF Levels for Sale  
(metric tons per year)**

Product	Portsmouth	Paducah	Total
70% solution	2,500	3,300	5,800
49% solution	5,800	7,700	13,500

A small quantity of radioactive materials would transfer into the HF and CaF<sub>2</sub> products from the conversion process. As per the requirements of DOE Order 5400.5 (see Section E.4), UDS plans to apply for authorized release limits for these materials. Pending DOE's approval of authorized limits, estimates of the contaminant levels in the HF and CaF<sub>2</sub> have been made on the basis of the experience of Framatome Advanced Nuclear Power, Inc. (ANP) (a partner in UDS) at its Richland, Washington, facility authorized for manufacturing nuclear fuel. These values for HF are shown in Table E-3, along with the values that were assumed for estimating impacts in this EIS.

Any CaF<sub>2</sub> produced (either the small quantities from the off-gas treatment system or the mass conversion of all HF) would also be slightly radioactive. As it would do for HF, UDS also plans to apply for authorized release limits for CaF<sub>2</sub>. Pending approval of authorized limits, the values shown in Table E-4 were used to estimate the impacts (UDS 2003a,b).

Certain chemical specifications must also be met for a product to be successfully marketed. Table E-5 shows likely process specifications for the production of HF. These specifications are based on vendor requirements at the Framatome ANP facility in Richland, Washington (UDS 2003a).

Similar process control specifications have been developed for CaF<sub>2</sub>. These specifications were based on trade standards for acid-grade CaF<sub>2</sub> and are shown in Table E-6 (UDS 2003a).

**TABLE E-3 Activity Levels for Aqueous HF**

Contaminant	Expected Value	Assumed Activity
Depleted uranium	0.08 pCi/mL	3.0 pCi/mL (6.4 ppm)
Tc-99	$1.6 \times 10^{-5}$ pCi/mL	$2.0 \times 10^{-3}$ pCi/mL (15.9 ppb U)

**TABLE E-4 Activity Levels for CaF<sub>2</sub>**

Contaminant	Expected Value	Assumed Activity
Uranium	0.04 pCi/g	1.5 pCi/g
Tc-99	$0.8 \times 10^{-5}$ pCi/g	$1.0 \times 10^{-3}$ pCi/g (15.9 ppb U)

**TABLE E-5 Process Control Specifications for HF**

Chemical Analysis or Physical Property	Specification
HF	49%
H <sub>2</sub> SiF <sub>6</sub> (fluosilicic acid)	<70 ppm
H <sub>2</sub> SO <sub>4</sub> (sulfuric acid)	<50 ppm
SO <sub>2</sub> (sulfur dioxide)	<50 ppm
Fe (iron)	<15 ppm
As (arsenic)	<14 ppm
U (uranium)	<0.5 ppm <sup>a</sup>
P (phosphorous)	<10 ppm
Color	Water white (clear)

<sup>a</sup> Based on mass concentration of uranium, regardless of radioactivity.

**TABLE E-6 Process Control Specifications for Acid-Grade CaF<sub>2</sub>**

Chemical Analysis	Typical Range (% , except for As)
CaF <sub>2</sub>	97.0 – 97.6
Total carbonate	0.8 – 1.8
SiO <sub>2</sub> (silica)	0.4 – 1.0
BaSO <sub>4</sub> (barium sulfate)	0.3 – 0.8
Pb (lead)	0.05 – 0.2
Fe	0.05 – 0.2
S (sulfide)	0.005 – 0.014
Moisture	<0.1 (8 – 9 as filtercake)
As (arsenic)	1 – 5 ppm

### E.3 DESCRIPTION OF THE COMMERCIAL HF AND CaF<sub>2</sub> MARKETS AND POTENTIAL USES

Two potential markets for products made in the conversion process are considered here. The first is aqueous HF and the other is solid CaF<sub>2</sub>. Small quantities of the CaF<sub>2</sub> would be produced in the preferred design. However, if no market for the HF could be found, large quantities of CaF<sub>2</sub> would be produced for sale to the market or for disposal as a solid waste. These products are discussed below.

### E.3.1 Aqueous Hydrogen Fluoride (HF)

HF is the source of fluorine for most fluorine-containing chemicals. It is used either to directly manufacture such chemicals or to produce intermediates for their manufacture. HF is used to manufacture a wide variety of products, including refrigerants, gasoline, electronic components, aluminum, and plastics. It is used as a reactant or fluorinating source in the manufacture of fabric- and fiber-treating agents, herbicides, pharmaceutical intermediates, inert fluorinated liquids, and electronic grade etchants. Stannous fluoride, used in toothpaste, is manufactured by using HF. HF lasers have been tested for use in corneal transplants and for use in space. While the majority of HF used by industry is in the anhydrous or 100% form, aqueous HF solutions with concentrations of 70% and lower are used in stainless steel pickling, metal coatings, chemical milling, glass etching, exotic metals extraction, and quartz purification.

The commercial market in the United States for HF is in excess of 300,000 t (330,000 tons) per year (SRI Consulting 2002). However, only a small fraction (about 26,000 t [29,000 tons] or less than 9%) of that market is for aqueous HF. Uses for aqueous HF include the pickling metal and electronics industries. The U.S. capacity for producing HF consists of facilities owned by two companies. A plant near Geismar, Louisiana, has a production capacity of approximately 128,000 t (141,000 tons) per year, and a plant near La Porte, Texas, has a capacity of approximately 80,000 t (88,000 tons) per year. All of the aqueous HF produced in the United States is currently manufactured by Honeywell at the Geismar facility. Of the approximately 100,000 t (110,000 tons) of HF imported each year to the United States, Mexico provides approximately 75%, and Canada provides most of the remainder.

As the market information above shows, the HF produced during the DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion process would represent only about 10% and 6% of the U.S. production and demand, respectively. However, it would represent more than 70% of the total U.S. market for aqueous HF.

### E.3.2 Calcium Fluoride (CaF<sub>2</sub>)

On the basis of the assumption that a market would be found for the HF, the small quantity of CaF<sub>2</sub> that would be produced (approximately 42 t [46 tons] per year) would be disposed of as a solid waste. Part of this decision stems from the fact that at approximately \$135/t (SRI Consulting 2002), annual revenues of only about \$5,700 would be realized from the sale of this quantity of material. However, in the event that a market for the HF could not be found, approximately 20,600 t (22,700 tons) of CaF<sub>2</sub> would be produced annually. As shown in Table E-6, this material would be more than 97% pure. CaF<sub>2</sub> of this grade is commonly referred to as "acid-spar."

The U.S. market for fluorspar is approximately 600,000 t (661,000 tons) per year. Of this, approximately 65% is used for the production of HF. Since the closing of the Rosiclare, Illinois, mine in 1995, there has been no mining of fluorspar in the United States. Instead, demand has been met by imports and by purchases of CaF<sub>2</sub> from the National Defense Stockpile. Since the U.S. Department of Defense was authorized to sell fluorspar from its stockpile, these sales have

represented 20% or more of the annual U.S. demand for CaF<sub>2</sub>. In 2001, approximately 71,000 t (78,000 tons) of fluorspar were sold from the National Defense Stockpile. However, only about 9,500 t (10,500 tons) of acid-spar remain in the stockpile, with an additional 40,000 t (44,000 tons) of metallurgical grade fluorspar (a lower grade of fluorspar having a CaF<sub>2</sub> content of approximately 60% to 85%) (SRI Consulting 2002). Thus, it is not clear whether a significant portion of the U.S. demand for fluorspar could be met by the National Defense Stockpile.

The United States has been heavily dependent on imported fluorspar for many years. Imports have represented more than 90% of the U.S. demand in recent years, and, with the unavailability of the National Defense Stockpile to make any large-scale contributions, the percentage of CaF<sub>2</sub> imports is likely to get even higher. China has become the biggest supplier of fluorspar to the United States, providing 60% to 70% of the total U.S. imports. South Africa and Mexico are the other major suppliers to the United States, representing approximately 20% and 10%, respectively, of U.S. imports (SRI Consulting 2002).

#### **E.4 OVERVIEW OF THE DOE PROCESS FOR ESTABLISHING AUTHORIZED LIMITS FOR RELEASE OF RADIOACTIVELY CONTAMINATED MATERIALS**

As previously explained, two products of the DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion technology, HF and CaF<sub>2</sub>, would have potential commercial use. However, because these products are expected to contain small amounts of volumetrically distributed residual radioactive material in the form of uranium and technetium-99 (Tc-99), they could not be sold for unrestricted use, unless DOE establishes authorized limits. In this context, authorized limits would be the maximum concentrations of uranium and Tc-99 allowed to remain volumetrically distributed within the HF and CaF<sub>2</sub> being sold.

Authorized limits are limits on the amount of residual radioactive material distributed volumetrically within property that DOE or its contractors release for unrestricted use. In cases involving volumetrically distributed residual radioactive material, such as the proposed release of HF and CaF<sub>2</sub>, authorized limits are typically expressed as maximum allowable concentrations of specified residual radionuclides. Correspondingly, the authorized limits for HF and CaF<sub>2</sub> would specify maximum allowable concentrations of residual uranium and Tc-99.

In general, authorized limits for DOE property that will be released from DOE control are established and implemented on a case-specific basis according to a process defined by DOE Order 5400.5, "Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment," and supporting guidance documents. This process (referred to as the authorized limits process) is designed to achieve the following goals (DOE 2002):

- Property is evaluated, radiologically characterized, and, where appropriate, decontaminated before release.
- The level of residual radioactive material in the property to be released is as near to background levels as is reasonably practicable, as determined by

applying the principles of the DOE ALARA (as low as reasonably achievable) process.

- All property releases meet authorized limits and are appropriately certified, verified, documented, and reported; public involvement and notification needs are addressed; and processes are in place to appropriately maintain records.

If UDS decides to release HF and/or CaF<sub>2</sub> from the DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion facilities for unrestricted use, the authorized limits process would include the following steps:

- Identification, for both HF and CaF<sub>2</sub>, of several sets of potential maximum allowable concentrations for residual uranium and technetium-99 to serve as alternative sets of authorized limits for the purpose of ALARA analysis;
- Verification that each alternative set of authorized limits would comply with the DOE public dose limit;
- Selection through an ALARA analysis of one set each of authorized limits to be proposed for DOE approval from among the alternatives for both HF and CaF<sub>2</sub>;
- Coordination with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) or the responsible Agreement State agency;
- Development of survey and/or test methods, including provisions for quality assurance, to be used for demonstrating compliance with the proposed authorized limits;
- Acquisition of DOE approval of the proposed authorized limits for release of HF and CaF<sub>2</sub>; and
- Placement in the DOE permanent record and in the public record of documentation supporting the release for unrestricted use of HF and CaF<sub>2</sub>.

Additional information about each step in the authorized limits process is provided below.

#### **E.4.1 Identification of Alternative Sets of Authorized Limits**

As previously mentioned, Framatome ANP (one of the partners in UDS) currently operates an NRC-licensed, nuclear fuel manufacturing facility near Richland, Washington, that has a uranium conversion system with several design features similar to those of the proposed DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion facilities. HF from the Richland facility is sold under the provisions of that facility's NRC license. UDS would identify alternative sets of authorized limits for the release of HF and CaF<sub>2</sub> from the DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion facilities on the basis of the Framatome ANP facility's operating experience and the release limits specified for HF in its existing NRC license. The

analyses presented in Section E.5 very conservatively estimate the impacts that would result from the use after sale of HF and CaF<sub>2</sub>. Because these analyses are so conservative, they are expected to bound the impacts from selling HF and CaF<sub>2</sub>, in compliance with any alternative set of authorized limits that UDS is likely to propose for DOE approval.

#### **E.4.2 Verification of Compliance with the DOE Public Dose Limit**

The DOE public dose limit for any member of the general public is 100 mrem total effective dose equivalent (TEDE) in a year. This limit applies to the sum of internal and external doses resulting from all modes of exposure to all radiation sources (i.e., both DOE and non-DOE sources) except background radiation sources and medical sources [DOE Order 5400.5, II.1.a.(3)(a)].

Because the DOE public dose limit applies to exposure from all sources and pathways, not just DOE sources, it would be very complicated and expensive to verify compliance. Therefore, for the purpose of establishing authorized limits, DOE has simplified verification of compliance with the primary dose limit by adopting a presumption of compliance if the dose from a DOE practice, such as releasing HF or CaF<sub>2</sub> containing residual radioactive material, to those individual members of the public most likely to receive the highest doses (referred to as the maximally exposed members of the public) can be demonstrated to comply with a dose constraint of one-quarter of the public dose limit (i.e., 25 mrem TEDE in a year) (DOE 2002). As a result, each alternative set of authorized limits identified by UDS for the release of HF and CaF<sub>2</sub> from the DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion facilities would have to be shown during the authorized limits process to result in doses to maximally exposed members of the public of no more than 25 mrem TEDE in a year.

#### **E.4.3 ALARA Analysis**

DOE Order 5400.5 requires that DOE contractors implement the ALARA process with respect to any DOE activity or practice that may cause members of the public to be exposed to radiation [DOE Order 5400.5, II.2]. For that reason, UDS is required to have an ALARA program for the DUF<sub>6</sub> facilities. The ALARA program must address activities on the sites that can cause members of the public or workers to be exposed to radiation. With respect to releases of property, such as the HF or CaF<sub>2</sub> produced by the DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion facilities, the ALARA program must include a procedure for an ALARA analysis to select authorized limits that would reduce radiation exposures to levels that are as low as practicable, taking into account technological, economic, safety, environmental, social, and public policy factors. There is no single best procedure for conducting an ALARA analysis. However, a key component should be a cost-benefit analysis (DOE 1997). For the purposes of this analysis, costs are assumed to accrue as a result of (1) expenditures to purchase, install, operate, and maintain the equipment and (2) expenditures to address health effects that may be induced by exposures of humans to ionizing radiation, such as cancer and genetic diseases. In evaluating expenditures to address health effects, DOE assumes that collective dose is proportional to the risk (i.e., the probability of observing radiation-induced health effects in a fixed population). Benefits accrue as a result of

(1) reduced expenditures for equipment and (2) reduced collective dose. To determine the collective dose to the exposed population for purposes of the ALARA analysis, the number of exposed persons would be multiplied by the average individual dose. The average individual dose is determined, to the extent practicable, by estimating anticipated doses to actual people (rather than doses to hypothetical maximally exposed persons), as was done for verification of compliance with the DOE public dose limit.

In addition to analysis of direct costs and benefits, consideration of technological, environmental, social, and public policy factors must also be a component of the ALARA analysis. While the particular nonradiological factors to be considered with respect to the release of HF and CaF<sub>2</sub> from the DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion facilities would be identified by UDS on the basis of case-specific issues, the following list provides examples of possible factors within each general category.

- *Technological factors:* promotion of emerging technology, technology transfer, robustness of technology, industrial safety of technology, and track record of technology;
- *Environmental factors:* effects on ecological resources, waste generation rates, ease of management of resulting wastes, probable disposition of resulting wastes, and fate of residual radioactive material released;
- *Social factors:* impacts on local/national product market, employment, public acceptance, environmental justice considerations, and transportation effects; and
- *Public policy factors:* consistency with waste minimization principles, promotion of resource conservation, adaptability to existing procedures and protocols, and environmental permitting issues.

#### **E.4.4 Coordination with NRC and Agreement States**

DOE policy prohibits the transfer of radioactive materials that require an NRC license to members of the public who are not licensed to receive them (see, e.g., Sections 3.7 and 5.6 of DOE [2002] and Section IV.5 of DOE Order 5400.5 [DOE 1990]). Accordingly, before DOE approves authorized limits for the release of HF or CaF<sub>2</sub>, the NRC or responsible Agreement State must be consulted to ensure that releases under the proposed authorized limits do not violate any licensing requirements.

#### **E.4.5 Development of Measurement Protocols**

Radiological surveys and measurements of residual radioactive material in HF and CaF<sub>2</sub> must be conducted before the material is released. To accomplish this, measurement protocols, procedures, and equipment must be specified and approved by DOE as being sufficient to meet data quality objectives for characterization of the material being released and verification of

compliance with the authorized limits. To obtain DOE approval for measurement protocols and procedures, UDS will need to show that such actions comply with the quality assurance requirements contained in the *Code of Federal Regulations*, Title 10, Part 830 (10 CFR 830), “Nuclear Safety Management,” Subpart A.

#### **E.4.6 Obtaining DOE Approval of Authorized Limits**

Authorized limits and survey protocols for the sale of HF and CaF<sub>2</sub> containing volumetrically distributed residual radioactive material must be approved by both the responsible DOE Field Element and the Assistant Secretary for Environment, Safety, and Health. The application for these DOE approvals would contain the information listed below.

- Description of the anticipated physical, chemical, and radiological attributes of the HF and CaF<sub>2</sub> proposed for release;
- Descriptions of the alternative sets of authorized limits evaluated in the ALARA analysis;
- For each alternative set of authorized limits, the expected doses to those individual members of the public most likely to receive the highest doses in the actual and likely use scenario and in the worst plausible use scenario;
- Results of the ALARA analysis, including collective doses and other relative costs and benefits for each alternative set of authorized limits, and discussions of any nonradiological factors that influenced the selection of the proposed authorized limits;
- Clear and concise statement of the proposed authorized limits for HF and CaF<sub>2</sub>, including the limit for each isotope of concern;
- Discussion of the measurement protocols that would be implemented to determine compliance with the proposed authorized limits; and
- Information on activities that have been conducted to gain agreement with representatives of affected groups, including documentation that coordination has occurred with NRC personnel or Agreement State representatives.

#### **E.4.7 Final Documentation**

DOE Order 5400.5 requires that documentation of specific information related to releases of property containing residual radioactive material be made part of DOE’s permanent record. In addition, DOE recognizes the importance of public participation in its program operations (DOE 2003) and instructs its contractors to make documentation supporting approval of authorized limits and subsequent releases of property containing residual radioactive material available to the public (DOE 2002). Accordingly, in addition to the information provided in this EIS, the

documentation listed below regarding DOE's approval of authorized limits and subsequent sales of HF and CaF<sub>2</sub> from the DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion facilities would be made available in the public record.

- Application submitted by UDS to DOE requesting that authorized limits be established for the sale of HF and CaF<sub>2</sub> from the DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion facilities;
- DOE's final approval of authorized limits for the sale of HF and CaF<sub>2</sub> from the DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion facilities; and
- Periodic performance reports submitted by UDS to DOE summarizing the contents of (1) certificates of conformance issued by UDS after batches of HF and CaF<sub>2</sub> destined for sale have been sampled and analyzed according to approved procedures and determined to meet the applicable authorized limits, (2) analytical results from the sampling and analysis, and (3) shipping manifests indicating the disposition of the HF and CaF<sub>2</sub>.

## **E.5 BOUNDING ESTIMATION OF POTENTIAL HUMAN HEALTH IMPACTS FROM HF AND CaF<sub>2</sub> SALE AND USE**

### **E.5.1 Radiological Impacts**

#### **E.5.1.1 Exposures to HF**

Bounding radiological impacts resulting from exposure to trace amounts of uranium (U) and technetium (Tc) in HF were calculated by considering a hypothetical worker working in close proximity to an HF storage tank. The storage tank was assumed to be a 10,000-gal (37,854-L) cylindrical container, with a diameter of 3.2 m (10.5 ft) and a height of 4.7 m (15.4 ft). The worker was assumed to work 2,000 hours per year at a distance of 1 m (3 ft) from the storage tank. Concentration of U in the HF solution was assumed to be 3 pCi/mL (6.4 parts per million [ppm]), the NRC-approved limit for the Framatome ANP facility; the concentration of Tc was assumed to be 15.9 parts per billion of uranium (ppb U), or  $2 \times 10^{-3}$  pCi/mL.

Potential radiation exposure incurred by the hypothetical worker was considered to result from external radiation and inhalation. Because of the corrosive nature of HF, ingestion of HF was considered extremely unlikely and was excluded from consideration. According to Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) standards, the permissible exposure limit to HF vapor is 3 ppm. For concentrations of 3 to 30 ppm, a minimum of a full-face respirator equipped with an HF canister must be worn. Unlike HF, which can vaporize under room temperature, U and Tc oxides that are contained in HF solution would most likely stay in the solution. However, for the purpose of calculating a bounding exposure, the oxides were assumed to be entrained in the vaporized HF molecules. The permissible limit of 3 ppm was assumed as the air concentration for HF. The DOE-recommended air release fraction (ARF) of 0.002 for radionuclide solute in aqueous solutions (DOE 1993) was assumed for the U and Tc

oxides. The bounding inhalation dose was calculated by using an inhalation rate of 1.2 m<sup>3</sup>/h and the maximum inhalation dose conversion factors (Class Y for U and Class W for Tc) from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA 1988). The bounding external dose was calculated with the MicroShield computer code (Negin and Worku 1992).

On the basis of the above assumptions, it is estimated that total radiation dose for a worker in close proximity to the HF storage tank would be 0.034 mrem/yr. External radiation contributes 0.027 mrem/yr to the total dose and is the dominating pathway. Radiation doses result primarily from exposure to uranium isotopes and their decay products; the dose contribution from Tc is negligible. It should be reiterated that this bounding dose was estimated by combining several extremely conservative assumptions; for example, the close proximity to the storage tank, the exposure duration of all the work hours in a year, the entrainment of U and Tc oxides, and the bounding air release fraction for U and Tc oxides. In reality, the actual dose resulting from using or handling the HF product would be much smaller. For comparison, the radiation dose constraint set to protect the general public from a DOE practice is 25 mrem/yr (see Section E.4).

As discussed in Appendix A, Sections A.4 through A.6, transuranic (TRU) radionuclides are not expected to reach the conversion chambers in the facility and should not be present in any measurable quantities in the conversion products. Any minute concentration of such radionuclides in the products would be much less than the 10% threshold discussed in Section A.5. As a result, their contribution to doses calculated in this appendix would be negligible.

#### **E.5.1.2 Exposures to CaF<sub>2</sub>**

Bounding radiological impacts resulting from exposure to trace amounts of U and Tc in CaF<sub>2</sub> were calculated by considering an exposure scenario similar to that considered for HF. A hypothetical worker was assumed to work in close proximity to a CaF<sub>2</sub> filling bag. The filling bag was assumed to have a 19-t (21-ton) capacity, with a diameter of 2.8 m (9.2 ft) and a height of 1.2 m (4 ft). The worker was assumed to work 2,000 hours per year at a distance of 1 m (3 ft) from the filling bag. Concentrations of U and Tc in CaF<sub>2</sub> were assumed to be half of those in HF solution, that is, 1.5 pCi/g for U and 15.9 ppb U or  $1 \times 10^{-3}$  pCi/g for Tc.

Potential radiation exposure incurred by the hypothetical worker was considered to result from external radiation, inhalation, and ingestion. The U and Tc oxides were assumed to attach to the CaF<sub>2</sub> particles and to become suspended in air during the filling operation. According to OSHA standards (OSHA 2002), the particulate emission limit for fluoride compounds is 2.5 mg/m<sup>3</sup>. This limit was used to calculate the air concentration for CaF<sub>2</sub> and, subsequently, the air concentrations of U and Tc. The bounding inhalation dose was calculated by assuming a respirable fraction of 10% and by using an inhalation rate of 1.2 m<sup>3</sup>/h and the maximum inhalation dose conversion factors (Class Y for U and Class W for Tc) from the EPA (EPA 1988). The hypothetical worker was also assumed to ingest CaF<sub>2</sub> particles incidentally. The ingestion rate was assumed to be 100 mg/d. Like inhalation, the maximum ingestion dose conversion factors for U and Tc from the EPA (EPA 1988) were used to calculate the bounding

ingestion dose. The bounding external dose was calculated with the MicroShield computer code (Negin and Worku 1992).

On the basis of the above assumptions, the estimated total radiation dose for a worker in close proximity to the CaF<sub>2</sub> filling station would be 0.234 mrem/yr. External radiation contributes only 0.007 mrem/yr to the total dose, which is dominated by the contribution from inhalation, 0.217 mrem/yr. The rest of the dose is contributed by ingestion, 0.01 mrem/yr. Radiation doses result primarily from exposure to uranium isotopes and their decay products; the dose contribution from Tc is negligible. It should be reiterated that this bounding dose was estimated by combining several extremely conservative assumptions, for example, the close proximity of the worker to the filling bag, the exposure duration of all the work hours in a year, and the maximum allowable particulate concentration of fluoride compounds in the air. In reality, the actual dose resulting from use or handling the CaF<sub>2</sub> product would be much smaller. For comparison, the radiation dose constraint set by DOE to protect the general public from a DOE practice is 25 mrem/yr (see Section E.4).

## **E.6 POTENTIAL SOCIOECONOMIC IMPACTS OF HF AND CaF<sub>2</sub> SALE AND USE**

The *DUF<sub>6</sub> Conversion Product Management Plan* (UDS 2003a) identifies potential uses of conversion facility products, either as CaF<sub>2</sub> or as aqueous HF. This section assesses the impacts from the use of these products at the U.S. locations likely to be directly affected and in the U.S. economy as a whole. Since the success of CaF<sub>2</sub> and HF sales to chemical manufacturers depends on future market conditions, the impacts of treating CaF<sub>2</sub> or aqueous HF as waste are also considered.

### **E.6.1 Impacts from the Sale and Use of HF**

The current aqueous HF producers have been identified as a potential market for the 19,200 t (21,200 tons) of aqueous HF that could be produced by the proposed conversion facility (UDS 2003a), with UDS-produced aqueous HF replacing some or all of current U.S. production. The impact of HF sales on the local economy in which the existing producer is located and on the U.S. economy as a whole is likely to be minimal.

All aqueous HF currently produced in the United States is manufactured by Honeywell at a facility in Geismar, Louisiana. Additional plants owned by Honeywell and other companies serving the U.S. market are located in Canada and Mexico. The Geismar plant as a whole employs a fairly large number of workers and manufactures a range of industrial chemicals, including both anhydrous and aqueous HF, which is marketed in various concentrations. The manufacture of aqueous HF employs a small number of production and clerical workers. A fleet of dedicated tankers employing a small number of drivers is used to transport HF to end-users in various locations in the United States (Honeywell International, Inc. 2002).

Although the actual impact of the sale of UDS HF is not known, if Honeywell were to purchase HF from UDS, production of aqueous HF at the Geismar facility might be reduced or

cease altogether, which would mean the loss of some or all aqueous HF production and transportation employment at the plant and the loss of some related clerical employment.

The loss of employment and income at the Geismar facility with the end of aqueous HF production and transportation would lead to minor additional losses in the surrounding economy, with a slight reduction in activity associated with reduced wage and salary spending. Offsetting these losses would be a slight increase in transportation employment at Paducah and Portsmouth associated with the shipment of HF from the UDS facilities. There would also be benefits to the U.S. balance of trade, with the use of UDS-produced HF reducing the need to import CaF<sub>2</sub>, the raw material for HF production. These benefits would be minimal, however, given the small quantity of HF production likely to take place at the proposed facilities and the relatively low potential value of the HF product. There would also be some benefits to Honeywell in terms of cost savings associated with the end of blending anhydrous with aqueous HF. However, if HF concentrations were different than those preferred by end-users, some additional capital and operating expenditures might be needed to accommodate the change in acid concentration (Taylor 2003).

### **E.6.2 Impacts from the Sale and Use of CaF<sub>2</sub>**

No market for the 20,600 t (22,700 tons) of CaF<sub>2</sub> that might be produced in the proposed conversion facilities at Paducah and Portsmouth annually has been identified (UDS 2003a). If a market for CaF<sub>2</sub> is found, the impact of CaF<sub>2</sub> sales on the U.S. economy would likely be minimal.

Although CaF<sub>2</sub> was produced in the United States until 1995, most of the 636,000 t (701,000 tons) of CaF<sub>2</sub> consumed in the United States in 2001 was imported. While the use of CaF<sub>2</sub> produced at the UDS facilities would affect the balance of trade, this impact would be minor, given the small quantity of CaF<sub>2</sub> production at the proposed facilities and the relatively low potential value of the CaF<sub>2</sub> product. There might be benefits to U.S. users of CaF<sub>2</sub> if the price of CaF<sub>2</sub> produced in the proposed facilities provided a significant incentive to use the UDS products rather than imported material. However, a price range for UDS-produced CaF<sub>2</sub> has not yet been established, and since plentiful supplies of CaF<sub>2</sub> are available from overseas, the small amount of CaF<sub>2</sub> that would be produced would not likely have a significant effect on the domestic market.

### **E.6.3 Impacts from the Nonuse of HF and CaF<sub>2</sub>**

If no market for either HF or CaF<sub>2</sub> is established, it is likely that the material would be disposed of as waste. This would require shipping these wastes to an approved waste disposal facility. While disposal activities would result in a small number of transportation jobs and might lead to additional jobs at the waste disposal facility, the impact of these activities in the transportation corridors, at the waste disposal site(s), and on the U.S. economy would be minimal.

## E.7 REFERENCES

DOE (U.S. Department of Energy), 1990, *Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment*, DOE Order 5400.5, Washington, D.C., Feb. 8.

DOE, 1993, *DOE Handbook: Recommended Values and Technical Bases for Airborne Release Fraction (ARFs), Airborne Release Rates (ARRs), and Respirable Fractions (RFs) at DOE Non-Reactor Nuclear Facilities*, DOE-STD-0013-93, Washington, D.C., July.

DOE, 1997, *DOE Standard Applying the ALARA Process for Radiation Protection of the Public and Environmental Compliance with 10 CFR Part 834 and DOE 5400.5 ALARA Program Requirements*, draft standard, Washington, D.C., April. Available at <http://tis.eh.doe.gov/oepea>.

DOE, 2002, *Implementation Guide, Control and Release of Property with Residual Radioactive Material for Use with DOE 5400.5, Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment*, DOE G 441.1-XX, draft, Washington, D.C., April 4.

DOE, 2003, *Public Participation and Community Relations*, DOE P 141.2, Washington, D.C., May 2.

EPA (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency), 1988, *Limiting Values of Radionuclide Intake and Air Concentration and Dose Conversion Factors for Inhalation, Submersion, and Ingestion*, Federal Guidance Report No. 11, EPA-520/1-88-020, Office of Radiation Programs, Washington, D.C., Sept.

Honeywell International, Inc., 2002, *Hydrofluoric Acid Properties*, Vol. 1.1, Morris Township, N.J., Jan. Available at <http://www.hfacid.com>.

Negin, C.A., and G. Worku, 1992, *MicroShield, Version 4, User's Manual*, Grove 92-2, Grove Engineering, Inc., Rockville, ME.

OSHA (Occupational Safety and Health Administration), 2002, "Toxic and Hazardous Substances," Subpart Z in *Code of Federal Regulations*, Title 29, Part 1910, "Occupational Safety and Health Standards," U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., July 1.

SRI Consulting, 2002, "CEH Marketing Research Report: Fluorspar and Inorganic Fluorine Compounds," in *Chemical Economics Handbook*, Menlo Park, Calif., July.

Taylor, E., 2003, personal communication from E. Taylor (Honeywell International, Inc., Morris Township, N.J.) to T. Allison (Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Ill.), March 4.

UDS (Uranium Disposition Services, LLC), 2003a, *DUF<sub>6</sub> Conversion Product Management Plan*, DUF6-UDS-PL-004, Rev. OC, Jan. 20.

