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4.

After JAW had found by contact with Berger that he was willing to go to the meeting the following day, Miss Margaret Murray, secretary at Project Matterhorn, called the local station of the Pennsylvania Railroad in Princeton to make reservations on the night sleeper from Philadelphia to Washington for both potential participants in the conference of the following day. Use of this night sleeper was in the past, and continues to be the standard practice of JAW as a means to get to meetings in Washington early in the morning, without loss of three hours of working time by going during the day. The meeting at ERL was scheduled to begin at 8 a.m., identical with the hour of commencement of a previous meeting there which JAW had attended some weeks before. This circumstance made it particularly to the point to go by train. A single sleeping car handles the Philadelphia to Washington night service. It had already been discovered on previous occasions that this sleeper has no roomettes; only upper and lower berths and a compartment. This compartment was sold to someone on the night in question. The Princeton railroad station did not have time to secure an answer on space to Washington before the close of business of Project Matterhorn on Tuesday, January 6, so JAW made plans to stop by the local ticket office on his way home.

5. Loss of document en route.

It is appropriate to begin this account by reciting details of the receipt of the document the preceding day. Mail for Project Matterhorn, both classified and unclassified, arrives at the Princeton Post Office under the address P. O. Box 451, which is listed under the name of Project Matterhorn. The Post Office gives up mail only to a restricted list of people, approved by Project Matterhorn, and in addition only to someone who has the key to the mail box. This key is kept within the guarded confines of Project Matterhorn with a mail sack which itself has a padlock and key. The guard does not have a key to the padlock. One key is kept by Miss Murray, the secretary at Project Matterhorn, and the other key is kept by the Princeton Post Office. The normal practice, as also on the morning of January fifth, was and continues to be for the guard to go the two miles into the Princeton Post Office about 9 a.m., and to get back with the mail about 9:30 a.m. Thereupon he departs and the mail bag is opened by Miss Murray. Registered mail having to do with the AEC she gives to the document custodian, Mrs. Chrystine Shack. All the operations of these two persons and all their normal work are carried on in the same room, where also the safes are kept. This room is next to and opens into JAW's office. In the mail on the morning/~~January fifth~~ was /of Jan. 5 the document in question from the Joint Congressional Committee. Miss Murray/~~reports~~ that the envelope bore on its outside the notation "personal", and that she gave it to the document custodian, Mrs. Shack, with the comment that Mrs. Shack should check with JAW how to handle. Mrs. Shack has a postal registry slip with a notation that the item in question was personal and that she gave it to JAW. JAW deposited the item in his safe without

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Junction-Princeton-Philadelphia and first-class ticket and pullman ticket for Philadelphia-Washington leg. During this transaction JAW had manila envelope lying on marble ledge of ticket counter with one hand over manila envelope.

About 5:20 p.m. JAW took manila envelope and tickets from railroad station one half block to Studsbaker garage to pick up car which had been serviced during day. To best of recollection car was sitting in street with keys over visor. Drove one mile home from station with envelope sitting on seat in car beside self. Picked up wife, according to previous arrangement, to go to home of Professor S. Bochner, one quarter mile from home, in pursuance of Bochner invitation to stop in for sherry before their forthcoming departure for California. JAW held envelope during this visit of about three quarter hour duration at Bochner home. Contents of envelope were not discussed, but obvious presence of envelope led into discussion of clearance investigations (Professor Bochner had been cleared for, and had participated in Project Matterhorn.). There was no occasion to discuss any classified information nor would it have been possible, as the place was not appropriate and, in addition, Mrs. Bochner is not cleared.

About 6:30 p.m. returned home with wife and document, had dinner, bag. /This pocket is sewed to cover of bag.  
/having secured packed suitcase, and at approximately 8:35 p.m. called Blackie Taxi. Bag  
catch but no is approximately 5" x 15" x 2 1/4". Manila envelope containing documents was  
key lock placed in pocket, inside bag, [redacted] Contents/ included /of bag  
shaving things, pajamas, and about two four-inch piles of accumulated /reading also  
/read matter. It was the intention to / [redacted] of most, if not all, of this matter /un-  
on the coach sectors of the trip to and from Washington. The material [redacted] class:  
consisted of [redacted] reprints, copies of Science magazine, the Economist, and the Physical fied  
Review. The classified material was not referred to between 4:50 p.m. & 10:10 p.m.

