



Jack Howard

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through covert (concealed from Admiral Guest) liaison between AF and Navy EOD personnel that the appropriate information was available when #4 was brought up.

1. Plutonium problem treated too lightly at first. Capt. Pizutto of DNS fought this tendency. Arrival of Spanish JEN (AEC) officials started things rolling.
2. Security around #3 point was not the best. Access on road was barred but not access through fields. Local people were picking beans in patch very close to #3 second or third morning after accident.
3. Air Force Attitude toward AEC Team

Col. Gernert and DNS

Offered to transport AEC team (accepted).

Cooperation on all points.

Understood AEC consultant and investigative roles.

Acted as go-between with 16th AF during first days.

Very good working relationship during final days.

Col. Rhodes (SAC Hqtrs.)

Informed us of weapon condition on our arrival.

Arranged for our contact with weapon sites as soon as possible.

Maj. Gen. Wilson & Staff

No contact for first few days, all done through Col. Gernert.

After first theories of #4 fate:

We sat in on staff meetings.

We were chief theorists for search meetings.

This arrangement continued through the period of ground search.

After #4 was found, Sandia participation in finale was requested by Gen. Wilson.

EOD Teams

Here was immediate understanding of each other's roles, and good cooperation.

In summary, the Air Force relationship to the AEC team varied quite a bit at first from group to group, but became one of sustained cooperation over the whole period on the scene.

4. Air Force - Navy Liaison

The only real liaison between the two services was between the two flag officers. This suffered from the generalities imposed by such a relationship and from the infrequent meetings of the two.

A typical example is the attempt to get the working types together to help implement the Sec. Def. request for a press review of the recovered weapon. A message went from 16th AF to CTF-65 requesting that the EOD officer come ashore to discuss the crucial time at lift and thereafter. The return message read in part, "My EOD officer cannot come ashore at this time." No opening was made for any later time either.

A chance meeting with Lt. Cdr. Moody, when Lt. Col. Neal, DNS and I went out to deliver gear to the AF EOD sergeants aboard the USS Hoist, led to a lot of points being cleared up and an instant rapport when we got together again when the item came aboard.

The holding back of information by the Navy from the Air Force (like the actual find) caused friction which was ridiculous

considering the priority and pressure given to the overall operation.

5. My understanding of the unfollowed track story is as follows:

The track on the bottom was found by the Alvin crew about March 1. They thought it was promising and Sam Moore (SC) also said so after detailed discussion with Capt. Andrews (USN, ret) who was aboard Alvin. They were refused permission to return to it, day after day. As told me by Lt. Cdr. Mooney, in charge of the submersible, the day it was found was going to be an off day for the Alvin because of bench testing of some new gear. Cdr. Mooney took an hour convincing Admiral Guest, not without difficulty, that the Alvin should investigate the track. On the first try they followed the track and found the bomb. This was 14 days after the track was first discovered.

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6. AEC had no word in the recovery of #4, that is, pulling it aboard ship from the bottom. An example of the situation: On April 9, on the plane from Madrid to New York, Lt. Cdr. Mooney, whom I had just met, asked me why we had not given them any word about the lift lugs and the possibility of grabbing them. I showed him the draft of a message I had prepared about March 25 requesting that further pictures be taken of the lug and rack area because of the possibility of grabbing. This message was not sent because Gen. Wilson did not want to tell the Navy how to do their job and although I was speaking for AEC, Gen. Wilson had invited me back to Spain and it would be his message.

7. CTF-65 attitude toward AEC was - don't call us, we'll call you. Most of the contact with the Navy was through the Air Force. The only direct request for AEC assistance or consultation was when W. E. Griffith AEC/ALO was called out to look at photos of the underwater object. Unfortunately, his enthusiasm was not appreciated by Admiral Guest. With all the pressure behind the recovery effort, Admiral Guest would not let the submersible crews know what they were looking for. When Griffith and AF sergeants Nowak and Grimmet talked to the Alvin crew about particular external details (pressure valve access plate, blue velocity switch cover bubbles, etc.) the resulting confirmation gave a very high probability that the object was the missing weapon and of course it was. Admiral Guest's reaction was one of apparent embarrassment and he later told Gen. Wilson (who told me) that he had been mad because the meeting violated security and he had not been consulted before. The fact of the matter was that Griffith had been called to the flagship earlier that day and the meeting with the Alvin crew and any AF representatives Gen. Wilson wished to send was arranged at that time. The pictures were to be sent to the ship where the Alvin crew was but they weren't. Thus the fruitful discussion between the knowledgeable people and those that had seen the object took place. Disclosure of unclassified external details did not violate security.



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UNCLASSIFIED

CLASSIFICATION CANCELLED  
PER DOC REVIEW JAN. 1973

July 31, 1944

2 Aug

To: R. Cornog

From: F. Birch

Subject: Gun development program. (u)

~~SECRET~~ UNCLASSIFIED

- I. Target Assembly (blind target assembly at 1000 ft/sec).
  - A. Target (case, tamper, insert).
  - B. Projectile (active material, tamper, base).
  - C. Initiator.



DOE  
b(3)

II. Gun.

- A. Ballistic and strength tests.
- B. Strength of gun-target system (free recoil, with open and blind targets).
- C. Seating of projectile and target insert.
- D. Drop tests.

III. Fuse Tests.

- A. Ground.
- B. Drop tests with dummy gun.
- C. Drop tests with real gun, inactive material.

IV. Engineering of outer case and accessory parts as bomb. (Suspension, tail, antenna, safety devices, etc.)

V. Preparation and assembly of active material for projectile and insert (collaboration with Metallurgy and Experimental Physics.)

VI. Delivery (shipping, field assembly, protection in flight).

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NAME: Spencer J. ...	3. CONTAINS NO DOE CLASSIFIED INFO
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Daniel ...  
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10/2/02  
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F. Birch

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