UDS, 2003b, *Initial NEPA Data*, DUF<sub>6</sub>-UDS-NEP-001, Rev. 0, Oak Ridge, Tenn., Feb. 28.



**APPENDIX F:**  
**ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGIES**



## APPENDIX F:

### ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGIES

In general, the activities assessed in this environmental impact statement (EIS) could affect workers, members of the general public, and the environment during construction of new facilities, during routine operation of facilities, during transportation, and during facility or transportation accidents. Activities could have adverse effects (e.g., human health impairment) or positive effects (e.g., regional socioeconomic benefits, such as the creation of jobs). Some impacts would result primarily from the unique characteristics of the uranium and other chemical compounds handled or generated under the alternatives. Other impacts would occur regardless of the types of materials involved, such as the impacts on air and water quality that can occur during any construction project and the vehicle-related impacts that can occur during transportation. The following sections describe the assessment methodologies that were used to evaluate potential environmental impacts associated with the no action alternative and the action alternatives.

#### F.1 HUMAN HEALTH AND SAFETY — NORMAL FACILITY OPERATIONS

##### F.1.1 Radiological Impacts

###### F.1.1.1 Receptors

For this EIS, radiation effects during normal (or routine) operations were assessed by first estimating the radiation dose to workers and members of the general public from the anticipated activities required under each alternative. The analysis considered three groups of people: (1) involved workers, (2) noninvolved workers, and (3) members of the general public. They are defined as follows:

- *Involved Workers:* Persons working at a site who are directly involved with the handling of radioactive or hazardous materials.
  - They might be exposed to direct gamma radiation emitted from radioactive materials, such as depleted uranium hexafluoride (DUF<sub>6</sub>) or other uranium compounds.
  - The radiation doses they would receive from inhaling uranium would be very small when compared with the direct radiation doses that result from enclosed processes. Containment and ventilation controls would be used to reduce airborne radionuclides in workplaces. Furthermore, the requirement of wearing protective respirators would limit inhalation exposures to very low levels.

- Involved workers would be protected by a dosimetry program designed to control doses below the maximum regulatory limit of 5 rem/yr for workers (*Code of Federal Regulations*, Title 10, Part 835 [10 CFR Part 835]).
- *Noninvolved Workers*: Persons working at a site but not directly involved with the handling of radioactive or hazardous materials.
  - They might be exposed to direct radiation from radioactive materials (although at a great distance) and to trace amounts of uranium released to the environment through site exhaust stacks.
  - They could receive radiation exposure through inhalation of radioactive material in the air, external radiation from radioactive material deposited on the ground, and incidental ingestion of soil.
- *Members of the General Public*: Persons living within 50 mi (80 km) of the site.
  - They might be exposed to trace amounts of uranium released to the environment through exhaust stacks or wastewater discharges.
  - They could receive radiation exposure through inhalation of radioactive material in the air, external radiation from deposited radioactive material, and ingestion of contaminated water, food, or soil.

For the noninvolved workers and general public, doses were estimated for the group as a whole (population or collective dose) as well as for a maximally exposed individual (MEI). The MEI is defined as a hypothetical person who — because of proximity, activities, or living habits — could receive the highest possible dose. The radiation exposures of the MEIs would be bounded by the exposure calculated on the basis of maximum air concentrations for airborne releases and on the basis of maximum surface water or groundwater concentrations for waterborne releases. For involved workers, the average individual dose rather than the MEI dose was estimated because of the uncertainty about the activities of each involved worker. In addition to the average individual dose, the collective dose was also estimated for involved workers. Under actual conditions, all radiation exposures and releases of radioactive material to the environment are required to be as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA), a practice that has as its objective the attainment of dose levels as far below applicable limits as possible.

#### **F.1.1.2 Radiation Doses and Health Effects**

All radiological impacts were assessed in terms of committed dose and associated health effects. The calculated dose was the total effective dose equivalent (10 CFR Part 20), which is the sum of the deep dose equivalent from exposure to external radiation and the 50-year committed effective dose equivalent from exposures to internal radiation. Radiation doses were

calculated in units of milliroentgen-equivalent man (mrem) for individuals and in units of person-rem for collective populations.

The potential radiation doses resulting from normal operations would be so low that the primary adverse health effects would be the potential induction of latent cancer fatalities (LCFs). Health risk conversion factors (expected LCFs per absorbed dose) from Publication 60 of the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP 1991) were used to convert radiation doses to LCFs, that is, 0.0005 per person-rem for members of the general public and 0.0004 per person-rem for workers. Adverse health effects for individuals were assessed in terms of the probability of developing an excess LCF; adverse health effects for collective populations were assessed as the number of excess LCFs expected in the population.

### **F.1.1.3 Exposure Pathways**

External radiation would be the primary exposure pathway for involved workers because they would directly handle radioactive materials and/or be at a close distance from radiation sources. Radiation exposures through inhalation and incidental ingestion of contaminated particulates would be possible; however, the exposure would probably be very small compared with exposures from external radiation. Operations that could result in potential airborne emissions would be confined and most likely would be automated and controlled remotely. Even if airborne emissions did occur, the use of high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters and various air circulation systems would reduce the amount of airborne pollutants in the workplace to a minimal level. Exposures from inhalation could also be prevented by implementation of ALARA practices, as required. For example, workers could wear respirators while performing activities associated with potential airborne emissions. Potential exposure from incidental ingestion of particulates could be reduced if workers wore gloves and followed good working practices.

Inhalation of contaminated particulates and incidental ingestion of deposited particulates were considered for noninvolved workers who, because of being located farther away from the radiation sources handled in the facilities, would not be exposed to direct external radiation from those sources. However, secondary external radiation would be possible from the deposited radionuclides on ground surfaces and from airborne radionuclides when the emission plume from the stacks of the processing buildings passed the locations of the noninvolved workers. The potential radiation exposure would be bounded by the exposure associated with the largest downwind air concentration. To obtain conservative estimates of the bounded value, the noninvolved workers were assumed to be exposed to radiation caused by airborne emissions without any shielding from buildings or other structures.

Radiation exposures of members of the off-site general public were assessed for both airborne and waterborne pathways. The airborne pathways included inhalation of contaminated particulates, external radiation from deposited radionuclides and from airborne radionuclides, incidental ingestion of deposited radionuclides, and ingestion of contaminated food products (plants, meat, and dairy products). Plants grown in the area where the emission plume passed could become contaminated by deposition of radionuclides on leaves or ground surfaces.

Radionuclides deposited on leaves could subsequently translocate to the edible portions of the plants; those deposited on ground surfaces could subsequently be absorbed by plant roots. Livestock and their products could become contaminated if the livestock ate the contaminated surface soil and plants.

The waterborne pathways included ingestion of surface water and groundwater; ingestion of contaminated plant foods, meat, and dairy products; and potential radon exposure from using contaminated water. Plant foods and fodder could be contaminated from irrigation with contaminated water, and the livestock and their products could become contaminated if the livestock were fed with contaminated water and ate contaminated fodder. Potential indoor radon exposures would be possible if contaminated water was used indoors and radon gas emanated from the water. Because of the large dilution capability of surface water at the site, the estimated radionuclide concentrations in surface water were always very low, and potential radiation exposures from the food chain pathways associated with these low water concentrations would be negligible. Therefore, radiation exposures resulting from contaminated surface water were assessed only for the drinking water pathway. The dilution capability would be smaller for groundwater, resulting in higher groundwater concentrations. Therefore, if the groundwater was predicted to be contaminated, radiation exposures from the food chain pathways, radon pathway, and drinking water pathway were all estimated.

Radiation exposure of the off-site general public MEI would be bounded by the exposure associated with the maximum downwind air concentration and maximum water concentration.

#### **F.1.1.4 Data Sources and Software Applications**

Potential impacts associated with the operations of the conversion facility were estimated or calculated by using measurement data or computer codes.

The external exposures incurred by the involved workers in the conversion facility were estimated on the basis of the measurement data for worker exposures at the Framatome Advanced Nuclear Power (ANP) facility in Richland, Washington. A dry conversion process is used to convert UF<sub>6</sub> into uranium oxide at the Framatome facility. A similar conversion process would be implemented at Paducah. According to Uranium Disposition Services, LLC (UDS 2003a), the key components of the conversion facility at Paducah would be similar to those at Framatome; therefore, conditions for potential worker exposures are expected to be similar at these two facilities. The worker exposure data from Framatome provided in the UDS National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) data package (UDS 2003b) were used to obtain involved worker exposures at Paducah, with consideration of different specific activities in the processed uranium materials and different uranium processing rates. Potential external radiation exposure for employees working in the cylinder storage yards resulting from loading and unloading cylinders were estimated with the use of the MicroShield computer code (Negin and Worku 1992). To use MicroShield, potential exposure distances, duration of activities, and number of workers involved in each activity were developed. MicroShield is a commercial software program designed to estimate external radiation doses from a variety of sources; it is widely used for such applications. External exposures for cylinder yard workers from

maintenance activities were estimated on the basis of past site-specific monitoring data. The increase in cylinder number resulting from arrival of the ETTP cylinders and decrease in cylinder numbers resulting from conversion of DUF<sub>6</sub> to U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> were both taken into account. In actuality, the radiation dose to the individual worker would be monitored and maintained below the DOE administrative control limit of 2,000 mrem/yr (DOE 1992), which is below the regulatory dose limit of 5,000 mrem/yr (10 CFR Part 835).

Radiological impacts from airborne pathways were estimated with the emission data provided in the UDS NEPA data package (UDS 2003b) and the use of the CAP88-PC computer code (Chaki and Parks 2003). CAP88-PC was developed under the sponsorship of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and was designed for use in demonstrating compliance with regulatory requirements on air emissions. It uses site-specific or representative meteorological data (joint frequency data) to estimate the air concentrations at downwind locations, calculates the biota concentrations by using biotransfer models, and then estimates the corresponding radiation doses.

Depending on the location of the conversion facility, the on-site maximum air concentrations would be different from the off-site maximum air concentrations; however, on the basis of the small emission rate provided by UDS (UDS 2003b), both maximum concentrations would be very small. In this EIS, a bounding approach was used to find the potential exposures of the MEI of the noninvolved workers and the general public.

The absolute maximum downwind air concentrations determined solely by the meteorological data were used to find the bounding exposures of both MEIs. Because of the use of the bounding approach, the potential MEI impacts associated with the different conversion facility locations would be the same. This bounding approach was judged to be acceptable because the location of the conversion facility would not be determined on the basis of the MEI exposures, since such impacts would be insignificant.

According to the CAP88-PC results, the maximum downwind air concentrations would be located at approximately 380 m (1,247 ft) from the emission stack of the conversion facility. The bounding collective exposure of the noninvolved workers was estimated by multiplying the MEI dose with the population of noninvolved workers. The number of noninvolved workers was estimated by using year 2000 information on sitewide worker distribution. Collective off-site population exposure was calculated by using CAP88-PC with 2000 population distribution data. A range of 50 mi (80 km) around the site was considered.

Because no waterborne release of uranium is expected from the conversion facility process water (UDS 2003b), potential impacts resulting from the use of contaminated surface water were not estimated.

#### **F.1.1.5 Source for the Derived Results**

Results presented in this EIS for the no action alternative and cylinder preparation activities at ETTP under the action alternatives were derived from the site-specific data

compilation reports prepared for the DUF<sub>6</sub> management program in support of NEPA requirements (Hartmann 1999a-c) and the programmatic EIS (PEIS) (U.S. Department of Energy [DOE] 1999). The receptors and exposure pathways for the data compilation report and the PEIS were the same as those described above. In addition, site-specific meteorological and aquatic environmental data at the Paducah and ETTP sites were used. The assumptions used for the no action alternative in the data compilation report were considered to bound the potential impacts. Detailed discussions on the assumptions are provided in Section 5.1.1 of this EIS. Worker activities for preparing cylinders for shipment (including retrieving cylinders, inspecting them, and loading them to a transportation vehicle) from ETTP to Paducah were assumed to be the same as those considered in the PEIS. Therefore, impacts for the involved workers presented for the cylinder preparation activities in the PEIS were used in this report.

For involved workers, radiation exposures were dominated by the external exposure pathway. Potential doses in the data compilation report (UDS 2003b) and PEIS (DOE 1999) were estimated with information on worker activities and with the use of the MicroShield computer code (Negin and Worku 1992). Radiation exposures of the noninvolved workers, on the other hand, would result mainly from the airborne release of depleted uranium. For cylinder preparation activities, air emissions are expected to be negligible. Therefore, no impact would be expected for the noninvolved workers. Under the no action alternative, the emissions locations and emissions rates assumed in the data compilation report (Hartmann 1999a) were adopted to bound the potential impacts. Consequently, the results that were obtained by using the emissions data and an air dispersion model from that report were used directly for the MEIs. For the collective exposure, an upper bound estimate was obtained by multiplying the MEI dose with the sitewide worker population. The upper bound values rather than the actual values were used because the potential level of radiation exposures would be very small ( $< 0.1$  mem/yr).

Radiation exposures of the general public would result from both airborne and waterborne releases. For cylinder preparation activities, there would be negligible air emissions and waterborne releases. Therefore, no impact would be expected for the general public. For the no action alternative, because the bounding assumptions used in the data compilation report were adopted, results from that report were used directly in this EIS for the MEI. The collective exposures were obtained by scaling the results in the data compilation report with the population size. This scaling approach was used because of the very small exposures and the small change (less than 3%) in the total population within 50-mi (80-km) of the Paducah site between 1990 and 2000.

#### **F.1.1.6 Exposure Parameters and Dose Conversion Factors**

Inhalation rates for workers were assumed to be  $1.2 \text{ m}^3/\text{h}$  (ICRP 1994), with an exposure duration of 8 hours per day for 250 days per year. The inhalation rate for the general public was assumed to be  $20 \text{ m}^3/\text{d}$ , with an exposure duration of 24 hours per day for 365 days per year. The ingestion rate for drinking water for the public was assumed to be 2 L/d. No building shielding effect was considered for inhalation and external radiation exposures. Therefore, radiation doses estimated in this way would be greater than the actual doses, which would always be associated with some shielding from buildings.

Site-specific agriculture data (yield per unit area) for food crops and fodder were used. Default food consumption data for a rural setting from CAP88-PC were also used. Nevertheless, it was found that radiation doses from the food ingestion pathways constituted only a small fraction of the total dose, which is dominated (>90%) by doses from inhalation (for airborne pathways).

CAP88-PC uses the EPA internal dose conversion factors to estimate internal doses (EPA 1988). The inhalation doses depend strongly on the solubilities of the inhaled chemicals. With high solubility, a chemical would be excreted from the human body within a shorter period of time and would result in less internal exposure. For U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub>, it was assumed to remain in the human body for years, thus resulting in greater radiation exposures. The ingestion doses were estimated by assuming that the uranium compounds would be absorbed by the gastrointestinal tract to the largest extent possible for uranium compounds; this would result in the maximum internal exposure.

### F.1.2 Chemical Impacts

The method used to assess the potential human health impacts from exposures to chemicals of concern emitted during normal operations was discussed in detail in the DUF<sub>6</sub> PEIS (DOE 1999). The chemicals of greatest concern are soluble and insoluble uranium compounds and hydrogen fluoride (HF). Uranium compounds can cause chemical toxicity to the kidneys; soluble compounds are more readily absorbed into the body and thus are more toxic to the kidneys. HF is a corrosive gas that can cause respiratory irritation in humans, with tissue destruction or death resulting from exposure to large concentrations. No deaths are known to have occurred as a result of short-term (i.e., 1 hour or less) exposures to 50 parts per million (ppm) or less of HF. Neither uranium compounds nor HF are chemical carcinogens; thus, cancer risk calculations were not applicable for this assessment.

#### Key Concepts in Estimating Risks from Low-Level Chemical Exposures

##### Reference Level

- Intake level of a chemical below which adverse effects are very unlikely.

##### Hazard Quotient

- A comparison of the estimated intake level or dose of a chemical with its reference dose.
- Expressed as a ratio of estimated intake level to reference dose.
- Example:
  - The EPA reference level (reference dose) for ingestion of soluble compounds of uranium is 0.003 mg/kg of body weight per day.
  - If a 150-lb (70-kg) person ingested 0.1 mg of soluble uranium per day, the daily rate would be  $0.1 \div 70 \approx 0.001$  mg/kg, which is below the reference dose and thus unlikely to cause adverse health effects. This would yield a hazard quotient of  $0.001 \div 0.003 = 0.33$ .

##### Hazard Index

- Sum of the hazard quotients for all chemicals to which an individual is exposed.
- A value less than 1 indicates that the exposed person is unlikely to develop adverse human health effects.

For long-term, low-level (chronic) exposures to uranium compounds and HF emitted during normal operations, potential adverse health effects for the hypothetical MEI in the noninvolved worker and general public populations were calculated by estimating the intake levels associated with anticipated activities. Intake levels were then compared with reference levels below which adverse effects are very unlikely. Risks from normal operations were quantified as hazard quotients and hazard indices (see text box on previous page).

### **F.1.2.1 Receptors**

The main source of impacts to noninvolved workers and members of the public would be the emission of trace amounts of uranium compounds or HF from exhaust stacks. Chemical exposures for involved workers would depend, in part, on detailed facility designs that have not yet been determined; however, the workplace environment would be monitored to ensure that airborne chemical concentrations were kept below applicable exposure limits.

### **F.1.2.2 Chemical Doses and Associated Health Effects**

For normal operations, risks were expressed by using the hazard quotient concept for exposures to noncarcinogens (i.e., comparison of estimated receptor doses with reference levels or doses below which adverse effects would be very unlikely to occur). In general, the chemicals of concern for this EIS were uranium and fluoride compounds, especially HF gas. These substances would not be chemical carcinogens; thus, cancer risk calculations were not applicable. The toxicity of the exposures for relevant receptors was estimated through comparison with oral and inhalation reference levels (levels below which adverse effects would be very unlikely to occur). The oral reference dose of 0.003 mg/kg-d was used for evaluating risks from ingestion of soluble uranium compounds; the EPA derived this value on the basis of a lowest-observed-adverse-effect level in rabbits of 3 mg/kg-d of uranyl nitrate hexahydrate, combined with an uncertainty factor of 1,000 (Maynard and Hodge 1949; EPA 2003a). Because of conflicting results concerning absorption of insoluble uranium compounds such as U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> from the gastrointestinal tract, the oral reference dose of 0.003 mg/kg-d was also used in this analysis for calculating hazard quotients for this compound. This assumption is conservative because the gastrointestinal tract would absorb a smaller amount of insoluble than soluble uranium compounds.

Inhalation reference concentrations for uranium compounds and HF are not currently available from standard EPA sources. To assess potential risks from inhalation of these compounds, derived reference levels were developed from proposed Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) permissible exposure limits (PELs) (29 CFR Part 1910.1000, Subpart Z, as of February 2003). The 8-hour time-weighted-average PEL for soluble uranium compounds is 0.05 mg/m<sup>3</sup>; for insoluble uranium compounds, it is 0.25 mg/m<sup>3</sup>; and for HF, it is 3 ppm (2.5 mg/m<sup>3</sup>). These values were converted to assumed inhalation reference level values for noninvolved workers in mg/kg-d by assuming an inhalation rate of 20 m<sup>3</sup>/d and a body weight of 70 kg (154 lb), resulting in derived worker inhalation reference level values of 0.014 and 0.71 mg/kg-d for soluble uranium compounds and HF, respectively.

The inhalation reference level calculated for soluble compounds was also used for insoluble uranium compounds. To generate derived inhalation reference level values for the general public, these worker values were adjusted to account for increased exposure duration of the general public (assumed to be 168 hours per week rather than 40 hours per week); an additional uncertainty factor of 10 was used to account for sensitive subpopulations in the general public. This results in derived inhalation reference levels for the general public of 0.0003 and 0.02 mg/kg-d for uranium compounds and HF, respectively.

The reference levels used for preliminary evaluation of general public hazard quotients and carcinogenic risks from the existing environment were obtained from the EPA's Integrated Risk Information System (IRIS) when available (EPA 2003a). The derived reference concentration levels for uranium compounds and HF discussed above were used as reference levels for evaluating inhalation of these substances.

### **F.1.2.3 Exposure Pathways and Parameters**

As described in Section F.1.1 (radiological impacts for normal facility operations), the chemical exposures for the noninvolved worker and general public MEIs would result mainly from airborne releases from the conversion facility. The maximum downwind air concentrations of uranium compounds and HF emitted from the conversion facility were calculated. These maximum downwind concentrations would be the same for the three alternative locations at Paducah, although the exact location of the maximum level would be different. The maximum concentrations were used to estimate maximum exposures for both the noninvolved worker MEI and the general public MEI, although the maximum concentration location could be either within or outside the gaseous diffusion plant boundaries, depending on the location of the conversion facility. This simplified approach to the analysis of potential chemical impacts is justified because the exposures and hazard indices calculated on the basis of these maximum possible exposures are very low. In other words, the identification of very small differences in hazard indices for the MEI receptors for the three alternative locations at the site would not be helpful in differentiating chemical exposure impacts for the locations, because all the exposures would be very small and would not result in adverse effects (see the results in Chapter 5 of this EIS).

Differences in estimated exposures and hazard indices for the noninvolved worker MEI and the general public MEI result from differences in assumed exposure times (e.g., the general public MEI is assumed to be a resident exposed continually, whereas the noninvolved worker MEI would be exposed for only 8 hours per day) and from differences in reference doses for workers and the general public.

For the MEI receptors, it was also assumed that exposure could occur through incidental soil ingestion. Similar to the approach used to assess inhalation exposures, it was assumed that both the noninvolved worker MEI and the general public MEI could be exposed to the maximum estimated soil concentration of contaminants associated with conversion plant emissions, whether that location was inside or outside the gaseous diffusion plant boundaries. No waterborne release of uranium is expected from construction and operation of the conversion facility (UDS 2003b); therefore, potential impacts resulting from use of contaminated water were

not estimated. For the no action alternative analyses, potential chemical exposures from runoff water contaminated through cylinder breaches were calculated by using the estimated surface or groundwater concentrations obtained through water quality analyses.

#### **F.1.2.4 Exposure Modeling and Risk Evaluation**

Media-specific concentrations of contaminants associated with the normal operation of the facility for the various options were modeled on the basis of effluent data provided in the NEPA data report (UDS 2003b). For airborne pathways, these effluent amounts were modeled by using either the CAP88-PC computer code (see Section F.1.1) or the Industrial Source Complex (ISC) computer code (see Section F.4.1).

Modeled concentrations of contaminants in the various environmental media were used to estimate average daily intakes for the various receptors examined. The ratios of the daily intakes to appropriate reference levels were calculated to generate hazard quotients. Hazard quotients were summed for individual contaminants and across all appropriate exposure routes (e.g., inhalation, soil ingestion) to generate hazard indices for the noninvolved worker MEI and the general public MEI. These hazard indices were compared with the reference hazard index of 1. A hazard index of less than 1 is interpreted to indicate that adverse noncancer effects are unlikely; a hazard index of greater than 1 indicates that adverse effects are possible for the MEI and that further investigation of potential exposures and additivity of individual contaminant toxicity are warranted.

When no adverse effects are expected for the MEI of a given population (i.e., the hazard index is less than 1), then, by definition, no adverse effects are expected in that population. Therefore, calculation of population risks is not applicable when MEI hazard indices are less than 1.

## **F.2 HUMAN HEALTH AND SAFETY — FACILITY ACCIDENTS**

### **F.2.1 Radiological Impacts**

The DUF<sub>6</sub> PEIS (DOE 1999) discussed in detail the analysis of facility accidents that potentially could cause radiological health impacts (PEIS Sections 4.3.2 and A.4.2). Specifically, it addressed the consequences, frequencies, and risks from the accident scenarios postulated to occur at a conversion facility as well as at the current cylinder storage locations. The analysis involved the application of the following three radiological and air dispersion software packages: GENII (Napier et al. 1988), HGSYSTEM (Hanna et al. 1994; Post et al. 1994a,b) and FIREPLUME (Brown et al. 1997).

In the DUF<sub>6</sub> PEIS (DOE 1999), the accident analyses assumed that the accident would occur in the center of the storage yard site (i.e., Paducah). For collective exposures, radiation doses were assessed for the population within a distance of 50 mi (80 km) from the release point.

Because the distance between the possible facility locations and the center point of the sites is much smaller than the assessment distance of 50 mi (80 km), the location of the conversion facility would have very little impact on the off-site collective exposures. Individual and population impacts were estimated for the public and noninvolved workers. Impacts to involved workers during accidents were not quantified because it was recognized that, depending on the accident conditions and the exact location and response of the workers, the involved workers would also be subject to severe physical and thermal (fire) hazards and that the impacts from such hazards might be greater than the impacts from radiological or chemical exposure. Therefore, injuries and fatalities among involved workers would be possible from chemical, radiological, and physical forces if an accident did occur.

Since the population distribution estimate would not vary significantly with the specific location of the conversion facility, the methodology used to analyze the collective public dose in the PEIS also would apply for this EIS analysis. Similarly, the assumptions made in the PEIS for estimating the MEI doses were kept the same. For ground-level releases, the MEI was assumed to be located at a distance of 328 ft (100 m) from the release point. For releases from a stack, the MEI was assumed to be at the point of maximum ground concentration. Current on-site and off-site population distributions were used to estimate the collective noninvolved worker and off-site public impact.

Since trace transuranic (TRU) elements were identified in the DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinder inventory after the PEIS analysis was performed, their contribution to additional radiological impact was considered in the analysis for this EIS. A conservative concentration was assumed for the accidents, since the TRU elements are not distributed evenly through the DUF<sub>6</sub> inventory. Comparisons of the relative hazards from this TRU concentration with the hazards from DUF<sub>6</sub> considered in the DUF<sub>6</sub> PEIS were used to determine their radiological impact in the accident analyses conducted for this EIS. Appendix B contains a discussion of the methodology used to assess the impacts associated with the presence of trace TRU contamination in cylinders.

### **F.2.2 Chemical Impacts**

General data used in the accident predictions included the following:

- Release amount (source term) for each chemical released,
- Chemical-specific health impact levels,
- Number of workers on site and population off site by direction, and
- Locations of sources and receptors for both workers and members of the general public.

Two meteorological conditions, D stability with a 4-m/s (9-mph) wind speed and F stability with a 1-m/s (2-miles-per-hour [mph]) wind speed, were assumed for all scenarios except the tornado accident scenario, which assumed D stability and 20-m/s (45-mph) wind.

The same approach used for the DUF<sub>6</sub> PEIS was adopted in this EIS for the chemical facility accident analysis under the no action alternative and the action alternatives. Accident consequences were estimated by using the HGSYSTEM (Version 3) model for the nonfire scenarios and the FIREPLUME model for the fire scenarios. For each scenario and each of the two meteorological conditions, hazard zones were generated for two health indices (i.e., adverse effects and irreversible adverse effects). These zones were overlain on worker and general public geographic information system (GIS) layers, with the zone origin located at the centroid of each of the identified conversion plant site alternatives (Locations A, B, and C; see Figure 2.2-3). Updated data on current Paducah GDP workers (2002) and updated general population data (based on the 2000 census) were used to estimate the consequences and associated risk of each accident scenario. The dispersion conditions (i.e., meteorology, accident frequencies, and, for most scenarios, release quantities or source terms) were identical to those developed and used in the DUF<sub>6</sub> PEIS. For the estimated chemical accident risks for the proposed conversion facility, variations in this EIS from values reported in the DUF<sub>6</sub> PEIS are attributable to variations in the candidate locations for the conversion facility, changes in the numbers and locations of workers and the general public, and some changes in the source term values.

Of the nearly eight dozen postulated chemical accidents considered and evaluated in this EIS, a total of eight bounding chemical accidents were identified for detailed risk analysis. These accidents are listed in Table 5.2-8.

#### **F.2.2.1 Nonfire Accident Scenario Modeling**

The nonfire accident scenarios were treated as either liquid spills on the ground followed by evaporation and/or pressurized releases from tanks. The DUF<sub>6</sub> PEIS assumed the same temperature for both day and night spill conditions. This analysis differs in that it accounts for evaporation rate reduction not only due to the assumed very conservative (from an air dispersion perspective) low wind speed and F-stability condition combination but also due to what would be typically lower ambient air temperatures during these conditions. The evaporation rate from spilled chemical pools depends on pool temperature and saturation vapor pressure. The pool temperature was conservatively assumed to be constant for the entire release duration and was set equal to the assumed ambient temperature. The saturation vapor pressure was set equal to the partial pressure over the pool. The saturation vapor pressure or the partial pressures of the vapors emanating from the pool depend on the pool temperature. For the aqueous HF spill scenarios, the partial vapor pressures were determined for two temperatures, 77°F (25°C for the F-1 conditions, representative of nighttime conditions during July or August) and 95°F (35°C for D-4 conditions, representative of daytime conditions during July or August). For a 70% HF solution, the partial vapor pressure over the pool is 20 kPa ( $T_p = 77^\circ\text{F}$  [25°C]) and 31.7 kPa ( $T_p = 95^\circ\text{F}$  [35°C]), determined empirically. Table F-1 gives the spill assumptions and the source term for the bounding aqueous HF spill scenario.

**TABLE F-1 Bounding Aqueous (70%) HF Spill Source Term**

Berm Area (m <sup>2</sup> )	Evaporative Spill Duration <sup>a</sup> (h)	Evaporation Rate (kg/s)		Spill Amount (kg)	
		F-1	D-4	F-1	D-4
412	2	0.13	0.58	933	4,211

<sup>a</sup> Unmitigated.

The evaporative emissions were estimated by using a simplified evaporative model (EPA 1999). The model uses the molecular diffusion of water and the kinematic viscosity of air to calculate the mass transfer coefficient. A less conservative estimate of the evaporative release rate would be expected if chemical-specific molecular diffusivities and kinematic viscosities were used. Because of the change in quantity and chemical composition of the spill, the spill hazard zone changed in this assessment. A scaling procedure was adopted to recalculate the hazard zone, as detailed below.

For a ground-level release, the simplified Gaussian expression for estimating downwind concentrations can be rearranged to solve for the product of horizontal and vertical plume spread. This expression is shown below:

$$\sigma_y \sigma_z = \frac{Q \text{ (mg/s)}}{\pi u \text{ (m/s)} \chi_{LOC} \text{ (mg/m}^3\text{)}} \quad (\text{F.1})$$

The level of concern,  $\chi_{LOC}$ , is set to the HF Emergency Response Planning Guideline (ERPG)-1 and ERPG-2 levels. With the source term and wind speeds already known, the respective LOC  $\sigma_y \sigma_z$  products can be calculated. The hazard distance can then be obtained from the already tabulated sigma products (Turner 1994, Table 2-5). The next step in identifying the hazard area or zone is to estimate the hazard width for each contour. This is done by estimating the approximate contour width at the midpoint or half the hazard distance. With these distances, the respective sigma product and  $\sigma_y$  values in Table F-1 can be used in Equation F.1 to solve for the midpoint centerline concentration. The hazard width can then be estimated by using the following expression:

$$HW = \sigma_y @ 0.5 HD \{2 \ln[\chi(x,0,0)/\chi_{LOC}]\}^2 \quad (\text{F.2})$$

By using the same procedure described above, hazard zone dimensions can also be estimated for the HF tank release analyzed for the PEIS. The new hazard distances and hazard widths can then be calculated by multiplying the original model-derived values by the ratios of the new to old values calculated by using the above method.