It was necessary to sit in the coach of the Princeton-Princeton Junction shuttle train about five minutes before the 8:56 p.m. departure of that train. JAW occupied about the fifth seat from the rear on the left-hand side, sat with bag on his knees forming a work table, going through some of the reading material he had brought along. [redacted] Neither on this leg, nor on either of the other two legs of the coach trip, was the brown envelope opened or removed from its special place within the bag. [redacted] However, it was easy to see, and was seen on raising the lid, that the envelope rested in its proper place.

The only other passengers on the shuttle were a middle aged couple on the right-hand side, about eight seats from the rear, and a drunken colored woman in the forward part of the car performed various antics in the aisle to the obvious embarrassment of this couple. On arrival at Princeton Junction, about 9:01 p.m., JAW looked through the waiting room window and saw inside Dr. Jay Berger, obviously en route to the next morning's conference with Krause. To avoid getting into conversation with him, which would destroy the working utility of the trip from Princeton Junction to Philadelphia, JAW refrained from going in and instead

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again through wash room. Removed all cushions from seat and back of sections 9 where I had slept and 6 where I had sat in morning searching for paper. Continued search until last minute before car moved out of station about 7:45 a.m. Got name of porter and information how to secure assistance of pullman lost and found.

Went with suitcase and Berger through all eating places in Union Station looking for two well remembered passengers who had been in wash room, hoping to establish contact with them and get guidance or assistance in search for missing paper, or at least their names and addresses. Found them neither in quick lunch counter, nor in either of two Gateway Restaurants in Union Station. Left Berger at Gateway breakfast counter guarding suitcase and ordering breakfast for two, and went to lost and found division in station where reported loss and emphasized importance of missing paper and asked that search be made for it. About 8:15 a.m. rejoined Berger at breakfast counter. Completed breakfast about 8:25 a.m. Already late for Krause conference. Had decided to abandon Krause conference until document situation was brought under control. Proceeded with Berger to Office of Joint Congressional Committee to report loss of document and review with appropriate authorities whatever could be done to regain control of it. Phoned Mr. John Walker from JCC offices. Joint Committee security officer, Mr. Frank Cotter, appeared in about five minutes. Situation was quickly reviewed with him. Suitcase was taken into guarded premises and all papers spread out for search through for missing letter. This was about the third search of these papers. Similar and more thorough searches were made in the course of the day.

Proceeded with Mr. Cotter and Mr. Berger to pullman yards, perhaps a mile from Union Station, and searched again in great detail through car without results, except to locate old issues of Science magazine and other already read material which JAW had discarded in period around 7:10 a.m.

Spent rest of day until about 3:30 p.m. at offices of JCC reviewing steps as above reported, answering questions, etc. Had called Krause in course of early morning to report that it was unlikely that JAW would be able to attend meeting.

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7. Nature of document and its classification.

two The Walker document consisted of a covering letter from himself, of ~~three~~ pages of text in blue type on bond paper written in the same style as the more extensive document shown to me by Mr. Walker and Mr. Mansfield on December seventeenth and ~~two~~ pages of onion skin carbon copy material extracted from an earlier report which had dealt, not with the thermonuclear

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11.

program, but with the program of conventional atomic weapons. This material was classified as secret. This question has since been twice asked JAW whether the document in question should not have been classified as top secret. If JAW had been the originator of the document, and had been responsible for classifying it, in the light of instructions given on this subject by Los Alamos the document would have been classified in the same category as that which it actually had, secret. The four items which render a document top secret by Los Alamos standards\* are: (a) Production rates of critical materials; (b) Complete description of an entire gadget including drawings with diagrams, electronic details, etc.; (c) Overall picture of U.S. atomic potential: such items as weapon stockpile, distribution of ready weapons among types, etc.; (d) Time schedule of dates at which U.S. will arrive at important and well defined steps in its military capability. By none of these standards did the document come into the top secret category. The document did include reference to the notion of primer implosion, since one of the principal points at issue was the correlation between the ideas as now used and the ideas as discussed in the Klaus Fuchs period. The description of primer implosion given in the document was, however, of quite a qualitative character and much less ~~useful~~ useful to a finder than the information given in typical Project Matterhorn monthly reports. These reports deal with radiation implosion and its advantages as a regular thing. They are always classified as secret and sent to Los Alamos on this basis. The loss to enemy hands of any one of these monthly reports, like that of any other material classified secret would, of course, be a serious matter and, in particular, the loss of the Walker letter is a serious item for U.S. national security.

