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States Assessments Intelligence Brief

17998

Denuclearizing Ukraine: Potential Bumps in the Trilateral Road (U)

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Abstract

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Terms of the Trilateral Statement

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The Russian Federation

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Compensation for the U-235: A Straight Exchange

Ukraine

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[1] *Trilateral Statement by the Presidents of U.S., Russia, and Ukraine*, January 1994, U.S. Department of State Dispatch Supplement, Vol. 5, No. 1. (U)

[2] *Russian-Ukrainian Accord Implementing Trilateral Nuclear Agreement*, State Cable 141047Z February 1994, American Embassy, Moscow. (S)

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Ukraine's Energy Problems

The Trilateral Offers Limited Help For Ukraine's Reactor Needs

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[3] *Implementation of the Trilateral Statement: Ukraine*

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Geopolitical Factors

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Ukraine's Energy Dependence on Russia: Opportunity for Coercion

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Russian Assertiveness Toward the CIS

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[9] *Status of Debt/Gas Supply Talks with Ashgabat and Moscow,* State Cable 181517Z January 1995, American Embassy, Kiev. (C)

[10] *Deputy Minister Deems Russian Stand on Fleet 'Annexation'*, Kiev Intelnews, December 27, 1994 . (U)

[11] Vladimir Socor, *Military Bloc Foreseen,* RFE/RL Daily Report, November 20, 1994 . (U)

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12 Vladimir Socor, *Joint Borders, Troop Deployments*, RFE/RL Daily Report, November 20, 1994 . (U)

13 This pressure could be interpreted as violating the terms of the Trilateral Accord. (U)

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[14] *Grozniy—Ukrainian Reaction*, State Cable 281557Z December 1994, American Embassy, Kiev. (C)

[15] Were Crimea to erupt, Russia could be drawn into a violent conflict which would almost certainly produce a negative effect on Trilateral implementation. (U)

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