### F.2.2.2 Fire Accident Scenario Modeling

In the fire accident scenarios, the release quantities were presented as a function of time for the three phases of the release: puff, fire release, and cooldown. The 48G cylinder fire and vapor temperatures, as reported in Brown et. al. (1997), were used in the FIREPLUME simulations to estimate buoyant and smoldering plume rise and the resulting downwind concentration contours.

### F.2.2.3 Pressurized Release Accident Scenario Modeling

The anhydrous ammonia (NH<sub>3</sub>) rupture scenario was treated as a pressurized release tank rupture. Some of the key release parameters used for the scenario are listed in Table F-2 (Vincent 2003).

The pressurized release was modeled with the HGSYSTEM AEROPLUME source module and the HGSYSTEM HEGADAS dispersion module (Hanna et al. 1994; Post et al. 1994a,b), which handled the subsequent dispersion and transport of the dense liquid-vapor aerosol mixture emanating from the tank rupture. AEROPLUME is a multicomponent two-phase thermodynamic aerosol jet model that simulates steady-state release rates from a rupture or a leaking pressurized vessel and the near-field vapor cloud development of the flashed vapor and aerosol components in expelled jet release. Upon formation of the flow field from the release point and establishment of a heavy aerosol-laden cloud, the release is linked to the HEGADAS model to simulate dense vapor cloud dispersion and entrainment of ambient air as the cloud moves and disperses downwind.

### F.2.2.4 Health Impact Levels

Assessing the consequences from accidental releases of chemicals differs from assessing routine chemical exposures, primarily because the reference doses used to generate hazard indices for long-term, low-level exposures were not intended for use in evaluating the short-term (e.g., duration of several hours or less), higher-level exposures that often accompany accidents. In addition, the analysis of accidental releases often requires the evaluation of different effects: for example, irritant gases can cause tissue damage at the higher levels associated with accidental releases but are not generally associated with adverse effects from chronic, low-level exposures.

**TABLE F-2 Anhydrous NH<sub>3</sub> Tank Rupture Spill Parameters**

Tank Size (gal)	Fill Level (%)	Tank Fill Amt. (gal)	Release Amt. (lb)	Tank Pressure (psig) <sup>a</sup>	Relief Valve (psig)	Berm area (ft <sup>2</sup> )
6,565	85%	5,580	29,500	209	265	324

<sup>a</sup> psig = pound(s) per square inch gauge.

To estimate the consequences of chemical accidents, two potential health effects endpoints were evaluated: (1) adverse effects and (2) irreversible adverse effects. Evaluation of these two health endpoints was consistent with the accident evaluations typically conducted to assess industrial risks (American Industrial Hygiene Association [AIHA] 2002). Potential adverse effects range from mild and transient effects — such as respiratory irritation, redness of the eyes, and skin rash — to more serious and potentially irreversible effects. Potential irreversible adverse effects are defined as effects that generally occur at higher concentrations and are permanent in nature — including death, impaired organ function (such as damaged central nervous system or lungs), and other effects that may impair everyday functions.

For uranium compounds, an intake of 10 mg or more was assumed to cause potential adverse effects (McGuire 1991). An intake of 30 mg of uranium was used as the health criterion for potential irreversible adverse effects for exposure to uranium as either U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> or as UO<sub>2</sub>F<sub>2</sub>. The background document for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulations for the Certification of Gaseous Diffusion Plants (10 CFR Part 76) states that “in assessing the adequacy of protection of the public health and safety from potential accidents, the NRC will consider whether the potential consequences of a reasonable spectrum of postulated accident scenarios exceed 0.25 Sv (25 rem), or uranium intakes of 30 mg, taking into account the uncertainties associated with modeling and estimating such consequences” (NRC 1994). According to these regulations, the selection of the 30-mg uranium intake level as an evaluation guideline level for irreversible injury was based on information provided in Fisher et al. (1994).

In applying the 30-mg uranium intake to accident analysis for the uranium compounds, the following parameters were accounted for: molecular weight, solubility, inhalation rate, and duration of predicted exposure. On the basis of an inhalation rate of 1.5 m<sup>3</sup>/h as the ventilation rate during light exercise (ICRP 1994), and on appropriate adjustments to account for the percent uranium in each compound, air concentrations corresponding to an intake level of 30 mg were calculated for modeled exposure durations. For example, the air concentration of 26 mg/m<sup>3</sup> of uranyl fluoride (UO<sub>2</sub>F<sub>2</sub>) corresponding to a 30-mg uranium intake for a 60-minute exposure to UO<sub>2</sub>F<sub>2</sub> would be calculated as follows:

$$\frac{30 \text{ mg uranium} \times 308/238 \text{ (molecular weight UO}_2\text{F}_2\text{/molecular weight uranium)}}{1.5 \text{ m}^3\text{/h} \times \text{modeled exposure duration (h)}} \quad (\text{F.3})$$

In addition, for the insoluble uranium compounds, an uptake factor was incorporated into the calculated air concentrations, on the basis of ICRP guidance that 0.2% absorption be assumed for inhalation of less soluble uranium compounds that have biological half-lives of years (i.e., triuranium octaoxide or U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub>), as compared with 5% absorption for soluble and slightly soluble compounds such as UO<sub>2</sub>F<sub>2</sub> (ICRP 1979).

For HF and NH<sub>3</sub>, potential adverse effect levels were assumed to occur at levels that correspond to ERPG-1 levels, and potential irreversible adverse effects levels were assumed to occur at levels that correspond to ERPG-2 levels. ERPG 1 levels are defined as “the maximum airborne concentration below which it is believed nearly all individuals could be exposed for up to 1 hour without experiencing or developing any but mild transient adverse health effects or

perceiving a clearly defined objectionable odor” (AIHA 2002). ERPG 2 levels are defined as “the maximum airborne concentration below which it is believed nearly all individuals could be exposed for up to 1 hour without experiencing or developing irreversible or other serious health effects or symptoms that could impair their abilities to take protective action” (AIHA 2002). The ERPG values were generated by toxicologist teams who review all published (as well as some unpublished) data for a given chemical (AIHA 2002). The levels used in this assessment were as follows: ERPG-1 values of 2 ppm for HF and 25 ppm for NH<sub>3</sub> for adverse effects, and ERPG-2 values of 20 ppm for HF and 150 ppm for NH<sub>3</sub> for irreversible adverse effects (AIHA 2002).

The chemicals evaluated exhibit irritant characteristics; the toxicity of these substances is generally not linearly proportional to the intake amount. For example, the toxic effect of exposure to 32 mg/m<sup>3</sup> HF for 30 minutes would actually be greater than the toxic effect of exposure to 16 mg/m<sup>3</sup> HF for 60 minutes, because the irritant action of the HF is greater at higher air concentrations. Data on the appropriate adjustments of HF concentrations for evaluation of shorter exposure times are presented and discussed in various documents dealing with the toxicity of UF<sub>6</sub> (Fisher et al. 1994; McGuire 1991). On the basis of these data, for modeled exposure durations of between 5 and 60 minutes, the air concentrations of HF and NH<sub>3</sub> corresponding to the ERPG-2 value were calculated from:

$$C = C_{\text{ERPG-2}}(60/t)^{0.5}, \quad (\text{F.4})$$

where:

$C$  = adjusted exposure guideline value and

$t$  = modeled exposure duration (min).

It was conservatively assumed that the 5-minute adjusted exposure guideline value would be applied even for modeled exposure durations of less than 5 minutes.

It should be noted that human responses do not occur at precise exposure levels but can extend over a wide range of concentrations. The values used as guidelines for potential adverse effects and potential irreversible adverse effects in this EIS should not be expected to protect everyone but should be applicable to most individuals in the general population. In all populations, there are hypersensitive individuals who will show adverse responses at exposure concentrations far below levels at which most individuals would normally respond (AIHA 2002). Alternatively, some individuals will show no adverse response even at exposure concentrations somewhat higher than the guideline levels.

#### **F.2.2.5 Estimation of Population Impacted**

Demographic data for the on-site worker population were compiled into a GIS layer by using building footprint polygons and records of the number of workers in the buildings. For the off-site population, 2000 U.S. Census Bureau TIGER (Topologically Integrated Geographic Encoding and Referencing) block group data were obtained. In each layer, population density

was calculated for each building or block group by dividing the population for a polygon by the area of the polygon. The site boundary polygon was added to the off-site population layer, and the population inside the boundary was set to zero.

To estimate the population affected by a specific accident, its plume was loaded into the GIS as a polygon, moved to an origin location, and intersected with one of the population layers (either noninvolved worker or general public). The intersection process combined the plume polygon with the population data, thereby subdividing the polygons where the boundaries crossed and discarding portions of polygons falling outside the plume footprint. Next, the areas of the subdivided polygons were recalculated and multiplied by the population density to obtain a population total for each. These values were summed to obtain an estimate of the total population within the plume footprint. An assumption of this approach was that the population was uniformly distributed within each building or block group.

For each accident, the impacts on noninvolved workers and the general population were estimated. No quantitative predictions of impacts were made for involved workers. Noninvolved workers and members of the general public were considered to be at risk for a given health endpoint if they were located within the plume contour (based on ERPG level or uranium intake level) for the wind direction that would lead to the largest population count. Individuals were assumed to be in the locations where they work or live and, for conservatism, the protection provided by the building structure was not included. This computation involved the overlay of the plume contour from the source point at Location A, B, or C and the rotation of the plume 30 to 100 times to identify the direction with the highest number of workers or general population. Those counts were reported in the impact evaluation. In most cases, the direction leading to the maximum worker count did not match the direction for the maximum general population count. The adverse effects and irreversible adverse effects contours were predicted for each accident, with the adverse effects contour being the larger of the two. For UF<sub>6</sub> releases, both the UO<sub>2</sub>F<sub>2</sub> contour and the HF contour were predicted for both adverse effects and irreversible adverse effects levels; in general, the HF contours were larger than the uranium contours and led to larger population risks.

The MEI worker was assumed to be located 328 ft (100 m) from the accident location. The MEI for the general population was assumed to be located at the nearest fence line position, although there are currently no residences at these locations at the three current storage sites. Impacts for MEIs are presented as “yes” or “no” in Chapter 5 of this EIS, depending on whether air concentrations of chemicals greater than or equal to corresponding adverse effects and irreversible adverse effects were modeled at the MEI locations.

### **F.2.3 Accident Frequencies**

The expected frequency of an accident is an estimate of the chance that it might occur during operations. Frequencies range from 0.0 (no chance of occurring) to 1.0 (certain to occur). If an accident is expected to happen once every 50 years, the frequency of occurrence is 0.02 per year: 1 occurrence every 50 years =  $1 \div 50 = 0.02$  occurrence per year. A frequency estimate can

be converted to a probability statement. If the frequency of an accident is 0.02 per year, the probability of the accident occurring sometime during a 10-year program is 0.2 (10 years × 0.02 occurrence per year).

The accidents evaluated in this EIS were anticipated to occur over a wide range of frequencies, from once every few years to less than once in 1 million years. In general, the more unlikely it would be for an accident to occur (the lower its probability), the greater the expected consequences. Accidents were evaluated for four frequency categories: likely, unlikely, extremely unlikely, and incredible (see text box). To interpret the importance of a predicted accident, the analysis considered the estimated frequency of occurrence of that accident. Although the predicted consequences of an incredible accident might be high, the lower consequences of a likely accident (i.e., one much more likely to occur) might be considered more important.

#### Accident Categories and Frequency Ranges

**Likely (L):** Accidents estimated to occur once or more in 100 years of facility operations (frequency of  $\geq 1 \times 10^{-3}/\text{yr}$ ).

**Unlikely (U):** Accidents estimated to occur between once in 100 years and once in 10,000 years of facility operations (frequency from  $1 \times 10^{-2}/\text{yr}$  to  $1 \times 10^{-4}/\text{yr}$ ).

**Extremely Unlikely (EU):** Accidents estimated to occur between once in 10,000 years and once in 1 million years of facility operations (frequency from  $1 \times 10^{-4}/\text{yr}$  to  $1 \times 10^{-6}/\text{yr}$ ).

**Incredible (I):** Accidents estimated to occur less than one time in 1 million years of facility operations (frequency of  $< 1 \times 10^{-6}/\text{yr}$ ).

### F.2.4 Accident Risk

The term “accident risk” refers to a quantity that considers both the severity of an accident (consequence) and the probability that the accident will occur. Accident risk is calculated by multiplying the consequence of an accident by the accident probability. For example, if a facility accident has an estimated frequency of occurrence of once in 100 years (0.01 per year) and if the accident occurred with an estimated consequence of 10 people suffering from irreversible health effects (IHEs), then the annual risk of the accident would be reported as 0.1 IHE per year ( $0.01 \text{ per year} \times 10 \text{ IHEs}$ ). If the facility was operated for a period of 20 years, the accident risk over the operational phase of the facility would be 2 IHEs ( $20 \text{ years} \times 0.1 \text{ IHE per year}$ ).

This definition of accident risk was used to compare accidents that have different frequencies and consequences. Certain high-frequency accidents that have relatively low consequences might pose a larger overall risk than low-frequency accidents that have potentially high consequences. In calculations of accident risk, the consequences have been expressed in terms of IHEs and adverse health effects for chemical releases and in terms of expected LCFs for radiological releases.

### F.2.5 Physical Hazard Accidents

Physical hazards, unrelated to radiation or chemical exposures, were assessed for each alternative by estimating the number of on-the-job fatalities and injuries that could occur to

workers. The expected numbers of worker fatalities and injuries associated with each option were calculated on the basis of statistics available from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), as reported by the National Safety Council (2002), and on estimates of total worker hours required for construction and operational activities.

Construction and manufacturing annual fatality and injury rates were used for the construction and operational phases of each option, which were computed separately because these activities have different incidence statistics. The injury incidence rates were for injuries involving lost workdays, including days away from work and/or days of restricted work activity. The specific rates used in calculations for each option were as follows: fatalities during construction, 13.3 per 100,000 workers; fatalities during operations, 3.3 per 100,000 workers; injuries during construction, 4.1 per 100 full-time workers; injuries during operations, 4.5 per 100 full-time workers (National Safety Council 2002).

Fatality and injury risks were calculated as the product of the appropriate incidence rate (given above), the number of years for construction and operations, and the number of FTEs for construction and operations. The available fatality and injury statistics by industry are not refined enough to warrant an analysis of involved and noninvolved workers as separate classes.

The calculation of risks of fatality and injury from industrial accidents was based solely on historical industrywide statistics and therefore did not consider a threshold (i.e., any activity that would result in some estimated risk of fatality and injury). All DUF<sub>6</sub> activities would be implemented in accordance with DOE or industry best management practices, thereby reducing the risk of fatalities and injuries.

### **F.3 HUMAN HEALTH AND SAFETY — TRANSPORTATION**

The methodology and assumptions used in this transportation risk assessment were based on two previous analyses conducted for the transportation of depleted uranium compounds (DOE 1999; Biwer et al. 2001). The approach is described below.

#### **F.3.1 Scope of the Analysis**

The transportation risk assessment involved estimating the potential human health risks to both crew members (i.e., truck drivers and rail crew) and members of the public during transportation of various forms of depleted uranium and other materials. Impacts that could arise from the radioactive or chemical nature of the cargo and also from the nature of transportation itself, independent of the cargo, were addressed. Transportation risks were evaluated for all of the materials that could potentially be transported for each alternative, including UF<sub>6</sub> cylinders, uranium conversion products, HF and other chemicals, and process waste. A summary of the materials transported is provided in Table F-3. Transportation impacts were estimated for shipment by both truck and rail modes for most materials. The impacts were assessed on a route-specific basis, but unit risks per kilometer were developed for shipments of the conversion

**TABLE F-3 Potential Shipments of Material Analyzed for the DUF<sub>6</sub> Conversion EIS<sup>a</sup>**

Material	Origin	Destination
Depleted U <sub>3</sub> O <sub>8</sub>	Paducah	Envirocare, NTS
LLW, empty cylinders	Paducah	Envirocare, NTS
CaF <sub>2</sub>	Paducah	Envirocare, NTS
HF	Paducah	User facility
Non-DUF <sub>6</sub> cylinders	ETTP	Paducah
DUF <sub>6</sub> cylinders	ETTP	Paducah

<sup>a</sup> CaF<sub>2</sub> = calcium fluoride, ETTP = East Tennessee Technology Park, LLW = low-level radioactive waste, NTS = Nevada Test Site.

products for use because the locations of user facilities are not yet known. In the latter case, the unit risk factors were used to estimate transportation impacts for sample distances of 250, 1,000, and 5,000 km (260, 620, and 3,100 mi); average route characteristics were assumed. In the case of depleted uranium conversion products, impacts from shipment to two alternate disposal sites were also estimated.

The transportation-related risks to human health were assessed from both vehicle- and cargo-related causes. Cargo-related risks arising from both the radiological and chemical hazards of the depleted uranium shipments were assessed when appropriate.

With regard to the radioactive nature of depleted uranium, the cargo-related impacts on human health during transportation would be caused by exposure to ionizing radiation. Exposures to radiation could occur during both routine (i.e., incident-free) transportation and during accidents. During routine operations, the external radiation field in the vicinity of a shipment must be below limits specified in federal regulations. During transportation-related accidents, human exposures may occur following the release and dispersal of radioactive materials via multiple environmental pathways, such as exposure to contaminated ground or contaminated air or ingestion of contaminated food.

In contrast, the chemical nature of depleted uranium and other hazardous chemicals does not pose cargo-related risks to humans during routine transportation-related operations. Transportation operations are generally well regulated with respect to packaging, such that small spills or seepages during routine transport are kept to a minimum and do not result in exposures. Potential cargo-related health risks to humans can occur only if the integrity of a container is compromised during an accident (i.e., if a container is breached). Under such conditions, some chemicals may cause an immediate health threat to exposed individuals, primarily through inhalation exposure.

Vehicle-related risks result from the nature of transportation itself, independent of the radioactive and chemical characteristics of the cargo. For example, increased levels of pollution from vehicular exhaust and fugitive dust emissions may affect human health. Similarly, accidents during transportation may cause injuries and fatalities from physical trauma.

Vehicle-related health impacts and health impacts from the radioactive and chemical nature of the depleted uranium are presented separately in the tables of this EIS. No attempt has been made (even in cases where both radioactive and chemical characteristics must be considered) to sum the estimated radioactive, chemical, and vehicle-related risks. To understand and interpret the estimated health impacts presented in this report, readers must keep in mind the fundamental differences between the radioactive, chemical, and vehicle-related hazards discussed below.

The technical approach for estimating transportation risks uses several computer models and databases. Transportation risks were assessed for both routine and accident conditions. For the routine assessment, risks were calculated for the collective populations of all potentially exposed individuals, as well as for a small set of MEI receptors. The accident assessment consisted of two components: (1) an accident risk assessment, which considered the probabilities and consequences of a range of possible transportation-related accidents, including low-probability accidents that have high consequences and high-probability accidents that have low consequences, and (2) an accident consequence assessment, which considered only the radiological consequences of low-probability accidents that were postulated to result in the largest releases of radioactive material. The release fractions used in the accident risk assessment were based on the data in NUREG-0170 (NRC 1977) and independent engineering analyses.

### **F.3.2 Radiological Impacts**

All radiological impacts are calculated in terms of dose and associated health effects in the exposed populations. The radiation dose calculated is the total effective dose equivalent as specified in 10 CFR Part 20, which is the sum of the deep dose equivalent from exposure to external radiation and the 50-year committed effective dose equivalent (ICRP 1977) from exposure to internal radiation. Doses of radiation are calculated in units of rem for individuals and in units of person-rem for collective populations.

The potential exposures to the general population from transportation of radioactive materials, whether during routine operations or from postulated accidents, are usually at a low dose, such that the primary adverse health effect is the potential induction of latent cancers (i.e., cancers that occur after a latency period of several years from the time of exposure). The correlation of radiation dose and human health effects for low doses has been traditionally based on what is termed the “linear/no-threshold hypothesis,” which has been described by various international authorities on protection against radiation. This hypothesis implies, in part, that even small doses of radiation cause some risk of inducing cancer and that doubling the radiation dose would mean doubling the expected number of cancers. The data on the health risk from radiation have been derived primarily from human epidemiological studies of past exposures, such as Japanese survivors of the atomic bomb in World War II and persons exposed during

medical applications. The types of cancer induced by radiation are similar to “naturally occurring” cancers and can be expressed later in the lifetimes of the exposed individuals.

On the basis of the analyses conducted for this report, transportation-related operations are not expected to cause acute (short-term) radiation-induced fatalities or to produce immediately observable effects in exposed individuals. Acute radiation-induced fatalities occur at doses well in excess of 100 rem (ICRP 1991), which generally would not occur for a wide range of transportation activities, including routine operations and accidents.<sup>1</sup> For all severe accident scenarios analyzed, other short-term effects, such as temporary sterility and changes in blood chemistry, are not expected.

In this EIS, the radiological impacts are expressed as health risks in terms of the number of estimated LCFs for each alternative. The health risk conversion factors (expected LCFs per dose absorbed) were taken from ICRP Publication 60 (ICRP 1991). The health risk conversion factors used were  $5 \times 10^{-4}$  LCF per person-rem for members of the general public and  $4 \times 10^{-4}$  LCF per person-rem for occupational workers.

The RADTRAN 4 computer code (Neuhauser and Kanipe 1992) was used for the routine and accident cargo-related risk assessments to estimate the radiological impacts to collective populations. As a complement to the RADTRAN calculations, the RISKIND computer code (Yuan et al. 1995) was used to estimate scenario-specific radiological doses to MEIs during both routine operations and accidents and to estimate population impacts for the accident consequence assessment.

### F.3.3 Chemical Impacts

In contrast to radioactive hazards, chemical hazards do not pose cargo-related risks to humans during routine transportation-related operations. Transportation operations are generally well regulated with respect to packaging, such that small spills or seepages during routine transport are kept to a minimum and do not result in exposures. With respect to chemical hazards, the cargo-related impacts to human health during transportation would be caused by exposure occurring as a result of container failure and chemical release during an accident (i.e., a collision with another vehicle or road obstacle). Therefore, chemical risks (i.e., risks that result from the toxicology of the chemical composition of the material transported) are assessed for cargo-related transportation accidents. The chemical risk from transportation-related accidents lies in the potential release, transport, and dispersion of chemicals into the environment and the subsequent exposure of people primarily through inhalation exposure.

An accidental release of UF<sub>6</sub> to the atmosphere would result in the formation of UO<sub>2</sub>F<sub>2</sub> and HF from the reaction of UF<sub>6</sub> with moisture in the atmosphere. Both compounds are highly water soluble and toxic to humans.

---

<sup>1</sup> In general, individual acute whole-body doses in the range of 300 to 500 rem are expected to cause fatality in 50% of the exposed individuals within 30 to 60 days (ICRP 1991).

The risks from exposure to hazardous chemicals during transportation-related accidents could be either acute (immediate impact) or latent (result in cancer that would present itself after a latency period of several years). The severity of the immediate health effects would depend strongly on the toxicity and exposure concentration of the specific chemical(s) released. The severity of the immediate (i.e., acute) health effects could range from slight irritation to fatality for the exposed individuals. Neither the uranium compounds nor HF are carcinogens or suspected carcinogens. Therefore, latent cancer incidences and fatalities from chemical exposure are not expected and not assessed in this report for potential accidents.

In this assessment, the endpoint for acute health effects that was assessed is the potential for irreversible adverse health effects (from permanent organ damage or the impairment of everyday functions up to and including lethality). A nonlinear or threshold correlation between the exposure concentration and the toxicity was assumed for the evaluation of this acute effect; that is, it was assumed that some low level of exposure could be tolerated without affecting health. In many cases, data on human toxicity that relate acute health effects to chemical exposures did not exist. When data on toxicity in humans were not available, chemical risk estimators were derived from levels that are toxic to laboratory animals. The use of animal data to predict toxic concentrations in humans added uncertainty to the risk estimates.

In addition to understanding the results in terms of the health endpoint described above, it is of interest to understand how it relates to potential fatalities. Exposure to HF or uranium compounds is estimated to be fatal to approximately 1% or less of those persons experiencing irreversible adverse effects (Policastro et al. 1997).

The chemical transportation accident risk assessment was performed by using the HGSYSTEM and FIREPLUME models (Brown et al. 1997) for uranium compounds (DUF<sub>6</sub>, U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub>, and cylinder heels) and the Chemical Accident Stochastic Risk Assessment Model (CASRAM) (Brown et al. 1996, 2000) for HF. Chemical accident consequences were assessed by using HGSYSTEM/FIREPLUME for uranium compounds and HGSYSTEM for HF.

### **F.3.4 Vehicle-Related Impacts**

In addition to the cargo-related risks posed by transportation-related activities, vehicle-related risks were also assessed for the same routes. These risks, which are independent of the radioactive nature of the cargo, would be incurred for similar shipments of any commodity. The vehicle-related risks were assessed for both routine conditions and accidents.

Vehicle-related risks during routine transportation are incremental risks caused by potential exposure to airborne particulate matter from fugitive dust and vehicular exhaust emissions. These risks are based on epidemiological data that associate mortality rates with ambient air particulate concentrations. A discussion of the basis for the emissions risk factors and the uncertainty associated with them is provided in Section F.3.5.3.

The vehicle-related accident risk refers to the potential for transportation-related accidents that could result in fatalities due to physical trauma that are not related to the cargo in

the shipment. State average rates for transportation-related fatalities were used in the assessment. Vehicle-related risks are presented here in terms of estimated fatalities for the truck and rail options considered.

### **F.3.5 Routine Risk Assessment Method**

The RADTRAN 4 computer code (Neuhauser and Kanipe 1992) was used for the routine risk assessments to estimate the radiological impacts to collective populations. The RISKIND computer code (Yuan et al. 1995) was used to estimate scenario-specific doses to MEIs during routine operations. Routine risks from hazardous chemical shipments are not expected. It is assumed that the shipping packages would not leak during routine transportation operations.

#### **F.3.5.1 Collective Population Risk**

The radiological risk associated with routine transportation results from the potential exposure of people to low-level external radiation in the vicinity of loaded shipments. Because the radiological consequences (dose) occur as a direct result of normal operations, the probability of routine consequences is taken to be unity in the RADTRAN 4 code. Therefore, the dose risk is equivalent to the estimated dose.

For routine transportation, the RADTRAN 4 computer code considers all major groups of potentially exposed persons. The RADTRAN 4 calculations of risk for routine highway and rail transportation include exposures of the following population groups:

- *Persons along the route (off-link population).* Collective doses were calculated for all persons living or working within 0.5 mi (0.8 km) of each side of a transportation route. The total number of persons within the 1-mi (1.6-km) corridor was calculated separately for each route considered in the assessment.
- *Persons sharing the route (on-link population).* Collective doses were calculated for persons in all vehicles sharing the transportation route. This group includes persons traveling in the same or opposite directions as the shipment, as well as persons in vehicles passing the shipment.
- *Persons at stops.* Collective doses were calculated for people who might be exposed while a shipment was stopped en route. For truck transportation, these stops include stops for refueling, food, and rest. For rail transportation, stops were assumed to occur for purposes of classification.
- *Crew members.* Collective doses were calculated for truck and rail transportation crew members involved in the actual shipment of material.

The doses calculated for the first three population groups were added together to yield the collective dose to the general public; the dose calculated for the fourth group represents the collective dose to workers. The RADTRAN 4 models for routine dose are not intended for use in estimating specific risks to individuals.

For the DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinder shipments, route-specific data were used to estimate the collective routine risks using the input assumptions as given in Biwer et al. (2001). For this EIS, the route data were updated with population data from the 2000 census.

### **F.3.5.2 Maximally Exposed Individual Risk**

In addition to assessing the routine collective population risk, RISKIND was used to estimate the risks to MEIs for a number of hypothetical exposure scenarios. Receptors included transportation crew members, departure inspectors, and members of the public exposed during traffic delays, while working at a service station, or while living near a facility.

RISKIND was used to calculate the dose to each MEI considered for an exposure scenario defined by an exposure distance, duration, and frequency specific to that receptor. The distances and durations of exposure were similar to those given in previous transportation risk assessments (DOE 1990b, 1995, 1996, 1997b, 1999) The scenarios were not meant to be exhaustive but were selected to provide a range of potential exposure situations.

The RISKIND external dose model considers direct external exposure and exposure from radiation scattered from the ground and air. RISKIND was used to calculate the dose as a function of distance from a shipment on the basis of the dimensions of the shipment (millirems per hour for stationary exposures and millirems per event for moving shipments). The code approximates the shipment as a cylindrical volume source, and the calculated dose includes contributions from secondary radiation scattering from buildup (scattering by the material contents), cloudshine (scattering by the air), and groundshine (scattering by the ground). The dose rate curve (relative dose rate as a function of distance) specific to depleted uranium was determined by using the MicroShield code (Negin and Worku 1992) for input into RISKIND. As a conservative measure, credit for potential shielding between the shipment and the receptor was not considered.

### **F.3.5.3 Vehicle-Related Risk**

Vehicle-related health risks resulting from routine transportation might be associated with the generation of air pollutants by transport vehicles during shipment; such risks are independent of the radioactive or chemical nature of the shipment. The health endpoint assessed under routine transportation conditions was the excess latent mortality due to inhalation of vehicular emissions. These emissions consist of particulate matter in the form of diesel engine exhaust and fugitive dust raised from the road/railway by the transport vehicle.

Risk factors for pollutant inhalation in terms of latent mortality were generated by Biwer and Butler (1999) for transportation risk assessments. These risks are based on epidemiological data that associate mortality rates with particulate concentrations in ambient air. Increased latent mortality rates resulting from cardiovascular and pulmonary diseases have been linked to incremental increases in particulate concentrations in air. Thus, the increase in ambient air particulate concentrations caused by a transport vehicle, with its associated fugitive dust and diesel exhaust emissions, is related to such premature latent fatalities in the form of risk factors. In this EIS, values of  $8.36 \times 10^{-10}$  latent fatality/km for truck transport and  $1.20 \times 10^{-10}$  latent fatality/railcar-km for rail transport were used. The truck value is for heavy combination trucks (truck class VIII B). Because of the conservatism of the assumptions made to reconcile results among independent epidemiological studies, the latent fatality risks estimated by using these values may be considered to be near an upper bound (Biwer and Butler 1999). The risk factors are for areas with an assumed population density of 1 person/km<sup>2</sup>. One-way shipment risks were obtained by multiplying the appropriate risk factor by the average population density along the route and the route distance. The risks reported for routine vehicle risks in this EIS are for round-trip travel of the transport vehicle.

The vehicle risks reported here are estimates based on the best available data. However, as is true for the radiological risks, there is a large degree of uncertainty in the vehicle emission risk factors that is not readily quantifiable. For example, large uncertainties exist with regard to the extent of increased mortality that occurs with an incremental rise in particulate air concentrations and with regard to whether there are threshold air concentrations that are applicable. Also, estimates of the particulate air concentrations caused by transport vehicles depend on location, road conditions, vehicle conditions, and weather.

### **F.3.6 Accident Risk Assessment Methodology**

The radiological transportation accident risk assessment used the RADTRAN 4 code for estimating collective population risks and the RISKIND code for estimating MEI and population consequences. The HGSYSTEM model (Post et al. 1994a,b) was used to assess the hazardous chemical transportation accident risks for both the collective population and individuals. The model is a widely applied code recognized by the EPA for chemical accident consequence predictions.