8. Personal analysis of potential importance to an enemy power information in document.

A reconstruction of the Walker letter was brought to Princeton at JAW's request by Mr. Frank Cotter and Mr. Paul Hamilton of the staff of the Joint Committee on the afternoon of Friday, 27th February.

From the standpoint of potential revelation of information the most important parts of the document appear to be the following:

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\* JAW went over once again the question what makes a document top secret in a special discussion at Los Alamos on 17 February. The occasion was the question how to give the Project Matterhorn final report the broadest possible perspective without making it Top Secret. Two associate directors of the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory, Ralph Carlisle Smith and Darol Froman, gave the four stated criteria any one of which raised a document to the top secret category.

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JAW also reviewed the text to try to determine what pencil notes he made in the margin. It was difficult to gain a proper mental attitude for meditation about the letter and to reconstruct the atmosphere of freedom from interruption which had existed on the original reading of the document in the train, because of the press of things to do and interruptions at Project Matterhorn on the afternoon of February 27th. Consequently the following reconstruction of the original pencil notes is meant to be merely indicative of their general nature and not in any sense guaranteed to be a detailed repetition of what was written in the margin. These notations did not raise the classification of the document from secret to top secret. The notations were made by penciling through words in the text and drawing lines out to the margin and writing there the appropriate proposal or suggestion.

p. 1 - cover letter - no notes believed to have been made.

p. 2 - first page of main text on bond paper - last paragraph on this page - JAW believes he made a half sentence marginal note on this paragraph, but does not now recall its nature since it is not directly suggested by the text. Also: Change "par" to "pure" in next to last sentence.

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The idea had not yet arisen to use radiation implosion, under somewhat different theoretical conditions, strongly to compress ..." Next paragraph - insert after Lithium-6; "discussed motives and methods for imploding the main charge of deuterium in the super;" (may have added also references to one or two other items in the report, but do not now remember whether, and if so, which.)

p. 4 - Carbon sheet; second paragraph of section dated April 4 - after "Dr. Teller in 1951" change rest of sentence to read "is difficult to trace or to compare with the possible course of Russian thinking." Next paragraph - respell "compressions".

p. 5 - Carbon page containing only one paragraph. Respell "compressors" as "compressions"; insert period after "implosion".

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13.

It is concluded that the following deductions could be drawn by a potential enemy who knows how to make conventional atomic bombs, but who has not yet cracked the thermonuclear field:

- (1) U.S. is on the way to a successful thermonuclear weapon.
- (2) There are several varieties of the thermonuclear weapon conceived to be practical.
- (3) Lithium-6 is useful.
- (4) Compression is useful.
- (5) Radiation heating provides a way to get compression.

Of these points it would seem that the first four are probably known anyway to any intelligent group. Consequently the qualitative idea of radiation implosion -- whatever that may mean, for the text is not very specific -- is the most important revelation. It is difficult to assess the importance of this notion without knowing the present state of thinking of a Russian like Landau. The revelation could conceivably be very important indeed.

#### 9. Conclusion.

(a) There is 99% probability that the document disappeared in pullman car 101 of the Pennsylvania Railroad between 10:30 p.m. Tuesday, January 6, and 7:15 a.m. Wednesday, January 7, as stated by JAW.

~~case in which~~ (b) The time and manner of the loss is not known, nor is it known whether the word theft is more or less appropriate than the word loss.

(c) The possession of the document would give an enemy power the idea that U.S. advances in the thermonuclear field depend in an important way on getting high fuel compression via radiative implosion. Short of success of manifold espionage attempts a potential enemy can have no indication of the importance attached to these notions by the U.S. except through the earlier discussions in which Fuchs took part, or the qualitative deductions from newspaper reports of the past year and a half.

(d) It is the conservative thing to assume that the information in question is indeed in the hands of a potential enemy, regardless of the alternative possibility of simple loss.

(e) Additional incentive, therefore, exists for the U.S. to increase its effort in the weapons field.

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