The collective accident risk for each type of shipment was determined in a manner similar to that described for routine collective population risks. For the DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinder shipments, route-specific data were used to estimate the collective accident risks on the basis of the input assumptions given in Biwer et al. (2001). For this EIS, the route data were updated with population data from the 2000 census.

#### **F.3.6.1 Radiological Accident Risk Assessment**

The risk analysis for potential accidents differs fundamentally from the risk analysis for routine transportation because occurrences of accidents are statistical in nature. The accident risk

assessment is treated probabilistically in RADTRAN 4 and in the HGSYSTEM approach used to estimate the hazardous chemical component of risk. Accident risk is defined as the product of the accident consequence (dose or exposure) and the probability of the accident occurring. In this respect, both RADTRAN 4 and HGSYSTEM estimate the collective accident risk to populations by considering a spectrum of transportation-related accidents. The spectrum of accidents was designed to encompass a range of possible accidents, including low-probability accidents that have high consequences and high-probability accidents that have low consequences (such as “fender benders”). The total collective radiological accident dose risk was calculated as:

$$R_{Total} = D \times A \times \sum_{i=1,n} (P_i \times C_i) , \quad (F.5)$$

where:

$R_{Total}$  = total collective dose risk for a single shipment distance  $D$  (person-rem),

$D$  = distance traveled (km),

$A$  = accident rate for transport mode under consideration (accidents/km),

$P_i$  = conditional probability that the accident is in Severity Category  $i$ , and

$C_i$  = collective dose received (consequence) should an accident of Severity Category  $i$  occur (person-rem).

The results for collective accident risk can be directly compared with the results for routine collective risk because the latter results implicitly incorporate a probability of occurrence of 1 if the shipment takes place.

The RADTRAN 4 calculation of collective accident risk employs models that quantify the range of potential accident severities and the responses of transported packages to accidents. The spectrum of accident severity is divided into a number of categories. Each category of severity is assigned a conditional probability of occurrence — that is, the probability that an accident will be of a particular severity if an accident occurs. The more severe the accident, the more remote the chance of such an accident. Release fractions, defined as the fraction of the material in a package that could be released in an accident, are assigned to each accident severity category on the basis of the physical and chemical form of the material. The model takes into account the mode of transportation and the type of packaging being considered. The accident rates, the definition of accident severity categories, and the release fractions used in this analysis are discussed further in Biwer et al. (1997, 2001). The approach for hazardous chemicals incorporates the same accident severity categories and release fractions as those used by RADTRAN 4.

For accidents involving the release of radioactive material, RADTRAN 4 assumes that the material is dispersed in the environment according to standard Gaussian diffusion models. For the risk assessment, default data for atmospheric dispersion were used, representing an

instantaneous ground-level release and a small-diameter source cloud (Neuhauser and Kanipe 1995). The calculation of the collective population dose following the release and dispersal of radioactive material included the following exposure pathways:

- External exposure to the passing radioactive cloud,
- External exposure to contaminated ground,
- Internal exposure from inhalation of airborne contaminants, and
- Internal exposure from the ingestion of contaminated food.

For the ingestion pathway, national-average food transfer factors, which relate the amount of radioactive material ingested to the amount deposited on the ground, were calculated in accordance with the methods described by NRC Regulatory Guide 1.109 (NRC 1977) and used as input to the RADTRAN code. Doses of radiation from the ingestion or inhalation of radionuclides were calculated by using standard dose conversion factors (DOE 1988a,b).

### **F.3.6.2 Chemical Accident Risk Assessment**

The risks from exposure to hazardous chemicals during transportation-related accidents can be either acute (result in immediate injury or fatality) or latent (result in cancer that would present itself after a latency period of several years). Both population risks and risks to the MEI were evaluated for transportation accidents. The acute health endpoint — potential irreversible adverse effects — was evaluated for the assessment of cargo-related population impacts from transportation accidents. Accidental releases during transport of UF<sub>6</sub>, U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub>, and HF were evaluated quantitatively.

The acute effects evaluated were assumed to exhibit a threshold nonlinear relationship with exposure; that is, some low level of exposure could be tolerated without inducing a health effect. To estimate risks, chemical-specific concentrations were developed for potential irreversible adverse effects. All individuals exposed at these levels or higher following an accident were included in the transportation risk estimates. In addition to acute health effects, the cargo-related risk of excess cases of latent cancer from accidental chemical exposures could be evaluated. However, none of the chemicals that might be released in any of the accidents would be carcinogenic. As a result, no predictions for excess latent cancers are presented in this report for accidental chemical releases.

In addition, to address MEIs, the locations of maximum hazardous chemical concentrations were identified for shipments with the largest potential releases. Estimates of exposure duration at those locations were obtained from modeling output and used to assess whether MEI exposure to uranium and other compounds exceeded the criteria for potential irreversible adverse effects.

The primary exposure route of concern with respect to an accidental release of hazardous chemicals would be inhalation. Although direct exposure to hazardous chemicals via other pathways, such as ingestion or dermal absorption, would also be possible, these routes would be expected to result in much lower exposure than the inhalation pathway doses for the chemicals of concern in this assessment. The likelihood of acute effects would be much less for the ingestion and dermal pathways than for inhalation.

The chemical transportation risks for shipment of the depleted uranium compounds were estimated by using FIREPLUME and HGSYSTEM accident consequences multiplied by the appropriate accident rate probabilities, population densities, and distance traveled in a similar fashion to that used by RADTRAN, as discussed in Section F.3.6.1 for the radiological transportation risks.

The chemical accident transportation risk and consequences for shipment of aqueous HF were estimated by using the CASRAM and HGSYSTEM models, respectively. For the risk assessment, 24 generic but representative routes were selected for hazardous commodity shipments in the region of interest (ROI). The generic HF routes were derived from historical shipments of five chemicals, in addition to HF, that are typically shipped in similar corrosive chemical container tank trucks. Temperature-dependent vapor pressures and densities for aqueous HF properties were derived with an empirically derived formulation (Pratt 2003) and experimentally generated plots (Honeywell International, Inc. 2002). The heat of vaporization was calculated from vapor pressure relationships. These parameters were used in estimating the evaporation rate from the HF pool and the HF that spilled onto the surface. Rail and highway accident rates, spill fraction, and population densities along the shipment routes were incorporated into CASRAM from statistics reported in the Hazardous Material Information System (HMIS) database and from census data. For each shipment, CASRAM calculates the probabilities of a release, given an accident and the risk of adverse (ERPG-1) and irreversible (ERPG-2) effects associated with the shipment. The overall risks are estimated by summing over all shipments and routes. The risks are normalized by shipment distance and weight, so that the calculations can be applied to specific shipment destinations and shipment quantities. For consequence assessment, procedures that are the same or similar to those used for fixed facilities are used (e.g., aqueous HF tank rupture). A description of the method can be found in Section F.2.2.1, Nonfire Accident Scenario Modeling. It was assumed for both the risk and consequence assessment that aqueous HF would be shipped in nonpressurized corrosive liquid tank cars with a 20,000-gal (76,000-L) capacity for rail shipments, and in corrosive liquid cargo tanker (MC312) trucks with a 5,000-gal (19,000-L) capacity.

### **F.3.7 Accident Consequence Assessment**

Because predicting the exact location of a severe transportation-related accident is impossible when estimating population impacts, separate accident consequences were calculated for accidents occurring in three population density zones: rural, suburban, and urban. Moreover, to address the effects of the atmospheric conditions existing at the time of an accident, two atmospheric conditions were considered: neutral (i.e., unstable) and stable.

The MEI for severe transportation accidents was considered to be located at the point of highest hazardous material concentration that would be accessible to the general public. This location was assumed to be 100 ft (30 m) or farther from the release point at the location of highest air concentration as determined by the HGSYSTEM and FIREPLUME models. Only the shipment accident resulting in the highest contaminant concentration was evaluated for the MEI.

### **F.3.7.1 Radiological Accident Consequence Assessment**

The RISKIND code was used to provide a scenario-specific assessment of radiological consequences from severe transportation-related accidents. Whereas the RADTRAN 4 accident risk assessment considered the entire range of accident severities and their related probabilities, the RISKIND accident consequence assessment focused on accidents that result in the largest releases of radioactive material to the environment. Accident consequences were presented for each type of shipment that might occur under any given option for each alternative. The accident consequence assessment was intended to provide an estimate of the potential impacts posed by a severe transportation-related accident.

The severe accidents considered in the consequence assessment were characterized by extreme mechanical and thermal forces. In all cases, these accidents would result in a release of radioactive material to the environment. The accidents correspond to those within the highest accident severity category, as described previously. These accidents represent low-probability, high-consequence events. The probability of accidents of this magnitude would depend on the number of shipments and the total shipping distance for the options considered; however, accidents of this severity are expected to be extremely rare.

The severe accidents involving solid radioactive material that would result in the highest impacts would generally be related to fire. The fire would break down and distribute the material of concern. Air concentrations of radioactive contaminants at receptor locations following a hypothetical accident were determined by using the FIREPLUME model. On the basis of these air concentrations, RISKIND was used to calculate the radiological impacts for the accident consequence assessment.

The accident consequences were calculated for both local populations and MEIs. The population dose included the population within 50 mi (80 km) of the site of the accident. The exposure pathways considered were similar to those discussed previously for the accident risk assessment. Although remedial activities after the accident (e.g., evacuation or ground cleanup) would reduce the consequences of an accident, these activities were not accounted for in the consequence assessment.

### **F.3.7.2 Chemical Accident Consequence Assessment**

HGSYSTEM Version 3.0 was used to estimate the potential consequences from severe hazardous chemical accidents. FIREPLUME was used to predict the consequences of transportation accidents involving fires. The HGSYSTEM model is discussed in Section F.2.2.

### F.3.7.3 Vehicle-Related Accident Risk Assessment

The vehicle-related accident risk refers to the potential for transportation-related accidents that could directly result in fatalities not related to the cargo in the shipment. This risk represents fatalities from mechanical causes. National-average rates for transportation-related fatalities (Saricks and Tompkins 1999) were used in the assessment for shipments without a defined origin or destination site (e.g., the use location of the conversion HF products). For truck transport,  $1.49 \times 10^{-8}$  fatality per truck-km was assumed. For rail transport,  $7.82 \times 10^{-8}$  fatality per railcar-km was assumed. State average fatality rates from Saricks and Tompkins (1999) were used in the assessment for the DUF<sub>6</sub> shipments that had known origin and destination sites. Vehicle-related accident risks were calculated by multiplying the total distance traveled by the rate for transportation-related fatalities. In all cases, the vehicle-related accident risks were calculated by using distances for round-trip shipment.

## F.4 AIR QUALITY AND NOISE

### F.4.1 Air Quality

Potential air quality impacts under each alternative were evaluated by estimating potential air pollutant emissions from the activities associated with facility construction and operations, followed by atmospheric dispersion modeling of these emissions to assess impacts on ambient air quality.

Air emissions resulting from activities associated with construction (e.g., construction equipment, engine exhaust, and fugitive dust emissions) and with operations (e.g., boiler<sup>2</sup> and emergency generator stack emissions) were estimated by using applicable emission factors (EPA 2002) and emission and activity level data provided by UDS (UDS 2003b). The significance of project-related emissions was evaluated by comparing the estimated project-related emissions with countywide or statewide emissions.

Atmospheric dispersion modeling of pollutant emissions was performed by using the EPA-recommended ISC short-term model (EPA 2000). In addition to project-related emission data, model input data included stack and building downwash data, meteorological data, receptor data, and terrain elevation data. Emissions from construction activities were assumed to occur during one daytime 8-hour shift, while the emissions from facility operations were assumed to occur 24 hours per day and 7 days per week.<sup>3</sup> Effects of building downwash on stack plumes

---

<sup>2</sup> UDS is currently proposing to use electrical heating in the conversion facility but is evaluating other options. If natural gas was used, either furnaces or boilers could be selected. The air emissions from boilers are greater than those for residential-type furnaces for carbon monoxide (CO) and nitrogen oxides (NO<sub>x</sub>), and the same for other criteria pollutants and volatile organic compounds (VOCs). To assess bounding air quality impacts, a boiler option was analyzed.

<sup>3</sup> The backup generator is assumed to be operating for 192 hours per year, which represents 4 hours per month for testing and 3 days of operation twice per year in response to a power outage.

were considered for the emission sources during the operational period. The meteorological data selected for the Paducah site are the 1990 surface data (10-m [33-ft] level) and mixing height data from the nearby Barkley Regional Airport. For construction impact analysis, initial receptor grids were placed at distances of 100 m (328 ft) from the construction site (because heavy equipment operators would not allow public access any closer for safety reasons) and extended up 50 km (31 mi) beyond existing site boundaries. For operation impact analysis, receptor grids were set along and beyond the existing and planned conversion facility boundaries up to 50 km (31 mi). The grid intervals ranged from 25 m (82 ft) near the facility to 5 km (3.1 mi) outmost. To model the effects of terrain elevation, elevation data for the emission sources and receptors were also input to the model.

For assessing potential air quality impacts, the estimated maximum ground-level concentration increments due to these pollutant emissions beyond site boundaries were compared with allowable PSD increments. Total maximum concentrations, obtained by adding the background concentration levels representative of the site to the estimated maximum ground-level concentration increments, were compared with applicable national and state ambient air quality standards.

#### **F.4.2 Noise**

Potential noise impacts under each alternative were assessed by estimating the sound levels from noise-emitting sources associated with facility construction and operations, followed by noise propagation modeling. Examples of noise-emitting sources include heavy equipment used in earthmoving and other activities during construction; process equipment and emergency generators during operations; and train whistles and on-site and off-site traffic during construction and operations. Potential noise levels due to these sources were obtained from the literature (Harris Miller Miller & Hanson, Inc. [HMMH] 1995) and data provided by UDS (UDS 2003b). For construction of the conversion facility, detailed information on the types and number of construction equipment required is not available. Therefore, for construction impact analysis, it was assumed that the two noisiest sources would operate simultaneously at the center of the construction site (HMMH 1995). For operations impact analysis, the highest noise levels (inside buildings) measured at the Framatome ANP Richland, Washington, facility, similar to the proposed facility at Paducah, were assumed to be those at a distance of 15 m (50 ft) from the facility.

Noise levels at the nearest residence from the alternative sites were estimated by using a simple noise propagation model on the basis of estimated sound levels at the source. The significance of estimated potential noise levels at the nearest residence was assessed by comparing them with the EPA noise guideline (EPA 1974) and measured background noise levels.

## **F.5 WATER AND SOIL**

Potential impacts to surface water, groundwater, and soil during facility construction, normal operations, and potential accidents were evaluated. Methods of quantitative and qualitative impact analyses are described in the following paragraphs.

For surface water, impacts were assessed in terms of runoff, floodplain encroachment, and water quality. Changes in runoff were assessed by comparing runoff areas with and without the proposed facility. Floodplain encroachment was assessed by evaluating the location of the proposed facility in terms of known floodplains. Inputs to the floodplain evaluation included estimated facility effluent volumes and estimates of flow volumes in nearby streams and rivers. Water quality impacts were estimated by using the proposed drinking water standard of 30 µg/L (EPA 2003b) as a guideline. When data were unavailable, assessment models that account for the different types of contaminants and dilution estimates for the surface water features were used to estimate surface water conditions.

Potential impacts on groundwater were assessed in terms of changes in recharge to underlying aquifers, depth to groundwater, direction of groundwater flow, and groundwater quality. Changes to recharge of groundwater were evaluated by comparing the increase in the impermeable area produced by construction and operations with the recharge area available at actual or representative sites. Impacts on the depth to groundwater were evaluated by comparing existing water use with modified water needs. Changes in the direction of groundwater flow were evaluated by examining the potential effects produced by the increased water demand. A model that considers movement, dispersion, adsorption, and decay of the contaminant source material over time was used to estimate the migration of contaminants from source areas to the groundwater (i.e., groundwater quality). Details of the model are provided in Tomasko (1997).

Potential impacts to soil were assessed in terms of changes in topography, permeability, quality, and erosion potential. Erosion potential was evaluated in terms of disturbed land area. Changes in soil quality were evaluated on the basis of the amounts of contaminants deposited as a result of certain activities. No standard is available for limiting soil concentrations of uranium; a health-based guideline value of 230 µg/g (EPA 1995a), applicable for residential settings, was used as a guideline for comparison in this EIS.

## **F.6 SOCIOECONOMICS**

### **F.6.1 Scope of the Analysis**

For this EIS, the analysis of the socioeconomic impacts under the no action alternative and the action alternatives was based on the analysis performed for the DUF<sub>6</sub> PEIS (DOE 1999), which used cost engineering data provided by Dubrin et al. (1997), with additional information provided by UDS (UDS 2003b).

For conversion, impacts were estimated for the ROIs at Paducah. For the no action alternative, impacts were estimated for the ROIs at this site and the ROI for the ETTP site. The analysis estimated the impacts of continued storage and conversion on regional economic activity, including direct (on-site) and indirect (off-site) employment and income. In addition, the impact of each conversion technology on (1) population in-migration, (2) local housing markets, (3) local public service employment, and (4) local jurisdictional revenues and expenditures was also calculated. Additional details on the analysis of socioeconomic impacts undertaken for the DUF<sub>6</sub> PEIS are provided in Allison and Folga (1997). Updated data on the affected environment at each site were used to revise the impacts from continued storage and conversion facilities on the economy and community at each site that were described in the DUF<sub>6</sub> PEIS (DOE 1999) and in Hartmann (1999a,b,c).

An assessment of the socioeconomic impacts from transporting DUF<sub>6</sub> was not included in the DUF<sub>6</sub> PEIS analysis or in this EIS. The transportation of DUF<sub>6</sub> would likely not lead to significant en route socioeconomic impacts because the total expenditures for transportation related to DUF<sub>6</sub> would be small compared with expenditures related to total shipments of all other goods for any of the routes that might be used. The analysis might also have considered the socioeconomic impacts of potential accidents, particularly for DUF<sub>6</sub>-related transportation activities. However, because it is unlikely that any potential accident would release large quantities of hazardous or radioactive material into the environment, accidents are expected to create only minor local economic disruption, and a substantial commitment of fiscal resources for accident remediation would probably not be necessary at any of the current storage sites or along transportation routes.

## **F.6.2 Technical Approach for the Analysis**

### **F.6.2.1 Regional Economy**

The analysis of regional economic impacts used engineering cost data for facilities that would be constructed and operated and input-output economic data for the ROI surrounding the site. The ROI was defined as the counties in which 90% of site employees currently reside (see Section 3.1.8). Additional data from the U.S. Bureau of the Census (2002a,b) were used to forecast economic data to provide the basis for the presentation of relative impacts.

The analysis was performed by using the engineering cost data of Dubrin et al. (1997) for the construction and operation of the conversion facility, which were then updated by using UDS data (UDS 2003b). Direct (on-site) employment and income impacts were then calculated on the basis of average total labor costs (i.e., fully loaded labor costs, including site overhead, contractor profit, and employee benefits) in each category. Estimates of direct income impacts were calculated by adjusting average fully loaded labor costs to exclude the various components of site overhead, state and federal income taxes, and other payroll deductions. This process produced a measure of disposable wage and salary income that would likely be spent in the regional economy at each of the sites.

Indirect (off-site) impacts were based on detailed item-specific procurement data for material and on adjusted direct and indirect labor costs. Cost information was associated with the relevant standard industrial classification (SIC) codes and construction and operation schedule information to provide estimates of procurement and wage and salary expenditures for each sector in the local economy for the year in which expenditures would be made. Information on the expected pattern of local and nonlocal procurement for the various materials and labor expenditures by SIC code was then calculated on the basis of local shares of national employment in each material and labor procurement category and information provided for the site. Expenditures by SIC code by year occurring in the ROI were then mapped into the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) sectors used in an IMPLAN input-output model (Minnesota IMPLAN Group, Inc. 2003) specified for the ROI (see Section 3.1.1.8). Each model was used to produce employment and income multipliers for each sector where procurement and labor expenditures occur. Indirect impacts were then calculated by multiplying expenditures in each sector by the input-output multipliers produced by the model for the ROI.

Impacts were presented in terms of the (1) direct, indirect, and total employment impacts; (2) direct and total income impacts; and (3) relative employment impact, or the magnitude of the absolute impact compared with the growth in the local economic employment baseline. Construction impacts for the facility were presented for the peak construction year. Operations impacts were presented for the first year of operations.

#### **F.6.2.2 Regional Economy Assessment Model**

The analysis used county-level IMPLAN input-output economic data for 2000 (Minnesota IMPLAN Group, Inc. 2003) to measure the regional economic impacts of conversion facilities at the site. The IMPLAN input-output model is a microcomputer-based program that allows construction of input-output models for counties or combinations of counties for any location in the United States. Input-output data are the economic accounts of any given region and show the flow of commodities to industries from producers and institutional consumers. The accounts also show consumption activities by workers, owners of capital, and imports from outside the region. The model contains 528 sectors, representing industries in agriculture, mining, construction, manufacturing, wholesale and retail trade, utilities, finance, insurance and real estate, and consumer and business services. The model also includes information for each sector on employee compensation; proprietary and property income; personal consumption expenditure; federal, state, and local expenditures; inventory and capital formation; and imports and exports. The model can be used to produce accurate estimates of the impact of changes in expenditures in specific local activities on employment and income in any given year. The analysis of regional economic impacts used the model to calculate multipliers for each sector in the ROI for which procurement and wage and salary expenditures would be likely to occur. These multipliers were calculated for the year 2000, the latest year available.

For this EIS, data from the 2000 census were used to modify and update the data presented in the data compilation reports (Hartmann 1999a-c) for both the affected environment and impact sections. In addition to using 2000 population data to describe population trends in the ROI, counties, and important cities near the site, these data were used to provide information

on per capita personal income at the county level and on the number of employees per capita at the county and city level for key public services, including police, fire protection, general government, education, medical facilities, and hospitals. Housing data from the 2000 census were also used to establish trends in housing growth over the period 1990 to 2000; details were presented for both the owner-occupied and rental markets, including vacancy rates. The 2000 census data were used in this EIS to update the impacts that were described in the data compilation reports for each alternative.

### **F.6.2.3 Population**

The construction and operation of a conversion facility would likely lead to in-migration into the ROI. In-migration would be both direct, related to new employment created on site, and indirect, related to changes in employment opportunities in the ROI as a whole. In the DUF<sub>6</sub> PEIS (DOE 1999) analysis, the number of direct employees in-migrating was based on information on employment in existing DOE programs and on the level of contractor support. Indirect in-migration that would occur for each ROI was calculated by using assumed in-migration rates associated with changes in employment in the local industries most significantly affected indirectly by construction and operation expenditures, with residual in-migration rates assumed for the remaining industries in the economy indirectly affected. As in the DUF<sub>6</sub> PEIS, population impacts in this EIS are presented in terms of the (1) absolute total (direct and indirect) in-migration impact and (2) relative population impact, or the magnitude of the absolute impact compared with the growth in the local economic population baseline.

### **F.6.2.4 Local Housing Markets**

In-migration that would occur with the construction and operation of a conversion facility could affect the local housing market in the ROI. The DUF<sub>6</sub> PEIS (DOE 1999) analysis considered these impacts by estimating the increase in demand for housing units in each year of construction and operation on the basis of the number of in-migrating workers to the area surrounding each site and average household size. The results were compared with forecasts for housing supply and demand and owner-occupied and rental vacancy rates for each year during construction and operation, on the basis of information provided by the U.S. Bureau of the Census (1994, 2002a).

### **F.6.2.5 Local Jurisdictions**

The construction and operation of a conversion facility would likely lead to some in-migration into the area surrounding the site, which would change the demand for educational services provided by school districts and for public services (police, fire protection, health services, etc.) provided by cities and counties. The DUF<sub>6</sub> PEIS (DOE 1999) analysis used estimates of in-migration (see above) as the basis for estimating impacts on public service employment and impacts on revenues and expenditures for the various counties, cities, and school districts in the ROI. Revenue and expenditure data were based on the annual

comprehensive financial reports produced by individual jurisdictions surrounding each site and on demographic information provided by the U.S. Bureau of the Census (2002a). Impacts were presented in terms of the number of (1) new public service employees required and (2) percentage change in forecasted revenues and expenditures for counties, cities, and school districts. Impacts were estimated for the peak year of construction and the first year of operation for the conversion facility.

## F.7 ECOLOGY

Potential impacts on terrestrial and aquatic biota — including vegetation and wildlife, wetlands, and federal- and state-listed threatened and endangered species — were evaluated. The impact analysis focused on the radiological and chemical toxicity effects to biota that would result from exposure to DUF<sub>6</sub> and related compounds and from physical disturbance to biota and habitats. The conversion of DUF<sub>6</sub> was evaluated on the basis of the UDS technology for converting DUF<sub>6</sub> to depleted U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub>. The analysis considered potential impacts on biota in the vicinity of the Paducah site.

The analysis of impacts on wildlife addressed the effects of facility construction (including physical disturbance and habitat loss) and facility operations (including air quality, radiological, and chemical toxicity effects through the exposure pathways of inhalation, dermal contact, and ingestion). Exposures were based on predicted concentrations of contaminants in air, surface water, groundwater, and soil. Radiological dose rate estimates (in rad/d) were calculated for aquatic biota (fish and shellfish) on the basis of undiluted concentrations (in pCi/L), energy released per decay (MeV) for depleted uranium, and a bioconcentration factor (factors of 2 and 60 were applied for fish and shellfish, respectively). These dose rate estimates were compared with the dose limit of 1 rad/d specified in DOE Order 5400.5 (DOE 1990a). The screening level for potential ecological effects is  $4.55 \times 10^3$  pCi/L for fish (Bechtel Jacobs Company LLC 1998). In addition, concentrations of uranium, uranium compounds, and HF in air, water, and/or soil were compared with published benchmark values (levels with no effects or lowest observed effects) to determine potential toxicity effects. Benchmark values for air concentration lowest observable effects due to inhalation were 7 mg/m<sup>3</sup> for HF and 17 mg/m<sup>3</sup> for U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub>. The benchmark values for aquatic toxicity were a screening level of 2.6 µg/L, the Tier II secondary chronic value for potential adverse effects (Suter and Tsao 1996), and a lowest observable effect level of 150 µg/L for total uranium (Hyne et al. 1992). Potential impacts analyzed included impacts on individuals (such as mortality, injury, or physical disturbance) and potential changes in biotic communities.

The analysis of ecological impacts on plant species addressed the effects of facility construction (such as effects from the removal of vegetation) and operations (such as chemical toxicity effects). Estimated concentrations of uranium in soil were compared with a benchmark value of 5 µg/g, which is the lowest observed effects concentration (Will and Suter 1994). Potential impacts analyzed included impacts on individuals (such as injury or mortality) and potential changes in biotic communities.

Physical disturbances to biota and habitats were also evaluated. The general guidelines used to assess impacts of habitat loss and wildlife disturbance were as follows: (1) negligible impacts were those that would affect less than 10 acres (4 ha) of required land; (2) moderate impacts would affect 10 to 100 acres (4 to 40 ha) of required land; and (3) potential large impacts would affect more than 100 acres (40 ha) of required land.

The potential impacts on wetlands were based on the direct impacts that could result from construction (such as filling) or the indirect impacts that could result from changes in water quality or the hydrologic regime or from soil compaction or runoff. The potential impacts on federal- and state-listed threatened and endangered species were based on the direct impacts that could result from habitat loss or modification or the indirect impacts that could result from disturbance.

Input for the impact analysis included data on plant and animal species either known to occur or that could potentially occur at the site and in ecosystems (such as wetland, forest, grassland) in the vicinity of the site.

## **F.8 WASTE MANAGEMENT**

Potential impacts to waste management programs at Paducah and ETTP were evaluated for the alternatives considered in this EIS. The categories of waste evaluated were LLW, TRU, hazardous waste, and nonhazardous solid and liquid waste. Current (as of fiscal year [FY] 2002) projected total generation volumes for each of the categories of waste for the period covering FYs 2002 through 2025 were obtained from a database maintained by the DOE Oak Ridge Office for the site (Cain 2002). These volumes included wastes generated from routine site operations and from planned environmental restoration activities; they are summarized in Table F-4.

For this EIS, annualized generation volumes were derived for use in evaluating potential impacts from the conversion facility. These volumes were derived by dividing the forecasted total volumes from FY 2002 through FY 2025 by 24 years. These annualized generation volumes are included in Table F-4 and are also presented in Section 3.1.9. Potential impacts were then evaluated (see Chapter 5) by comparing the waste volumes that would be generated (from the conversion to U<sub>3</sub>O<sub>8</sub> considered in this EIS) with the annualized generation volumes.

The majority of the wastes generated from the conversion facility would be LLW and nonhazardous wastes (wastewater and solids). At both Paducah and ETTP, all LLW is transported off site for disposal except Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) or environmental restoration LLW solid wastes generated at ETTP. (These wastes are disposed of at the disposal cell located within the Oak Ridge Reservation [ORR] complex.) Nonhazardous wastewater is treated at on-site treatment facilities and discharged to permitted outfalls. It appears that the wastewater treatment facilities at these sites would have adequate remaining capacities to treat the additional wastewater that would be generated from the conversion facility (see Section 3). Nonhazardous solids at Paducah are

**TABLE F-4 Environmental Management Waste Generation Forecast<sup>a</sup> for Fiscal Years 2002 through 2025**

Site	Waste Type	Waste Volume (m <sup>3</sup> )			
		Inventory at End of FY 2001	Forecast of Newly Generated Waste, FY 2002–2025	Total Managed Waste, FY 2002–2025	Annualized Projection <sup>b</sup>
Paducah	Hazardous	0	8,828	8,828	384
	LLW	33,245	138,761	172,006	7,479
	LLMW	5,980	175,955	181,935	7,910
	TRU	6	8	14	0.6
	Nonhazardous (sanitary/industrial)				
	Wastewater	0	1,728	1,728	75
	Solids	0	454,438	454,438	19,758

<sup>a</sup> Source: DOE Oak Ridge Operations Office (Cain 2002). Volume projections include wastes from routine site operations and environmental restoration. A large portion of the waste would be from environmental restoration activities.

<sup>b</sup> Annualized projections were obtained by dividing volumes by 23 years for Paducah.

disposed of at an on-site landfill. At ETTP, nonhazardous solids generated from environmental restoration activities are disposed of at the landfill located within the ORR complex, and the remaining waste (from other site activities) is transported to an off-site facility. All low-level mixed (radioactive and hazardous) waste (LLMW) and hazardous waste at these sites are transported off site for disposal, except for waste from environmental restoration activities at ETTP, which is sent to the disposal cell located within the ORR complex. TRU waste would most likely be transported to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in New Mexico.

## F.9 RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS

The evaluation of resource requirements identified the major resources required that could be determined at this level of analysis. The commitment of material and energy resources during the entire life cycles of the facility considered in this EIS would include construction materials that could not be recovered or recycled, materials rendered radioactive that could not be decontaminated, and materials consumed or reduced to unrecoverable forms or waste. For construction, materials required would include wood, concrete, sand, gravel, steel, and other metals. Materials consumed during operations could include operating supplies, miscellaneous chemicals, and gases. Strategic and critical materials, or resources with small reserves, were also identified and considered.

Energy resources irretrievably committed during construction and operations would include the fossil fuels used to generate heat and electricity (if furnaces or boilers were used for heating; current plans are for electrical heating of facilities). Energy in the form of diesel fuel, gasoline, and oil would also be used for construction equipment and transportation vehicles.

The assessment of potential resource requirements for continued storage (no action) and the action alternatives was based on comparing the resource requirements needed for building and operating the proposed facility with the existing resource capacities of on-site infrastructure systems and with current off-site demand for resources at the three current storage sites. A variation of the methodology applied in the Waste Management Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (WM PEIS) (DOE 1997a) was utilized in this EIS study. The effects of the various options on on-site infrastructure systems (such as electrical demand) were assessed qualitatively by comparing the new demand with the existing maximum capacity. The demand on the off-site infrastructure that would result from new resource requirements was compared with the estimated current demand.

## **F.10 LAND USE**

The evaluation of land use impacts under the action alternatives and the no action alternative employed a similar approach. A baseline description for 2003 outlined the land use patterns currently occurring on the Paducah site, providing a sense of what is both typical and acceptable in this locale. A complementary description of land use in McCracken County, based on available interpreted satellite imagery, provides a sense of land use tendencies in the vicinity of the site (which remained relatively unchanged over the past decade). An analysis of the alternatives, in turn, enabled an assessment of how compatible (or incompatible) the various potential development scenarios would be with existing land use patterns. Although the analysis employed quantitative data when available — such as summaries of land use activities by the size of the area involved — the assessment ultimately was qualitative, being based on comparisons with existing land use patterns and current zoning and planning guidelines.

The assumptions underlying the assessment of impacts on land use for this EIS include these:

- Baseline conditions are assumed to be those that are occurring in 2003, although, in some cases, information on land use was available from prior years.
- The projected operating life of the proposed facility is assumed to be 25 years, beginning in about 2006.
- Under the no action alternative, continued storage of DUF<sub>6</sub> is assumed to occur over a 40-year period.

## **F.11 CULTURAL RESOURCES**

Cultural resources include those portions of the natural and man-made environment that have significant historical or cultural meaning. These resources include archaeological sites, historic structures, cultural landscapes, and traditional cultural properties.

The DUF<sub>6</sub> conversion project activities that would have the greatest potential for affecting significant cultural resources would be those related to construction. It is anticipated that the operation and decommissioning of the conversion facility would have far fewer effects.

Three alternative locations for the conversion facility have been proposed for Paducah. The area of potential effect at each construction location was determined. This area would include the land within the boundary of each facility construction location, including access roads, laydown areas, parking areas, and any locations where upgrades to infrastructure (e.g., roads, power lines, and water lines) would be necessary. The land use history of these areas was reconstructed and evaluated to determine to what extent recent construction or earthmoving has altered the landscape and thus affected the likelihood of cultural resources being present.

A records search was conducted for each proposed construction location to determine if either unevaluated cultural resources or cultural resources eligible for inclusion in the *National Register of Historic Places* (NRHP) were known to exist. All classes of cultural resources were considered, ranging in date from the prehistoric to the contemporary. Sources included published documents, cultural resource surveys on file at the site, and files maintained by the relevant State Historic Preservation Officer (SHPO). Consultation was undertaken with the SHPO and Native American groups with historical ties to the area. This information was placed within a broader cultural and historical context. If cultural resource information was lacking, requiring new field studies before construction, the potential for encountering cultural resources in the projected area of effect was evaluated on the basis of the known distribution of cultural resources in the surrounding area.

The potential effects of chemical and radiological releases on cultural resources were investigated. There is a potential for an adverse effect on historic structures when secondary air quality standards for criteria pollutants are exceeded. Secondary standards set pollution limits to protect public welfare and include protection against damage to buildings (EPA 2002). Air quality models were used to estimate the potential that construction and operation of the conversion facility would result in pollution beyond these limits. In this model, the projected increase in emissions was added to the background levels for the pollutant, and the sum was compared with state and national secondary standards. The potential for adverse effects on cultural resources from the accident scenarios considered in this EIS was also evaluated.

## **F.12 ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE**

The methods used to evaluate environmental justice impacts emphasized issues identified in Executive Order 12898 (“Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low Income Populations”), which defines environmental justice as a topic that must be evaluated for federal actions. As such, the methods focused on identifying high and adverse impacts on low-income and minority populations under the action alternatives and the no action alternative. The impacts examined under environmental justice included those impacts identified in all disciplines considered in this EIS (human health, air quality, socioeconomics, etc.).

The evaluation of impacts under environmental justice was based on the following basic assumptions:

- Baseline conditions are those occurring in 2002. However, the data used to identify minority populations were from 2000, and the data used to identify low-income populations were from 1999.
- The anticipated operating life of the proposed facility is 25 years, beginning in 2006.
- The ROI for environmental justice varies by impact area, ranging from 50 mi (80 km) from the proposed facility to geographic areas close to the facilities.

Because the environmental justice evaluation relied heavily on analyses in other disciplines, it also incorporated the assumptions underlying these other inquiries. The data used to evaluate impacts related to environmental justice were of two types: (1) census data used to define disproportionality and (2) data on anticipated effects under the action alternatives and the no action alternative. Data from the most recent decennial census of population and housing, conducted in 2000, provided a recent, detailed basis for evaluating the distribution of minority and low-income populations. These two population groups are defined as follows:

- *Minority*: Individuals who classify themselves as belonging to any of the following racial groups: Black (including Black or Negro, African American, Afro-American, Black Puerto Rican, Jamaican, Nigerian, West Indian, or Haitian); American Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut; Asian or Pacific Islander; or “Other Race” (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1991; see CEQ 1997). In the 2000 census, many individuals categorized themselves as belonging to more than one race. This EIS considers individuals of multiple races to be minority, regardless of the races involved. This study also includes individuals identifying themselves as Hispanic in origin, technically an ethnic category, under minority. To avoid double counting, the analysis included only White Hispanics, since the above racial groups already accounted for Non-white Hispanics.
- *Low-income*: Individuals falling below the poverty line. For the 2000 census, the poverty line was defined by a statistical threshold based on a weighted average that considered both family size and the ages of individuals in a family. For example, the 1999 weighted average poverty threshold annual income for a family of three with one related child younger than 18 years was \$13,410, while the poverty threshold for a family of five with one child younger than 18 years was \$21,024 (U.S. Bureau of the Census 2000). If a family fell below the poverty line for its particular composition, the census considered all individuals in that family to be below the poverty line. Low income figures in the 2000 census reflect incomes in 1999, the most recent year for which entire annual incomes were known at the time of the most recent census.

This EIS examined minority and low-income populations with census data collected and presented for counties and for census tracts. Census tracts are small, relatively permanent statistical subdivisions of a county, usually containing between 2,500 and 8,000 persons (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1991). Through the use of these geographic units, the environmental justice analysis is geographically commensurate with analyses in two other impact areas of particular concern with regard to minority and low-income populations: socioeconomics (which used counties) and human health (which used census tracts).

Environmental justice is not itself an impact area, per se. Rather, it considers other impacts that are both high and adverse and affect minority and low-income populations disproportionately. As such, the results of assessments in these other disciplines were crucial in the evaluation of environmental justice — essentially preceding the environmental justice evaluation. The key type of data required to identify environmental justice concerns was the result of these other analyses.

### **F.13 CUMULATIVE IMPACTS**

Cumulative effects or impacts result from the incremental impact of the action alternatives when added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions, regardless of what government agency or private entity undertakes such actions. Cumulative effects may result from impacts that are minor individually but that, when viewed collectively over space and time, can produce significant impacts. The approach used for cumulative analysis in this EIS was based on the principles outlined by the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ 1997) and on the guidance developed by the EPA (1999) for independent reviewers of EISs.

The analysis of cumulative impacts focused on specific impacts on the human or natural environment that could result from multiple actions in the vicinity of the Paducah site and the ETTP site (for the option of preparing DUF<sub>6</sub> cylinders for shipment to Paducah). Generally, the geographic area for each cumulative impact analysis was defined by the specific resource or receptor of concern and the spatial extent of the interacting (cumulative) impact generators. Although the cumulative analysis acknowledged the past history of impacts at each site, its emphasis was on future cumulative impacts that could occur during the life of a conversion facility. This focus allows the decision maker to place the direct and indirect impacts of the proposed action within the context of other potential stressors.

The cumulative impact analysis for this EIS was not meant to be a review of all potential environmental impacts at and near a site, nor was it meant to be a sitewide impact analysis. As a starting point, the cumulative analysis used the direct and indirect impacts from the action alternatives as evaluated for each technical subject. Then similar impacts from other actions (including DOE actions, United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC) actions, and the actions of others) were identified. These were added to determine the cumulative impact from all activities occurring together. Then meaningful trends in past, present, and future cumulative impacts were discussed.

For each cumulative impact, the significance of the consequences was assessed on the basis of the (1) likelihood of the impact, (2) geographic or spatial extent of the impact, (3) duration in time of the impact, (4) applicable regulatory considerations, (5) potential for recovery if the impact was temporary, and (6) potential for effective mitigation.

#### F.4 REFERENCES

AIHA (American Industrial Hygiene Association), 2002, *The AIHA 2002 Emergency Response Planning Guidelines and Workplace Environmental Exposure Level Guides Handbook*, Fairfax, Va.

Allison, T., and S. Folga, 1997, *Socioeconomic Impact Analyses in Support of the Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement*, attachment to memorandum from T. Allison (Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Ill.), to H. Avci (Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Ill.), May 21.

Bechtel Jacobs Company LLC, 1998, *Radiological Benchmarks for Screening Contaminants of Potential Concern for Effects on Aquatic Biota at Oak Ridge National Laboratory*, BJC/OR-80, Oak Ridge, Tenn., July 30.

Biwer, B.M., and J.P. Butler, 1999, "Vehicle Emission Unit Risk Factors for Transportation Risk Assessments," *Risk Analysis* 19:1157–1171.

Biwer, B.M., et al., 1997, *Transportation Impact Analyses in Support of the Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement*, attachment to intraoffice memorandum from Biwer to H.I. Avci (Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Ill.), May 21.

Biwer, B.M., et al., 2001, *Transportation Impact Assessment for Shipment of Uranium Hexafluoride (UF<sub>6</sub>) Cylinders from the East Tennessee Technology Park to the Portsmouth and Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plants*, ANL/EAD/TM-112, Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Ill., Oct.

Brown, D. et al., 1996, *The Chemical Accident Stochastic Risk Assessment Model, Technical Description*, ANL-UIUC Rept. No. TD-2375, April 5.

Brown, D. et al., 1997, *FIREPLUME: Modeling Plume Dispersion from Fires and Applications to UF<sub>6</sub> Cylinder Fires*, ANL/EAD/TM-69, Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Ill.

Brown, D. et al., 2000, *A National Transportation Risk Assessment for Selected Hazardous Materials in Transportation*, ANL/DIS-01-1, Dec.

Cain, W., 2002, personal communication from Cain (U.S. Department of Energy, ETTP Site Office, Oak Ridge, Tenn.) to H. Hartmann (Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Ill.), July 30.

CEQ (Council on Environmental Quality), 1997, *Environmental Justice Guidance under the National Environmental Policy Act*, Executive Office of the President, Washington D.C., Dec.

Chaki, S., and B. Parks, 2003, *Updated User's Guide for CAP88-PC, Version 2.0*, EPA 402-R-00-004, prepared by U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Radiation and Indoor Air, Washington, D.C., and U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Research, Germantown, Md., March.

DOE, 1988a, *External Dose Rate Conversion Factors for Calculation of Dose to the Public*, DOE/EH-0070, Office of Environment, Safety, and Health, Washington, D.C.

DOE, 1988b, *Internal Dose Conversion Factors for Calculation of Dose to the Public*, DOE/EH-0071, Office of Environment, Safety, and Health, Washington, D.C.

DOE, 1990a, *Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment*, DOE Order 5400.5, Washington, D.C., Feb. 8.

DOE, 1990b, *Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement, Waste Isolation Pilot Plant*, DOE/EIS-0026-FS, Washington, D.C., Jan.

DOE, 1992, *Radiological Control Manual*, DOE/EH-0256T, Assistant Secretary for Environment, Safety and Health, Washington, D.C., June.

DOE, 1995, *Department of Energy Programmatic Spent Nuclear Fuel Management and Idaho National Engineering Laboratory Environmental Restoration and Waste Management Programs Final Environmental Impact Statement*, DOE/EIS-0203-F, Office of Environmental Management, Idaho Operations Office, Idaho Falls, Idaho, April.

DOE, 1996, *Final Environmental Impact Statement on a Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel; Appendix E: Evaluation of Human Health Effects of Overland Transportation*, Vol. 2, DOE/EIS-0218F, Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management, Washington, D.C., Feb.

DOE, 1997a, *Final Waste Management Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Managing Treatment, Storage, and Disposal of Radioactive and Hazardous Waste*, DOE/EIS-0200-F, Office of Environmental Management, Washington, D.C.

DOE, 1997b, *Final Environmental Assessment for the Lease of Land and Facilities within the East Tennessee Technology Park, Oak Ridge, Tennessee*, DOE/EA-1175, Oak Ridge Operations Office, Oak Ridge, Tenn.

DOE, 1999, *Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Alternative Strategies for the Long-Term Management and Use of Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride*, DOE/EIS-0269, Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology, Germantown, Md., April.

Dubrin, J.W., et al., 1997, *Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride Management Program: The Engineering Analysis Report for the Long-Term Management of Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride*, UCRL-AR-124080, Vols. I and II, prepared by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Science Applications International Corporation, Bechtel, and Lockheed Martin Energy Systems for U.S. Department of Energy, Washington, D.C., May.

EPA (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency), 1974, *Information on Levels of Environmental Noise Requisite to Protect Public Health and Welfare with an Adequate Margin of Safety*, EPA-550/9-74-004, Washington, D.C.

EPA, 1988, *Limiting Values of Radionuclide Intake and Air Concentration and Dose Conversion Factors for Inhalation, Submersion, and Ingestion*, Federal Guidance Report No. 11, EPA-520/1-88-020, Office of Radiation Programs, Washington, D.C., Sept.

EPA, 1995a, *Risk-Based Concentration Table*, July–December 1995, Region III, Hazardous Waste Management Division, Office of Superfund Programs, Philadelphia, Pa., Oct.

EPA, 1995b, *User's Guide for the Industrial Source Complex (ISC3) Dispersion Models*, EPA-454/B-95-003a, Version 00101, Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards, Research Triangle Park, N.C., Sept.

EPA, 1999, *Consideration of Cumulative Impacts in EPA Review of NEPA Documents*, EPA 315-R-99-002, *Office of Federal Activities*, Washington, D.C. Available at [www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/nepa/cumulative.pdf](http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/nepa/cumulative.pdf).

EPA, 2002, *Compilation of Air Pollutant Emission Factors*, AP-42, 5th ed. Available at <http://www.epa.gov/ttn/chief/ap42/index.html>. Accessed June and July 2002.

EPA, 2003a, *Integrated Risk Information System*, database, IRIS QuickView. Available at [http://cfpub.epa.gov/iris/quickview.cfm?substance\\_nmbr=0421](http://cfpub.epa.gov/iris/quickview.cfm?substance_nmbr=0421). Accessed Aug. 2003.

EPA, 2003b, *Ground Water and Drinking Water, Radionuclides in Drinking Water, Final Standards*. Available at [wysiug://45/http://www.epa.gov/safewater/standard/pp/radnucpp.html](http://www.epa.gov/safewater/standard/pp/radnucpp.html). Accessed Aug. 2003.

Fisher, D.R., et al., 1994, *Uranium Hexafluoride Public Risk*, letter report, PNL10065, Pacific Northwest Laboratory, Health Protection Department, Richland, Wash., Aug.

Hanna, S.R., et al., 1994, *Technical Documentation of HGSYSTEM/UF<sub>6</sub> Model*, K/SUB/93-XJ947/1, prepared by The Earth Technology Corporation, Concord, Mass., for Lockheed Martin Energy Systems, Inc., Oak Ridge, Tenn., Oct.

Hartmann, H.M., 1999a, *Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride Management Program: Data Compilation for the Paducah Site in Support of Site-Specific NEPA Requirements for Continued Cylinder Storage, Cylinder Preparation, Conversion, and Long-Term Storage Activities*, ANL/EAD/TM-109, Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Ill., Aug.

Hartmann, H.M., 1999b, *Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride Management Program: Data Compilation for the Portsmouth Site in Support of Site-Specific NEPA Requirements for Continued Cylinder Storage, Cylinder Preparation, Conversion, and Long-Term Storage Activities*, ANL/EAD/TM-108, Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Ill., Aug.

Hartmann, H.M., 1999c, *Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride Management Program: Data Compilation for the K-25 Site in Support of Site-Specific NEPA Requirements for Continued Cylinder Storage and Cylinder Preparation Activities*, ANL/EAD/TM-107, Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Ill., Aug.

HMMH (Harris Miller Miller & Hanson, Inc.), 1995, *Transit Noise and Vibration Impact Assessment*, prepared by HMMH, Burlington, Mass., for Office of Planning, Federal Transit Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation, Washington, D.C., April.

Honeywell International, Inc., 2002, *Hydrofluoric Acid Properties*, Vol. 1.1, Morris Township, N.J., Jan. Available at <http://www.hfacid.com>.

Hyne, R.V., et al., 1992, "pH-Dependent Uranium Toxicity to Freshwater Hydra," in *The Science of the Total Environment*, Elsevier Science Publishers B.V., Amsterdam, the Netherlands, pp. 125, 159–173.

ICRP (International Commission on Radiological Protection), 1977, *Recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection*, ICRP Publication 26, Annals of the ICRP, Vol. 1, No. 3, Pergamon Press, New York, N.Y.

ICRP, 1979, *Limit for Intakes of Radionuclides by Workers*, ICRP Publication 30, Part 1 (and subsequent parts and supplements), Vol. 2, No. 34 through Vol. 8, No. 4, Pergamon Press, Oxford, United Kingdom.

ICRP, 1991, *1990 Recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection*, ICRP Publication 60, Annals of the ICRP, Vol. 21, Nos. 1–3, Pergamon Press, New York, N.Y.

ICRP, 1994, *Human Respiratory Tract Model for Radiological Protection*, ICRP Publication 66, Pergamon Press, Oxford, United Kingdom.

Maynard, E.A., and H.C. Hodge, 1949, "Studies of the Toxicity of Various Uranium Compounds when Fed to Experimental Animals," in *Pharmacology and Toxicology of Uranium Compounds*, National Nuclear Energy Series (VI), I.C. Voegtlin and H.C. Hodge (editors), McGraw-Hill, New York, N.Y., pp. 309-376.

McGuire, S.A., 1991, *Chemical Toxicity of Uranium Hexafluoride Compared to Acute Effects of Radiation*, Final Report, NUREG-1391, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, Washington, D.C., Feb.

Minnesota IMPLAN Group, Inc., 2003, *2000 IMPLAN Data*, Version 01.15.2003, CD-ROM, MIG, Inc., Stillwater, Minn.

Napier, B.A., et al., 1988, *GENII — The Hanford Environmental Radiation Dosimetry Software System*, PNL-6584, prepared by Pacific Northwest Laboratory, Richland, Wash., for the U.S. Department of Energy, Dec.

National Safety Council, 2002, *Injury Facts, 2002 Edition*, Itasca, Ill.

Negin, C.A., and G. Worku, 1992, *MicroShield, Version 4, User's Manual*, Grove 92-2, Grove Engineering, Inc., Rockville, Md.

Neuhauser, K.S., and F.L. Kanipe, 1992, *RADTRAN 4, Volume 3: User Guide*, SAND89-2370, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, N.M., Jan.

Neuhauser, K.S., and F.L. Kanipe, 1995, *RADTRAN 4, Volume II: Technical Manual*, SAND89-2370, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, N.M.

NRC (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission), 1977, *Final Environmental Statement on the Transportation of Radioactive Material by Air and Other Modes*, NUREG-0170, Washington, D.C.

NRC, 1994, "10 CFR Part 19, et al., Certification of Gaseous Diffusion Plants, Final Rule," discussion on Section 76.85, "Assessment of Accidents," *Federal Register* 59(184):48954–48955, Sept. 23.

Policastro, A.J., et al., 1997, *Facility Accident Impact Analyses in Support of the Uranium Hexafluoride Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement*, attachment to intraoffice memorandum from Policastro et al. to H.I. Avci (Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Ill.), June 15.

Post, L., et al., 1994a, *HGSYSTEM 3.0, User's Manual*, TNER.94.058, Shell Research Limited, Thornton Research Centre, Chester, United Kingdom.

Post, L., et al., 1994b, *HGSYSTEM 3.0, Technical Reference Manual*, TNER.94.059, Shell Research Limited, Thornton Research Centre, Chester, United Kingdom.

Pratt, B., 2003, personal communication from Pratt (Honeywell, Morristown, N.J.) to M. Lazaro (Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Ill.), Feb. 26.

Saricks, C.L., and M.M. Tompkins, 1999, *State-Level Accident Rates of Surface Freight Transportation: A Reexamination*, ANL/ESD/TM-150, Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Ill., April.

Suter, G.W., and C.L. Tsao, 1996, *Toxicological Benchmarks for Screening Potential Contaminants of Concern for Effects on Aquatic Biota: 1996 Revision*, by Risk Assessment Program, Health Sciences Research, for U.S. Department of Energy.

Tomasko, D., 1997, *Water and Soil Impact Analyses in Support of the Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement*, attachment to intraoffice memorandum from Tomasko to H.I. Avci (Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Ill.), May 21.

Turner, D.B., 1994, *Workbook of Atmospheric Dispersion Estimates: An Introduction to Dispersion Modeling*, 2nd Ed., CRC Press, Inc., Boca Raton, Fla.

UDS (Uranium Disposition Services, LLC), 2003a, *DUF<sub>6</sub> — General Facility Description*, personal communication from S. Gertz (Burns and ROE Enterprises, Mt. Laurel, N.J.) to H. Avci (Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Ill.), Feb. 3.

UDS, 2003b, *Updated NEPA Data*, DUF<sub>6</sub>-UDS-NEP-002, Rev. 0, Oak Ridge, Tenn, Aug. 27.

U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1991, *1990 Census of Population and Housing: Summary of Population and Housing Characteristics*, Washington, D.C.

U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1994, *County and City Data Book, 1994*, Washington, D.C.

U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2000, *Poverty in the United States: 1999*, P-60-210, U.S. Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C.

U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2002a, *U.S. Census American FactFinder*. Available at <http://factfinder.census.gov>.

U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2002b, *County Business Patterns, 2000*, Washington, D.C. Available at <http://www.census.gov/ftp/pub/epcd/cbp/view/cbpview.html>.

Vincent, T.F., 2003, personal communication from Vincent (Framatome Advanced Nuclear Power, Richland, Wash.) to M. Lazaro (Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Ill.), Feb. 26.

Will, M.E., and G.W. Suter, 1994, *Toxicological Benchmarks for Screening Potential Contaminants of Concern for Effects on Terrestrial Plants: 1994 Revision*, ES/ER/TM-85/R1, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tenn., Sept.

Yuan, Y.C., et al., 1995, *RISKIND — A Computer Program for Calculating Radiological Consequences and Health Risks from Transportation of Spent Nuclear Fuel*, ANL/EAD-1, Argonne National Laboratory, Argonne, Ill., Nov.



**RESPONSES TO  
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY  
LETTERS TO STATE AGENCIES  
AND NATIVE AMERICAN GROUPS**



## United States Department of the Interior

### FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE

Ecological Services  
6950 Americana Parkway, Suite H  
Reynoldsburg, Ohio 43068-4127

September 23, 2002

OFFICIAL FILE COPY  
AMESQ

James L. Elmore, Ph.D.  
Department of Energy  
Oak Ridge Operations Office  
P.O. Box 2001  
Oak Ridge, TN 37831

Log No. \_\_\_\_\_  
Date Received OCT 9 2002  
File Code \_\_\_\_\_

Dear Dr. Elmore:

This responds to your letter of July 12, 2002 regarding Federally listed endangered or threatened species that may occur in the vicinity of the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant (PORTS) located in Pike County, Ohio.

#### ENDANGERED SPECIES COMMENTS:

The proposed project lies within the range of the Indiana bat (*Myotis sodalis*), a Federally listed endangered species. Summer habitat requirements for the Indiana bat are not well defined, but the following are thought to be of importance:

1. Dead trees and snags (especially those with exfoliating bark), split tree trunk and/or branches, or cavities which may be used as maternity roosts;
2. Live trees (such as shagbark hickory) which have exfoliating bark;
3. Stream corridors, riparian areas, and upland woodlots which provide forage sites.

We recommend that if potential bat roost trees with the above characteristics are encountered in the project area, they should be saved wherever possible. If they must be cut, they should not be cut between April 15 and September 15.

If desirable trees are present and if the above time restriction is unacceptable, mist net or other surveys should be conducted to determine if bats are present. Any survey should be designed and conducted in coordination with the endangered species coordinator for this office, Ms. Angela Boyer (614-469-6923 ext. 22). The survey should be conducted in June or July, the period when peak bat populations could be expected.

The project lies within the range of the timber rattlesnake, a large shy rattlesnake that is declining throughout its national range. No Federal listing status has been assigned to this species. Instead, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service has initiated a pre-listing Conservation Action Plan to support state and local conservation efforts. Your proactive

efforts to conserve this species now may help avoid the need to list the species under the Endangered Species Act in the future. The timber rattlesnake is protected throughout much of its range and listed as endangered by the State of Ohio. Due to their rarity and reclusive nature, we encourage early project coordination to avoid potential impacts to timber rattlesnakes and their habitat.


In Ohio, the timber rattlesnake is restricted to the un-glaciated Allegheny Plateau and utilizes the specific habitat types, depending upon season. Winters are spent in dens usually associated with high, dry ridges. These dens may face any direction, but southeast to southwest are most common. Such dens usually consist of narrow crevices in the bedrock. Rocks may or may not be present on the surface. From these dens, timber rattlesnakes radiate throughout the surrounding hills and move distances as great as 4.5 miles. In the fall, timber rattlesnakes return to the same den. Intensive efforts to transplant timber rattlesnakes have not been successful. Thus protection of the winter dens is critical to the survival of this species. Some project management ideas include the following:

- 1) At a minimum, project evaluations should contain delineations of timber rattlesnake habitat within project boundaries. Descriptions should indicate the quality and quantity of timber rattlesnake habitat (den sites, basking sites, and foraging area, etc.) that may be affected by the project.
- 2) In cases where timber rattlesnakes are known to occur or where potential habitat is rated moderate to high, timber rattlesnake surveys may be necessary. If surveys are to be conducted, it may be helpful to inquire about timber rattlesnake sightings with local resource agency personnel or reliable local residents. In addition, local herpetologists may have knowledge of historical populations as well as precise knowledge of the habits, and the specific local types of habitats that may contain timber rattlesnakes. Surveys should be performed during the periods of spring emergence from dens (usually a short period in April or May) and throughout the active season until October. The species is often easiest to locate during the summer months when pregnant females seek open areas in early morning, especially after cool evenings.
- 3) In portions of projects where timber rattlesnakes will be affected, clearing and construction activities should occur at distances greater than 100 feet from known dens. Most importantly, tops of ridges and areas of exposed rock should be avoided.
- 4) In areas where timber rattlesnake dens are known or likely to exist, maintenance activities (mowing, cutting, burning, etc.) should be conducted from November 1 to March 1, when timber rattlesnakes are hibernating.

Two divisions of the Ohio Department of Natural Resources, the Division of Wildlife (614-265-6300) and the Division of Natural Areas and Preserves (614-265-6472), maintain lists of plants and animals of concern to the State of Ohio. If you have not already done so, you may wish to contact each of these agencies to obtain site-specific information about species of state concern.

If you have questions or we may be of further assistance in this matter please contact Mr. Bill Kurey of this office at 614-469-6923 ext. 14.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Mary Knapp". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large, prominent "M" and "K".

Mary Knapp, Ph.D.  
Supervisor

cc: R. Sanders, ODOW

**FISH & WILDLIFE COMMISSION**

Mike Boatwright, Paducah  
Tom Baker, Bowling Green  
Allen K. Gailor, Louisville  
Ron Southall, Elizabethtown  
Dr. James R. Rich, Taylor Mill, Chairman  
Ben Frank Brown, Richmond  
Doug Hensley, Hazard  
Dr. Robert C. Webb, Grayson  
David H. Godby, Somerset



COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY  
DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND WILDLIFE RESOURCES  
C. THOMAS BENNETT, COMMISSIONER

July 26, 2002

OFFICIAL FILE COPY  
AMESQ

Mr. James L. Elmore  
Department of Energy  
Oak Ridge Operations Office  
P.O. Box 2001  
Oak Ridge, TN 37831

Log No. 71283  
Date Received AUG 2 2002  
File Code \_\_\_\_\_

RE: Environmental Impact Statement Converting DUF6  
Stored at Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant,  
McCracken County, Kentucky

Dear Mr. Elmore:

I have reviewed the information provided on the above-referenced project. Accordingly, I offer the following comments and recommendations.

A review of the Kentucky Fish and Wildlife Information System indicates that several federal and/or state threatened and/or endangered species are known to occur within McCracken County that could be impacted by the project. That species list is attached. Please be aware that our database system is a dynamic one that only represents our current knowledge of the various species distributions. This information may also be obtained on the worldwide web at: [www.kfwis.state.ky.us](http://www.kfwis.state.ky.us).

I would recommend that a habitat survey be conducted at the site of the proposed project and if any habitat that might harbor any of these species exists, then a specific survey for that species should be conducted. The results of those surveys will dictate if any additional surveys or analysis need to be conducted.

I appreciate the opportunity to comment.

Sincerely,

Wayne L. Davis  
Environmental Section Chief

cc: Environmental Section Files



Arnold L. Mitchell Bldg. #1 Game Farm Road Frankfort, Ky 40601  
An Equal Opportunity Employer M/F/D

1 of 1

<i>Alosa alabamae</i>	Alabama shad	Osteichthyes	MCCRACKEN	C	E	Reference
<i>Atractosteus spatula</i>	alligator gar	Osteichthyes	MCCRACKEN		E	Reference
<i>Cyprinella camura</i>	bluntnose shiner	Osteichthyes	MCCRACKEN		E	Reference
<i>Hybognathus hayi</i>	cypress minnow	Osteichthyes	MCCRACKEN		E	Reference
<i>Myotis sodalis</i>	Indiana myotis	Mammalia	MCCRACKEN	LE	E	Reference
<i>Obovaria retusa</i>	ring pink	Bivalvia	MCCRACKEN	LE	E	Reference
<i>Notropis maculatus</i>	taillight shiner	Osteichthyes	MCCRACKEN		T	Reference
<i>Nyctanassa violacea</i>	yellow-crowned night-heron	Aves	MCCRACKEN		T	Reference



## United States Department of the Interior

### FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE

446 Neal Street  
Cookeville, TN 38501

September 18, 2002

Mr. James L. Elmore, Ph.D.  
U.S. Department of Energy  
Oak Ridge Operations Office  
P.O. Box 2001  
Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37831

Dear Dr. Elmore:

Thank you for your letter and enclosures received July 23, 2002, regarding the preparation of an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for the proposed construction and operation of a facility to convert DUF<sub>6</sub> to a more stable chemical form at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant (PGDP) in McCracken County, Kentucky. The referenced maps of the PGDP and proposed facility locations were not included in your letter. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service personnel have reviewed the information submitted and offer the following comments for consideration.

According to our records, the following federally listed endangered species may occur on or near the PGDP:

Indiana bat *Myotis sodalis*

A qualified biologist should assess potential impacts and determine if the proposed project may affect the species. We recommend that you submit a copy of your assessment and the draft EIS to this office for review and concurrence. A finding of "may affect" could require the initiation of formal consultation procedures.

These constitute the comments of the U.S. Department of the Interior in accordance with provisions of the Endangered Species Act (87 Stat. 884, as amended: 16 U.S.C. 1531 et seq.). We appreciate the opportunity to comment. Should you have any questions or need further assistance, please contact Steve Alexander of my staff at 931/528-6481, ext. 210, or via e-mail at [steven\\_alexander@fws.gov](mailto:steven_alexander@fws.gov).

Sincerely,

Lee A. Barclay, Ph.D.  
Field Supervisor

xc: Wayne Davis, KDFWR, Frankfort  
Laila Lienesch, FWS, Frankfort

DONALD S. DOTT, JR.  
DIRECTOR



PAUL E. PATTON  
GOVERNOR

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY  
**KENTUCKY STATE NATURE PRESERVES COMMISSION**  
801 SCHENKEL LANE  
FRANKFORT, KENTUCKY 40601-1403  
(502) 573-2886 VOICE  
(502) 573-2355 FAX

August 12, 2002

James L. Elmore, Ph.D.  
Department of Energy  
Oak Ridge Operations Office  
P.O. Box 2001  
Oak Ridge, TN 37831-2001

Dear Dr. Elmore:

This letter is in response to your data request of July 12, 2002 for State-Listed species information in the vicinity of the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant DUF<sub>6</sub> Conversion facility project. We have reviewed our Natural Heritage Program Database to determine if any of the endangered, threatened, or special concern plants and animals or exemplary natural communities monitored by the Kentucky State Nature Preserves Commission occur in the area. Based on our most current information, we have determined that 68 occurrences of the plants or animals and one occurrence of the exemplary natural communities that are monitored by KSNPC are reported as occurring in the specified area. Please see the attached report for more information. I have included a separate report of the species known from McCracken County, Kentucky as well.

Data and data products received from the Kentucky State Nature Preserves Commission, including any portion thereof, may not be reproduced in any form or by any means without the express written authorization of the Kentucky State Nature Preserves Commission. The exact location of plants, animals, and natural communities, if released by the Kentucky State Nature Preserves Commission, may not be released in any document or correspondence. These products are provided on a temporary basis for the express project (described above) of the requester, and may not be redistributed, resold or copied without the written permission of the Kentucky State Nature Preserves Commission's Data Manager (801 Schenkel Lane, Frankfort, KY, 40601. Phone: (502) 573-2886).



OFFICIAL FILE COPY  
AMESQ

Log No. 73630

Date Received AUG 16 2002

AN EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMPLOYER M/F/D  
File Code \_\_\_\_\_

Page 2  
August 12, 2002

Please note that the quantity and quality of data collected by the Kentucky Natural Heritage Program are dependent on the research and observations of many individuals and organizations. In most cases, this information is not the result of comprehensive or site-specific field surveys; many natural areas in Kentucky have never been thoroughly surveyed, and new plants and animals are still being discovered. For these reasons, the Kentucky Natural Heritage Program cannot provide a definitive statement on the presence, absence, or condition of biological elements in any part of Kentucky. Heritage reports summarize the existing information known to the Kentucky Natural Heritage Program at the time of the request regarding the biological elements or locations in question. They should never be regarded as final statements on the elements or areas being considered, nor should they be substituted for on-site surveys required for environmental assessments. We would greatly appreciate receiving any pertinent information obtained as a result of on-site surveys.

If you have any questions or if I can be of further assistance, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Sincerely,



Sara Hines  
Data Manager

Enclosures: Data Report and Interpretation Key, McCracken County List  
Endangered, Threatened, and Special Concern Plants and Animals of Kentucky  
Plants and Animals Presumed Extinct or Extirpated from Kentucky  
Monitored Natural Communities of Kentucky

**Data Key for Element and Occurrence Reports (v. 3.98)**  
 Kentucky State Nature Preserves Commission  
 Natural Heritage Program Data Services

Many of the data fields on the enclosed report are easily understood. Other fields, however, use abbreviations and formats that are not always self-explanatory. A key to these fields follows. Your report may contain some or all of the following data fields.

BEARING:	Bearing in degrees from a center point to an occurrence's latitude and longitude. This field is masked for sensitive occurrences; contact KSNPC in these cases. Omitted for G, U, and Q precision occurrence records.
BESTSOURCE:	Best available reference to the occurrence: literature citation, collector, collection number, museum or herbarium code, etc.
COMMENTS:	Additional information about the occurrence including identification, taxonomy, or date of occurrence.
DIRECTIONS:	Directions to an occurrence. This field is masked for sensitive occurrences; contact KSNPC in these cases.
DISTANCE:	Distance from a center point to an occurrence's latitude and longitude. Units coded as M (miles), K (kilometers), and F (feet). This field is masked for sensitive occurrences; contact KSNPC in these cases. Omitted for G, U, and Q precision occurrence records.
ELCODE:	Element (species) code.
EOCODE:	Element (species) code, occurrence number (last three digits), and state.
EODATA:	Occurrence population data: date of observation, number of individuals, health, size of colony, flowering data, etc.
EORANK:	Judgement of occurrence quality: A = excellent, B = good, C = marginal, D = poor, E = verified extant but quality not judged, O = obscure (not found at reported site but more searching needed), H = historically known from site but no known observation or collection since 1975, X = extirpated from site.
FIRSTOBS:	Year of first known observation or collection.
GENDESC:	Description of an occurrence's habitat.
GRANK:	Estimate of element abundance on a global scale: G1 = extremely rare, G2 = rare, G3 = uncommon, G4 = common, G5 = very common, GH = historically known and expected to be rediscovered, GU = uncertain, GX = extinct. Subspecies and variety abundances are coded with a 'T' suffix; the 'G' portion of the rank then refers to the entire species.
HABITAT:	General description of the element's habitat across its range.
IDENT:	Whether the identification has been checked by a reliable individual and is believed to be correctly identified: Y = identification confirmed and believed correct, N = No, identification determined to be wrong despite reports to the contrary, ? = Whether identification is correct or not is confusing or disputed, blank or U = unknown whether identification correct or not, assumed correct.
KSNPC:	Kentucky State Nature Preserves Commission status: N or blank = none, E = endangered, T = threatened, S = special concern, H = historic, X = extirpated.
LASTOBS:	Year(-month-date) of most recent known observation or collection.
LAT:	Latitude. This field is masked for sensitive occurrences; contact KSNPC in these cases. Omitted for G, U and Q precision occurrences.
LONG:	Longitude. This field is masked for sensitive occurrences; contact KSNPC in these cases. Omitted for G, U and Q precision occurrences.
MAP NUMBER:	Number used to location the element on KSNPC Heritage maps.
MARGNUM:	See MAP NUMBER.
PREC:	See PRECISION.

KSNPC  
Data Request No. 03-022

Rare Species and Communities Revisited for the Proposed DUF<sub>6</sub> Conversion Facility at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant.

Pg 1 of 7  
8/12/02

ECCODE	SCIENCE NAME	SCORNAME	SRANK	SRANK	SPROT	IDENT	LASTDTS	PREORANK	COUNTY	7.5 MINUTE QUADRANGLE	EPA WATERBODY	DIRECTIONS	HABITAT
***Vascular Plants													
PDAB03417015KY	BAPTISIA BRACTEATA VAR LEUCOPHAEA	CREAM WILD INDIGO	S3	S3	S	Y	1997-05-11	0	McCracken	HEATH	WEST KY WMA, RD AROUND NUCLEAR PLANT (DYKE RD).		PRAIRIES AND OPEN WOODS ON SANDY SOIL.
PDJUG01010027KY	CARYA AQUATICA	WATER HICKORY	S2S3	S2S3	T	Y	1997-	0	McCracken	JOPPA	METROPOLIS LAKE.		BOTTOMLANDS AND FLOODPLAIN SWAMPS.
PDSTY01030217KY	HALESIA TETRAPTERA	MOUNTAIN SILVER-BELL	S1S2	S1S2	R	Y	2001-04-13	0	McCracken	JOPPA	METROPOLIS LAKE SW. SW. END OF METROPOLIS LAKE, CA 0.3 AIR MILE OF POWERPLANT LOCATED OFF OF KY 99E.		RICH WOODS AND EDGES OF SLOUGHS AND OXBOW LAKES.
PDSTY01030715KY	HALESIA TETRAPTERA	MOUNTAIN SILVER-BELL	S1S2	S1S2	R	Y	1991-09-20	0	McCracken	JOPPA	CIRCA 1.0 AIR MI. W. W. CORNER OF SETTLING PONDS FOR SHAWNEE STEAM PLANT ALONG RIDGE ABOVE OHIO RIVER.		RICH WOODS AND EDGES OF SLOUGHS AND OXBOW LAKES.
PDASTB03040701KY	MELANTHERA NIVEA	SNOW MELANTHERA	S37	S37	S	Y	2001-07-23	0	McCracken	JOPPA	METROPOLIS LAKE, OFF KY 99E, W OF PADUCAH.		FLOODPLAINS AND SANDY WOODS INCLUDING DISTURBED OPENINGS.
PDPOA48030205KY	MUHLENBERGIA GLABRIFLORIS	HAIR GRASS	S2S3	S2S3	S	Y	1977-08-21	0	McCracken	JOPPA	ALONG METROPOLIS FERRY ROAD, OFF OF KY 142D, 725 BETWEEN KY 726 AND KY 1154 (MARGINUM 34, 37605N, 844339W), (MARGINUM 35, 37053N, 844339W), (MARGINUM 36, 370521N, 844305W), (MARGINUM 37, 370515N, 844089W), (MARGINUM 38, 370517N, 844191W); JCT OF MAGRUDER RD		DRY, DESICCATED OR BAKED SOILS, PRAIRIES, GRAVELS, OR ROCKY SLOPES AND MEDLEY REPORTS WET WOODS, MARSH EDGES AND FIELDS.
PDASTL02027015KY	SILPHIUM LACINATUM VAR ROBINSONII	COMPASS PLANT	S17	S17	T	Y	1993-07	0	McCracken	HEATH	WEST KENTUCKY WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT AREA BETWEEN SPRING BAYOU (BAYOU CREEK) AND ACID RD, CA 0.5 AIR MI NW OF SPRING BAYOU CHURCH.		PRAIRIES INCL. REMNANTS OF THIS FLORA ON ROADSIDES AND FIELDS.
PDASTL02027025KY	SILPHIUM LACINATUM VAR ROBINSONII	COMPASS PLANT	S2	S2	T	Y	1999-07	0	McCracken	HEATH	BOTH SIDES OF UNPAVED GRAVEL RD, CA 0.1 AIR MILES OF SOUTH ACID RD (MARGINUM 21), (MARGINUM 22, 270510N, 844351W), (MARGINUM 40, 37053N, 844349W), (MARGINUM 41, 370548N, 844320W), (MARGINUM 42, 370545N, 844349W).		PRAIRIES INCL. REMNANTS OF THIS FLORA ON ROADSIDES AND FIELDS.
PDASTL02027016KY	SILPHIUM LACINATUM VAR ROBINSONII	COMPASS PLANT	S2	S2	T	Y	1993-07	0	McCracken	HEATH	WEST KENTUCKY WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT AREA BETWEEN SPRING BAYOU (BAYOU CREEK) AND ACID RD, CA 0.5 AIR MI NW OF SPRING BAYOU CHURCH.		PRAIRIES INCL. REMNANTS OF THIS FLORA ON ROADSIDES AND FIELDS.
***Gastropod													
IMGASG1007008KY	LEPTOXIS PRABROSA	ONYX ROCKSMAIL	S3S4	S3S4	Y	Y	1990-10-18	0	McCracken	JOPPA	OHIO RIVER AT MILE 446.0, LITTLE CHAIN BAR.		CALL (1815) INDICATED THAT IN THE OHIO RIVER AT THE FALLS IT OCCURRED IN THE GREATEST PROPORTION WHERE THE BOTTOM IS CLEAN ROCK OR ROCK WITH ABUNDANT "CONIFEROID" VEGETATION.
IMGASG1007023KY	LITHASIA VERRUCOSA	VARIKOSE ROCKSMAIL	S3S4	S3S4	Y	Y	1990-10-18	0	McCracken	JOPPA	OHIO RIVER AT MILE 446.0, LITTLE CHAIN BAR.		OBSERVATIONS ON THE HABITAT INCLUDE SPECIMENS TAKEN FROM RECENTLY EXPOSED BARS AND POOLS WITH SAND, GRAVEL, AND ROCK SUBSTRATES (HAG AND PALMER-BALL, PERS COMM).

Rare Species And Communities Recorded for the Proposed DUF<sub>6</sub> Conversion Facility at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant.

KSNPC  
Data Request No. 08-022

ECCODE	SNAME	SCOMNAME	SRANK	SRANK	SPROT	USESA	IDENT	LASTOBS	PREC	COUNTY	7.5 MINUTE QUADRANGLE	EPA WATERBODY	DIRECTIONS	HABITAT
***Breathes														
IMEV21107054*XY	LAMPUSILUS ABRUPTA	PINK MUCKET	03	03	0	Y	2001-08-31	0	McCracken	JOPPA	OHIO RIVER MILE 848.4, CA 120 M FROM KY SHORE.	OHIO RIVER BETWEEN METROPOLIS AND JOPPA (PLOTTED AT MIDPOINT).	APPARENTLY MORE COMMONLY FROM GRAVEL AND COBBLE, COLLECTED FROM SHALLOW AND DEEP WATER WITH CURRENT VELOCITY RANGING FROM ZERO TO SWIFT (AHLSTEDT 1983, BOGAN AND PARMALEE 1983, BUCHANAN 1989), BUT NEVER STANDING POOLS OF WATER (LAURITSEN PARMALEE 1987, STANSEBY 1978), BUT OCCURS IN MEDIUM-SIZED STREAMS IN GRAVEL, SAND, OR EVEN MUD (PARMALEE 1987, JOHNSON 1970, GORDON AND LAYZER 1989). IN THE LOWER WABASH AND OHIO RIVERS SPECIMENS WERE TAKEN IN DEEP WATER (5-10 FEET OR MORE) IN CURRENT FROM SAND	
IMEV211307078*XY	LAMPUSILUS OVATA	POCKETBOOK	03	03	0	Y	1954-06-30	0	McCracken	JOPPA	OHIO RIVER AT HILLERMAN, IL.	OHIO RIVER AT HILLERMAN, IL.	USUALLY FOUND IN LARGE RIVERS IN SAND AND GRAVEL SUBSTRATES (AHLSTEDT 1983, BOGAN AND PARMALEE 1983, MILLER, A.C. ET AL. 1988).	
IMEV340207032*XY	PLETHOBASIS COOPERIANUS	ORANGEFOOT PINPLEBACK	03	03	0	Y	1907-09-18	0	McCracken	BANDANA	OHIO R. AT LITTLE CHAIN BAR CA R. MI 948.	OHIO R. AT LITTLE CHAIN BAR CA R. MI 948.	USUALLY FOUND IN LARGE RIVERS IN SAND AND GRAVEL SUBSTRATES (AHLSTEDT 1983, BOGAN AND PARMALEE 1983, MILLER, A.C. ET AL. 1988).	
IMEV340207053*XY	PLETHOBASIS COOPERIANUS	ORANGEFOOT PINPLEBACK	03	03	0	Y	1999-09-07	0	McCracken	JOPPA	OHIO RIVER MILE 848.4, CA 120 M FROM KY SHORE	OHIO RIVER MILE 848.4, CA 120 M FROM KY SHORE	USUALLY FOUND IN LARGE RIVERS IN SAND AND GRAVEL SUBSTRATES (AHLSTEDT 1983, BOGAN AND PARMALEE 1983, MILLER, A.C. ET AL. 1988).	
IMEV340207055*XY	PLETHOBASIS COOPERIANUS	ORANGEFOOT PINPLEBACK	03	03	0	Y	2001-08-31	0	McCracken	JOPPA	OHIO RIVER BETWEEN METROPOLIS AND JOPPA (PLOTTED AT MIDPOINT).	OHIO RIVER BETWEEN METROPOLIS AND JOPPA (PLOTTED AT MIDPOINT).	USUALLY FOUND IN LARGE RIVERS IN SAND AND GRAVEL SUBSTRATES (AHLSTEDT 1983, BOGAN AND PARMALEE 1983, MILLER, A.C. ET AL. 1988).	
IMEV340307080*XY	PLETHOBASIS CYPHIUS	SHEEPIROSE	03	03	0	Y	1954-06-30	0	McCracken	JOPPA	OHIO RIVER AT JOPPA.	OHIO RIVER AT JOPPA.	USUALLY FOUND IN LARGE RIVERS IN CURRENT ON MUD, SAND, OR GRAVEL BOTTOMS AT DEPTH OF 1-2 METERS OR MORE (BAKER 1928, PARMALEE 1987, GORDON AND LAYZER 1989).	
IMEV340307087*XY	PLETHOBASIS CYPHIUS	SHEEPIROSE	03	03	0	Y	1955-05-17	0	McCracken	JOPPA	OHIO RIVER AT HILLERMAN, IL.	OHIO RIVER AT HILLERMAN, IL.	USUALLY FOUND IN LARGE RIVERS IN CURRENT ON MUD, SAND, OR GRAVEL BOTTOMS AT DEPTH OF 1-2 METERS OR MORE (BAKER 1928, PARMALEE 1987, GORDON AND LAYZER 1989).	
IMEV340307085*XY	PLETHOBASIS CYPHIUS	SHEEPIROSE	03	03	0	Y	1907-08-18	0	McCracken	BANDANA	OHIO RIVER AT LITTLE CHAIN BAR, CA MI 848.	OHIO RIVER AT LITTLE CHAIN BAR, CA MI 848.	USUALLY FOUND IN LARGE RIVERS IN CURRENT ON MUD, SAND, OR GRAVEL BOTTOMS AT DEPTH OF 1-2 METERS OR MORE (BAKER 1928, PARMALEE 1987, GORDON AND LAYZER 1989).	
IMEV340307125*XY	PLETHOBASIS CYPHIUS	SHEEPIROSE	03	03	0	Y	1999-08	0	McCracken	JOPPA	OHIO R. AT HILLERMAN, MASSACHUSETTS, U.S.A.	OHIO R. AT HILLERMAN, MASSACHUSETTS, U.S.A.	USUALLY FOUND IN LARGE RIVERS IN CURRENT ON MUD, SAND, OR GRAVEL BOTTOMS AT DEPTH OF 1-2 METERS OR MORE (BAKER 1928, PARMALEE 1987, GORDON AND LAYZER 1989).	
IMEV370307001*XY	POTAMILUS CAPAX	FAT POCKETBOOK	03	03	0	Y	1907-08	0	McCracken	BANDANA	OHIO RIVER AT CA R. MI 948.6, BAR AT POWERLINE CROSSING.	OHIO RIVER AT CA R. MI 948.6, BAR AT POWERLINE CROSSING.	SMALL TO LARGE RIVERS WITH SAND, GRAVEL, AND COBBLE AND MODERATE TO SWIFT CURRENT, SOMETIMES IN DEEP WATER (PARMALEE 1987, BOGAN AND PARMALEE 1983).	
IMEV370307029*XY	POTAMILUS CAPAX	FAT POCKETBOOK	03	03	0	Y	1999-09-07	0	McCracken	JOPPA	OHIO RIVER AT HILLERMAN, IL.	OHIO RIVER AT HILLERMAN, IL.	SMALL TO LARGE RIVERS WITH SAND, GRAVEL, AND COBBLE AND MODERATE TO SWIFT CURRENT, SOMETIMES IN DEEP WATER (PARMALEE 1987, BOGAN AND PARMALEE 1983).	
IMEV380417041*XY	QUADRULA CYLINDRICA	RABBITFOOT	03	03	0	Y	1907-08-18	0	McCracken	BANDANA	OHIO RIVER AT HILLERMAN, IL.	OHIO RIVER AT HILLERMAN, IL.	SMALL TO LARGE RIVERS WITH SAND, GRAVEL, AND COBBLE AND MODERATE TO SWIFT CURRENT, SOMETIMES IN DEEP WATER (PARMALEE 1987, BOGAN AND PARMALEE 1983).	

ECODE	SWNAME	SCOMNAME	CRANK	SRANK	SFROT	USESA	IDENT	LASTOSS	PREC	COUNTY	7.5 MINUTE QUADRANGLE	EPA WATERBODY	DIRECTIONS	HABITAT
IMBV03041003*XY	QUADRULA CYLINDRICA CYLINDRICA	RABBITSFOOT	G3T3	S2	T	Y	1887-05-21	S	O	McCracken	JOPPA	OHIO RIVER, CRH 945, AT END OF ROAD THAT PASSES E SIDE OF METROPOLIS LAKE, 10 MI WNW OF PADUCAH.	SMALL TO LARGE RIVERS WITH SAND, GRAVEL, AND COBBLE AND MODERATE TO SWIFT CURRENT. SOMETIMES IN DEEP WATER (PARMALEE 1987, BOGAN AND PARMALEE 1983).	
***Cnidarians														
ICMAL11060704*XY	ORCONECTES LANCIFER	A GRAYFISH	GR	S1	E	Y	1975-04-28	S	H	McCracken	JOPPA	METROPOLIS LAKE 4.8 KM N GRAHAMVILLE NEAR END OF HWY 205 (ACTUALLY END OF HWY 895 AND DRIVEWAY TO LAKE).	OXBOW LAKES AND STREAMS ON THE GULF COASTAL PLAIN (PAGE 1985) WHERE IT LIVES AMONG ORGANIC DEBRIS, USUALLY NEAR BALD CYPRESS (BURR AND HOBBS 1984).	
***Fishes														
AFCBA0207002*XY	ATROCTOSTEUS SPATULA	ALLIGATOR GAR	GR4	S1	E	Y	1975-06-27	S	H	McCracken	JOPPA	OHIO RIVER AT SHAWNEE STEAM PLANT, NEAR PADUCAH.	SLEAZH POOLS AND BACKWATERS OF LARGE RIVERS, BACKWATERS, AND OXBOW LAKES (BURR AND WARREN 1986, PAGE AND BURR 1991, EITNER AND STARNES 1992).	
AFCJCS620708*XY	ERIMYZON SUCCETTA	LAKE CHUBSUCKER	GR	S2	T	Y		S	H	McCracken	JOPPA	OHIO RIVER, SHAWNEE STEAM PLANT W OF PADUCAH.	LOWLAND LENTIC HABITATS (WETLANDS AND FLOODPLAIN LAKES) WITH SUBMERGENT AND FLOATING VEGETATION (BURR AND WARREN 1986, EITNER AND STARNES 1992).	
AFCJDN01040703*XY	ESOX NIGER	CHAIN PICKEREL	GR	S3	S	Y	1972-05-28	E	M	McCracken	JOPPA	METROPOLIS LAKE, 4.3 KM N GRAHAMVILLE.	COASTAL PLAIN WETLANDS, STREAMS, AND VEGETATED OXBOW LAKE SHORELINES, AND IT ALSO TOLERATES RESERVOIR CONDITIONS (BURR AND WARREN 1986, EITNER AND STARNES 1992).	
AFCJBI6002004*XY	HYBOMYXUS HATI	CYPRESS MINNOW	GR	S1	E	Y	1982-07-21	S	D	McCracken	JOPPA	METROPOLIS LAKE, 3 MI N GRAHAMVILLE.	COASTAL PLAIN AND SHAWNEE HILLS, USUALLY OVER MUD OR SAND BOTTOMS, BUT OCCASIONALLY ASSOCIATED WITH SUBMERGED AQUATIC VEGETATION OF OTHER COVER (BURR AND WARREN 1986, PFLIEGER 1975, SMITH 1973, GILBERT 1990, BURR ET AL. 1990). NEEDS WETLANDS ADJACENT CONSISTS OF GRAVEL AND RUBBLE WITH AREAS OF SAND AND SILT. LARVAE REQUIRE CLEAR STREAMS WITH STABLE BARS OF SILT, SAND AND ORGANIC DETRITUS (BECKER 1983, PFLIEGER 1975, RICHIE AND LANTIGNIE-COURCHERE 1986, SCOTT AND CROSSMAN 1973, SMITH 1979).	
AFCBA0207006*XY	ICHTHYOMYZON CASTANEUS	CHESTNUT LAMPREY	GR	S2	S	Y	1951	S	H	McCracken	JOPPA	OHIO RIVER AT JOPPA, ILLINOIS.	RESERVOIRS AND MEDIUM TO LARGE RIVERS WITH MODERATE TO LOW GRADIENT AND SOME TIME SWIFT CURRENT (BECKER 1983, PFLIEGER 1975, SMITH 1979, TRAUTMAN 1981, AND BURR AND WARREN 1986).	
AFCBA0207007*XY	ICHTHYOMYZON CASTANEUS	CHESTNUT LAMPREY	GR	S2	S	Y	1951	S	H	McCracken	METROPOLIS	OHIO RIVER AT METROPOLIS, ILLINOIS.	RESERVOIRS AND MEDIUM TO LARGE RIVERS WITH MODERATE TO LOW GRADIENT AND SOME TIME SWIFT CURRENT (BECKER 1983, PFLIEGER 1975, SMITH 1979, TRAUTMAN 1981, AND BURR AND WARREN 1986).	
AFCBA0207010*XY	ICHTHYOMYZON CASTANEUS	CHESTNUT LAMPREY	GR	S2	S	Y	1974-04-17	S	M	McCracken	JOPPA	OHIO RIVER, AT SHAWNEE STEAM PLANT.	RESERVOIRS AND MEDIUM TO LARGE RIVERS WITH MODERATE TO LOW GRADIENT AND SOME TIME SWIFT CURRENT (BECKER 1983, PFLIEGER 1975, SMITH 1979, TRAUTMAN 1981, AND BURR AND WARREN 1986).	
AFCJDT0307016*XY	ICTIOBUS NIGER	BLACK BUFFALO	GR	S3	S	Y	1987-08-20	E	O	McCracken	JOPPA	OHIO RIVER, SHAWNEE STEAM PLANT, NW OF PADUCAH.	RESERVOIRS AND MEDIUM TO LARGE RIVERS WITH MODERATE TO LOW GRADIENT AND SOME TIME SWIFT CURRENT (BECKER 1983, PFLIEGER 1975, SMITH 1973, TRAUTMAN 1981, AND BURR AND WARREN 1986).	
AFCJDT0307025*XY	ICTIOBUS NIGER	BLACK BUFFALO	GR	S3	S	Y	1989-04	S	O	McCracken	JOPPA	LITTLE BAYOU CREEK (AT UNNAMED RD NR HOOPER CEMETERY CA 2.0 AIR KM NW OF KY 896 KY 7400 JCT).	RESERVOIRS AND MEDIUM TO LARGE RIVERS WITH MODERATE TO LOW GRADIENT AND SOME TIME SWIFT CURRENT (BECKER 1983, PFLIEGER 1975, SMITH 1973, TRAUTMAN 1981, AND BURR AND WARREN 1986).	

Rate Species And Communities Recorded for the Proposed DUF<sub>6</sub> Conversion Facility at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant.

Pg 4 of 7  
8/12/02

KSNPC  
Data Request No. 09-022

ECO CODE	SHANE	SCOMNAME	SRANK	SRANK	SPHOTO	USESA	IDENT	LAST OBS	PREC	COUNTY	7.5 MINUTE QUADRANGLE	EPA WATERBODY	DIRECTIONS	HABITAT
AFC020107027KY	ICTOBUS NIGER	BLACK BUFFALO	6	6	S	Y	197-08	6	6	McCracken	JOPPA		BIG BAYOU CREEK (CA. 0.4 STREAM KM S OF WEST BOONE RD CROSSING)	RESERVOIRS AND MEDIUM TO LARGE RIVERS WITH MODERATE TO LOW GRADIENT AND SOMETIMES SWIFT CURRENT (BECKER 1983, PFLIEGER 1975, SMITH 1979, TRAUTMAN 1981, AND BURR AND WARREN 1986).
AFC0B11207032KY	LEPOMIS MINIATUS	REDSPOTTED SUNFISH	6	6	T	Y	1987-08	6	6	McCracken	HEATH		LITTLE BAYOU CK AT KY 438 (SITE 12)	OCCURS IN WELL-VEGETATED SWAMPS, SLOUGHS, BOTTOMLAND LAKES, AND LOW GRADIENT STREAMS (BURR AND WARREN 1979, PFLIEGER 1975, SMITH 1979, BURR AND WARREN 1986, ETNIER AND STARINES 1989).
AFC0B11207035KY	LEPOMIS MINIATUS	REDSPOTTED SUNFISH	6	6	T	Y	1986-04	6	6	McCracken	JOPPA		LITTLE BAYOU AT UNNAMED RD (SITE 10) (NR HOOPER CEMETERY CA 2.0 AIR KM NW OF KY #66KY 1426 JCT)	OCCURS IN WELL-VEGETATED SWAMPS, SLOUGHS, BOTTOMLAND LAKES, AND LOW GRADIENT STREAMS (BURR AND WARREN 1979, PFLIEGER 1975, SMITH 1979, BURR AND WARREN 1986, ETNIER AND STARINES 1989).
AFC0B11207034KY	LEPOMIS MINIATUS	REDSPOTTED SUNFISH	6	6	T	Y	1988-06	6	6	McCracken	JOPPA		BIG BAYOU CREEK AT BOLDY RD, 2.8 RIVER KM FROM MOUTH (SITE 14)	OCCURS IN WELL-VEGETATED SWAMPS, SLOUGHS, BOTTOMLAND LAKES, AND LOW GRADIENT STREAMS (BURR AND WARREN 1979, PFLIEGER 1975, SMITH 1979, BURR AND WARREN 1986, ETNIER AND STARINES 1989).
AFC0B11207007KY	LEPOMIS MINIATUS	REDSPOTTED SUNFISH	6	6	T	Y	1988-04-02	6	6	McCracken	JOPPA		METROPOLIS LAKE, 4.8 KM N OF GRAHAMVILLE	OCCURS IN WELL-VEGETATED SWAMPS, SLOUGHS, BOTTOMLAND LAKES, AND LOW GRADIENT STREAMS (BURR AND WARREN 1979, PFLIEGER 1975, SMITH 1979, BURR AND WARREN 1986, ETNIER AND STARINES 1989).
AFC0A020107007KY	MENIDIA BERYLLINA	INLAND SILVERSIDE	6	6	T	Y	1992-08-04	6	6	McCracken	JOPPA		OHIO RIVER NEAR JOPPA.	SCHOOLING SURFACE FISH THAT OCCURS IN THE MISSISSIPPI RIVER AND FLOODPLAIN LAKES (BURR AND WARREN 1986, ETNIER AND STARINES 1989).
AFC0A020107009KY	MENIDIA BERYLLINA	INLAND SILVERSIDE	6	6	T	Y	1992-08-25	6	6	McCracken	JOPPA		OHIO RIVER MILE 844-848, NEAR SHAWNEE STEAM PLANT.	SCHOOLING SURFACE FISH THAT OCCURS IN THE MISSISSIPPI RIVER AND FLOODPLAIN LAKES (BURR AND WARREN 1986, ETNIER AND STARINES 1989).
AFC0A020107012KY	MENIDIA BERYLLINA	INLAND SILVERSIDE	6	6	T	Y	1989-07-21	6	6	McCracken	JOPPA		METROPOLIS LAKE AT BOAT RAMP.	SCHOOLING SURFACE FISH THAT OCCURS IN THE MISSISSIPPI RIVER AND FLOODPLAIN LAKES (BURR AND WARREN 1986, ETNIER AND STARINES 1989).
AFC0B085070027KY	NOTROPIS MACULATUS	TALLIGHT SHIRER	6	6	T	Y	1998-04-02	6	6	McCracken	JOPPA		METROPOLIS LAKE, 5 KM N GRAHAMVILLE	LOW GRADIENT STREAMS, OXBOW LAKES, AND SLOUGHS IN AND AROUND CYPRESS KNEES, MARGINAL VEGETATION, AND ACCUMULATIONS OF STICKS AND DETRITUS (BURR AND WARREN 1986, ETNIER AND STARINES 1989).
AFC0A022207047KY	NOTURUS STIGMOSUS	NORTHERN MADTOM	6	6	S	Y	1999-08-08	6	6	McCracken	JOPPA		OHIO RIVER AT SHAWNEE STEAM PLANT, NW OF PADUCAH.	LARGE STREAMS AND RIVERS IN MODERATE TO SWIFT CURRENT OVER GRAVEL AND SAND, AND SOMETIMES DEBRIS OR POWNEED FOR COVER (BURR AND WARREN 1986, ETNIER AND STARINES 1989).
AFC0A022207037KY	NOTURUS STIGMOSUS	NORTHERN MADTOM	6	6	S	Y	1999-08-08	6	6	McCracken	JOPPA		OHIO R AT LITTLE CHAIN BAR.	LARGE STREAMS AND RIVERS IN MODERATE TO SWIFT CURRENT OVER GRAVEL AND SAND, AND SOMETIMES DEBRIS OR POWNEED FOR COVER (BURR AND WARREN 1986, ETNIER AND STARINES 1989).
AAABC020670035KY	HYLA CINEREA	GREEN TREEFROG	6	6	S	Y	1981-05-28	6	6	McCracken	JOPPA		CIRCA 0.3 AIR M SW OF W TIP OF SHAWNEE STEAM PLANT SETTLING PONDS.	FLOODPLAIN WETLANDS, PARTICULARLY THOSE DOMINATED BY BUTTUBUSH AND HERBACEOUS EMERGENT VEGETATION.

\*\*\*Amphibians

Rare Species and Communities Recorded for the Proposed DUF<sub>6</sub> Conversion Facility at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant.

KSNPC  
Data Request No. 03-022

ECCODE	SWNAME	SCOMNAME	BRANK	SRANK	SPROT	IDENT	LASTOBS	PRE	COUNTY	7.5 MINUTE QUADRANGLE	EPA WATERBODY	DIRECTIONS	HABITAT
AAAEB0208034KY	HYLA CINEREA	GREEN TREEFROG	S3	S3	S	Y	1991-06-25	0	McCracken	JOPPA		WEST KENTUCKY WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT AREA, CA 1.4 AIR MI NW OF THE N TP OF THE HIGST SHAWNEE STEAM PLANT SETTLING POND, US 52, 5.0 MI SW OF PADUCAH.	FLOODPLAIN WETLANDS, PARTICULARLY THOSE DOMINATED BY BUTTOMBUSH AND HERBACEOUS EMERGENT VEGETATION. BREEDS IN PONDS IN FARMLAND AND EDGE. REMAINS UNDERGROUND THROUGHOUT MOST OF THE YEAR, USING CRAWFISH BURROWS IN MOIST GRASSLANDS AND MEADOWS.
AAAEB01014759KY	RANA AREOLATA CIRCULOSA	NORTHERN CRAWFISH FROG	S3	S3	S	Y	1964-03-07	0	McCracken	PADUCAH WEST		US 52, 5.0 MI SW OF PADUCAH.	BREEDS IN PONDS IN FARMLAND AND EDGE. REMAINS UNDERGROUND THROUGHOUT MOST OF THE YEAR, USING CRAWFISH BURROWS IN MOIST GRASSLANDS AND MEADOWS.
AAAEB01014750KY	RANA AREOLATA CIRCULOSA	NORTHERN CRAWFISH FROG	S3	S3	S	Y	1964-03-13	0	McCracken	HEATH		US 50, 0.8 MI E OF FUTURE CITY, 10 MI W OF PADUCAH.	BREEDS IN PONDS IN FARMLAND AND EDGE. REMAINS UNDERGROUND THROUGHOUT MOST OF THE YEAR, USING CRAWFISH BURROWS IN MOIST GRASSLANDS AND MEADOWS.
AAAEB01014707KY	RANA AREOLATA CIRCULOSA	NORTHERN CRAWFISH FROG	S3	S3	S	Y	1991-03-18	0	McCracken	JOPPA		MARTIN CEMETERY, S SIDE KY 288 CA 0.6 RD MI E JCT BETHEL CHURCH RD.	BREEDS IN PONDS IN FARMLAND AND EDGE. REMAINS UNDERGROUND THROUGHOUT MOST OF THE YEAR, USING CRAWFISH BURROWS IN MOIST GRASSLANDS AND MEADOWS.
AAAEB01014707KY	RANA AREOLATA CIRCULOSA	NORTHERN CRAWFISH FROG	S3	S3	S	Y	1991-03-20	0	McCracken	HEATH		CIRCA 0.2 AIR MI E OF KY 154, CA 1.2 RD MI N OF ITS JCT W US 60.	BREEDS IN PONDS IN FARMLAND AND EDGE. REMAINS UNDERGROUND THROUGHOUT MOST OF THE YEAR, USING CRAWFISH BURROWS IN MOIST GRASSLANDS AND MEADOWS.
AAAEB01014703KY	RANA AREOLATA CIRCULOSA	NORTHERN CRAWFISH FROG	S3	S3	S	Y	1991-03-18	0	McCracken	JOPPA		CIRCA 0.2 RD MI E OF BETHEL CHURCH RD, CA 1.0 RD MI S JCT KY 359 (MARGNUM 33), CA 1.0 AIR MI SSE JCT KY 358 AND BETHEL CHURCH ROAD (MARGNUM 34, 370728N, 884841W).	BREEDS IN PONDS IN FARMLAND AND EDGE. REMAINS UNDERGROUND THROUGHOUT MOST OF THE YEAR, USING CRAWFISH BURROWS IN MOIST GRASSLANDS AND MEADOWS.
AAAEB01014709KY	RANA AREOLATA CIRCULOSA	NORTHERN CRAWFISH FROG	S3	S3	S	Y	1991-03-18	0	McCracken	HEATH		WEST KENTUCKY WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT AREA, N SIDE WATER WORKS RD JUST W OF FILTRATION PLANT.	BREEDS IN PONDS IN FARMLAND AND EDGE. REMAINS UNDERGROUND THROUGHOUT MOST OF THE YEAR, USING CRAWFISH BURROWS IN MOIST GRASSLANDS AND MEADOWS.
AAAEB01014707KY	RANA AREOLATA CIRCULOSA	NORTHERN CRAWFISH FROG	S3	S3	S	Y	1991-03-20	0	McCracken	HEATH		MINW JCT KY 359 AND OGDEN LANDING RD (MARGNUM 14), WEST KY WVA, CA 1.3 RD MI W JCT KY 866 AND KY 358 ON N SIDE KY 358 (MARGNUM 15, 370728N, 884758W), WEST KY WVA, 1.5 RD MI W OF JCT KY 866 AND KY 358, 0.15 AIR MI S OF WEST KENTUCKY WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT AREA, CA 0.1 RD MI NW OF JCT KY 359 AND KY 866, DOWN ROAD JUST SE OF LODGE (MARGNUM 36), AND CA 0.15 RD MI NW OF JCT KY 358 AND KY 866, DOWN RD JUST SE OF LODGE (MARGNUM 36).	BREEDS IN PONDS IN FARMLAND AND EDGE. REMAINS UNDERGROUND THROUGHOUT MOST OF THE YEAR, USING CRAWFISH BURROWS IN MOIST GRASSLANDS AND MEADOWS.
AAAEB01014705KY	RANA AREOLATA CIRCULOSA	NORTHERN CRAWFISH FROG	S3	S3	S	Y	1998-02-27	0	McCracken	JOPPA		WEST KENTUCKY WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT AREA, CA 0.6 RD MI SW OF JCT KY 865 AND KY 359, CA 0.15 AIR MI W OF KY 865, CA 0.3 RD MI SW OF AREA OFFICE (LODGE).	BREEDS IN PONDS IN FARMLAND AND EDGE. REMAINS UNDERGROUND THROUGHOUT MOST OF THE YEAR, USING CRAWFISH BURROWS IN MOIST GRASSLANDS AND MEADOWS.
AAAEB01014708KY	RANA AREOLATA CIRCULOSA	NORTHERN CRAWFISH FROG	S3	S3	S	Y	1991-03-18	0	McCracken	JOPPA		CIRCA 0.4 AIR MI NW OF SPRING BAYOU CHURCH ON KY 725 (MARGNUM 11), CA 0.1 RD MI W OF SPRING BAYOU CHURCH ON KY 725 ON N SIDE OF RD (MARGNUM 12, 370524N, 885030W).	BREEDS IN PONDS IN FARMLAND AND EDGE. REMAINS UNDERGROUND THROUGHOUT MOST OF THE YEAR, USING CRAWFISH BURROWS IN MOIST GRASSLANDS AND MEADOWS.

\*\*\*Regulates

OPEN WATER HABITATS: MOST NUMEROUS IN OPEN RIVER SITUATIONS WITH GRAVEL OR SAND SUBSTRATES, BUT ALSO PRESENT IN SLOWER RIVERS AND IMPOUNDMENTS.  
OHIO RIVER, NEAR BOAT RAMP ACROSS FROM JOPPA (ASSUMED TO BE NEAR METROPOLIS), IL.

MIDLAND SMOOTH SOFTSHELL  
APALONE MUTICA MUTICA  
METROPOLIS

Rare Species and Communities Recorded for the Proposed DUF<sub>6</sub> Conversion Facility at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant.

KSNPC  
Data Request No. 09-022

Fig 6 of 7  
8/12/02

ECCODE	SHANE	SCINAME	CRANK	SRANK	SPROT	USESA	IDENT	LASTOBS	PHC	COUNTY	7.5 MINUTE QUADRANGLE	EPA WATERBODY	DIRECTIONS	HABITAT
ABPB01601038KY	AMOPHILA AESTIVALIS	BACHMAN'S SPARROW	G	S18	m	m	Y	1951-07-17	0	McCracken	PADUCAH WEST	OHIO RIVER FROM TENNESSEE RIVER TO MISSISSIPPI RIVER	5 MI W OF PADUCAH.	OPEN PINE WOODS WITH SCATTERED BUSHES OR UNDERSTORY, BRUSH OR OVERGROWN HILLSIDES, OVERGROWN FIELDS WITH THICKETS AND BRAMBLES, GRASSY ORCHARDS, BEACHES, BAYS, LAGOONS, INLETS, SWAMPS, NEAR MARSHES, AND, LESS FREQUENTLY, DECIDUOUS OR CONIFEROUS WOODLAND, IN LAND SITUATIONS PRIMARILY IN BALDOCPRESS SWAMPS AND ALONG MAJOR WATERCOURSES. ALSO GARBAGE DUMPS.
ABPW10307014KY	CORVUS OSSIFRAGUS	FISH CROW	G	S28	s	s	Y	1980-06-27	0	McCracken	JOPPA	TENNESSEE RIVER TO MISSISSIPPI RIVER	WEST KY WMA, ALONG OHIO RIVER AT EDGE OF BOTTOMLAND FOREST.	STREAMS, LAKES, SWAMPS, MARSHES, AND ESTUARIES; WINTERS MOSTLY IN FRESHWATER BUT ALSO REGULARLY IN ESTUARIES AND SHELTERED BAYS (BSCONGHNA). DENSE BRUSH, MESQUITE, STREAMSIDE THICKETS, AND SCRUB OAK, IN ARID REGIONS BUT OFTEN NEAR WATER (BSCONGHNA); MOST WOODLAND, IN BOTTOMLANDS, WOODLAND EDGE, SCATTERED COVER AND HEDGEROWS IN CULTIVATED AREAS, OPEN WOODLAND, BRUSH IN WINT.
ABNB20101004KY	LOPHODITES CUCULLATUS	HOODED Merganser	G	S12B, S24	T	m	Y	1980-05-08	0	McCracken	JOPPA	WEST KENTUCKY WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT AREA, 3.9 MI NNW OF GRAHAMVILLE.	WEST KENTUCKY WMA, W SIDE OF MAIN GRAVEL RD, CA 1.0 MI S OF ENTRANCE ON KY 358.	WEST KENTUCKY WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT AREA, 3.9 MI NNW OF GRAHAMVILLE. ALONG LITTLE BAYOU CREEK, ADJ TO THE W SIDE OF THE ASH SETTLING POND AT THE SHAWNEE STEAM PLANT, 6 MI NNW OF GRAHAMVILLE.
ABPW01101001KY	VIREO BELLII	BELL'S VIREO	G	S23B	s	Y	1980-06-27	0	McCracken	JOPPA	JOPPA	WEST KENTUCKY WMA, W SIDE OF MAIN GRAVEL RD, CA 1.0 MI S OF ENTRANCE ON KY 358.	WEST KENTUCKY WMA, W SIDE OF MAIN GRAVEL RD, CA 1.0 MI S OF ENTRANCE ON KY 358.	
ABPW01101002KY	VIREO BELLII	BELL'S VIREO	G	S23B	s	Y	1984-05-05	0	McCracken	JOPPA	JOPPA	WEST KENTUCKY WMA, W SIDE OF MAIN GRAVEL RD, CA 1.0 MI S OF ENTRANCE ON KY 358.	WEST KENTUCKY WMA, W SIDE OF MAIN GRAVEL RD, CA 1.0 MI S OF ENTRANCE ON KY 358.	
AMCC010301028KY	MYOTIS AUSTROPRARIUS	SOUTHEASTERN MYOTIS	G3G4	S192	m	m	1998-07-14	0	McCracken	HEATH	HEATH	WEST KENTUCKY WMA, BAYOU CREEK JUST UPSTREAM OF SOUTH ACID RD.	THE SOUTHEASTERN MYOTIS USES PRIMARILY CAVES FOR HIBERNACULA AND SUMMER MATERNITY AND ROOSTING SITES.	
AMCC010301027KY	MYOTIS AUSTROPRARIUS	SOUTHEASTERN MYOTIS	G3G4	S192	m	m	1998-07-22	0	McCracken	JOPPA	JOPPA	BAYOU CREEK RIDGE STATE NATURAL AREA, W END ON N SIDE OF CREEK, CA 0.1 AIR MI SE OF END OF WMA RD TO OHIO RIVER.	THE SOUTHEASTERN MYOTIS USES PRIMARILY CAVES FOR HIBERNACULA AND SUMMER MATERNITY AND ROOSTING SITES.	
AMCC010010101KY	MYOTIS SOCALLIS	INDIANA BAT	G2	S192	m	Y	1998-07-28	0	McCracken	JOPPA	JOPPA	WEST KENTUCKY WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT AREA, W OF BAYOU CREEK RIDGE SNA, CA 0.1 AIR MI SE OF END OF RD (MARGNUM 24), AND CA 0.15 RD MI SE OF BAYOU CREEK ALONG OLD RD (MARGNUM 38).	INDIANA BATS USE PRIMARILY CAVES FOR HIBERNACULA, ALTHOUGH THEY ARE OCCASIONALLY FOUND IN OLD MINE PORTALS.	
AMCC060101015KY	NYCTICEIUS HUMERUS	EVENING BAT	G	S293	T	Y	1998-07-28	0	McCracken	JOPPA	JOPPA	0.4 AIR MI SSE OF END OF RD TO OHIO RIVER (MARGNUM 26), AND JUST DOWNSTREAM OF GRAVEL RD CROSSING (MARGNUM 38), AND W OF BAYOU CR RIDGE, CA 0.1 AIR MI SE OF N END OF WMA ROAD TO THE OHIO RIVER (MARGNUM 28).	THE EVENING BAT IS A COLONIAL SPECIES THAT ROOSTS IN TREES AND HOUSES. IT APPARENTLY MIGRATES SOUTHWARD IN WINTER.	
AMCC060101047KY	NYCTICEIUS HUMERUS	EVENING BAT	G	S293	T	Y	1998-08-02	0	McCracken	JOPPA	JOPPA	WEST KY WMA, ALONG BAYOU CREEK CA 0.3 AIR MI WSW OF HEADQUARTERS.	THE EVENING BAT IS A COLONIAL SPECIES THAT ROOSTS IN TREES AND HOUSES. IT APPARENTLY MIGRATES SOUTHWARD IN WINTER.	

\*\*\*Palustrine Communities

Pg 7 of 7  
8/12/02

Rare Species And Communities Recorded for the Proposed DUF<sub>6</sub> Conversion Facility at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant.

KSNPC  
Data Request No. 03-022

ECCODE	SNAME	SCOMNAME	SRANK	SPROT	USESA	IDENT	LASTOBS	PREC	BOFRANK	COUNTY	7.5 MINUTE QUADRANGLE	EPA WATERBODY	DIRECTIONS	HABITAT
CPFOR000570TKY	FLOODPLAIN RIDGETERRACE FOREST		51	N		Y	1991-06	0	0	McCracken	JOPPA		WEST KY WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT AREA, BAYOU CREEK WOODS, CA 2.0 AIR MILE N.W. OF SHANNICE STEAM PLANT.	

69 Records Processed.

**COUNTY REPORT  
OF  
ENDANGERED, THREATENED, AND SPECIAL CONCERN  
PLANTS, ANIMALS, AND NATURAL COMMUNITIES  
OF  
KENTUCKY**

**KENTUCKY STATE NATURE PRESERVES COMMISSION  
801 SCHENKEL LANE  
FRANKFORT, KY 40601  
(502) 573-2886 (phone)  
(502) 573-2355 (fax)**

**[www.kynaturepreserves.org](http://www.kynaturepreserves.org)**

Kentucky State Nature Preserves Commission  
Key for County List Report

The attached report lists endangered, threatened, special concern, and historic plants, animals, and natural communities (elements) reported from each county in Kentucky. Within a county, elements are arranged first by taxonomic complexity (plants first, natural communities last), and second by scientific name. A key to status, ranks, and count data fields follows.

**STATUS**

KSNPC: Kentucky State Nature Preserves Commission status:

N or blank = none E = endangered T = threatened S = special concern H = historic X = extirpated

USESA: U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service status:

N or blank = none C = candidate LT = listed as threatened  
LE = listed as endangered

LTNL = Listed Threatened in part of its range, but is not listed in Kentucky (Copperbelly water snake has a special conservation agreement in 14 Kentucky counties as an alternative to Federal Listing.)

**RANKS**

GRANK: Estimate of element abundance on a global scale:

G1 = extremely rare G2 = rare G3 = uncommon G4 = common G5 = very common  
GU = uncertain GH = historically known and expected to be rediscovered GX = extinct

Subspecies and variety abundances are coded with a 'T' suffix; the 'G?' portion of the rank then refers to the entire species.

SRANK: Estimate of element abundance in Kentucky:

S1 = extremely rare S2 = rare S3 = uncommon  
S4 = many occurrences S5 = very common SA = accidental  
SRF = reported falsely in literature SU = uncertain SX = extirpated  
SE = exotic ? = unknown SH = historically known in state  
SZ = not of significant conservation concern SR = reported but without persuasive documentation  
S#B - breeding rank for non-resident species S#N - non-breeding rank for non-resident species

**COUNT DATA FIELDS**

# OF OCCURRENCES: Number of occurrences of a particular element from a county. Column headings are as follows:

- E - currently reported from the county
- H - reported from the county but not seen since 1980 (at least 20 years)
- F - reported from county & cannot be relocated but for which further inventory is needed (previously reported as "O")
- X - known to have extirpated from the county
- U - reported from a county but cannot be mapped to a quadrangle or exact location.

The data from which the county report is generated is continually updated. The date on which the report was created is in the report footer. Contact KSNPC for a current copy of the report, which is produced in this form annually.

Please note that the quantity and quality of data collected by the Kentucky Natural Heritage Program are dependent on the research and observations of many individuals and organizations. In most cases, this information is not the result of comprehensive or site-specific field surveys; many natural areas in Kentucky have never been thoroughly surveyed, and new species of plants and animals are still being discovered. For these reasons, the Kentucky Natural Heritage Program cannot provide a definitive statement on the presence, absence, or condition of biological elements in any part of Kentucky. Heritage reports summarize the existing information known to the Kentucky Natural Heritage Program at the time of the request regarding the biological elements or locations in question. They should never be regarded as final statements on the elements or areas being considered, nor should they be substituted for on-site surveys required for environmental assessments.

KSNPC appreciates the submission of any endangered species data for Kentucky from field observations. For information on data reporting or other data services provided by KSNPC, please contact the Data Manager at:

KY State Nature Preserves Commission  
801 Schenkel Lane  
Frankfort, KY 40601  
phone: (502) 573-2886  
fax: (502) 573-2355

County Report of Endangered, Threatened, and Special Concern Plants, Animals, and Natural Communities of Kentucky  
 Kentucky State Nature Preserves Commission

County	Taxonomic Group	Scientific name	Common name	Statuses	Ranks	# of Occurrences E F X U
	HABITAT					
McCracken	PLANTS	<i>AESCULUS PAVIA</i>	RED BUCKEYE	T	G5/S2S3	0 1 0 0 0
	WOODS AND THICKETS.					
McCracken	PLANTS	<i>ASTER DRUMMONDII VAR TEXANUS</i>	TEXAS ASTER	T	G5T7/S2	0 0 0 0 1
	BOTTOMLANDS AND OPEN WOODS.					
McCracken	PLANTS	<i>BAPTISIA BRACTEATA VAR LEUCOPHAEA</i>	CREAM WILD INDIGO	S	G4G5T4T5/S3	2 0 0 0 0
	PRAIRIES AND OPEN WOODS ON SANDY SOIL.					
McCracken	PLANTS	<i>CAREX HYSTERICINA</i>	PORCUPINE SEDGE	H	G5/S3	0 1 0 0 0
	SWAMPS, WET MEADOWS, SHORELINES.					
McCracken	PLANTS	<i>CARYA AQUATICA</i>	WATER HICKORY	T	G5/S2S3	1 0 0 0 0
	BOTTOMLANDS AND FLOODPLAIN SWAMPS.					
McCracken	PLANTS	<i>HALESIA TETRAPTERA</i>	MOUNTAIN SILVER-BELL	E	G5/S1S2	2 0 0 0 1
	RICH WOODS AND EDGES OF SLOUGHS AND OXBOW LAKES.					
McCracken	PLANTS	<i>HETEROTHECA SUBAXILLARIS VAR LATIFOLIA</i>	BROAD-LEAF GOLDEN-ASTER	T	G5T5/S2	1 0 0 0 0
	DRY, OFTEN SANDY PLACES, PARTICULARLY DISTURBED SITES.					
McCracken	PLANTS	<i>HYDROLEA UNIFLORA</i>	ONE-FLOWER FIDDLELEAF	S	G5/S3?	0 1 0 0 0
	SWAMPY WOODLANDS, POND AND SLOUGH MARGINS, WET DITCHES.					
McCracken	PLANTS	<i>HYPERICUM ADPRESSUM</i>	CREeping ST. JOHN'S-WORT	H	G2G3/S3	0 0 0 0 1
	MARSHES, SHORES, WET MEADOWS, SWALES AND DITCHES.					
McCracken	PLANTS	<i>LATHYRUS PALUSTRIS</i>	VETCHLING PEAVINE	T	G5/S2	0 0 0 0 1
	WET MEADOWS, SWAMPS, WET WOODS, AND IN KY BOULDER COBBLE BARS ALONG CREEKS AND RIVERS, AND KNOWN FROM A ROADSIDE NEAR A RAILROAD. (MEDLEY).					
McCracken	PLANTS	<i>LESPEDEZA STUEVEI</i>	TALL BUSH-CLOVER	S	G4T/S3?	0 1 0 0 0
	DRY HILLSIDE, WOODLAND.					
McCracken	PLANTS	<i>LILIUM SUPERBUM</i>	TURK'S CAP LILY	T	G5/S1S2	0 0 0 0 1
	MOIST MEADOWS, MOIST WET WOODS INCLUDING FLOODPLAINS, AND COVES					
McCracken	PLANTS	<i>MALUS AMGUSTIFOLIA</i>	SOUTHERN CRABAPPLE	S	G5T/S3	0 1 0 0 0
	OPEN DRY - MESIC WOODS AND THICKETS.					
McCracken	PLANTS	<i>MELANTHERA NIVEA</i>	SNOW MELANTHERA	S	G5/S3?	1 0 0 0 0
	FLOODPLAINS AND SANDY WOODS INCLUDING DISTURBED OPENINGS.					
McCracken	PLANTS	<i>MUHLENBERGIA GLABRIFLORIS</i>	HAIR GRASS	S	G4T/S2S3	0 1 0 0 0
	DRY, DESSICCATED OR BAKED SOILS, PRAIRIES, GRAVELS, OR ROCKY SLOPES AND MEDLEY REPORTS WET WOODS, MARSH EDGES AND FIELDS.					
McCracken	PLANTS	<i>PRENANTHES ASPERA</i>	ROUGH RATTLE-SNAKE-ROOT	E	G4T/S1	1 1 0 0 0
	DRY PRAIRIES AND BARRENS, LIMESTONE GLADES, DRY, OPEN ROCKY WOODS, USUALLY IN ACID SOILS.					
McCracken	PLANTS	<i>RUDBECKIA SUBTOMENTOSA</i>	SWEET CONEFLOWER	E	G5/S1	1 0 1 0 0
	PRAIRIES AND LOW GROUNDS SUCH AS OPEN STREAM TERRACE WOODLANDS.					
McCracken	PLANTS	<i>SILPHIUM LACINATUM VAR ROBINSONII</i>	COMPASS PLANT	T	G5T7/S2	5 0 0 0 0
	PRAIRIES INCL. REMNANTS OF THIS FLORA ON ROADSIDES AND FIELDS.					
McCracken	PLANTS	<i>SOLIDAGO BUCKLEYI</i>	BUCKLEY'S GOLDENROD	S	G4/S2S3	0 1 0 0 0
	WOODS AND BLUFFS.					

Data Current as of June 2002

County Report of Endangered, Threatened, and Special Concern Plants, Animals, and Natural Communities of Kentucky  
 Kentucky State Nature Preserves Commission

County	Taxonomic Group	Scientific name	Common name	Statuses	Ranks	# of Occurrences						
						H	F	X	U			
	HABITAT											
McCracken	GASTROPODS	<i>LEPTOXIS PRAEROSA</i>	ONYX ROCKSNAIL	S	G5/SS4	0	1	0	0	0		
	CALL (1895) INDICATED THAT IN THE OHIO RIVER AT THE FALLS IT OCCURRED IN THE GREATEST PROFUSION WHERE THE BOTTOM IS CLEAN ROCK OR ROCK WITH ABUNDANT CONFEROID VEGETATION.											
McCracken	GASTROPODS	<i>LITHASIA ARMIGERA</i>	ARMORED ROCKSNAIL	S	G3G4/SS4	0	0	0	0	1		
	BARS AND POOLS WITH SAND, GRAVEL, AND ROCK SUBSTRATES (KNPC), SLOPING ROCK OUTCROPS WITH POCKETS OF SAND, GRAVEL AND MUD, PARTIALLY BURIED LOGS, AND ROCK RIPRAP (SICKEL 1988).											
McCracken	GASTROPODS	<i>LITHASIA GENICULATA</i>	ORNATE ROCKSNAIL	S	G3G4/S1	0	3	0	0	0		
McCracken	GASTROPODS	<i>LITHASIA VERRUCOSA</i>	VARICOSE ROCKSNAIL	S	G3G4/SS4	0	2	0	0	1		
	OBSERVATIONS ON THE HABITAT INCLUDE SPECIMENS TAKEN FROM RECENTLY EXPOSED BARS AND POOLS WITH SAND, GRAVEL, AND ROCK SUBSTRATES (HAAG AND PALMER-BALL, PERS COMM).											
McCracken	BIVALVES	<i>FUSCONAIA SUBROTUNDA SUBROTUNDA</i>	LONGSOLID	S	G3T3/S3	0	1	0	0	0		
	GRAVEL BARS AND DEEP POOLS IN LARGE RIVERS AND LARGE TO MEDIUM-SIZED STREAMS (AHLSTEDT 1984, GOODRICH AND VAN DER SCHALIE 1944, NEEL AND ALLEN 1984, PARMALLEE 1987).											
McCracken	BIVALVES	<i>LAMPSILIS ABRUPTA</i>	PINK MUCKET	E/E	G2/S1	2	3	1	0	0		
	LARGE RIVERS IN HABITATS RANGING FROM SILT TO BOULDERS, BUT APPARENTLY MORE COMMONLY FROM GRAVEL AND COBBLE. COLLECTED FROM SHALLOW AND DEEP WATER WITH CURRENT VELOCITY RANGING FROM ZERO TO SWIFT (AHLSTEDT 1983, BOGAN AND PARMALLEE 1983, BUCHANAN 1980), B											
McCracken	BIVALVES	<i>LAMPSILIS OVATA</i>	POCKETBOOK	E	G5/S1	0	3	0	0	0		
	CONSIDERED A LARGE RIVER SPECIES (CLENCH AND VAN DER SCHALIE 1944, PARMALLEE 1987, STANSBERRY 1979), BUT OCCURS IN MEDIUM-SIZED STREAMS IN GRAVEL, SAND, OR EVEN MUD (PARMALLEE 1987, JOHNSON 1970, GORDON AND LAYZER 1989). IN THE LOWER WABASH AND OHIO RIVERS											
McCracken	BIVALVES	<i>OBOVARIA RETUSA</i>	RING PINK	E/E	G1/S1	0	1	0	1	0		
	LARGE RIVER SPECIES THAT INHABITS GRAVEL AND SAND BARS (BOGAN AND PARMALLEE 1983, GOODRICH AND VAN DER SCHALIE 1944, NEEL AND ALLEN 1984, STANSBERRY 1976).											
McCracken	BIVALVES	<i>PLETHOBASUS COOPERIANUS</i>	ORANGEFOOT PIMPLEBACK	E/E	G1/S1	4	2	2	0	0		
	USUALLY FOUND IN LARGE RIVERS IN SAND AND GRAVEL SUBSTRATES (AHLSTEDT 1983, BOGAN AND PARMALLEE 1983, MILLER, A.C. ET AL. 1986).											
McCracken	BIVALVES	<i>PLETHOBASUS CYPHIUS</i>	SHEEPNOSE	S	G3/S3	3	5	1	0	0		
	USUALLY FOUND IN LARGE RIVERS IN CURRENT ON MUD, SAND, OR GRAVEL BOTTOMS AT DEPTH OF 1-2 METERS OR MORE (BAKER 1928, PARMALLEE 1967, GORDON AND LAYZER 1989).											
McCracken	BIVALVES	<i>PLEUROBEMA RUBRUM</i>	PYRAMID PIGTOE	E	G2/S1	0	1	0	0	0		
	INHABITS MEDIUM TO LARGE RIVERS AND USUALLY OCCURS IN SAND OR GRAVEL BOTTOMS IN DEEP WATERS (AHLSTEDT 1984, MURRAY AND LEONARD 1982, PARMALLEE ET AL. 1982).											
McCracken	BIVALVES	<i>POTAMILUS CAPAX</i>	FAT POCKETBOOK	E/E	G1/S1	1	1	1	1	0		
	OCCURS IN MEDIUM TO LARGE-SIZED RIVERS OFTEN AROUND ISLAND AND BACK CHANNELS, AND SOMETIMES IN DITCHES, IN MUD (OOZE); MIXED SAND, MUD, AND CLAY; OR FINE SILT AND MUD IN FLOWING WATER AT DEPTHS OF A FEW INCHES UP TO EIGHT FEET (PARMALLEE 1967, AHLSTEDT AN											
McCracken	BIVALVES	<i>POTAMILUS PURPURATUS</i>	BLEUFER	E	G5/S1	1	0	0	0	0		
	DEEP STREAMS WITH DEEP MUD AND FAIRLY QUIET POOLS (MURRAY AND LEONARD 1982). IN MISSOURI BOOTHEEL STREAMS, IT IS FOUND IN SMALL TO MEDIUM GRAVEL WITH MUD OCCASIONALLY INTERSPERSED (OESCH 1984). IN THE ST. FRANCIS RIVER OF ARKANSAS AND MISSOURI, INDIVIDUA											
McCracken	BIVALVES	<i>QUADRULA CYLINDRICA CYLINDRICA</i>	RABBITSFOOT	T	G3T3/S2	1	2	1	0	0		
	SMALL TO LARGE RIVERS WITH SAND, GRAVEL, AND COBBLE AND MODERATE TO SWIFT CURRENT, SOMETIMES IN DEEP WATER (PARMALLEE 1967, BOGAN AND PARMALLEE 1983).											
McCracken	CRUSTACEANS	<i>CAMBARELLUS PUER</i>	A DWARF CRAYFISH	E	G4G5/S1	0	0	0	1	0		
	CYPRESS SWAMPS, STREAMS, AND LOWLANDS (DRAINED WETLANDS) ON THE MISSISSIPPI ALLUVIAL PLAIN, USUALLY AMONG LIVING OR DEAD VEGETATION (PAGE 1985).											
McCracken	CRUSTACEANS	<i>ORCONECTES LANCIFER</i>	A CRAYFISH	E	G5/S1	0	1	0	0	0		
	OXBOW LAKES AND STREAMS ON THE GULF COASTAL PLAIN (PAGE 1985), WHERE IT LIVES AMONG ORGANIC DEBRIS, USUALLY NEAR BALD CYPRESS (BURR AND HOBBS 1984).											

Data Current as of June 2002

County Report of Endangered, Threatened, and Special Concern Plants, Animals, and Natural Communities of Kentucky  
 Kentucky State Nature Preserves Commission

County	Taxonomic Group	Scientific name	Common name	Statuses	Ranks	# of Occurrences			
						E	H	F	X
		HABITAT							
McCracken	INSECTS	<i>EUPHYES DUKESI</i>	DUKES' SKIPPER	S	G3/S1	3	0	0	1
		SHADED TUPELO SWAMPS IN SOUTH, PARTIALLY SHADED MARSHES AND DITCHES IN MIDWEST (OPLER AND MALIKUL 1992). FEEDS ON SEDGES (CAREX LACUSTRIS AND C. HYALINOLEPIS) (L.D. GIBSON PERS COMM). ON THE ATLANTIC COAST IT ALSO FEEDS ON CAREX WALTERIANA (L.D. GIBSON P							
McCracken	INSECTS	<i>SATYRIUM FAVONIUS ONTARIO</i>	NORTHERN HAIRSTREAK	S	G4T4/S1	0	1	0	0
		S. FAVONIUS IS FOUND IN WOODS OR EDGES WITH EVERGREEN OR DECIDUOUS OAKS (OPLER AND MALIKUL 1992). MAIN HABITAT REQUIREMENTS ARE BLACK-JACK OAK (QUERCUS MARILANDICA) AND A NECTAR SOURCE SUCH AS FARKLEBERRY (VACCINIUM ARBORETUM) OR DOGBANE (APOCYNUM CANNAB							
McCracken	FISHES	<i>ACIPENSER FULVESCENS</i>	LAKE STURGEON	E	G3/S1	0	1	0	0
		LAKES AND LARGE RIVERS WITH A FIRM SAND/GRAVEL BOTTOM (BURR AND WARREN 1986, ETNIER AND STARNES 1993).							
McCracken	FISHES	<i>ATRACTOSTEUS SPATULA</i>	ALLIGATOR GAR	E	G3G4/S1	0	1	0	0
		SLUGGISH POOLS AND BACKWATERS OF LARGE RIVERS, BACKWATERS, AND OXBOW LAKES (BURR AND WARREN 1986, PAGE AND BURR 1991, ETNIER AND STARNES 1993).							
McCracken	FISHES	<i>CYPRINELLA VENUSTA</i>	BLACKTAIL SHINER	S	G5/S3	1	0	0	0
		OCCURS IN CREEKS AND SMALL STREAMS OF THE COASTAL PLAIN OVER FIRM SAND AND GRAVEL OF RIFLES AND RACEWAYS, AND ALONG UNDERCUT BANKS OR AMONG SUBMERGED STUMPS AND LOGS (BURR AND WARREN 1986). ALSO, OVER FIRM SAND OR GRAVEL IN THE MISSISSIPPI AND LOWER OH							
McCracken	FISHES	<i>ERIMYZON SUCCETTA</i>	LAKE CHUBSUCKER	T	G5/S2	0	1	0	0
		LOWLAND LENTIC HABITATS (WETLANDS AND FLOODPLAIN LAKES) WITH SUBMERGENT AND FLOATING VEGETATION (BURR AND WARREN 1986, ETNIER AND STARNES 1993).							
McCracken	FISHES	<i>ESOX NIGER</i>	CHAIN PICKEREL	S	G5/S3	1	0	0	0
		COASTAL PLAIN WETLANDS, STREAMS, AND VEGETATED OXBOW LAKE SHORELINES, AND IT ALSO TOLERATES RESERVOIR CONDITIONS (BURR AND WARREN 1986, ETNIER AND STARNES 1993).							
McCracken	FISHES	<i>ETHEOSTOMA PROELIARE</i>	CYPRESS DARTER	T	G5/S2	1	0	0	0
		SMALL TO MEDIUM-SIZE SLUGGISH STREAMS, OXBOWS, AND WETLANDS WHERE THE BOTTOM IS SOFT AND AQUATIC VEGETATION ABUNDANT (BURR AND MAYDEN 1979, KUEHNE AND BARBOUR 1983, PAGE 1983, BURR AND WARREN 1986).							
McCracken	FISHES	<i>HYBOGNATHUS HAYI</i>	CYPRESS MINNOW	E	G5/S1	1	2	0	0
		OXBOW LAKES AND QUIET WATER OF LOW GRADIENT STREAMS ON THE COASTAL PLAIN AND SHAWNEE HILLS, USUALLY OVER MUD OR SAND BOTTOMS, BUT OCCASIONALLY ASSOCIATED WITH SUBMERGED AQUATIC VEGETATION OR OTHER COVER (BURR AND WARREN 1986, PFLUEGER 1975, SMITH 1979, G							
McCracken	FISHES	<i>ICHTHYOMYZON CASTANEUS</i>	CHESTNUT LAMPREY	S	G4/S2	1	2	0	0
		MODERATE-SIZE CREEKS, LARGE RIVERS, AND RESERVOIRS. SUBSTRATE CONSISTS OF GRAVEL AND RUBBLE WITH AREAS OF SAND AND SILT. LARVAE REQUIRE CLEAR STREAMS WITH STABLE BARS OF SILT, SAND AND ORGANIC DETRITUS (BECKER 1983, PFLUEGER 1975, ROHDE AND LANTEIGNE-COU							
McCracken	FISHES	<i>ICTIOBUS NIGER</i>	BLACK BUFFALO	S	G5/S3	4	0	0	0
		RESERVOIRS AND MEDIUM TO LARGE RIVERS WITH MODERATE TO LOW GRADIENT AND SOMETIME SWIFT CURRENT (BECKER 1983, PFLUEGER 1975, SMITH 1979, TRAUTMAN 1981, AND BURR AND WARREN 1986).							
McCracken	FISHES	<i>LEPOMIS MINIATUS</i>	REDSPOTTED SUNFISH	T	G5/S2	4	0	0	0
		OCCURS IN WELL-VEGETATED SWAMPS, SLOUGHS, BOTTOMLAND LAKES, AND LOW GRADIENT STREAMS (BURR AND MAYDEN 1979, PFLUEGER 1975, SMITH 1979, BURR AND WARREN 1986, ETNIER AND STARNES 1993).							
McCracken	FISHES	<i>LOTA LOTA</i>	BURBOT	S	G5/SU	1	0	0	0
		KENTUCKY SPECIMENS GENERALLY COME FROM MEDIUM TO LARGE-SIZE RIVERS. IN THE NORTH, THEY INHABIT COOL, LARGE, AND DEEP RIVERS AND LAKES (BECKER 1983, PFLUEGER 1975, SCOTT AND CROSSMAN 1973, SMITH 1979, TRAUTMAN 1981).							
McCracken	FISHES	<i>MENIDIA BERYLLINA</i>	INLAND SILVERSIDE	T	G5/S2	4	0	0	0
		SCHOOLING SURFACE FISH THAT OCCURS IN THE MISSISSIPPI RIVER AND FLOODPLAIN LAKES (BURR AND WARREN 1986, ETNIER AND STARNES 1993).							
McCracken	FISHES	<i>NOTROPIS MACULATUS</i>	TAILLIGHT SHINER	T	G5/S2S3	1	1	0	0
		LOW GRADIENT STREAMS, OXBOW LAKES, AND SLOUGHS IN AND AROUND CYPRESS KNEES, MARGINAL VEGETATION, AND ACCUMULATIONS OF STICKS AND DETRITUS (BURR AND PAGE 1975, BURR AND WARREN 1986, ETNIER AND STARNES 1993).							

Data Current as of June 2002

County Report of Endangered, Threatened, and Special Concern Plants, Animals, and Natural Communities of Kentucky  
 Kentucky State Nature Preserves Commission

County	Taxonomic Group	Scientific name	Common name	Statuses	Ranks	# of Occurrences				
						E	H	F	X	U
HABITAT										
McCracken	FISHES	<i>MOTURUS STIGMOSUS</i>	NORTHERN MADTOM	S	G3/S2S3	2	1	0	0	0
		LARGE STREAMS AND RIVERS IN MODERATE TO SWIFT CURRENT OVER GRAVEL AND SAND, AND SOMETIMES DEBRIS OR PONDWEED FOR COVER (BURR AND WARREN 1986, ETNER AND STARNES 1993).								
McCracken	FISHES	<i>UMBRA LIMI</i>	CENTRAL MUDDMINNOW	T	G5/S2S3	1	0	0	0	0
		RESTRICTED TO DENSE BEDS OF SUBMERGENT AQUATIC VEGETATION OR ORGANIC DEBRIS PILES IN SPRING-FED WETLANDS, DITCHES, AND THE MARGINS OF LOWLAND LAKES OF THE COASTAL PLAIN (BURR AND WARREN 1986).								
McCracken	AMPHIBIANS	<i>AMPHIUMA TRIDACTYLUM</i>	THREE-TOED AMPHIUMA	E	G5/S1	0	0	0	0	1
		THE AMPHIUMAS FOUND IN LAKES, OPEN SPRING STREAMS OF RUNNING WATER, AND STREAMS FLOWING OVER CALCAREOUS ROCKS. ALSO RECORDED FROM DRAINAGE DITCHES, BAYOUS, AND WOODED ALLUVIAL SWAMPS (BISHOP 1974), PROBABLY ONLY THE LATTER IN KENTUCKY.								
McCracken	AMPHIBIANS	<i>HYLA CINEREA</i>	GREEN TREEFROG	S	G5/S3	2	0	0	0	0
		FLOODPLAIN WETLANDS, PARTICULARLY THOSE DOMINATED BY BUTTONBUSH AND HERBACEOUS EMERGENT VEGETATION.								
McCracken	AMPHIBIANS	<i>RANA AREOLATA CIRCULOSA</i>	NORTHERN CRAWFISH FROG	S	G4T4/S3	17	1	6	0	0
		BREEDS IN PONDS IN FARMLAND AND EDGE. REMAINS UNDERGROUND THROUGHOUT MOST OF THE YEAR, USING GRAYFISH BURROWS IN MOIST GRASSLANDS AND MEADOWS.								
McCracken	REPTILES	<i>APALONE MUTICA MUTICA</i>	MIDLAND SMOOTH SOFTSHELL	S	G5T5/S3	1	0	0	0	0
		OPEN WATER HABITATS; MOST NUMEROUS IN OPEN RIVER SITUATIONS WITH GRAVEL OR SAND SUBSTRATES, BUT ALSO PRESENT IN SLOWER RIVERS AND IMPOUNDMENTS.								
McCracken	REPTILES	<i>MACROCLEMYS TEMMINCKII</i>	ALLIGATOR SNAPPING TURTLE	T	G3G4/S2	0	1	0	0	0
		FLOODPLAIN SLOUGHS, BACKWATER AREAS OF LARGER RIVERS, IMPOUNDMENTS. SEEMS TO PREFER MUDDY SUBSTRATE WITH DARK RETREATS INCLUDING MUSKAT AND BEAVER DENS, LOGS, OR SHELTERING VEGETATION.								
McCracken	REPTILES	<i>THAMNOPHIS SAURITUS SAURITUS</i>	EASTERN RIBBON SNAKE	S	G5T5/S3	1	0	0	0	0
		VARIETY OF SEMI-OPEN HABITATS, GENERALLY IN WEEDY OR BRUSHY GROWTH ALONG THE MARGINS OF SLOUGHS, MARSHES AND OTHER AQUATIC HABITATS.								
McCracken	BIRDS	<i>ACCIPITER STRIATUS</i>	SHARP-SHINNED HAWK	S	G5/S3B,S4N	1	0	0	0	0
		FOREST AND OPEN WOODLAND, CONIFEROUS, MIXED, OR DECIDUOUS, PRIMARILY IN CONIF. IN MORE NORTHERN AND MOUNTAINOUS PORTION OF RANGE (B83COM01NA). MIGRATES THROUGH VARIOUS HABITATS, MAINLY ALONG RIDGES, LAKESHORES, & COASTLINES (B83NATO1NA).								
McCracken	BIRDS	<i>AIMOPHILA AESTIVALIS</i>	BACHMAN'S SPARROW	E	G3/SX7B	0	0	0	1	0
		OPEN PINE WOODS WITH SCATTERED BUSHES OR UNDERSTORY, BRUSHY OR OVERGROWN HILLSIDES, OVERGROWN FIELDS WITH THICKETS AND BRAMBLES, GRASSY ORCHARDS.								
McCracken	BIRDS	<i>ARDEA HERODIAS</i>	GREAT BLUE HERON	S	G5/S3B,S4N	0	0	1	0	0
		FRESHWATER AND BRACKISH MARSHES, ALONG LAKES, RIVERS, BAYS, LAGOONS, OCEAN BEACHES, MANGROVES, FIELDS, AND MEADOWS.								
McCracken	BIRDS	<i>CORVUS OSSIFRAGUS</i>	FISH CROW	S	G5/S3B	2	1	0	0	0
		BEACHES, BAYS, LAGOONS, INLETS, SWAMPS, NEAR MARSHES, AND, LESS FREQUENTLY, DECIDUOUS OR CONIFEROUS WOODLAND, IN INLAND SITUATIONS PRIMARILY IN BALDCYPRESS SWAMPS AND ALONG MAJOR WATERCOURSES, ALSO GARBAGE DUMPS.								
McCracken	BIRDS	<i>ICTINIA MISSISSIPPIENSIS</i>	MISSISSIPPI KITE	S	G5/S2B	1	0	0	0	0
		TALL FOREST, OPEN WOODLAND, PRAIRIE, SEMIARID RANGELAND, SHELTERBELTS, WOODED AREAS BORDERING LAKES AND STREAMS IN MORE OPEN REGIONS, SCRUBBY OAKS AND MESQUITE.								
McCracken	BIRDS	<i>LOPHODYTES CUCULLATUS</i>	HOODED MERGANSER	T	G5/S1S2B,S3S4N	0	1	0	0	0
		STREAMS, LAKES, SWAMPS, MARSHES, AND ESTUARIES; WINTERS MOSTLY IN FRESHWATER BUT ALSO REGULARLY IN ESTUARIES AND SHELTERED BAYS (B83COM01NA).								
McCracken	BIRDS	<i>RIPARIA RIPARIA</i>	BANK SWALLOW	S	G5/S3B	0	0	1	0	0
		OPEN AND PARTLY OPEN SITUATIONS, FREQUENTLY NEAR FLOWING WATER (B83COM01NA).								
McCracken	BIRDS	<i>TYTO ALBA</i>	BARN OWL	S	G5/S3	2	0	0	0	0
		OPEN AND PARTLY OPEN COUNTRY IN A WIDE VARIETY OF SITUATIONS, OFTEN AROUND HUMAN HABITATION (B83COM01NA). IN NORTHERN WINTER OFTEN ROOSTS IN DENSE CONIFERS, ALSO ROOSTS IN NEST BOXES IF AVAILABLE (B83MARD1NA).								

Data Current as of June 2002

County Report of Endangered, Threatened, and Special Concern Plants, Animals, and Natural Communities of Kentucky  
 Kentucky State Nature Preserves Commission

County	Taxonomic Group	Scientific name	Common name	Statuses	Ranks	# of Occurrences E H F X U
	HABITAT					
McCracken	BIRDS	<b>VIREO BELLII</b>	BELL'S VIREO	S	G5/S2S3B	1 1 0 0 0
		DENSE BRUSH, MESQUITE, STREAMSIDE THICKETS, AND SCRUB OAK, IN ARID REGIONS BUT OFTEN NEAR WATER (B83COM01NA); MOIST WOODLAND, BOTTONLANDS, WOODLAND EDGE, SCATTERED COVER AND HEDGEROWS IN CULTIVATED AREAS, OPEN WOODLAND, BRUSH IN WINT.				
McCracken	MAMMALS	<b>MYOTIS AUSTRORIPARIUS</b>	SOUTHEASTERN MYOTIS	E	G3G4/S1S2	1 0 0 0 0
		THE SOUTHEASTERN MYOTIS USES PRIMARILY CAVES FOR HIBERNACULA AND SUMMER MATERNITY AND ROOSTING SITES.				
McCracken	MAMMALS	<b>MYOTIS SODALIS</b>	INDIANA BAT	E/LE	G2/S1S2	1 0 0 0 0
		INDIANA BATS USE PRIMARILY CAVES FOR HIBERNACULA, ALTHOUGH THEY ARE OCCASIONALLY FOUND IN OLD MINE PORTALS.				
McCracken	MAMMALS	<b>NYCTICEIUS HUMERALIS</b>	EVENING BAT	T	G5/S2S3	3 0 0 0 0
		THE EVENING BAT IS A COLONIAL SPECIES THAT ROOSTS IN TREES AND HOUSES. IT APPARENTLY MIGRATES SOUTHWARD IN WINTER.				
McCracken	COMMUNITIES	<b>FLOODPLAIN RIDGE/TERRACE FOREST</b>		N	S1	1 0 0 0 0
McCracken	COMMUNITIES	<b>WET PRAIRIE</b>		N	S1	1 0 0 0 0



**EASTERN SHAWNEE TRIBE  
OF OKLAHOMA**

P.O. Box 350 • Seneca, MO 64865 • (918) 666-2435 • FAX (918) 666-3325

July 23, 2002

Department of Energy  
Gary S. Hartman, EIS Document Manager  
Oak Ridge Operations Office  
PO Box 2001  
Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37831

Re: Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant,  
McCracken County, Kentucky  
Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant,  
Pike County, Ohio


Dear Mr. Hartman:

Thank you for notice of the referenced project. The Eastern Shawnee Tribe of Oklahoma is currently unaware of any documentation directly linking Indian Religious Sites to the proposed construction. In the event any items falling under the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA) are discovered during construction, the Eastern Shawnee Tribe request notification and further consultation.

The Eastern Shawnee Tribe has no objection to the proposed construction. However, if any human skeletal remains and/or any objects falling under NAGPRA are uncovered during construction, the construction should stop immediately, and the appropriate persons, including state and tribal NAGPRA representatives contacted.

Sincerely,

  
Charles Enyart, Chief  
Eastern Shawnee Tribe of Oklahoma



**PEORIA TRIBE OF INDIANS OF OKLAHOMA**

118 S. Eight Tribes Trail (918) 540-2535 FAX (918) 540-2538  
P.O. Box 1527  
MIAMI, OKLAHOMA 74355

CHIEF  
John P. Froman

SECOND CHIEF  
Joe Goforth

July 26, 2002

Gary S. Hartman  
Department of Energy  
Oak Ridge Operations Office  
P. O. Box 2001  
Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37831

RE: DUF conversion facilities

Thank you for notice of the referenced project. The Peoria Tribe of Indians of Oklahoma is currently unaware of any documentation directly linking Indian Religious Sites to the proposed construction. In the event any items falling under the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA) are discovered during construction, the Peoria Tribe request notification and further consultation.

The Peoria Tribe has no objection to the proposed construction. However, if any human skeletal remains and/or any objects falling under NAGPRA are uncovered during construction, the construction should stop immediately, and the appropriate persons, including state and tribal NAGPRA representatives contacted.

John P. Froman  
Chief

xc: Bud Ellis, Repatriation/NAGPRA Committee Chairman

**OFFICIAL FILE COPY**  
**AMESQ**

Log No. 71278  
Date Received AUG 2 2002  
File Code \_\_\_\_\_

TREASURER  
LeAnne Reeves

SECRETARY  
Hank Downum

FIRST COUNCILMAN  
Claude Landers

SECOND COUNCILMAN  
Jenny Rampey

THIRD COUNCILMAN  
Jason Dollarhide



July 26, 2002

**TENNESSEE HISTORICAL COMMISSION**  
 DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND CONSERVATION  
 2941 LEBANON ROAD  
 NASHVILLE, TN 37243-0442  
 (615) 532-1550

Mr. Gary S. Hartman  
 Oak Ridge Operations/DP-80  
 Post Office Box 2001  
 Oak Ridge, Tennessee, 37831

RE: DOE, DUF MANAGEMENT/ETTP, OAK RIDGE, ANDERSON COUNTY

Dear Mr. Hartman:

In response to your request, received on Wednesday, July 24, 2002, we have reviewed the documents you submitted regarding your proposed undertaking. Our review of and comment on your proposed undertaking are among the requirements of Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act. This Act requires federal agencies or applicant for federal assistance to consult with the appropriate State Historic Preservation Office before they carry out their proposed undertakings. The Advisory Council on Historic Preservation has codified procedures for carrying out Section 106 review in 36 CFR 800. You may wish to familiarize yourself with these procedures (Federal Register, December 12, 2000, pages 77698-77739) if you are unsure about the Section 106 process.

Considering available information, we find that the project as currently proposed MAY AFFECT PROPERTIES THAT ARE ELIGIBLE FOR LISTING IN THE NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES. You should continue consultation with our office, designated consulting parties and invite them to participate in consultation, and provide us with appropriate survey documentation for review and comment. Please direct questions and comments to Joe Garrison (615) 532-1559. We appreciate your cooperation.

Sincerely,

Herbert L. Harper  
 Executive Director and  
 Deputy State Historic  
 Preservation Officer

HLH/jyg

OFFICIAL FILE COPY  
 AMESQ  
 Log No. 72373  
 Date Received AUG 8 2002  
 File Code \_\_\_\_\_



**United States Department of the Interior**

FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE

Ecological Services  
 6950 Americana Parkway, Suite H  
 Reynoldsburg, Ohio 43068-4127

(614) 469-6923/FAX (614) 469-6919  
 March 16, 2004

Dr. James L. Elmore  
 Oak Ridge Operations Office  
 Department of Energy  
 P.O. Box 2001  
 Oak Ridge, TN 37831

OFFICIAL FILE COPY  
 AMESQ

Log No. 151493  
 Date Received MAR 25 2004  
 File Code \_\_\_\_\_

Dear Dr. Elmore:

This is in response to your January 9, 2004 letter (which we received on February 10, 2004) and attached Biological Assessment of the Effects of Construction and Operation of a Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride Conversion Facility at the Portsmouth Site, January 2004, regarding informal consultation under section 7 of the Endangered Species Act for the proposed depleted uranium hexafluoride conversion facility at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant located in Pike County, Ohio.

In response to our September 23, 2002 letter, you prepared and submitted a Biological Assessment (BA). The BA addresses two species, the Indiana bat, a Federally listed endangered species which is listed in all 88 counties of Ohio, and the timber rattlesnake, which has not been assigned a Federal listing status, but the Service has initiated a pre-listing Conservation Action Plan to support State and local conservation efforts.

Your BA provides a thorough assessment of habitat for the above two species. The BA concludes that most of the site was found to have poor summer habitat for the Indiana bat because of the small size, isolation, and insufficient maturity of the few woodlands on the site. Potential summer habitat for the Indiana bat was identified and sampled during surveys conducted in 1994 and 1996. No Indiana bats were collected during those surveys. Nevertheless, the Department agreed that any unavoidable cutting of trees, associated with the proposed facility, with summer roost characteristics would be done between September 15 and April 15. Thus, the proposed action is not likely to adversely affect the Indiana bat. Also, the Department concludes that habitat for the timber rattlesnake is not present on the Portsmouth site; therefore, the propose action would not affect the rattlesnake species.

We concur with the Department of Energy's conclusion regarding the above two species. Regarding the Indiana bat, we recommend your continued efforts to avoid impacting summer bat habitat and/or enhance other areas which could be developed into good summer habitat. The Indiana bat surveys were conducted at least seven years ago; new surveys on the Portsmouth site could result in the capture of this species.

These comments have been prepared under the authority of the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act (48 Stat. 401, as amended; 16 U.S.C. 661 et seq.), the Endangered Species Act of 1973, as amended, and are consistent with the intent of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 and the U. S. Fish and Wildlife Service's Mitigation Policy.

If you have questions, or if we may be of further assistance in this matter, please contact Ken Lammers at extension 15 in this office.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Mary Knapp".

Mary Knapp, Ph.D.  
Supervisor

cc: ODNR, Div. of Wildlife, SCEA Unit, Columbus, OH  
ODNR, Div. of RELM, Columbus, OH  
Ohio EPA, Water Quality Monitoring, Columbus, OH

**United States Department of the Interior**

FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE

3761 GEORGETOWN ROAD

FRANKFORT, KY 40601

March 2, 2004

Mr. James L. Elmore, Ph.D.  
U.S. Department of Energy  
Oak Ridge Operations Office  
P.O. Box 2001  
Oak Ridge, Tennessee 37831

OFFICIAL FILE COPY  
AMESO  
Log No. 148070  
Date Received MAR 8 2004  
File Code

Subject: FWS #04-0582; Biological Assessment for the Indiana bat, Informal Consultation for the Proposed Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride Conversion Facility, McCracken County, Kentucky

Dear Dr. Elmore:

Thank you for your letter and enclosures transmitting a biological assessment (BA) for the federally endangered Indiana bat in association with the Proposed Depleted Uranium Hexafluoride Conversion Facility in McCracken County, Kentucky. Fish and Wildlife Service (Service) biologists have reviewed the document, and we offer the following comments.

Based on the information provided in the BA, tree clearing will be necessary in one of the three proposed facility construction locations. Of the proposed sites, Location A covers 35 acres, with approximately 10 acres of mature hardwood; Location B covers 59 acres, with the southern half occupied by mature hardwood forest; Location C is 53 acres, with its western half recently disturbed and occupied by young growth (trees and saplings). Once construction begins on the selected location, the facility will occupy approximately 10 acres with up to 45 acres potentially affected by construction activities.


The project area is known to have Indiana bat summer foraging and roosting habitat (of varying quality) in the vicinity. Indiana bats typically roost under exfoliating bark, in cavities of dead and live trees, and in snags (i.e. dead trees or dead portions of live trees). Trees in excess of 16 inches in diameter at breast height (DBH) are considered optimal for maternity colony roosts, but trees in excess of 9 inches DBH appear to provide suitable roosting habitat. Male Indiana bats have been observed roosting in trees as small as 3 inches DBH. The BA states that tree removal would occur between September 15<sup>th</sup> and April 15<sup>th</sup>. However, to be fully protective of Indiana bat summer roosting and foraging seasons, we recommend that trees only be removed between October 15<sup>th</sup> and March 31<sup>st</sup>. There are no known or suspected Indiana bat hibernacula within 10 miles of the project area, therefore, hibernacula mitigation measures will not be necessary.

Provided that tree and vegetation clearing occurs during the above-specified interval of October 15 to March 31, the Service concurs that the proposed action is "not likely to adversely affect"

the federally endangered Indiana bat. In view of this, we believe that the requirements of section 7 of the Endangered Species Act have been fulfilled for this project. Your obligations under section 7 must be reconsidered, however, if: (1) new information reveals that the proposed action may affect listed species in a manner or to an extent not previously considered, (2) the proposed action is subsequently modified to include activities which were not considered during this consultation, or (3) new species are listed or critical habitat designated that might be affected by the proposed action.

If you have any questions or if we can be of further assistance, please contact Anthony Velasco at (502)/695-0468 (ext.225).

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Virgil Lee Andrews, Jr." The signature is written in black ink and is positioned to the right of the typed name.

Virgil Lee Andrews, Jr.  
Field Supervisor

**APPENDIX H:  
CONTRACTOR DISCLOSURE STATEMENT**



**APPENDIX H:****CONTRACTOR DISCLOSURE STATEMENT**

Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) is the contractor assisting the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) in preparing the environmental impact statement (EIS) for depleted UF<sub>6</sub> conversion. DOE is responsible for reviewing and evaluating the information and determining the appropriateness and adequacy of incorporating any data, analyses, or results in the EIS. DOE determines the scope and content of the EIS and supporting documents and will furnish direction to ANL, as appropriate, in preparing these documents.

The Council on Environmental Quality's regulations (40 CFR 1506.5(c)), which have been adopted by DOE (10 CFR Part 1021), require contractors who will prepare an EIS to execute a disclosure specifying that they have no financial or other interest in the outcome of the project. The term "financial interest or other interest in the outcome of the project" for the purposes of this disclosure is defined in the March 23, 1981, "Forty Most Asked Questions Concerning CEQ's National Environmental Policy Act Regulations," 46 *Federal Register* 18026-18028 at Questions 17a and 17b. Financial or other interest in the outcome of the project includes "any financial benefit such as promise of future construction or design work on the project, as well as indirect benefits the consultant is aware of (e.g., if the project would aid proposals sponsored by the firm's other clients)," 46 *Federal Register* 18026-18038 at 10831.

In accordance with these regulations, Argonne National Laboratory hereby certifies that it has no financial or other interest in the outcome of the project.

Certified by:

  
Signature

Anthony J. Dvorak

Name

Director, Environmental Assessment Division

Title

6/10/02  
Date

